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New Series

The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*
Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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
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The Rise of American Nationalism

Lucio Levi

The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon five years ago on September 11, 2001, are now generally perceived as an historic event which marked the beginning of a new era in world politics. The principal characteristic of this new era is the loss of US invulnerability, demonstrated by the actions of an international terrorist organization; that is, a global non-state actor. Even though the main target was the US, the terrorist bombings in Madrid and London show that all the West is under attack and, besides the West, also moderate Islamic countries, such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia and so forth.

What is new is the fact that the threat to our security does not come from another state: this enemy hides within our own societies. And yet, the obsession with terrorism has pushed the US to use the same tools against a non-state actor as those usually utilized against states. Hence, the misleading expression "war on terrorism". The stated goal of eradicating international terrorism is far from being reached, although to date the campaign has lasted one year more than WWI and one year less than WWII.

The American response to terrorism is based on nationalism, unilateralism and war. While Europe is progressively giving up nationalism, on the opposite coast of the Atlantic Ocean the US is promoting institutions and policies which reproduce the same evolution toward power centralization, authoritarianism and militarism which was characteristic of the history of the European great powers during the 19th and 20th centuries until 1945. In Iraq, far from being welcomed as a liberation army, American troops

are perceived by the population as the vehicle of a foreign mastery. The growing influence of insurgency in Afghanistan shows that a similar process is in progress in that country too. In the world now taking shape in this era of globalization, US foreign policy looks like the vestige of a bygone age.

The main justification for the Iraqi war – to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – has been proven groundless. The subsequent justification – the exportation of democracy to the Middle East – has been demolished by the revelation of abuse and torture in the Abu Ghraib prison. Moreover, the occupation of Iraq paved the way to terrorism, which was an unknown phenomenon there before the war.

Nor is this all. The struggle against terrorism has proved to be the occasion for an authoritarian turning point in the US, the world's oldest democracy. The new powers conferred by the Patriot Act have enabled the government to restrict individual freedom and to erode the structures established for the protection of human rights against arbitrary state action. The government can now suspend the right of *habeas corpus* for non-citizens suspected of being connected with terrorism and detain them indefinitely without trial. The Patriot Act permits intelligence activities to infringe the right to privacy and gives unprecedented powers to listen, read and monitor US citizens' activities. Another blatant abuse of power are the so-called extraordinary renditions, i.e. the arrest of suspected terrorists and their transport to foreign countries for imprisonment

and interrogation, in order to shun US laws prescribing due process and prohibiting torture. The notorious Guantanamo camp in Cuba, where prisoners are denied the right to challenge their detention in court, is only one example.

In order to prevent terrorists from entering the US and enhance border security, new barriers to restrict international mobility have been instituted. The US is abandoning the cultural flexibility which allowed it to integrate and assimilate millions of immigrants. Now it is blocking claims for citizenship from among the eleven million immigrants without legal status. The tendency towards strengthening the cohesion of the American people has pushed the government to declare English as the national language of the US. The decision to build a wall along the US-Mexico border recalls the Great Wall of China, which was built to withstand the pressure of nomadic populations. Lastly, the Homeland Security Act established a new Department, namely a Ministry of Internal Affairs – the type of ministry which used to be typical of the centralized states of the European continent with their illiberal and police traditions.

More than 200 years ago Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist Papers* that “Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. ... Nations the most attached to liberty [are compelled] to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free”. This is the lesson he learnt from observing the policy of countries on the European continent.

He was able to foresee that, because of its

isolation and the lack of prominent military pressures on its borders, the US would not need to develop any imposing military machinery, nor an oppressive police apparatus like those of the continental powers of Europe. Until the World Wars, therefore, the US did not pursue (except for the wars against Mexico and Spain) power politics, but confined itself mostly to preventing foreign countries from invading its territory. The navy was sufficient for this task. Nor was there any need to control citizens’ and foreign residents’ lives for security reasons.

Yet today, owing to the threat of international terrorism, the US is embarking on the same course of action followed in the past by the continental powers of Europe. US nationalism is the symptom of a dangerous illness, which is the effect of the overload of responsibilities lying on the federal government. Following the European nation-state model – after a delay of two centuries – it is trying to build a homogeneous and closed society based on the adoption of one single language, the fortification of its borders, and suspicion of foreigners who are considered as potential enemies.

If the ultimate cause of the American nationalism lies at the international level, it is here that the remedy must be sought. The defeat of American nationalism and the evolution of the world toward a more peaceful situation can be best assured by the mutual checks created by a balance of forces. The new forces which are emerging in the world states system should convince the US that alone it cannot prevail over terrorism. Only by co-operation among the most responsible countries in the struggle against terrorism, within a strengthened and democratized United Nations, can world peace be achieved.

The True Illusions

Barbara Spinelli

When the newly-elected President of the Italian Republic made reference, on the island of Ventotene, to the birth of the European unification project, many were probably wondering: how did that idea come about, how did it become the dominant idea of a continent, and how did it enter the lives of all of us in the form not only of a promise or a remorse for unaccomplished things, but also in the form of so many laws that nowadays have prevalence over national laws. There is to wonder why we insist in giving to that idea the name, noble but shaky, of a dream. Giorgio Napolitano vividly recalled what then, in the midst of a war between Europeans, seemed a fancy born in the minds of three anti-fascist confined men – Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, Eugenio Colorni. Indeed, so was considered what they envisaged: the birth of a Europe where there will never again be wars, and where a fundamental conviction regarding the nation-States will take roots. The nation-States had dugged their own grave, by transforming their absolute State sovereignties into a mutual annihilation weapon, and finally into a self-annihilation one. As in a Greek tragedy, from sorrow and guilt a lesson was to come out, which will lead Europe to a new life. This was the catharsis proposed as a remedy in the Ventotene Manifesto.

To a close look, it was a quite special dream. It was more similar to a prophetic vision of a man looking for the unconfessed roots of his present time, and sketching on what he found the possible reality of tomorrow. It was supported by a very strong awareness of reality – which always imposes on one's political aspirations

the respect of the conditions of the real world – and hence by a deeply-rooted practical sense, based on the experience and the memory of countless European wars. If it continued to be defined as a dream or utopia, it is because the States wanted that that be the general consideration of it, necessary for safeguarding their absolute national sovereignties. But it was not so for the founders of the Community: Adenauer, Monnet, Schuman, De Gasperi had clear in their minds the tragic sequel of Europe's history, and considered the Union to be essential in practice, not only desirable as an Utopia. But the guardians of nationalism did not cease for decades to fight it with convenient expedients. Since the beginning, their main weapon has been to define the European adventure as an illusion, talked of as a thing of the past, like other Utopias.

It would be worth reading again the papers that James Hamilton and John Jay wrote between the autumn of 1787 and the spring of 1788 in *The Federalist* under the pen-name of Publius, when there was to ratify the American Constitution approved by the Philadelphia Convention on September 17, 1787. In the sixth paper, Hamilton explains where the true illusions, the true "Utopian speculations", lie. Who was cherishing them were not the federalists, but their opponents, who supported the inviolable sovereignty of the thirteen American states or, at the most, partial confederations. Hamilton is stern: they believe possible "a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood". They share the unwise optimism of those who

believe that a republican spirit is substantially peaceful ("There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars"). Reading Publius helps us reveal the deception of an Utopia that usually wraps itself in the mantle of a pragmatic respectability: "Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?", Hamilton writes.

Also for today's Europe that is true. Certainly those who see in the post-war founding principles something noble but no longer attracting are right: just because the Union partly exists already, it is not easy to contemplate new wars among Europeans. But that is not a reason for the European project to be seen as an Utopian desire, an old rhetoric for a world that does not exist. The threats from which the idea of Europe was born are still present, only their names and the challenges have changed: they are called globalized economy, terrorism, scarcity and political use of energy. Today like yesterday the individual States cannot face them alone, and their rulers know it even when they are reluctant to delegate sovereignty. If they could look into their own history, they would know that theirs is not even real sovereignty: it is a shadow what they are clinging to. It is an illusion, as described in Abbagnano's Dictionary of Philosophy: "an erroneous appearance that does not cease when it is recognized as such (...) it is like seeing kinked a stick immersed in the water". By delegating decision-making powers to Europe, the States can regain a sovereignty that they have lost today.

Therefore it is for a sense of reality that we have to make Europe and give it a capacity to govern, just like in the Forties and Fifties. It is for a practical spirit that it is urgent to have a Union ready to act even when there is not unanimous agreement, instead of a Union

blocked by the right of veto. Once again it is the historical experience that demands this, as called for by a prophetic dream, founded however on rationality. Today it is the nation-State to be under an illusion, when it pretends to be non-vulnerable and even wraps itself in the mantle of *real-politik* and pragmatism. The democratic rhetoric itself is a conjuring exercise, that risks to hide reality. Of course it is essential that Europe be accepted by the peoples. But without an efficient government it makes no sense to put that necessity as a priority: without a government, Europe may well be more democratic, but absolutely without any weight.

This too is a valuable lesson that comes from the American federalists of 1700. The generous democratic bursts may turn into a "torrent of angry and malignant passions"; "an over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people" may turn into "mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good", Publius says in *The Federalist*. The dangerous ambition is the one of those who "lurk behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people", not of those who, taking the harder route, are concerned "for the firmness and efficiency of government" (Hamilton, Paper No. 1). Democracy, under certain conditions, may even become a deceit. The referendums on the adhesion of Turkey, promised in France and Austria, are in effect a way for expressing the right of veto by individual States over Europe's future foreign policy. More than respected, the peoples are thus made instruments.

A realistic dream of the Union is today the Constitution, and it is not by chance that it too is declared dead, as happens for Utopias condemned by reality. The two referenda in France and the Netherlands in May-June 2005 would have ditched the idea of a suitable European government, able to complement the national governments. Of course it is advisable to do something, waiting

Comments

for France to elect a new Head of State in 2007; something pragmatic with the existing treaties, said the President of the Commission Barroso, proposing – in view of the European Summit on June 15 – a common security policy, domestic and against terrorism. But it will not be enough, as long as the decisional powers in Europe will not be made clearer, besides being shared, and only a Constitution can do that. If possible, a Constitution approved this time by all the peoples simultaneously.

This project too is not illusive, and who has already ratified the constitutional Treaty knows it. Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she does not intend to give up: the German people and many other countries have voted for the Constitution, therefore the project cannot be dumped by some nations with easy presumption. Fifteen States out of 25 have ratified it (soon they will be 16, with Finland) and this means that a majority wants the Constitution. Also a majority of citizens – about 250 millions out of 450 – wants it. Reviving the realistic dream means to start from here, from this Europe that has already expressed herself by a majority for a working European government and for a continent that

shall have a greater weight in the globalized economy and in an effective international policy. It is necessary to take into account those who are unsatisfied and denounce the faults of the Union, but also those who strongly want to complete the Union and give it a Constitution. To go back would be not only illusory, it would be a betrayal and a breach of the agreements, because all the governments have committed themselves to bring the Treaty to ratification in two years, when they signed it on October 29, 2004. It is important that Italy has got again a government team that has supported this project and is willing to even improve on it (for example, by abolishing the paragraph of the Treaty that requires a unanimous vote for constitutional revisions): President Napolitano will continue on this matter the struggle of former President Ciampi, and others will join in, starting with Prime Minister Prodi, who proposed an even more advanced constitutional Treaty – the Penelope Project – when he was President of the Commission. At that point it will indeed be a very good thing to revive the realistic dreams and put an end to the utopian national illusions: illusions that do not cease even when they are acknowledged as such.

Europe vs. USA: Whose Economy Wins?

George Irvin

Many Europeans are deeply ambivalent about the economic performance of the European Union. "The EU was meant to bring us a golden future, but instead it has brought us stagnation, unemployment and social discontent" has become a familiar refrain. What is worse, lest we abandon our relentless pessimism, our eternally optimistic American friends excel at reminding us that they are richer, enjoy faster growth with lower unemployment and are generally better off in every way. Lots of sensible folk buy into this story; but is it borne out by the facts? The right answer is not a simple yes or no, so let me explain.

In what sense is the US richer?

Average gross domestic product (GDP) in the US is about 40% higher than average GDP of the EU-15 when measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). The gap is slightly greater if we consider either the twelve Eurozone members (EU-12) or add the accession states (EU-25). Although GDP is a poor indicator of measure of welfare or happiness, let's agree to use it for the sake of comparison.

The main reason the US is richer is, first of all, because a higher proportion of Americans are in employment and, secondly, they work about 20% more hours per year than Europeans. When we adjust for both these factors and look at GDP in 2005 per person per hour worked, there is virtually no difference between Germany, France and the US.

Economists often speak of this as revealing different American and European social

preferences for work and leisure. In truth, both the employment rate and how long the average person works are explained mainly by political history. Until the late 1970s total hours worked were falling both in Europe and in the USA; since then, total hours worked have continued to fall in the EU-15 but have risen again in the US. Equally, if we look at employment data by age group, Americans join the work force earlier and leave it far later than Europeans. The key to understanding why this has happened is the change in US income distribution over the past 30 years. Since 1979, the bottom 40% of income earners in the US has been trading water, while the bottom 20% has become poorer. US workers have needed to put in more years and longer hours simply to maintain their real income position.

Who has Faster Growth?

Does the US grow faster than the EU? Again, the answer depends on what we measure. When we compare the growth rate of GDP of the US and the EU-15, the US rate averaged over the past decade is about 1.2 percentage points higher than that of the EU-15 (oddly, the difference is slightly smaller if we use the EU-25). But the usual measure of growing prosperity is GDP per head; i.e., if GDP grows at 2% but population grows at 3%, then GDP per head is falling! US population growth is a full percentage point higher than that of the EU-15, mainly because US immigration in the past decade has been higher. Expressed on a per capita basis, GDP growth rates in the US and the EU are virtually the same over the past decade. The same is true of labour productivity growth.

What is also true is that since the 2001 recession, the US has bounced back faster than the EU. At present, both GDP growth per head and labour productivity are growing faster in the US. But recent US productivity gains are concentrated in distribution rather than manufacturing, and US growth continues to pull in more imports than it produces exports, resulting in a growing external deficit – funded in part by the EU current account surplus.


On the EU-15 side, lower growth is reflected in a high and prolonged average rate of unemployment, which has remained about three points above that of the US for some time. Equally, looking at the disaggregated data, some EU-15 countries have done better than others over the past decade in terms of prosperity and unemployment; e.g., the UK, Ireland and the Nordic countries. But these differences exist for quite different reasons and, equally important, we do not normally disaggregate US data to compare growth in (say) North Dakota and California.

Employment and Unemployment

Perhaps the most common argument is that contrasting the job-creating virtues of the US ‘flexible’ labour market with the sclerotic state of the EU, where unemployment is persistently high. Economics students attending US university (and increasingly those in the EU as well) learn that because EU labour is supplied at an artificially high wage rate, equilibrium employment in the EU is lower and unemployment higher.

Now while it is true that the US has a better employment and unemployment record, the key to understanding the difference between the EU and the US lies in disaggregating employment by age group. If we compare employment rates in 2005 of the 25-55 age group, there is virtually no difference; e.g., the employment rates are 86 and 88 percent for the EU-15 and the US respectively (ignoring differences in how the data are recorded). The US data show a higher employment rate for

Employment rates by age group, 2005



Source: Terry Ward, Alphametrics, Cambridge and Brussels, 2006.

youth (15-24) and a much higher rate for pre-retirement (55-64) and post retirement (65 and over) groups. What the average employment and unemployment figures hide is the age-specific nature of the 'European problem'. The picture remains much the same when comparing the US and the EU-25.

Once again, the crucial element in understanding these differences is income distribution. At the youth end of the scale, young workers in the US get less education and those who go to university are more likely to work part-time than their European counterparts. At the older end of the scale, pension provision in the US is neither as broad nor as generous as in the EU, so people – particularly the poor who cannot afford to save for retirement – carry on working.

Making labour markets 'more flexible' (i.e., cutting wages) does not cure these problems; if anything, it makes the problem worse. By contrast, putting resources into active labour market policies such as improved education, retraining and high benefit provision contingent on job searching helps workers to find and retain high productivity jobs. This is the strategy pursued by the Nordic countries, one which has paid and will continue to pay handsome rewards in terms of prosperity and job security.

Who wins?

Comparing the economic performance of the European Union and the USA does not lead one to conclude that America has the more dynamic economy, or that it has performed better in the past or will do so in future. The most important feature of the comparison is neither the growth nor the unemployment record of the US and the EU. It is, rather, that US growth, unlike that in the EU, is funded by a dangerously high mountain of foreign debt. US external indebtedness, in turn, is driven by the US house-price bubble, enabling US consumers to spend more than they earn. Ironically, it is the EU which, together with China and Japan, continues to lend the money to the US which keeps their households spending and their economy growing.

The truth is that neither side 'wins' in this beauty contest. Europe merely does less badly than the USA in some crucial respects. Yes, while it is true that the core Eurozone countries could perform far better, Germany, France and Italy have quite different problems – in comparison both to the US and to each other – which require quite different solutions. Anybody who claims that the US provides a model which the EU should copy needs to consider the basic economic facts of the case.

Long Live the Euro!

Alain Malégarie

After the double negative vote on the Constitution Treaty in France and the Netherlands, Europe is plagued by a lack of self-confidence and doubts about its strength and its future. It was not by chance that scarcely a few weeks had passed after these referenda before Europe's most successful and emblematic achievement, the Euro, came under attack in certain countries. The reasons were various. Some were questionable and on these it is pertinent to cast a new look.

In this respect, the Euro appeared to have become a scapegoat for the full range of economic and social difficulties in France, Germany, Italy (Northern League) and the Netherlands. Some populist politicians or "Eurosceptic" economists, backed by various opinion polls in these countries, bluntly advocated a return to "national currencies" and even – which is just as absurd – a system of the "dual circulation" of the former currencies and the Euro.

How could we have reached such a point just seven years after the birth of the Euro was greeted with such enthusiasm and rejoicing, not to say jubilation? In over *fifty* years of economic, social and monetary policy we have moved from misunderstanding to misunderstanding, from unease and even fear of where Europe, globalisation, the movement of peoples is taking us; and for this we must blame the absence of regular, courageous and informative debates led by political leaders and the media. That we should find ourselves now in such a surrealist, *ubu-esque* situation would be comic if its consequences (as demonstrated in the negative ballot) had not been so dramatic.

What are the objections to the single currency?

Already a few months after its introduction the

Euro was severely criticized for its weakness against the US dollar, which was then the world standard. Even when the Euro strengthened to 80% of the US dollar's value some people sniggered, being unaware that until then no currency had ever reached this level. Slowly but steadily the Euro then climbed to become the second world currency – which was not a bad achievement – and even rose to overtake the quotation of the greenback by 30%. Those same pundits who had forecast and condemned its anticipated fall then ranted and raved about the consequences for European firms' international competitiveness if the Euro became too strong, even though two-thirds of their exports were within the borders of the Euro-Zone. Moreover, the exchange rate is not the only variable in the adjustment of the import/export ratio. Product innovation and technological added-value are even more important factors in successful exports.

Domestically, on the other hand, the Euro is said to be detrimental to the buying power of Europeans. This devastating feeling is deeply rooted in the collective subconscious, and not only among the French. Yet here again we find a discrepancy between the consumers' subjective "feelings" about price increases and the reality as scientifically computed by serious indexes such as INSEE and others. Briefly, each consumer "fills his basket" and perceives inflation in relation to what his family consumes. For example, when he or she buys fruit and vegetables, cigarettes or petrol, coffee or a pint of beer, they definitely perceive a rise in prices. Some shopkeepers and tradesmen have been known to capitalize on the change-over to the Euro. In addition, we must note people's lack of familiarity or watchfulness when handling a currency 6.5 times higher¹ than the old coins and

notes which they were used to. The most typical example is the one cent coin that many people will leave at the cash-register, thinking it worth no more than a *centime* of franc!

Broadly speaking, however, all serious surveys, whether public or private, indicate that the purchasing power of the French has been steadily rising since 1999 (that is, since birth of the Euro as bank-Euro) and even since the introduction of the fiduciary Euro in 2002. According to INSEE the buying power of the average household increased by 2.5 % in 2002 after the deduction of inflation. This rate slowed down in 2003 (+ 0.5 %), and since then has risen again.

The generally perceived inflation rate (some mention increases of 10, 20, or even 30 per cent) is largely subjective. In the absence of explanations, such perceptions are harmful and misleading. For example, increases in the prices of fruit and vegetables in winter (or summer if it does not rain) are not the fault of the Euro! Nor is the Euro to blame for the abuse of “back margins” in supermarkets or the stagnation of salaries since 2000 (partly due to the 35-hour week), which increases the “feeling” that prices are rising!

From the moment of its introduction, the Euro – together with the European Central Bank, that goes without saying – instantly became the ideal scapegoat. And nobody undertook its defence. Politically it is useful to have such a convenient whipping boy. To which the answer must be – useful, yes, but also cowardly and dangerous.

One thing leads to another. Virulent attacks have been made on the European Central Bank’s “outrageous” power as not being “democratically elected”, especially regarding its main mission: price stability. The reason why the EMU (Economic & Monetary Union) and the Euro were created has been too soon forgotten. It was because in all developed economies, from the eighties onwards, economists of all persuasions and of all political allegiances (with rare exceptions) agreed on the necessity for independent central banks to be free to

manage interest rates and measure for controlling inflation without political interference. Economic and monetary history is filled with examples of the disasters caused by runaway inflation and monetary crises. It is odd how this basic justification for the European Central Bank’s powers has now been “forgotten”. Thanks to the Euro, we need no longer fear two-figure inflation, nor “wildcat” (so-called “competitive”) devaluation of the currency. Stability prevails, and here the attacks on the ECB are profoundly unjust and result from the absence of informed understanding.

Some critics go so far as to speak of the “blind rigour” of the ECB. They really do have a nerve! The contrary is true, for the ECB has generally operated with a light touch in managing our brand new currency in relation to the “standard” of the US dollar. It conducted a policy of flexible interest rates from 3% to 2.50% in 1999, raised to 4.75% in 2000 and lowered again to 2% in 2003. The result has been that inflation has been held in check throughout the Euro-zone at between 2.3% and 2.1% in 2002-2004/5.

As an international standard currency, second in importance after the dollar, the Euro has remained steady despite numerous and varied crises such as the ENRON and VIVENDI bankruptcies, 9/11 and the rise of terrorism, plus major crises in Asia, Russia, Argentina – all shocks which would have rocked the former national currencies, perhaps even sweeping some away like wisps of straw –, triggering extreme devaluations, steep interest rate rises and the end of economic growth. And that is without taking into account the sharp increase in import costs (petrol at €1.50 per litre, for example), a considerable increase of national debts and chronic instability, which is always a heavy handicap for international exchanges. Yet all this has been ignored!

Yes, even at the risk of going against the tide of the almost unanimously critical view of the Euro, we must acknowledge the security it provides. It gives Europe greater economic leverage and political weight. Whether we like it or not, the

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Euro has been the most successful achievement of European construction for fifty years. Let us then protect and strengthen it through a renewed stability pact which must be respected. Once and for all we have to admit that we cannot go on living with our abysmal public debt without penalizing future generations. This is an elementary economic and budgetary principle. Nor can we give up our margin of manoeuvre for such crucial future policies as research and development. France with its debt of 2000 billion Euros – the equivalent of €32000 per inhabitant – can barely pay the interest

on what it owes, and certainly not the debt itself. In fact, interest payments are equivalent to the sum produced by income tax. It is no wonder that the country is in great difficulty, yet practically nobody cares a pin! It must be said that for quite some time the French “have distanced themselves” from the economy. Very well, maybe the feeling is that “everything is going well”, as the old song says², and future prospects may be rosy. But for goodness’ sake, keep the Euro! In our troubled times, it can, it must continue to serve us for many years to come.

¹In France, in Italy for example the ratio is much higher. (Note of the translator).

²“Tout va très bien, Madame la Marquise”, an old French folk song.

The British are not Afraid of Europe any more

Brendan Donnelly

Throughout the past fifty years, fear has always been a significant component of British policy towards the European Community and the European Union. This fear has taken contrasting, even contradictory forms. At some moments, the British government and public have particularly feared the political and economic consequences of exclusion (self-willed or otherwise) from the integrative process on which their neighbours were engaged. At others, the British government and public have more feared the political and economic consequences of a whole-hearted commitment by themselves to this integrative process. British European policy has traditionally reflected which of these two fears was the stronger at any given time.

More recently, however, this situation has changed substantially. A number of events and processes have combined to soothe both sets of British fears. It would be wrong to conclude that these fears have been replaced by the "perfect love" which the Bible treats as the best antidote to fear. But an important shift has occurred in British attitudes towards the European Union, with potentially mixed consequences which have yet to be fully appreciated by Britain's neighbours.

It is a familiar observation that Britain joined the European Community in 1973 primarily for economic reasons, reasons which had done much to sap national morale and self-confidence over the preceding twenty five years. The late 1960s and early 1970s were the low point of the United Kingdom's relative economic decline after the Second World War.

Fear that this decline might otherwise become irreversible was probably the most powerful single argument persuading the British public of the time to acquiesce in the decision of Edward Heath's Conservative government to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1973. It was a heightened version of this fear which played a major role in the decision of the British electorate in the referendum of 1975 to remain within the European Community. As Winston Churchill's son-in-law, Christopher Soames, graphically expressed it, 1975 was "not the time for Britain to leave a Christmas club, let alone the Common Market."

Although throughout the 1980s Britain's relative economic position began to improve, fear of isolation within the European Community remained for most of Mrs. Thatcher's premiership a powerful component of British attitudes towards Europe. Mrs. Thatcher had only reluctantly accepted the calling of the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the Single European Act when she realised that all the other eleven member states were firmly ranged against her. The fear that her policies on the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the single European currency were driving the United Kingdom irrevocably to the margin of European decision-making was the immediate cause of her deposition as Prime Minister in 1990. Her successor, John Major, knew that the prospect of British isolation within the European Union was worrying to many voters. He attempted publicly to distance himself from Mrs. Thatcher's European policies by insisting that he wanted to see Britain "at the heart of Europe."

Unfortunately, Mr. Major's initial European rhetoric and his subsequent erratic European policy bore little relationship to each other. The arrangement he negotiated at Maastricht for Britain to postpone indefinitely its decision on whether to join the single European currency was an incomparable example of the paralysis in British European policy caused by contradictory fears of both participation in and isolation from the process of European integration. Britain's bitter isolation from its European neighbours over the contentious issue of BSE ("mad cow disease") was a sad, but fitting end to the uncertain European diplomacy of John Major. Mr. Major's time as Prime Minister bequeathed to British public opinion a new fear to complement existing concerns, namely that Britain would always be within the European Union a victim of hostile coalitions ranged against it. Mr. Blair came to power in 1997 promising, as Mr. Major had, to make a better job of European policy than had his predecessor.

Mr. Blair's version of the Majorite aspiration to be "at the heart of Europe" was that he would "never allow Britain to be isolated in Europe." In pursuit of this goal, Mr. Blair signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the Nice Treaty in 2000, both being treaties rejected by the Conservative Opposition. For a number of years, both Mr. Blair's supporters and opponents believed he was preparing the ground for a referendum on British membership of the single European currency. In reality, Mr. Blair's preparations for this possible referendum were little more than a vague confidence in his own ability as a political campaigner when propitious circumstances presented themselves. In so far as he had a more detailed strategy, Mr. Blair seems to have believed that he could in a referendum exploit traditional British fears about economic and political isolation in Europe, while at the same time reassuring British voters fearful of continuing European political integration that the question of joining the single currency was a largely technical and economic matter,

with only limited constitutional implications. It must be more than doubtful whether the intrinsic tension within this strategy could have survived the relentless scrutiny of a referendum campaign.

What is certain however, is that Britain is today psychologically a great deal further away from joining the single European currency than it was when Mr. Blair became Prime Minister. Many of those who believed that under Mr. Blair's premiership Britain would join the single European currency expected that the United Kingdom would suffer demonstrable economic harm through standing aside from the euro. Others hoped that the Eurozone would exert so powerful an attractive force on the United Kingdom, both politically and economically, that rapid British membership would become inevitable. The City of London was sometimes envisaged as a leading advocate of British membership of the single currency, on the supposed ground that its currency-related operations would suffer from sterling's exclusion from the Eurozone.

None of these expectations have come to pass. Britain's economic performance outside the Eurozone has been relatively good, and noticeably better in recent years than that of some other large countries within the single currency area. The City of London has not suffered, and indeed seems unlikely to suffer from Britain's non-membership of the Eurozone. Millions of British tourists and businesspeople travel to the Eurozone every year. Some of them certainly conclude that there are lessons in economic management which Britain can learn from its neighbours. But work and holidays in the Eurozone have not led many Britons to conclude that there is any pressing need for their country to join the euro. Circumstances can certainly be envisaged in which this attitude might change, if the economic performance of the Eurozone countries for a substantial period of time outstripped Great Britain's, or perhaps if

every other member state of the EU apart from Britain had joined the single currency. But these are in no sense imminent possibilities. While probably a majority of British electors would still fear the economic consequences of leaving the European Union altogether, no such fear currently attaches in the British electorate to Britain's indefinite absence from the euro.

In the same way as British governmental and public opinion has now concluded that no foreseeable penalty attaches to the preservation of sterling, so they have also concluded more recently that the danger of Britain's political isolation within the European Union has been much exaggerated. When the British government sent Peter Hain as its representative to the European Constitutional Convention in 2002, his mission was at least partly to avoid British isolation within the institutional debates of the Convention. In this context, he was willing to make a number of concessions to other points of view, for instance on the use of the term "Constitutional Treaty," on the title of the European "Foreign Minister," on the role of the European Parliament, and on the binding character of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The delay in the signing of the final European Constitutional Treaty was not due to British intransigence, but rather to Spanish and Polish reluctance to accept changes to the Nice Treaty which, at least symbolically, were to their national disadvantage.

It is today easy to forget that before the French and Dutch referendums serious commentators, in Britain and elsewhere, considered it a real possibility that the United Kingdom alone might prove unwilling to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. It was no secret that the British government hoped to hold its national referendum on the Treaty as late as possible, allowing as many other countries as possible to ratify the Treaty beforehand. It might then be possible for Mr. Blair and his colleagues to argue that the referendum was essentially one about Britain's continuing membership of

a European Union, on the future structure of which all other member states were agreed. The referendum on the Constitutional Treaty might, on this analysis, become a repetition of the referendum in 1975, with its clearcut endorsement of Britain's European future. Mr. Blair's failure to hold, let alone win, his much-advertised referendum on the euro would probably have undermined his credibility in trying to win by such tactics a referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. Few of his colleagues in the British government seem to have shared his conviction that British voters in 2006 could be persuaded to vote "yes" just as successfully as their parents and younger selves had been in 1975.

All such speculations vanished rapidly from the British debate after the French and Dutch referendums. Some commentators in the United Kingdom gleefully claimed that this double rejection of the Treaty marked the beginning of the unravelling of the whole European integrative project. A more general view was that the Treaty was now dead beyond resuscitation and that it was difficult to envisage any remotely similar document for many years in the future. At most, the European Union would be able to agree in the coming decades on discrete, limited and incremental changes to its existing institutional structure. The United Kingdom would not necessarily be hostile to such innovations, particularly in areas such as foreign policy and defence, where the British government had a strong hand to play in shaping the terms of the debate towards intergovernmental co-operation and away from further integration through the Union's central institutions. Something very like a consensus is emerging in the United Kingdom that Great Britain has now arrived at a new point of sustainable equilibrium in its relationship with the rest of the European Union. Britain will not join the euro for many years, if ever, and it is exceedingly unlikely that the British government will be confronted in the next decade with difficult European institutional

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choices put to it either by all its partners in the Union or even a substantial minority willing to form a “hard core.” Over the past year, opinion polls in the United Kingdom have shown a noticeable increase in the majorities of British electors supporting British membership of the European Union and believing that the Union is doing its job well.

Many readers of the “Federalist Debate” will have understandably mixed feelings about this most recent evolution of British opinion. While welcoming a quieter and less hostile British approach to the Union, they may fear it is based on a misapprehension. Some readers on the other hand will fear that the British analysis described here is all too correct and that further progress on institutional integration over the coming decade will be a slow and painful process. Two points are worth stressing in conclusion. First, the present functioning of the European Union still contains within itself an immense untapped reservoir of integrative potential. The completion of the single market, the

development of the single European currency’s governance structure and the vast legislative programme on Justice and Home Affairs are already promising areas of further European integration even without further significant Treaty change. We can confidently say that in ten years time the European Union will be a much more legislatively and institutionally integrated body than it is today. Second, a more relaxed and self-confident British approach to the European Union will have at least one advantage for readers of the “Federalist Debate.” Successive British governments have often claimed that they served as a convenient scapegoat for other European governments, who were less enthusiastic in reality than in their rhetoric to promote further European integration. Over the coming years, it will be less easy to depict the British government as the only significant road-block on the path towards a federal European Union. There will be correspondingly greater pressure on those governments which have said they wish to follow this federalising path to match reality to their rhetoric.

Reconciling the Irreconcilable

John Parry

When asked to comment in July 2006 on the then current outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah forces based in Lebanon, US President George Bush was quoted as saying that the 'root cause' was terrorism. He was wrong. Terrorism was, and is, a symptom of a malaise whose roots lie much deeper: firstly, in the injustice of centuries of anti-Semitism in Europe culminating in Hitler's 'Final Solution' in which certain elements in the occupied European countries also took part; and, secondly, in the injustice suffered by the Palestinian people by the creation without their consent of an immigrant nation state in their midst, plus its consequences. These experiences have shaped the psychology of both Israelis and Palestinians and must be taken into account when discussing a possible future for the region.

Historically Jews were to be found in many parts of the Roman empire, particularly after the fall of Jerusalem in the year 135 AD, and under the emperor Caracalla's constitution of 212 AD they acquired Roman citizenship. Ironically, it was the spread Christianity that brought increasing instances of religious discrimination against them, even leading in the early Middle Ages to forced conversions. But despite these injustices the Jewish faith and religious practices remained intact, reinforced by the emphasis they placed on education. Several were held in high esteem for their scholarship or their skill as physicians or astronomers.

Because many earned a living in commerce, their contacts with fellow Jewish communities

across Europe, North Africa and the Middle East enabled a flourishing international trade to develop. Yet anti-Jewish sentiments lurked beneath the surface even in peaceful times. A notorious example occurred in 1096, when thousands of Jews in the Rhineland towns and provinces were slaughtered by the armies of ruffians on their way to seek fame and fortune in the First Crusade, though both the Church and the Emperor condemned this brutality¹. In fact the Church's attitude, clearly stated by St. Bernard, was that it was 'far better to convince and convert the Jews than to put them to the sword'².

A further example of anti-Jewish hostility occurred in Britain when riots in the city of York in the year 1190 resulted in the massacre of 150 Jewish men, women & children. This was eventually followed by King Edward I's decision to expel all Jews from Britain. They were not legally readmitted till the mid-17th century. Meanwhile, the papal 'Lateran Council' of 1215 ordered that all Jews in Latin Christendom should wear a distinguishing badge and forbid Gentiles either to work for or lodge with them. In a series of staggered expulsions over the next two or three hundred years, Jewish communities were also forced to leave France, certain German states, Spain and Portugal. Many fled to eastern Europe though a substantial number settled in North Africa. Discrimination in the Arab lands was in most cases considerably less severe. There, Jews and Christians – as People of the Book – were required to pay a poll tax but otherwise were mostly free to practise their own religion as they wished.

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In western Europe it was not until the late 18th century that tensions began to ease. Works such as Lessing's *Nathan the Wise* – a plea for mutual understanding between Jew, Christian and Muslim – had begun to appear even before the liberal ideas of the French revolution had swept across Europe. But was it possible for Jews and non-Jews to live peacefully together, each respecting the others' views? Today's situation in the 'free' world, in which a person can achieve high political office whatever their religion or origin, was still on the distant horizon. For the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, a close associate of Lessing's, the first step involved a search for common ground between the communities with the aim of achieving a greater degree of assimilation, although some members of his own family still held at least a nominal conversion to Christianity to be more practical. This became the route followed by a number of talented Jews including the poet Heinrich Heine, the composer Gustav Mahler, and the future British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli.

Moreover, the post-Rousseau, post-Napoleonic rise of national consciousness in 19th century Europe carried with it the danger of a revival of anti-Semitism, as one young Jewish idealist – Theodor Herzl – was to discover. While studying law at Vienna University Herzl joined the 'Albia' Burschenschaft³, an exclusive student club whose members were strong supporters of German nationalism. He had long been an enthusiast for German culture and this seemed a natural thing to do, but within months anti-Semitic elements among Albia members had gained control of the organisation, claiming not only that Jews could never be truly German but also that they should be barred from the professions. Feeling that for him at any rate assimilation had been denied, Herzl was left with no choice but to quit in protest.

The concept of 'nation' and of the nation state

had become fashionable in Europe. German unification – at that time just ten years old – was only its most recent expression. Hungary – where Herzl was born – had become semi-autonomous within the Hapsburg empire, Italy had unified in 1860, and nationalist movements elsewhere were also developing. If such self-conscious nationalism meant that Jews were to be regarded as aliens, should not they too have their own nation state? Herzl brooded over this idea for some years until, in 1896 and by then a well-known journalist, he decided to publish the proposal as a pamphlet: *The Jewish State*.

The response was immediate⁴. In Vienna the Jewish middle class was scornful. Why should they abandon their comfortable lives to pursue such an unrealistic dream? But Jews in Russia and eastern Europe, living under difficult conditions and still victims of discrimination and occasional pogroms, took the opposite view. For them the proposal offered hope, and their enthusiasm resulted in the birth of the Zionist movement which held its first international Congress the following year in Basel.

Yet where should this Jewish state be situated? With imperialist arrogance, the UK government, busily expanding its own settlements in East Africa, offered land in Uganda. This was considered, and then rejected. Did not all Jews dream of "Next year in Jerusalem" – a phrase repeated every year at Passover? Little thought was given to the fact that Palestine was then part of the Ottoman empire and already had a long-established Arabic-speaking population, mostly Muslim but with Christian and Jewish minorities.

In World War I the Ottoman empire (specifically Turkey) allied itself with Germany and this brought about a radical change in the region. Britain now faced the possibility of losing control over the Suez Canal which was a vital trade route to her empire in the

east. To counter this threat, Arab nationalist groups were contacted with offers to assist them in their struggle for independence from the Turks. Moreover, Britain was also hard pressed on the western front in Europe. Help was desperately needed, but could America be persuaded to abandon its neutrality? In an attempt to win over influential Jewish support in the USA, the British promised to permit the establishment of a 'Jewish National Home' in Palestine.

This commitment, confirmed in the Balfour Declaration⁵ of November 1917, also contained the sub-clause 'that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country'. Despite this 'guarantee' the document caused an uproar among Palestine's Arab population who saw it as a threat to their own national right of self-determination. The Zionist interpretation – that it opened the way to the establishment of a Jewish nation state and that Palestine would become 'as Jewish as England is English' – only served to confirm Arab fears.

In July 1922 Britain formally undertook responsibility for Palestine under the League of Nations mandate. This responsibility Britain could well have done without. Having been freed from the Ottoman administration, Palestinian Arabs were in no mood to submit to British 'colonial rule'. Attempts to agree a constitution were fraught with difficulties. The proposed elected legislative council never got off the ground. Meanwhile, a steady stream of Jewish settlers arrived in the country, establishing successful industries and farming communities, for the most part using only Jewish labour.

Europe too had fundamentally changed. The rise of extreme nationalism, particularly but not exclusively in Germany, led to an increase

in anti-Semitism unparalleled since the Middle Ages and with it came a further increase in the number of Jews wishing to settle in Palestine. A proposal to divide Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab, while keeping Jerusalem and Bethlehem under British mandate⁶ had to be abandoned when the partition commission reported that the Jewish and Palestinian communities were so intermingled that no geographical boundaries between them could be established. In trying to be fair to both sides – 'to reconcile the irreconcilable', as the historian A.J.P. Taylor put it⁷ – the British were out of their depth.

Twenty-one years after the end of World War I hostilities began in Europe again. Country after country was occupied by National Socialist troops. Often with the collaboration of the local police, Jews were herded into trains and transported to concentration camps. Six million perished in the gas chambers or by other means. A few who managed to escape fought as partisans, but these were exceptions. Once the war had ended thousands of survivors fled towards Palestine by any means possible.

For the British, responsible as the mandatory power for maintaining peaceful relations between the different communities in Palestine, this vast influx of refugees determined to establish the State of Israel caused major problems. Despite the UK's leading role in defeating the Nazis, liberating the camps and hunting down war criminals, their attempts to control this new situation resulted in acts of violence by both Arabs and Zionists. In July 1946, in an action later denounced by the Jewish National Council, the terrorist group Irgun Zvai Leumi led by Menachim Begin⁸ planted a bomb in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, causing the deaths of almost a hundred British soldiers and civilians. Some days later two young British sergeants were kidnapped and hanged from street lampposts, while in London security services discovered

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a Stern Gang plot to murder the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin⁹.

The UK government, its policy in tatters, handed the problem back to the United Nations. Violent clashes between Zionists and Arabs intensified even while the UN debated the issues, finally voting for partition. Despite the continued opposition of the majority indigenous population, British forces left in May 1948 and David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the birth of Israel as an independent nation state. On his orders the recently-formed Israeli Defence Force began to expel the 50,000-strong Arab population in areas such as Lydda and Rammlé¹⁰. In total, well in excess of 500,000 refugees fled the new State of Israel¹¹.

Neighbouring countries immediately intervened on behalf of their fellow Arabs in the first of the Arab-Israeli wars of which the most recent example is the recent conflict involving Lebanon-based Hezbollah fighters. Any prospect of reaching a just and permanent settlement still looks uncertain. Resentment among the Palestinians remains acute, reinforced since 1967 by the Israeli occupation and/or domination of the rump of what used to be their country. Israel herself, the most heavily armed state in the region and backed by the USA, still sees every conflict as a fight for survival. To an outside observer it seems the only way to move towards a long-term solution must be through a modification of attitudes on both sides.

In the view of many immigrants, according to Israeli writer Amos Oz¹², 'The Holocaust convinced many Jews that the cruel game of nations had to be played according to its cruel laws: statehood, a military establishment and a pessimistic concept of the use of military power.' This he rightly regrets. Yet there is another game in town. As Barbara Spinelli has suggested in an article in *La Stampa*¹³, no country exists in total isolation. Inevitably

Israel and its neighbours are to some extent dependent upon each other. There is therefore a valid case for Israel to move forward from being a Jewish 'nation state' of the traditional kind and to strengthen its own security by working towards the construction of a regional federation.

Such a move would naturally be long-term and would depend on – and, in fact, contribute to – reaching an accommodation over current problems. A model already exists in the early history of the European Union. Who in Europe in 1941 would have dreamed that, within ten years, six of the combatant states would agree¹⁴ to place fundamental aspects of their economies under common control?

In preparation for the future, Israel must realise that in the eyes of the world her policy towards the Palestinians has so far failed. Responding to every terrorist attack with overwhelming force is understandable, particularly in the light of the barbaric acts suffered by Jews in the past, but it is now counterproductive. To subject Palestinians to terror attacks by helicopter gunships, destroying power stations, houses or cars; to block funds needed to pay doctors and nurses; to set up checkpoints in the West Bank or otherwise preventing farmers reaching their fields, patients getting to hospital or children going to school: all these are actions which lead to despair, and it is despair which recruits terrorists together with those who support them.

Developing an alternative strategy offering the Palestinians some hope for a better future must become a priority. Theodor Herzl's vision of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine assumed a harmonious relationship between the new arrivals and the existing population¹⁵. Perhaps this was naïve, yet out of the present ruins it must be possible to build a more prosperous and peaceful society. The 'two-state solution' depends upon it, and

so too does Israel's security. Going in stages beyond the 'two-state solution' towards a wider, embryonic federation involving several of the neighbouring countries – such as an independent Palestine, with Jordan, Lebanon and perhaps Egypt – could in due course lead to peace in the Middle East.

In this context it is worth recalling some words spoken by Ehud Olmert at a conference in

Ireland a few years before he became Israel's prime minister¹⁶. 'How are fears born?' he asked. 'They are born because of differences in tradition and history, and in emotional, political and national circumstances. If we are to overcome such fears, a credible political process must be developed that does not aim to change the other, nor to overcome differences, but that allows each side to live peacefully in spite of them.'

¹See Stephen Runciman, *History of the Crusades*, Vol.I, Bk.3

²See Letter 393 in *The Letters of St. Bernard*, Edited by Scott-James

³See Steven Beller, Herzl, Chap.1

⁴Beller, *op. cit.*, Chap.4

⁵A.J.P. Taylor, *England 1914-1945*, Chap.3

⁶Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 354

⁷Taylor, *op. cit.*

⁸F. Fernandez-Armesto [Ed.], *England 1945-2000*, Chap.1

⁹BBC Radio 4, 24 July 2006

¹⁰Benny Morris, *The Road to Jerusalem*, p.177

¹¹Morris, *op.cit.*, p.190

¹²Amos Oz, *Israel, Palestine and Peace*, p.12

¹³*La Stampa*, 23 July 2006

¹⁴In the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel Community

¹⁵Theodor Herzl, *Briefe und Tagebücher*, Propyläen Verlag, Einführung, p.12

¹⁶Quoted by Brian Keenan, "After the Flood", in *The Guardian* newspaper, 22 July 2006

Steps on the Path to Global Justice

Joseph E. Schwartzberg

The achievement of historically significant goals is seldom, if ever, realized in one grand sweep. Typically, the path to success is long, tortuous, and marked by an alternation of setbacks and gains. Ultimate success can never be taken for granted. Many more attempts at shaping history end in failure than in triumph. Alexander the Great, Attila, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin are but a few in a long list of would-be earth shakers whose careers bear witness to this truth. Soon, I would predict, the gang of neo-cons who have set our own country's current imperial agenda will join their ranks.

But, even when a movement's goal is obviously worthy, providing logical arguments in support of it will not suffice to insure its realization. Change agents must do more. They must outmaneuver those who benefit from maintenance of the status quo and they must also overcome one of the most powerful – and least recognized – political forces: the inertia that is born of apathy and ignorance. This requires careful and realistic planning, education (including salesmanship) and steadfast determination. Although world federalists have done well in putting forward logical arguments for world federal government, we have fallen woefully short in other respects and would be well advised to reassess our strategy to date.

Consider, if you will, the history of attempts to climb Mount Everest. While the conquest of that peak will probably not go down as one of the major achievements of the 20th Century, it still has much to teach us. Let us examine that story.

Everest was recognized as the world's loftiest summit in the year 1852. For decades thereafter it is doubtful that mountaineers even imagined that it could be successfully ascended. Although Mont Blanc, Europe's highest peak, had been climbed as early as 1786, Everest, at 29,028 feet, rose almost twice as high above sea level. Mountaineering as a serious endeavor did not gain much of a following until the middle of the 19th century. Men might have dreamed of conquering Everest, just as they dreamed of reaching the north and south poles; but it was not until 1920 that a team of alpinists actually attempted an ascent. Approaching the mountain from the high plateau of Tibet, the expedition ended in failure. The ensuing decades witnessed six more unsuccessful expeditions (not counting three for reconnaissance only) and a variety of approaches to the summit were abortively explored. Several brave efforts ended in fatal tragedy.

Finally, in 1953 an expedition met with success; Edmund Hillary of New Zealand and Tensing Norgay of Nepal at last stood briefly at the apex of the world. While these two climbers are justly lauded for their achievement, they knew that their success would not have been possible without a great deal of teamwork. And it required not merely individual skill and stamina, but also careful planning at every stage along the way. No fewer than eight camps were established from the initial base up to the one at the South Col at an altitude of roughly 26,000 feet. Only from that key point could the final assault on the summit be made, via Everest's treacherous, but negotiable, Southeast

Ridge. At each of the camps leading to the Col, stores of supplies were brought in and a strategy for further advance was formulated or modified as conditions warranted. Credit must also be given to advances in technology, including oxygen tanks, radio communication, better insulated clothing, and improved mountaineering equipment. Thus, what may have truly been impossible in 1920 proved doable in 1953. Other routes were successfully negotiated in subsequent years, demonstrating that the way that worked first was not the only possible path.

World federalists can, I believe, learn much from the foregoing account. First, we should recognize the likelihood of repeated setbacks before our goal is reached and the probability that certain paths that appear most promising will not necessarily take us where we want to go. Additionally, the necessity for planning, teamwork and the efficient use of available resources is obvious. But, plan as we may, there is also the factor of luck to consider; some of the failures on Everest prior to 1953 were related to rapid shifts in the weather over which climbers had absolutely no control. Human history can be equally quirky and unpredictable.

Less obvious, perhaps, is the necessity to distinguish between our true goals and key steps en route to those goals. Listening to many world federalists, one would think that federal world government is our ultimate objective. I would maintain, however, that that is but a key step, very likely the key step – the sine qua non – on the way to what our true goal ought to be: a just, peaceful, democratic and ecologically sustainable world; just as reaching the South Col was the key step on the way to the summit of Everest.

Although peace activists are inclined to speak (as I did in the previous paragraph) of peace, justice, democracy and ecological sustainability as if they are separate objectives, in actuality such rhetoric is redundant. If we make justice

our overriding goal, the others would logically be subsumed under that term. Without a high degree of justice and a strong commitment to its maintenance, there can be no enduring peace. Further, justice presupposes that government will be democratic. Finally, a society committed to justice will acknowledge its obligations to future generations and therefore feel obliged to become ecologically sustainable.

Our traditional emphasis on the goal of world peace through world government and law, which characterized organized world federalism in its early decades, was understandable in the aftermath of World War II. Justice, as opposed to government, did not loom large in the thinking of Clark and Sohn, arguably the most influential of all modern writers on world government. The need to avert a catastrophic World War III, fought with nuclear weapons, overrode all other considerations. Times have changed, however. The chief global needs at present are to deal with the obscene economic gulf between the world's haves and have-nots (and thereby, incidentally, to significantly reduce the threat of global terrorism), and to seriously address environmental threats to the very survival of our species.

But, if we are to succeed in addressing these and other pressing concerns, we will have to emulate the conquerors of Everest and move forward by pursuing a carefully planned series of attainable objectives, each setting the stage for further advance. In that way we will, over time, instill in a critical mass of the world's citizens growing confidence in our ultimate goals and an atmosphere of trust in the efficacy of ever-greater international cooperation.

Analogies, of course, can be pushed too far. While attainment of the South Col of Everest was the penultimate step in the initial ascent, we would be wrong to suppose that the creation of a world government would be the penultimate step in what ought to be a never-ending quest to promote and maintain global

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justice. And while ascents subsequent to the initial one via the South Col demonstrated that multiple routes to the summit were feasible, it is doubtful that enduring global justice can be attained without the prior creation of world government. But that does not mean that there is only one route from where we are at present to our cherished - if not final - goal of world government.

Among our most immediate objectives, I would endorse some on which Citizens for Global Solutions is already working: a standing UN rapid deployment force to preclude future acts of genocide, support for the ICC, an improved UN Human Rights Council, a major reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and the attainment of the millennium development goals. Beyond these, I would recommend several more on which I have written papers over the past decade or so: a more effective means of raising substantial revenue for the UN; a larger and more robust standing UN Peace Corps equipped to function in both peaceful and military modes; the creation of a UN Administrative Academy through which to build up a standing UN Administrative Reserve for service in failed states; a more realistic system of weighted voting in the General Assembly, with a concomitant GA capability to legislate on a limited (but expansible) set

of vital global issues; and a fairer, objective and flexible system of representation in the Security Council. Further down the line would be a global Marshall Plan; restructuring the international financial and trade institutions; and the establishment of a popularly elected World Parliamentary Assembly, advisory at first, but ultimately with real legislative powers.

This list is tentative and may be indefinitely expanded; and the sequencing is certainly open to debate. But a point should come when people and many of their representatives will say, in effect: "Hey, this legalized global cooperation stuff really works! Things are getting noticeably better. The system may not be perfect, but it sure beats our fighting or exploiting one another. Moreover, it is in our power to improve it. Maybe a whole new UN Charter would be the way to go. Let's give it a try and see what we can come up with."

Is all of this a pipe dream? I don't think so. Everest was conquered. Humans learned to fly. Men were sent to the moon. Women won the right to vote. Slavery and Apartheid were ended. The list of achievements of goals once thought to be unattainable goes on and on. World government will also come and in its wake global justice will be mightily advanced.

World Federalism as a Catalyst for Human Evolution

Ben Freeman

The most pressing reasons for world federalism are to replace “might makes right” with international law and to help deal with transnational ecological and resource depletion issues. Only an international body can govern space and areas of the world where no nation has sovereignty. Especially when nations disagree, a global governmental type authority is also needed to deal with economic justice, trade, intellectual property, criminal, legal, terrorism related, immigration and myriad other issues that cross national boundaries. International funding and control is appropriate for many types of research, development, exploration and transnational networks which benefit people from many countries. Because the importance of these types of interactions which require global governance have greatly increased in the last fifty years, the objective need for world federalism is far greater than it was forty or fifty years ago. If this is so, why is the world federalist movement no stronger than it was fifty years ago?

Not only does nationalism and the fear and distrust of foreigners continue to exist, but the big multi-national corporations are the only obvious winners in the global economy. How can those of us who see the advantages of world federalism overcome the feeling that it would not be advantageous to give international bodies more power than they already have?

Just as people sell a new product or service by demonstrating its functional value, the way to gain global interest in world federalism is to

focus on its functional advantages. Creative educational and media outreach efforts should be used to suggest why many key issues can only be solved on a global level. Furthermore, we should focus on actually solving the one key issue that is amenable to a world federalist solution right now.

Since the UN Security Council was already given the power to “keep the peace” by using military force and other means, replacing “might makes right” with international law only requires comparatively minor changes in the Security Council system.

To gain coveted positions as full or part time Security Council members, ten or more large countries who are not now Permanent Members (such as India, Germany, Brazil, Italy etc.) would be willing to collectively provide most of the troops the UN needs to enforce Security Council decisions. Nevertheless, there is little point in creating the “ready deployment force” the UN needs if Security Council decision-making is paralyzed by the unilateral veto system. Just as national governments and other international organizations do not use the veto system because it is a recipe for paralysis, the veto system is the fundamental reason that the Security Council cannot reliably apply international law to specific situations and problems. By allowing the UK, US, Russia, China or France to unilaterally veto any decision, this veto system prevents international law from being applied to these P-5 nations or their allies. Even when the Council is dealing with an issue which all P-5 nations see as a problem, the difficulties

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inherent in making any decision unanimously undermines the Council's ability to make effective decisions in a timely manner.

Since an empowered UN would replace the US as the center of gravity of international decisions, the US would have to be given a vote weighting to accept an empowered vetoless UN. But if other nations proposed a plan that gave the US the most votes and dealt with other secondary American concerns, the desire of the American people to shed their unwanted world policeman power could motivate most American voters to support UN empowerment. Especially now that the failures and costs of Bush's unilaterally driven foreign policy have become evident to most American voters, the next set of Presidential candidates could find it politically opportune to agree to join the rest of the world in empowering the UN. Russia and China would probably also need an intermediate vote weighting to accept the possibility that a Western dominated Security Council might over-rule them. However, having an extra vote in a true global decision-making body is better for Russia and China than the current situation where Western powers have repeatedly ignored their opinions by acting without UN sanction.

None of the three leading plans to expand the Council membership has sufficient support to gain adoption over the objections of those who support the other two leading plans. Therefore, all of the nations big enough to hope for some form of guaranteed representation have sufficient motivation to compromise on Security Council expansion. The common advantage that they gain from veto modification and from the requirement that new Council members provide troops creates a motivation for the smaller nations of the world to support a Security Council reform plan that includes a compromise on expansion and a veto modification aspect.

If we in the world federalist movement could find a way to motivate one peace loving, thoughtful and well respected Foreign Minister to officially propose a realistic compromise for Security Council empowerment, most non P-5 nations would probably go along. At that point, the world's religious leaders, peace movements and other well known people of goodwill would help generate media coverage and high positive polling numbers. This would motivate holdout governments to join the emerging bandwagon for peace.

Within a decade after a compromise Security Council empowerment plan was implemented, most people would realize that there is no reason to waste huge sums of money on arms in a world where the UN was protecting every nation's security. This would make it possible to negotiate a global disarmament treaty of unprecedented proportions. Within a few decades, this process would lead to fulfillment of the Biblical prophecy that "nations will beat their swords into ploughshares, neither shall they learn the art of war anymore."

As the results of global warming become more evident and an empowered UN has proven its ability to "keep the peace," most people will be ready to empower the UN or other international bodies to prevent a catastrophic increase in planetary temperatures. After an empowered UN ends war and begins to solve the problem of global warming, the fear of giving the UN more powers to deal with global issues will dissipate. Just as the EU has been given the power to oversee and coordinate action on issues that involve more than one European country, the UN and related international agencies will eventually be given the power to oversee and coordinate action on many issues that involve more than one country. Because "necessity is the mother of invention," the need to survive and prosper in the post-technological age will provide the underlying motivation for humanity to move towards world federalism.



Replacing “us versus them” with a truly cooperative way of thinking will be both a cause and an effect of moving towards world federalism. Einstein was correct when he stated that the “inevitable” alternative to “changing our way of thinking” is “unparalleled catastrophe.” Therefore, post-modern humanity has sufficient motivation to develop a new “way of thinking” based on universal brotherhood and all people working cooperatively towards mutually advantageous goals.

Moving towards world federalism will be inextricably interwoven with overcoming our fear of strangers and our desire to achieve victory at other peoples’ expense. This process will help move all humans towards unification in brotherhood and sisterhood. After eons of living in hominoid bodies that have experienced the pain that results from playing what Buddha derisively called “the game of victory and defeat,” our souls and collective unconscious can see the practical advantages associated with living a more nurturing and fulfilling life based on universal love and compassion. We will be ready to “harvest” the “fully grown plant” of universal

loving compassion that Jesus, Buddha and others planted as “seeds” in our mind/soul personalities so many centuries ago.

The divine soul that is our inner core personality has always yearned for a more cooperative and loving world based on universal compassion. Hence, the transition from “me versus you” and “us versus them” will accelerate exponentially once most of us realize that we no longer have to live in a world based on predatory selfishness. Just as it is only necessary to push one domino to make thousands fall if they are properly lined up, the objective conditions that favor world federalism mean that the first serious attempt to work cooperatively to empower the UN to replace “might makes right” could quickly lead to a more globally cooperative world order and attitude. As objective conditions make it possible for our souls to achieve more fulfilling states of bonding and unity, we will begin our technologically generated metamorphosis from predatory tool wielding animals to a cooperative collective of angels. We will begin to find our way home to Christ’s “kingdom,” Buddhist “nirvana,” Qu’ranic “paradise” and, eventually, heaven.



Louis Bruno Sohn

(1 March 1914 - 7 June 2006)

Joseph P. Baratta

Professor Louis B. Sohn, a great international legal publicist whose teachings continue to contribute to international law against the current opposition of the so-called realists in world politics, died near Washington, D.C., in June. He was 92. Cause of death was complications after a stroke.

Sohn contributed to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, peaceful settlement of disputes, enforcement of human rights, disarmament and arms control, the law of the sea, protection of the environment, and especially systemic United Nations reform. He was co-author, with Grenville Clark, of *World Peace through World Law* (1958). Sohn was said to have been “an architect of much of modern international law” (Edith Brown Weiss, 2003). That was true enough, though it cannot be denied that, especially in his adopted United States of America, adherence to the Law of Nations was at a low ebb at the time of his death. More true was the praise of a former student: “What set Louis apart from all the rest of the great teachers at Harvard Law School was his grand vision of creating a future world order based upon the rule of law” (Francis A. Boyle, 1984). Sohn was a model for those teachers who aim at the higher realism of the rule of law in place of leadership in an arms race.

Louis B. Sohn was born in Lwów, Poland (now Lviv, Ukraine). Lwów, in the center of Galicia, was a strategic point in east-west trade, industry, and history. Possession of the city had shifted from Poland to Austria in 1772, to Poland in 1919, to the USSR just after Sohn escaped in 1939, to Poland again after 1945,

and finally since 1991 to Ukraine. Young Sohn received diplomacy and law degrees (tops in his class) from John Casimir University in 1935. He continued research in the library, but as a Jew his movements were restricted. Later, both his parents, Isaak and Fredericka, who were doctors, perished in the Holocaust. A Harvard professor saw one of Sohn’s papers and invited him to study in America. Sohn caught the last boat out of Poland two weeks before the Nazi invasion. These formative experiences contributed to his hatred of war and racism and to his determination to extend the rule of law from within states to relations between states.

At Harvard, Sohn learned that the professor who had invited him died. But the dean helped the young, multilingual Pole, found him a room and a job in the cafeteria. Soon Sohn began to work with Prof. Manley O. Hudson, a former American judge on the World Court even though the USA was not officially a member. Harvard Law was then much under the influence of former dean Roscoe Pound, whose “sociological jurisprudence” emphasized adapting law to new social circumstances. Sohn applied this doctrine to the customary and treaty law between states in the age of machine industry and soon atomic weapons.

Sohn earned his LL.M masters degree at Harvard in 1940 and married Betty Mayo of Radcliffe, who survives him. He accompanied Judge Hudson to the San Francisco conference on the United Nations Organization, where they worked on the Statute of the International Court of Justice, integral with the Charter. Sohn began teaching at Harvard Law in 1947, publishing case books

first on "World Law" (1950) and then, as the high idealism of the end of World War II waned, on "United Nations Law" (1956). He won his S.J.D. doctorate in law about the time he and Clark published *World Peace through World Law*, and Sohn succeeded Hudson as Bemis professor of international law in 1961.

He taught there for twenty years. (I myself, curious about the origins of the World Federalist Movement, met him there in 1977, and he showed me every courtesy.) He then accepted an offer from former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk to teach at the University of Georgia Law School, where Sohn became Woodruff professor in 1981. His personal library of 3,200 books and monographs – a treasure for the future – is now collected in the Louis B. Sohn International Law Library on the fourth floor of Dean Rusk Hall at the law school.

Sohn then moved to Washington as a Jennings Randolph Distinguished Fellow of the new US Institute of Peace in 1991. He finally became director of research and studies of the International Rule of Law Institute of George Washington University. When I arranged a conference on the history of federalism after fifty years (1997), I convened it there, and Sohn graced us with his reflections of a lifetime. I once wrote to him about international arbitration and human rights, and he sent me reprints of every paper he had written on the subjects! Even after he declined in old age, I was pleased to give him a copy of my history, long in the making, *The Politics of World Federation* (2004), which recounts his and others' vision and practice.

Prof. Sohn won many prestigious assignments and awards. Besides participant in the US delegation to the San Francisco conference in 1945, he was briefly a legal officer in the UN Secretariat, a consultant to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a counselor on international law to the Department of State at the turning of the Vietnam War, an official US

delegate to the third Law of the Sea conference (1974-80), chairman of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, member of the board of editors of the *American Journal of International Law*, president of the American Society of International Law, chairman of the section on international law and practice of the American Bar Association, winner of the Manley O. Hudson medal (1996), and winner of the first award for outstanding contributions to the development of international environmental law (2003).

Sohn also wrote countless books, pamphlets, articles, reports, and lectures on international law, settlement of international disputes, the law of the sea, protection of the environment, disarmament and arms control, protection of human rights, regional organizations, the United Nations, world order, and peace. Some of these are instructive from the point of view of his influence on the legal and political establishment of the United States. *World Peace through World Law* made a plain and convincing argument for "general and complete disarmament under effective international control," as the first two UN disarmament conferences expressed the objective (1961, 1978), but the Cold War gutted this goal; in its place came the much less ambitious project of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. One of the most prescient proposals of Clark and Sohn was a "world equity tribunal" to settle *political* disputes beyond the capacity of international courts, but hostility to further steps of international organization is so great that one never hears of it any more.

Sohn and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace produced a work, "The United Nations: The Next Twenty-five Years" in 1969, which was replete with practical next steps (not instantaneous world government), but the complete rejection by states-members of reforms of the Security Council and the like in the fall of 2005 indicates how far the world has drifted away from such visions. Like many of Sohn's works, that article remains a program for

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the future, probably after some crisis like the one that led to the UN itself. About the Law of the Sea, Sohn was so impressed with its provisions for arbitration that he wrote that international arbitration is “the wave of the future.” We shall see. One success he had was to declare that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) had been incorporated into so many new national constitutions and international treaties that it had become “customary [binding] international law” (1968).

The problem seems to be that the *teaching* of international law is, despite Sohn’s dissent, currently dominated by a generation of scholars schooled in the Cold War and is likely to remain so for another generation. If the US continues to get bogged down in wars far from home without UN authority, then for two generations. So Francis Boyle argued in *The Future of*

International Law and American Foreign Policy (1989). The realists, he stated, “have left in their wake an entire generation of American foreign policy decision makers who really believe that international law and organizations are totally irrelevant to the conduct of international relations.”

This current American attitude is not born of *hubris*, but of painful reflection over policies of non-preparedness and trust in the beginnings of international organization before the US was dragged into two World Wars. We are now making trial of the realist alternative, taught by *émigré* Europeans like Hans Morgenthau. Whether Americans can yet avoid reverting to isolationism but lead the world toward freedom under the international rule of law may well depend on appreciating the teaching of wiser Europeans like Louis B. Sohn.

Gil Jonas

Gilbert Jonas, a pioneer of WFM passed away on 22 September. He was one of those people whose vocation and accomplishments help change the world. He graduated from Stanford in 1951 with a BA in Journalism and Social Sciences, later he obtained a Masters Degree from Columbia University’s School of International Affairs and a Graduate degree in Chinese Studies from its East Asian Institute.

Gil Jonas was a leader of the Student Federalists and the last elected head of this organization, which was active in the United States from 1942 to 1953 and reached 10,000 members. In 2000 he published a history of this movement entitled *One Shining Moment*.

He has been engaged during the past fifty years as a journalist and civil rights activist of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). His activity in this movement began in 1949, when he created Stanford University’s first NAACP chapter. From 1965 to 1995 he headed the NAACP’s National Development Program. The high point of the NAACP achievement came in 1954 when the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* overturned precedent and declared segregation inherently unconstitutional. He wrote the history of the NAACP, *Freedom’s Sword*, which offers an account of the memorable struggle of this movement against racism.

Recently he revived the New York chapter of WFA and was appointed Council member of WFM. He was also an appreciated contributor to *The Federalist Debate* (I.I.).

Two Proposals for the World Federalist Movement

Fernando A. Iglesias

For those who are committed to building a democratic global order, one of the most difficult problems is how to identify where humankind stands at present in this regard. We must avoid both unjustified optimism tending to utopianism and an equally destructive pessimism, which could lead us to underestimate the possibilities in the current situation. On the one hand many of the attempts (some still “operative”) made by world federalists and the world citizens movement in the 20th century to establish a global constituent assembly, a world parliament and Earth constitution were premature and resulted in wasted time and energy. But on the other hand, there are at least three reasons for thinking that a new and more concrete opportunity awaits us.

1) For the first time in history, the project of the democratic political unity of the world is no longer simply a utopian activists’ dream; it is now, in the light of global phenomena, increasingly recognised by the average person as a necessity. Global warming, international financial crises, massive migrations, fundamentalist terrorism, militaristic unilateralism, world-wide mafia, tax havens, international disputes over raw materials, increasing inequality, nuclear proliferation, crimes against humanity, loss of control over biogenetics, etc. are just the visible part of a bigger iceberg on which our planet – Titanic-like – could come to grief. These global crises are examples of the multitude of potential problems facing humanity today and for which purely national solutions are inadequate; nor do we have the necessary democratic, accountable and representative institutions able to act at the global level.

2) As the situation becomes progressively clear for most thinking human beings, we are witnessing the fast development of theoretical research on globalisation and an impressive growth of literature about its political aspects. Most of this work is clear on the need to democratise the existing global order, while the more advanced call more or less openly for values such as world federalism, global democracy and universal citizenship.

Global public opinion is increasingly aware of the élitist and undemocratic character of the current world political architecture, so that a world-wide social movement opposing war, inequalities and injustices has become – despite its many inconsistencies – a permanent actor on the global stage. In various ways it gives voice to a general perception that the national/inter-national order is unable to deal with the constantly-mentioned “challenges of globalization”. At the same time, the creation of new agencies such as the G8, the WTO (World Trade Organization), the ICC (International Criminal Court), etc. and the centrality acquired by the democratisation of the principal supranational structures such as the European Union and the United Nations show the concern of both the general public and their political leaders about the need for democracy and justice to extend beyond national borders.

As usual, the cup of the democratic global order may appear either half-full or half-empty. But the important point is to realise how fundamental these amazingly fast changes are and to find the best strategy to enable us to

redirect such abstract and negative energies towards more concrete and positive goals. Clearly, one of the extremes in this equation consists of unrealistic fanatics who shout: "Let's create a World Parliament here and now!". The opposite wing is composed of those who fail to understand the accelerated character of change in global times. Believing that almost nothing is possible, they prefer to await the "natural" development of the situation, maybe through another global catastrophe (such as the Second World War that "originated" the UN and the EU) before taking a consistent step forward.

Reason lies at a point between these two extremes. But where exactly is that point? I maintain that, although the creation of democratic global institutions is not immediately possible, the present situation nevertheless allows a rapid development of two meaningful preparatory tasks: world-wide popularisation of the debate on these issues at every social level, and the creation of a global coalition able to press for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) as the first step towards a World Parliament.

No matter how optimistic or pessimistic a person may be, two undeniably successful initiatives have taken place recently: namely, the creation of a global coalition of NGOs in support of the ICC (which played a decisive role in the diplomatic Conference) and the considerable success of the World Social Forum (WSF) which – despite its limitations – opened the first global space for the discussion of global matters. I shall argue that both initiatives can be dramatically improved by the use of innovative tools. I refer specifically to:

1) A Global Democracy Forum (GDF) to be developed on the lines of an improved model of the WSF. The GDF would be a vital initiative towards opening a world-wide debate on such crucial topics as world federalism, global democracy, universal justice, world citizenship and so on. I am speaking of an

open space focused on concrete proposals for the construction of a democratic world political mainframe. It should also be able to catch the attention of citizens throughout the world by means of such global mass media as CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera and others. More importantly, not only must the global civil society and its NGOs be invited to contribute, but also world leaders, political parties, trade unions, national and regional parliamentarians and governments, as well as those academics and writers who have been developing an amazing corpus of work on all these topics during the past few years. The success of this GDF would enable the majority of humankind to see current global dilemmas from a new perspective: that of global democracy and world federalism. Furthermore, contact between civil, political and intellectual actors at the global level should generate new synergies leading to a consequential step being taken within a short time-span.

2) Secondly, the highly valuable work of the Committee for a Democratic UN (CDUN), whose campaign for the creation of a UNPA I have endorsed and promoted, should be continued through building a global coalition able to raise the stakes. Assuming that the experience gained through the Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its more than 2,000 associated members was not just a matter of chance (which it was not!), this same method is the only one able to attract both the attention and help of political leaders, parties, parliamentarians and governments and thereby make the UNPA project feasible.

Such a Global Coalition for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly would also allow the many organisations and individuals already working on these questions and whose undertakings are often wasted by isolation and lack of resources, to combine forces while at the same time allowing them to keep their political and financial independence. If I am not wrong, this was the key to the success of the ICC project: conciliation, co-operation and autonomy.

A discussion forum embracing the whole planet and a coalition campaigning for the first democratic global body: these are two concrete proposals for the WFM. They offer an opportunity to capitalise on their decades of valuable work and provide a consistent roadmap for their future success. The justified criticism of amateurism levelled at organisations that have already tried such strategies does not change the fact that they express a genuine need and that to achieve their aim is actually possible.

After the outstanding success of the World Social Forum and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, two initiatives that started with only minimal means, do our proposals for a Global Democracy Forum and a Global Coalition for the UNPA really sound so utopian? I rather think they can make a genuine difference by linking the most promising players on the global scene, identified by David Held as the Scandinavian and European countries with their long tradition of liberalism and social-democracy, the EU, which is itself a major experiment in supranational democracy, the increasing progressive forces inside the United States that strongly oppose both the Washington consensus and the Washington

security agenda, the developing countries struggling for more equitable rules in global finance and trade, the vast universe of global NGOs, the most progressive and pro-democratic UN agencies and their officials, the economic forces which require a more stable and well managed global economy, and – last but not least – the rising world social movement. All of these need new and imaginative tools able to produce a concrete plan of action for the construction of a more democratic global order.

From the international coalition for the abolition of landmines, from the Coalition for the International Criminal Court to a Global Coalition for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, and from the social and economic world forums of Davos and Porto Alegre to a Global Democracy Forum to be established in some world capital: no organisation is better placed and has better human resources, experience and expertise to provide consistent leadership than the World Federalist Movement. Let us therefore work together to find a common space where – far away from utopianism and passivity – the seeds of a democratic global order can grow!

Civil Society Initiatives to Prevent and/or Reduce Small Arms Violence

W. James Arputharaj

The context of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka – commonly referred to as the paradise island – is located in the Indian Ocean below India. More than 75,000 people have lost their lives in the armed conflict which continues in a smaller degree even today, although there is a Norwegian-brokered cease-fire in place. To my mind, proliferation of small arms by the non-state PWG actor is as equally serious a problem as the excessive accumulation of arms by the state. The proliferation of small arms by both parties impedes to a large extent a peacefully negotiated settlement of the issues.

People living in the conflict zone in the North of Sri Lanka face a constant threat to life and livelihoods from varying communities, non-state actors and the presence of the military in their paddy fields and fishing coastline, due to their classification as high-security zones. Some of the most intense fighting have been in the peninsula of Jaffna. The fighting had led to the community being displaced a number of times, the most significant of which was the mass displacement of the Tamil community, approximately 500,000, in 1995 during the army's occupation. With no support policies in place, the communities over the years have developed their own coping/community resilience mechanisms, setting up small groups within the community.

The Author's views expressed here are based on earlier research in 2003 with the South Asia Partnership, supported by EED, Germany, in understanding human insecurity in Jaffna, where several types of community resilience/coping mechanisms were observed, and on his work in 2004-5 with Cord Aid in a program called Resources for Peace and Reconciliation

(RPR), which supports and strengthens existing coping mechanisms of the communities and broadens their scope, with adequate training, as Village Reconciliation Committees (VRC). This community-based peace building effort strengthens the coping mechanisms to foster unity in the village and settle differences of opinion between individuals and groups, so that the non-state actor or the military do not interfere in the affairs of the community.

It is interesting to note that outside the theatre of conflict, proliferation of small arms in the south is quick and at an all-time high. There are more than 85,000 army deserters with arms, who are in hiding and are believed to be the cause for most of the road and house robberies. There is a mushrooming of private armies, and even a few state ministers prefer to have private armies as security personnel to defend themselves. Contract killing is on the increase. Politicians, who were issued arms during the 1971 insurgency, have not returned them subsequently.

The proliferation of small arms undermines democracy, leads to an increase of human rights violations and stalls development, besides escalating conflicts and promoting a culture of violence and increased poverty. Due to the proliferation of small arms, the Sri Lankan society is becoming a weapon-dependent society.

There is a network of NGOs campaigning against small arms in Sri Lanka, called the South Asia Small Arms Network (SASANET). This network is currently nurturing the work of the National Commission of Small Arms in Sri Lanka. Further, South Asia Partnership International analyzed Small Arms legislation in South Asia with reference to the UN Program

of Action, and published a book (*Small Arms-Big Problem*) to serve as a guide for SASANET activists to lobby with their Governments.

Community initiatives to provide more security

The common definition of community coping mechanism is to describe the ways in which individuals adjust to difficult situations. A coping mechanism is in fact a process through which an individual manages the demands of the person-to-environment relationship, which is considered stressful, and the emotions generated by it. In my earlier study of Jaffna villages on understanding human insecurity, we realized village after village that it was a small group of women who withstood the ordeal of war in Jaffna. Interestingly, a significant proportion of men died of shock, unable to cope with the stressful situation.

A person's capacity to adopt a coping mechanism depends on three sets of factors:

- 1) Infrastructural, that is, his age, sex, environment and the demographic structure of the community
- 2) Structural, that is, the individual socio-economic status and the services available to the community
- 3) Super-structural, that is, literacy/illiteracy, cultural beliefs and attitudes of fatalism

Therefore there is not one set of standards for coping strategies. They vary depending on, and are influenced by, the socio-cultural factors, even in times of war.

Strategies to cope with risks to life:

- Leave one's native homeland in search of places of safety
- Seek emotional support from family members in times of risk – e.g., during heavy shelling in Nachikuda relatives came together under one roof for emotional support.
- Dialogue and negotiation with army commanders – e.g. in coastal areas, fisher folks returning after the 1995 exodus were able to negotiate with the Sri Lankan Army for provision of protection and support.

An example would be that of Komathy Francis, from the fishing community in Navanthuraia, who at that time was nine-months pregnant. Her family was informed of the impending army occupation and given less than two hours to escape. She, like the rest of the community, walked more than twenty hours at a stretch. She carried her sister's disabled child, and without a drop of water to drink she walked till she reached safety. Her only source of food was a banana given to her by a stranger, which she thought of sharing twice with her niece. While in displacement to survive, to feed her family she sold her jewelry for the asking price, which was one fourth of the market value. After she returned to her village, she, with some of her women neighbors, then negotiated to obtain entry pass, and formed a committee for security and protection. The men were unable to negotiate as they were always suspected.

Strategies to cope with threat to livelihood:

- Negotiate with military personnel to cultivate their lands, access to sea, etc.
- The village communities provide support to one another. Members who were comparatively well off would lend to the needy.
- Females become head of households – i.e. women become income earners, facilitated by the community support structures.

Malligadevi from Thinvali, in the aftermath of the conflict, was part of a group of women who were actively gathering women in their village to meet their economic needs. In particular, they were organizing displaced women to negotiate for land, so that they could have access to loans.

Strategies to cope with threat to physical/psychosocial needs:

- Form women groups, grief or survival groups, groups that deal with missing persons, etc.
- The Tharaka Widows Centre in Jaffna is a group of widows who initially came to undertake bead-rolling to ease their livelihood. This trade they learnt when they were working children. But this togetherness gave them time to share their grief. In the words of Selvi, "we were glad that we had at least four women to hug and cry

together with". At the Jaffna Hospital more than half were suffering from psycho-social trauma.

Peace Building from the Bottom up – Case Study of RPR, Mannar

Utilizing the opportunity of the ceasefire, the Resources for Peace and Reconciliation (RPR) in Mannar formed peace committees to help the war returnees to re-establish a sense of community ('we') feeling. This was part of the team's understanding of community-based peace-building efforts, aimed to bring lasting peace in the country. Following is the process adopted by them in forming the VRCs.

The RPR team would gather the people of an entire village and explain to them the rationale behind forming the VRCs, and would request them to elect 20 persons to work in these committees. These 20 persons will be trained in human rights laws, mediation skills and non-violent communication. Over the last two years, the VRCs have been able to solve disputes among individuals, groups and communities. They have been able to address the problem of returnees, their land rights, etc. The problems hitherto referred to the military or the LTTE are now independently resolved within the community by the VRCs. They have regular monthly meetings and every quarter they hold meetings at the Divisional level to share their experience and learn from each other. They also contribute to a Newsletter, which highlights the success stories as well as the failures. Over the years, their level of confidence in handling local disputes has increased.

According to Madutheen of Mada village, where about one hundred people who took shelter in the Mada church were bombed: "In the past, I realize now, I was mad and indulged in many violent acts and I thought they were the right thing to do. Now, being part of the VRC group, we were made to realize that we should do things without hurting others and I have stopped viewing others in a narrow minded way. I have

now understood what violence is. I believe that if men change, the society will change". Another VRC member, Sribalan of Kattashopistal, says, "In my village, people of Hindu, Islamic and Christian faith live together. We are all living in peace. We learnt through the RPR training how truthful we should be in respecting others' feelings and in trying to understand others. This to a large extent has reduced violence in our village".

RPR builds the capacity of the VRCs to analyze and find solutions to threats from forces external to their village. There is a high proliferation of small arms in this area. Since the VRC is widely accepted in the village, it is in a position to request those who carry arms to surrender them with the VRC elder, at least at night, to avoid any incident in the village. In this phase they would tolerate the arms in circulation without questioning their use or origin. The VRC could then gradually try to counsel and understand from each of them about the need to possess arms and also to have them think of people's security in the future without the use of arms.

In their recent strategy-planning meeting, the members of the VRC identified Peace Building, Development and Governance as their priority goals to address the problem of insecurity and the prevailing unstable condition, in order to achieve a lasting peace in the island. Youth are given special focus in RPR's programming. Inter-school debates and music programs are conducted on the topic of peace to let them voice their opinion.

While greater collaboration between the state and the non-state entities still needs to be fully achieved, it is evident that the role of the non-state actors in preventing armed violence, in peacefully resolving conflicts and in post-conflict reconciliation of divided societies is very important, and in particular the concept of peace building from the bottom up empowering the local people in managing their own problems through peace education methods should be actively pursued.

UN Arms Talks Meltdown: Conference Allows Global Gun Crisis to Continue

After two weeks of negotiations, from June 26 to July 7, 2006, the UN Small Arms Review Conference collapsed without agreement. Despite the efforts of the majority of governments to secure real change, the conference, hijacked by a small number of states, notably the US, failed to agree on any measures at all. Delegations from many countries in Africa and Latin America, the regions worst affected by gun proliferation, complained that their interests were overlooked. Control Arms campaigners from Oxfam, Amnesty International and IANSA were disappointed that due to the consensus decision-making process of this conference, a small number of countries were able to block the outcome. The campaign is now looking towards the UN General Assembly, where they will be calling for work to begin on an International Arms Trade Treaty and where they expect more success due to the voting process.

Obstruction occurred mainly in the following areas:

- The US refused to acknowledge the impact of small arms proliferation on development.
- Governments failed to agree to provide support for the survivors of gun violence.
- Progress on global standards for international arms transfers – which would prevent exports to destinations where they might be used for human rights violations – was obstructed primarily by Cuba, India, Iran, Israel and Pakistan.
- Discussion on how strengthening national laws can prevent gun deaths was blocked by the USA. 60% of the world's guns are in the hands of civilians, and many countries recognize national gun laws as vital to tackling gun violence
- The US was instrumental in preventing any follow-on global meetings to discuss the small arms trade.

On a positive note the impact of the Control Arms campaign in New York has been rewarding. During the first week of the conference all delegates were made very aware of the Million Faces campaign, which collected one million signatures by people from 160 countries. The campaign gained extensive coverage on TV, radio, online and print media.

There have also been several important side events. Notable among them were the launch of the Small Arms Survey Report 2006, the screening of a film titled "Dealing and Wheeling in Small Arms", a photo exhibition on "Men and Guns", IANSA Women's Network and gun survivors meeting, "Youth and Gun Violence", and more technical meetings on "Operational Support Tools for Small Arms Light Weapons Control Initiatives", "Targeting Ammunition", etc. Another highlight was a special concert – Control Arms Live – that took place in Times Square, New York.

The failure of this meeting will not detract from the enormous amount of work being done at local, national and regional levels around the world to protect people from gun violence. Since gun proliferation is a global problem, though, it does require a global solution, and supporters of the anti-small arms campaign will continue to seek ways to make this happen (*v.r.*).

For statistics on the extent and impact of the small arms trade, see:

http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/documents/2006/Statistics-2.pdf

East Asia Community and Japan

Shunsaku Kato

In 1947, two years after the end of World War II, the World Movement for World Federal Government (WMWFG) adopted the Montreux Declaration, in which it said as follows: "We consider that an integration of activities at regional levels is consistent with the true federal approach. The formation of regional federations... insofar as they do not become an end in themselves or run the risk of crystallizing into blocs... can and should contribute to the effective functioning of a world federal government. In the same way, the solution of technical, scientific, and cultural problems, which concern all the peoples of the world, will be made easier by the establishment of specialist functional bodies."

So far, the world has been moving along the lines the declaration predicted. Quite a few of the regional unions, such as the AU (African Union, 2002, – as a successor of the Organization of African Unity) or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967) have formed. Who would ever have anticipated the present EU in 1947?

But it still does not exist any concrete organization in Northeast Asia. Michio Morisima, professor emeritus at Osaka University, might have been the first Japanese who elaborated on the formation of an East Asia Community as a well-grounded undertaking. He proposed to found an East Asia Community in his book entitled *Collaborative Development in Northeast Asia* (Iwanami Shoten, 2001). However, the idea of an East Asia Community as such was not a new one. Since the 1990s,

it had gained considerable influence among regional policymakers. The initiation of the ASEAN+3 process (APT: Japan, China, and Korea) as well as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) indicate that Northeast and Southeast Asians have begun to formulate their own cooperative mechanisms of regional self-help. However, the rapid proliferation of bilateral and subregional preferential-trade agreements in recent years does not correspond to the logic of building a collective East Asian identity. This article examines the origins of the major barriers to community building in East Asia.

The Manila Summit in November 1999 issued the Joint Statement of East Asia Cooperation in which APT leaders endorsed East Asia collaboration in the economic field, in financial and monetary affairs, in social and human resources development, and various other areas. Yet it is worth noting that the joint statement does not specify the intention of building an "East Asia Community." A number of reasons retard this process. When Japan started the Pacific War on December 8, 1941, it stated that the war was to emancipate the nations that were suffering from Western colonialism and establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, but the military had their own ideas and reality turned out to be far from their declared objectives. After being "liberated" from the West, the attacked Asian nations had to face a new colonial power. After the war, the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia began to change as a result of enhanced trade in the 1970s, so that from that decade onward the Asianist map was gradually widened to include Southeast

Asia on equal terms.

Since the 1970s, Japan has issued quite a few war-apology statements. In the most famous of these, on August 15, 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama formally stated, "During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly those of Asia. In the hope that no such mistake will be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humanity, these as irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology" (statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end).

These apologies naturally inclined the Asian people more favorably toward Japan and fostered better relationships among the three countries: Japan, China, and Korea. Moreover, they paved the way for formulating an East Asia Community.

Japanese Neo-Nationalism and the Idea of East Asia Community

However, coupled with a decreasing number of Japanese who knew of the crimes their government and military had committed in the Pacific War, Japanese politics has since been swinging to the right and toward militarism. Now the Liberal Democratic Party plans to amend the Peace Constitution, among other ways, by abolishing Article 9 (which renounces the right to wage war). Also, the tide of grassroots rightism or neo-nationalism is rising, especially on the pretext of threats from North Korea. This new Japanese neo-nationalism is a complex phenomenon. Unlike the traditional rightists, neo-nationalists tend to be rather young people who are socially disconnected from communities (companies, labor unions, and the like). Moreover, in

recent years, the visits by high-ranking officials to Yasukuni Shrine have become a sticking point in relations between Japan and its neighbors. The enshrinement of war criminals, honoring them for having fought and died for their country (even though the Japanese Constitution implies the separation of church and state) has greatly angered the people of various countries that had been invaded by those same men. Especially, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has committed himself to visiting Yasukuni Shrine regularly, and did so every year as the Prime Minister of Japan, causing uproar in China and Korea. He used to say, when he visited Yasukuni Shrine, that he visited it to swear by God "eternal peace", but his assertion could not persuade the people or leaders of Japan's neighbor countries, China and Korea, and the leaders of China and Korea refused to see him formally. This friction was one of the main reasons for deteriorating relationships between Japan and its neighboring countries, China and Korea, and also hampered the formation of the East Asia Community.

At the same time, it seems to me that another explanation behind Koizumi's visiting Yasukuni Shrine could lie within the US-Japan Alliance. The American president and his colleagues are wary about the idea of the East Asia Community. For example, in a speech at Jochi University in Tokyo, last March, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice clearly opposed the idea of an East Asia Community and proposed instead the idea of a Pacific Community including America. The fear is that an East Asian Community would weaken the present strong US-Japan Alliance, especially in military terms. Mr. Koizumi, a loyal partner of the Bush administration, may have felt encouraged to carry on with his visits, accepting the fact that they made further talks with China and Korea about the formation of an East Asia Community more difficult.

The well-known peace campaigner Prof.

Comments

Sung Suh of Ritsumeikan University in Japan declared: "For a long time, I have dreamed of a regional community of co-prosperity in Northeast Asia like the EU. The age of Northeast Asia will finally come to full fruition. I pledge to devote my whole heart and effort to bring about that day at the earliest possible time." Sung argued that achieving a Northeast Asian Community will require two fundamental steps. The first and perhaps the easiest will be to reestablish an international balance of power, "to check US unilateralism... to recover the world balance of power, which was damaged by the United States, it is useful to set up a new 'three-kingdom age', that is, an era characterized by a balance among the 'kingdoms' of the United States, the European Union, and a Northeast Asian Community."

The second and perhaps more difficult step,

Sung continues, "will be to find a way to get away from where we are today", facing the growing strength of Japanese neo-nationalism, and to where Prof. Sung believes we should be in the future: a Northeast Asian Community of peace. The fundamental problem is Japan. "Will Japan be able to turn to a Northeast Asian Community? What concrete steps are possible today?" I believe that answering these questions posed by Prof. Sung Suh must be the vital first task assumed by Japan's new prime minister, Shinzo Abe. At this moment, it is uncertain what Mr. Abe will or can do to improve the deteriorated situation. He is known as a conservative and rather a more nationalistic politician than Mr. Koizumi. However, we hope that in cooperation with his advisors he will make a serious effort to establish relationships with China and Korea to form an East Asia Community.

Federalism and “False Friends”

Richard Mayne

“Federalism,” wrote the British constitutional lawyer A.V. Dicey in 1939, “substitutes litigation for legislation.” It was a chilling remark, but a useful reminder. In litigation as much as in legislation, precise wording is obviously vital; and translation in both is full of pitfalls.

The best known are so-called “false friends” – words or expressions that appear the same in two languages, but have different meanings in each. French and English form a happy hunting-ground. In France, the word “*demandeur*” means only to ask or request. Woe betide the translator who renders it into English as “demand” – which is far more peremptory, and in some contexts can sound rude. This error is rumoured to have provoked a diplomatic incident. Another, which I witnessed myself, was made by the official interpreter whom the late President Georges Pompidou brought with him to London when Britain was seeking to join the European Community, as it was then called. The President had said – on television – that he well understood the emotional bonds between Britain and the Commonwealth. His interpreter translated “*liens sentimentaux*” as “sentimental links”. He should perhaps have said “links of sentiment”: but his actual words implied that those links were mawkish, false, or a blend of both.

These are plain instances of how “false friends” can affect diplomatic relations. But there are many that merely confuse ordinary people. “*Actuel*” means “present-day”, not “actual”; “*une bribe*” is a fragment (of music or talk), not a bribe; “*un courtier*” is not a courtier, but a broker; “*descente de lit*” (“bedside mat”) was misread, by a translator of Jean Cocteau, as “getting out of

bed”. The alphabet could continue indefinitely.

The late Philip Thody, with Howard Evans and Gwilym Rees, produced a whole book on *Faux Amis and Key Words* (Athlone Press, 1985) which should be required reading for any translator or interpreter seeking to bridge the Franco-British divide.

Some words can be misleading in their own languages without the extra risks involved in translation. An example in French is “*faire long feu*”. This can bemuse even Frenchmen. The late Pierre Daninos, author of the *Major Thompson* books spoofing France through the eyes of an imagined English expatriate, wondered in print why the phrase meant “burn briefly” instead of “for a long time”. The answer, presumably, is that if (say) burning paper flares high in the air the flame is unlikely to last. “*Faux frais*” is a further French expression that may mislead an unwary Anglophone reader. It might be thought to mean “unjustified expense claims”. In fact it denotes what the British call “overheads” – although this in turn is a misleading expression, since overheads usually involve *infrastructure*, which is surely basic and *below*. “Beg the question” is another English phrase that may be misleading and is often misused. Many people seem to believe that it means “raise the question”. In formal logic it strictly means wrongly to anticipate the answer to a question, by putting it in a biased way.

But translation remains the problem, especially when the words in each language appear the same. And “false friends” are not the only culprits. Less usual suspects also carry burdens from the

past. These are words and expressions that are directly translatable, and sometimes virtually identical, on either side of the Straits of Dover, but which have historic or political overtones so divergent as to mislead all but the most alert. The British Section of the Franco-British Council is currently preparing a short bilingual list of them. Its proposed title is *Nuances*.

A prominent recent example is “suburb”. In English, the word signifies the area between a city and the surrounding countryside, a peaceful, leafy, and largely middle-class habitat of detached or semi-detached houses with gardens and local bowling clubs – the sort of place that appears reassuring in the early reels of some American horror films, only for mayhem to burst later on to the tranquil scene. Such places are sometimes mocked or even despised by intellectuals. But they are far removed from what “*banlieue*”, the direct translation of “suburb”, often means in practice in France. True, some French suburbs resemble those in Britain or America, with quiet “*pavillons*” or villas inhabited by commuters. Not all, however. Especially around Paris, but also outside several big towns, other *banlieues* are semi-urban wastelands of tower-block poverty and sporadic violence, unsparingly portrayed in Mathieu Kassovitz’s 1995 film *La Haine*, and exploding in real riots in 2006.

“Suburb” and “*banlieue*” are extreme examples. Other pairs of words are no less misleading. “*Paysan*” is often translated as “peasant”: but there is a world of difference between the two words. A peasant, in English, is a very primitive tiller of the soil, perhaps a share-cropper, certainly poor and ill-equipped. “*Paysan*” merely denotes a rustic, a farmer, or a country-dweller, with no necessary suggestion of mediaeval rags.

“Conservative” and “*conservateur*” have likewise been celebrated traps. “*Conservateur*” is the normal French translation of “Conservative” (as of the political party); but “*conservateur*” with a small “c” means “conserving” (as in jam). So

“*un agent conservateur*”, which might suggest a Conservative Party official, actually means a “preservative”. An unfortunate European Union official is said to have offered “*préservatif*” as the French translation of that word, unaware that in English this meant “condom”.

A less pungent instance is the word “radical”, apparently identical in both English and French. In both languages, obviously, it can mean “of or by the root”, implying (when linked to “change”, for example) fundamental, visceral, ground-breaking novelty. But in French, unlike English, the same word evokes the Radical Party, a rather old-fashioned entity described by some as politically left-of-centre and economically right-wing.

“*Citoyen*”, too, has connotations in France that “citizen” lacks in Britain. Most obviously, it evokes the *Marseillaise*: “*Aux armes, citoyens!*” And it has a sense of noble independence not unlike that of the word “yeoman” in English. A French citizen is proud to be so called, and mildly puzzled that the British accept the title of “British subject”, which seems to smack of subjection.

“Republican” is a cognate example. Barely heard in Britain, except by and of fierce opponents of the monarchy, it is of course used most often in the United States to denote the eponymous political party. In France, by contrast, the word “*républicain*” conveys a sense of pride and virtue, an allegiance to the principles of the 1789 Revolution, because the French Republic has been interrupted by two Napoleonic Empires and one Vichyite French State.

Marshal Pétain’s wartime “*État français*” is another reason why the word “*état*” still has a somewhat negative ring in French, suggesting over-powerful authority even more strongly than the word “state” does in English. Far more approving in French is the word “*national*” used much more than in Britain, where the adjectives most often replacing it are “royal” and “British” – with perhaps “federal” in the United States.

Of French and English, whose expressions conceal more pitfalls and hidden overtones? It may be that France is richer in hidden overtones, especially in popular speech. "Original" is quite correctly translated as "original", but it contains an ironical shade of meaning missing in English – that of "eccentric" or "bizarre". "Politicien" likewise, is not quite the same as "politician": even more than in English, the noun carries a disparaging connotation, which is even stronger when the same word is used as an adjective. A more neutral French term for a politician is "homme politique". But the English language too has its almost clandestine shades of meaning. Take "these" and "this". What could seem more innocuous? Yet in certain contexts the two very similar words convey almost opposite emotions – scorn and pride. "These people" is a phrase most often used to disparage those described: e.g. "these people must be found and prosecuted". But the self-same speaker may also say "this country" (i.e. Britain) with an air of patriotism; e.g. "in this country we make sure that these people are caught".

Words change their meanings too – even in France, despite the *Académie Française*. Long before the internet signalled the invasion of nerdish Americana, casual French speakers had begun to succumb to *franglais*. "Opportunité" strictly means "opportuneness", not "opportunity" (which is "occasion"); but some twenty years ago it began to be fashionable to misuse the word as if it were indeed its English homonym. Similarly, "réaliser" in French can be translated as "realise", in the sense of "making

real", as applied to realising assets. But it is not the counterpart of the English verb "realise" (to become aware of), which strictly should be "*se rendre compte*". However, under the influence of English, more and more French people may say "réaliser" instead.

There are three words, finally, that deeply concern any federalist European. One is "Europe". To too many British people, this word means "continental Europe", not Europe as a whole, still less as an integrating entity. By their own use of language, they prejudice their future. The second word is "constitution". To the French, a constitution is a written document, subject to amendment and even replacement. To most Britons, their own constitution is something profound, organic, age-old, unwritten, and deeply resistant to change. Hence, in part, their hesitancy about the proposed European constitution. Their political reactions were unconsciously determined by language itself.

And the same applies, of course, to federalism. "Federal" to most continental Europeans, means just what it implies: the taking of decisions at the appropriate level – local, regional, national, and so on up to world level if and when that becomes feasible. But far too many Britons mistakenly believe that "federal", in Europe, means "centralised", "tightly integrated", even "dictatorial". The press, in Britain, is full of such errors, often venomously expressed. Language matters. We should pay it the attention it deserves.

The Search for a European Identity: Who are we?

Giampiero Bordino

In the long constitutional process towards Europe's political unity the issue of the European demos, of its identity, has often been regarded, and above all dealt with, as secondary with respect to the issue of the political order and the institutional arrangement required for the Union. But the issue of the demos and its identity – *Who are we Europeans? What is the meaning of being Europeans? How can we be simultaneously European and Italian, or French or German and so on?* – cannot be dodged. The lack of an identity and of a feeling of belonging can in fact turn against the on-going institutional processes, as the negative outcome of the referenda on the ratification of the European Constitution shows. If we are not adequately conscious and convinced of “belonging” to a common European space, there is the risk, as there are identity-related urges to satisfy, that other and different spaces of belonging (localist, ethnic, national at best) will be cultivated to a hypertrophic degree, and that in between these spaces attitudes tending to exclusion and the generation of conflicts will be primed, as our common, even recent (Yugoslavia, the Balkans) European history tragically reminds us.

To this end, some reflection on European identity looks necessary. But first, a more general and preliminary reflection would be appropriate on what identity means today in the globalized world of the 21st century we have just entered. As our individual experience may tell us, identity never is – and never has been, not even before this global age – solely or simply a “given”. It is “a process”, the result of a more or less conscious elaboration of identity construction which is the result, on the one hand, of our past, and on

the other hand of our future. Our identity, in other words, depends upon what we have been and also upon what we plan to become. With respect to the past (the history behind us) we all – both as individuals and as human groups – inevitably make choices and selections: we pick up the fragments that are more effective for our present and for our future projects. Over the rest we draw a veil and forget them. Hence not even the past is a given, for it too is a process and a construction. History, as Benedetto Croce said, is always “contemporary”, because it is always revisited at the light of the trends of today and the intentions for the future.

To understand this, it is sufficient to think of how national identities in Europe have been built over the past centuries. In all cases, during the course of national unification processes, on the one hand fragments of the past (those functional to the unification process, considered useful for legitimizing it) have been picked up, and, on the other hand, projects for the future have been made. One convenient interpretation of the past legitimized the unification process, and that in turn brought people to look at the past in a different way. National identity – ethnic, linguistic, cultural – was used by the States and their ruling classes as a “symbolic umbrella” for legitimizing political unification (and it also legitimized, with tragic results, the wars always waged in the name of one's own identity against the others') as if it were a natural given. In reality, a national identity was never “a given”, but has always been a construct: for example, Italian national identity, above all linguistic, is the result of mass schooling, of mandatory conscription, of the unifying action of State

bureaucracy, of the internal migration processes that have hybridized peoples and cultures, and lastly of the mass communication media, with television taking the first place.

In the 21st century, with globalization, this evident process-related and constructed character of identity has, so to speak, collapsed. In fact, today both individual and collective identities increasingly depend on and are built through processes of transnational mobility which affect all societies and territories with ever greater intensity.

The mobility of goods, people and “signs” (news, images, values) nurture every day people’s imagination, offer a growing variety of identity options, make new life choices possible. As anthropological and sociological studies have highlighted in the last years, identity therefore appears ever more mobile, composite, plural, even “floating”. This applies in the first place to the hundred millions of people of various transnational Diasporas (American-Indians, Anglo-Pakistanis, French-Moroccans, Italian-Americans, etc.: the new “hyphenated” identities) that dot the world and originate from mobility and migrations, but it applies also to some extent to all those who with globalization are experiencing ever more various and articulated social relations in their local context, and those who are themselves mobile and travel to different countries, surf transnational and global media networks (Satellite TV’s and the Internet), watch and become acquainted with different and distant images and life-models.

If we now, as is necessary, reflect on European identity, we are faced with a new aspect of 21st century identity. European identity cannot be conceived or searched for as if it were a “natural fact” which even the present national or local identities were not; instead, it must be constructed both by looking to the past and at the same time making plans for the future. The path to follow for identity-building is to rethink history and at the same time plan and realize the new polis. This is exactly what the

Founding Fathers of the European Community from Schumann to Monnet, from Einaudi to Spinelli did in their day, when they critically reconsidered Europe’s wars and at the same time devised and proposed a new project for the Europe of peace.

European identity, in this perspective, is unlike what happened in the past with national identities. It can be neither univocal, nor exclusive. Being European must by necessity mean having a plural identity open to differences, facing the world, and hence cosmopolitan. It is not an “ethnic” identity – for that has not been true even of national identities – but “ethical” in the etymological meaning of the word: namely, of custom, of life-style, of values. It must be able to face both the complex and composite character of European history and society, and the new transnational dimension of the globalized world in which we are living.

European history presents, for this purpose, many historical experiences and cultural contributions that can be singled out and placed among our roots: Greek philosophy, Christian universalism, the Jewish culture of the Diaspora, the multicultural and tolerant experience of Islamic Spain, Humanism and the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, liberal political thought, the theories and practices in the 19th century of the social State and of inclusive democracy, and so on. In European history, as in that of the other continental civilizations, there is everything and its contrary too: peace and war, solidarity and massacres, the Christianity of the Crusades and the Wars of Religion, and the Franciscan and ecumenical one, the culture of equality and that of biological and racial inequality, liberal democracy and the Fascist and Stalinist totalitarianism, the nationalist culture and that of supra-national federalism. Europe, in retrospect, appears as a great depository of many possible and diverse identities, often not mutually reconcilable, among which it is necessary for us to make choices according to the values of the present day and the projects

Borderless Debate: The European Identity

for the future.

As to identity and belonging, Europe is confronted, in our global century, with a decisive challenge: how to promote and ensure a peaceful and consensual living together, sharing the same territory with human groups which are much more diverse (because of origin, language, culture of reference, etc., besides social status) and much more mobile (because of migration, work, etc.) than ever before. How can we make possible and construct institutions adapted to such pluri-identity (the “hyphenated” identity): that is, the pluri-belonging, pluri-language-speaking, pluri-citizenship of such human groups? Already today we are simultaneously citizens of a particular nation and of Europe; and tomorrow, hopefully, of the world too.

I believe it is evident that in order to realize

a coexistence of such a kind it is necessary to promote the idea of a plural identity open to diversity, mild, cosmopolitan, for the alternative would be the totalitarian State and the ethnic cleansing that we have already experienced. This is a challenge with which other civilizations and other continents are also confronted. If we are to avert the “clash of civilizations” which some are actively trying to fuel and of which others passively complain, it is necessary to call on all civilizations to become mutually committed to such an identity model. In this respect, we need “more Europe”, not less. Europe must put herself in a position to propose to the world “a pact of civilizations” (a new global *foedus*) that may in time defuse the permanent worldwide civil war that seems to have started. It may well lie right here, in this perspective and in this new European identity project for the 21st century.

The European Identity and the Inclusion of Diversities

Peter D. Sutherland

In his seminal speech on European integration in the University of Zurich on September 19th 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of the old continent as being, “united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He portrayed the base of Greco-Roman culture and the Christian faith and ethics as “being at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. But it was our conflicts rather than our similarities that really motivated him. Everyone in that lecture hall knew that his reference to nationalistic struggles that had “...wrecked the peace and marred the prospects of mankind” was the real reason for his desire to see, “a United States of Europe” (albeit one from which Great Britain would stand somewhat apart). Certainly it was the agonies of divisive histories rather than any sense of a shared European identity that drove the Founding Fathers, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenaur, Alcide De Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak, to propose a new institutional structure to help reconciliation and future peace. There were, of course, other reasons that motivated them also, such as the rejection of what one observer has described as “The false universalism of communism and the false particularism of fascism, one of which sought to make everyone the same and the other of which refused any sense of common humanity”.

Those times are now long past and the context of our present debate is different. The threat of fratricidal conflict in Europe has receded and our peoples seem, perhaps complacently, unconcerned by it. Also, apart from the faltering memories of past conflicts, we no longer have the need to be cemented together in mutual

protection from the USSR.

So inevitably attitudes to European integration, particularly amongst the young, have changed and are challenged by new realities such as the enlargement of the EU. Their motivation for a belief in the process can no longer be promoted by the recollections of terrible events now only within the living memory of a small and diminishing minority. Therefore we must rethink and restate the case for European integration. This will be assisted by an understanding that the fundamental relationship between the nation state and the citizen has been changed in the globalising and increasingly interdependent world of today. Of course it had been the nation state, and the manner in which it functioned particularly since the nineteenth century, that created many of our historic problems. In 1826 the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, remarked following the collapse of the Congress of Vienna system, “Things are getting back to a wholesome state, every nation for itself, and God for us all”. His world was that which many of us hope that we have escaped fearing, as President Mitterrand said in his farewell speech to the European Parliament, “Le Nationalisme, c’est la guerre”.

So what is this concept of a nation state which some eurosceptics and nationalists in particular wish to retain? It means different things to different people. Jeremy Rifkin (*The European Dream*, p. 166) has written, “The popular conception of the Nation State... is rooted in common culture, language and customs. (But) in reality is more of... an artificial construct...”. Often, in order to create it, he wrote, it was

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necessary to, "...create a compelling story about a common past, one convincing enough to capture the imagination of the people and convince them of their shared identity and common destiny." The reality however is often more complex. There are indeed shared histories and values and the binding together of communities has many valid and positive aspects that are not contrived. It has to be admitted, however, that in many cases the alleged unity of peoples has been a recent phenomenon and is less than fully convincing historically. National languages have been important in this but, for example, in 1789 a small fraction of the French people spoke French and in 1861 only 2% of Italians spoke Italian. Castilian too was very much a minority language in Spain. After the Reformation, religion also had an effect in creating a sense of a shared past and a common destiny for majorities in a national state, although it also has had the divisive effect of creating a question mark over the nationality of minorities. However, the fact is that most people in Europe feel an intense and often passionate sense of belonging to a nation state. This could never be supplanted by a European identity and nor should it be. It is to national identity that people primarily cling. The Danish intellectual Tozer Seidenfaden wrote: "There is no European people, no European ethnicity, no European demos; as a consequence the EU is notoriously incapable of generating popular enthusiasm on any major scale. This is, of course, one of its most attractive features". Whilst this comment goes a little too far for my taste, one can see what he meant.

Ernest Renan has written that the nation is a spiritual principle consisting of two things, "A common legacy of rich memories from the past and a consensus to forget the oppressions and injustices that once divided the members of the nation". We have all seen this in action. If one looked into the heart of most Europeans today, they would see themselves as part of one race or another, although their DNA may well provide evidence of a more complex reality. Unfortunately, many probably see their race as being "better" in

one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and perhaps the price for the cohesion of a community. Of course, too, there are confusing overlaps between nations within nations. Examples proliferate around Europe. The British are comprised by a group of perceived nationalities, as are the Spanish and many others. The question as to where their ultimate loyalty lies would be hard to answer for many a Scot, a Walloon, a Bavarian or a Catalan.

In his *History of Europe*, Norman Davies draws a distinction between civilisation and culture. The former is defined as "the sum total of ideas and traditions which had been inherited from the ancient world and from Christianity". In other words it constitutes what binds us together. Culture, on the other hand, is seen by him as growing "from the every day life of the people... In earlier times civilisation was extolled and culture despised. Nationalism did the opposite."

All of this makes for a volatile situation, particularly when one takes into account the new challenges of integrating the relatively recent waves of migration within Europe itself and also, particularly, from North Africa. We now have a Europe that is increasingly diversified within its component parts with, for example, 10 million Muslims living in the EU. Paradoxically, too, while the EU integrates nation states with each other it also can create the seeds of national disintegration. This is because nation states that contain different ethnic strands were often bound together in the past because of the advantages of economic integration within a nation state, combined with the need for protection from external aggression. Neither of these conditions exist today within the EU. Essentially, the completion of the Common Market and the removal of the prospect of intra-European warfare has removed the fears that formerly drove regions to adhere to a larger nation state. Many Catalan or Basque nationalists, for example, see little

point in a continued connection with Madrid if it costs them money. In addition, a positive reason for division into smaller units is that, within the EU, there is increasing evidence of greater economic success amongst the smaller nation states than the larger. The three highest levels of GDP per capita are to be found in Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark. This is argued by some to be influenced by the greater flexibility in domestic economic policy that each can now deploy. These smaller states can adapt to the opportunities afforded by a full access to a vast Common Market in a more focused and effective way than larger states.

So today our political structures have to accommodate a series of apparently conflicting realities. These include separatism and integration and diversity and shared values and the EU can help in this accommodation. We have to build upon and develop our shared values to bind us together, whilst not attempting to stifle the legitimate distinctions and loyalties between ethnic or religious groups within our collective body politic. If we do not maintain a sense of some shared identity and interdependence, we will be unable to continue to justify the essential supranational aspects of what the EU is. As William Wallace, the political scientist, wrote in the early 1980s of the EC, "it is less than a Federation, but more than a regime". This is particularly the case because, within agreed confines, laws can be made that are opposed by individual Member States, and the direct effect of Community Law makes national law and national courts less than fully sovereign.

The integration process should help to develop a common political community to protect the values, political diversity, democracy and human rights in which we jointly believe and which will act as a defence against the attack on any of these values at national level. The EU should, in a broader sense too, be the means for the resolution of, "The contradictions of tribalism and globalism" (Horsman and Marshall, *After the Nation State*, p.189). We are assisted in this

because we are much more alike today than many recognise. Indeed, on the big issues of our time, European peoples are remarkably united in the attitudes that reflect their shared values. Their distinctive positions can be contrasted to those currently prevailing in other parts of the world, including the United States. In this regard Robert Kagan has detailed our differences. Although his description of a Europe of Kant's perpetual peace as against a Hobbesian US defending and promoting a liberal order through force are gross simplifications, they reflect some truth. We here believe in communitarianism, solidarity and multilateralism in a specific European way. The fact that according to Eurobarometer surveys Europeans want, in a majority everywhere, 'a more independent' common foreign and defence policy is a reflection of an increasing European belief that we share more in our approaches to international affairs with our European neighbours than anything that divides us. That was shown in reactions to the Iraq war, where public opinion was generally negative to the war throughout the EU, even though European leaders notoriously divided with some courting unpopularity in supporting the US. On the domestic front too we share similar views on a wide range of issues, for example, from the death penalty to the extent and limitations of individual freedom. The European convergence means that we and others now have a capacity to work together to constructively influence a world full of both opportunities and threats. If we fail to do so together, even the largest states will reduce their influence over their own destiny, and the distinctive European viewpoint will be increasingly marginalised and ignored internationally.

In my opinion, the approach of the current leadership of some important Member States to global challenges facing the EU has regrettably been to retreat more towards national capitals rather than advance the integration process that we need to deal with the issues of interdependence. Should it persist, this will gradually undermine institutions such as the

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European Commission and the European Parliament having a limited but clear federal vocation. The 'no' votes in France and The Netherlands have incorrectly been interpreted as votes against European integration, and this may increase this intergovernmentalist tendency. They have also been interpreted by some as a warning against further enlargement, particularly in regard to Turkey.

Let me turn now to the issue of future enlargements and possible limits to the expansion of the EU having regard to this issue of shared identity. Firstly, however, it should be emphasised that the enlargement of the EU can no longer be considered as inevitable even for those countries within Europe that comply with the requirements set in what is known as 'the Copenhagen Criteria'. There is a likelihood that in the future new accessions will only take place after specific referendums, at least in some existing Member States. It needs to be recognised in particular that amongst those most likely to oppose enlargement to include Turkey will be some committed integrationalists who argue that Turkish membership damages the cohesion of the EU.

The debate about Turkish accession, therefore, crystallises many of the questions about identity, history, attitudes and values within the EU. Religion plays a real part in this too. Even though the Founding Fathers of the EU were virtually all Christian Democrats, they did not invoke God or Christianity as a factor in European integration. Indeed, the separation of Church and State remained the prevailing position in the conclusion of the debate on the Constitutional Treaty, but Christianity remains the heritage of many Europeans. Although the status of the Church was included in Article 1-51, the invocation of God in the preamble was omitted (although only after fierce debate during which Catholics were joined by Lutherans, Calvinists and Orthodox). One can take it, however, as evidenced by the papal blessing of the politicians who convened on the 29th

October 2004 in Rome to sign the Constitution, that the Catholic Church, for example, did not reject the draft. However, this accepted division between the Church and State in the EU does not mean that there are no objections to Turkish accession, based upon a perception that the Turkish people are in some sense different and this is connected with religion. Thus, although Pope John Paul II in *Ecclesia in Europe* made the point that "...Europe must be equivalent to openness...", it is apparent that this openness has limitations. Pope Benedict XVI is publicly against Turkish accession. He is not, of course, alone in this. The President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Giscard d'Estaing, has said that Turkish accession would mean "...the end of the EU". Nor is it supported by President Chirac, Angela Merkel or Chancellor Schussel of Austria, and these politicians, amongst others, clearly reflect the views held by many Europeans. The question may be asked as to whether this opposition is related to questions surrounding the distinctive identity and values of the Turkish people or whether it is simply related to more pragmatic concerns such as the fear of migration, the lack of development of the Turkish economy or real depth of its democracy. It might also specifically relate to the treatment of religion in Turkey. Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, recently said "...freedom of religion is one of the key issues to be addressed by Turkey." The reality is that the debates about secularism in Turkey today, such as whether to make adultery a criminal offence or whether boys who have been to religious schools can pursue a university education of their choosing, underline the fact that accession will create a very new and much deeper diversity in the EU, should it occur.

The bottom line should surely be that there is an existing commitment to negotiations. These will take many years to conclude and only then will it be possible to judge whether Turkey could or should be a full member. That judgement will depend, in turn, on a fair assessment of the extent to which Turkey can subscribe to a

deepening political integration founded upon shared values and the attitudes that emanate from them.

The very fact of this debate taking place now, whatever its merits, underlines the fact that there is a widely shared belief that there is something distinctive and important in European values and attitudes, and that the EU is about more than the creation of a functioning market supported by some elements of cross border solidarity.

Even though the Constitution has not been adopted, it presents, in its terms, a reasonable template for our future development. Article 1.1 was exhaustively discussed and it simply states that any European country that subscribes to promoting the Union's values is eligible for accession. It did not define what it is meant by "European", but it is a geographic concept that has been interpreted to include states that are potentially within the border of the continent. The values, too, are set out in Article 2 as being "Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy

the rule of law" and "respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities". The objectives set out in Article 3 include, "Promoting cohesion and solidarity and respect for the rich cultural and linguistic diversity of the Member States". These all seem to be an expression of identity that has a real meaning.

I believe that the meaning of these values and objectives have a particular – and shared – European interpretation. It is not intended to be divisive or disparaging to suggest that this interpretation is different to that applied in other parts of the world. Our cultures may be distinct, but our development has gradually brought us together in a unique way which we can build upon. The late Hugo Young once wrote in *The Guardian* about our European cultures "It is helpful to learn that there are not rival cultures a zero sum game of allegiance, but that they mingled and grew together." We should seek to continue that process of growing together.

This article was first published in the autumn issue of *Studies*

General Outlook: the Europe of the Media and Europe in the Media

Stéphane Carrara

Relations between the EU and the national media do not stand comparison with the relationship between national powers and “their” media. Similarly, we cannot but notice that existing European-level media such as *Euronews* have nothing in common in terms of impact, for instance, with mass TV networks in any member state.

Consequently, the EU is at present hindered by “re-nationalized” readings of its current events. National media inevitably “re-nationalize” European information, removing or distorting that “community” dimension which is indispensable if the public are to grasp the full extent of the issues under discussion. Purely European media hardly exist and have had very little success up till now. The big press and TV groups show no interest in Europe, and consider the EU to be “not sexy enough” and not “marketable”. There is an obvious need for trans-national media to bring new life into community democracy and give a higher profile to a European reading of the community agenda. Here the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas would speak of the necessity of creating a European public space. The project designed and implemented by *Café Babel* is inspired by this ambition and realizes it in a very interesting manner.

Indeed, the European Magazine *Café Babel* is the result of work by a network of more than 350 young Europeans drawn from practically all member states and even beyond. Together they produce a magazine of information for the citizens – but not only – in six languages (French, English, German, Italian, Spanish and Catalan).

This magazine gambles on supplying its readers with a European outlook on current events, offering multiple points of view and thereby creating a genuinely European – that is to say, supra- or trans-national – debate. It also successfully experiments with public debates: the so-called *coffee stormings*. In Brussels, for example, the local team organizes monthly public debates on current European themes, including such topics as the constitution, Euro-Mediterranean policy, Lisbon strategy etc. These bi-lingual debates (French/English) take place between young Europeans and various personalities from the political world (European representatives), academics, members of institutions (such as the European commission), and members of European associations.

Conclusion: the media, a key to power?

Of course, the media alone are not the key to power, or at least they are not the only key on which the EU should rely. For the present, media system’s doors have been locked against EU information and still remain definitely closed today. But steady and strenuous pressure to develop a mass information capacity via the media must be maintained and stepped up. We must call on the media world’s sense of responsibility, especially in information; but we must also call on the European institutions themselves to promote and help projects going in this direction. In this respect the work of teams of dedicated journalists is a vitally important means of enhancing the political awareness of European citizens. It must be emphasized that the media are an essential key, which Europe does not yet possess, to the clear detriment of its integration process.

XXI UEF Congress

(Vienna, Austria, June 30 - July 2)

On the occasion of the XXI UEF Congress, which took place in Vienna from Friday 30 June to Sunday 2 July, some 200 participants, delegates, guests and observers gathered in order to define the UEF's policy line for the next years, as well as to elect the organs of the organisation.

In her key note speech, Mercedes Bresso, President of UEF, stated that the discomfort of European citizens vis-à-vis the process of European integration was due to the fact that the EU appears to be incapable of facing problems. While European citizens want more and not less Europe, political elites are incapable of demonstrating that the European Constitution brings progress of great importance to build a more efficient and more democratic Europe. The President proposed that a petition supported by 1,000,000 citizens should be launched, requesting a Convention that is indeed constituent, and a ratification referendum to be held together with the European elections of 2009.

On Friday 30 June, Pat Cox, President of the European Movement and former President of the European Parliament, gave the opening speech at the XXI UEF Congress. Mr. Cox acknowledged the present crisis of the EU, but was determined not to give way to pessimism.

On Saturday morning, the Congress, divided up into four Political Commissions, centred on the following topics: "The European Constitutional process?", "Which industrial and energy policy for Europe?", "Europe as a power for peace" and "Financing the European project". The proposals of the Commissions were discussed in the Congress plenary, and lead to the drafting of some resolutions.

A total of six resolutions were adopted by the Congress. In its general strategy resolution, the UEF states that it is an illusion to think that a more democratic and more effective Europe can be built without a European Constitution. The

democratic deficit of the European Union could not be overcome until the veto right in the Council is abolished and the majority rule is accepted as the general principle of the Constitutional Treaty. The UEF therefore requests that the European Parliament takes part in every future change of the Constitutional Treaty. The amended Constitutional Treaty should be submitted to a European-wide referendum, simultaneously with the next European parliamentary elections in 2009. The Constitutional Treaty should then enter into force if a double majority of citizens and states approves it. Countries having voted against the Constitutional Treaty should have a second chance to accept it. The UEF decided therefore to start a new phase of the Campaign for a Federal Constitution, focused on the European consultative ballot in 2009, in alliance with the organizations of civil society and all political parties which support the aim of a European Federation.

During the days of Saturday and Sunday, there were also the elections for the President, the directly elected Federal Committee members, as well as the Vice-Presidents and the new Bureau. Mercedes Bresso was confirmed in her role of President. Philipp Agathonos and Sergio Pistone were confirmed Vice Presidents, and Heinz Schaumann joined them. Anders Ekberg is the new Treasurer, while the other elected members of the Executive Bureau are Alfonso Iozzo, Richard Laming, Michel Morin, Florian Rodeit and Paolo Vacca. JEF President Jan Seifert and the new Treasurer will join the Bureau as ex-officio members.

The texts of the other resolutions, as well as all the speeches, the complete election results, and the working documents can be found on the UEF website: <http://www.federaleurope.org/index.php?id=4183>.

The Referendum of the Cowards

Michel Morin

Philippe Val

Le Referendum des Laches

(The Referendum of the Cowards)

Paris, Ed. Le Cherche Midi, 2005

Reading this small book was a surprise, a happy surprise, one which leaves you buoyant and light-hearted, and eager to share it with all your friends – which was soon done and rapidly spread out in concentric waves. That is the reason why, one year after the results of the French vote, a review presenting the content of this book may still be of interest at a time when the breakdown of the European construction is under the eyes of everybody.

During the electoral campaign for the referendum on the adoption of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) which took place in France in May 2005, federalist militants became aware, day after day, of the weakness of the campaign for the Yes led by the main political leaders and organizations, a campaign that the federalists could not help much with their enthusiasm. This is the reason why the message delivered by Philippe Val was welcomed as a good piece of news. The interest of its arguments, which will be summarized in the present note, was much increased by the position occupied by its author in the French political scene as a columnist. Director and Editorial writer of the weekly *Charlie Hebdo*, Philippe Val in his leader articles developed arguments in favour of the Yes vote, against the advice of most of his editorial staff, who were in favour of various currents in the French radical left. As a satirical paper,

Charlie Hebdo does not mind its words when it criticizes established powers, be they capitalism, outdated values, authoritarian government trends, violence and the abusing of individuals. It is the reason why the support given to the ECT by a somewhat iconoclastic personality aroused at least some curiosity and a desire to debate the issues.

As far as new arguments are concerned, in the book there are few of them for the federalists, but on the other hand the tone, the way to present the problems, to link analyses, to connect arguments, all this adds to the usual style of a pro-European and federalist approach. For the first time a passion and conviction deeply rooted in a private history inspire words for a Europe of flesh and blood. It is not about a virtual Europe but a Europe which lives in men's bodies and minds, in the reality of cultures which are both deeply rooted and of everyday use. And at a conference-debate between Philippe Val and the Rhône-Alpes federalists the writer confirmed the dimension of his commitment which we find now in his written testimony.

Of this small book, which Philippe Val meant as a scathing tract to spread his ideas, only few copies have been sold, due to rather weak advertising; but its publication allowed its writer to take a very active part in various televised talks. From the very first lines the book is presented as "a combative pamphlet expressing a deeply-felt commitment. I am devoted to the European cause in such a sensitive way, that I am astonished of myself" (p. 7). The form, which is a bit rugged and less structured than it should have been, is due to the hurry in which the writer found himself. Why did he submit to the "revolt and anger" which are the reasons of such urgency?

Because the author puts the stake of the referendum on the burning issue of the "nation", which is the underlying taboo of this ballot. For him "the problem posed by the adoption of this Constitution is that it marks a fundamental stage

on the way to the abandonment of national sovereignty. It announces the end of the nation in favour of a federation" (p. 56). Numerous elements of an analysis of the function and the history of the nation are to be found in the chapters of this book. In it we also perceive the denouncement of a strong personal conviction: "Everything happens as if the protagonists had agreed to speak of something else... nobody wants to touch this idea of the nation" (p. 16). "To open the debate entails breaking the taboo of the nation, a concept which is much more sacred in the minds of the citizens than one may imagine, although they are not fully aware of it" (p. 26).

In fact, the debate on the Constitution rekindles in France very old quarrels at the very heart of the debate on the "nation": what are its foundations? The territory or an ideal? The primacy of the rights of man or the reason of State? This approach leads Philippe Val to a vigorous criticism of "*souverainiste*" ideas and even to the attempt to unmask hidden positions. The protesting upholders of sovereignty prefer criticizing Europe rather than "the holy nation", even though the decisions they dislike are taken by *national* authorities. This observation, which regularly comes up in the actions sponsored, among others, by the French Communist Party, matches up with the conception of internationalism, which is connected with the idea of nation, which is also strongly rooted in the psychology of the main leaders of ATTAC, a radical-left movement.

Philippe Val denounces the caution of these leaders, who refuse to reveal their deeper motivations to militants; they are misled and attracted only by the radical economic criticism directed against the ECT. He charges the ones and the others with simply having chosen to unite against Europe all kinds of discontent. It is true that a wide variety of complaints and sufferings lead to say No to everything and anything – and never mind the European Constitution! Another recurrent theme in the book is peace. Several times the writer is struck by the

"weariness" or "boredom" that the lasting peace reigning over the European continent seems to engender. Peace for too long? "The argument according to which 'Europe means peace' is on the point of losing its meaning, since peace has become the natural element we live in" (p. 109).

From his dedication to peace, peace being a priceless value, Philippe Val opens two interesting perspectives. On the one hand, he considers that the construction of peace entails, explains and justifies the complexity of the European construction in general and of the ECT in particular. To his mind, such a lengthy and dull text is "the price to be paid for a political creation – the construction of Europe – with no precedent in the past, a consequence of the economic, political and moral collapse of Europe after the two world wars" (p. 12). On the other hand, this process leads to developing a culture of negotiation and discussion that progressively replaces the culture of confrontation and war, which used to be a much easier one.

From this basic remark it is possible to draw a strategic reflection for the federalist thought. To say No to the ECT is an act based on a national ideal. To say Yes means accepting compromise, negotiation, discussion. Consequently, it is a confrontation between a concrete ideal and an horizon which recedes as one moves forward. "One does not send men to be killed for an horizon". Hence an important question on the forms of the federalist action towards a European people: how to galvanize and mobilize citizens for a federal Europe?

Dynamic and militant, the author launches a few pointed remarks at the supporters of the Yes in the referendum; for him, they got caught in a debate about real concerns, and in order not to appear cynical, they have prudently camped on the very ground of controversies chosen by the supporters of the No, so as to elude the problem of the nation. They did not fight against the strategy of a scapegoat (Europe) which was employed against them. He goes so far as to

denounce their pusillanimity, not to say their cowardice, when they did not dare to speak of the construction of a European federation, of European federalism, which were the real issues at stake (pp. 70-71).

There are three positive aspects in the militant message delivered by Philippe Val, each one being an element which enriches federalist culture in an original way.

He contributes to the definition of a positive pro-European action. He strongly places his reflection in the field of politics. "When the supporters of the No protest that they are genuine Europeans, they play with words... Today "European" has in fact two meanings: a traditional acceptance, "of European origin and culture", and a more up-to-date sense, "in favour of the abandonment of sovereignty as necessary to the building of a new Europe"" (p. 23). He resolutely takes position in favour of a Federal Europe, but he disagrees with the tenets of militant federalists by stating that the present construction of Europe is already federal, in his opinion, in the institutions already in existence (European laws prevailing over national laws). Consequently, according to him, the ECT is only one additional, democratic stage towards a fully federal Europe.

The political debate on the referendum is a confrontation between *républicains* (in the French, quite nationalist, sense) and democrats. The Yes or No votes have been given according to the prevailing political leaning of the voters. The unquestionable democratic advances brought by the Constitution largely compensate for the loss of the former structuring values, i.e. the republic associated with the nation.

Indeed, a debate did take place, but there is a final criticism on the role played by the media. A detailed analysis shows that in over 7 weeks of open debate, the agony, then the death and funeral of Pope Jean-Paul II was given a paramount place in the news for more than three weeks, clouding the political debate. It might not have changed the result of the ballot, but it

may have had a greater weight in the balance than one thinks. The role played by the media has not been analyzed further, but we know that the history and analysis of this political event remains to be written.

In his conclusion, Philippe Val enlarges his topic to the scale of the world and mankind: "To be a citizen of Europe means sharing ideas and not origins... The European construction is a cosmopolitan thought, which asserts itself politically against any ethnic thought" (p. 112).

What Europe?

Francesca Lacaïta

Donatella Della Porta & Manuela Caiani

Quale Europa? Europeizzazione, identità e conflitti (What Europe? Europeanization, identity and conflicts)

Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006

It has been over a year since the No's carried the day in the referenda on the European constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. Pro-European people do not seem to have got over the sense of shock yet, their feelings being still marked, on the whole, by doubt and uncertainty. How to interpret the twice resounding No? What to make of the fact that in France the opponents of the Treaty are for the most part women, young people, the have-nots and the weakest in general – but also public-sector employees and groups having a "social" conception of the State? Does this mean that by now the European project is supported by a minority in public opinion, or is at most an option for the "contented" classes? But then – again in France – 66% of interviewees, both Yes and No voters, say they want a new

Constitution, and only 27% want to stick to the present treaties. Is this a contradiction, or is it not? And if it is not, how to relaunch the European integration process and come at last out of this state of paralysis? Della Porta and Caiani's work offers a complex, original analysis and interpretation of the present situation, stimulating reflection and the search for new avenues in political action.

This study is part of a European research project on the transformation of political mobilization and communication in the public sphere Europe-wide; within this framework it illustrates the situation in Italy. In particular, it focuses on the construction of a "public discourse" on European integration, which is in turn a significant factor not only in the way the EU impacts on the national systems of the member States (Europeanization), but also in the formation of a European identity. Indeed, European identity, too, not unlike its national counterparts, is imagined or construed in many ways according to different points of view, and it is defined out of the conflicts taking place over it. The research is based on two types of sources: on the one hand, on the analysis of the debate on Europe as it has developed in the media (four newspapers and the Internet) in the period from 1990 to the present day; on the other hand, on 80 interviews to journalists, newspaper editors, and exponents of institutions, business interests, political parties, social movements and civil-society organizations (among whom the then Secretary of the Italian European Federalist Movement (MFE)).

It is first to be observed that in Italy too, as in the rest of Europe, a phase has definitely come to an end, i.e. when the European integration process was driven by comparatively narrow elites who relied on the "permissive consensus" of the "silent public" on account of undoubtedly beneficial effects. That is to say, when European elites were legitimised by their *output*, rather than by the usual democratic procedures, or *input*. In Italy this was reflected in an enthusiastic

and almost universal support to "Europe" as the way both to regain respectability and prestige after the discredit fascism had brought, and to cure what were considered to be the traditional Italian "anomalies". Never mind if such enthusiasm was not accompanied by awareness or understanding (even now the Italians are among the last in Europe as to knowledge of European institutions and policies). Or if the general consensus did not encourage discussion on the choices that were being made, or if Italy was the country that most flouted Brussels ordinances. Europe stood for modernity and progress; its symbolic value was in itself enough to make it desirable.

Well, those times are over for good. In the 1990s a quantum leap occurred in the European integration process (although not in the direction the federalists had hoped). Several matters and processes have become "Europeanised", i.e. authority over them has been relocated to the European arena. Europe has become more present and more visible than ever before in policies affecting everyday life. In turn, national politicians have begun to shift the blame on "Brussels" for unpopular measures at home. Thus the consensus about European integration can no longer be taken for granted; public opinion is now more critical and the issues at stake have become "politicised". Discontent has found voice as well as political *entrepreneurs* ready to ride it. The very idea of Europe has become controversial. The victory of the No's in the French and Dutch referenda is symptomatic in this sense. In Italy support for Europe remains high, although with considerable dents; in particular, the end of a broad consensus and the politicisation of the discourse on Europe have coincided with the crisis of that very political system which had for decades assured a full and virtually universal advocacy. At the same time, an "Italianisation" of the discourse on European integration can be observed, reproducing the quarrels and fractures of national politics.

In this new context, in which Europe is definitely

part of everyday life and is discussed as never before, the old clear distinction between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics (or nationalists) has become much more complicated. The difference of opinion is no longer only about the *quantity* of Europe, but also about the *quality* of Europe, and even about the distance between the “existing Europe” and one’s own “imagined Europe”. Do we want an intergovernmental Europe or a supranational Europe, a “deregulated” Europe or a federalist Europe, a neo-liberal Europe or a social Europe, a technocratic Europe or a Europe “from the bottom up”? Do we understand Europe as “instrumentally” useful to solve problems of national interest or as a project involving identity and changing collective self-understanding? The cleavages over such different, if not opposite, visions of Europe may in turn overlap pre-existing ones. Indeed, although support for European integration is, as is well-known, independent of one’s collocation in the political spectrum, it can be noticed that an “instrumental” idea of Europe tends to prevail at the right end, just as the “identity-laden” one seems to find most favour on the left. Sometimes the interviews may well cause surprise – say, when the representative of the globalisation-critic group *I Disobbedienti* (usually thought of as the most distant from the European project to be found on the left) states: “We are deeply pro-European, but we believe that Europe cannot be run by the established powers only. We think of a federalist Europe formed by the network and the federations of European cities, in other words a Europe constituted by strong local powers, even strong self-government” (p. 101). Similar ideas are also expressed by the representatives of other social movements.

Besides the various conceptions of Europe, the essay deals with the actors expressing them, their communication strategies, their ability to exert influence at European level, their access to the media, and the role of the media themselves. In this analysis, the dysfunctions characterizing the Europeanization process and the construction of a European public discourse stand out quite

clearly. It is significant, for example, that the more “Europeanised” a political issue becomes, the less access civil-society actors get to the public sphere (i.e. the media or decision-making channels) – with the partial exception of that process called “Europeanization from the bottom up”, which however implies more conflict than consensus. More than in the countries studied in the research project, on average, the Italian press appears to be alive to the European dimension of events, but at the same time it is highly selective with regard to the attention given to the different types of actors, in that it favours national ones over those lacking resources and power, who are thus excluded or discriminated against. If the latter want to make their points of view known or to widen the range of their political action, they mostly have the Internet and transnational networks to rely on, as the representative of the Italian MFE remarks about the experience of his organization. It is in this way, surely, that a European public sphere is being built too. However, the process is hampered by contradictions and the dysfunctions, due to the fact that in the early stages of European integration an active and critical participation from the bottom up was simply not contemplated. Now, unsurprisingly, protest and dissent is inevitable. Which does – understandably – worry those who fear that protest will eventually fray even that little of “Europe” that has been possible to knit so far.

However the authors argue that, in the light of the very evolution of the public sphere in national states (developed not, as is often erroneously believed, out of a nonexistent “unity”, but out of conflicts of different ideas and interests), certain stages are not to be avoided: “the building of the nation-state has been in any case a conflictual process: citizenship rights have been the outcome of social struggles [...]. Democracy has arisen by challenging public decisions; criticizing the course taken by the elites has contributed to legitimising the State as the main decisional level. [...] Contesting European policies is [...] – as Thomas Risse points out – the only possible

way to create a supra-national democracy: in fact, the hallmark of a democratic process is not the tacit consensus to the rulers' decisions, but, on the contrary, the very subjecting of those decisions to the "test of discussion" (pages 208-209). Perhaps the No's in the French and Dutch referenda do not in themselves signify a "crisis of Europe". But they do all the more lend a new urgency to the struggle for an authentic European democracy. Which is, after all, the core of the federalist idea.

State of the World '06

The Need for an Environment-Oriented Reconversion of the World Economy

Roberto Palea

Worldwatch Institute
State of the World 2006
New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006

This year, the Worldwatch Institute report on the environmental state of the planet, named *State of the World 2006*, focuses on the economic development of India and China, to draw attention to the consequences that such a development will generate on the environmental equilibrium in these particular regions and worldwide.

Twenty years ago, China entered a period of economical reforms; since then, the country has recorded average growth rates of 9,5% a year. India's economy is also undergoing a fast growing phase, so much so that the economic experts forecast that India will experience the fastest economic boom in history over the next fifteen years. It should be noted that these economic successes have not been achieved through the wealth of natural resources,

which are moderate, but through considerable investments in human capital, in particular in the population with the highest degree of education. India has thus developed good practices in computer science and is achieving a true miracle in the hi-tech sector.

On the other hand China has built its economic success on the boom of the manufacturing industry, from textile to sophisticated electronic equipment that, owing to the low production costs, has put all competitors in other countries in a difficult situation. China is currently developing one of the most important automotive sectors in the world.

As a consequence of the economic development, China and India have become large consumers at world-wide level, especially of oil products, creating tensions on the major raw material markets. Over 300 million Chinese and 200 million Indians can be considered as belonging to the new consumer class, with a purchasing power reaching that of the populations of rich countries.

Analysing the repercussions of this development on the human and environmental health of the respective countries, the Worldwatch Institute reveals that both countries are undergoing the fastest and most confused process of urban migration in history. Already 35 cities in India and 45 in China have a population exceeding one million individuals, all characterised by an unbreathable air quality since energy is produced through the use of carbon and oil, in technologically backward and inefficient plants and motors.

China owns only 8% of the world water supplies to fulfil the needs of 22% of the world population, and the north of the country is practically dry. In India, only 10% of waste water is treated; as a consequence, most rivers are polluted by domestic and industrial polluting agents. It can be forecast that within 2025, India will double its water demand in the cities, and in China over

one hundred large towns may soon have to face water crises in an attempt to supply water both to the population and to the industries. The water requirements will also weigh on the currently self-sufficient agribusiness production, affecting the territory's capacity to feed its inhabitants.

In the coming years, China and India will inevitably claim increasing shares of the global resources, reaching a consumption level never experienced before at world-wide level. According to the Worldwatch Institute's analyses, if these two countries should use as much oil per capita as Japan is using today, their demand alone would exceed the current global demand. And if their biosphere demand per capita should equal that of today's Europe, the whole planet Earth would be necessary to support these two countries alone.

Reflections on the environmental consequences, for the whole world, of the economic development in China and India, confirm the impossibility for the ecosystem to sustain the development model adopted by industrialised countries (which is also spreading to developing countries), based on endless growth, product maximisation, unrestrained consumption, and squandering of natural resources, in particular energy resources. To achieve "sustainable development" (according to the definition of the Brundtland Commission of 1987) the implementation of an environment-oriented reconversion of the world economy is definitely crucial.

After reading the interesting report "State of the World 2006", I would like to express some considerations on this fundamentally important theme for humanity at large. In the writer's opinion, the environment-oriented economic reconversion process should initiate from a precise and localised starting point, then spread gradually, and as fast as possible, to the whole world. The European Union, in its position of world economic area, could probably implement this process, starting with reductions in the use

of fossil fuels in energy production.

In the energy sector, the EU has to face the consequences of the rising oil prices and must solve serious problems related to increasing imports, dependence on foreign countries and the diversification of energy supplies. On the other hand, the EU occupies a leading position in the world in terms of energy demand management, promotion of new and renewable forms of energy and development of low-carbon emission technologies.

In the EU's Green Book on "European strategy for sustainable, competitive and safe energy", approved in March 2006 by the EU Commission, the EU declares its intention to establish among the 25 member states a common policy in the energy sector and proposes, at the same time, a Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to improve energy efficiency, to increase the share of electric energy produced by renewable energy sources (bioethanol, solar, wind), to complete the domestic gas and electricity markets; if implemented, this plan would represent an epoch-making event in the energy policy of the Old Continent.

However, to reach these ambitious targets, the European Union needs to acquire suitable institutional tools and, therefore, a European Agency for Energy, based on the model of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was entrusted, after the Second World War, with the rationalisation of the energy resources available at that time.

Proceeding in this direction, the EU could assume, at a later stage, the role of the leading (peaceful) power in the environment-oriented reconversion process of the economy. This choice would be in keeping with the EU's ambitions and inherent to its own interests, not only in the energy sector, but in all the production and consumption fields. The EU could really "shake" the European economy with significant repercussions on development

and employment, restructuring the Common Agricultural Policy and basing it on crops intended for the production of bioethanol; intervening on the production processes, encouraging material reuse and recycling; improving water distribution and its rational use; redesigning its cities to make them more liveable; enhancing the cultural and artistic heritage, and so on.

Should the EU become the leading power in the ecological sector, it could exercise international leadership in the environment-oriented

reconversion process of the world economy, and thus negotiate with the United States, at an equal level, the revision of the current American position – up to now opposed to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and hostile to the limitation of fossil fuel consumption and to the adoption of measures that may influence the American life style – and work together to improve the “world governance”, strengthen and democratise the UN and the world institutions that make up the UN system, and build the new world order, more respectful of the environment and more equitable, that the world requires.



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