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The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*
Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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The Unaccomplished Way Toward the European Unity

Lucio Levi

This year is the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the European Community. This event represents an opportunity for reflection on the historical meaning of the European unification.

At the beginning, the EC was a union of six countries. Now it stretches from Lapland to the Mediterranean and from Poland to the Canaries and includes 27 countries. It is a Community of 487 million inhabitants where 23 official languages are spoken, and includes approximately 100 ancient ethnic minorities. It has an executive commission, a parliament, an upper house, a court of justice, a central bank, a currency, a citizenship, a flag, an anthem, a passport. National borders have been abolished.

The unification process has developed with the ups and downs characteristic of a difficult undertaking such as the overcoming of the sovereignty of an increasing number of states which joined the original core of the founding states.

It is worth recollecting two dates which represent milestones in the history of European unification. The first is 10 June 1979, when the European Parliament was first elected by universal suffrage. This represented a qualitative leap in the construction of European unity with the European Parliament becoming the first supranational parliament in history. It is an innovation that could change the world history. Democracy, which usually stops at state borders, has become international. In future it could become global with the transformation of the UN General Assembly into a World Parliament.

The second date is the 1st of January 1999 when

the European Central bank was established, thus opening the way to the circulation of the euro in 2002. It was a historic step on the road toward the construction of a European sovereignty. The euro has been a great success. The share of euros in the global official reserves amounts to 25%. Since December 2006, the quantity of euro notes in circulation in the world has overtaken the dollar. This is an extraordinary performance considering that it is only five years since the euro was launched. At the same time, the euro is the starting point of a transition toward a polycentric international monetary system and, as an integrated global market cannot work with many competing currencies, towards a world currency.

What is the historical significance of the grand design of European unification? The most important achievement of the EU is undoubtedly peace. After centuries of warfare, Europe has never before lived so long in peace as it now has in the post-2nd world war period, which coincides with the beginning of the process of European unification.

What is peace? It is not simply the absence of war. This is the negative notion of peace which Kant called "truce" and placed in the same category as war. Instead, positive peace, requires a political organization which prevents war through entrusting the power to settle conflicts among states to a federal authority acting on the basis of law. According to Kant's philosophy, the foundation-stone of peace is law and – more precisely – the extension of law to the sphere of international relations.

"War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention", said Henry Maine. War

has always been considered a normal event in political life, the vehicle for settling conflicts unsolvable through diplomacy. The novelty of the EU lies in the fact that it represents the most successful attempt so far to build a new form of statehood at international level, even though its pace has been slow and hesitant. The EU is the most intensively regulated region of the world. Its political institutions impose restraints on what sovereign states may do in their relations with each other, and in this it shows the way to what the UN could become in the future: namely, the guardian of international law and the framework of a process of constitutionalization of international relations. The European integration process weakens national governments and compels them to co-operate in order to solve together the problems they are unable to cope with separately. It creates a European civil society side by side with national civil societies, and establishes European institutions that represent a decision-making mechanism which progressively depletes national institutions. The process has advanced to such a stage that war among European Union member states has become inconceivable. The current political debate on the Constitution shows how far the process of unification in Europe has advanced. In other words, slowly and imperfectly something like a European Federation is taking shape.

It is wholly unrealistic to plan fusion among nation-states; that is, among forms of political organization based on power centralization and international antagonism. The EU represents a rejection of such nationalism which knows no other way to pursue unification but imperialism. The EU is not and will never be a state in the traditional meaning of the word. It will rather be a Federation of states. The nascent European Federation is facing the task of promoting mutual toleration and solidarity among nations. The vitality of the European unification experience springs from the attempt to reconcile unity on the one hand with the Old Continent's diversity of peoples on the other.

It relies on the principle that the result of any attempt to suppress differences will be worse than accepting them. The experience of the European Community brings ample evidence that the epoch of World Wars has passed. The enlarged EU, which now includes most Central and Eastern European Countries, represents the overcoming of the Cold War.

In spite of this success, the mood of the Europeans towards celebrating the birth of the European Community is one of indifference. As Pope Benedict XVI, drawing up a balance of 2006, has stated: "Europe seems to be tired, or rather seems to be inclined to take leave of history." By blocking the European Constitution, the French and Dutch electorates have suddenly made the future uncertain.

It is a fact that the European unification project is as yet unaccomplished. The EU still has only a limited capacity for action. The budget is only 1% of the European GDP. The proposed rapid reaction force agreed in 1999 has not yet been established. Moreover, widening the Union without first strengthening it threatens the cohesion of its political institutions and carries with it the hidden danger of the EU regressing to the status of a free trade area.

During the past half century the construction of the EU was based essentially on economic integration under the protection of the US. In future the EU will exist only if it is able to become a global actor. The growing role of the euro and the mission to Lebanon can be judged as positive steps in the right direction.

Another weakness of the EU lies in the right of veto, which continues to be the rule in such crucial areas as foreign, security and fiscal policies, and constitutional revision. It is a dream to imagine that the 27 member states can all proceed at the same speed. Unanimous ratification of the Constitution was an illusory expectation. True, 18 countries have now ratified the full document, but the rejection of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands has meant that – following the current rules which are at variance with the democratic

principle – the will of a small minority can in the end prevail over that of the majority. The only way out of this deadlock is to entrust EU citizens with the power to express their decision through a European constitutional referendum. This method will oblige governments to recognize the sovereignty of the European people and comply with the majority rule. An EU-wide referendum will

mark the birth of the European people who will appear on the stage of political life as the holders of the constituent power.

In conclusion, it seems that Europe's destiny can be to define global models. If the EU becomes able to speak with one voice, it will unify its representation in the IMF, the World Bank and the Security Council and will therefore become the vehicle for UN reform.

New UN Secretary-General Pledges to Stay on Reform Course

During the campaign for the election of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki Moon was viewed by many as the least visible candidate and the one offering the least objectionable views in order to not offend any governments. Unlike Mr Tharoor (India) or Mr Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), he rarely made public appearances or spoke in specific terms of his vision. He also chose not to respond to questions from civil society groups on his campaign, or not to contribute an op/ed along with other candidates for a *New York Times* series. He responded to this criticism, by recalling his own reputation as a man of humble demeanor as well as the virtue of modesty in Asian cultures.

“... Modesty is about demeanor, not about vision and goals. It does not mean the lack of commitment or leadership. Rather it is determination in action to get things done without so much fanfare... This may be the key to Asia's success, and to the UN's future. Indeed, our organization is modest in its means, but not in its values. We should be more modest in our words, but not in our performance”.

This view of modesty and performance may portend what can be expected from Mr Ban's administration. During Mr Kofi Annan's two terms, the international community has made significant advancements and adopted new norms in human rights, commitments to development and international justice. With Ban at the helm, we may see the United Nations return to a more traditional “intergovernmental” role, working to consolidate the “supranational” gains achieved in the last decade (*t.f.*).

Excerpt from an article with the same title appeared in *Mondial*, December 2006. For a broader discussion on the topic visit <http://www.unsg.org>

For a UN Emergency Force

Sir Brian Urquhart

In 1948, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, proposed during a commencement speech at Harvard the development of a small, dedicated UN force to deal with the violent and chaotic conditions in Jerusalem. Perhaps unwisely, he called it a "United Nations Legion". In any case, the proposal was greeted with thunderous silence from the permanent members of the Security Council; even the United States and the USSR agreed that it was a terrible idea. The violence in Jerusalem continued.

UN peacekeeping came into full bloom with the 1956 Suez crisis and the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I). That force was deployed, due to the leadership and determination of Dag Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche, within eight days of the General Assembly's decision to establish it. The early peacekeeping forces of the Cold War period were put into the field with similar speed, the record being seventeen hours for UNEF II (to preserve a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel) in 1973. Although the political stakes were often very high, those early forces were less complex than the post-Cold-War multifunctional operations that were later deployed within the frontiers of a single disturbed country. Except for the 1960 Congo operation, these early forces had little or no humanitarian responsibilities. Equally important, they dealt only with governments and national forces and were deployed with the agreement of those governments as soon as a cease-fire was in place.

Although in the early days of its existence a standing rapid deployment force was accepted without major criticism from states parties, such

a force became really indispensable when, in the 1990s, the Security Council agreed to set up seventeen multifunctional peacekeeping/humanitarian missions in quick succession. The role of these operations was far more complex than the original peacekeeping operations, and the humanitarian crises facing most of them meant that even a month or two of delay in deployment was devastating not only for the victims, but also to the mission's effectiveness and subsequent authority. Moreover, very few of their contingents were trained in the fundamental tasks of stopping random violence and dealing with chaos and disorder. This was why situations like that in Sierra Leone, where the rebel faction more or less successfully immobilized a UN force, could easily develop.

The failure to deploy forces in emergency situations can start a chain reaction of disaster, loss of life, and misery. However, late deployment of a mission with forces untrained for the tasks at hand can create an equally devastating humanitarian situation. In her recent, remarkable book, *The Turbulent Decade*, Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees in the 1990s, describes vividly what the absence of trained forces can mean for a large refugee population in whose camps there is no one to keep order or stop factional abuse. The post-Rwandan-genocide refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region led to homicidal chaos that has so far cost over four million lives as well as many millions of dollars in relief aid and general economic loss. Tragedy in the camps continues despite the eventual arrival of a UN peacekeeping force. Much of this might have been avoided if, in the early stages, Ogata's

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pleas for immediate military assistance had not been ignored.

I have mentioned this one example because it helps address some of the most common objections to a standing rapid deployment force or an Emergency Peace Service. There are several common objections to this idea, as well as one seldom expressed but very important. The first common objection is related to *expense*. Certainly even a small standing force would be quite expensive by United Nations standards, though it would still be exponentially less costly than prolonged disasters like the continuing tragedy in the Great Lakes region – in lives, in economic and social disruption and in the cost of humanitarian and other assistance year after year, including at present a UN peacekeeping force that shows no sign of leaving any time soon.

Another popular argument against a standing emergency service is grounded in a belief that “standby arrangements” with governments can and should be enlisted to handle these tasks. That, unfortunately, is not always true. In 1994, there were more than twenty standby arrangements with governments for the provision of peacekeeping forces. *Not one could be activated successfully when the Security Council belatedly decided that something ought to be done about the Rwandan genocide*. Later on, when Sadako Ogata appealed for help in controlling the very large refugee camps set up outside the borders of Rwanda, only one standby agreement could be activated, and that for so short a time that Ogata ended up asking president Mobutu of Zaire, who was about to be overthrown, for assistance from the Zairean army. Any government has a perfect right not to send its troops into disagreeable and dangerous situations, which is more often than not what the UN has to deal with. Only a professional, specially trained, standing UN force at the full disposal of the Security Council can be absolutely relied on to respond with the necessary speed in such situations. At present, this does not exist. As Kofi Annan once said, the UN is the only fire

brigade in the world that has to acquire a fire engine after the fire has started.

However, the most basic objection to a standing UN peace service is seldom expressed publicly. Protection of national sovereignty is a concern that very often limits the ability of the UN to do the right thing in the right way at the right time. Fear of any UN development that may erode national sovereignty has always limited the UN’s capacity for intervention. For this same reason, governments have been acutely cautious about expanding the Secretary-General’s sphere of authority. A standing emergency peace service would certainly increase the Security Council’s capacity to react quickly and effectively in an emergency, rather than go through the pedestrian and often untimely and unsatisfactory process of setting up a traditional peace-keeping force. Nevertheless, it seems as though it will take more disasters and many more debates before the governments that object to a standing UN rapid deployment force can be convinced that saving lives and stopping incipient disasters before they run out of control is more important, and far less dangerous, than any possible threat to national sovereignty.

Meanwhile, it is vitally necessary that the concept and the practical plan for making an emergency peace service a reality be kept alive. The basic proposal begins by stating, “Because governments have not created the necessary UN capability, the responsibility for breathing life into the UN Emergency Peace Service now lies with civil society, working with allies in the UN and interested governments”. This venture is of the greatest importance both to the UN as a responsible institution and to the millions as of yet unknown, innocent victims who might, in the future, be saved by this essential addition to the UN’s capacity to act on their behalf. Like many visionary ideas, there are several plausible objections to a UN Emergency Peace Service, or whatever it might finally be called. Nevertheless, there is one overwhelming argument *for* it. It is desperately needed, and it is needed as soon as possible.



Legal Basis of the Integral Review of the San Francisco Charter of 1945

For the transformation of the UN into a World Federation of Nations

Francisco Plancarte y Garcia Naranjo

It has been stated, not without reason, that, according to the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, it is impossible to make amendments to the charter itself without the consent of each of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, due to the fact that those Members have the right of veto. It has been also mentioned that pretending to amend the Charter with the purpose of creating something different, which steers towards a world government, would be a waste of time, due to the aforementioned reason. In this article we will try to prove that a procedure does exist that is immune from the veto right, that is based on a call for an integral review of the charter and then, as a consequence of that review, it is possible to advance towards the transformation of the UN.

As a frame of reference, we state that since the beginning of the Cold war the two superpowers set aside the possibility to put the theme of a world government on the world's agenda. That theme was relegated to novels or fiction movies, that showed the evil side of an empire based on military or scientific might, enslaving the human kind.

To counter that view, we pronounce ourselves in favor of the supremacy of International Law, on which we base our proposal to transform the UN into a World Federation of Nations, according to the General Principle of International Law known as *ius cogens*, and in particular to the Right of self-determination of peoples, which has been widely acknowledged, also in recent times, by the international community.

The solution that we propose arises from the Charter of the UN itself, and has the purpose to attract people's attention on a path through which it would be legally possible for the

General Assembly to issue a call for a meeting aimed to set up a General Conference of UN Members, with the mandate to review the entire Charter. This procedure would not be subject to any veto.

Once the General Conference is convened, the UN could pass a resolution for the transformation of the UN itself into a World Federation of Nations, based on a new principle that we propose: the *right to self-determination of nations as a whole*, with the same *raison d'être* of the above mentioned right of self-determination of peoples.

In order to call this Conference *with the purpose to review the Charter*, it is desirable to reach the consensus of all Nations, including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Lacking that, though, the Conference could still be called by a simple majority of the Members of the UN General Assembly, and with the affirmative vote of any one of the seven Members of the Security Council, whether permanent Member or not, pursuant to Article 109, paragraph 3, of the San Francisco Charter. Before we continue with the analysis of the ways to review the Charter by a Conference, we will briefly remind the requirements for amending or modifying the San Francisco Charter.

The General Assembly of the UN is the competent organ to amend the Charter, according to Article 108, which refers precisely to this matter and states that: "Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the

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United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council”.

Therefore it's clear that, since the ratification must be voted by all of the permanent members of the Security Council, each of them individually has the right to veto any amendment, just by not ratifying it.

On the other hand, our proposal is not to amend or to modify the Charter, which is a task of the General Assembly, but to *review* the Charter through a General Conference of the Members of the UN, in accordance with the terms of the first paragraph of Article 109, which states the following: “A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council”.

Hence, a General Conference of the UN Members that has the purpose to *review* the Charter, can be called by the General Assembly without the hazard that such a call could be blocked by the veto power of any of the five permanent members, as long as the required voting quorum is observed. It must be understood that in this case the Charter does not provide any ratification by the participating Nations, probably because it's a simple call.

Nevertheless, the Founding Members of the UN foresaw the convenience, in the third paragraph of the same Article 109, to reduce the quorum for the calling of a General Conference of Members for reviewing the Charter starting from 1955, establishing that: “If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the Members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven Members of the Security Council”. This paragraph has been in effect since 1955, because the Founding Members thought wisely to reduce the quorum

required to call a General Conference with the purpose to review the Charter. This was made in order to facilitate the procedure for the General Assembly to promote such a Conference. Amazingly, this General Conference has never been called in 61 years. The purpose of this essay is to create consciousness in the world civil society of this convenient and valid legal instrument.

Let's recall that the convening of the conference recommended in this document is possible “with the purpose to review the Charter”, including its integrity, and not to amend it or to modify it. In other words, the Members of the General Conference, duly called and installed pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 109 mentioned above, can proceed to review the entire Charter without the interference of a veto right, and to open a discussion on the very *raison d'être* of the United Nations. After making a proper debate, the Members of the UN could consider that, in essence, the UN does not respond to the needs of the 21st century, due to its lack of efficiency, of capacities in general, and of legal powers. Besides, the UN does not have coercive means to pursue all of its aims. Therefore, the UN could well agree to transform itself into a World Federation of Nations, based on the General Principle of international law known as *ius cogens*, and without having amended or modified any legal dispositions of the Charter.

Conclusions

The international community cannot renounce the evolution of international law nor to seek and use all the possible legal instruments with the aim to reach world peace and international security. In order to help achieving those purposes, *Planetafilia* (<http://planetafilia.org>) proposes a path towards a complete review of the San Francisco Charter, immune from the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The result of that review should be the transformation of the UN into a World Federation of Nations.

Basing ourselves on a new vision of the United Nations and of the necessity to effectively enforce

International Law, we propose the following *legal bases* for the complete review of the San Francisco Charter and for the transformation of the UN into a World Federation of Nations:

To review the Charter - Based on article 109, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Charter and with the purpose of reviewing it, a General Conference of Members is to be called for and convened as soon as possible, after having put it in the UN agenda during an annual meeting of the General Assembly. The reduced quorum of paragraph 3 is valid for any annual session of the General Assembly, because otherwise the paragraph would have explicitly said "only for the tenth annual session". In any event, the first paragraph of Article 109 is clearly legal and in good standing and is not subject to any veto power.

To transform the UN into a World Federation of Nations - Based on the "General principles of the law acknowledged and accepted by civilized nations", as expressed in Article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, also known as *ius cogens*, and in particular on the Principle of self-determination of peoples, we affirm a new concept: *The right to self-determination of nations as a whole*. Each one of the participating nations, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has the right to legally adopt a resolution to transform the UN in the course of the General Conference of Members of the United Nations.

The aforementioned legal bases are supported and strengthened by the concept sustained by the founders of the United Nations and referred to in the introduction of the San Francisco Charter that states: "We, the peoples of the United Nations", which is traditionally considered as a source of inspiration for the enforcement of multilateralism and democracy inside the international community.

The 1945 UN Charter shall continue to be in effect for all the necessary time, as long as the General Conference implements all the legal acts required by the transformation process. Once the procedures set out by the Conference are concluded, and the World Federation of

Nations is established, the UN Charter would be declared terminated, without being amended or modified. That means that the Charter shall be abrogated in due time by a decree of the new supranational entity.

Our proposals only aim to build a new world order, in favor of legality, derived from multilateralism, and founded on the idea that international law shall prevail above the "law of the stronger". The aforementioned approach is based on the same logic of any community of free men and women that aims to live in dignity and harmony, according to the rule of law.

It is necessary to demonstrate to civil society that a legally possible path exists to transform the UN into a World Federation of Nations, or in any other legal democratic, transparent, efficient and equitable institution. This institution should be the result of the proposed General Conference of Members and of the acknowledgment of the supremacy of international law. The Universities and the Non-Governmental-Organizations would be the grounds and the moral instruments to give impulse to the review of the Charter and to the transformation of the UN. All of the aforementioned ideas have the purpose to begin to solve the urgent and serious problems that in the last decades have been arising. In fact, the globalization process has made it obvious that humankind deserves a new legal and political system to face social injustice, to avoid the collapse of the Planet's environment, and to assure the respect of Human Rights, sustaining and seeking a political balance among nations in favor of the future generations.

As a result of the transformation of the United Nations, the "foundations" of a World Federation of Nations should include the issuance of an International Political Constitution, drawn with the acknowledgment of legal and international experts and academics, and with the consensus of the Nations, whose political leaders should be bound to act in response to the civil society's demands coming from the serious problems and conflicts that humankind and the planet are facing.

Abbé Pierre's Death

William Pace

On behalf of the WFM-IGP, we express our sadness at the passing of Abbé Pierre, who was an early and strong leader of our movement. It is hard to describe how significant the world federation movement was in the early years after WWII. Millions rallied to the cause of using the new UN to outlaw war. From Einstein to Churchill to hundreds of thousands of students and young men and women returning from war, the strength of the federation peace movement was however slowly decimated by the wake of a new, Cold War. While world citizenship initiatives and efforts to outlaw war at the UN continue to struggle, the European citizenship and integration movement, while taking decades itself, has been an exceptional success.

Below are a few excerpts about Abbé Pierre's work for world peace from "The Politics of World Federation" by Joseph Preston Baratta, Praeger (2004); volume 2. *Citizens of the World! The atomic weapon threatens with the most atrocious death each man, each woman, and each child. The war-blaze of yesterday is not even yet extinguished. Who would dare to state that it cannot at any time set again the whole earth ablaze? That armament race is accelerating everywhere. Whole peoples are starving to death everywhere, while others choke under the threat of overproduction and unemployment. The cry of the anguished peoples who want to live is arising everywhere, but in vain. Will their cry be heard by the statesmen? This depends on you, Citizens of the World!*"

Born Henri Gouès in Lyon, France, Abbé Pierre played an inspirational and important role in the Montreux Congress of 1947 that launched the WFM. A Catholic Abbot by convocation, Abbé Pierre was also a hero of the French Resistance movement against German occupation and defender of political minorities, including Jews and laborers. He

was a man whose popularity transcended political orientation, as demonstrated by his rise in standing as a member of the French Constituent Assembly in 1945 and later member of the National Assembly. At the Montreux congress (where the WFM was formally founded in August 1947) he was made vice-chairman of the continuing executive committee and [...] later became the acting chairman during World Movement's first year (p. 341). In 1947, Abbé Pierre played a tremendous role in sowing the seeds of World Federalism in the former Czechoslovakia in the anxious months at the beginning of the Cold War. He came away from a meeting with the Prague group, one formed by Czech student members of the Montreux Congress, with nascent hope that federalism was possible and had even hoped to schedule another trip, this time to rally Moscow. Tragically, the Communist coup of 1948 silenced Czech cries for a democratic world government. The same year, Abbé Pierre travelled to Rome, only to find the hope of world federalism confronted again by the communist specter as the Italian federalist movement stymied by the communist Popular Front (p. 346).

In late October of 1948, with the UN General Assembly meeting in Paris, Abbé Pierre joined the ranks of Albert Camus, André Breton, Georges Altman, Claude Bourdet, and Robert Robin to create the so-called Garry Davis Solidarity Committee in support of the young American who bravely renounced his citizenship in order to make a statement about the necessity of creating a new paradigm of citizenry, one that Abbé Pierre had been championing from the very inception of the World Movement for World Federal Government: the global citizen (p. 404).

Abbé Pierre will be missed, but many continue the struggle.

¹Abbé Pierre, Montreux Congress of the World Movement for World Federal Government, 23 August 1947 (p. 331).

Federation Projects in Central Europe in the Period 1848-1914

Artur Lakatos

Usually, the second half of the XIXth century and the years leading up to World War I are associated with the emergence of nation-oriented values, the struggle for national unification, and independence from the imperial powers. In the context of this pattern of events historical accounts do not pay much attention to the federalist and confederative ideas of the period. True, such ideas did not have as great an impact as others, and were far from having the success they enjoyed in the XXth century. Nevertheless, they did exist and they did have a certain influence on the perspectives of important thinkers.

1848 was the year of revolutions across Europe, probably comparable only with the year of 1989 during which the Communist system collapsed. In central European states the 1848 revolutions were all defeated. Among the variety of reasons, the most important was probably the overwhelming power available to the centralized empires which, cooperating together, overwhelmed the revolutionaries among whom cooperation was rare.

The revolutionaries, in fact, seldom reached out beyond their national constituencies, and – in the view of many of their leaders – this contributed in large measure to their failure. However, those forced into exile had time enough to reconsider their previous positions and to start to negotiate with their fellow revolutionaries from other nations. One of these was Giuseppe Mazzini who, in his idealist way, placed the paramount emphasis on human freedom and equality. The ideals of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* could not, in his opinion, be

achieved by excessive individualism, nor by cosmopolitanism, but only by extending the idea of Nation beyond the simple attainment of national unity. A further step was also necessary, namely the federalisation of nations¹. In his vision, each European nation has its own state. European unification could be realized by the common will of these independent nation-states. Mazzini was the main figure in the *Central European Democratic Committee*, which he founded in June 1849 in London, together with Ledru-Rollin, Arnold Ruge and Albert Durasz. The importance of this organization and the respect which it earned was illustrated by the fact that in 1851 many Hungarian and Romanian revolutionaries, led by Lajos Kossuth and D. Brătianu, joined it.

Meanwhile, the Romanian revolutionary leader, Nicolae Bălcescu, had a more concrete concept. In 1850 he attempted, also in London, to form a committee to bring about a *Democratic Confederation of Eastern Europe*, in which he aimed to include Romanians, Hungarians, Poles, Russians, Czechs, Moravians and Southern Slavs. His idea was also that revolutionaries could achieve unity through a federation of nation-states². At its heart would be the federated Danube states – an idea also proposed by Bălcescu's Hungarian friend and opponent, Lajos Kossuth – which would include Hungary, Moldova, Bessarabia (Romanian-inhabited territory under Russian rule at that time, today included in the Republic of Moldova), Walachia and Serbia.

The confederation was to be organized in three administrative units, Romanian,

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Hungarian and Southern Slav, with a common parliament conducting business alternately in its three capitals. Matters such as defence, financial, commercial and transport policies would be federal government competences. Many revolutionaries found Bălcescu's ideas interesting and worthy of consideration³.

Lajos Kossuth's proposals in many ways resembled those of Bălcescu, the main difference being that Bălcescu wanted to reshape state borders in the region along strictly national and ethnic lines, while Kossuth emphasized a confederation of nations and nationalities based on respect for certain traditional, historical borders. Kossuth's federalist ideas were developed mostly in his draft constitution of 1851 for the countries under the Hungarian Crown in which he argued the need for a corrective reorganization of existing frontiers – though as a Hungarian politician he wanted this to be done in a way which ensured that his own nation would not suffer any major territorial loss, and this led many historians and political analysts of the neighbouring nations to see his plan as an Hungarian hegemonic attempt over the region⁴.

“There are countries whose inhabitants speak different languages and therefore belong to different races or ethnic groups, but they live either mixed in with others, or in compact masses, though within the historical and natural delimited territory of the state,” wrote Kossuth. “What will they do for the sake of their own nations? Will they divide the state according to language criteria? This is either practically impossible because they are living mixed together with other nationalities, or it is impossible to bring about without destroying the state which would lead to other citizens' rights and security being violated. The state conditions the existence of a nation, but speaking a common language is not the sole criteria of nationhood. A unified language does not of itself mean national unity and diversity of language does not preclude national unity”⁵.

Kossuth placed primary importance on his own nation's interests, but he also felt that its security could only be maintained through good understanding and cooperation with neighbouring nations. For this reason he was ready to make important concessions. At this period of his life, he conceived of a federal Hungary with autonomy for Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovakia, as well as their ultimate independence if their people so desired. On the other hand, if they chose to remain part of Hungary, they would obtain full autonomy, and the federal government would only have authority over them in those policy areas which were handled in common. Transylvania would be a part of Hungary by union, but its Romanian and Saxon inhabitants would acquire the right of self-government based on their own traditional, national institutions, while if they preferred to break away from Hungary, they could do so by referendum. He proposed a similar status for Voivodina province with its Serb inhabitants⁶.

This Constitutional project represented the key elements of Kossuth's federalist ideas. At their heart was the plan for a Danube Confederation made up of the independent nation-states of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungarian, Romanian, Polish and other revolutionary groups had many debates about the reorganization of this region, giving rise to many interesting ideas, though they were never implemented.

Frantisek Palacky fulfilled the same role for the Czechs as Kossuth did for the Hungarians, Bălcescu for the Romanians and Mazzini for the Italians. Palacky was one of the chief figures of the Czech nation's politics and culture. At the moment when the exiled revolutionaries lacked real power, Palacky was busy formulating a Memorandum which he presented at the imperial Diet in Kremsier in 1849. At the same time he also published its ideas in an article with the title “*O centralizaci a narodni rovnoprasnoski v*

Rakousku (Centralization and the equal rights of nations from Austria)"⁷.

While Kossuth's plans were intended to secure Hungarian national interests, Palacky's project envisaged an Austro-Slav cooperation under the dominance of the Slav elements. It proposed that the Empire be reorganized on federal lines into eight provinces: German-Austrian, Czech-Slovak, Polish-Ukrainian, Illyrian, Italian, Southern Slav, Hungarian and Romanian⁸. These provinces would be created on historical, geographical and ethnographical principles and would enjoy equal rights, having only the Imperial authority above them. Palacky's plans became a source of inspiration for many thinkers concerned with the relationship between federal structures and local units.

But Palacky's plan was not welcomed by the Emperor nor by any other important statesman of the Hasburg Empire. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867, most national groups in the Hasburg Empire were frustrated by the new dualist structure, and their politicians agitated against it, in many cases also proposing changes. Perhaps the most important among them was Aurel C. Popovici's project for a *United States of Austria*. A Romanian National Party deputy in the Hungarian parliament and a friend of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Popovici published his proposal for the first time in 1906. He was an aggressive critic of Hungarian nationalist politics, just as Palacky had been of the Austro-Hungarian dualist system⁹.

Popovici's work is one of the most complete and well-documented federal projects in the whole prehistory of European construction. The author was familiar with the Swiss and American federal models, and also with the earlier projects of this kind in his own country. For him, it was not nationalism but ethnic diversity which guaranteed equality and democracy because of the simple fact that

none of the cohabiting nations could attain hegemony, and therefore none would suffer oppression by the others¹⁰.

Especially well conceived was his projected institutional framework. The Empire was to be reorganized as a federal structure, with a clear distinction between federal and local institutions. The head of the whole structure was the Emperor, having great power and competence, but no accountability at all. "The Emperor is sacred, inviolable and he cannot be held accountable,"¹¹ he wrote. Instead, it was not the Emperor but the head of government, the chancellor, who was to be held accountable.

The whole empire was to be reorganized into 15 federal units, linked to the federal government only in matters concerning common problems. They would be: German-Austria, German-Bohemia, German-Moravia (Silesia), Czech-Bohemia, Western Galicia (inhabited mostly by Poles), Eastern Galicia (inhabited mainly by Ruthenes), Transylvania (the parts inhabited predominantly by Romanians), Croatia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Voivodina, Hungary (within the limits of its ethnic borders), the Szeklerland, Tyrol and Trieste. Bosnia and Herzegovina would keep their own special positions as occupied territories until their international position became clear.

These units were to be self-governing, organized on the basis of their own local (that is, national) criteria, and would enjoy equal rights. They would be headed by a governor nominated by the Emperor. This governor had to meet only one criterion: namely, to be a citizen of his country. He would preside over the state's government, whose members would be nominated by the Emperor on the governor's recommendation.

Each of these federal states would have its own constitution, which must not be in opposition to imperial dispositions. Such constitutions

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became valid on acceptance by the Emperor. The empire's official language was to be German, but each country or state could also use its national language within its own territory. The parliament and the administrative structures would function on the basis of the states' own constitutions.

At the imperial level, other federal institutions were also very important. The main legislature was to be a bicameral parliament made up of the House of Deputies and the Senate. The Deputies were to be elected directly by the citizens, whereas Senators would either hold their position by inheritance (members of traditional aristocratic families), or acquire it by merit and prestige (bishops, rectors of universities, etc) or be nominated by the Emperor.

The federal government was to be large, led by its president with the title of Chancellor and nominated by the Emperor. The other members of the Government – 42 in all – were to be nominated by the member states in proportion to their size and importance in the federal empire. Seven delegate places – the largest number – were to be reserved for Austria and Hungary, but even the smallest state would have at least one representative in the government. Decisions were not to be made by commissions. The third power, the judiciary, was represented by the Imperial Court endowed with primacy over the national courts, and supremacy throughout the whole empire.

In his entire project, Popovici greatly emphasised national rights and the resolution of inter-ethnic disputes whether between neighbouring countries or between majorities and minorities within a country. In his opinion, the basis for everything had to be the guarantee of individual rights for each of the citizens, together with respect and understanding for their aspirations to certain rights at a community level. As someone who

had experienced life as a minority member in Hungary – being a Romanian from Transylvania – Popovici was extremely sensitive and cared deeply about national problems. He knew it was not easy to solve delicate situations of this kind, but he was also convinced that an effort had to be made to deal with them in the best possible way, even if a perfect solution could not be found. In his opinion, the best approach was to reorganize the imperial provinces along ethnic lines, reducing the number of minorities as much as possible in the new institution's territory. But even if minority communities still remained there, they should nevertheless be treated with respect and be guaranteed equality before the law¹².

All these federal projects had many elements in common. First, none were ever applied in their original form. Nevertheless, to an important extent they influenced the idea of European unity. All were regional projects, limited to the "Central European" space, even if none of the authors used this term. And all visualised cooperation between the nations of this region being based on federative or confederative, supranational institutions.

As to the authors of these projects, two groups can be distinguished. The first were key figures in revolutions from 1848 onwards. These men were idealists who lacked institutional power. They were free to express very radical opinions and ideas on the reorganization of the region based on the liquidation of imperial structures and the creation of new national states.

The second group included Palacky and Popovici, who were important figures in the political and cultural life of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For them, it would have been suicidal to challenge the Hasburg family's authority over the empire, so they had to find a kind of *modus vivendi* between imperial structures and innovative ideas. Both thought about reshaping internal borders while keeping the authority of central power structures

(emperor, imperial government, imperial legislative structures, imperial court, etc), which in this way would become federal. They both hid their own national interests in their reorganization model, even though they did not spell this out in the text. In Palacky's vision, four of the new provinces were dominated by Slav elements, while Popovici, on the other hand, saw those same Pan-Slav ideas as a great danger, not only for the Hasburg empire, but also for his Romanian nation. He therefore conceived of the reorganization in such a way that Slav elements would be unable to exercise domination over the possible coalition of German, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian provinces. The Romanian national interest was also clearly visible in the proposal to restructure Transylvania, separated from Hungary and

the Szeklerland, with the Romanian element becoming clearly dominant. Both Palacky and Popovici also opposed Dualism and the aggressive national policy of the Hungarians.

None of these projects was realized in its original shape, and even today Central European regional cooperation remains more an idea than a reality. But these projects are important mainly because they were dreamed up by people who are still significant figures in national mythologies. The examples of Mazzini, Kossuth, Bălcescu, Palacky and Popovici show how people can uphold their own nations' interests by means of skilfully handled cooperation, an approach which remains a basic premise of European integration to this day.

¹Ladislau Gyémán, *Preistoria Construcției Europene (Prehistory of the European Construction)*, Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 34

²Ovidiu Pecican, *Europa: o idee în mers*, Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 1997, p. 93

³Márki Sándor, *A legújabb kor története*, Budapest, Multipress, 2000, pp. 224-225

⁴Gyémánt, *Ibidem*, p. 42

⁵Kossuth Lajos alkotmányterve. *Javaslat Magyar Ország jövő politikai szervezetét illetőleg-tekintettel a nemzetiségi kérdés megoldására*, Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1994, p. 9

⁶*Ibidem*, pp. 50-59

⁷Jiri Koralka, "La formation de la société civile tcheque: Palacky, Havlicek-Borovsky, Rieger", in Chantal Delsol, Michel Maslowski, *Histoire de idées politiques de l'Europe centrale (History of the Political Ideas in Central Europe)*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, pp. 310-323

⁸Gyémánt, *Ibidem*, p. 41

⁹C. Aurel Popovici, *Stat și națiune, Statele Unite ale Austriei Mari*, Fundația pentru Literatură și Artă Regele Carol II, București, 1939, *passim*

¹⁰*Ibidem*, pp. 186-188

¹¹*Ibidem*, p. 246

¹²*Ibidem*, pp. 205-250

Post-Iraq Global Politics

Robert Paehlke

For some the invasion of Iraq was always about military control of Middle East oil, for others it was a much more complex combination of motivations. Few would deny that the region's overwhelming share of global exportable oil was relevant.

Regardless of the motivation, the outcome – whatever it is – will not be as it was envisioned prior to the invasion. What is increasingly clear is that unilateral military action is no longer a viable option, even for a hegemonic power. Some other means of combating terrorism and some other answer to the question of peak oil must be found. Post-Iraq global politics may well be more multilateral.

The United States is now deeply in deficit and debt and Americans may soon realize that even they cannot afford to keep massive armies of occupation on the other side of the globe. Other nations must conclude as well that if they cannot, no nation can.

There are many reasons that a contested occupation of even a middle-sized nation is no longer possible, not the least of which is the widespread availability of modern weapons, the inherent advantage to insurgents willing to attack civilian populations, and a globally-shared post-colonial worldview.

The only alternatives to today's unilateralism are either open and explicit militarism, or a return to slowly building a system of multilateral global governance. The former is unlikely and I will argue here that the latter (multilateral global governance building towards world federalism)

should focus on the political, economic and social implications of peak oil.

The long process of developing a world that no longer depends on fossil fuels has a catastrophic potential if we cannot quickly get beyond violent rivalries between nations. Given the massive costs of a transition to a post-oil world, warfare is unaffordable *and at the same time* the potential for violent confrontation is enormously high. The dual challenge of this new reality demands multilateral global governance.

Moreover, in my view, peak oil cannot be addressed effectively without, simultaneously, collectively and effectively addressing three other issues: climate change, terrorism, and global equity. The links between peak oil and both climate change and terrorism are obvious enough. Climate change and peak oil both require reductions in fossil fuel consumption. Terrorism arises in no small measure out of Western military interventions in the Middle East and out of the peculiarities of oil wealth as a source of economic development.

The links to social equity are more complex, but arise, as noted, out of the political economy of oil. Oil today provides vast wealth, without providing much by way of social and economic development in the form of industrialization and employment. It also delivers wealth very, very unevenly to nations near to each other: Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf mini-states have oil, and Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Afghanistan do not.

Unemployment is widespread in both wealthy

and poor nations, though in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States many foreign workers are imported and routinely exploited. In few cases are industrialization, and the employment and entrepreneurial opportunities it has historically provided, part of oil-based economic development. Thus, while terrorist recruits are often educated and middle class, the climate in which terrorism often arises is one of staggering inequality, a frozen class structure, and limited opportunities.

More than this, the lack of social equity also has a profound effect on the other side of the struggle with terrorism: in the United States. I would contend that the wrong-headed global *war* on terror, the military 'solution' to terrorism that led to the invasion of Iraq, and a concomitant increase in terrorist recruitment arose out of a political system negatively influenced by extreme social and economic inequality. This, I know, will be seen as a wild assertion by some, so I will elaborate on it before returning to a discussion of post-Iraq global politics.

Socio-economic Inequality and Democracy in the United States

Political democracy, most political theorists would agree, requires some minimum level of socio-economic equity. It does not require a workers' paradise or even a first-rate welfare state, but in evaluating the strength of democracy in the United States we must consider the recent trajectory of wealth distribution in that nation. This consideration raises questions about the depth and resilience of American democracy.

Paul Krugman, writing in the *New York Times*, noted: "Between 1972 and 2001 the wage and salary income of Americans at the 90th percentile of income distribution rose only 34%, or about 1% per year. [...] But income at the 99th percentile rose 8 percent; income at the 99.9th percentile rose 181 percent; and income at the 99.99th percentile rose 497 percent."¹ The United States, as events surrounding the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina laid bare, is very far from

being an economic democracy, further from it than any other wealthy nation outside of the Middle East.

Since 2001 (the last year of the study reported by Krugman), the wealth gap has grown. Gains at the top have been accelerated by tax cuts. Is such a legislatively-induced shift in income distribution (to the disadvantage of an overwhelming majority) even possible within an effective democracy? Globalization and deindustrialization is a partial explanation, so too perhaps is the vast illegal immigration that drives down low-end wages. But another part of the explanation is a pattern of flawed democracy – with three components: low voter turnout, overwhelmingly right-wing media, and the use of non-economic wedge issues like terrorism, war and the now classic American triumvirate of guns, God, and gays.

This is not the place for a detailed discourse on democracy in America, but I will elaborate briefly on two of these components. In a non-Presidential election year, voter turnout in the United States is often less than 50% of eligible voters – in part because turnout among minorities and the poor is actively discouraged in some states.² Turnout among evangelical Christians (who predominantly vote Republican), however, was very high in 2004, because many key state ballots included referenda regarding marriage rights for gay citizens in order to selectively stimulate turnout.

Second, radio and television news coverage in the United States is skewed in a systematic way. There are some relatively neutral information sources and there are many stations and channels that are systematically hyper-conservative, most notably Fox Television News, all 'Christian' radio, and most radio opinion programs. Funds available to right-wing media, right-wing think tanks and policy institutes appear to be unlimited.

Paul Krugman, again, offers an example regarding how the US media system functions

with regard to climate change. Exxon Mobil provides substantial funding to 'scientists' that are climate change deniers. They produce arguments that are not accepted in peer reviewed journals and do not influence scientific opinion, which is overwhelmingly convinced that climate change is real and that it is caused by human activities. Krugman notes a study in *Science*, that found that all 928 papers on the subject published in scientific journals were within this consensus view.

The climate change skeptics produce a variety of 'findings' that cast doubt on the view that climate change is real and/or caused by human activities, and "the fake research works for its sponsors, partly because it gets picked up by right-wing pundits, but mainly because it plays perfectly into the he-said-she-said conventions of 'balanced' journalism. A 2003 study of reporting on global warming in major newspapers found that a majority of reports gave the skeptics – a few dozen people, many if not most receiving direct or indirect financial support from Exxon Mobil – roughly the same amount of attention as the scientific consensus, supported by independent researchers."³

Republican opinion leaders and many of their strongest supporters watch and listen primarily to right wing news sources, and perhaps selectively read 'balanced' news from a pre-established perspective. Thus climate change in the United States is still, in some circles, seen as a 'controversial' idea despite an *overwhelming* scientific consensus to the contrary. Government in the United States is thus substantially out of touch with both world opinion and scientific fact. This is, of course, astonishing, given that the United States is the most international of nations in the economic sense and the most scientifically advanced nation in the world.

Even though America's electorate is deeply divided on both climate change and energy transition, the government is monolithic

in its views, views that are out of step with the rest of the world. When asked: "Do you think it's been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the earth is warming because of man-made pollution?", 77% of Republican leaders (Senators, Congressmen and others of comparable influence) said "No", while 98% of a similar group of Democratic leaders said "Yes."⁴ In contrast, 85% of American citizens believe that climate warming is real.

The overwhelming power of money and media in American politics is a genuine threat to the viability of effective democracy. The increasing imbalance in social equity in the United States and the increasing power of concentrated wealth in American political life undermines American democracy and also threatens to undermine the possibility of effective global governance at a time when it is most necessary.

American Democracy and Global Governance

An effective system of global governance must go in precisely the opposite direction from that taken by the Bush administration. Greater cooperation on climate change and energy transition is the *sine qua non* of global governance in the 21st century. So too is an International Criminal Court, not to mention the Geneva Conventions and the Convention on Torture, as well as restraints on unilateral military action. We cannot, however, be at all sure what direction the United States will take on these issues in the years ahead.

Is it not time, then, for much of the rest of the world to consider the implications of that reality and ask: is there a viable alternative to waiting for the United States to come to its senses?

One possibility might be called a 'coalition of the unwilling' – a grouping of nations committed to working toward effective long-term global action regarding peak oil, climate change, terrorism, increasing socio-economic



inequality, and unilateralism. There is no more urgent task, and an overwhelming majority of people worldwide understand this to be the case.

The leadership for this coalition must come from Europe. Europe alone, outside the United States, has the technological capacity and the will to deal with climate change and peak oil. Europe has experienced the challenges of creating and building federalist governance structures for a community of nations. Europe is committed to the international rule of law and multilateralism. Europe has experienced modern warfare within its borders and has suffered terrorist attacks. Europe is now deeply democratic and many European nations have a commitment to global governance and social equity.

Recent and imminent political events in Europe suggest that the possibility of a more assertive global leadership is increasing. Particularly notable to a non-European are the recent elections in Spain and Italy, and the political change that may be possible in Great Britain on the stepping down of Tony Blair. Should Europe have the courage and sense of unity to be more collectively assertive, other nations such as my own (Canada) may find the tenacity to join in renewed commitments to the United

Nations, the Kyoto process and the Geneva Conventions and to any new initiatives that are forthcoming.

One would assume that support might come from most or all of Latin America, and perhaps from Canada and Japan, even though their economies depend like no others on the United States. Other nations might follow once their governments or electorates sense that they are out of step with the future.

There is no clear or easy path ahead here. While my nation, Canada, has a particular problem in regard to climate change (rapid development of the oil sands in Alberta produces twice as much carbon dioxide per barrel of oil, and our conventional oil is running down), Canada prides itself on being deeply committed to internationalism and multilateralism.

I am convinced that Canada and many other nations would join with any European initiative to create an alternative to unilateralism and to advance global governance. The United States itself may ultimately come to see the wisdom of that path, but it is far more likely to see it clearly if other nations first proceed some distance along it.

¹Paul Krugman, "Graduates versus Oligarchs" in *The New York Times*, February 27, 2007.

²Georgia driver's license or a card only available from places not easy to get to without a car. Felons 20% of African-American males.

³Paul Krugman, "Enemy of the Planet", in *The New York Times*, April 17, 2006.

⁴"Inside Washington: Congressional Insiders Poll", in *National Journal*, April 1, 2006, pp. 5-6.



Strong European Political Parties for a Democratic EU

Jo Leinen

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Rome-Treaty, the process of European Integration is in danger to come to a halt. Citizens, media, academics and politicians alike, criticize the democratic deficit. However, the ratification of the European Constitution, which would have lessened this deficit, is blocked. The referenda in France and the Netherlands as well as the missing public debate on the Future of Europe have shown that the EU is still lacking the democratic infrastructure to conduct a truly pan-European debate. A key role in providing this infrastructure is to be played by European political parties.

One of the main reasons for the EU's democratic deficit is the missing link between the European institutions and the citizens. On the national level the link between citizens and decision makers as well as the link between political debate and political decisions is provided by political parties. European political parties as a tie between the Union's citizens and EU policies are hardly developed. Only recently, European political parties have emerged and begun to improve the debate about the challenges for Europe.

European democracy needs strong European political parties

The political system of the Union does not yet stimulate sufficiently pan-European debates. Although the European Parliament, the Commission and some NGO-umbrellas can be seen as supranational actors, the view of citizens on European issues still follows merely the positions of national politicians. National governments use "Brussels" as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions, although the same

governments are responsible for these very decisions in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Combined with the often anti-European reporting in the purely national tabloid media, this leads to a rising gap between the citizens and the European decision makers. Debates in which the benefits and costs of political decisions on the EU level are discussed, hardly take place outside Brussels.

In federal systems such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, political parties play an important role in linking national, regional and local levels. Party members from the different levels are involved in party decisions and follow the ideological line of the party. On the European level such link is missing. The parties have hardly succeeded in agreeing on a clear overarching political line, nor is the loyalty to the European party position very strong. Not only do leaders of the national parties hesitate to follow a European party line. Also positions of European parliamentarians, government representatives in the Council and Commissioners from the same party often differ fundamentally.

Obstacles to strong European political parties

One of the reasons for European parties being weak is that they cannot yet fulfil their tasks. On the national level, parties have clearly defined functions: the elaboration of a political program for the future government, the recruitment of political personnel and the feedback of legislative decisions to the voters. In the EU, these functions have been partly taken over by other institutions.

The political programme for the EU is drawn

up by the European Parliament, the European Council and the Commission. While the work of the Parliament is dependent on the positions of the strongest party groups, the European Council and the Commission are made up of members of all big parties. Decisions on the political program in the latter two institutions are taken by unanimity, not allowing any of the parties to establish a high political profile. Furthermore the governments in the European Council are supposed to take decisions in the interest of the entire country, not only their voters. The contrary applies to the Commission, whose members are supposed to act in the interest of the entire Union, but have therefore similar difficulties to follow a party line. European parties have had little influence on shaping the political program of the Union until today.

Also on choosing the future leadership of the Union, European political parties have had so far not much influence. Indeed the party membership of the candidate matters, which is shown by the fact that after the election victory of the conservatives in 2004, Manuel Barroso, a conservative politician, was made President of the Commission and not the better qualified but liberal Guy Verhofstadt. But the nomination of the candidates is not done by the standing bodies of the European parties, but by all EU heads of state and government. Furthermore the Commission Presidents until today had little loyalty to the European parties. As previous Prime Ministers, they have gained their European experience in European Council meetings and are more likely to respect the wishes of member state governments, than those of the European party leaders.

To date, European political parties have not been able to sufficiently connect the European level with the citizens. Contrary to the national parties, European political parties are not made up of individual members. The statute of the European socialist party limits the party membership to national parties. Indeed, the statute of the European people's party allows individual membership. Nevertheless, just as

with the greens and the liberals, individual members account only for a very small percentage of the entire membership. Thus, the European political parties still have to rely on the national structures of the member parties to communicate the European political programme and European politics. However, in the local branches of the national parties, European policy does not yet play an important role. Party members consider the discussion of European issues not as their priority; European decisions seem to be far from the reality of the local work. If the European political parties wish to fulfil their role as link between decisions taken at the European level and citizens at the local level, they have to either build up a direct membership or develop new instruments to reach out also to the local level.

The Party of European Socialists has established a new tool called "PES @ctivists". These "activists" are not individual members of the party, but function as ambassadors of the European party at the local level and participate in pan-European political discussions on a wide range of topics. This could serve as a role model also for other parties.

The future of European political parties

Although more than fifty years of European integration had to pass before European parties gained their independence, a lot of progress has been made since the regulation on the financing of European parties has been passed in 2003. Before European parties can play the same strong role in European democracy, which they play at the national level, still many reforms of the structures of the EU as well as of the running of the parties need to be done.

A first prerequisite for stronger European political parties is the continuing constitutionalisation of the European Union. The institutional reforms foreseen by the European Constitution will bring Europe closer to a full democratic design: with their votes in the European elections the citizens will not only decide on the political programme of the European Union, but also influence the

choice of the political leadership. Furthermore the European Constitution strengthens the European Parliament by introducing the co-decision procedure as the rule for European legislation, and by only allowing for a limited number of exceptions. Also on budgetary decisions the parliament will be strengthened. On the other hand, the President of the European Commission will be elected by the European Parliament and the Commissioners will need approval of the Parliament, once the European Constitution enters into force.

Besides institutional reforms, there is also the need for more specific regulations on the functioning of European political parties. These need to be laid down in a truly European statute for European political parties. On May 23rd, 2006 the European Parliament has adopted a resolution stressing the need for such a statute.¹ It needs to establish the rights and obligations of European political parties and lay down rules on their internal functioning, such as guidelines for the democratic nature of parties (regular elections and nomination of candidates). To date, the European political parties are registered as associations, mostly under Belgium law. One of the aims of establishing a European statute is to enable European political parties to obtain a genuine European legal personality. This would give them the same obligations and rights in all member states. Even if the participation of European political parties in European electoral campaigns, referenda and other campaigns seems to be self-evident, this is not clearly foreseen by the *acquis communautaire*. The statute needs to bring clarity in this perspective and needs to allow European political parties to do their work.

Experiences in some member states have shown that political foundations can be an important element of the democratic infrastructure. They provide political education by organising seminars, conferences and directly supporting students through grants. Since political

foundations are close to the respective political families but independent from them, they provide an important space for politicians and academics to brainstorm on upcoming political challenges, without having to be accountable for their statements in front of political bodies. Thus they represent important think tanks for the political parties. In order to develop European democracy, political foundations also need to be developed at the European level. They can play a leading role in organising Europe-wide political discourses.

Also the role of political youth organisations must be strengthened. They play an important role in the formation and education of future political leaders in Europe. The already existing youth party organisations arrange numerous activities at the European level, which helps to sensitise future national politicians on the importance of European politics. Steps should be taken to recognise the role European youth organisations play and to ensure sufficient financial support to their activities.

The gap between citizens and the EU institutions must be bridged with the help of European political parties. In their short existence, the ten European parties have matured considerably. However, much needs to be done before the structures of the EU allow for European political parties to play a leading role in the EU political system and before the parties are strong enough to do so. In the near future a statute for European parties needs to be established and the European Constitution needs to be ratified. Also, the parties need to implement brave reforms which will enable them to adopt strong European manifestoes, decide on top candidates for elections and provide a link between citizens' interests and European decisions. The first results of these reforms need to come into effect before the next European elections in June 2009, in order to improve the voters' participation and therefore reduce the democratic deficit.

¹European Parliament resolution on European political parties, (A6-0042/2006), 23.03.2006, rapporteur Jo Leinen.



Four Routes to the New Europe

Possible solutions to the problem of the Constitutional Treaty

Richard Laming

The No votes in the two referendums in France and the Netherlands brought the process of ratification of the European constitutional treaty to a sudden halt. Never before had a treaty failed in two member states, two of the founding member states at that. This was an unprecedented setback.

The European Council called for a “period of reflection”, as time to take stock, and think what to do next. That period has produced several plans and proposals regarding what to do next. This paper sorts through the different ideas, to describe what they have in common and also to look at how they differ. There are four basic analyses upon which the different plans are based.

1. Abandon institutional reform, and focus on policy delivery instead

The immediate reaction in a number of political quarters to the French and Dutch No votes was to call for the abandonment of the treaty process altogether. For some politicians, that remains the case. Instead, they call for the European Union to focus on policy delivery. Become better at doing the things that Europeans want, they say, rather than thinking about institutional reform.

There are some improvements to the institutions which can be made without amending the treaties, but more is, on this view, neither necessary nor desirable. For example, national parliaments can be informed about forthcoming European legislative proposals, and more legislative sessions of the Council of Ministers can be

held in public. These innovations are already taking place, and are largely uncontroversial. The argument put forward is that these moves are an alternative to more far-reaching reform rather than a prelude to it.

There are two problems with this option. First, one of the reasons why the EU is not as good at delivering policy outcomes as we would like is precisely because the institutions are not reformed. For example, if Europeans want the EU to have a stronger voice in the world, they will be left waiting in vain until the methods for making and expressing foreign policy are improved. If Europeans want their fundamental rights respected by the European institutions, then somehow the EU has to become subject to the same human rights guarantees that apply to the member states. If Europeans want the EU budget spent more efficiently and accountably, the directly-elected European Parliament has to have more control over it, particularly over the 40 per cent or so that is spent on agriculture.

Secondly, it is not clear that a choice has to be made between better delivery and institutional reform. Surely it is possible that better policies and better institutions can be developed side-by-side, rather than one before the other. Are the European leaders who say this choice is necessary admitting that they cannot think about more than one thing at a time? As the Scottish Labour MP James Maxton once said, “If you can’t ride two horses at once, you shouldn’t be in the bloody circus”.

2. Ask the French and Dutch to think again

The second reaction at the time of the French and Dutch No votes was that those two countries should be asked to think again. The text of the constitutional treaty represented the European political consensus, supported by 27 EU national governments, as well as by most representatives from the European Parliament and national parliaments, including both government and opposition political parties. This consensus should not be abandoned lightly. The text has now been ratified in 16 out of the 25 member states, and the popular vote in referendums where they have been held is 26.7 million Yes votes against 22.7 million No.

If France and the Netherlands are the countries out of step, then the onus is on them to come back into line. There is a precedent for this. After the Danish No vote on the Maastricht treaty and the Irish No to Nice, a second referendum was held in each country a year later. That gave the voters a chance to rethink: did they want their country to be the one to drop out of the EU? In each case, after more debate and discussion, the No vote was succeeded by a Yes and the treaty was finally ratified.

This time, though, the prospects for repeat referendums in France and the Netherlands look rather bleak. This is for three reasons.

The first is that, while France and the Netherlands are the only two countries to have voted No, it might be correct to say that they are the only two that have voted No so far. There are eight countries where ratification has barely commenced, and in perhaps four or five of them, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden and the UK, ratification would be difficult. In this respect, the experience of the Maastricht and Nice treaties is not a precedent. The case then was that Denmark and then Ireland were isolated in their non-ratification, with unknowable

consequences if they remained that way. It is not possible to argue that this is true of France and the Netherlands while so many other member states remain to ratify: those other member states on the other hand will not take any risks with their relationship with the EU until they are sure it is worth it.

Secondly, it is difficult to try to reverse the results of the French and Dutch referendums without undermining the whole concept of popular referendums. Cynics already point to the Danish and Irish experience to say that, when it comes to referendums on European treaties, Yes means Yes but also No means Yes. That is not really democracy, they say. To go straight back to the French and Dutch voters, as though they were re-sitting an exam they had failed, would serve to confirm that view.

Thirdly, any repeat of the referendums in France and the Netherlands would require the support of the French and Dutch governments (although the first Dutch referendum was actually called by the parliament, not the government). There is no sign from any prominent political figure in either country that they are willing to do this. They would prefer to say that they are listening to their own voters and correspondingly adopting a new approach.

3. Rewrite the text of the treaty

The main aspect of this new approach is to look again at the text of the constitutional treaty itself. The original text contained 448 articles in four parts, stretching over 230 pages. It was a far cry from the text that Jack Straw, British foreign minister at the time, had hoped would fit in his jacket pocket.

To make things more complicated, 322 of those articles, making up part III of the treaty on individual policies, were in large part not even new. They were restatements of the previous position, and so would remain in force even if the treaty were not ratified. For

example, Article III-227 on the objectives of the common agricultural policy is identical to Article 39 of the original Treaty of Rome.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that so many conflicting and contradictory claims were made about the constitutional treaty and what it would and would not do. Changes to the text might simplify things for the voters and also pacify some of the critics.

Several different proposals have been made along these lines. Jo Leinen MEP, chair of the European Parliament's constitutional affairs committee, has suggested that the text should be slimmed down by removing all those parts relating to policy areas which are not new. Ratification debates would then focus on the institutional issues and policy changes only.

Andrew Duff MEP, also a member of the constitutional affairs committee, suggests adding new articles on five areas – the economic governance of the union; Europe's social model; sustainable development and climate change policy; enlargement policy; and the reform of the EU's finances – to deal with the areas of difficulty and uncertainty that led people to vote No.

Both of these proposals are intended to preserve as far as possible the existing text of the treaty. The text embodies a careful balance between the different institutions and also between the different member states. It was agreed as a package, requiring compromise on all sides. To choose some elements and not others will upset this balance and, in practice, might actually prove impossible to get agreed. Any member state that thinks it is disadvantaged by the new deal can simply block it.

A more far-reaching approach to rewriting the treaty has been put forward by Nicolas

Sarkozy, French interior minister and likely candidate for the French presidency in the spring. He has suggested a "mini-Treaty", stripping out quite a lot of the former constitutional treaty text, but retaining some of the most important institutional changes. Other proposals being floated are more restricted still. A package of measures drawn from the constitutional treaty to deal with foreign policy, for example, has been suggested (a mini-mini-Treaty, it has been called).

Sarkozy is careful, in his proposal, to point out that the mini-Treaty would not replace the constitution, but rather postpone it. The mini-Treaty could be agreed before the next European elections, and the constitutional process would recommence afterwards. He is also careful to say that the mini-Treaty could be ratified by parliaments and would not therefore trigger another round of referendums. If the Leinen or Duff proposals would be easier to negotiate, the Sarkozy proposal, he believes, would be easier to ratify.

4. Rethink the methods for ratification and entry into force

This is the last of the approaches to be thought about in any rescue plan for the European Union. Up until now, it has not really attracted much attention, but it should from now on.

The current principle is that each amendment to the treaties must be agreed by all member states and ratified by all. This is true even when it does not apply to all. The creation of the single currency, for example, did not apply to the United Kingdom and Denmark, but they were still required to ratify its creation on behalf of the other 10 member states.

The picture would be different if a European initiative were to be taken outside the

current institutions. The Schengen group, for example, was set up separately from the then EU treaties by a smaller group of just five member states, and only incorporated into the EU treaties later. However, given that a central purpose of the constitutional treaty is to reform the existing EU institutions, this is not an option open this time.

Each national government having agreed the new treaty, it then has to ratify the treaty according to its own national law. In some countries, e.g. Ireland, this must be by referendum. In other countries, e.g. Germany, this must be by parliament alone. In a third group of countries, e.g. the UK or France, the formal ratification will be by parliament but it can be made conditional on a successful referendum, thus giving the referendum a political but not direct legal significance.

The effect of this, say its critics, is to create a series of national debates on the future of Europe, rather than a single European debate on the future of Europe. National debates might be appropriate when a country is considering whether or not to join the EU, but once it is a member those national debates make no sense. The treaty, whatever it might say, was the result of a collective negotiation and can only be understood as such during ratification.

The Union of European Federalists (UEF) has therefore proposed that ratification of the new treaty should be by means of a European referendum, held everywhere in the EU on the same day (at the same time as the next European elections). This would tackle the problem identified by Nicolas Sarkozy but from the opposite direction. He fears that the existing text cannot be ratified by the current method, and would therefore change the text: the UEF would change the method.

In some member states, there is a constitutional prohibition on the holding of

referendums. There are two possible means of dealing with this. The first is to treat the referendum result as consultative, i.e. to give it political rather than legal significance, on the French model. The second would be to start with a commitment by those member states that can hold referendums, that they should all do so on the same day, and then see the effects that this might have on the others. When direct elections to the European Parliament were first proposed, the proposal was adopted by only seven of the then nine member states, the UK and Denmark declining to take part. When those two member states realised subsequently that their own citizens would visibly be excluded from a democratic decision about the future of Europe, they reversed their stance and followed the first seven. In June 1979, elections were held in all nine countries at the same time. These were the first ever supranational elections; perhaps the EU will see the first ever supranational referendum thirty years later.

The last consideration in plotting a route to the new Europe is actually the point at which this article started: what happens if a member state votes No. It happened in France and the Netherlands last time; it could happen anywhere next time. This possibility was considered during the negotiations over the constitutional treaty, but no decision was reached as to what to do. Declaration 30 recorded only that, should this arise, "the matter will be referred to the European Council".

This recognises the potential problem, but falls short of proposing a solution. Here again, the UEF has a suggestion. Assuming there is a double majority of member states and citizens voting in favour, the constitution should come into force in those member states that have voted Yes, even if there are other member states that have voted No. It implies that the text of the treaty is structured



in such a way as to make this possible, and it poses all kinds of legal and technical difficulties. If the alternative, though, is stalemate or expulsion, then the solution to these difficulties might well prove attractive.

Conclusion

The German government, holding the presidency of the European Council for the first six months of 2007, has said that it intends to restart the debate about the future of the constitutional treaty. The four factors outlined above will all have to be discussed, and any likely solution is going to include elements of all four of them. Certainly it will be necessary to improve the way that the EU deals with business within the terms of the current treaties. Greater openness and transparency will help build confidence in values, principles and practice of European integration.

Secondly, there will be French and Dutch politicians and campaigners who are going to have to go back and recommend the approval of a new text. The French and Dutch No votes last year did not settle the issue,

whatever some of the No campaigners at the time might have thought or hoped.

Thirdly, there will have to be some changes to the text. It would be absurd to go back to the French and the Dutch as though nothing had happened; it would also mean missing the opportunity to improve and clarify the proposal.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the member states need to recognise that ratification is not a formality. National governments are no longer entitled to assume that the voters will simply do their bidding. The citizens are now a factor in European politics in their own right.

Whatever approach is adopted, furthermore, it is necessary for each country to realise that its own participation in the European Union is a matter of importance for all the others. Whatever decisions European countries and European citizens take about the future of Europe, they have to take those decisions together.



The Case for a Pacific Islands Union

Chris Hamer

The road towards world federation is likely to involve, as a first stage, the formation of regional unions or federations in various parts of the globe. The European Union has already shown the way, and a number of other regional associations are attempting to follow the European example. In this article we argue the case for a Pacific Union, based on the present Pacific Islands Forum.

Who is in the Pacific Islands Forum, and what does it do? The heads of government of the Pacific Islands Forum hold an annual meeting to discuss matters of common interest in the region. There are currently sixteen members, consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Palau, and Niue. There is enormous variation in size and resources between them, ranging from Australia with 20 million people to tiny Niue with only 1,700 inhabitants. Most of the smaller island nations were formerly European colonies, and afterwards many of them were protectorates, for a time, of either New Zealand or Australia. Hence, New Zealand and Australia have assumed a responsibility to promote stability and economic development in the region. The United States has been happy to allow Australia to act as "deputy sheriff" during several recent crises in the region, such as the upheavals in Solomon Islands and East Timor.

The main focus of the Forum hitherto has been on trade and economic issues, such as regional air and shipping services, and the fisheries in the surrounding seas. The day-to-day activities

are carried out by the Forum Secretariat based in Suva, Fiji, with some 68 staff members circa 2005. The Secretary-General is Greg Urwin from Australia. The annual budget was then about A\$10 million, of which Australia and New Zealand contributed around \$4 million each. The main aims of the Secretariat are to provide economic and political policy advice to the members of the Forum.

Recognizing the important issues of security and governance facing the region, the Forum leaders in 2003 commissioned a review of the Forum and its operations by an Eminent Persons' Group, led by ex-Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan of New Guinea. This review emphasized the concept of the 'Pacific Way': "Leaders believe the Pacific can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures and traditions are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and its defence and promotion of human rights".

The review called for a new 'Pacific Plan' for the future development of the Forum. It asked the leaders "to consider regional integration that runs deeper than that established already under regional trade arrangements".

Subsequently, a draft Pacific Plan was drawn up containing short term, medium-term and long-term goals over a ten-year time span. Included

among the longer-term elements were "Pacific-wide economic integration covering all areas", "enlargement of the annual Presiding Officer's Conference into a Forum Parliamentary Assembly", and "development of a regional judicial mechanism to deal with important legal issues...". So far, only the shorter-term functional goals have been approved by the Forum leaders.

There is a compelling case for greater integration in the Pacific region. For the smaller island nations, it is a necessity if they are to aspire to a modern lifestyle, as opposed to their traditional subsistence way of life based upon fishing and growing copra. They do not have the population or resources to support tertiary or technical education facilities of their own, or modern hospital facilities, or an elaborate industrial infrastructure. The usual problems of underdeveloped nations are all endemic: poverty, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, lack of education and underemployment. To deal with all of these problems, they must rely upon cooperation with their larger neighbours. Even in some of the larger islands such as Solomon Islands, Fiji or Papua New Guinea, there is chronic unrest and unstable governance. Papua New Guinea is said to be in imminent danger of becoming a "failed state".

A regional organization could do much to help overcome these problems. Regional universities and technical colleges, regional hospitals, and regional industrial and commercial enterprises are all required. Some such institutions already exist, such as the University of the South Pacific based in Fiji; but much more remains to be done.

The Forum could also do much to improve stability and good governance in the region. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2004 showed what can be done. After the Forum approved intervention there, a mixed force of soldiers and police drawn from the Forum members was successful in stopping

the violence there. The renewed riots in Honiara this year have shown, however, that the effort needs to be sustained over a long period of time to cure problems of this sort.

The leaders of the Forum nations already meet once a year to coordinate policy. Funds should be provided to the Secretariat to underwrite the meetings of a 'Council of Ministers' as well, or in other words, regular meetings of Ministers from the Forum countries to set policy in specific areas, after the pattern of the European Council of Ministers. This would have to be approved by the Forum leaders, of course.

For example, Forestry Ministers from the Melanesian nations, plus Australia and New Zealand, could meet to coordinate action on the logging industry, one of the mainstays of the island economies. It is well known that the logging industry in the Islands faces enormous problems of corruption, illegal logging, and unsustainable rates of harvesting. Contracts are often let way below market prices, while a recent report estimates that three out of four logs harvested in New Guinea are taken illegally; and the rainforests of the Solomon Islands will all be gone in five or six years at the current rate. The Forestry Ministers could agree on measures such as the establishment of a common marketing authority for forestry products to ensure that market prices are achieved, thus boosting income by many millions of dollars, and checking corruption in the industry. They might also establish a common regulatory authority, using technical resources such as satellite data from Australia plus on-site patrols to monitor and prevent illegal logging, ensure that logged areas are properly replanted, and cut back harvesting to sustainable levels.

Other possible measures might include:

- Establishment of a Development Bank for the Pacific, to act as a focus for aid and economic development in the region. The model here is the Grameen Bank, which provides 'microcredit' loans to help get household

productive enterprises off the ground in Bangladesh and elsewhere, which has apparently been very successful.

- Establishment of common regulatory and marketing authorities for the fishing industry. This is another mainstay industry for the islands, and the problems here mirror those of the logging industry, including the exhaustion of fish stocks and illegal poaching by international operators. Again, Australian aid could provide resources for surveillance and control of the Maritime Exclusive Economic Zones of the islands, to set up a Pacific Islands Maritime Patrol to combat illegal fishing, piracy, drug smuggling and similar problems in the region. This is already happening to some extent, but no doubt more can be done.
- The building of a new Technical College for the region is an excellent idea. Another measure might be the establishment of a regional educational authority to monitor educational standards and promote better education in the region. Providing distance education would be another obvious beneficial role.
- *Regional security is a sensitive question which goes to core issues of national sovereignty, and the Pacific Plan is notably bare of long-term aims in this section. We have already argued, however, that it would only be sensible to look for the creation of a regional Maritime Patrol.*
- Another obvious thought would be the creation of a land-based security force, perhaps a Pacific Islands Regiment, to carry out peacekeeping duties both within and outside the region, and if necessary to intervene in "extra-constitutional crises" in the region. Interventions by such a force would carry much greater legitimacy than a similar intervention by (say) Australian or New Zealand forces, which are always subject to charges of paternalism or neo-colonialism. It could also provide a significant source of employment for some of the smaller islands.

For Australia and New Zealand, the arguments for integration are equally compelling. Both

countries have accepted a responsibility for promoting stability and development in the region, but the era of colonialism and gunboat diplomacy is long gone, and they need to be careful to avoid the charge of paternalism. They need to engage with the other nations in the region as partners and collaborators, and the best way of doing that is through a regional community.

In order to promote the common good of the island states in the region, it has been generally recognized that political and economic integration between the Forum nations should be strengthened. We would argue that in the longer term, the Forum should be developed into a full-blown Pacific Union, a (very much smaller) cousin of the European Union. The draft Plan already includes prototype versions of two of the missing elements of such a Union, namely a Court and a Parliamentary Assembly.

This may seem a heavy load to put on what is now quite a small organization. The great advantage of the Pacific Plan is that it is not set in stone, and the member states will be free to pick and choose, and implement the various measures if and when it suits them. The evolution of the Union is likely to be a gradual process, as in the European case, involving a succession of treaties between the member states. It is likely to take a good deal longer than the ten-year timeframe of the initial Plan; but it is always valuable to outline the ultimate objectives from the start.

The attitude of the Australian and New Zealand governments is that it must be for the Pacific Islands themselves to determine the costs and benefits of the Plan, and they are taking something of a back seat in its development. New mechanisms are needed to allow for communal discussion and decision-making, and to increase stability and good governance in the region. A Pacific Union is the obvious answer.

Australia and New Zealand would have

to assess how deeply they would commit themselves to such a Union. It could provide an ideal environment, relatively benign and non-threatening, for “practising the art” of regional integration, in preparation for possible wider integration in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. It could also provide an ideal platform for pursuing a Closer Economic Relationship between the two countries themselves, without surrendering the identity of either. It will take

more time for the answers to these questions to emerge.

In any case, the Forum is already firmly launched on a path towards greater integration. If wisely managed, this course will indeed lead to a Pacific region “of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives”.



Internal Developments and Foreign Policy Perspectives of Ukraine and Belarus

A European View

Heinz Timmermann

During the first phase following the independence of Ukraine and Belarus in 1991, the EU largely neglected its relationship with both countries. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the EU's primary focus was on its enlargement to east and central Europe. Alongside this, and in order to strengthen its ability to act, the EU needed to place its main emphasis on the *deepening* of integration. Furthermore, to a certain extent the EU gave priority to developing privileged relations with the new Russia. Right up to the mid-nineties Ukraine and Belarus were considered to be primarily within Moscow's and the CIS's sphere of influence.

Since then the situation has fundamentally changed. With the EU's eastward expansion, Ukraine and Belarus have become direct neighbours of the Union, moreover neighbours who affect developments in the EU more than before. Because of this new situation, and not least because of pressure from the new members, particularly Poland and the Baltic States, the EU has developed the concept of a "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP), currently for Ukraine, but potentially also for Belarus once it has become more democratic. In addition, Ukraine's democratic breakthrough has acted as a fresh stimulus for this policy. ENP does not include the prospect of membership, but in principle it certainly does not exclude it.

This policy does not ignore Moscow's interests, nor is it subservient to them. Contrary to what is assumed in Russia, the EU is not aiming to absorb Ukraine and Belarus on the pattern of a zero-sum game. The EU's growing influence is

based not on striving for geographic expansion but on the *attractiveness of its social system*. In fact, the EU has a strong interest in having partners on its eastern flank which are politically stable, economically prosperous and with constitutions following the rule of law. The EU is not, like the USA, primarily aiming at a geo-strategically motivated "regime-change"; nor is it, like Russia, striving to safeguard a status quo rooted in its own geopolitical ambitions and principally supporting regimes loyal to its own system. In the EU's view, states operating internally and externally on the principle of *self-determination* should, at least for the near future, rather function as a bridge between the EU and Russia and be open towards both West and East.

Ukraine

1. The non-violent rise of democracy in Ukraine has produced a qualitative change from the semi-autocratic Kuchma system. For the first time in the CIS, a presidential constitution has successfully been converted into a parliamentary-presidential constitution. Even after Yanukovich's comeback, the new situation has in essence been accepted by all political camps. The presidential elections of December 2004 and the parliamentary elections of March 2006 were in general free and fair. The great majority of political forces in a consolidated pluralism of parties have shown their willingness in principle to compromise, to accept procedures of decision-making which are binding on all parties involved, and also to accept as norms the separation of powers and the rule of law, including the balance of power between the president and the parliament. Public criticism in the form of free mass media

and civil engagement is guaranteed.

Above all, there is the commitment to the integrity of the Ukrainian state and to national reconciliation, as set out in the Pact for national unity ("Universal") of August 2006. Yushchenko, the hero of the orange revolution, preferred to aim at a compromise and stability-oriented grand coalition with his former opponent Yanukovich rather than face the dissolution of the parliament which would have been in accordance with the constitution but might have intensified the conflict between the eastern and western parts of the country. Moreover, as the leader of the coalition partner which emerged as the strongest party in free elections, Yanukovich adopted a policy of consolidation of the *whole nation*, thus ridding himself of his past image as a one-sided Moscow-backed politician representing only the Eastern parts of the country.

2. However, it is still too early to claim that a Ukrainian democracy based on European basic values is now fully in place. The reasons are in particular that these values have only shallow roots in the population. There is no general agreement on which policies to pursue regarding economic and social transformation and modernization of the country, nor on the key question of eventually joining NATO. Signs of decay are appearing in Yushchenko's party "Our Ukraine", which filled important ministries in the coalition, yet was formally not part of it – and, indeed, it even shifted later into the opposition. Last but not least there are the problems caused by radical personal ambitions, not least on the part of Yuliya Tymoshenko and her refusal to support the Pact of national unity. Nevertheless, the coalition offers a chance to guide the country along the European path via a period of transition: not only verbally as under Kuchma, but by active measures agreed in the pact of unity.

3. Indeed, the coalition gives priority to relations with the European Union, thus stressing its

willingness to apply for full membership while continuing its strategic partnership with Russia, which is also appreciated by the EU. The goal of full membership is enshrined in both the pact of unity and the coalition agreement. So the *symmetric* multi-vector policy of the Kuchma era which was characterized by unpredictable manoeuvres between Brussels and Moscow, is now being replaced by an *asymmetric* multi-vector policy with its central focus on the EU. At the same time, the enthusiasm in Kiev about the possibility of early admittance to the EU has given way to more a realistic approach based on the realization that an essential precondition for the integration of Ukraine within the EU is the country's willingness and ability to enter into a sustainable phase of reforms by its *own* efforts. This means enhancing its ability to make reasonable use of EU aid and securing the gradual adoption of EU law (the *acquis communautaire*) in order to enjoy, in the long run, the famous four freedoms.

In its roadmap to Europe, the Kiev leadership has set the goal of having the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (APC) replaced after execution of the action plan plus of February 2005 by an Association Agreement to be concluded by 2008. This should pave the way to full EU membership in 10 to 15 years. The impulse for such an approach will be by such common actions as Ukrainian participation in crisis management under EU leadership in the context of CFSP/ESDP and joint monitoring of the border between Ukraine and the Transdnestr Republic. On the other hand, the coalition will probably reduce its activities in regional organizations such as the "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM" and the "Community of Democratic Choice" which are inspired by the USA and take a critical attitude towards Moscow.

4. From abroad Ukraine is no longer perceived as the western part of the post-Soviet area, but as an independent member of the international community of nations. The EU, after periods

of Ukraine-fatigue and subsequent Ukraine-enthusiasm, has entered into a new active phase in its relations with Kiev, offering a partnership for modernization which exceeds the existing APC. In the economic field Brussels has acknowledged Ukraine as a market economy, advocates the country's application for WTO membership and supports the subsequent formation of a free trade zone. This will enhance the country's attraction for western investors, while offering chances for exports to the EU to those industrial groups in eastern Ukraine which so far have been considered opponents of the reformers. The envisaged energy dialogue will cover agreements on safeguarding supplies and transit – including Russia – and also cooperation in the technology of modernizing the Ukrainian gas pipeline networks. Other fields of cooperation in which EU members have rich experience and expertise are energy saving, increasing energy efficiency and the use of regenerative energy. Modernization of transport infrastructures and an improvement in the security standards relating to accident-prone coal mines, predominantly in Eastern Ukraine, should help to promote equality of living standards in the whole country.

5. Finally, Brussels' message that Ukraine should combine its approach to Europe with good relations with Russia should not be forgotten. This obviously refers to the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, a policy which is being actively pursued by the Yushchenko camp but is opposed by Yanukovich supporters. In contrast to the geo-strategically driven USA policy, a large majority of EU member states feel sceptical about an early admission of Ukraine to NATO, especially as popular support stands at roughly 20 per cent, which is rather low. In Moscow's view, such a step would be the most serious anti-Russian decision to be made in the post-Soviet area. It must be presumed that the early admission of Ukraine to NATO would have extremely negative regional consequences, affecting the whole spectrum of Ukrainian-Russian

relations and also the EU-Russia relationship. However, this would not prevent the coalition from combining its approach to the EU with a policy of backing away from deeper integration in the quadripartite unified economic space envisaged by, and de facto dominated by, Moscow. The best way for Russia to avoid the risk of loosening ties with Kiev would be to strengthen its *own* relations with the EU, for instance by gradually implementing the road maps for the four common spaces.

Belarus

1. In the context of transformation in Eastern Europe, Belarus is a special case. The Lukashenko regime is an *antimodel* in the region and is characterized by the restoration of essential elements of the Soviet system: a rigidly repressive political system, a state-dominated economic order, a selective Soviet ideology and specific methods to prevent any attempt at independent political, economic, social or cultural expression. All aspects of life are determined by Lukashenko's ambitions to secure his personal power by largely privatising the state power.

2. Even without repression and manipulation, Lukashenko would have won the presidential elections of March 2006 with an absolute majority. The president owes his popularity in the first place to economic and social stability which creates political stability. This is, however, a *subsidized* stability, which for the most part is due to cheap energy supplies from Russia. Therefore, securing stability could become difficult now that Moscow, in the recent sharp controversy with Minsk, has doubled the gas price with prospective step-by-step increases to market-prices by 2011. Additionally, Russia will stop deliveries of cheap oil and take either high taxes for its oil exports to Belarus or participate 85-15 in the profits from oil products re-exported to the West by Belarus at market prices. Russia is certainly not interested in incorporating Belarus nor in destabilizing the country's political system, which eventually might result in a democratic

upheaval. Its strategy is aimed at actual political and economic *dominance* in Belarus, while the country formally keeps its independence. In this context, after Minsk's long and strong resistance, Moscow will now gradually get up to a 50 per cent stake in Belarusian gas-distribution and its gas-transit system Beltransgas, thereby depriving Lukashenko of one of the essential instruments of his power.

3. The EU's ability to influence developments in Belarus is limited, especially since, after the anti-constitutional coup of 1996, Brussels imposed a ban on the regime's top representatives and suspended the ratification of the APC. Nevertheless, the realisation and adjustment of an asymmetric double strategy of dialogue does offer some chances. On the one hand, it permits purposeful *selective* contacts to continue where participation by the Belarusian government is essential: for instance in common border management, soft security problems, safe transit of persons, energy and goods, the OSCE bureau in Minsk, and the activities of foreign foundations. On the other hand, this strategy is guided by the wish to offer solidarity and support to the political opposition, modernizers of the economy and civil society protagonists. In this context, honouring opposition leader Milinkevich with the Sakharov-prize in Strasbourg in November 2006 was a positive signal, as was also the elaboration – similar to the approach in Ukraine – of an EU action plan within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy to enable work on the democratic aspects (the "shadow action plan") to start soon.

4. Although the EU and Russia certainly have a common interest in a stable Belarus, there is very little prospect in *the near future* of a move to democracy on the Ukrainian model.

Despite all the troublemaking, with special regard to energy transit, the Lukashenko regime is still backed by Russia as the main factor of influence. The president's machinery of repression is still functioning and has even been strengthened, and the majority of the population appreciates stability and basic social security. Unlike Ukraine's experience during its period of upheaval, the Belarus opposition lacks a charismatic leader, and is represented neither in parliament, the courts, nor in the economy, and only minimally visible in the mass media.

However, in the *medium-term*, some changes are possible. Increased strengthening of the security authorities and the anti-democratic tightening of the relevant legislation are evidence of the regime's growing nervousness. Among the population, fear of repression is decreasing. Sections of the nomenklatura are frustrated and appear less monolithic. The opposition has demonstrated its ability to gain nationwide attention. The stability of basic securities is endangered by Russian energy price increases. The eastward extension of the EU has intensified the impulses it sends out, so that the younger generations more and more turn their view to Europe.

The future of the region lying between the EU and Russia will be one of the most important factors determining relations between them. The outcome is uncertain, yet an optimistic view is still possible. During the dramatic negotiations in Kiev in November/December 2004 both sides participated in the successful mediation and settlement of the conflict. They showed then that, regardless of underlying diverging values between EU and Russia, and of competition for integration, the possibility existed for all the actors involved to reach an understanding.

Europe Accelerates on Renewable Energies

Renewable energies, especially photovoltaic (a technology that uses solar panels to directly generate electricity from the sun's rays), seem to increasingly constitute a common field of action for European states, too often worryingly divided on energy matters. In spite of the fact that the USA is ahead in this field, as proved by the recent, marvellous innovations in photovoltaic research (Spectrolab-Boeing achieved a new world record in solar-cell efficiency, demonstrating the feasibility of an advanced photovoltaic cell to convert as much as 40.7 percent of the sun's energy into electricity, which could also greatly reduce the production costs of solar panels), it is in Europe that the most relevant and numerous investments are taking place. Largely boosted by the Kyoto Protocol (signed by the European Community as a whole), the EU has long been encouraging both the production and the use of sustainable energy (from the sun, wind, water, biomasses) among individuals, authorities and organisations of all kinds, trying to raise public awareness about these matters.

The latest European initiative in the framework of the *Sustainable Energy Europe Campaign*, which is part of the European Commission's *Intelligent Energy - Europe (2003-2006)* programme, is the *European Union Sustainable Energy Week (EUSEW)*, taking place in Brussels and other European cities between January 29th, 2007, and February 2nd, 2007. It is the first major initiative of this kind promoted by European institutions together with many private and public organizations.

The EUSEW is an important opportunity to address crucial matters such as the investments in ecological innovation, urban transport, local energy-saving programmes and cost-saving actions within the larger European context. As well as various useful informative conferences about the Earth's worsening conditions and its environmental risks, the EUSEW meetings offer some solid managerial and financial reference points for the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources.

These developments are, in turn, the materialization of the *Action Programme for Renewables* contained in the 1997 *White Paper*, another European landmark. The European Commission's *White Paper for a Community Strategy* contains a strategy to double the share of renewable energies in gross domestic energy consumption in the EU by 2010 (from the present 6% to 12%).

Finally, it is worth noting that recent studies, such as Eurobarometer's *Energy Technologies: Knowledge, Perception, Measures*, point out the strategic importance of renewable energies; and other volumes published in 2006, which focus on the problems of the means of transportation and on conversion technologies for generating electricity and heat, urge Europe to proceed in this direction (*l.&r.p.*).

Multilingualism and the European Language Portfolio

A new instrument for citizenship?

Giovanni Cicero Catanese

Profound changes have taken place in the structure of European population as a result of the events occurred since the Second World War. On the one hand there has been a gradual process of political and economic unification of the continent, which has favoured the “internal” movement of its population, and, on the other, Europe has gradually and inexorably become the favoured destination of non-European immigrants. The mass movement of workers and students has little by little underlined the necessity of reaching agreements between the various countries to help evaluate or at least equate the differences between varying levels of education, in order to create the possibility for people to make use, outside of their state of origin once the frontiers have been opened up, of the technical and professional skills they have acquired.

Since 1999, the so-called Bologna Process has been moving in this direction. It stipulates a series of international agreements for the gradual conformation of school curricula in different countries. One of the principal conditions for putting this into practice is linked to the necessity that a European citizen could improve and certify his linguistic competencies in a simple way, in order to be designated as a “multilingual citizen”¹.

At the end of the 1990s, the European Council put together a new instrument, the *European Language Portfolio* (ELP), which was designed to accompany the school careers of European students and which is a decisive step towards the acknowledgement of language skills acquired both at school and through

personal life experiences, within a common framework of reference. The Portfolio is made up of three distinct parts: the *Language Passport*, the *Language Biography* and the *Dossier*. The first part, the *Language Passport*, can be updated by the students according to their personal knowledge of the different languages they speak or study. The evaluation of this knowledge is based on the *European Community Framework of Reference for Languages*, a document that was also issued by the European Council and which defines the different levels of linguistic knowledge. The *Language Biography* includes information on linguistic and cultural experiences acquired both at school and in other informal situations. In this way it is hoped to directly involve the students in the planning, overview and self-evaluation of their learning processes. Finally, all the documentation pertaining to courses, experiences and skills, as described in the *Biography*, is gathered together in the *Dossier*².

The ELP: its purpose and descriptive value

One of the Portfolio’s distinctive features is its descriptive nature. It documents the student’s language education and experiences, although it does not evaluate them. As opposed to the majority of other tests, that are exclusively geared towards measuring the quantity of experiences, the Portfolio embraces a “positive” and “purposeful” philosophy that is geared towards the evaluation of (multi)lingual and intercultural skills which enrich and strengthen the student’s personality. After compiling and re-reading the Portfolio, an activity carried out directly by the students, they are able to observe the evolution of

Comments

their personal learning curve, evaluate it and consider an individual plan for new courses and new strategies.

It is on this basis that what can be defined as the “purposeful” function of the Portfolio comes into play and integrates an individual study plan in a community environment. It may offer a suggestion for initiating a class discussion in order to share the language “inheritance” and experience of each student. In this way it is possible to share different experiences and individual skills in an atmosphere of absolute freedom, avoiding any invasion of privacy. It might be possible to put together a “linguistic map” of the class, for example, and with that information find hitherto undiscovered characteristics that the pupils have in common, that can lead to create ideas for educational games, laboratories and other projects helping to evaluate the multilingual abilities of the class in the classroom itself.

The discovery and recognition of skills which are often hidden or unknown, or which are apparently uninteresting or seen as rather exotic because they are related to distant lands without economic, political, or cultural influence, can create a bond between these different worlds, once it is discovered that they are represented by some students in the classroom.

Although the Portfolio is usually used for children who attend primary school, and are therefore literate, it might also be possible to document language skills and learning abilities starting from nursery school. This might prove useful at the stage when the child will move on to primary school.

An Italian-German experience

A project known as the *Deutsch-Italienische Sprachbildung in einer mehrsprachigen Kindertageseinrichtung und Grundschule* (literally “Italian-German Language Education in a nursery school and in a multilingual

primary school”) has been developed in the German city of Mainz. It is a language-education experiment which, since 2005, has been trying to promote early multilingualism in children, making use of the human and linguistic resources available within a given context³.

The work was undertaken bearing in mind the objectives of the Portfolio, and the direction of each educational project is always geared towards the implementation of its objectives, starting from a careful observation of the needs and linguistic tendencies of the children and their families. The actual start of the project was preceded by a preliminary investigation which approached those Italian families who had in the past received for their children some sort of language support from the city’s *Kindergartens*.

It was observed that the children were showing a certain awareness of the variety of idioms used in the school, which almost certainly was due to the fact that the school in question was peculiar for the presence of numerous languages, given the migrant background of the families that lived in that district. Above all, in that nursery school, as in many others in the Rhine-Palatine area, some special educators and foreign student-teachers are present, as a regional law provides for their employment in proportion to the number of non-German children present in the school. The *Kindergarten* has, for some years, also chosen an educational philosophy which foresees both intensive-support programmes for the learning of German, as well as contact with the other languages present amongst the pupils in the school. This contact can take place during the normal everyday activities of the pupils (reading, play activities and music, excursions, celebrations and special feast days) where simple elements such as greetings, numbers, songs and nursery rhymes can be presented in the different languages. Within this framework, there is also the experiment

Deutsch-Italienische Sprachbildung directed towards children of Italian origin and towards German or other nationality children whose parents (or the children themselves) seem interested in “approaching” Italian.

The main objective is to support the learning of German by children who come from German-Italian or bi-national families, but at the same time to use and widen their skills in their first language, whether it be Italian or not. The aim is to encourage children to discover a language that is not that of the country in which they are living, and which will allow Italian children to cultivate their linguistic inheritance, even though, often, they are not conscious of that inheritance, since their parents, albeit of Italian origin, mostly or exclusively speak German. Children of German or other nationalities can, on the other hand, learn the basics of a new language, and, from a more intercultural point of view, can learn to approach and appreciate “otherness”, discovering at the same time the hitherto “hidden” values of their Italian companions. In both cases, the aim is to create a positive attitude towards linguistic differences, which motivates the children into improving their own communications skills and to make them more open to learning other languages in the future. At the end of the first year of the experiment, a “Language-biography video” was made, a sort of filmed interview with pairs of children. Its structure followed the principles set out in the Portfolio (What language/s I have learned/am learning, where, when, how).

The Portfolio: final considerations

The aim of the project backed by the *Institut für*

Interkulturelle Pädagogik fits into the framework of Europe’s recent language policies, which promoted the drafting of the ELP and see the necessity of “encouraging language learning and promoting linguistic diversity in society”. On the other hand, the learning of new languages is a necessity which, in this world of global communication, has become essential to everybody, both natives and foreigners.

In our opinion, the prospect offered by the Portfolio, however indirectly, opens the way to a new concept of citizenship, which becomes more real also through the sharing of and participation in languages. For this to become possible, we must not neglect to speak to the families, both native and foreign. One element which almost any activity in language education and promotion can benefit of is that of carrying out projects which involve families, help them to interact, offer them adequate advice, and which they agree with and make them feel that they are participating in the construction of a multicultural and multilingual society.

Lastly, in a strictly educational sense, the success of a multilingual education programme depends on an early start, as early as in infant school, by substituting the idea of *teaching* a language with that of *approaching* a language. The aim is that of ensuring that the child can experience a “taste” for some elements of the proposed language (phonological, lexical), which will exploit and improve his linguistic abilities (for example by learning to articulate unknown sounds at infant school) as well as his intercultural abilities (the “building” of a less ethnocentric mentality), as is proposed by the ELP.

¹Commission of the European Communities, *White Paper on Education and Training. Teaching and learning. Towards the learning society*, COM(95) 590 final, 29 November 1995; Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A new Framework Strategy for multilingualism*, COM(2005) 596 final, 22 November 2005

²For further information about the characteristics and structure of the ELP consult <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/Linguistic/>

³A project promoted by the IPE Institute (*Institut für Interkulturelle Pädagogik im Elementarbereich*), directed by Prof. Otto Filtzinger, and co-ordinated in the field by Dr. Giovanni Cicero Catanese. Since November 2005 with the co-operation of *Progetto Scuola Nord e. V., Frankfurt*, an association which guarantees assistance to Italian children in German schools. For further information on the activities of the IPE see <http://www.ipe-mainz.de>

New IPCC Report Raises Alarm on Global Warming

According to a new report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change presented in Paris last February, global warming is so severe that it will continue for centuries, and might lead to a different planet in 100 years. According to the report, global warming is “very likely” caused by man, meaning more than 90 percent certain; if nothing is done to change the current emission levels of greenhouse gases, global temperature could increase as much as 6 °C (11 °F) by 2100, but if the world does get greenhouse gas emission under control – something scientists say they hope can be done – the best estimate is about 1 to 2 °C (3 °F). Sea levels are projected to rise 18 to 59 cm (7 to 23 in) by the end of the century. Add another 10 to 20 cm (4-8 in) if recent, surprising melting of polar ice sheets continues.

Still, many scientists are optimistic, because they think that their message is finally getting through to the political leaders. According to Yvo de Boer, the executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a multi-national body that tries to change policy to fight global warming, “a growing sense of urgency to come to grips with the issue” can be sensed. French President Jacques Chirac warned that “We are on the historic threshold of the irreversible”, and called for an economic and political “revolution” to save the planet. President Chirac demanded the creation of a new UN Agency for the environment, with the mandate to confer a global political dimension to the struggle against global warming. His proposal has already been backed by 46 countries, i.e. the EU countries and some African and Latin American ones, while the US, Russia and other emerging countries were skeptical.

The world is looking at the United States, the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, that refused to back the Kyoto Protocol. Bush administration officials praised the report but said they still oppose mandatory cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman declared that the problem can be addressed by better technology that will cut emissions, promote energy conservation, and hasten development of non-fossil fuels. Despite the official stance, though, there are signals that a change is afoot in the US, e.g. the growing congressional interest, and the carbon dioxide emission limits requested by top industry CEOs.

The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme. Its role is to assess the scientific basis of the risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impact, and options for adaptation and mitigation. The body does not carry out any research of its own: its assessments are based on peer-reviewed and published scientific literature.

Japanese Federalists against North Korea's Nuclear Testing*

We, the World Federalists, are making efforts day and night in order to create a peaceful world without war by eventually completing international disarmament, not only nuclear but also conventional – with the exception of those weapons necessary to maintain domestic order –, by establishing world law as soon as possible and by solving all conflicts peacefully without force.

Abolishing nuclear weapons everywhere on Earth has been the long-cherished common wish of us, the Japanese people, on whom nuclear weapons were dropped for the first time in human history. However, it is extremely regrettable to see that enough nuclear weapons to annihilate humankind several times still exist today, more than half a century after the disasters at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that nuclear powers are still proliferating.

Under these circumstances, your nuclear testing will, in the face of worldwide criticism, not only isolate your nation further from the rest of the world but also counteract the "Sun Policy" of the current government of South Korea and complicate the peaceful unification of North and South Korea. Besides, it will become a significant obstacle for the realization of the "East Asia Community", which we, the Japanese World Federalists, are aiming for.

Admittedly, all of the current big nations are nuclear powers, and it is not always possible to see that they are sincerely performing their duties of nuclear disarmament as stated in the "Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT). In order to accomplish a truly effective "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (CTBT), above all, these big powers should take the initiative in carrying out nuclear disarmament and should make efforts to solve problems peacefully by strengthening the International Criminal Court.

However, nuclear weapons are an absolute evil. Therefore, for whatever reason you may have carried it out, your recent nuclear testing is not only completely unacceptable, but we also strongly request that you will not repeat a test like this hereafter.

* Resolution adopted on October 9, 2006, by the World Federalist Movement of Japan

“I am a Federalist...”

James Christie

It has been thirty years since that fateful November in 1976 when Rene Levesque and the sovereigntist/separatist Parti Quebecois swept into power in the Province of Quebec. That election forever altered the shape of Canada, and the quality of Canadian political debate. For many Anglophones and allophones, within Quebec or in the rest of Canada, it seemed as though the end of the cherished dream of Canadian federalism, so highly celebrated during Canada's centennial less than a decade earlier, was doomed.

The business community in particular was in dismay and disarray. In reaction to anticipated – but unrealized – social and political instability, an exodus of money and talent benefited Toronto to the detriment of Montreal.

But at the dawn of the third millennium, federalism is alive and well in Canada, more nuanced than ever before, perhaps, but still the defining principle upon which the second largest geopolitical entity on the planet governs its present and imagines its future.

Even more startling to many was the declaration by Rene Levesque in *Memoirs*, smack in the middle of that extraordinary book, that “*I am a federalist*”. Who would have guessed? The man once seen as the greatest threat to Canadian federalism was a champion of world federalism. He wrote: “North cannot live without South and South dies without North, the few in comfort cannot for long go on living off the hunger of the many... on two or three absolutely essential levels, the nation

state has had its day. It must give up part of its power and resources to an authority that would be a Security Council for humanity... not for tomorrow, of course. But if we want to count on a tomorrow, no other solution is in sight... to put an end to the massacre of innocents, to give children everywhere a minimum of equal opportunities, one cannot be anything but federalist... at least in world terms”.

This is a ringing endorsement of the federalist vision, and yet, ironically, despite the increased urgency of the federalist solution in a world which is more dangerous than it was during the cold war, when Levesque penned his paean, there are those, especially in the United States of America, who are finding the language of federalism a hindrance.

There are, of course, reasons for this. At least one radical right wing group has purloined the term “federalist”, turning it to its own perverse purposes. Federal leadership under Mr. Bush has led the United States into a money-clogged, blood soaked quagmire in Iraq, hideous national debt and international disrepute. And, it is argued, the world of the fifteen second sound bite does not lend itself to the nuanced language of federalist rhetoric.

But despite disproportionate American influence on the world, especially on global popular culture, the human community is larger than the United States, and federalism is far from being universally discredited. In fact, in both Europe and Canada, federalism is

not only practiced, but understood.

As the late C.S. Lewis wrote in another context and on another subject, it is important to know whether an idea has actually been discredited or is simply out of fashion. There are simply no cogent arguments against federalism as a viable political strategy not only for the west, but especially for the emerging nation states and trans-states regions of the emerging world. Federalism's underlying doctrine of subsidiarity stands alone as a strategy for power sharing among and between levels and spheres of government, and not only between and among states but within states.

As the world's population becomes increasingly and perhaps irrevocably urbanized, how else will the world's mega cities be sustainably governed and managed?

This is not to say that federalism is easy. It isn't, as any student of European, Canadian and yes, American history can testify. But it has one seminal advantage over all other political theories and systems. Federalism is perhaps more a political methodology than a doctrinaire ideology.

Certain political systems, most especially democracy, seem ideally suited to federalism, but federalism's pragmatic approach to power sharing can be adapted to almost any political worldview, from extreme liberal to die-hard conservative. Its economic implications are entirely positive and in no way dogmatic. Federalism may be the most adaptable methodology for governance ever devised by the human race.

One can only begin to imagine the possibilities for federalist solutions in some of the most volatile areas of the globe. Is it possible to imagine a solution to the generations old conflicts of the Middle and Near East apart from federalist strategies? Even the much vaunted "two state" solution

for Israel and Palestine is incomplete unless an understanding is reached among all the players in the region. A unified Iraqi state has become virtually unimaginable in the wake of the societal breakdown engendered by the ill conceived and worse executed regime change of 2003. While it may be too late – or too early – for any positive intervention in that troubled country's affairs, a federalist strategy would at least provide positive talking points among the three principal communities of combatants. Might a federalist solution be brought to bear in Asia, offering a peaceful resolution to the ongoing tensions of Taiwan and Tibet and China? Perhaps not, but an Asian "federalist debate" might generate other, hitherto unimagined possibilities for the region.

Then there is Africa. I am convinced that posterity will judge this generation, and perhaps subsequent generations, by the way in which the North and the West of the world respond to the plight of Africa. Poverty, HIV/AIDS, human trafficking, genocide, all combine in a deadly cocktail contained in a poisoned chalice of failed governance and failed governments, much of the failure induced by the monetary policies of the first world. Two generations ago, Alan Paton wrote in his potent and painful novel, *Cry the Beloved Country*, that the crime of the British was not the destruction of the tribes, but their unwillingness to offer anything in return. The postcolonial abandonment of Africa to sectarian and religious strife is equally as unconscionable as the colonial rape of Africa in the first place. Support for African federalism, and support for the length of time it takes to become established is the least we of the West can do. Not simply as repentance and reparation, but, as every world federalist knows, because the world is one, period. The fate of Africa is our fate.

One of my great privileges over the past year has been to work with Senator Romeo Dallaire, the retired Canadian Lieutenant

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General of Artillery who was the commander of the United Nations mission in Rwanda and Burundi during the 1994 genocide, when 800,000 people were slaughtered in a matter of weeks, most up close and personal, by machete. Dallaire struggled in vain with the United Nations bureaucracy, world governments and world media to bring both attention and support to the plight of the doomed, but to no avail. The experience, of which he writes with unbearable poignancy in *Shake Hands with the Devil*, very nearly broke him: nearly, but not quite. A long and painful road back from the abyss of self-destruction has left him more than ever committed to positive change in Africa.

Currently, the University of Winnipeg, through Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, former foreign minister of Canada and now university president, and his establishment of a Global College, and my own Faculty of Theology, is a partner with Senator Dallaire, UNICEF, Search for Common Ground and others in seeking to define a working doctrine to counter the use of child soldiers as an effective weapons platform. We are about to enter phase two of the project. It will not be easy. It will not be swift. Neither factor is of consequence to the Senator. He anticipates that "Peacekeepers" will be required in the Great Lakes region of Africa for another sixty years under current conditions. But what, he asks rhetorically, is a generation or two when placed in the context of the whole human story? What indeed?

In 2002, Senator, then General Dallaire, was awarded the Peace Award of the World Federalist Movement in Canada. He is one of us, just like, and yet entirely different than the late Premier of Québec, René Lévesque.

There's the beauty of federalism once again and in a nutshell. Diverse people with divergent views, disparate systems and even more disparate interests may be accommodated under the very big tent which is federalism – under the even bigger tent which is world federalism.

Federalism is the place where, to borrow a phrase from Archimedes, those of us who wish to see a better tomorrow for the whole human community – or for that matter any tomorrow at all – "can rest our levers to move the world".

Here Bill Pace, General Secretary of the World Federalist Movement, can organize with credibility a Coalition for an International Criminal Court, or engage with the Government of Canada to articulate the doctrine and policy of the responsibility to protect. Here perhaps lies the place whence yet may spring a reformed and reconstituted United Nations, truly able to be that "Security Council for all humanity" of which Lévesque wrote.

In the grand scheme of the human story, federalism is still a very new idea. It must be cherished and nurtured, not so much that it may come to maturity, but so that the human family may come to the maturity to recognize its worth.

The late Sir Peter Ustinov, for many years President of the World Federalist Movement, used to remark that it was true that he had never engaged in partisan politics, because he couldn't bear the burden of being right all the time. But Sir Peter was always candid, even proud to declare that he was a federalist. So am I. So ought we.

Cosmo-Federalism as a Response to International Exclusion

Raffaele Marchetti¹

“Our political and social conceptions are Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copernican.”²

International exclusion

International exclusion occurs when political agents are deprived of their entitlements to influence public decisions at the international and global level. At the moment, this is nowhere more visible than on the edge between national and international jurisdictions concerning political participation. Increasingly, decisions taken in one country affect people in other countries who do not have the possibility to express their consent because of their subaltern status as non-fellow, *ergo* disenfranchised, citizens. The fracture between the socio-economic reality, which is transnational in its effects, and the political system, which is still fundamentally anchored to a community-based model, is widening. Actions and consequences are tightly linked across borders, and yet those who bear the effects of decisions taken abroad are not typically entitled to have a political voice in the process.

A state-based political system remains an unsatisfactory framework for self-determination of trans-border interests such as those embodied by non-national or trans-national political agents such as migrants, people of trans-border religions, minorities and workers. Both in cases where decisions taken in a given country have border-crossing consequences, and in those where decisions taken at the international level have correspondingly internationally-spread effects, usually the individual consequence-bearer does not have significant power to register

his or her ‘trans-border consent’ (or, indeed, dissent). Assuming she or he has the power to register her or his consent at the domestic level (which is rarely the case), she or he nevertheless does not have a voice at all in the domestic decisions of other countries and has a tenuous, trans-border voice in international *fora*, even when they are public. Using these observations as a starting point, one can argue that current international affairs are characterised by a high degree of exclusion and disenfranchisement.

Were this international scenario of multiple disenfranchisement translated into a domestic setting, it could not be tolerated by any version of democratic theory. Any democrat would be ready to accept the principle that any citizen should be entitled to have a voice on the decisions concerning public issues, above all those that affect him or her. Accordingly, the democrat would not accept that decisions taken, for instance, by a private club with restricted membership could significantly affect the life prospects of the remaining citizens without the latter having the legal possibility to contest the outcomes. However, this is the common understanding, not to mention the usual practice, of international affairs.

This article argues that this system needs to be revised in order to end the resulting unjust exclusion of a vast portion of the world’s population from transnational decision-making processes and thereby to improve the overall implementation of the democratic ideal. An enlargement of democratic institutional arrangements to the global level is, therefore, needed in order to include the excluded



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political agents and thus to preserve democratic congruence.

Cosmopolitan citizens

The response of the present version of cosmopolitanism to the multiplication of diverse social actions dispersed geographically and institutionally on different levels, consists in affirming a political principle that grants to all choice-bearing citizens as members of the public constituency a political voice and the power to make the choice-makers accountable. At the global level of action in particular, a political system has to be envisaged as characterised by a universal constituency, which in granting rights of political participation to all citizens, is able to identify both responsible and vulnerable agents, and consequently to implement a sanctioning system.

The selection of the most appropriate institutional framework for a project of reform of international politics must, in this vein, be based on the assessment of the institutional performance of the different frameworks of rights in relation to the criteria concerning freedom of choice through participation. The fundamental premise of this argument, in fact, holds that each individual is entitled to an equal opportunity to influence, within an institutional order, the making of any public decision that significantly concerns him or her. The preferred institutional framework should thus be one that reduces the constraints on participation in decision-making in all the vastly diverse political units dispersed throughout the vertical and horizontal dimensions of social action. More specifically, the two sub-criteria of an optimal framework are decentralisation, in order to maximise opportunity, and centralisation, to avoid exclusion.

Cosmo-federalism

The present cosmopolitan perspective advocates a federal reform of the UN in response to the claim that the democratic goal of participation cannot be properly achieved either through

a liberal confederation of republican states or an enhancement of the multilateral structures of global governance. It must be noted that the present proposal, unlike those within the mainstream federal tradition, seeks the establishment of a more democratic form at the global level for reasons pertaining to the democratic reflexivity between choice-bearers and choice-makers. While a major concern for many federalists was peace, the primary concern for the present version of cosmopolitanism is the maximisation of freedom of choice via political participation. The most effective and consistent way of responding to these requirements at the global level currently resides indeed in a cosmo-federal reform of the UN.

Objections

A number of the objections traditionally raised against the idea of a global federation, including practical and normative arguments, can be dismissed from the point of view of cosmo-federalism. Two arguments regarding the *feasibility* and *desirability* of the federal proposal are the most frequent and, apparently, decisive. As regards feasibility, critics point out that federations have historically come into being in reaction to external enemies or for common interests, and that this is inconceivable at the global level. This argument can be refuted by pointing to, on the one hand, global threats such as global warming, and on the other, global public goods such as peace and international financial stability, which represent common interests capable of unifying differing strategic agendas. Such interests currently provide the motive pushing international cooperation strongly beyond borders towards a tighter political system. The other concern, feasibility, is mainly technical and regards the practical difficulties of world management in a scenario characterised by high quantity and high complexity. Three points provide adequate response: firstly, there have been enormous improvements in technology since Kant's time; secondly, the demands of justice may well require a certain degree of trade-off at

the expense of efficiency; and, thirdly, the high diversity of global political agents provides a reason for (not against) the search for a common, non-exclusionary framework of justice. The two latter points, moreover, crucially underscore the desirability of global federalism.

The other major critique of global federalism concerns the issue of desirability and holds that the power accruing to a world government would inescapably lead to homogeneity, or worse, tyranny. The quick response to this consists in stressing that these risks are higher without a federal authority than with it. With regard to homogeneity, it should be remarked that only through a political system where action bearers can democratically express their dissent based on equal standing, can the imposition of mere power (both political and cultural) be avoided and local differences be respected. If we reckon the infinite ways of influencing other countries, an all-inclusive world organisation based on equal democratic participation represents the only political project able to escape the imposition of a local standard on the world community. With regard to tyranny, the distinction between a unitary state and a federal government should be highlighted, together with the recognition that a federal global institution would only rule on global issues, while leaving national affairs to the jurisdiction of the local authorities. In this way, states would preserve their *raison d'être* and the risk of an authoritarian state would be diminished.

Recently, Robert Dahl famously re-stated a further objection, the *restricted-size argument*, to any proposal for the establishment of a global democratic institution. According to this objection, which in a less sophisticated version dates at least to the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau and was amply discussed and rebutted in the *Federalist Papers*, an extended republic is an oxymoron. In brief, Dahl argues that the bigger a state is, the smaller is the weight each single vote has in proportion to the total of the voting lot; consequently, the less democratic

a state is. Three counter-moves can be used to refute Dahl. First, as already made clear by the federalist writers, the right size of a republic is not at all clear, since it seems that if we stick to the original ideal of a republican society, states such as the US, Russia, India, Brazil, or indeed most contemporary states, would remain structurally inadequate for any form of democratic government. Second, in the current interdependent international affairs, it is likely that the individual will be affected in any case by decisions taken outside of his community. In the light of this, it goes against reason to argue against granting the possibility to influence politically such decisions, even if the final result is minimal impact. And thirdly, in a situation such as the current one, that is, one deprived of any form of direct international representation, the relative weight of each individual's vote should be even more severely discounted, in so far as it passes through a double mechanism of representation from the citizen to the national MP and from the MP to the state's delegate in international organisations. Having presented and rebutted the traditional objections to the federalist model, it is now legitimate to move on to the examination of a concrete application of the federal ideal to the structure of the UN.

Institutions

A reformed UN would be a global federal organisation in which states would share power for specific global purposes under a system of strengthened international law. Consequently, states would renounce a portion of their sovereignty and agree to a compulsory jurisdiction uniquely for a determined list of competences on global issues (typically, non- or trans-territorial), while retaining those powers and specific institutional forms directed to domestic concerns. Rather than a loss, this would be regarded as a gain in freedom and order, since states would be compelled only to accept decisions taken according to majority rule – General Assembly resolutions would have a legally binding status – and implemented through a subsidiary scheme of actions at both

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global and state levels. Moreover, individuals would acquire a full cosmopolitan citizenship while remaining national citizens within a consistent scheme of multiple allegiances, which would allow for frustrated and excluded citizens to channel their claims beyond their governmental representation. They would be enfranchised as voting constituents for an elected legislative world assembly with an authoritative mandate representing general as well as special interests restricted to global issues. Finally, since global agents would be recognised as vulnerable and responsible, they would also be protected from and punished for global crimes, according to an appropriate multilayered and multi-agent scheme of sanctions. Human rights would become legally enforceable.

A critical point of a federal reform of the UN resides in the allocation of the diverse functions and powers between the central world government and the federate states. As with current forms of federalism, even in the case of the reformed UN a stable equilibrium would not be possible without a constitution whose authority is accorded primacy over all other powers. A global constitution is thus required to delineate the distribution of legislative and executive authority regarding a number of functions among the different levels of political action. The global constitution, together with the continuous work of a world parliament, constitute two essential components in the

fundamental function of drawing jurisdictional boundaries in an inclusive way. A clear demarcation of the issue of competence is crucial not only to allocate *ab initio* authority (and its limits), but also to solve conflicts that may arise about the power to judge. At the global level, where so many disputes are raised daily about conflicting competences, the only democratic solution consists in moving the power to adjudicate to a superior level where all parties can have a voice – a world parliament. Neither the central power (as in the unitary state) nor the single states (as in the confederation) have the authority to decide on who has to decide.

Within the federal reform of the UN, a renewed general elected assembly would acquire the role of the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN. Members of such an assembly would be elected through a universal democratic voting system. However, the necessity of fair voting procedures in the original countries poses a severe practical constraint for this proposal. A clear precondition for a legitimate reform of the UN remains thus the existence of domestic democratic systems, since any new membership to this democratically-renewed supranational organisation must be on a free and voluntary basis. A previous decentralised process fostering democratic systems within states does, indeed, form a condition for any legitimate reform of the UN, and is therefore a priority for any cosmopolitan political project.

¹For a more detailed (with full references) exposition of these arguments see my "Global Governance or World Federalism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute on Institutional Models", in *Global Society*, (2006) 20, 3: 287-305.

²Emery Reves, *Anatomy of Peace*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1947, p. 37.



The Birth of the UEF

Jean-Pierre Gouzy

15 December 1946, 9 rue Auber, Opera quarter in Paris: the Union of European Federalists (UEF) is established, at the headquarters of "La Fédération", the principal French federalist movement of the time.

This momentous occasion was not the result of coincidence... it would probably never have taken place without the repercussions of the 1941 Ventotene manifesto, without the European resistance of men like Henri Brugmans, Henri Frenay and Altiero Spinelli, future leaders, of, amongst other things, the UEF; without similar meetings, like that of the "Socialistes européens" in Montrouge in June 1946; that of intellectuals in Geneva like Jaspers, Spendler, de Rougemont, Lukacs in September 1946, and of course the meeting in Hertenstein on the edge of the Quatre Cantons Lake from September 15 to September 22, 1946, the same year during which Churchill made his famous speech on September 19, in Zurich, in which he proudly said: "Stand up Europe! We have to create a United States of Europe".

The UEF was already starting to take shape in Hertenstein, but it would take another meeting, called for by the British leaders of Federal Union a month later in Luxembourg, to decide on the establishment of a European federalist secretariat in Paris and another one in New York for global federalists. In Paris, December 1946, after a last preparatory conference in November in Basel, the decision was taken to set up a Union of European Federalists, but many members remained captured by the idea of global federalism. Hence the first motto of the UEF: "One Europe in a united world".

Additionally, certain groups were only interested in the establishment of a European federation, others thought mostly about founding a new organization, others about organizing peace, and others still about global federalism. Some referred voluntarily to an Anglo-Saxon model of federalism; others, specifically French speakers, related to Proudhon and the libertarians of the preceding century or to the individualist thinking that emerged from debates and ideas during the course of the 1930's. For others, Hamilton still represented the essential reference.

Such a mixture of ideas was quite surprising. They needed to be channeled. This mixture made up the richness of the UEF, but in many ways it made life complicated for the movement over the course of the 1950's and even into the 1960's.

Could it have gone differently at the start of our grand adventure in that European wasteland in which everything had to be rethought and rebuilt?

In Great Britain, for example, Miss Josephy, ex Vice-President of the Liberal Democrats, and one of the most active federalists of the time, was the incarnation of this mix of globalist, Atlanticist and European perspectives, representing one of the most symptomatic expressions of the *Outre-Manche* federalist tradition.

The constitutive meeting of the UEF took place on December 15, 1946, under the presidency of a man who incarnated the debates of the third French republic. Ex deputy of Ardèche, Gaston Riou was the President of a group named





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“Union économique et douanière européenne”. Being the oldest member of the Assembly, he published in 1929 a premonitory work called *Europe, ma patrie (Europe, my Homeland)* which included a declaration by Aristide Briand. I must remind you that Aristide Briand, in the name of the French government of the time and with the support of Gustav Stresemann, called for the peoples of Europe – from the stage of the League of Nations – to tie a “federal knot” to each other.

The conspirators of rue Auber, despite their differences, decided unanimously to convene a first Congress, which was held in Montreux from 27 to 31 August, 1947. They also decided that the young UEF, which did not yet have a legal statute, would get one, conforming to Swiss legislation. The process was finalized with the establishment of its headquarters at Palais Wilson in Geneva. They then asked Alexandre Marc, journalist and 1930’s avant-garde, to become the first Secretary General of the new organisation, and Henri Brugmans, future dean

of the College of Europe, to be its first President. The first task would be to control the post-war federalist explosion: about fifty clubs, circles, and unequal movements in about ten countries. There were, for example, no less than around fifteen in France alone and about twelve in Belgium.

I conclude by mentioning that as a young man, I myself had been involved in the federalist movement for several months. Six years later, I became Secretary General for France. I therefore personally knew the witnesses and actors who were involved in the events that I just related. This authorizes my testimony of the day.

When the delegates of that memorable gathering separated, into the bitter cold Paris night, immensely dark and sad, deprived of everything (because of the rations which disappeared definitively in 1949), the first post-war sign of European hope finally materialized: the UEF was born.

The Nomad Man

Giampiero Bordino

Jacques Attali
L'homme nomade
 Paris, Fayard, 2003

Jacques Attali's – a French intellectual and former adviser to President Mitterand – historical research recounts the ancient, but to some extent still topical, dialectical confrontations between nomad and sedentary peoples throughout the millennia. "Sedentarity – Attali observes – is just a short interval in human history. In the crucial part of his adventure, man has been forged by nomadism and is becoming once again a traveller".

Nomad at his start, some million years ago, man, as well known, has progressively become sedentary, has created farming, cities, the State. Between coexistence and, more often, conflict, the relations between nomads and sedentaries have marked the entire human history. Attali reconstructs the "long times" of those processes, picks up the "threads" of nomadism in the various areas of the world, from Europe to Asia (or rather Eurasia, a single continent at the center of which, in the area of the steppes, there has been for millennia the greatest reservoir of nomadism in human history), to Africa and to the Americas. Cultures, forms of social life, beliefs are sketched in a great fresco that tries to convey to us, living in the era of globalization (or *mondialization*, as the French prefer to call it) the idea of an "archaic" experience in many aspects, but in others still

alive in new forms.

Man, Attali says, is becoming once again traveller: through the scientific and technological revolution in transport and communication, through globalization in its various forms, through the explosion of the processes of trans-national mobility of goods, individuals and "signs", is underway today a new and unprecedented nomadic experience. "Today more than 500 million people can be considered as nomads due to their work or for political reasons: immigrants, refugees, expatriates, the homeless and migrants of any kind... More than one billion people every year travel for leisure or obligation... Every year, 10 million people expatriate: this could drive, in 50 years, more than one billion people to live outside of their country of birth". And then there are – it is worth reminding – the "virtual nomads", those who navigate in the "ocean" of the Internet, who draw up journeys without space, who build trans-national networks and communities without propinquity.

In this context, Attali's thesis is that a new clash between a nomad and a sedentary way of life is under way. The last big "standing" empire – the United States, a superpower, albeit declining – is faced with the "countless nomads of poverty", the "infra-nomads", who are and will be the key movers of history, the economy and politics". This perspective, according to Attali, gives a sense also to the dramatic events of September 11th: "With September 11th, 2001, new wars have started opposing nomad rebels to the present empire. These wars will mix the most advanced technologies with the eternal principles of nomad war (scare somebody to make him flee)". The future, Attali says, will be "a terrible chaos from which a new civilization will arise", simultaneously nomad and sedentary. "Such a democratic mondialization – so Attali calls it – will pass through the difficult putting in practice of

the virtues of the nomad... and the virtues of the sedentary... There will take shape, then, after enormous troubles, something like the promise of a planetary mingled-race, of a land which will be hospitable to all travellers of life".

But how will such a passage from disorder to a "democratic mundialization", marked by hybridization and mingled-race, take place, what will make it possible? And what actors, what institutions, what governance and government systems will assure the new order, the new ways of coexistence, the possibility that a land be, in the way that Kant described, "hospitable to all travellers of life"? Attali does not deal with that. In his fresco, written in a bright and charming language (that calls to mind the French historiographic tradition of the *Annales*), there is perhaps "poetry", but the "prose" of politics, of institutions and of a project is missing.

It must be said, however, that Attali did later deal with such problems, at least to some extent, in another book (*Une brève histoire de l'avenir*, Fayard, 2006), in which he outlines a scenario of world crisis for the next sixty years and then, getting out of that crisis, the possible hope of a planetary "hyper-democracy" and of a sort of world government. However, there too he does not deal explicitly and adequately with the problems of an institutional architecture and of the transition towards the construction of such a possible world. The federalist political culture would have about it, and about many other issues, much to say and to teach. But for doing that it should be able to open, better than it does today, channels of dialogue and interaction with other ideological worlds. To become itself, to some extent and without the fear of losing its way, *nomad*, so as to intercept and hybridize other cultures (and cultural fashions) that dominate the landscape of the contemporary world.

Tilting at Windbags

Giovanni Finizio

Harold S. Bidmead

Tilting at Windbags. The autobiography of a world federalist

Devon, Edward Gaskell publishers, 2005

Harold Bidmead, born in Great Britain a few months before the outbreak of World War One, is a man who has devoted his life to theoretical and militant federalism. His autobiography, more than about his private life, tells us about his battles for world federalism, fought in federalist movements and even more in tens of newspapers and reviews in Europe and the world that published his numerous contributions.

His career as a militant started in 1940, when, fascinated by the *Federal Union Movement*, joined it and immediately became an active member. In a short time he was elected to the National Council and was thus in a position to influence the movement's policy. British federalism was enjoying at the time the contributions of great figures like Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, Lionel Curtis, William Curry, William Beveridge, Kenneth Wheare. They, and the fathers of American federalism Hamilton, Jay and Madison, are Bidmead's theoretical points of reference. In 1947 he was among the founders of the *World Federalist Movement*, called then *World Movement for a World Federal Government*, in which he actively took part until, Geir Giske reveals in the introduction to the book, it became clear to him that the movement was steering away from a "sound federalism", supporting the United Nations and joining all those who were at the most calling for trifling reforms to it,

thus legitimizing international anarchy, which federalism should have opposed. In fact, a great part of Bidmead's intellectual commitment was always spent to defend federalist orthodoxy from the manipulation attempts perpetrated by newspapers, politicians and intellectuals, who were used to confuse a federation with, on the one hand, a confederation (League of Nations, United Nations, European Union), and on the other with centralization of power, that is, with a super-State. To this end, the author spelled out a short list of key principles of federalism, and accurately translated them into 17 languages, publishing and spreading them over the world.

According to the principles he spelled out, are in error (often deliberately) those who fear that a world federation or even a European federation will be a super-State, because decentralization, and not centralization of power, is the peculiarity of federalism; are in error, likewise, those who place their confidence in the United Nations or in the European Union, because those institutions have a non-democratic and confederative structure, based on the intangibility of national sovereignty. The UN in particular draws Bidmead's criticism, because it is not substantially different from the League of Nations, and likewise it is unable to keep peace except by threatening or waging war; and because many of those who declare themselves federalists place too much hope in it and in its reform. Actually, the author states, reminding Boutros-Ghali's words, that "The UN is not and never could become a world government". In other words, the hope to transform a confederation into a federation would be illusory and the UN would be non-reformable. The only way to reach the goal of a world federation would be that of a constituent assembly giving rise to a new organization replacing the UN. A substantial part of the book is then devoted to reaffirming the principles of federalism and to showing that, as they are not reflected in the UN, the

would-be federalists struggling for the UN reform are nothing but renegades.

Bidmead resumes the debate initiated at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco negotiations over the institution of the United Nations, which caused what will later appear as perhaps the most profound fracture in federalist movements, first in the USA and then in the rest of the world. Indeed, the attitude about the UN was and is still posing today the problem of which strategy shall be chosen; which is, once a goal has been identified, the fundamental question for every movement. Quite soon the inadequacy of the new institution became apparent, and also its evident inconsistency with the federalist precepts; among the various movements a difference of opinion arose between those who believed that it was necessary to strive to reform it, even radically (Grenville Clark and many of the *United World Federalists*), and those who wanted a brand new federal and democratic institution (for example, Emery Reves or the *Committee to Frame a World Constitution* of Robert Hutchins and Giuseppe Antonio Borgese). The former were gradualist, meaning that they agreed with the possibility of a small-steps process; the latter were revolutionary, espousing the idea of a constituent strategy that had the peoples as protagonists, who would spontaneously and solemnly cede part of their own sovereignty to the benefit of a world federation. This strategy was adopted, among others, in Great Britain by Henry Osborne, a friend of Bidmead, who launched the *Crusade for a World Government*, which should have led to a *Peoples' Convention* to be held in Geneva in 1950. And this is precisely the strategy adopted by Bidmead, who has always categorically refused the reformist route; but whilst in those times he was in clever and numerous company, today he finds himself in a definite minority, and his strategy does not seem convincing any longer, for many reasons.

First of all, the years of the Second World War



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and those immediately after it were marked by the fluidity that is peculiar to the moments when a new world order is being created, and were therefore more inclined to a constituent strategy. In such a moment, it was right to try to immediately set up a federal world government, even though the world that came up from the war was so deeply divided that such an outcome would have been rejected. But the following years and the Cold War made it apparent that the political conditions for that strategy were lacking: Albert Einstein too, mentioned many times by Bidmead, although he had supported Usborne's *Crusade*, started to strive more and more for the reform of the UN in a federal direction.

Sixty years after the birth of the United Nations and after a world war, creating a new institution completely bypassing the national States seems an inadmissible road. However, choosing the reform of the UN does not mean that the federalist claims must be trimmed down. Actually, it is to a large extent thanks to the federalists that today, in Universities and civil society circles, people discuss about a world Parliament and how to transform the UN Security Council into a Chamber of the great regions of the world without the right of veto. Choosing the reform of the UN does not mean renouncing the strategy from the bottom upwards, either: just think of how quickly civil society networks are being created, spread and grow stronger, that call for the UN reform in a federal direction and may potentially have an influence on government decisions and policies; precisely from the civil society the request is coming to adopt a constituent strategy for reforming the UN, and not a new institution, following the method of the Convention which gave rise to the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Constitution project (*The Federalist Debate*, Year XIX, n. 1, February 2006). But all that can only be brought about together with the States, not without them. The role of the federalists today appears then to be twofold:

on the one hand, a traditional lobbying activity on decision-makers, but, on the other, take upon themselves the responsibility to help civil society movements to mature; spread among them the awareness that all their specific goals must be accompanied by the struggle for a democratic world government; support their networks; guide them in our common action.

The political and social developments of the last 60 years make an exaggerated, schematic contraposition "confederation vs. federation" inadequate, as it leads one to believe that what is not within the latter category is automatically in the former. According to the author, the European Union is a confederation, but one cannot ignore that it does possess several federal elements, like, for example, a European Parliament directly elected by the European citizens, a single currency, the direct applicability of Community laws to all citizens, and many responsibilities of the Commission typical of a federal government. Actually, although the EU is not a federation, it is acknowledged that it has acquired many State-typical features that allow it already, thanks to its supra-national bodies and its common policies, to play a concrete role in the world, and to be taken as a model in other continents. It is the result of a process that always saw the federalists as protagonists and that will continue with a European Constitution. As to the United Nations, limiting oneself to define it useless or dangerous because it is based on national sovereignty does not take into account the important results achieved thanks to it, which constitute a premise for the political unity of mankind: how to ignore that, thanks also to civil society (hence, to the peoples), the UN has given birth to the process of constructing the international juridical system of human rights, which already constitutes the first part of a universal constitution? Nor can one ignore that the sacred nature of national sovereignty, thanks to the UN and civil society, is declining in the face of the imperative requirement to safeguard human rights: the

UN is already considering the *gross violations* of human rights as threats to peace and security, and as such liable to make national sovereignty yield to the intervention of the international community. We owe to the United Nations if we can talk today of human security and human development, and we owe to it to a large extent (and to the WFM and civil society) if the International Criminal Court could be instituted, the first permanent body capable of making concrete the criminal responsibility of an individual for crimes violating the founding values of the world community (this is a federalist principle!), and which opens the way to a future request for international police corps, of a world government and hence of global democracy.

In addition, one cannot forget globalization, never mentioned in Bidmead's book, a political, economic and social process that drives humanity towards unity and makes apparent the crisis of the national State and the contradictions and inadequacy of the UN specialized-agencies system (that Bidmead, however, absolves). It also makes evident the necessity of a world government, which in a democratic way conforms it to the needs of human beings. On the other hand, globalization highlights how the federalists' goal can no longer be to grant to a world government only the minimum powers necessary to assure peace (as, for example, Clark suggested, and partly Bidmead too), but also the adequate powers for establishing economic, social and environmental policy lines, in order to assure human rights for all and life preservation on the planet.

Finally, one cannot ignore the development process of regional organizations in the whole world, which make it thinkable a future transformation of the Security Council into the Chamber of regional organizations, without the right of veto.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the

classical scheme federation vs. confederation, or nationalism vs. federalism, presented by Bidmead and still applied, does not allow, alone, to adequately interpret reality in its evolution from a federalist point of view, so as to correctly appreciate it in its smaller crevices for an effective action and for choosing our allies for the goal of the world federation. One of those crevices is the International Criminal Court, and some allies are today the global civil society, the UN itself, the European Union and the other regional organizations.

Every clever political scientist knows that a theory cannot remain unchanged, losing interest in the evolution of reality; every "sound federalist" should consider that a strategy cannot lose interest in the evolution of both.

The Parliament of Man

Karen Hamilton

Paul Kennedy

The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations
Toronto, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd,
2006

Such a book as this, especially such a book as might be read by World Federalists, could hardly begin in any other way than by quoting Alfred Lord Tennyson's famous "Locksley Hall" and so indeed does Paul Kennedy begin. "Till the ward-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd / In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. / There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, /

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And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law”.

While, of course, Paul Kennedy has not actually written this book which gives a thorough and timely history of the United Nations, explaining its roots and functions while also critically analysing both its effectiveness past and present and its prospects for effectiveness in the future, specifically for World Federalists, it is a book that resonates indeed with our incremental federalist vision. As we strive forward to our particular vision of a ‘Federation of the world’, it is heartening to discover in a book like this, written by a former fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University and of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung in Bonn, not one, not two (as the index says) but actually three references to World Federalists. And they are references that simply take the existence of World Federalists for granted as an NGO working in a positive and helpful way towards good global governance and international relations.

This very readable book begins though not only with a note on the title, a commentary therefore on Tennyson and his poem, but also with some commentary on the influence that Tennyson’s vision and his poem have had on those such as former US President Harry Truman, (P. Kennedy is after all an American) including such ‘colour commentary’ as the fact that Truman kept a copy of the poem in his wallet to be read out as a justification of his commitment to international organizations whenever the occasion should call for it.

This kind of ‘colour commentary’, used effectively and not over-used, is part of what makes this book so very readable and both realistic and positive. Kennedy clearly knows his subject matter inside out in both its strengths and its weaknesses but he is

neither an unthinking apologist for the UN nor a dour critic. He assesses both the UN’s strengths and weaknesses, sees its necessity for the world and cautions the world community to neither be too optimistic or too pessimistic about what it has done and is doing and can do. And he does all this, through a thorough analysis of some of the major thematic and governance streams of the UN, focusing not on the plethora of minutiae but on the major themes and streams. And he does it with a realistic touch and a sense of humour. He includes what my son would call such ‘fun facts’ as the irony that Germany and Japan are still referred to in the UN Charter, Article 53, as ‘enemy states’ and yet are now the second and third largest contributors to the UN budget. He also, when referring to the permanent five members of the Security Council, refers to them on one occasion as ‘the grumpy P5’.

The book is helpfully divided into a number of sections with Part One, in Kennedy’s words, telling “...a tale of the first, tentative steps that humankind – really their governments – took toward international accords, codes of ideas, and cooperative behaviour. It notes those intellectuals and public officials who urged the case for greater global cooperation and even the idea of global governance”. It must, therefore, tell the story of the creation, evolution and collapse of the League of Nations as a way of deepening understanding of the ways in which the creation of the UN involved structures and ideas which were to correct the flaws of its predecessor. Kennedy reminds the reader here and then throughout the book that it is far too easy, from the standpoint of current context, to be critical of the UN, the Security Council in particular, of course. It is necessary to understand the post-war context of global power relationships and realities that caused the UN structures and procedures to be created as they were. That is not to say, and Kennedy has a section at

the end of the book that outlines possible, desirable and necessary reforms to UN structures and procedures, that there should not be change, he thinks there should. But that change not only needs to be strategic and realistic. It also needs to take into account why things are the way they are. The current global realities and particularly the reality of 'failed states', the cross-border nature of terrorism and the fact that so many of the conflicts around the globe are internal to nation states, need, desperately need, UN processes and procedures to change in order to be effective. Fundamental to Kennedy's book is his belief that in order to make those changes effective, we have to understand why things were set up as they were.

Part Two of the book consists of "...six loosely linked chapters that examine the chief aspects of the world organization's missions and how well or poorly each purpose has been fulfilled in the decades between 1945 and our present times". This thematic approach makes it easier for the reader to appreciate the diversity of function of the UN, another one of Kennedy's strongly-made points throughout the book. It is so helpful to the western reader to be reminded that the UN is perceived of and functions in very different ways and capacities around the world. Kennedy takes all the current criticisms of the Security Council and its failures in such places as Rwanda, very, very seriously. He makes the point though that given the fact that the world's population has tripled since the creation of the UN and the world's economic reality has increased ten-fold, without such an increase being reflected in member states' grants to the UN, the complications under which the world body tries to function may not allow it to do much better. And while taking both the UN's constraints and failures seriously, Kennedy also clearly and articulately points out that life in many southern and developing parts of the world would be almost unimaginably

worse without the work of such UN agencies as UNICEF.

And while Kennedy's detail and analysis of such visible UN realities as the Security Council and the role of the Secretary General, the latter of which this reviewer found to be particularly intriguing because of the parallels with her own role, also very helpful is his emphasis on and his reminder of the importance and achievements of what he calls the 'soft agendas' – work on what are often called women's and children's issues, human rights, health and cultural and intellectual affairs. He notes too the importance of such bodies as the Statistical Commission and the effect that it has had on how the world sees the world. We may not have yet been able to solve many of the world's problems in the areas of poverty, lack of resources, illiteracy etc., but we know where they are and the numbers of people affected by them.

Kennedy ends his book with some ideas for a way forward for the UN and many of them resonate strongly with our World Federalist, incremental vision of good, international governance. We may not, as World Federalists agree with some of the specifics he proposes, but we would certainly agree that one of the key questions which frames the whole discussion of the UN past, present and future, of UN reform, is the one that he articulates throughout the book (one of the book's few flaws is a tendency to repetition), the question "How are world citizens and their governments to reconcile universal human rights with claims for state sovereignty?" (Kennedy could perhaps have answered that with reference to the European Union, but remember, he is an American!). He talks about strengthening "...that three-legged stool of peace, development and democracy envisaged sixty years ago". And he talks about doing that by what he sees as the only way forward: "...intelligent, piecemeal reforms

such as expanding the size of the Security Council; improving operational effectiveness in all aspects of peacekeeping and peace enforcement; abandoning the Trusteeship Council and the Military Staff Committee (but finding better ways to do their originally designed jobs); shaking up or abolishing the ECOSOC; improving the performance of the human rights [he has no use for a system that allowed Libya to chair the Human Rights Commission], environmental, and cultural agencies; establishing closer coordination with the Bretton Woods and other specialized agencies; and giving the workings and structure of the General Assembly a thorough overhaul". Always remembering, and something that World Federalists must remember in order to be most effective, that the tension in the global reality between sovereignty and internationalism is inherent and persistent, and unavoidable.

And three final points which are heartening to the complexity of this particular reviewer's reality. Kennedy is very affirming of NGOs, not just in his three references to World Federalists, but throughout the book. He sees the crucial import of their expertise and passion as a part of the voice, action and witness of civil society. And very related to this is his affirmation and knowledge of church organizations as important contributors to the reality of NGOs, as one of the key factors in ensuring transparency and awareness in such areas as human rights. And finally, on page 257 of *The Parliament of Man*, Kennedy commends the Canadians for their establishment of a standing force, ready, willing and able to respond immediately to any Secretary General request for troop contribution. It is, according to this book, in such specific endeavours and in knowing the historical and global realities of the UN's context that '...the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world' has the possibility of moving forward into a future 'lapt in universal law'.

Making Globalization Work

Edward Chobanian

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Making Globalization Work

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Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel-honored economist, has written a second and perhaps heroic effort with recommendations to make globalization a positive force in *Making Globalization Work*¹. The issue that he wishes to confront is that despite the many promises of globalization and with the chief beneficiaries being developed nations, the developing nations are not getting their fair share of the benefits. Stiglitz provides the reader with a credible critique of complex globalization subjects – non-tariff trade barriers, the history of trade agreements, the global reserve system – in a vocabulary that is understandable by non-economists.

Despite a small oversight where Stiglitz has not defined globalization in either book, he leads the reader into a mirage of solutions². Nevertheless, *Making Globalization Work* is an important and understandable book. While many economists write in a language that might bore most readers, Stiglitz is able to cut through the jargon and clichés and explain the advantages of "fair globalization" and its shortcomings in simple terms.

While many would consider this a courageous attempt at an all-comprehensive subject, he does focus on development, fair trade, patents, world resources, the environment, the multilateral corporation, international debt and the global reserve system.



David Dollar, who is currently World Bank's director of Development Policy, defines globalization as "the growing integration of economies and societies around the world resulting from increased flows of goods, services, capital, technology, and ideas". He states that "globalization has helped reduce poverty in a large number of developing countries, but that it must be harnessed better to help the world's poorest, most marginalized countries improve the lives of their citizens".

Sir Nicholas Stern, former Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank and Stiglitz, who held the same title, have both declared, "globalization has assisted in reducing poverty and ... is needed, but should be guided to work for the poor". Stern takes it even further by stating "reversing globalization would come at an intolerably high price, destroying the prospects of prosperity for many millions of poor people. We do not agree with those who would retreat into a world of nationalism and protectionism".

Recently, Stiglitz was asked: Why a new book on globalization? Have there been changes since your last book on this topic?

About his book, Stiglitz states: "There have been changes that make it necessary to write a new book. The most dramatic change in the global landscape is that five years ago it would have been difficult to imagine a world in which India and China ... would have played such a big role, with their 2.4 billion people" ... being "more integrated into the global economy. This has an enormous impact and change on everyone, both on developed and less developed countries. For instance I talk about capital market liberalization; how the flow of destabilizing market capital did not lead to more growth, but to more instability. The really big recognition in 2001 in November in Doha was the need to recognize that the previous rounds of trade were unfair to developing countries. There needed to be a development round. But since then the

development rounds have essentially failed, and so the question is where will those trade negotiations go? It is a very big issue; we know it's not working well, it's not fair; but what will happen?".

Anti-globalization readers or opponents of the international institutions, IMF, World Bank and WTO, have not been vocal in opposition to the book's main findings. Perhaps their voices are muted because Stiglitz and his book are saying the market can be shaped and managed. Without shaping them, they often work in the wrong way.

In "*Making Globalization Work*", Stiglitz sets out to rescue the global economic system and make it perform fairly for developing countries. He has founded the "Initiative for Policy Dialogue" to assist developing countries in seeking macro-economic alternatives to the policies imposed upon them by the IMF and the World Bank.

Stiglitz places emphasis on environmental concerns and what he calls a "grand experiment" we are conducting in respect of global warming. One solution is an effort to create a global system of emissions trading and taxing. If countries producing pollution won't pay for the damage their industries cause, other countries should tax imports from the offending nations at rates proportional to the environmental cost of these emissions. Such a system might force polluters to change by allowing the market economy to adjust demand, based on prices that more accurately reflect the true cost of production.

Trade fairness, global debt and increasing macro-economic stability (at the level of nations) are not generally dinner table topics. Stiglitz does an excellent job of describing difficult topics – non-tariff trade barriers, the history of trade agreements, the global reserve system – in language that's



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understandable and accessible.

At the heart of *Making Globalization Work* is Stiglitz's discussion of the global reserve system. The basic idea goes: Countries, like individuals, try to set aside some of their income to use when the economy slows down or there is an impending financial crisis. A good currency to set aside is one that is easily converted into goods and services in an emergency.

In the modern world, the US dollar had previously been the reserve currency of choice because of its relative stability and strength of the USA.

The foreign reserve savings for other countries is the United States. However, for the past eight years or more, the US has taken on massive debt, "borrowing \$2 billion a day from poorer countries". Building this much debt ultimately undermines the strength of the US currency. It is, thus, likely that at some point, foreign countries will realize that the US dollar isn't the bastion of stability, and they may slowly divest or perhaps "dump" their dollars.

We have some indication from various countries, namely, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, and Singapore, who have voiced concern about their heavy reliance on dollars. Most recently China has announced that it is no longer committed to holding its reserves in dollars and moved substantial amounts out of dollars. The announcement had immense symbolic value.

If the IMF is to exist, it is time for it to institute radical reforms by democratizing its membership vote and decreasing its heavy reliance on the US dollar. One of Stiglitz's solutions involves creating a universal currency, similar to John Maynard Keynes' "bancor", or the IMF's "special drawing rights" (SDRs), that could be banked by

nations and used in times of crisis. This new currency could also be used in emissions trading, as well as grants for developing medical, educational and financial systems in poor countries.

How this system of "global greenbacks", (unfortunate words) as Stiglitz calls his hypothetical currency, is created and governed is the topic of his chapter, "Reforming the Global Reserve System".

The poor countries have too much debt, he says, and it is largely the fault of the lenders. The debts should be forgiven, and followed by large increases in foreign aid. The poor countries have gotten back too little from trade deals, he says. They should be given free access to rich-country markets, and the fat countries should quit featherbedding their farmers.

Both of Stiglitz's books are not without fault. His chapter on Development is at best frail. First, his lack of field experience is quite apparent. He never had field experience in identifying, appraising and supervising individual projects in developing his solutions to the problems he poses in globalization. David Dollar states, quite rightly, "Stiglitz and Easterly never worked on the operational side of the World Bank" [nor has Dollar]. This lack of operational experience is evident in any number of the recommendations and that lack of knowledge of the development process that has taken in each country, as well as the many stages that the Bank had gone through the turnover of World Bank presidents and chief economists. Interestingly, the World Bank sought to impose marketization measures that were both naive and premature for most of its members. Often the Bank's recommendations went along with the same measures that the IMF was forcing on its recipients for emergency assistance. Moreover, there was a propensity for inexperienced staff to push hard for



privatization, capital markets, and even more incredulously, future markets, without having in place the necessary infrastructure (banking, training, and transportation) to back them. Fortunately, a number of countries like China and Vietnam refused to go along with those recommendations.

Why was the Bank recommending futures market for Poland (potatoes); an orange juice futures market for Morocco; a fertilizer futures market for China? Why wasn't the Chief Economist's office more proactive in seeing the folly in many measures that structural adjustment and marketization pushed on member countries? Yet, Stiglitz is a vocal critic of the IMF for giving the same financial or economic advice? Was he or his office paying attention? Or did he think being the Vice President and Chief Economist was just an academic post to write papers?

A telling example could be the collaboration between China and the World Bank. Initially China was willing to use the Bank's

experience to learn from its own and the developing community's mistakes. Chinese authorities stated, however, that they did not want a big-bang approach, nor any structural adjustment loans. They did not want to move into marketization too quickly, and as a matter of fact, stated quite clearly, "we will move toward the market in our own time". "We accept the fact that we need assistance in identify our shortcomings and will weigh your recommendations carefully before we accept your money". China continues to regulate its economy by providing administrative prices for certain agricultural commodities to its state-owned industries. It continues to restrict which industries shall be state-owned. It continues to restrict imports of competing goods.

Stiglitz fails to see this process or development in the Bank's "knowledge and technology transfers". Readers will learn much from this competent book, but must realize its shortcomings, particularly his chapter on Development.

¹This book should be read with his first book, *Globalization and its Discontents*, Martin Wolf's *Why Globalization Works*, J. Sachs' *End of Poverty*, and J. Easterly's *The Elusive Quest for Growth*.

²Stiglitz has presented forty articles and major speeches about globalization, between two on globalization.



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