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*New Series*

# The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists  
in Europe and the World

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*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution  
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations  
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

# The Federalist Debate

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# The Federalist Debate



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# No Globalisation without Representation

## Lessons Learnt from the Failure of the Seattle Summit

*Lucio Levi*

After the failure of the Seattle summit, the WTO reached a turning point. The failure underlined the WTO's institutional inability to pursue the ambitious goals of the Millennium Round.

### *Globalisation Needs Regulation*

The fact is that, after the creation of an open world market through a generalised tariff reduction, the main problem to be addressed now is the application of new rules to global competition and their universal enforcement. The real issue is that of correcting the distortions of a globalisation process, which left protection of the environment, social rights, public health and consumer defense to unbridled market forces. In other words, it is no longer possible to deal with trade issues separately from ecological and social issues. At the same time, the creation of an open global market requires the establishment of a new international monetary order. This is necessary also because of increasing monetary instability, the decline of the global role of the dollar and the rise of the euro.

Thus after the first phase of the globalisation process, which saw a generalised tariff reduction, a second phase must now be embarked upon in order to regulate the global market. Using John Pinder's terminology, we may say that the challenge the world has to face is the transition from a negative integration (removal of the obstacles to the free circulation of goods and services) to a positive integration (development of world policies to regulate the globalisation process). The analogy with the problems that the European Community had to face after the completion of customs union is evident. Since the creation of the Common Market, the transition toward an economic and monetary union has always been on the

European agenda.

Of course the WTO, with its 135 member states, is not yet truly a universal body: 25 countries, including China, Russia and Indonesia, are still on the waiting list. The most urgent signal to be sent to the developing countries should be the decision to abolish tariff barriers for goods coming from the 48 poorest countries of the world. But the need to complete the process of liberalisation does not exclude the fact that the current central issue is the regulation of globalisation.

Two different visions of the future of the WTO clashed at Seattle. On the one hand, the United States has remained faithful to the formula of international free trade, which would allow its hegemonic position on the world market to be confirmed. Of course, this position is shared by most of the multinational corporations. On the other hand, Europe and developing countries, even though driven by different interests, supported the idea that globalisation needs regulation and the strengthening of the institutions necessary to pursue this goal.

### *The Global Civil Society Claims International Democracy*

There is no way to stop globalisation. The return to protectionism would be a reactionary solution, since it opposes the thrust given to social and historical evolution by the scientific revolution of material production. Impoverishment and even the risk of fragmentation are the dramatic consequences facing countries that decide to break with the world market. At the same time, we cannot expect from the "invisible hand" of the market to bring about the achievement of such public goods as full employment, aid to development, protec-

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tion of the environment and public health. Globalisation has been studied as an economic phenomenon. Its political dimension has been neglected. And yet a political mechanism is essential for keeping globalisation under control. World government is the answer. Without effective world political institutions, global interdependence is destined to deepen inequalities and foment international disorder and conflicts. The only way to regulate the globalisation process is to build stronger and democratic world-wide authorities.

Seattle has clearly shown the emergence of a global civil society and a global public opinion. The NGOs coalition, which brought about the failure of the Millennium Round, was a choir of discordant voices. For instance, the interests of the American trade-unions, which fear competition from developing countries, where labour is unprotected, do not coincide with the interests of countries which exploit child labour and consider the "social clause" as the protectionist intervention of rich countries. At the same time it must be recognised that protection of the environment is hardly a priority in countries where starvation is still a serious challenge.

One of the most meaningful posters exhibited during the Seattle demonstrations read: "no globalisation without representation". This slogan displays a confused aspiration to international democracy that henceforth will be impossible to stifle. A new political actor has entered the global scene and wants to make his voice heard by the big economic and political powers which rule the process of globalisation.

We cannot content ourselves with a mere institutional reform of the WTO. We must dare to claim a world government and circulate this watchword within the global civil society, even though we know that it is the last stage of a long march. What the world needs is the democratisation of the globalisation process through the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly of the United Nations, conceived as a step toward a World Parliament (a process which might well start with the creation of the Forum of the Global Civil Society, allowing NGOs to have an impact on the General Assembly); a Security Council that would become the

Council of the great regions of the world with the role of World Senate; the strengthening of the executive powers of the Secretariat General and its transformation into a body similar to the European Commission, which would run the different UN Agencies; the bestowal of binding powers on the sentences of the International Court of Justice; broader powers for the UN system, in order to entrust it with the leadership of the international trade (WTO), financial (IMF), development (WB), labour (ILO) and environmental (UNEP) organisations; the creation of resources belonging exclusively to the UN.

### *The European Government: a Step Closer to Regulating Globalisation*

The EU, though still an unfinished building, is not only a model for the unification of the great regions of the world and for UN reform. It can also be seen as the engine of regional unifications and world unification, provided that it endows itself with an effective and democratic government. The European government is potentially the only world power which can share with the United States the burden and the responsibility of world politics and push the United States toward supporting the project of a UN reform.

The design of a Euro-American partnership can become the main pillar sustaining the building of world peace, just as the Franco-German axis was the nucleus around which the construction of the European unity developed.

The democratic government of Europe will point the way toward world unity and international democracy, and how to go about restoring the power of politics to rule over globalisation. We must make every endeavour to mobilise all the available forces, beginning from the movements of civil society, to claim people's power to rule Europe. The European Council, summoned at Nice on 7 December to conclude the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms, will show that governments alone are unable to give Europe a Constitution. The demonstration promoted by federalists on that occasion could become the European Seattle.

# European Union Citizenship and Charter of Fundamental Rights

Jo Leinen

## 1. Introduction

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe faces a difficult choice. Either we return to a "Europe of the Nations" based on Treaties between governments and an all powerful Council of Ministers, or we move on towards the "Europe of the Citizens" with a Constitution as the legal foundation for Union citizenship and a Charter of Fundamental Rights at its helm.

In this situation, minimalist strategies for Europe, and tendencies to re-nationalise policies do not offer any prospective for the future. But even maintaining the *status quo* carries the danger of stagnation. In the past, it was often a lack of political will that prevented more decisive steps being taken towards a citizens' Union. Even though EU citizenship was included in the Treaties at Maastricht in 1991, its shape and content are still unknown to most citizens. To remedy this situation now, Europe needs a qualitative leap forward.

It has to become obvious that Europe guarantees security, freedom and justice for its citizens. The past century has seen too many violations of human rights on our continent. Recently the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that Europe is still unable to handle such problems. Therefore it is necessary for Europe now to be based on a legally binding set of fundamental rights, which would confer real substance to the Union's citizenship. Such a Charter would have to establish citizens' rights vis-à-vis the institutions of the EU and ensure that they are guaranteed at the highest level. This demand is a central part of the broader project for a Constitution for the Union.

## 2. Union Citizenship

### Citizenship in the context of state organisation

In modern times, the concept of citizenship developed in parallel to concepts such as state, nation, sovereignty, and ultimately democracy, because today citizens are also voters. The French revolution first established the direct link between the status of being a citizen, and the emerging concept of a nation-state. On the basis of this connection, citizenship developed into a complex system of rights and duties. The most important duty in this context still is in many countries the duty to defend the country with one's life. Despite the fact that all member states of the EU (indeed all liberal democracies) are now similarly organised around a delicate balance between the rights and duties of their citizens, important differences still persist. The most important of these differences concern the ways in which citizenship is acquired. Either citizenship is based on the so-called *jus soli* which makes everybody a citizen who is born on the territory of the country in question, or it is based on the *jus sanguinis*, making citizenship a matter of blood and descent.

These two opposing principles, which form the basis for citizenship laws in different EU member states, have been partly softened by external pressures such as increased migration and European integration. Nevertheless it is obvious that they pose difficult problems for the EU: since the Maastricht Treaty, all citizens of the 15 EU member states are also European citizens. The inclusion of a Union citizenship with its corollary rights into the Treaties was meant to be a symbol of deepening integration. At the same time

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it was clear from the outset that the European Union was not to become a state in the 19th century sense of the word. Unfortunately, as the controversies about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty revealed, this distinction was not understood by the public. Precisely for this reason, Union citizenship is important for the EU: even in a non-state entity such as the Union, membership needs to be defined. Citizenship serves to define the community and its competences in the same way as territorial borders define the geographic extension of a state. From this it is obvious that it does not make sense to apply a traditional concept of state-citizenship to an expanding, supra-state and trans-national entity such as the EU. On the other hand the EU as a polity-in-the-making does need a clear link with its own citizens in order to develop democratically. The institutionalisation of citizenship in 1991 therefore was an important step. Right from the beginning in 1974, with the concept of a "European Union", the European Parliament played an important part in promoting and protecting ideas relating to a Europe of the citizens. The right to vote in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 was thus the first genuinely European political right enjoyed by citizens of the member states by virtue of being citizens of the EC. From then onwards, the Parliament developed a number of ideas to strengthen European citizenship. In its 1984 proposal for a Treaty on European Union, the EP devised the now familiar link between member state citizenship and European level citizenship.

### **The rights deriving from Union citizenship**

Of course, this close link between national and European citizenship, which was reaffirmed in the Amsterdam Treaty, creates problems for the development of genuine European citizenship. The member states are still the gate-keepers of European citizenship. Access to member states, and consequently to European citizenship, is regulated differently from country to country and, as the recent debate about a change to the

traditional access to German citizenship has shown, is still a highly sensitive issue. This means that the EU cannot ensure uniform application of EU citizenship rights, especially for third country nationals.

Moreover, there is criticism that the rights deriving directly from the citizenship articles (17 - 22, AT) are still very limited. They contain the right to vote and stand in European and local elections in another member state than one's own, as well as the right to diplomatic protection from any EU member state in a third country. Every European citizen also has the right to petition the European Parliament or the European Ombudsman and, since Amsterdam, to write to the European institution in any of the Union's eleven languages and get a reply in the same language. On the other hand there are, so far, no corresponding duties apart from the general acceptance of the legal rules governing the EU. Thus neither the rights nor the duties of EU citizenship match up to those of national citizenship. But beyond the rights directly deriving from the citizenship provisions, the Treaties grant a variety of rights in their other parts, most notably in the stated aims of the Union and in the shape of the four freedoms that form the central pillars of the European Single Market. The very fact, however, that these rights are derivative from the single market idea rather than constituting an aim in themselves has attracted severe criticism. Therefore it is now time to draw up a Charter on Fundamental Rights on the basis of the historical traditions of the different member states' heritage of fundamental rights, to confirm the EU's commitment to become an area of justice, security and freedom for its citizens.

### ***3. Fundamental Rights in the EU***

#### **Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU**

The existing Treaties do not contain an explicit catalogue of fundamental rights that would be comparable to most national constitutions. Apart from a general commitment to funda-

mental rights as they derive from the European Convention on Human Rights and the member states' constitutional traditions (Art. 6, AT) the Treaties only include certain specific provisions vis-à-vis the member states, such as the prohibition of discrimination and the four fundamental freedoms. It was the preamble to the Single European Act of 1986 that mentioned the specific protection of fundamental freedoms for the first time. With the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam we did see a modest move from the idea of mere market citizens toward real union citizens. The Treaty of Amsterdam makes the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms a pre-condition for EU membership, as well as recognising a broader remit for the European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. Before this, the ECJ had to rely on case law which specifically recognises fundamental rights as they derive from the member states' constitutions and from the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECJ's jurisdiction however, refers only to the European Communities. Fundamental rights are thus guaranteed only as far as the application of EC law is concerned. On the other hand, all members of the European Union have signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU as a whole recognised the importance of the ECHR in the Amsterdam Treaty, but it is not clear if the EU as such could sign it because of legal difficulties. As far as a guarantee of fundamental rights is concerned, the current system based on the general provision of Art. 6 and ECJ case law is thus insufficient to ensure a uniform justiciability of fundamental rights across the Union.

The logical next step is therefore the drafting of a detailed catalogue of fundamental rights as an integral part of a European constitution. Such a legal document would ensure the protection of the individual and could help to create a greater degree of trust in the EU by the citizens.

Opponents of a Charter of Fundamental Rights usually argue that it would be enough if the EU as a whole signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights. But even if it were clear

that the EU had the legal personality to do so, such a step would be insufficient. The European Convention does not protect "modern" rights such as social rights or the right to equal treatment of men and women. There is no general protection of human dignity or the overall freedom of research, nor is there a reference to fundamental rights such as data protection or the right to a healthy environment. Moreover, a genuinely new system of protection for the fundamental rights of its citizens could greatly enhance the identification of EU citizens with the emerging political structure. This is even more important since the support of the European people for integration is crumbling. A clear statement of the EU's insistence on Fundamental Rights would clarify its political aims and help to alleviate the fear that European integration could lead to a loss of rights.

This would be a major improvement over the current situation where one has to deduce even the most crucial rights from a variety of ECJ cases. A systematic, clearly structured Constitution would also have to include the right to an individual appeal against European legal acts if they violate any of the Rights guaranteed in the Charter. Such a system already operates in many national constitutions and provides an effective safeguard against institutional malpractice. It would also send a strong signal to the institutions themselves, showing them where the limits of their remit lies. A Charter on Fundamental Rights would thus greatly improve the transparency of the EU, which is a pre-condition for a lively democracy. In addition, the EU always claims that the protection of fundamental human rights is not just important for its internal organisation, but also a central goal of its foreign and security policy, as well as its development initiatives. In demanding commitment to these rights from other countries, Europe would be much more credible if it could point to a legally guaranteed set of rights for her own citizens. This also holds true for the enlargement process. A catalogue of rights would clearly signal to the applicant countries that they are not just joining an economic free trade

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area, but a community of values. Finally a European Charter of Fundamental Rights would help to build a European identity. It would be a manifestation of the common political culture of Europe and would help to foster a feeling of community among the citizens.

### **Procedure to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights**

The Charter should be seen as an essential part of the European constitutional process. There are several different methods according to which such a Charter could be developed.

#### **The Diplomatic Method**

One possibility would be to create a new Charter in the traditional way of revising the existing Treaties within the framework of an intergovernmental conference. But this way of developing integration is extremely undemocratic. Governments negotiate behind closed doors, and the citizens have very little impact on the outcome. Even national Parliaments are merely presented with finished documents which they can only rubber-stamp or reject. Moreover the diplomatic horse-trading often leads to minimal solutions because agreement has to be by unanimity. Especially in the case of establishing the Union's fundamental rights, this method does not seem suitable.

#### **The Community Method**

An alternative would be the so-called community method: according to this, the Commission submits a proposal (Art. 48) after consultation with the European Parliament. This proposal is then accepted or rejected by the Council in co-decision with the EP and then submitted to an Intergovernmental Conference before it is ratified by the member states. Provided that there is enough political will to do so, this method could already be employed to introduce constitutional change to the Treaties. The dual legitimacy of the EU as a union of the citizens as well

as a union of states would be adequately expressed in a method of reform which gives full recognition to the European Parliament. But even in this case, there would be a lack of direct involvement of the citizens.

#### **The Democratic Method**

The most democratic method of all would be the convocation of a constitutional assembly with representatives of national, regional and local structures as well as members of civil society. The drafting of a constitution must not be the exclusive prerogative of a small elite. Thus a constitutional assembly would ensure real popular participation from the drafting stage onwards. The "convention" to draft the European Charter on Fundamental rights is an interesting step in this direction, but still the member state governments retain ultimate control over the process, and its mandate is too limited to draft a whole constitution. In any case, a European constitution would have to be subject to approval by popular referendum.

#### **Contents of the Charter**

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should form the basis for the new Charter. The Charter should build and expand upon the former, to guarantee the fundamental human, political, economic and social rights of Europe's citizens which they enjoy on top of nationally-guaranteed basic rights. Apart from "classical" rights such as freedom of opinion, assembly and speech, it should in particular include social rights such as the right to education, to healthcare and adequate housing. Moreover it should ensure rights to political participation, starting from a more detailed Union citizenship, to a uniform electoral law for European elections, to the establishment of the instruments of direct democracy such as European referenda and popular petitions. It should also contain modern rights such as those regarding data protection and a healthy environment. Finally

the European Charter would have to stipulate its own remit and the rules for its application. Thus it would provide inclusive protection for all European citizens.

### Conclusion

The EU has developed from a predominantly economic Community towards an increasingly political Union. Now this new polity needs a soul. To be able to meet the challenges of the next century the Union has to get closer to its citizens, become more democratic, transparent and efficient. The drafting of a European Constitution would be the decisive step towards

achieving this. This Constitution has to clarify the relationship between the Union and its citizens by setting out the rights and duties attached to European citizenship. It has to show clearly that the citizen is the sovereign of the Union. In it the Charter of Fundamental Rights has to guarantee a life in freedom and security. A European Constitution with these aims offers the possibility to build a European polity on the foundations of our common experience, which would be accepted by its people and could become a model for other regions in the world.

## Rau, Ciampi and Havel for a European Constitution

The 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> December 1999, in Paris, the President of the Federalist Republic of Germany, Mr. Johannes Rau gave a talk on request of the French Institute of International Relations entitled "A federal Constitution for Europe?" The German President underlined that today it is necessary for the European politics to give an answer to the finality question of the European unification process: it is necessary to define the political objectives of Europe and to adopt a new institutional structure.

Thinking about the political objectives, it is amazing that today there is in Europe an almost complete unanimity: a competitive, job-generating, sustainable economy is the present issue of Europe. Mr. J. Rau suggested to write down a European federal Constitution: a Constitution would be more comprehensible to citizens and could define federal policies and determine the federal structure. A subdivision between federal competences and member states competences is essential for a

federal Constitution; the institutional structure could be based on two Chambers: the European Parliament like a "citizens Chamber" and the Council of Ministers like a "States Chamber". Germany and France can be, once more, the engine force of the European integration, said Mr. J. Rau.

The Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi during a speech at the University of Bologna on 8 February 2000, in agreement with President Rau, asserted that the goal of the process of European unification is "a European Federation of democratic nations" and that the European institutions must be strengthened before the enlargement of the EU. In other words the European Constitution represents the first priority. This is the goal to be pursued also according to the opinion of the Czech President Vaclav Havel, who gave a speech at the European Parliament on 16 February 2000 (*an.v.*).

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# States Vote, People Do Not

*Tommaso Padoa Schioppa*

When the United States Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), various ills that have poisoned this century suddenly returned to the spotlight – the blindness of democracy, the fragility of peace, the threat of nuclear destruction. For the most part, these ills stem from the absence of limitations to the sovereignty of states.

The CTBT is intended to ban all nuclear testing (including subterranean) required to develop nuclear arsenals. Such a ban would not ensure peace. But it would diminish the risk that humans will one day destroy themselves in war, since it would impede or prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear arms among the planet's almost 200 nations. It was precisely because many countries with nuclear capabilities – including India, Pakistan, and North Korea – did not sign the Treaty that its ratification by the strongest military powers was fundamental. And it is precisely because two of these powers – China and Russia – remained undecided, that the U.S. ratification of the Treaty was indispensable.

Following the “no” vote of the leading superpower – which did the most to work out the Treaty in the first place – the Treaty's implementation has become problematic and unlikely. Many Americans are angry that nuclear peace has been placed in serious jeopardy by their country – the same country that, through its military might and political freedoms, has saved the contemporary world from catastrophe.

The twentieth century might have been more peaceful had the U.S. Senate not twice failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles – 1919 and 1920 – and, therefore, the entry of the U.S. into the League of Nations. Similarly, the political union of Europe might have come about earlier had the

French Parliament supported, in 1954, the establishment of a European defense community. By the same token, world economic relations might have developed more rapidly and in a more organized fashion had, in 1947, the United States ratified the Havana Treaty, which was to establish international authorities in this field. We would have neither the euro nor monetary union had the Danish repeated their “no” vote when called to a second referendum.

International treaties on issues vital for the well-being, and even survival, of the humankind stem from the exercising of the legal – political rights of the sovereign people, either directly or through the assemblies elected by them. This is true of treaties carefully drawn up and negotiated in full view of the public by legitimate, democratically elected governments, but not of secret treaties, such as those of Czarist Russia, which were brought to light only after Lenin came to power.

Is there too much democracy? On the contrary, in the case of the CTBT, there was a lack of democracy. In the first place, while only 48 out of 100 senators voted for the Treaty, it was supported by 80 percent of Americans. In the second place, and more importantly, the case of the CTBT shows the broadening gap between the domain of democracy (the states) and the domain of the general interest (that is, the world).


There are real technical and political issues that concern the whole world – issues, therefore, in which any attempt to address the interests of all can only be meaningful if the “all” is interpreted as the entire humankind. Greenhouse gasses, the pollution of our oceans, and, of course, the threat of nuclear war are all examples. There are issues relating to security and human rights in which our political and civil conscience regards all human

beings as fellows and denies the absoluteness of the sovereignty of states, even if these states act in a weak or contradictory fashion. In some cases the “generality” of interests is not global but still goes far beyond state borders. In pursuing general interests that go beyond state borders, however, neither organized representation nor democracy exist.

When nation-states first came into being, their subjects or citizens saw their boundaries as veritably endless as regards culture and the material conditions of life. For some time, achieving political freedoms and civil rights, and eventually introducing *universal* suffrage, within these boundaries meant granting liberty, rights, the vote, and security to people as such.

The American and French Bills of Rights speak of “people”, and not of Americans or French. But today the survival of the humankind has no form of organized representation. There are no forums in which the rights of humans are represented as such. International cooperation does not expressly require democracy; even in Europe, the process is incomplete.

In the slow and fickle formation of international authorities and rules that extend as far as the phenomena they are intended to regulate, it will become increasingly important to introduce means for representing both people and governments. The institutions and organization of a world democracy are yet to be invented. When they are introduced they will most likely be different from those experimented with to date – as different, in fact, as the processes used by a handful of residents in some Swiss valley and the millions of citizens that make up the United States. But these processes must be envisaged and implemented. Partly because of regressive steps such as the U.S. Senate’s recent decision, it will become increasingly obvious that democracies within individual states do not satisfy the need for an international democracy. The expression of general will is not a monopoly of the states; it belongs to all people. It will become increasingly clear that without legitimization through democratic processes, international authorities and rules will either not be established or will not be accepted.



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# Regionalist Movements for a European Constitution

Jean-Francis Billion

The Federation of *Régions et Peuples Solidaires* (Regions & United Peoples) "decided to support the campaign launched by the UEF in favour of a European constitution" during the fourth session of its Summer School and its fifth Congress held in Toulouse last August. "In accord with its objective of a Federal Europe of Regions and United Peoples, R&PS will insist on the need for integral federalism that applies the principle of subsidiarity at all levels". A UEF delegation was present for the first time, along with representatives of French local government bodies and political parties. Mr. Daniel Hulas, General Secretary of UEF France, sent a welcome message to all participants.

The Federation of *Régions et Peuples Solidaires* was founded in November 1994 at Aix en Provence; today its members include the Union of Alsatian People (Upa), Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity), the National Basque Party (Eaj-Pnv, in office in Southern Basque States), the Democratic Breton Union (Udb), Frankiz Breizh (Liberty for Brittany), the Catalunya Party, the Union of the Corsican People (Upc), the Occitan Party (Poc'), the *Région Provence*, *Mouvement Région Savoie*; while other organisations maintain the status of observers. The European commitment of the autonomist and regionalist movements united in R&PS is not recent, for some of its members have been involved in the political life of the European Community since its foundation in Brussels or have been members of the European Parliament. In fact, during the first Congress in Rennes in 1995, the motion which was adopted drew attention to the particular character of French centralisation in Europe and showed

considerable interest for European integration: "the nation-state is seriously challenged. Centralised and Jacobin as it is, it cannot meet modern world challenges nor can it organise new forms of solidarity, since it amplifies the differences of development between peoples and regions and increases social inequalities. This system is out-dated in Europe and represents a significant obstacle to the construction of European Union". At the second Congress held at Anglet (Northern Basque Provinces) in August 1996, the participants endorsed a new motion entitled *Regionalism and Federalism Make Progress in Europe*, which brought to the foreground the fact that France is sadly running last in the domain of local and regional democracy: "In the era of the Europe of Regions, French regions remain "dwarves" at the political and economic level in Europe. Fifteen years after regional bodies have reached the rank of public territorial communities, and ten years after the first election of Regional Councils by universal suffrage, France has still a considerable way to go. Since local bodies are still lacking the law-making tools, even in areas which clearly fall under regional jurisdiction like languages and regional cultures or education and training, and their budgets are lower than those of each department which form them. The regions' overall budgets in France are less than 3% of the total public budget, as opposed to 30% in Spain and 40% in Germany and in Belgium".

However, it would be a mistake to think that domestic federalist debate does not interest all federalists even outside the European context and above all world federalists; some of the

most heated political debates at the last WFM Congress, held in November 1998 at New Delhi and Chennai (Madras), focused on this issue. In fact, some members had proposed the adoption of a statement which substantially recognised the right to secession, however the majority of delegates firmly opposed it; debate was temporarily suspended thanks to the presentation of a motion entitled *Federalism, Regionalism and Subsidiarity* and the setting up of an informal working group. This is one of the many signs which shows how all federalists at whatever level their efforts are concentrated and whatever their strategy, have common interests and cultural references united by the formula coined by Mario Albertini: "the culture of peace as opposed to the culture of war".

Following the Kosovo crisis, it is quite clear that progress towards continental unity in Europe has been undermined by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Likewise, outside Europe, the development of wild and anti-democratic globalisation is generating balkanisation processes in all continents and challenging the existing state entities. In such circumstances, both federalists and independence advocates must absolutely define their political vocabulary, if they really wish to reach, within and among their organisations in all continents, unity in thinking and action to realise their ideals. For instance, the word "nationalism", which is "still" used in some democratic regionalist and autonomist circles, tends to cause unpropitious misunderstandings among leaders of national-fascist organisations as happens for example in former Yugoslavia or Corsica. Furthermore, there is the same need for political clarity in the analysis of the two conflicting notions of self-determination and self-government, as underlined by the WFM documents aimed at internal study.

Self-determination has at its root the concept of political action aimed at creating a new independent State with full sovereign powers (firstly an army and money): therefore it justifies seces-

sion of a community from a formerly constituted State. For over a century, the application of this ill-omened principle in Europe has generated neither progress, nor peace, nor development, but on the contrary, it has heightened economic and political fragmentation and has led to greater border conflicts, the oppression of minorities, centralisation, militarism, protectionism and international anarchy. Therefore, in the light of political experience self-determination is a reactionary political principle with ruinous and anti-democratic consequences which threatens peace among peoples as well as the development of production forces and ultimately opposes the spread and the victory of federalism.

On the contrary, self-government is at the heart of democracy, for it safeguards the interests of different populations and cultures without challenging state unity and a pluralistic organisation of society. Its fundamental principles lie in the widest application of the principle of subsidiarity (over all in the heart of decentralised or federal states) in the democratic sovereignty of the electorate, in free association among citizens and communities and in the rule of law. Recent instances can be seen in Canada with the formation of the independent territory of Nunavut, inhabited by the Inuit populations, and in Great Britain with *devolution*, i.e. autonomy granted to Wales and Scotland. Self-government is therefore based on the principle of subsidiarity, solidarity, co-operation and coordination which are typical of federal States or communities; essentially it is the principle which will enable the construction of political unity of mankind, from the smallest municipality to the whole world, with peace and with the respect of the law .

The need for a cultural debate among federalists of different allegiances including supporters of internal Federalism (above all in a backward and centralised nation like France), is essential to lead to greater knowledge and mutual acceptance of strategy and priorities.

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The same was true fifteen years ago for both European and world federalists (let us not forget the "Atlantic" federalists, who envisaged a federation of western democracies with Nato as the nucleus of world unity). In 1984, when the Cold War was drawing to a close and the political unification of mankind was about to become a concrete (although long term) political objective and not simply a Kantian requirement of reason, Albertini wrote an editorial in «The Federalist»: "Our review has set itself the task to work for the world unity of federalists and to constitute, to this end, a point of reference and an instrument for an exchange of information. Many people are aware of the necessity of federalism. ... But without unity of organisation, i.e. without the opportunity to know that what is being done in one's own region, country or city is being done in other regions, countries and cities of the world as well, nobody can gain confidence in his own action and thus maintain it, thus contributing towards making federalism into a political force."

Unfortunately, Albertini passed away before the essential political line he had defined, i.e. the approaching and unity of action between world and European Federalists, took its first steps, at the organisational level (which had likewise integrated the *Association to Unite the Democracies* in the United States) with membership of JEF and later the association of UEF to WFM. The dramas we have seen to date, in Kosovo, Ruanda, Kurdistan, in former Soviet Central Asia and lately in East Timor, have all shown how impotent the international community is, likewise the dangers of outbreaks of nationali-

sm, especially among stateless peoples; so therefore, we must continue Albertini's work for unification to create a federalist force which cannot but be world-wide. However, there is a further need for all available political forces to face the threat of balkanisation of the planet, which was formerly underestimated, as well as a sort of revival of the identity phenomena which have been triggered and augmented by wild, anti-democratic and anarchic globalisation: in the bid to build the federalist alternative. The political conditions for debate are ripe like they were in 1984 both as regards the democratic nature of autonomists' demands and the international prospect of the federalist struggle; today there are even channels like the return to press of *The Federalist Debate*, in its renewed form and with an editorial board equally representing the major International Federalist Associations (UEF, JEF e WFM). Consequently, like Albertini himself wrote, "the conditions for trying exist. So we shall try".

A debate can be opened with the autonomist groups in France, and let's hope in Europe with the support of R&PS in the campaign for the European Constitution of UEF and JEF. This support must be rapid and complete especially within the intergroup for the European Constitution of the European Parliament and in the European regions where autonomist movements are involved in local government or are in office. In some countries, like Italy, there have been significant moves: the power of MFE in Sardinia over the last few years and the similarity of intellectual and political views with the Partito Sardo d'Azione are indicators.



# Europe, the UN and Death Penalty

*Claudio Bascapé*

Europe's failure to win the battle against the death penalty in the UN deserves serious consideration, above and beyond the emotionally charged but often lamentably superficial comments that sprang up in the heat of the moment.

Everyone knows what happened: the European Union put forth a resolution to the UN General Assembly to proclaim a world wide moratorium on capital punishment for the year 2000, a Jubilee Year for the Roman Catholic church, with a view to the eventual total abolition of the death penalty in the course of the coming years. The proposal came under fire from the countries which still practice capital punishment: scathing and aggressive reactions from a sizable group of smaller, mostly poor, countries; less overt but equally determined reactions from the larger countries, headed by the US and China. The UN Assembly was clearly split over the issue: the European line was shared by a minority of members and its defeat was inevitable. Several compromise proposals mooted to create a majority, but still allowing each State to continue applying its own legislation, were deemed by various European governments to be unacceptable, on grounds that it would be pointless to proclaim a moratorium as an affirmation of principle while at the same time letting executions continue to be carried out.

So the European Union withdrew its resolution. The battle was lost. Or, perhaps, merely postponed. It is hard to say whether the withdrawal of the proposal was the best way out, or if it might have been preferable to push for an affirmation of principle, albeit incomplete and inconsistent. It is equally hard to gauge to what

extent American pressures influenced Europe. It was, understandably, unavoidable that the US federal government would oppose the European resolution, given that each State has its own criminal law and many States have neither abolished nor intend to abolish capital punishment. Furthermore, if the European proposal at the UN had been approved, it would have re-ignited a campaign directed by the more conservative segments of the American political spectrum against the UN itself, which stands accused of wanting to restrict the sovereignty of the world's governments and establish a sort of global super-government (if only!) just when Clinton had at last beaten down opposition from the Senate which had, for years, prevented him from paying America's dues to the UN. But apart from all this, there are three lessons that can be learned from this story. First, that Europeans are not entitled to be shocked if many countries are still unwilling to rid themselves of capital punishment. Even Europe itself only achieved this victory relatively recently. The death penalty is rejected by human consciences that have gained maturity and developed the concept of "rule of law" and its attendant values: only this development, which cannot be enforced from above but is gradually spreading throughout many parts of the world, will ultimately give rise to a situation in which the majority of States share the European stance. Second, it is unusual for the European Union to put on a united front before the UN Assembly with a determination to uphold "Community discipline", despite the concerns of one or the other Member State over what diplomatic approach should be adopted. Obviously the fifteen European governments

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realize full well that it is only by joining forces that they will be able to have an impact. In fact, the Rome conference that instituted the International Criminal Court teaches a valuable lesson: that endeavour was successful partly because the Fifteen held on to a common stance, surrounded themselves with a coalition of like-minded States and stood their ground against strong US pressures.

This brings us to a third consideration, perhaps the most important of all. It is hard to reconcile the fact that Europeans can share common values, yet at the same time be so divided politically. On the one hand, the European stance on capital punishment was unanimous because it stemmed from a history of unity of judgement and shared values. It is paradoxical that on such issues, undeniably of some consequence for a society, Europe enjoys a more strongly united identity than the United States itself, which has been a federation of states for over two centuries. In fact, Europe stands united on issues that go far beyond the death penalty: even more significant is the existence of the "European welfare state", a model virtually unheard of anywhere else in the world. It represents a major achievement because, despite some inevitable national differences, it forms an integral part of the life and soul of the entire Union. Similar examples abound. But alongside these shared values lies the woeful political and diplomatic weakness of the European Union: suffice it to say that the EU does not have just one ambassador to the UN, but rather fifteen national ambassadors whose actions are anything but coordinated. It took little effort on the part of the advocates of the death penalty to sense this weakness and take full advantage of it. A rift immediately appeared between those wanting to put together a majority whatever compromises were necessary, and those who steadfastly refused to budge from their stance, giving the opposition plenty of leeway for their own manoeuvres. The defeat comes as no surprise. With fifteen governments and as many ambassadors involved, there can be little hope for winning diplomatic battles.

## Pope Endorses ICC

Declaring human rights "have no borders", Pope John Paul II on 13 December 1999 gave strong backing to international efforts to punish crimes against humanity. "Crimes against humanity cannot be considered an internal affair of a nation," John Paul said in his annual message for the church's World Day of Peace on January 1.

The Pope said the world has been "sorely tried" in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by war and genocide and that humanity must abandon the idea that the claims of a nation take precedence over the common good. He endorsed establishment of an International Criminal Court to try such crimes as "an important first step" in accepting the concept that human rights are "universal and indivisible."

A U.N. treaty on the court was brokered in Rome last year over the opposition of major powers such as the United States, China and Russia. It is now going through a lengthy ratification process.

The Pope's message, which is sent to heads of state worldwide, reaffirmed church teaching that it is legitimate to take up arms against aggression to protect civilians but said such actions should be "guaranteed by an authority that is internationally recognized". (AP-NY-12-13-99)

# Asia among Federalism and Power Politics

*Antonio Mosconi*

There are in Asia three potential regional federations: Chinese, Indo-Pakistani and the one between Japan and ASEAN. Western Asia appears still to be far from the conditions that would make possible the establishment of a community and of cosmopolitanism, the two poles of federalist social behaviour<sup>1</sup>; it is therefore necessary to make it the subject of a separate discussion, interwoven with the African and the Islamic questions. Here I will consider the three more mature groups.

Greater China (China, Hong Kong, Macau, Mongolia and Taiwan) is the most ancient and extensive organisation of any human community. Today 1.3 billion people belong to it, more than one fifth of the world's population. The economic results achieved since the Chinese Communist Party's moderate wing, led by Deng Xiaoping, regained supremacy over the radicals in 1977, made it possible to assign to the Red Army as much as 6% of GNP, twice what was given to education. Now, 2.4% of the Chinese population is in the army, five times more than is normally found in the West. China is already the second military power in the world, and the state is certainly authoritarian (one party) and unitary (local governments are appointed by Beijing). However, the battles between moderates and radicals inside the CCP bring about more decisive political changes than in western democracies, and governments appointed against local indications are more and more unusual. The autonomism of the "white" south, as opposed to the centralism of the "red" north, has led to quarrels among the various government levels, which can be settled only in a federal state. Two reforms are

very significant in this respect. The tax reform provides for three classes of taxation: that due to the state, that due to local governments, and that to be divided between the two levels; they are also collected separately depending on to whom they are owed. The credit reform's prime objective is centralised control of the formation of the monetary base, previously made impossible by the almost automatic granting of credit to public companies by part of the local banks. Is this not a set of reforms that very closely resembles what we call fiscal federalism and monetary union? A federal process is taking place in China, as important as the European one, although the starting points are opposite. China must attain federalism starting from the unitary state; Europe instead by overcoming the sovereign national states. Zhou Enlai's extraordinary intuition of the importance of the European integration process for China's economic, social and political development has never been so topical. Beijing's participation in the political leadership of globalisation is now possible and necessary, both for the world order and for China's democratisation.

The Indian subcontinent (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri-Lanka and Buthan) and Pakistan together approach Greater China's population, but their GNP barely exceeds half the Chinese one. And yet, when independence was declared (1947), India alone had an income almost equal to China's. India does not enjoy the historical, social and ethnical continuity that is peculiar to China. When decolonisation started, Britain passed sovereignty to two national states instead of a single multiethnic federation: on one side Islamic Pakistan, on the other

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side the Indian Union, 82% of whose population profess Hinduism. However Islamic communities, scattered all over the country, represent more than 11% of India's population, and enjoy a privileged status. This is the cause of the unprecedented display of Hindu fundamentalism, which brought to power the BJP after the long crisis of the Congress Party and the nuclear achievements of the two countries.

In spite of the astonishing endurance of the quasi-federal constitution of 1950, it would be difficult to talk of Indian communitarianism by western standards. Castes tend to change into organised pressure groups, both in the form of lobbies as in that of unions, but the very high percentage of rural workers shows a society still characterised by feudal relations between land owners and farmers, determined by production relations and by religious precepts.

In spite of India's peaceful tradition, not even cosmopolitanism, measured today by penetration into the global market, can be considered developed. There is also to remark India's failure in its efforts to establish good relations with the neighbouring countries of western Asia, on which it depends for its energy supplies, and of eastern Asia, which could offer commercial outlets. The opening of the Indian market is comparable with that of the EU and the US, but it is less than half the Chinese one. Whilst for the EU and the US a relatively low dependence on world trade indicates high economic self-sufficiency, in India's case it would rather point to the country's belated introduction to the circuit of conveniences that determine the displacement of transnational firms. In addition, imports greatly exceed exports.

The most important attempt made by India to break its isolation was in promoting and founding the SAARC, to which also Pakistan belongs, in 1985. The most significant results expected from SAARC, in the fields of technological collaboration, joint water management and development of joint infrastructure projects, were however halted by Indo-Pakistani conflict. On one side India represents the most elevated

way of coupling a very ancient spirituality with western democracy, it has a vital interest for peace both on the west (energy) and on the east (markets), and it has so far produced a policy consistent with such an interest. On the other side Pakistan is carrying on its ambitions as a regional power in the restructured magma of western Asia. Indo-Pakistani co-operation and the two countries' participation in the political leadership of globalisation would strengthen the chances for peace.

The simultaneous crises of the Samurais and of the Tigers emphasise Japan's centrality in the eastern Asia economy (I include North Korea, which is not part of ASEAN, taking for granted forecasts of reunification with South Korea; but not Taiwan, an ASEAN country, which I already considered in the Greater China perspective). The population in such a defined zone is 680 million inhabitants and the total income is \$6.000 billions, but the annual per capita income ranges from \$23.000 in Japan and Singapore to \$1.000 in Cambodia, Myanmar and Viet Nam. A \$100 increase in demand in an ASEAN country determines an additional demand in Japan of \$36 if it occurs in Singapore, of \$31 if in Malaysia, of \$30 if in Thailand, of \$22 if in the Philippines, of \$20 if in South Korea and of \$15 if in Indonesia. On the other hand, an increase in demand in Japan entails negligible additional demand in those countries.

This asymmetry corresponds to the clear evidence that Japan is exporting technologies, capitals and durable consumers goods, but is importing very little beside raw materials and energy, following an economic model based on export, low internal consumption and foreign investments. However, interdependence between Japan and the US is symmetrical: an increase in demand in one country entails in the other an increase of 7% of that boost. Persistent trade surplus, financial investment of the same, speculative bubbles, deflation of the bubble, its impoverishing effect and liquidity trap: the very well known Keynesian sequence has thrown Japan into a dangerous deflationary vacuum,

but its population does not react either to the politics of demand or to that of supply.

Japan is in any case the most important "hinge-country". Two opposing lines are defined just by reference to their foreign policy primacy: "to abandon the United States and to come back to Asia", or "to leave the Asian culture and join the western community".

As far as the hinge-countries are concerned, the greatest difference is between the imperialist and the federalist approach. Imperialism implies taking care to keep them at any cost "on this side", to make them ramparts against those that are "on the other side".

Federalism instead considers them countries that, belonging to two groups, can have the function of getting them to co-operate. But is a

strategy of regional Japan-ASEAN integration compatible with the fact that Japan and other countries in the area remain militarily American protectorates?

The ASEAN objective to reach strategic independence was already expressed in 1971 (Zopfán), but it found practical applications only after the end of the cold war. Military bases in the Philippines have been closed, but Japan has renewed the security pact with the US. Hence, from a strategic point of view, Japan's decision whether to participate in the responsibility for assuring security in the area, or to continue to "buy" American protection, is crucial for allowing the realisation of an autonomous security frame in eastern Asia, and for starting Japan-ASEAN integration.

<sup>1</sup> Mario Albertini, *Introduzione a Immanuel Kant, "La pace, la ragione e la storia"*, [Introduction to Immanuel Kant, "Peace, Reason and History"], Bologna 1985. Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was professor of Philosophy of Politics at the University of Pavia (Italy). He has been President of the European Federalist Movement and of the Union of European Federalists.



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# African Unity: Myth or Reality?

*Maxime Désiré Ékani*

A special summit meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was held in Libya<sup>1</sup> between 6 and 9 September 1999. The final declaration which was issued stated that the institutional parties involved would endeavour to create an African Union based on the European model. 52 of the 53 member nations belonging to the organisation were represented. Amongst which 41 heads of state, 3 government leaders and the majority of Africa's Foreign Affairs Ministers.

This significant response to the Libyan leader's invitation, clearly showed the African establishment determination, to form a single political body in Africa within two years, as laid down in the above mentioned declaration.

The African masses have always recognised that union is the only way to face the various problems of the continent: disease, foreign debt, security and international trade. In fact, statistics reveal that a united Africa would account for a mere 5% of the world's GNP; without unity Africa counts nothing in this macroeconomic aggregation. Despite the enormous benefits that would derive from the achievement of this project, public opinion in Africa reacted very sceptically to the declaration mentioned earlier. What is there behind the lack of enthusiasm which met this idea?

We may be able to find an answer to this question if we try to review the history of the Progressive African Movement which was the first to set "union" as an objective.

The Progressive African Movement took root in the early 1940's, when colonial powers were granting greater political freedom to African peoples under their dominion in order to meet their commitments in line with the principles of

self-determination sanctioned in the Charter of the nascent United Nations Organisation. This concession led to the birth of the first African ruling class formed by all the intellectual elite the continent had at the time. The progressive area of this ruling class demanded immediate independence of African territories from colonial powers and set the objective of unification of African peoples after their independence. In this context, progressive leaders in the French colonial empire south of the Sahara formed the Democratic African Group (DAG) in 1948 which put pressure on the French colonial authorities. In the meanwhile this movement spread to the British colonies and the Maghreb. Initial successes came in the 1950's. In fact, Nasser headed the Egyptian officers who took power in Cairo in 1952 and a few years later he became leader of the movement<sup>2</sup>. Nasser found further allies in the struggle for unification of the continent in the mid-1950's when Morocco became independent in 1956, then Ghana in 1957 and Guinea Conacy in 1958; King Mohammed, Nkwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré all adopted an anti-colonial policy: these were the leaders who took responsibility to lead these newly independent states.

On the other hand, colonial authorities in power regarded this Pan-African ideology in territories still under their dominion as a real threat to the strategic and economic interests of their nations. The climate of tension which resulted saw harsh political repression of progressive leaders and their political groupings were actually outlawed. This ousting from the political scene made violence the only viable political option to meet their objectives. Thus armed movements sprouted which fought

against colonial authorities for years.

In 1960 many nations largely in the former French colonies were granted independence. Moderate leaders among the establishment in these new nations restrained the growth of the Progressive Movement in the continent. Furthermore, military agreements between moderate nations and former colonial powers coupled with financial and logistic support provided by the "Casablanca Group" member states<sup>3</sup> enabled them to oppose guerrilla resistance sparked from rebellion movements in their territories. In 1963 when the OAU Charter was ratified the group of progressive nations did not succeed in giving this document a Pan-African character due to their numerical inferiority. In fact, at that venue, the principle of full territorial sovereignty was reaffirmed<sup>4</sup>.

The changes which took place on the African political scene starting in the mid -1960's largely contributed to quenching the hopes of those who had believed for years in unification of the continent. In 1966, Nkwame Nkrumah's regime was overthrown. To that day he had been considered as one of the pillars of the progressive movement. The following year, the defeat Israel inflicted on Egypt encroached the political charisma of Nasser.

Both these events left a permanent void in the movement's leadership which had fought for years for African unity. Not even Qaddafi managed to rekindle the hopes of millions of Africans for unity of the continent or at least not

until the rise of Thomas Sankara on the African political scene in 1985: no political leader on the continent was able to trigger the passions to realise the Pan-African ideal. Finally, the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987 plummeted those, who had seen the realisation of this project as the only viable solution for the social and economic revival of the continent, into Afro-pessimism.

This brief analysis partly explains the recent lack of enthusiasm with which public opinion in Africa in general and particularly among the intelligentsia met the "Syrté Declaration", in the light of the pessimism which has spread over the continent following the death of leaders such as Lumumba, Nkrumah and Nasser who alone had been able to obtain a following among the African masses.

The outcome of the Pan-African organisation summit proved that a significant participation of national leaders is not enough to rekindle former passions.

One way to convince African peoples would be to rehabilitate the key players of the Pan-African movement, considering that many of the regimes in power today in African nations are represented by leaders who radically hampered the Pan-African movement in the past. To date, only Gadhafi acted in this direction at the conclusion of the last OAU summit. In fact, he awarded the "African Medal" to Francois Lumumba and Jamel Nkrumah, the eldest sons of Patrice Lumumba and Nkwame Nkrumah.

<sup>1</sup> OAU (Organisation of African Unity) was formed in 1963 in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Currently, there are 53 member states. In fact, Morocco pulled out of the organisation in November 1984 following the entry of the Arab Republic of Democratic Sahara (ARDS).

<sup>2</sup> "Egypt has the historical responsibility to lead both the struggle for liberty and the economic development of Africa". An extract from a speech delivered by Nasser in 1961 to the Egyptian Parliament. Augustin Kontchou Komegni, *Le système diplomatique africain*, A. Pédone, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> The "Casablanca Group" was formed by progressive African nations. In 1961 when King Hassan II came to power in Morocco he changed the progressive policy of his predecessor.

<sup>4</sup> International political and economic journal "Jeune Afrique", n. 2019, 1999, p. 16.

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# The Federalist Commitment of Julius K. Nyerere

*Guido Montani*

On the occasion of the death of Julius Nyerere (1922-1999), the international press remembered him as one of the greatest leaders of independent Africa, as the first president of Tanganyika and then of Tanzania (after the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, in 1964), and as a prestigious ambassador for the Third World in the world political community.

These evaluations certainly cast light on certain important aspects of Nyerere's political commitment. But there is one side which the international commentators have completely forgotten: his commitment to African federalism, which cannot be separated from his commitment to independence from colonialism. In fact, from the very first steps in his struggle against British colonialism, Nyerere realised that for the peoples of Africa there would be no guarantee of freedom without the unity of the African peoples guaranteed by a Federation.

In remembering the years of the first struggles for independence, Nyerere wrote: "From the formation of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) until 1961, our movement drew strength from the parallel struggles elsewhere in Africa. We regarded ourselves as part of a continent-wide movement for freedom, and triumphs such as that of Ghana in 1957 heartened us and gave us renewed strength. We saw then that our struggles and our dreams were based on reality; Africa could get free". For this, Nyerere's party participated in the foundation of, and actively supported, the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa and the All-African People's Organization Conference. Both these organisations acted to co-ordinate and support the struggles for African independence in various countries. "We recognized", wrote Nyerere, "that the

national boundaries separating our different freedom organizations were artificial".

In 1963, when the majority of African countries had succeeded in freeing themselves from colonial rule and the problem arose of organising relations between new independent nation states, Nyerere declared himself decidedly in favour of an African federation. "Our goal must be a United States of Africa. Only this can really give Africa the future her people deserve after centuries of economic uncertainty and social oppression". If the African peoples did not succeed in reaching this objective, the independence they had only just won would be transformed into divisions, rivalries and wars. "The boundaries which divide African states are so nonsensical that without our sense of unity they would be a cause of friction... Yet for us to start making 'claims' on each other's territory would be to play into the hands of those who wish to keep Africa weak so as to improve their own relative strength in the future, and it might well lead us to the tragic absurdity of spending money on armaments while our people die for want of medical attention or starve from want of knowledge".

These remarks were unfortunately confirmed by the subsequent history of Africa. The disunity of the African states has not only generated enormous costs for the budgets of states which spend much more on arms, relative to their income, than rich countries, but has also prevented adequate resources from being diverted towards development plans, which to be effective cannot be limited to the small dimensions of the post-colonial national economies. The politics of division is the primary cause of the disasters, poverty, wars and genocide which African unity could have avoided.

The lessons of history are eloquent. Compare the destiny of the thirteen colonies of North America which, once the war of independence had been won, were able to adopt a federal constitution, with the vicissitudes of Latin America and Africa, where attempts at union have failed miserably. Nyerere was conscious that the objective of the United States of Africa could not be achieved in the short term and that in politics it is necessary to take such steps as are possible in the given historical situation. Therefore, at the Addis Ababa Conference (May 1963), in which despite the efforts of Kwame Nkrumah in favour of an African Federation, all that was achieved was an agreement for a fragile Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Nyerere recognised realistically that the revolutionary objective was not yet possible. "A true revolutionary", he observed, "is not an unrealistic dreamer. A true revolutionary is one who analyses any given situation with scientific objectivity and then acts accordingly". Therefore Nyerere accepted the disappointing results of Addis Ababa, but recognised immediately, and repeated it countless times, that the Africans, by wanting to conserve an anachronistic national sovereignty, had not averted the dangers and evils of division at all. This was not to say, however, that intermediate steps could not be taken towards African unity. If the objective of a continental union was not yet possible, the route of federal unions on a regional scale had to be tried.

The occasion presented itself in 1964, when the conditions were ripe for political union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In the speech celebrating the Union, Nyerere observed that, "The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar has been determined by our two Governments for the interests of Africa and African Unity. There is no other reason. Unity in our continent does not have to come via Moscow or Washington". Hence, in those same months, Nyerere proposed the ambitious project of a Federation of East Africa, between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. These countries had already known a form of administrative union during the colonial era and many of the common institutions, like the University of Makerere, were now contested between the dif-

ferent countries. It was evident that division was harming the peace and well-being of the three peoples. For this reason, Nyerere emphatically declared that the aim of a wise unification policy must be to create a Federation and that a Federation, "once it has been established, is established for all time.... It is, therefore, in the full awareness of the difficulties and implications of Federation that I state quite categorically that the Government of the United Republic and myself are fully committed to entering immediately into a Federation with Kenya and Uganda, or with Kenya, or with Uganda, alone".

The Federation of Eastern Africa was never created. Nationalist ambitions were stronger than ideals of unity. This failure did not however prevent Nyerere from acting, when the occasion arose, in favour of African unity and for the unity of all the peoples of the Planet. "Nation states build their own internal unity by fabricating, or exaggerating their division from other nations. ... Externally the law of the jungle operates ... This is obviously absurd. The technology of the twentieth century straddles the world and yet we try to operate social relations as if national boundaries created impenetrable barriers between different peoples". Hence it is essential to have a long-term vision and not to be afraid to boldly indicate the ultimate goal. This goal is world government. It does not matter if at the moment it is not attainable. Without that precise direction, not even short-term orientations appear clear. "At the moment the talk of a 'World Government' - which is what a world society implies - is day-dreaming. It is very logical dreaming and very necessary. But it is not likely to become a reality soon". The prospect of world government however makes it possible to identify certain intermediate objectives. "We have to rejoice in the very imperfect United Nations and have to work to strengthen it".

Nyerere's political vision is defined at this point. The way is drawn out for useful federalist commitment from local level up to world level. It is necessary to overcome, whenever and wherever possible, the absolute sovereignty of the nation states. It is necessary to fight against the "proliferation of nation states. While we work towards world unity, we can

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create unity in our continent. Or, if African unity is still too big a step to take at once, then we can create greater African unity by unions, federations or

mergers of the present nation states, so that the number of sovereign societies in Africa is reduced”.

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We can conclude this brief recollection of the thought and political action of Nyerere with three observations. The first concerns the current relevance of federalism in African politics. It is true that nationalism has so far prevailed. It is true that all attempts at sub-continental or continental federal union so far have failed. The OAU is only a bad imitation of the UN and the states of Western Africa have only succeeded in keeping a joint currency thanks to the support of France and the European Union. No form of political unification has so far developed and supported itself autonomously. This does not mean that the federalist perspective must be abandoned. The evils of artificial national divisions are only too evident. Africans are dying to defend borders created on the drawing boards of the European powers in the nineteenth century. The true inheritance of colonialism from which the Africans have not yet managed to free themselves is the sovereign nation state. If young Africans want to build a free, prosperous and independent Africa, more and more they must adopt the federalist message of Nyerere. The national ideology belongs to the nineteenth century. Federalism is the future. The second observation concerns the means of federalist struggle in Africa. Up to the present – and this is a factor which has certainly contributed to the failure of attempts so far at supranational unification – African federalists have acted in isolation or within small national groups. It is essential to create an African federalist movement rooted in different countries and having a solid supranational organisational centre. It is not possible to fight against nationalism effectively if national divisions between federalists are accepted a priori. The premise for an effective struggle for African unity is therefore the construction of a supranational federalist movement, autonomous and independent of all the constituted powers.

The third consideration concerns the relationship between European and African unity. The European Union collaborates today in the development of Africa through the Lomé Convention. This collaboration is inadequate and insufficient. The first to be aware of this are the European federalists, who ever since the Second World War have been fighting for the European Federation, not only to unite the European peoples but also to radically change the relations between the rich and poor countries. In the political programme of the European federalists, which can be summed up in the slogan “Uniting Europe to unite the world”, there is an important chapter concerning African unity. If our struggle to provide Europe with a constitution and a federal government is successful, the political conditions will be created for a radical reform of the Lomé Convention, currently a simple pact of commercial co-operation, but with joint institutions (the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council) which could allow a real inter-continental equal partnership for development. Indeed, the European federal government would have an interest (not merely a duty or an act of generosity) in proposing to the Africans a grand development project for the entire continent (high speed railway networks, information networks, exploitation of energy resources, etc.) on the sole condition that the Africans agree between themselves the means and timetable for their political unification. In this way, through co-operation for development between continents, a decisive impulse would be given to the cause of peace and world unification. Federalism makes it possible to look ahead and plan the future. Is a Euro-African equal partnership for development a dream? Perhaps. But in any case, as Nyerere effectively put it, “It is very logical dreaming and very necessary”.

All quotations taken from J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966.

# World Disaster or World Transformation?

Charlotte Waterlow

The world's population has now reached the figure of 6 billion. For 10,000 years, until the dawn of the modern age in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it grew at the rate of 0.1% a year, and the average expectation of life was about 30 years. It reached one billion in 1800, and in 200 years has now reached 6 billion, with an average expectation of life, globally, of 67 years. If major changes do not occur the total world population may reach 18 billion by the year 2025. These figures are the background to three huge problems. First, there is the gulf between the rich or "developed" and the poor or "developing" countries, containing respectively 20 and 80 per cent of the world's population. The essence of the gulf lies in historical development. For about 5000 years humanity lived in different cultures or civilisations, stretching across the world from Japan to Mexico. With two signal exceptions, those of Greece and Rome, and of Africa south of Egypt, they were grounded on the same ethos: a revealed public religion expressed in canonical scriptures, regarded as infallible, from which their political, legal and social systems were derived. (The Greeks and Romans had scripts but no scriptures, the Africans no scripts).

Government was hierarchical from the god-like ruler to the peasant, serf or slave. Women's role was to serve men. This meant that rulers and scholars looked backwards to the past for inspiration. These civilisations ticked over unchanging for millennia.

And then, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the modern age burst forth in Western Europe and its off-shoot, North America. The great cry "liberty, equality, fraternity!" was raised. Scientific thinking arose, clashing with canonical religions. For the first time in history agnosticism and atheism became general. Applied science began to transform

standards of living. Change, progress, development became the order of the day. Peasants and women were proclaimed as equal persons with the men whose ancestors had dominated society for millennia. (Vide the behaviour of the British House of Lords on being abolished). I think, therefore, that it was because the modern age started in the West that the present gulf between the developed and the developing countries has emerged, the latter now seeking to integrate what is eternally relevant in their own traditions with the cultural ethos and scientific development of the Western world. The gulf between rich and poor has produced immense possibilities for world-wide cultural enrichment and synthesis, but also immense tensions – the incitement of the rich to power and greed, the poor to psychological insecurity, resentment, envy and hatred.

Secondly, against this background there is the problem of resources. The world is beginning to run out of the resources needed to meet the needs of 6 billion people at an adequate level. (Article 25 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care..." (See my article in *The Federalist*, 1992, No. 3, on "The Democratic Basis of Global Housekeeping"). A series of "Summit" conferences of Heads of States was initiated in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro, which led to the signing of a number of international conventions on social problems and economic threats, but so far there has been little implementation. The problems of energy, food, minerals, water, forest depletion, destruction of genetic species, and the menace of global war-

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ming, threaten a world breakdown. In 1992 the British Royal Society and the American National Academy of Sciences, two of the world's most prestigious bodies, concluded in a joint statement that: "The future of our planet is in balance. Sustainable development can be achieved, but only if the irreversible degradation of the planet can be halted in time. The next 30 years may be crucial". The late Erskine Childers, a very senior official at the United Nations, warned at the same time that: "In another ten years one in three beings alive will be existing on the margins of survival. The better-off 20% minority will not be able to control the world, or get off it". The misery of the poor and the greed of the rich is intensified by the refusal of the rich to relieve the poor of their debts, and by the determination of the rich to organise the newly created World Trade Organisation on terms which will enable them to control and exploit the resources of the poor. Greed is thus being met by rage. In general, the poor countries are suffused with emotional violence and inferiority complexes. Forty million people, including two million children, have been killed in their wars since 1945. Now that three major poor countries, China, India and Pakistan, have acquired nuclear weapons there is even talk about a nuclear war between the rich and the poor countries.

The third major world problem is the problem of nuclear weapons. At present they are in the hands of eight states - USA, UK, Russia, France, China, Israel, India and Pakistan. These countries are estimated to have a total stockpile of 35820 missiles with a sufficient number on alert to destroy human civilisation in a few minutes. Numerous treaties to abolish them have proved abortive.

Is the world collapse foreseen by the Royal Society and many others inevitable? I think that the history of the past 50 years shows that the negative developments described above can be halted, and the world set to pursue a benign course of constructive transformation, if certain new policies are urgently implemented. The concept of Human Rights has for the first

time in history been developed as a global ethic. Before 1945 only the Western states were democratic. Most of the rest were either European colonies or ruled by hereditary monarchs or chiefs. The essence of the ethic of Human Rights is contained, as I see it, in a clause in Article 26 about the right to education: "education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality"... This is a universal recognition that the most important thing about a person is his or her unique attributes as a psyche or soul. And souls are united by brother-sisterhood, by love. The United Nations has been established to put this marvellous principle into practice in all spheres of society. And it has attached to it 31 Specialised Agencies which collectively deal with almost every aspect of human affairs. A world society of souls necessitates democracy, civil law and social justice. And it implies fraternity - persons or souls relating to each other in love.

This principle, largely misunderstood or unobserved by most people, has entered like an enzyme into the world's politics body. The United Nations has created a large body of international law to promote the implementation of Human Rights - for example, Conventions on the Rights of Women, the Rights of the Child, the Law of the Sea, the Rights of Indigenous People, etc. Together with its Specialised Agencies it has carried out a great deal of research into economic and social matters, so that the groundwork for dealing with the immense problems described above - the Superproblem - has been laid. For instance, an African official from Senegal recently told me that in 1945 literacy in the developing countries was about 5 per cent; 50 years later, he said, it had increased to 50 per cent. And the explosion of communications throughout the world through radio, television, fax, e-mail etc. is making the humblest peasant throughout the world aware of his situation and giving him ideas about what to do about it. The ground has thus been prepared for GLOBAL HOUSEKEEPING - the planning, rationing and administering of scarce resources on the principle of what the International

Labour Organisation, as long ago as 1976, called "Basic needs first". The ILO pointed out then that the "trickle down theory" of conventional capitalism had not worked. Global Housekeeping points towards fraternal action between states and multinational corporations which will make emotional attitudes of national sovereignty and corporate greed fade away. And the climate will then be ripe for disarmament.

The implementation of such policies therefore points to the transformation of the existing nation states and multinational corporations into associates or agents of the United Nations for carrying out Global Housekeeping. This approach could solve the problem of the reform of the United Nations itself, the problem of the irrationality of basing international democracy on one state one vote - whether the state's population is 2 million or 2 billion - in the General Assembly, and endowing the veto power in the Security Council to the five states which won World War II fifty-five years ago. The answer, I believe, lies in the concept of "Community", which goes beyond law to fraternity, to love.

The creation of the European Community in 1950 was, I think, the greatest act of fraternity and forgiveness in history. The Community has grown from five to 15 member states and more, in East Europe, are anxious to join it. There are incipient Communities in Africa, the South Pacific, and Latin America. The Security Council could in future represent Communities. An interesting suggestion was recently made by two very senior United Nations officials, the late Erskine Childers and Sir Brian Urquart, that the Specialised Agencies should be relocated to New York and become embryo ministries for the United Nations as a world government.

The terrible threat of global collapse which is hanging over the world today is thus complemented by the marvellous portents for the emergence of a world civilisation based on Human Rights, "Community" and love. And it is likely that WOMEN will lead the way by insisting on disarmament.

## One Billion Illiterates

UNICEF sends an SOS to the world: one sixth of the Earth's population is still illiterate at the beginning of the new millennium! Seven billion dollars a year (less than that spent by the USA on cosmetics, or in Europe on ice-creams) would be sufficient to reverse this trend in only ten years.

In its annual report, UNICEF confirms that developing countries are still at the top of the list: almost 130 million children have never been to school, and 20 million do not finish primary school. Young girls are the most discriminated against. They have to work, to look after their younger brothers; and even if they go to school, they are overwhelmed with hostility and sexism. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only 57 per cent of females attend a school, compared to 61 per cent of males; in South Asia only 62 per cent of females compared to 74 per cent of males.

UNICEF's purposes are to open alternative schools, with a flexible timetable for lessons, itinerant teachers to reach rural villages and itinerant schools for refugees; new way of teaching to help children who have known war and in general to let them know how dangerous weapons are.

The last proposal is that the richest countries might give 20 per cent of their budget to poor ones and 20 per cent of their aid to development budget to social programs (*e.b.*).

# After Seattle: What next for WTO?

*Fergus Watt and Urs P. Thomas*

On January 1, 2000 *The Globe and Mail*, the most influential daily newspaper in Canada, ran a headline which read, "Pettigrew says WTO should be reinvented". In the article which followed, Pierre Pettigrew, Canada's Minister for International Trade, said that: "The WTO should be reinvented, somehow. You need to have more effective governance for the WTO. One idea I am toying with is that maybe it is time for the WTO to have its own security council".

The article went on to describe how a new and improved WTO would have a two-body design much like the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, with a handful of countries making key decisions on behalf of the entire world. The members of the security council would be not only the industrialized states. Rich and poor would be included, with perhaps each member representing a block of other states. Furthermore, the revamped WTO would also have official links to other international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization and perhaps other UN agencies.

Federalists could quite easily find fault with such a scheme. But the significance of Mr. Pettigrew's comments lies not in the details of his plans, but in the fact that he offers them in the first place. Here we have a trade minister from a respected middle power nation ruminating in the national press about re-structuring the entire institutional matrix of global economic governance! Welcome to life after Seattle.

The dust is still settling following the trade talks and massive public demonstrations in Seattle at the World Trade Organization Ministerial Confer-

ence November 30 to December 3. No one knows where the international community will go next, or who will be along for the ride. Governments, NGOs and WTO officials are all still getting their bearings.

Attempts to launch a new round of global trade talks were suspended on the evening of December 3, although discussions have already begun on when to resume the talks, aimed at determining the agenda for another trade round.

The progress which was made in Seattle (e.g. on agriculture and on issues of concern to least developed countries) was "locked in" and will not be lost. In the meantime, negotiations on agriculture and services, mandated in the last round, will proceed in January 2000, in Geneva. However, the 19-page draft Ministerial text which emerged on the fourth and final day of formal negotiations indicated significant disagreement on many issues: the preambular language outlining sustainable development, in extending Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) protection to additional product areas, and in the creation of various working groups, including Trade and Debt, Biotechnology and Transfer of Technology.

Many explanations were offered for the stalled discussions. Some delegates blamed the non-transparent decision-making procedures that shut out many developing countries from important negotiating sessions. Others pointed to an overloaded and overambitious agenda. Still others blamed the major players: the U.S. for failing to provide sufficient leeway in its position on implementation and for strong-arming other members over tying trade to labor

standards. The EU was also criticized for avoiding any commitment to agricultural liberalization.

### **Teamsters and Turtles**

Seattle will be remembered for the massive protests which initially halted and later delayed the official negotiations and (more significantly) coloured the world's perceptions of the negotiations.

Seattle brought together an unlikely alliance: farmers, students, pacifists, feminists, consumer, human rights and developing country advocates, animal rights activists, organized labour and environmentalists. The last two, probably the two biggest groups, seem to have discovered new common ground which may have important implications for future political strategy. For starters, it may require a re-assessment of the practicality and political feasibility of bringing social standards into the WTO, which the organization had decided in 1996 to leave to the International Labour Organization.

The massive street demonstrations were poorly reported. Mainstream media overplayed the looting and conflict. They also under-reported the police violence. And most importantly, they didn't reflect the tremendous range and complexity of civil society dialogue, teach-ins, workshops etc. on all matters of public interest issues arising from trade liberalization.

NGOs can't take credit for the failure of official negotiations. They would probably have broken down anyway. However, NGOs, as a societal phenomenon of our times, come away from this event strengthened. They have proven, more than ever before, that civil society must be reckoned with in trade talks. Public discourse on trade and governance issues will not be left to small enclaves of corporate lobbyists and bureaucrats.

There are still many misunderstandings to be overcome. Too many governments and corporate leaders continue to misunderstand, distort or ignore the public opposition to the WTO. The NGOs' agenda is viewed as naive and "anti-trade".

Similarly, many NGOs went to Seattle to attack the bogeyman of globalization. Now, many are realizing that the issues are very complicated; that some sort of global body to regulate trade is inevitable in a global economy.

Thoroughly discredited now is the idea that the world can carry on with a World Trade Organization with strong enforcement powers, while international institutions to protect the environment, ensure safety standards and protect rights remain weak. The need for institutional reforms is now widely accepted.

It is unclear how much of the "social agenda" can be incorporated within the WTO, and how much will need to occur through strengthening other international institutions, as well as the coordination of the various parts of the international "system".

Nobody knows how any of this will occur. But at least the debate on these key governance issues has been well advanced. For federalists, this is all to the good.

But federalists too ought to do more than sit back and smugly proclaim that the world is unfolding as it should. Federalists could also benefit from some critical self-examination and re-tooling, in order to successfully engage the global governance issues in the months and years ahead.

The application of the principles of democratic federalism to world affairs can take many forms and lead practitioners and theorists alike in a variety of directions. World federalists find evidence of this constantly in the varied (and sometimes eclectic) nature of the programs and campaigns undertaken by federalist organizations around the world. This is not a problem. Indeed the flexibility of our core ideals is part of what makes federalism such a wonderful and enduring theory of political organization.

In the years since 1947 when the world federalists re-organized as a worldwide social movement we have primarily seen ourselves as a United Nations reform organization. Perhaps this was appropriate decades ago, when there

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was a widely held view that the “UN System” was made up of (or ought to be made up of) a secretariat and executive bodies in New York, plus constellations of functional agencies, located elsewhere in the world but coordinated centrally from New York.

The UN is still, and will continue to be, vitally important. The Charter is the foundation of today’s international legal order. The UN is the world’s parliament of nations, the authoritative universal forum. And Security Council decisions will continue to bind state behaviour in the realm of international peace and security.

But World Federalists need to re-assess the political environment in which we are operating. The UN is hardly a governing “system”. Global governance today is fractured and multi-layered.

And when one surveys the realm of inter-governmental organizations, it would be unwise to ignore the enormous power vested in the

International Monetary Fund, which has grown from a “lender of last resort” to take on global financial regulatory responsibilities, and the World Trade Organization, which as a successor to the GATT has been vested with binding authority to enforce its trade rulings.

Both of these organizations have only a negligible and tangential relationship to what is commonly understood as the UN system. And yet there is now a growing international consensus that both institutions are in need of reform. Reform of the institutions of economic governance is unlikely to encompass the UN. The UN’s Charter makes such a development unlikely. Nevertheless, “new institutional bargains” are being considered. The G-20 for example has been created to discuss the political contours of a new international financial architecture.

This is where it’s at for world federalists. We must be flexible and pragmatic if we want to be relevant.



# Jacques Attali for International Democracy

For the second time in a few days (following an interview given to *Liberation*) Jacques Attali, former President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), set out in *Le Monde* on 8 December 1999 his views and ideas following the setback to the meeting of the WTO at Seattle.

“... We need therefore to profit from the pause demanded by some and imposed by circumstances to rethink the problem of globalisation in its entirety, and in particular, the architecture of the international institutions needed to affront it.

... The governments will have to take into account the genesis in each of countries of a public opinion concerned to defend not only national or regional interests, but also those concerned with the interests of the planet as a whole desirous to see established the instruments able to ensure a real democratic administration of the interests of humanity... alongside a national citizenship which is in the pro-

cess of giving birth to a planetary citizenship.

The world then needs a forum where public opinion could debate the vital interests of the planet without waiting, in order to achieve this, the need to demonstrate in the streets of the cities where intergovernmental meetings take place. Such a forum could take the form of a second chamber of the UN, alongside the General Assembly.

... In the same way as the end of the second world war led to the birth of the European Union, so the end of the cold war should lead to the birth of a World Union of similar lines: an assembly with embryonic powers to represent the peoples, a council of ministers to take decisions, a commission to execute them and a whole series of associated agencies to implement them.

Obviously it will be much more difficult to set up for two hundred countries that which was conceived for only six; the difficulties of EU enlargement recall this to us every day...” (j.-f.b.).

## A Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO

The Italian Foreign Trade Minister Piero Fassino in an interview published on *La Repubblica* on 24 January 2000 illustrated the plan of the Italian government for an institutional reform of the WTO. He stressed the need for “a WTO Parliamentary Assembly composed by the representati-

ves of the parliaments of all the member states, in order to create a better and more organic link according to the model of something already existing within NATO, OSCE and EU”. He suggested as well “to create a civil society forum beside the Parliamentary Assembly” (l.l.).

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# The Tobin Tax

## An important contribution to the building of a new financial order

*Vera Palea*

Thanks to modern computer technology, capitals are being moved in an increasingly free and fast way across borders for direct investments in real economy as well as to buy and sell financial activities. The movements of capital can bring significant advantages not only to the countries directly concerned with these exchanges but also to the whole world, if savings are focused on projects capable of promoting economic growth and therefore wealth. In fact, according to recent evaluations, only 4% of the currency exchange made world-wide - and estimated at 1.300 billion dollars a day - represent the offset of commercial movements or direct investments; the rest consists of credit operations and speculative movements. It is estimated that over two thirds of the latter are carried out over very short periods of time, of less than eight days but often as little as a few hours.

Progressive liberalisation of the financial markets and computer innovations have made speculative operations extremely simple and low cost, and have therefore notably increased the destabilising power factor. Since they involve very fast movements of capital, the speculative operations lead to a strong volatility of the interest rates which, in their turn, hinder and distort the decision-making processes of the real economy. They imply high costs for the macroeconomic policy that becomes neutralised and diverted from the achievement of its more important objectives, especially economic development and full employment. A single world currency would clearly side-step such disturbance and it would protect economy from the exchange risk and from speculative operations. In fact, even a fixed exchange system, the parity of which could however be modified, could not eliminate the opportunities for speculations.

In 1972 the Nobel Prize for economy, James Tobin,

taking up J.M. Keynes' idea, proposed to discourage the short-term speculative movements of capital ("*to throw sand in the financial markets mechanism*") by application of an international tax on foreign currency exchange operations. Tobin believed that a 0,5% tax on currency transaction would have been too low to depress the goods market or the long term financial investments but, as it could be compensated by a difference of four points of interest rates on three months, it would have been suitable to slow down the speculative movements of capital.

The considerable problems in managing the recent financial crises in South-East Asia, Russia and Brazil, and the virtually instantaneous speed with which these crises were spread induced many economists (among which the vice president of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz and the under-secretary of the US Treasury, Larry Summers) to adopt and support Tobin's proposal. At present, the governments of Australia, France and Germany and the Canadian Parliament have spoken out in favour of a currency exchange tax. The Tobin tax has been also supported by the *UN Human Development Report 1994* and by many NGOs. A bill has been already brought in the Italian Parliament while the Belgian Senate is studying the possibility of enforcing the Tobin tax on a European level.

The introduction of the Tobin tax would bring about a number of advantages.

In the first place, if we consider that the overall official reserves are lower than the value of a single day of transactions in foreign currency, the risk that future crises could exceed the "fire-fighting" capacities of the IMF and the G7 monetary authorities is very high. During the 90's, the IMF supplied aid for a total of 310 billion Dollars. During the last crises, the Fund used resources amounting to 138 billion

Dollars and today the current assets are very reduced. The Tobin tax collected on each foreign currency exchange operation would contribute to reduce the risk of global financial crisis and would discharge on the speculators a part of the costs of their activity. Secondly, by reducing the exchange rates instability, the Tobin tax would allow operators to invest more funds in the production of real assets and less in the protection of their investments from the currency markets ups and downs. Hindering the short term financial flows, the Tobin tax would therefore favour long term investments that promote the economical growth and wealth not only through capital transfer but also through the spreading of technology and the training of the human resources. Lastly, even though the main objective of the Tobin tax is not the revenues but the reduction of the taxable base - i.e. the short term speculative movements - it would however be capable, if applied globally, to generate high proceeds. Within the limits of more conservative estimates, a 0,05% tax (Tobin suggested 0,5%) could generate approximately 150 billion dollars a year, corresponding to two or three times the required amount to eliminate the worst forms of poverty.

Consistently with the principle according to which the most obvious way to finance the management of *global issues* is to tax common *global assets* (as the air and the bottom of the oceans), and *globalised activities* (such as the movements of foreign currency), the revenues generated by the Tobin tax could be used to constitute a fund available for the UN to be used for the major issues of underdevelopment, pollution, natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, migratory waves, etc. In this way a permanent source of financing could be created for the UN, that could have thus a greater autonomous balance from national governments and enhanced autonomy and initiative capacity.

To be efficient, the Tobin tax should be universal and uniform, i.e. applied world-wide with the same rate in order to avoid the arising of offshore tax heavens. To limit a tax evasion phenomenon, the tax collection should be entrusted to financial brokers qualified for currency exchange, who should collect the tax directly according to the withholding tax

system. Assigning tax assessments, sanctions and co-action functions for collection to the single states, the only ones currently having the required authoritative powers to levy taxes, would allow the immediate introduction of the Tobin tax. Providing that the single states can keep, according to the "consideration" principle, a minimum part of the total revenues of the new tax would favour a more intense control aimed at limiting the tax evasion.

At first the Tobin tax could be enforced just by some States, for example the States of G7. In this case the agreement should take penalty measures for capital transfers towards tax havens. However, appointing the single national states as reference centres for the control of international finance will not allow to deal efficiently and steadily with the growing interdependence of international economy.

A sound management of the economic globalisation requires not a co-ordination but a unification of the single states' intervention. This would imply creating supranational and democratic institutions within which the main economic areas in the world are represented and the relations between the states are regulated by the acceptance of common rules and not by balance of power. The creation of a new economic order cannot set aside the establishment of democracy at international level. Therefore the international financial organisations should be reformed according to the democratic principle of representation extension. A political body shall be entrusted with their control and co-ordination, as well as with the co-ordination of economic policies with other policies - as those aimed at implementing a sustainable development, environment protection, the development of underdeveloped countries - required to eliminate the distortions created by the globalisation process, free to play with the market forces.

This body could be represented by the UN, as it is already the institutional centre where all countries collaborate on issues related to global interdependence. UN should be strengthened in its capacity to act and reformed in a democratic sense in order to become a real supranational governing system, with limited but real powers, i.e. that could enable the UN to solve problems on a world-wide scale.

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# The Euro, the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System

*Francesca Siciliano*

The place of the euro in the international monetary system is a topic that is being hotly debated and closely analysed on both sides of the Atlantic. In an article that appeared in *Foreign Affairs*<sup>1</sup>, Fred Bergsten<sup>2</sup> wonders how the international monetary system will react to the euro's debut on the world financial markets and what impact the ensuing monetary balance will have on the world economy, in light of relations between the euro and the dollar.

In Bergsten's view, momentous changes are pre-  
saged by the creation of the euro - the biggest  
change in global finance since the dollar surpas-  
sed sterling, in the interwar period, to become  
the international reserve currency.

The launch of the euro may mean the prospect of  
disputing the leadership role of the United States  
dollar, which has so far gone unchallenged, and  
paves the way for a new monetary world order  
that could very well tip the scales away from  
America's increasingly unstable hegemony. Fol-  
lowing the collapse of the fixed exchange rate  
system put in place at Bretton Woods and the  
adoption of floating exchange rates, monetary  
instability has become a fact of life: the nume-  
rous international financial crises of the past two  
decades provide compelling evidence. The  
waning leadership of the United States is pri-  
marily due to the growing interdependence of the  
global economy, and to the extraordinary advan-  
ces made on the technological front, whereby  
multimedia communications networks can shift  
capital virtually in real time. Another cause lies  
in the economic competitiveness of the European  
Union, that has made it the world's number one  
trading power.

Because of the growing monetary instability that  
is spreading across the globe, no country can

consider itself shielded from financial turmoil;  
indeed, the global economy is on a slippery  
slope. It emerges quite clearly from Bergsten's  
analysis that there is a real danger of restrictive  
and protectionist practices rearing their ugly  
head. In fact, the US in particular may well start  
clamping down on imports to counter the threat  
of recession, which it fears will hamper economic  
growth. Should the tide of protectionism advan-  
ce unchecked, there is a danger of serious ten-  
sions developing between the European Union  
and the United States; and international trade  
would be the innocent victim, since it was the  
euro-american partnership that first fuelled the  
drive towards liberalization in the second half of  
the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, a wave of protectioni-  
sm would be ruinous for Asia's export-driven  
markets, which are only now getting back on  
their feet after the recent crisis, and would slow  
down the transition process currently under way  
in other emerging market countries in central  
and eastern Europe.

On the monetary front, transatlantic relations  
are getting more and more strained. According  
to the Bergsten article, the appearance of the  
euro on the international scene could lead to a  
situation of severe instability, unless the Euro-  
pean Union and the United States can manage  
their relations effectively and jointly forge a new  
global monetary system rendered stable by  
balanced relations between the euro and the  
dollar. It is anticipated that as soon as the shift  
takes place from the dollar to the euro and the  
European Central Bank establishes its credibi-  
lity on the world's financial markets, the dollar-  
euro exchange rate will start swinging, and this  
could jeopardize world economic growth.

On the one hand, an excessive appreciation of

the euro versus the dollar would hurt the competitiveness of European products and push Europe's productivity down, thus exacerbating unemployment. On the other, it is widely feared that any fall in the dollar against the euro could result in an abrupt termination of what has been defined as America's "economic miracle". If the euro becomes a real competitor to the dollar, the US will have to raise interest rates to attract foreign capital to finance its large external debt; the backlash would hit Asian economic and financial environments the hardest, and the emerging economies would also be hurt, since their foreign debt is primarily dollar-denominated and much-needed capital flows would end up in America, where interest rates are higher, instead of in their own needy economies. With these examples, Bergsten underlines the dramatic economic and financial consequences deriving from renewed instability between the two foremost international currencies. However, so far neither Europe nor the United States has shown the ability or the inclination to take on responsibility for ensuring the stability of the international monetary system. The European Union has concerned itself primarily with regional initiatives, mainly the launching of the euro, the reform of the common agricultural policy and of the structural funds and the enlargement of the Union towards central and eastern Europe.

Furthermore, although the EU has managed to create a single currency, it has not succeeded in putting up a united front in dealings with the principal international financial institutions, though it has done so at the trade level. For its part, the United States has shown indifference toward international economic and monetary issues. Bergsten argues that America's attitude is not just cavalier but ambiguous and goes so far as to call it schizophrenia: because while urging Europe to assert greater international responsibility, the US also seems to fear the prospect of having to share its leadership with others. The stability of the global economic and monetary system can only be ensured if the United States and the EU turn over a new leaf

and begin to cooperate effectively.

Bergsten stresses that on the monetary front, the ECB and Federal Reserve need to agree on a dollar-euro range that would reflect their respective domestic economic fundamentals, and undertake to intervene jointly in the markets to keep the rate from straying too far from central parity, while promoting some degree of coordination on economic and monetary policies.

Europe and the United States will form the core of the new international monetary system, but Japan will also have to be involved along with other states, both through informal groupings like the G-7, G-10 and even G-20, and in global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund.

The idea put forward by Bergsten is that of an economic and monetary system supported by extensive international cooperation and featuring the joint leadership of Europe and the United States. However, this development is unlikely to eventuate with European integration standing as it does today. If the euro is to join the dollar as an international reserve currency, the EU must have a democratic government that can draft common economic policy and speak with a single voice on the international stage without having to bow to the decisions of the national governments of its member states. So long as the paradoxical situation endures whereby a single European currency is circulating but there is no single European government, the euro will never gain the trust of the international economic community. In fact, without this trust, the euro will never become a currency against which world markets peg their units, since proof of its solvency and liquidity is a *conditio sine qua non* for acquiring that status, and such proof can only come from the Union's ability to put on a united economic policy front and, by so doing, match the US in terms of credibility and stature on world markets<sup>3</sup>.

Accordingly, the European Union needs to fill the democratic vacuum within its borders by creating a European government accountable

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to a European parliament, with effective legislative powers and authority to control the executive. This is the only avenue open to the EU for sharing a dominant role in global finance alongside the United States, and for contributing to the blueprint for a new international monetary system with a stable multi-polar exchange rate based on a group of pooled fidu-

ciary currencies that are equally stable in terms of solvency and liquidity. By the same token, only the establishment of a European government will enable the EU to shoulder concrete responsibilities within the world's financial institutions and thus take an active part in managing the new global monetary system.

<sup>1</sup> Fred Bergsten, "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?", in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999

<sup>2</sup> Fred Bergsten is Director of the Institute for International Economics of Washington

<sup>3</sup> Domenico Moro, "Il governo europeo dell'economia: l'euro e la stabilità monetaria internazionale", Report to the XIXth Congress of MFE (Salerno, 19-21 March 1999)



## The Need for a World Currency

The *International Herald Tribune*, in the January 31<sup>st</sup>'s issue, adapted a comment from a speech delivered in Bangkok on Jan. 27 by Paul A. Volcker, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The title is very impressive: *Toward a Single World Currency to Level the Playing Field*.

"(...) What contributed much to the severity of recent crises was the disparity in the size of participants in international markets (...) mere marginal shifts in funds by big international players can overwhelm the capacity of small economies and banking systems.

(...) While banks in small economies cannot make themselves big and diversified by international standards, they are joining forces with larger and more stable foreign partners. A similar consolidation is happening among corporations. In the world of money, something more surprising is taking place. Directly contrary to widely accepted textbook models, more and more smaller countries have questioned the value of an independent currency. A number have linked the local currency to a major international currency via a currency board, and others have abandoned their own currency

altogether. In effect, these countries are saying that they will forgo financial autonomy and flexibility in return for the stability, integrity and lower interest rates of an internationally strong currency such as the dollar or the euro. This approach runs against long-held notions of national sovereignty. (...) Without a dominant trading and financial partner, there is no obvious single monetary link.

It is almost impossible for such countries to conduct coherent foreign exchange policy when the exchange rates fluctuate radically between the yen, dollar and euro. As things stand, leaders of the big economies see little incentive to stabilize the relative value of their currencies within reasonable ranges. But in my view the main countries can and must coordinate such efforts to make a much safer and more reasonable world for emerging economies. In fact, if we are to have a truly globalized economy, a single world currency makes sense. That would be a world in which objectives of growth, economic efficiency and stability could be reconciled. (...). That is not a world I will live to see, but the underlying tendencies are in that direction" (*i.s.*).

# A Single Currency for North America or for the World?

*Ira Straus*

A survey sponsored by Coinstar Inc. found 43 percent of Americans would support an agreement among the United States, Canada and Mexico to create one currency for the three nations akin to the euro that is shared by 11 European nations. The survey also found 25 percent of respondents would like to adopt the euro. This both shows a surprisingly high level of popular support for a common currency including the U.S., elevating it nearer to the level of a serious political issue than was previously imagined possible in the near term, and at the same time shows an incredible lack of serious thinking in the manner in which the issue is raised. If Americans want a wider common currency, they should be thinking about a global or semi-global currency, built atop the euro plus the dollar plus the yen; not about joining the euro or forming some new North American currency. That it gets posed the latter two ways shows a dismal absence of awareness of the proposals of serious economists for doing it the former way.

Presumably it is our business as federalists to be raising the level of awareness of the more serious proposals, and to encourage thinking to start moving along the lines of scenarios for implementing them.

Among the serious economists who have proposed a U.S.-Europe-Japan federal reserve and common currency, I might mention Paul Volcker and William McChesney Martin – both are former chairmen of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board. Volcker just wrote an article in the *Inter-*

*national Herald Tribune*, January 31, 2000, advocating this.

A common North American currency means simply the U.S. dollar. One doesn't create a new currency to merge 80% of the North American economy with the remaining 20% that is using different currencies. A new currency like the "euro" is created out of a better-balanced basket of currencies.

The U.S. adopting the "euro" is equally absurd. The dollar and euro are in the long run equal in weight; for now and for some time to come, the dollar is the stronger, because of a much longer history and much more secure political backing. Abandoning one for the other is not in the cards, unless it is by the route (also highly implausible) of the euro collapsing or losing its political support and European nations defecting one by one to the dollar. More seriously, some major Latin American countries like Argentina have been talking about adopting the dollar. But adopting some other country's currency comes at a high psychological cost, as we are seeing in Ecuador, which is trying to carry through on dollarization.

The only common currency that makes sense for the U.S. to join is a new one, constructed atop the euro plus the dollar preferably plus the yen as well, perhaps by a method similar to the way the euro was constructed atop the national currencies of Europe. Which would amount to a global currency for most international transactions, probably also open to join for any country that wanted to adopt it.

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# Proposal for a Partnership between the European Union and India to Create a Global Community for Sustainable Development

*John Pinder and Andrew Duff*

1. The process that Jean Monnet initiated, of creating an integrated structure of states by successive stages in the development of institutions, competences and membership, has done much to establish the conditions for peace and prosperity in Western Europe. While the conditions and the time-scale would be very different, it is suggested that these principles could be applied at a wider international, and eventually global, level.

## **Aim**

2. The European Community was founded to deal with a problem of vital interest to the member states: the promotion of security within Europe through the joint governance of the heavy industries that were then the industrial basis of military power. It was subsequently developed to deal with other matters as this was found desirable by the member states. A problem of vital interest to the world today, which provides grounds for founding a global community of which the EU itself would be a member, is the establishment of ecological security through adequate control of the emission of gases that change the climate by global warming and depletion of the ozone layer.

3. The Tokyo Protocol made a useful contribution to this and was notable for the leading role played by the European Union. But the targets fell short of those proposed by the EU,

themselves not unduly ambitious in view of the potential dangers; and the means of making them effective are inadequate, as are the methods for responding to new challenges that will arise.

4. An initiative is therefore proposed in order to establish a global community of states which would, by accepting stronger aims, competences and institutions, themselves make a major contribution to dealing with the problem of climate change and at the same time provide a core for the community's development towards eventual universal membership.

5. Building on success in this capacity, the new community could also be developed, as the European Community has been, to perform other functions to enhance the security and prosperity of the member states.

## **Competences**

6. The competences of the community would be confined to those that would have a very substantial impact on net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, through limits on the consumption of fossil fuels and CFCs and through the conservation and development of forests, together with action to support sustainable development in the less developed member states.

7. The community would move towards a just

distribution of the right to such emissions, modified by a system of trade in states' allowances such as was agreed in Kyoto. Each member state would devise its own programme of measures for compliance, in accord with its own conditions and preferences. But the programmes would be subject to peer review and common agreement and their implementation would be monitored and controlled by the community.

8. The control of emissions will rapidly become inadequate unless it encompasses big players among the states that are not yet advanced industrial powers. These states reasonably insist that such control should not impair their economic development; and this requires a greater effort to support their development than the industrial powers were prepared to offer at Tokyo. That is why the new community should be called Community for Sustainable Development (CSD) and why it should have a limited but considerable competence to support such development.

9. For reasons outlined below, the membership of the CSD is not likely to be universal at its foundation. Its founding treaty should therefore state the aim of eventual universal membership and should provide for instruments of external policy designed to establish fruitful relations with non-member states, to develop associations with them that would facilitate their accession, and to ensure constructive participation in the International Panel on Climate Change.

### **Institutions**

10. The fundamental principle of the CSD would be the rule of law for matters within its competence. As in the European Community, there would be a Court of Justice to ensure, in conjunction with the judiciaries of the member states, that CSD law is observed. This would be the key to making the new community effective in a way that is not feasible for the IPCC.

11. Initially the CSD law would be largely treaty-

based, as it was under the original ECSC treaty. But there would, as in the EC, be a two-chamber legislature, comprising a Council of States, comprising senior ministers, and a parliamentary assembly, to enact legislation as required within the scope of the treaty. There would also be an executive to monitor compliance with the law and to administer the policies emanating from the political institutions in accordance with the treaty.

### **Membership**

12. Three principles underlying the membership of the European Community have contributed to its success. First, the member states have all been pluralist democracies based on the rule of law. Second, the member states, and the larger ones in particular, have from the outset transcended historical lines of division as well as differing political cultures, thus removing a barrier to enlargement that an initially more homogeneous membership would erect. Third, there has been no hegemon among the member states: a condition for the development of a democratic rather than an autocratic structure, and also for enlargement to states that would not accept a hegemony.

13. These principles, applied to the CSD, would require the member states to be pluralist democracies based on the rule of law, to include less developed as well as industrially advanced countries, and in particular at least one of the major powers from among these two groups.

14. The major powers among the industrially advanced are the US and the EU, while those among the less developed are China and India. Just as Britain, then the dominant West European power, initially stood aside from the European Community, so it is likely that the US would not at first be willing to accept the commitments required by membership of the CSD. China is not a pluralist democracy based on the rule of law, and thus not ready to become a founder member. While it is essential, for the ultimate success of the project, that the US and China

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should accede, the EU and India are the most likely among the major powers to be both ready and willing to be among the founders.

15. The initial membership should also include as many as possible of the states from both groups as are ready and willing. Brazil, with its vast forests and impressive economic development, would be particularly important, as would Japan, being the world's third industrial power. Such European democracies as are not yet members of the EU would moreover gain experience of working within an organisation based on similar principles by joining the CSD.

16. European experience has demonstrated the dynamics whereby states that are not founder members eventually become ready and willing to join. The CSD should seek to ensure that this experience is repeated at the global level.

#### **A key role for Britain in a Euro-Indian initiative towards global integration**

17. Just as the EU and India are the most likely among the major powers to be founder members, so they should jointly take the initiative to create

the CSD, as France and Germany did to found the European Community; and the EU itself is as well placed as France was then to be the prime initiator. Britain, as a leading member of both the EU and the Commonwealth, has a key part to play in bringing this about.

18. This is anything but a quick fix. It is nearly half a century since the foundation of the EC/EU, which is still in the process of development. Given the scale of the problems that will confront a community with global aspirations, the time-scale will be yet longer. But the EC had a beneficial impact from the outset, because it dealt effectively with crucial problems facing Europeans and because its further development, including a widening membership, was envisaged. The same could be expected of the CSD.

19. There is an important implication for the EU itself. The EU, as a result of its own character and history, is uniquely placed to contribute to a process of wider international integration for dealing with global problems. To take the lead in this would provide a much-needed focus for its common external policy. The project offers an ideal opportunity to make a constructive contribution to the development of the EU and of its place in the world.

<sup>7</sup>This proposal is based on a paper by John Pinder, of which the original draft appeared in *The Federalist Debate*, VIII, 1995, n.3 and the final version was published as a chapter entitled "The Rule of Law for a Uniting World: A Global Community for Sustainable Development", in Willem J.M. van Genugten et al. (eds), *Realism and Moralism in International Relations*, The Hague, London, Boston, Kluwer Law international, 1999. The proposal, by John Pinder and Andrew Duff MEP, was issued by the Federal Trust (of which Duff was then the Director) in October 1998 and suggested a British initiative for an EU policy to establish such a community. An initiative from any source would of course be welcome and the proposal printed here has been amended accordingly.



# The Montreal Treaty on Biotechnological Trade

*Lionello Casalegno*

A very significant step, historic in the opinion of many, has been made towards the regulation of international trade of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), i.e. plants, animals and bacteria, which will certainly open the way in finding a future agreement on the very heated debate about foods made with biotechnology.

A Biosafety Protocol has been approved by representatives of more than 130 countries in a UN-sponsored conference in Montreal, Canada, on Jan. 29, 2000. The treaty, concluded after a week of intense negotiations that saw the United States and five other big agricultural exporters - Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile and Uruguay - against the European Union and the other nations, is a compromise, but it already contains very important principles and procedures.

- First of all, there is the acceptance of the "precautionary principle", that states that a nation can block imports of GMOs even if it has not complete "scientific certainty" that it can be harmful to biological diversity and, by extension, human health.

- GMOs to be released into the environment (for example seeds and fishes) cannot be imported into a country without its previous approval.

- Shipments of GMOs that can be processed for food (for example corn and soybeans) do not have to get previous approval, but they must be

labelled "may contain" GMOs. Negotiations on more detailed labeling requirements will continue; at present the treaty does not address whether food containing genetically altered ingredients, like corn flakes made with bio-engineered corn, should be labelled as such on store shelves.

- Whenever a crop variety is approved for commercial use in a country, information must be sent to a central clearinghouse, so that it is made available to all other countries.

The protocol will go into effect after ratification by 50 countries, and will be subject to review at least every five years.

It is worthwhile to remind that one year ago in Cartagena, Colombia, no agreement could be reached. In the meantime there have been all over the world meetings, publications, discussions, demonstrations over the biotechnology issue, a series of manifestations of civil society groups that culminated in last year's famous protests at the WTO meeting in Seattle.

The result has been that the issue clearly started to raise concerns in the American public first and then in its establishment (remember President Clinton's apertures after the WTO demonstrations and some major US food producer's complaints about losses in their exports to Europe). Today, in what somebody calls "a rare success in balancing environmental protection with free trade", civil society, government officials and biotech industry welcome the Montreal accord.

## UEF Press Release on Helsinki

**The Helsinki Council's granting the European Parliament "associate" status in the IGC is unworthy of an assembly elected by universal suffrage**

The Union of European Federalists (UEF) regrets that the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council on institutional reform do not respect the democratic legitimacy of the European citizens as represented by elected members. For the Heads of State and Government it is only the legitimacy of the national states they represent that counts. Indeed the European Council "welcomes the presidency's report on the questions relative to the Intergovernmental Conference" but makes no mention of the contributions of the European Parliament and the European Commission...

The numerous appeals calling for the IGC to open with an agenda sufficiently wide to allow a fundamental reform of the institutions and a democratisation of the Union have been ignored. *"The narrowness of the views expressed by the Heads of State and Government is a bad augury for the limited results of the conference which can only have an adverse effect on the institutional conditions for enlargement of the Union"* said the President of the UEF, Jo Leinen, MEP.

The UEF insists that the extension of majority voting in the Council should not be considered to be a mere contingency arrangement when the democratic character and the effectiveness of decision-taking in an enlarged Europe depends on the final renunciation of the possibility of a veto by a Member State.

The European Federalists also greatly regret that the proposal, supported by the European Parliament and the Commission in particular, to reorganise the treaties in two parts, one dealing with constitutional issues and the other with Union policies, did not appear on the agenda.

Lastly, the Federalists consider it particularly deplorable that the European Parliament is granted only an "associated" role in the work of the IGC 2000. While the representative of the Commission "will participate" at the political and preparatory level, two observers of the European Parliament will only be able to "be present" at the meetings of the preparatory group at diplomatic level. At the political level of Ministers and Heads of State and Government, the European Council grants only an exchange of views with the two representatives and/or the President of the European Parliament before the meetings.

*"This status granted to the European Parliament, the more meagre the higher the level of the political meeting, is unworthy of an Assembly elected by universal suffrage! The European Council is caught red-handedly, contradicting itself when it affirms in its Millennium Declaration that democracy is fundamental to the European Union"* commented Jo Leinen.

Official UEF Press Release, Brussels, 13 December 1999



## JEF Press Release on Delors' Proposal to Create a "Federal Core" alongside the EU Enlargement

JEF shares the concerns expressed by Jacques Delors on Le Monde of January 18 about a minimalist Intergovernmental Conference, and welcomes Delors' proposal that a vanguard of states establish a federation as the core around which the enlargement of the Union can be pursued successfully.

The EU enlargement cannot be held hostage by the reluctance of the existing members to reform, as it is the interests of all the peoples of Europe that the EU enlarges quickly and successfully, nor it can lead to the paralysis and dilution of the Union. The European Community was born when 6 countries decided to go beyond the loose and fragile cooperation in the Council of Europe and found, in parallel, a new and stronger entity, based on a new treaty, open to further members when they were willing to join. Today a similar choice would be beneficial for all the European continent.

The Governments of the member states have called for a traditional diplomatic conference, with a narrow agenda, which will exclude the representatives of the European citizens and the political parties from the debate. JEF believes instead that the urgent and historic priority of the enlargement can be faced successfully only establishing a real European federal Constitution made through the involvement of the representatives of the European citizens. Otherwise, an enlarged Union risks being watered down into a mere free trade area, deprived of political cohesion, unable to govern itself and to continue to reform and meet the challenges of the future.

Delors' proposal would allow a quick and wide enlargement, it would preserve the interests of those countries who are not yet willing to proceed towards a closer political integration, and at the same time it would allow a federal pact among the countries that are willing and prepared to do it today.

But Delors' proposal has sense only if the new entity is not conceived as just a stronger Union, but as an effective federation, with a democratic supranational Government, a law-making Parliament sovereign on all European matters, a Council of the states acting always by majority, a single foreign and security policy. The will and the consensus for such a new constitutional pact can be found only

through the involvement of the European people.

JEF calls upon the most farsighted Governments to endorse Delors' proposals by giving the representatives of the European citizens the mandate to elaborate a Constitution for a federal Union open to the countries that are willing to join it.

JEF official Press Release, Brussels, January 25, 2000



## Citizens Agenda 2000

*Alessia Biava*

On the occasion of the end of the Finnish Presidency, the Forum of Non-Governmental Organisations "Citizens' Agenda 2000" was organised in Tampere. This event, promoted by the Finnish Presidency, lasted three days, from 3-5 December 1999. Approximately 1500 people from all over Europe attended the event, representing more than 150 different Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Most of the event took place at Tampere Hall, where many NGOs had set up stands. UEF and JEF's joint stand offered informative material and appeals for the 'European Constitution', and some signatures were collected from people interested in the UEF-JEF campaign. Twenty Jeffers from different sections joined the event. JEF Finland played an active role in the 'National preparatory committee', which was responsible for drafting the document which was officially presented as the "NGO Forum's message to the Helsinki summit" to the Finnish Prime Minister, Mr Paavo Lipponen, at the end of the event. On 3 December, the NGO Forum was opened by the welcoming words of Mr Folke

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Sundman, the Chairperson of the Finnish Preparatory Committee. The "Citizen's Agenda 2000 NGO Forum", he said, "is both an offer and a challenge, and an enhanced civil dialogue is one of the major preconditions for going ahead with our efforts to reform and democratise the European Union".

The first plenary was focused on the issues of democracy, participation and citizenship. The main question was how to bring the European Union closer to the citizens. One of the keywords was "transparency", referring to the European Union's institutions and decision-making processes. Pier Virgilio Dastoli, from the Permanent Forum of Civil Society, said that the responsibilities of different EU institutions should be made clear, so that citizens are not confused by the Union but know what it is doing. On Saturday 4 December two plenary sessions took place simultaneously, dealing with the different topics of "Globalisation: challenging welfare" and "Enlargement and the European Union". Later on, participants had the opportunity to join some of the twenty-one specific theme seminars, organised by different NGOs: six of them were about "Reforming the European Union", five about "Building social Europe", four about "Globalisation and human development", two about "From participation into ownership", and four about "Strengthening Civil Society".

Members of UEF and JEF were invited as speakers in the seminar on "A Constitution for Europe and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights". Laura Davis, Secretary General of JEF Europe, and Michael Cwik, member of the Federal Committee of the UEF, spoke on the issue of reforming the European Union; and Paolo Vacca, newly-elected President of JEF Europe, Lothar Jaschke from UEF and Piia-Noora Kauppi, MEP, introduced the topic "A

Constitution for Europe". JEF and UEF activists also took part in the seminar on "Citizen Contributions to the making of the European Constitution". They were asked by Bruno Kaufmann, journalist of *Die Zeit*, Andreas Gros, member of the Council of Europe, and Heidi Hautala, member of the European Parliament, to explain what a European Constitution means and what JEF and UEF activists do to spread their campaign and their ideas among the citizens.

On Sunday 5 December, celebrated as the International Day of Volunteerism, the third plenary session "European Union and Civil Society" focused the discussion on the role that NGOs are expected to take in the member states and what they are able to offer. It has been unanimously recognised that NGOs should play the role of a bridge between EU citizens and EU institutions.

In the document prepared by the National Preparatory Committee it is claimed that "the key role played by the NGOs has to be fully acknowledged in the forthcoming IGC to ensure that the voice of civil society is heard in the planning and implementation of the European Union". This document, called the "Tampere Declaration" and adopted by the Finnish Preparatory Committee in consultation with the European NGOs, concerns the Citizen's Agenda for the New Millennium (Peace, Welfare, sustainable development and participation). It was presented by Pauliina Arola, the Project Coordinator, and was officially given to Mr Paavo Lipponen, as a message for the Helsinki summit. The Portuguese Secretary of State of European Affairs, Mr Seixas de Costa, talked about the next Portuguese Presidency and the possibility of organising an event like this one in Portugal during the following months.

# Europe in the World of XXI Century

*Anna Montani*

In November 1999, from Friday 12 to Sunday 14, the Young European Federalists (JEF) held their European Congress, with the slogan “*Europe in the World of the XXI Century*”, in Marly-le-Roi, near Paris.

The Congress was preceded by a Seminar on the problems that Europe must face in the new Millennium. In particular, the participants, coming from 15 Countries all over Europe, analysed the new international order following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the role that Europe could play with the view of building a future of peace and democracy. The discussion on the consequences that the political unity of Europe could have on enlargement and globalization was the basis for an intensive debate on Europe’s responsibilities not only for the future of European citizens, but also for the future of peace and democracy in the world. JEF Congress was officially opened on Friday afternoon, in the City Hall of the VI *arrondissement* in Paris with the celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the foundation of JEF.

The JEF President, Philip Savelkoul and JEF France opened a round table on European institutional reforms: the main challenge that Europe must face in order to enlarge to the Eastern countries. Stephen Woodward, former President of JEF, chaired this debate to which many European political representatives contributed: Michel Albert, President of CIFE and member of the Council on Monetary Politics of the *Banque de France*; Pervenche Beres, MEP and member of the French European Movement; Alain Lamassoure, former French Minister of European Affairs and currently an MEP involved in the Intergroup for the European Constitution; Jean Michel Casa, Head of the Cabinet of Pierre Moscovici, French Minister of European Affairs; Jo Leinen, President of UEF (Union of European Federalists) and MEP, chair of the Intergroup. Jacques Delors, who

received a standing ovation from the delegates, concluded the debate. All the interventions stressed the important role of Federalists in the process of European unification. They also outlined the importance of improving this process today: after Economic and Monetary Union, it is time to build the Political Union. The differences in the speakers’ points of view concerned the federalist demand for an immediate start to a constituent process in Europe. Jo Leinen, President of the UEF, clearly expressed this demand, supported by the forces playing the role of the avant-garde for this more united and democratic Europe. He looked to the past, remembering the birth of world federalism, and then he came back to the present, declaring that it’s time to build the United States of Europe - the first step towards world unification - by giving a Federal Constitution to the European citizens. On this issue, the other speakers expressed a more gradual approach on the agenda of institutional reforms.

The opening session of the Congress ended with addresses by Jean Louis Bourlanges, MEP and President of the French European Movement, and Stéphanie Chémery, President of JEF France.

On November 13, Saturday, the Congress was held in Marly-le-Roi. The political debate led to the choice of the following Campaign slogan: “A Constitution for the whole Europe, enlargement with constitutional reforms”. This is also the topic of the political resolution approved at the end of the Congress stating that: “Establishing a Constitution for a federal Europe and widening the Union to the whole of the European continent are two sides of the same coin”. For these reasons the Congress “adopts as the priority for the next two years - for JEF Europe, and for JEF national sections to the greatest extent allowed by their political environment - to campaign for the reform of the institutions of the European Union with the aim to give Europe a federal

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Constitution and at the same time for the rapid enlargement of the European Union to all the countries of the European continent by the request of "A Constitution for the whole Europe, Enlargement with constitutional reforms". The JEF press release on the Congress states that: "JEF is extremely concerned to see that, despite many talks about bringing Europe closer to the citizens, the reform of the institutions of the Union is going to be tackled once again through an inter-governmental conference, with a very limited scope and ruled by the need of unanimity, without real involvement of the representatives of the European citizens in the European Parliament and the member states' parliaments, without any democratic control and any debate among the European political parties".

These political goals have been translated into an organizational plan including the following activities and events: a programme to constantly lobby (at European, national and local level) the members of the European Parliament; a programme to create "intergroups for a European Constitution" also in national parliaments; a programme to contact NGOs throughout Europe to be involved in the Campaign; a special Campaign day, Enlargement Day, in early 2000 and other public actions and lobby events linked to the Fundamental Rights Charter process. On Saturday, the Congress has also voted to renew the Federal Committee. Moreover, Paolo Vacca (Italy) is the new President of JEF; Juha Mustonen (Finland) and Caroline Guillaudeau (France) are the new Vice Presidents. The new FC, meeting for the first time after the end of the Congress, has elected the other members of the Executive Bureau: Barbara Goldoni (Italy), Jeremy Hargreaves (UK), Eliina Viilup (Estonia), Patrycja Weglorz (Poland). Today Europe needs fundamental reform in order to face the great challenges of the new Millennium, first of all the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

This was the major political outcome of the Congress, together with the awareness that Federalists are called on to improve their efforts in the next few months because, as stated in JEF press release on the Congress "it is time to give the Union a real Government and a true law-making Parliament,

democratic institutions closer to the citizens and no longer blocked by the unanimity rule, and a single foreign and security policy to enable Europe to play a progressive role on the world scene".

### **A Constitution for the whole of Europe**

*Jeremy Hargreaves, London, UK, EB member*

The 1999 JEF Congress met in the week of the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, and immediately after a seminar where participants from EU sections were outnumbered by participants from applicant and East European countries. The major decisions of Congress fittingly reflected this. The major political decision was to campaign for EU Enlargement alongside the Campaign for a European Constitution, and to declare that the two issues are two sides of the same coin. JEF wishes to see a Constitution for the whole of Europe. We wish to see eastern European countries as members of the EU as soon as possible.

### **Enlargement and Constitution go hand in hand**

*Patrycja Weglorz, Wroclaw, Poland, EB member*

The Congress has allowed the Central and Eastern European sections to express their standpoint on the European level. It has contributed to common action towards the development of JEF in our countries. Hopefully, it is a beginning of wider cooperation and a background for further enterprises and projects, that will help to overcome similar obstacles. The organisational reform and the new agenda guarantees more equal participation of the Central and Eastern European sections in JEF activities and the decision-making process. We appreciate the priority of Enlargement issues and strongly believe that we have a great chance for making ourselves heard and also a possibility to develop the organisation in essential areas.

# The Young European Federalists in the New Millennium

*Paolo Vacca*

JEF held its European Congress at the end of November in Paris. JEF has decided to continue and enhance the Campaign for a European Constitution, because after the euro the Union needs urgently to complete its political unification and finally found a federal Europe. We have decided to launch a Campaign for Enlargement, because rapidly extending the Union to the rest of the continent is an absolute political need and a moral obligation. We have decided to put Constitution and Enlargement under a single political framework, on the conviction that establishing a Constitution for a federal Europe and widening the Union to the whole of the European continent are two sides of the same coin. We have decided to challenge the Intergovernmental Conference, that is once again trying to reform the Union while excluding the citizens and their representatives. And we have decided to support strongly the sections that will be facing referenda in the next few years. Over 180 people from over 20 countries attended the Congress as evidence that JEF is alive and active and has huge energies at national, regional and local level. At the beginning of this new millennium, we, the Young European Federalists, should reflect on the *raison d'être* and the political role of a federalist political movement. In the host of speeches and articles celebrating the start of the new millennium, many have highlighted how the history of Europe in the XX century is split in two.

The first part of the century has seen the worst and most repellent tragedies mankind has ever experienced: two disastrous world wars, the victory of nationalism and totalitarianism, the horror of genocide. The second part has seen Europe trying to escape the tragedies of the past, abandoning centuries of continuous divisions and

rivalries, and taking a new path of international cooperation that has brought about peace and security, democracy and freedom, development and solidarity. The message politicians and intellectuals have conveyed to the citizens in these days is that everything is going well. Peace, democracy, development in Western Europe would be an irreversible achievement, now being spread also to Central and Eastern Europe.

Alongside the creation of the euro, the European Union would be strengthening a growing number of its policies and improving its institutions. Europe would be becoming a more and more significant player in an ever more globalised world where peace and democracy have definitely won.

The Young European Federalists know that this is only a very partial part of the truth. Despite the Euro and many other huge steps in the European integration, Europe is still very divided. The European Union is still a loose international organisation, without a real supranational government and a real supranational political will: without its own real sovereignty. The consequences of such division are self-evident. Europe is still unable to speak with a single voice on the international stage, it is leaving its security (and so its independence) to the United States, and it is allowing tragedies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. The European economy is sluggish and the European production systems and the European society are lagging behind in the technological revolution. The Union is still unable to enlarge its security and development to the rest of the European continent. Divisions and rivalries among the European states are not gone forever. The Union institutions are still dominated by the veto of the member states, are not transparent and far from

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the citizens. European politics and parties, trapped in the national boundaries, have lost their vision of the future and their capacity to project and struggle for a better world, so losing the loyalty and the faith of the citizens. The creation of a federal Europe – as much today as at the end of the second world war – is the key answer to the crisis of our times. And it will not happen simply by the natural, beneficial evolution of history, nor by chance nor by act of God. It will be the result of a political struggle, in which the federalist movements, and the Young European Federalists, have a key role.

After the Helsinki Summit, the question Europe is facing is no longer how much time is needed to arrive at a federal Europe but how much time left we have to arrive at a federal Europe. Today the Union is facing the dilemma federation or dissolution.

The decision by the Helsinki Summit to widen the membership negotiations to 12 countries, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, and to Turkey, and to fix 2002 as date for the first entries, is a great and historical achievement. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Union finally acknowledges that peace and security, as well as democracy and development, on the European continent depend on the enlargement of the Union, and is eventually taking irreversible decisions. But the decision to accompany such wide and rapid enlargement with a minor intergovernmental conference aiming at negligible institutional reforms is an irresponsible insanity.

A time bomb has been primed in Helsinki. *An enlarged Union needs a federal Constitution.* If no political initiative comes up before Enlargement, this historical challenge will lead to a Union that is impossible to govern and impossible to reform further, progressively watered down into a free trade area deprived of political cohesion and will, risking paralysis and dissolution. This makes JEF's role and action not only necessary but also desperately urgent.

But JEF's destiny and commitment have to go far beyond Europe. JEF is here to struggle for a European federation as a first step towards a world

federation. Outside the European continent division and wars, nationalism and genocide, hunger and underdevelopment, are still the rule of this world entering year 2000. Europe can show to the world that those evils can be defeated. JEF has a universal mission exactly because European unity, a real European federal state, the United States of Europe, are today needed more than ever to show the world the way of unity and to pave the way to international democracy and justice. Federalism, the idea of unity, is the thought for this new century.

Federalism will live long and prosper if every single young federalist and local group across the continent will give its contribution.

JEF and federalism live every time that a local section organises a public action or holds a debate with a local politician, every time that an activist spreads our watchwords in his university or among his friends or writes a letter to the editor of the local paper or to a local MP or MEP, every time that a local section challenges the anti-Europeans in public.

Activists become militants when they feel the responsibility to keep the movement alive. Let's be proud to enter the new millennium as activists and militants of the Young European Federalists, and to struggle for the United States of Europe and international democracy. We are, as Spinelli concluded in the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941, "those who have understood the reasons for the current crises in European civilisation, and who have therefore inherited the ideals of the movements dedicated to raising the dignity of mankind. The dividing line between progress and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantial line: those who conceive their essential purpose and goal of struggle to be the ancient one, the conquest of national political power, and who – albeit involuntary – play into hands of reactionary forces... and those who see the fundamental purpose as the creation of a solid international state... The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be".

# Who is Controlling Globalisation?

*Peter Ustinov*

The theme of this conference is a vital and difficult one. The question is not merely whether or not there will be a process of globalization. Globalization is happening: in commerce, finance, communications, culture, politics, security, human rights, and almost every other aspect of human life.

Globalization is ongoing and unstoppable. The central question is who is guiding and controlling this globalization?

Is it a small set of political and corporate elites far from public scrutiny and accountability? Or is it a diverse set of actors involved in a democratic process of decision making?

At WFM we are striving toward a more democratic and governed system of international decision making.

We have been working in strategic partnerships with other NGOs around the world to bring us closer to this goal, through our work supporting the creation of the International Criminal Court, enhancing the role of non-governmental organizations at the United Nations, strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to deal with civil and inter-state conflicts, advocating a parliamentary assembly at the UN and a reformed Security Council, and promoting regional federations such as the process occurring now in Europe.

I am particularly seized of the matter of the globalization of commerce and trade. As I remarked for WFM's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1997 in Montreux, Switzerland.

Today with the galloping globalization of commerce when a growing number of conglomerates are already more powerful than and influential than many governments, the creation of a World Criminal Court, brilliantly espoused by our organization, is an urgent necessity, for the simple reason that crime lives on commerce as a cancer lives on flesh and tissue, and there must be generally accepted constraints in the chaos of business opportunity.

World Federalists are not dreamers, we do not imagine these reforms will occur in a day. But we are also not cynics who believe that systems can not be changed.

I prefer to liken us to "practical idealists" who combine high principles with achievable strategies, long-term visions and short term objectives. And I am proud to consider myself among their numbers and honored to serve as their President. So on behalf of myself, the WFM vice-president and distinguished Canadian Senator Lois Wilson, and the entire world Movement I wish you well and look forward to the reports on your meetings.

Sir Peter Ustinov, WFM President, gave the following introductory address to the conference *Comment passer de la mondialisation sauvage à la mondialisation institutionnelle*, Paris, September 27, 1999

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# Progression from Untamed Global Chaos to an Institutionalised Global Order

*Jean-Luc Prevel*

This was the theme of a conference held on 27 November 1999 at the National Assembly under the auspices of the French Permanent World Committee, assembling some hundreds people.

Amongst the many speakers, Georges Berthoin, President of Honour of the European Trilateral and former president of the International European Movement, referred to Jean Monnet's method, namely working for world federation via concrete common policies. Jean Monnet's work, he said, must be followed up through establishing a new Action Committee to push governments in the direction of world political unification, without so much as mentioning the words federalism or supranationality, this to avoid frightening them or provoking them into a rejectionist stance.

Michel Rocard, former minister, said that "We are all Citizens of the World". The global dream, he said, has become a fundamental necessity. In his view, a way must be found to bring pressure to bear against the right of veto in the Security Council of the United Nations and militating in favour of a UN Economic Security Council. Like Georges Berthoin before him, Michel Rocard stressed the need to "help" the United States to "make the choice between international co-operation as opposed to imperialism". Jerome Bindé, director of the UNESCO Office for Analysis and Forecasting, said that "if the national democracy went along with a national economy, so world democracy should be implied in a world economy".

For the morning session the conference was chaired by Stéphanie Hessel, Ambassador of France, who insisted at length on "the need to reform, strengthen and democratise the United Nations".

Abbé Pierre, indisposed, was however able to grace the occasion thanks to a telephone link heard by all the participants, this enabling him to renew his world commitment made from the earliest hour; he who, as a young parliamentarian took part in the Montreux Congress setting up the World Movement for World Federal Government. Also taking part in the debate were Hassan Fodha, director of the United Nations Center at Paris, Sylvie Vauclair, astrophysician, Amedeo Postiglione, promoter of an International Court for the Environment, who, on many occasions during the day, reaffirmed his availability to co-operate with the World Federalist Movement to bring about the reform of the international institutions, Claude-André Anspar, Vice-president of the Franco-American Economic Commission, Alain Tynaire, Barrister at the Court of Paris, and Mr Decaux, Advisor at the World Bank.

The Conference received a message from Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, as well as one from Peter Ustinov, President of the WFM.

Jean-Francis Billion, member of the elected Council of the WFM and of the French committee of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), set out the main aims and activities of the federalist movements while stressing, as did Sir Peter Ustinov himself, the importance of regional, and in particular, European federalism.

# Only One Way Remaining

Antonio Mosconi

D. Held,  
*Democracy and the Global Order:  
From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan  
Governance*,  
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995

A. Giddens,  
*The Third Way: the Renewal of Social  
Democracy*  
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999

Academics as down-to-earth as David Held (*Open University*) and top-flight political advisers like Anthony Giddens (*London School of Economics*, one of the driving forces behind the politics of Tony Blair), are becoming increasingly convinced that the spread of economic interdependence and political democracy both demand and pave the way for the creation of a cosmopolitan government.

Held's views on the *conditio sine qua non* for recognising the existence of a process approaching the ideal of democracy is as radical as it is realistic.

It is a radical notion to link the idea of democracy to the principle of autonomy, in terms of people's freedom to choose the terms of their affiliations, the absolute legitimisation of the form and orientation of their political community. Equally radical is the consequent search for democracy, or something at least approaching it, in the following seven seats of power:

1) the human body, i.e. its physical and mental wellbeing, organised through certain institutio-

nal systems and environments;

2) the welfare state, which favours the transition of the individual from being a private citizen to a full-fledged member of the community;

3) the cultural milieu, which enables essential concepts to be organised in order to mobilise communities;

4) civil society and civic associations, which are part of society and are organised on the basis of agreements that escape the direct control of the state;

5) the economy, the seat of power in which capitalist ownership and control have generated widespread inequalities, many of which are threatening the principle of autonomy;

6) the organisation of violent and coercive relations, directly influencing the opportunities of life and the possibilities of death and giving rise to a decision-making process that is all too often out of the control of public opinion;

7) the judicial and regulatory institutions, in which the state represents an independent body comprised of a set of organisations co-ordinated by a given political authority.

Concerning these seven seats of power, Held warns that those choosing democracy must also be prepared to put in place a structure of empowering rights and duties (democratic public law), since this system represents the dimension within which the principle of autonomy can be pursued and applied.

The fact that the roots of Held's democratic radicalism lie in the solid tradition of *realpolitik* is evidenced by:

1) the book's analysis of the formation and evolution of the modern state toward the sovereignty and order of the Westphalian model;

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2) the analysis of the fractures which undermined that order (or, as Albertini<sup>1</sup> would have put it, triggered the crisis of the national state): the development of international law after Nuremberg, the internationalisation of political decision-making<sup>2</sup>, the existence of the superpowers and power blocks limiting the authority and integrity of the state, tensions between national identity and the globalisation of culture, the internationalisation of industrial production and financial transactions<sup>3</sup>;

3) the compelling conclusion that an increasingly drastic curtailment of the sovereignty of the state makes it possible to approach the democratic ideal only at the cosmopolitan level.

Held's conclusions thus appear to be consistent with the democratic radicalism and political realism of his analysis. His conclusions in fact link cosmopolitan democracy with international institutions. To begin with, the cosmopolitan model of democracy should aim toward consolidating democratic cosmopolitan law, in order to create and define the decision-making process. Alongside these developments, the cosmopolitan model should aim to form efficient legislative and executive bodies at the regional and global level, that operate in compliance with the fundamental principles of democratic law, and are bound by it.

However, the unabridged application of cosmopolitan democracy would also demand the formation of an official assembly of all organisations and democratic states.

In order to embark on a process leading to cosmopolitan democracy, Held contends that the most significant short and long term objectives that need to be set include: the reform of the UN Security Council (short term) and the affirmation of cosmopolitan democracy (long term); the institution in the UN of a second house, to be followed by a global parliament; compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court up until the creation of a juridical system with global scope and interconnections; the foundation of new institutions of regional and

global economic co-ordination that will be accountable to regional and global parliaments and assemblies; the formation of an international security force, the gradual transfer of coercive capabilities from the national states to regional and global institutions and ultimately, demilitarisation and the overcoming of war.

There is thus a need to free ourselves from facile antinomies that are not in line with the new political context, such as: the presumed conflict between globalisation and cultural diversity; the clash between constitutionalism and politics as a practical activity; tensions between the hierarchy of states and the tangled mesh of economic, organisational, military, juridical and cultural structures and processes that limit and erode their power; the gulf between political ambition and political feasibility; the incompatibility between direct and representative democracy; and lastly, the notion of solving the problems of world governance by simply extending basic democracy, as opposed to top-down intervention.

In this review I am not interested so much in *The Third Way*, the manifesto written by Anthony Giddens to relaunch social democracy, as the umpteenth death certificate for socialism nor for its well-known recipes for political reform. After reading Held's book, what I think is really interesting is how the last chapter of this pamphlet focuses on various aspects of the transition towards the global age, from cosmopolitan nation to cultural pluralism, cosmopolitan democracy, the European Union, global government and market fundamentalism on a global scale.

The search for a new role to give the nation in a cosmopolitan world closes with the argument that today, a nation's strength is not measured by its preparedness for war, but rather its self-confidence in accepting the new limitations placed on its sovereignty.

Cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism converge on the issue of immigration, since multi-

culturalism cannot develop in a world fast becoming global in the absence of a cosmopolitan society. At the head of global integration lies the cosmopolitan nation, but this implies the need for cosmopolitan democracy to operate on an increasingly global scale.

The processes that lead to globalisation have shifted power away from the nations and toward the global depoliticised space, and this new space is in need of regulations, rights and responsibilities: in other words, *ubi societas, ibi jus*, where there is a society, there must be laws. The European Union started out as part of a bipolar system, but today it should be regarded as the response to globalisation. At the international level, the existing institutions are still intergovernmental: they depend on agreements between states in order to function. Yet it is entirely possible that a more comprehensive system of global governance could replicate the format of today's EU (Parliament, Commission, Council and Court of Justice).

A world Parliament could initially be instituted as a subsidiary body to the Assembly, based on Article 22 of the UN Charter, and so on for the other institutions. The political foundations of the project are once again constituted by a convergence of the *raison d'état* (like what happened for European unification); Giddens in fact

concludes that there is currently an interest in global governance on the part of all states. The growth of cosmopolitan democracy is a necessity for the efficient regulation of the world economy, so it is capable of dealing with global economic inequalities and controlling environmental risks.

It makes no sense whatsoever to oppose market fundamentalism at the local level, but allow it to reign supreme at the global level. Like Soros, Giddens recommends stable dollar-euro exchange rates, and this implies regulatory intervention on the financial markets. Ultimately, Giddens deems it highly unlikely that the world's inequalities can be diminished without progressing towards a more extensive form of world governance.

Books such as those of Held and Giddens prove that the ideas developed by a group of federalists who were interned at Ventotene today represent the only real assets of Europe's cultural and political leadership.

They prove that after trying the first, the second and the third way, there is only one way remaining, the one which Albertini pointed towards at the MFE Congress in Bari in 1981: "uniting Europe to unite the world", a notion which embodies all the innovative political thinking required to complete the journey through the next chapter of contemporary history.

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<sup>1</sup>Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was a lecturer in the philosophy of politics at the University of Pavia. He was the President of the European Federalist Movement and the Union of European Federalists.

<sup>2</sup>Held, quoting Pinder, 1992, dwells on the example of the EU, stating that if every aspect of the treaty is applied the member states will have contributed to the future implementation of a deeply integrated, if not federal, association.

<sup>3</sup>Held, quoting Myers, 1994, recalls that multinationals now account for 30% of gross global output, 70% of global trade and 80% of international investments.



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# The Chechnya Drama

René Wadlow

Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin (Eds),  
*Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political  
and Center-Periphery Relations in Russia*,  
Santa Monica CA, RAND, 1998,  
53 pp. pbk.

Galina Starovoitova,  
*Sovereignty After Empire: Self-Determina-  
tion Movements in the Former Soviet Union*,  
Washington DC, US Institute of Peace,  
1997, 47 pp. pbk, Peaceworks N° 19

These studies all written by Russian ethnographers with experience in government policy making may help us understand better “Act II” of the Russia-Chechnya conflict which is going on. Galina Starovoitova was an ethnographer who had worked on minority populations in the USSR before becoming an advisor to President Yeltsin on ethnic relations and then representative of St Petersburg in the Russian State Duma (the lower house of the two-chamber Russian Federation Parliament). She was recently assassinated by as yet unknown killers but most likely paid for by forces hostile to her efforts for democracy and anti-corruption.

The RAND document is composed of four studies by Russian scholars with government experience, the broadest essay *Ethnic Separatism* by co-editor Payin, the Director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Research in Moscow. There is growing concern among both academics and policy makers that ethnic conflicts are contagious, that conflict in one locale may stimulate conflict elsewhere, either by drawing in neighbours to escalate the vio-

lence or by a “spill over” effect to other territories. The periphery of the Russian Federation are areas where ethnicity, economics and political questions all come into play with deep-rooted contradictions between the interests of the whole and the interests of the individual parts – all articulated by leaders who easily confuse their own interests with the common good.

Conflicts and tensions in Russia, during both the Soviet period and since, tend to be conflicts between the Center at the federal level and a region (whatever its constitutional status: republic, province, etc.). As Leonid Smyrnygin points out in the RAND study “There is the tradition of the rigid centralization of state life. This engenders many disappointing defects in the political culture of the Russian people, such as a habit of seeing *real authority* only in the leadership of Moscow, making it responsible for everything, and resigning oneself to the tyranny of local authorities”.

Thus center-periphery concepts and theories can be helpful in looking at tensions in Russia. One must ask not only what type of ethnic group is involved, but even more important, where is the group located.

As Galina Starovoitova points out, the most challenging problem for the Russian federation “is trying to find a type of federation that will enable its many ethnic groups to pursue their goal of self-determination while preserving its integrity and viability as a multinational state”. This is why both in Russia and in Georgia with its Abkhaz and Ossetian issues the concept of *asymmetric federation* is increasingly discussed. Different units have different legally-binding relations with the center – the local unit having such rights as broad self-government, control

over natural resources, educational and cultural policies, taxes etc. The status of Tatarstan within the Russian Federation is the prime example of such an asymmetric federation as seen in the agreement *On the Differentiation of Authority Between Various State Agencies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan*.

There is a need to develop “constitutional imagination” to meet new needs. However no amount of constitutional imagination can overcome the role of leaders and their quest to retain power. Thus Act I of the Chechnya drama largely concerned the will-to-power of Dzhokhar Dudayev who took power in the autumn of 1991 through his command of the national guard. However, there were other wills-to-power including that of Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov, a Moscow parliamentary leader but an ethnic Chechen. The drama unfolded slowly though Chechnya was effectively outside the control of Moscow. The fighting in late 1994 and 1995 left many dead, houses destroyed, what existed as an economy in the hands of a mafia, ethnic Russians leaving Chechnya and Chechens living in Moscow and St Petersburg increasingly discriminated against. On August 31, 1996 Russia’s and Chechnya’s representatives signed a peace agreement which stipulated that the question of Chechnya’s status *vis-à-vis* Russia would be post-

poned until 2001 – though this was a *de facto* recognition of independence.

Act II began in autumn 1999 with the introduction of new actors – Islamic warriors – with a *jihad* vocabulary, plans to expand the conflict to Daghestan, and to use terror tactics such as bombs in apartment buildings in Moscow. The Russian Government has responded with a “law and order” vocabulary, large-scale army troops movements – no doubt looking for revenge after their poor show in 1995 – bombing of civilian city centers resulting in a mass flow of refugees and displaced.

Act III needs the goddess of wisdom to appear. The current actors seem to be a dreary lot repeating stale words. As Leonid Smyggin writes “Conflict as a concept can be defined as the dispute which cannot be resolved within the existing legal framework”. Thus there is a need “to view conflicts as normal, to understand that the solution of one type of conflict takes the society to a new level, which is higher than the previous one but which also abounds in conflicts, albeit of a different kind”.

It is too early to analyse the Islamic factor in Chechen politics or to know if terrorism can be used as an on-going weapon, but the Chechnya drama should be watched closely even after the armed conflict stops.



## Unity and Autonomy

René Wadlow

Ruth Lapidot,  
*Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts*  
Washington DC, US Institute of Peace,  
1997, 298 pp.

As humanity moves from the end of the Piscean period to the Age of Aquarius, there is a short but violent rise in conflictual situations. These conflicts are due to karmic effects of past actions and to a loss among many individuals of the “we-they” identities developed during

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the Piscean period. The early years of the Age of Aquarius will be conditioned in the way the previous cycle is released: whether gently or violently, with compassion or animosity, with courage or fear.

Given that the “we-they” mentality will not dissolve overnight, many of the conflicts will need to find their accommodation in forms of autonomy so that the sense of the “we” can continue while at the same time there is a healing of past animosities and a growth of wider loyalties and co-operation.

As Ambassador Max Kampelman, who had long experience in disarmament and security questions points out “Across the globe - from Sri Lanka to northern Iraq, Chechnya to Bosnia - minority groups are asserting their distinctive ethnic, religious, or national identity and demanding greater control over the expression of that identity, not only in cultural and social matters but in political and economic areas as well... Heard less often are pleas for accommodation and self-restraint. Indeed, such pleas are more typically heard from those whose authority is being challenged – the governments of ethnically heterogeneous states – but all too frequently such official declarations of restraint seem intended to support an embattled *status quo* or even at times to disguise government attempts to repress dissent”.

Yet flexibility, compromise and co-operation are the hallmarks of success when it comes to resolving ethnic differences peacefully, keeping both the unity of the existing state and allowing autonomy so that the local community may develop its potential for cultural, economic and political interests to the fullest.

Autonomy is not a *panacea*, but a tool that can provide a constitutional framework for co-operative action. As Professor Lapidoth emphasizes “Autonomy cannot create the wish for compromise, but it can help shape its content. Like any fool, it must be used in accordance with the special circumstances of each case... One of the

great advantages of autonomy is its flexibility. It includes a wide range of possibilities from a minimum of competence, on the one hand, to a great number of powers just short of full independence, on the other hand”.

While much of the current discussions of autonomy is highlighted by ethnic-national differences, the conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor are recent examples, questions of autonomy can also be considered as part of good governance, even within a generally ethnically homogeneous state but with great economic diversity - such as the decentralization efforts within France.

We can use the term autonomy for the broad concept of the diffusion of authority and responsibility. It can take many different constitutional forms: federalism, decentralization, self-government, self-administration, associate status. Today, most discussions of autonomy concern territorial autonomy and deal with the authority of the autonomous entity to legislation, adjudication and administration. What is sometimes called “administrative autonomy” is not really autonomy but decentralized decision-making on policies set at a higher level. For autonomy to be real, goals as well as means must be set at the autonomous entity level.

As Lapidoth points out, “In order to avoid disputes and misunderstandings, it is important that the powers of a regime of autonomy be defined as clearly as possible when it is established. In fact, there are usually four different areas of powers to be considered: powers reserved for the central authorities, those fully transferred to the autonomous entity, parallel powers, and powers that can be exercised jointly... In fact, there is usually a need for co-operation, co-ordination, and consultation between the central authorities and the autonomous entity. This is crucial because there is likely to be a close link between their respective powers. In addition, certain powers are likely to require joint action”.

## Solana and a European Rapid Intervention Force

A few days after the Helsinki European Council, Dr Javier Solana, the High Representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and also Head of the Western European Union, gave a speech in Berlin on "The Development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Integration Project for the Next Decade". Solana said that in Helsinki the EU took steps to forge a united defence policy; this historic decision touches at the very heart of the sovereignty of the nation state, but, at the same time, offers the Union the opportunity to play an effective role in ensuring that the world is more stable and secure. However, it is to be noticed that Solana did not address the issue of the creation of a European government, which is necessary to lead any European military force.

According to Solana, the EU will be able to assert its values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights throughout the world. Firstly, to do that, the EU committed itself to deploy a corps-level military operation within 60 days, and to sustain it for at least a year.

This capacity will be coupled with the development of command, control and intelligence capabilities, as well as all the necessary support services. Secondly, the EU endorsed the establishment of new permanent political and military bodies within the Council to ensure both adequate political accountability and rapid and effective decision-making procedures.

In the end, asserted Solana, the Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, developing an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, launching and conducting EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

But in no way is the EU attempting to duplicate the work of NATO; obviously there will be full

consultation and co-operation between the EU and NATO, and between EU and non-EU European NATO members. Moreover, the EU recognises the importance of non-military crisis response tools: a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to co-ordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, and so on (*an.v.*).

## The Yearbook of International Cooperation

The Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development 1999/2000 from The Fridtjof Nansen Institute in its section on Non-Governmental Organizations has included WFM as one of the "23 most important Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in international cooperation on environment and development".

"It is a great honor to be recognized with Greenpeace, WWF, IUCN, WEDO, Third World Network, EEB and other eminent NGOs", declared Bill Pace, Executive Director of the WFM. "I believe this honor reflects respect for WFM's efforts to extend rights to NGOs at all levels of global society, and our service in disseminating information about efforts to undermine the United Nations".

## Federalists and the Canadian Parliament

In addressing democratization issues World Federalists of Canada (WFC) recently found a favourable audience in a committee of the Canadian Parliament which was conducting hearings on the next WTO round. WFC encouraged the Committee to support recommendations which:

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- 1) expanded NGO access at the WTO;
  - 2) improved the administrative accountability and transparency of the organization; and
  - 3) support for a consultative Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO.

The Committee's report to Parliament supported all three of these recommendations. While other organizations who testified before the Committee gave evidence in support of the first two points above, WFC was alone in pointing to the idea of a Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO (*f.w.*).

## Turkey, a Candidate to Enter the EU

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 decided to recognise Turkey as a candidate State to enter the European Union.

Turkey has demanded to be recognised as a candidate State since 1963, and only a few years ago its request was refused. Now Ankara is considered to be able to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria applied to the other candidate States. Nevertheless, negotiations will not start until some conditions are satisfied, particularly regarding respect for human rights. There are three conditions for Ankara to comply with in order to enter Europe:

- 1) candidate States must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties;
- 2) the European Council stressed that Ankara should make every effort to resolve peacefully its outstanding border disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter; failing this, the dispute between Turkey and Greece over some islands in the Aegean Sea should be brought to the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004;
- 3) finally the European Council strongly recommended a political settlement of the Cyprus problem and welcomed the launch of the talks on Cyprus in New York in December

1999; the settlement of the problem, without being a precondition, could in fact facilitate the accession of Cyprus and Turkey to the European Union (*an.v.*).

## Cronkite Champions World Government

On 19 October, the former CBS broadcaster Walter Cronkite spoke to the World Federalist Association (WFA) at the United Nations in New York, where he was presented with the WFA's Norman Cousins Global Governance Award. He argued that "those of us who are living today can influence the future of civilisation".

We call ourselves "civilised" but we still kill one another... there is no serious effort to establish world peace, and those who argue on behalf of a system of world government are called dreamers! To avoid world conflict, Cronkite suggests the strengthening of the United Nations as a step towards a world government, with its own legislature, executive, judiciary, and police force to enforce international law and to keep the peace. He therefore urges Americans to take up "this responsibility to posterity". We need to develop federal structures on a global level, since unlimited national sovereignty means international anarchy. He makes three suggestions for immediate action:

- 1) helping to create and develop the UN assessment formula, starting to pay "our" UN dues;
- 2) ratifying a series of important international treaties and conventions;
- 3) considering a more representative and democratic system of decision making at the UN (including the revision of the veto in the Security Council and the adoption of a weighted voting system for the General Assembly).

He concludes with the belief that the only way towards a democratic federal world government able to overcome reactionary movements is "to organise a strong educational counteroffensive

stretching from the most publicly visible people in all fields to the humblest individuals in every community". That is the vision and the program of the World Federalist Association and, of course, our vision too (*b.f.*).

## The UN Denounced for the Massacres in Bosnia and Rwanda

Srebrenica, a city located in Eastern Bosnia and sadly best known for the massacre of the Muslim population in the summer of 1995, is again at the centre of international affairs.

This is the city which became the symbol of UN failure in Bosnia: Blue Helmets taken as hostages and the disappearance of thousands of civilians have had a deep impact on Western public opinion. In December 1999, one of the survivors' associations proposed denouncing United Nations leaders (Kofi Annan, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the Commander of UN operations in the field) in front of the Hague International Court because of their passivity and inaction, leaving the Bosnian Serbs free to commit atrocities.

This follows another recent UN report which referred to the "global responsibility" of the international community, guilty of being unable to protect the city which two years earlier had become a "safe area" according to UN Security Council Resolution 819.

Shortly after this, Kofi Annan and the UN recognised the responsibility of the organisation in the Rwanda tragedy as well. In April 1994, the situation in the country was becoming increasingly dangerous but, despite this, the UN decided to cut the number of Blue Helmets present (from 2500 down to 250), thus "opening the doors" to a tragedy comparable to the Holocaust, where the international community knew

what was going on but did not act. This action on the part of the Bosnian survivors' associations will certainly not remove the horror and anger towards what could have been prevented, but perhaps something has been learned. It is time for the United Nations to act and to create the concrete possibility to organise a force which can respond rapidly, before a situation gets out of control, preventing the loss of human lives wherever (and I underline this word) necessary. Following up these admissions of guilt will be a challenge for the next century (*c.s.*).

## Forum of Federations in Canada

In October 1999, more than 600 delegates from 25 countries attended an international conference on federal political systems in Mont-Tremblanc, Quebec, Canada.

This Conference was arranged by the Forum of Federations, an organisation created by the Government of Canada. The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, gave an eloquent speech in praise of federalism around the world. Federalism, he said, is a principle enshrined in the Constitution of the United States by the founding fathers, and it has shown the world how people of different cultures and languages can live in peace, prosperity and mutual respect. Federalism is not a fixed system; it has to be, by definition, an evolving system: the federal government would never have all the answers, and the States should be seen as laboratories of democracy.

The purpose of federalism should be to take account of "local feelings", and every people must be given a sense of their identity and autonomy. In this turning of the millennium our major threat is the most primitive human feeling, the fear of the other: federalism can be the solution (*an.v.*).

# Andrew Duff

MEP

*What do you think should be the main institutional contents of a European Constitution?*

It should be a short piece of work. It should include the constituent clauses which are the decision-making procedures, the rules of membership and withdrawal of membership.

It should include the Charter of Fundamental Civil Freedoms, what we call Bill of Rights. It should set out the values which inspire the union and the principal objectives and it will be necessary, in describing the main objectives, to describe the competences of the union rather more clearly than they have been described so far in any of our treaties. So there is quite a lot of work to be done, but the results must be synthetic, short, clear, simple: a beautiful piece of craftsmanship.

*Do you think the union should have a European government, responsible towards the European Parliament?*

I think that we will not be creating a government in the classical way, as one would see with the separation of powers and so in the United States of America.

I think that there will still be a shared executive power between the representatives of the member states and the Commission and that the partnership between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament will be the strongest feature of the system of a government of the European Union. I think that we are not going to have a sort of a separate executive, an executive separate from the representatives of the states and of the citizens.

I think that it will be far more a tripartite machinery than what might be thought of has been meant by the word government.

*Do you think that, if the enlargement will take place without a Constitution, the political cohesion of the union will be endangered?*

I think that in the end it will result in complete paralysis whether or not solidarity will be affected in short term. I am sure, in the end, institutional paralysis will arise, because things will be blocked by one member state. That is inevitable. So the single most important thing in this IGC (Inter-Governmental Conference) is to revise article 48 to split the treaties, to have entrenched constitutive decision-making clauses which are very difficult to revise. In practice, it would be further impossible to change the treaty following enlargement (25 or 30 member states). So, we have to make sure that all the exciting things, the policy chapters, are amendable by a softer procedure, by an institutional procedure, with of course the Parliament playing a very important role in a co-decision process. If we fail to do that, then, in the end, the union will simply freeze up.

*Do you think that the European Parliament should ask a constituent co-decision in view of the next intergovernmental conference?*

Yes. I think it should and my group is certainly of that view. If we call it co-decision or not (that frightens some people), certainly the spirit of the conciliation procedure (concertation perhaps is a better word) would be the right way to prepare this IGC. Apart from anything else, this IGC has got to be completed very quickly and there is no group of reflection. It is going to be very hard to prepare it properly if we simply stick to the conventional process of the IGC.

We have to achieve an agreement before the IGC starts. The best way to do that is to exploit

this spirit of conciliation which we are used to now. The Commission, the Council and the Parliament are constantly using this procedure.

*In case the governments do not agree on the co-decision, do you think the European Parliament should start a new project of Constitution as Spinnelli had done?*

I think that we have to already prepare contingency plans if the member states refuse to allow any form of co-decision procedure. I think that it will be important that we get as close as we can to the Prodi Commission which

has got a reformist view about the IGC, it has got ambitious plans for the IGC.

And if the Parliament and the Commission can reach substantial agreement on a draft project, a draft text of treaty, that will be a huge step forward and the member states will then find it very hard to reject completely the formal proposals of the Commission and, of course, the formal opinion of the Parliament. I would favour a postponement of the formal opinion of the Parliament to open the IGC if at the December summit meeting in Helsinki, there is not an agreement to allow the conciliation procedure to get forward.



## Mundialism: an Extension of Meaning

In the excellent editorial of the first issue of the new series Lucio Levi says that the federalist position questions State sovereignty and “may be defined as mundialism”. However, an examination of the term suggests that it has a more specific meaning than there indicated. The word “*mondialisme*” was coined by the “*citoyens du monde*” who began to be active in Paris in 1949, at the time of the founding of the International Registry of World Citizens, following Garry Davis’ public declaration at the United Nations that summer.

During the first two decades of the United Nations, the world citizens, particularly in France, developed their theses in regular pamphlets and other publications, refining terms and exploring meanings. That led, in 1974, to the Peoples Congress publishing *Un Monde de Raison*, the first of three volumes of their *Somme mondialiste*, which commenced with a page

answering the question “Qu’est-ce que c’est le Mondialisme?”. Its opening paragraph well sums up the answer:

*Le Larousse Encyclopédique* donne cette définition “Doctrines qui vise à réaliser l’unité politique du monde considérée comme une communauté humaine unique”, mais nous dirons plutôt que le mondialisme est “l’ensemble des doctrines et des actes résultant de la solidarité des populations du globe et tendant à établir une loi et des institutions qui leur soient communes”.

From that was developed further their simplified definition which I emphasised in my book *World Citizenship and Mundialism* (Praeger 1999) “Mundialism is the sum of the ideas and actions expressing the solidarity of peoples of the globe and aiming to establish institutions and supranational law for a federative structure common to them, while respecting the diversity

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of culture and peoples”.

This question of meaning is of particular importance because whereas in French “*mondialisme*” is a straightforward term to use, its direct translation into English presents certain difficulties. In that language, the less common “mundane”, as well as “worldly” and the rarer “worldling” all have pejorative connotations. The result is that many anglophones, coming across the word “mundialism” for the first time, fail to grasp its

meaning, even when it has been spelled out for them in simple fashion. I found this in one American review of my book, where the reviewer complained that I had nowhere given an explanation of the meaning, despite the appearance of the above definition on the first page.

So while we may reasonably wish to use the word, non-anglophones need to be aware of its awkwardness to ears chiefly attuned to English.

*John Roberts*

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*Many thanks for your useful reflections on the neologism coined by world citizens and widely utilised by world federalists: “mundialism”. You perfectly describe the difficulties inherent in the use of this new word in the anglophone milieu.*

*However, I am afraid I have been misunderstood. In my editorial I tried to stress the difference between mundialism and federalism. I do not think that these words are synonymous. In my opinion, mundialism is a vague attitude that supports world solidarity and works for peace through international co-operation, i.e. co-operation among sovereign states. This means that mundialism (like Europeanism) does not question state sovereignty. Federalism, by contrast, is more exacting, since it questions national sovereignty and works towards*

*a supranational government and a supranational law as the means to achieve peace.*

*However, there is a large area of agreement between mundialism and federalism: the commitment to peace. They diverge as regards the means to achieve peace. While the mundialist attitude, widespread among governments, political parties and NGOs, cultivates the illusion that it is possible to achieve peace through international co-operation, federalism denounces this illusion and instead proposes the constitutional way to peace, the way leading to the creation of new supranational powers.*

*The conclusion I draw is that mundialism should prove a fertile recruiting ground for federalism. Thus, the goal of federalist strategy is to try to transform mundialism into federalism (l.l.).*

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