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The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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For Unity of Action by All Federalists at Regional, European and World Levels!

Bruno Boissière

Launched in March 1998 on the initiative of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), the supra-national organisation bringing together all federalist movements in Europe, the transnational campaign "For a European Constitution" aims at starting up a democratic procedure for the drafting of a European federal constitution involving all citizens and their elected representatives.

Since then, other European organisations in the civil society have joined the campaign: the Young European Federalists (JEF), the European Forum of Civil Society, the International European Movement, the Migrants Forum of the European Union, the Union of European Students... At their side, many tens of thousands of citizens have already signed the Campaign Appeal "For a European Constitution".

Today this citizens' campaign finds itself at the forefront of European politics. The chief diplomat of the most populous of the EU Member states has spoken out in a personal capacity in favour of the establishment of a European federation based on a Constitution. In doing that, Joschka Fischer has given an amplified echo to the recent declarations by Johannes Rau and Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Presidents of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Italian Republic, respectively, both in favour of a federal European Constitution.

From the diplomatic to the democratic method

Together the partners in the campaign are calling for a change in the method used for the construction of Europe, through abandoning the diplomatic method in favour of a democratic one.

Up to now, Europe's construction has been based on a series of treaties, originated by the will of the Member States. Today the single currency and the prospect of a common security and defence policy are a concrete contribution to a community destiny for Europe. But if this community is to avoid disintegration it must grow in stature and transform itself into a European political community. Europe then should now become an "identifiable political aim". Since this political community will either be democratic or it will be not, the construction of Europe must be pursued with the backing of the citizens.

The question now is to replace the intergovernmental conference with their successive revisions of the treaties, by a democratic procedure to prepare a European Constitution. In place of the "High Contracting Parties" of the sovereign states, signatories of the European treaties, should be substituted the constituent power (so coming from below) of the sovereign people. What is needed, to paraphrase the "founding fathers" of Europe, is to unite the peoples and not to form coalitions between the states. In short, Europe needs a constitution.

A Constitution to put Europe at the service of human beings

The European Constitution will be much more than a new and improved treaty. It will not be limited to defining the principles relating to the structure and operations of the European institutions; it will also and above all be a system linked to primordial legal values such as, in particular, the protection of liberty and human dignity. It is

around the central notion of the human beings that the citizenry will together be able to establish a community featuring solidarity and pluralism.

The European Constitution then will logically be dominated by the notion of fundamental rights and guided by the principles of democracy, primacy of law, solidarity and subsidiarity. In conformity with this last principle, it will include provisions putting limits to the powers of the Federation and federal entities and guarantees for the right of autonomy of regional and local bodies within the federal structure.

At the end of the day, the Constitution through its text and the methodology of its preparation, will give democratic legitimacy to a European political authority and to its decision as they concern Europe's citizenry as a whole. It will no longer only be making Europe for the Europeans or in their name, as governments have claimed to do it in the past; it will be a matter of Europe with the Europeans.

But the battle must continue to open the democratic process to enable the discussion and adoption of such a European Constitution, which expresses the will of European peoples to endow themselves with a common political system of governance, to survive together the challenges of the 21st century, and to invent a new model of shared development.

So let us hear the voices of the European peoples at Nice on December 7th, 2000!

The Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Union, who will be meeting as the European Council on December 7th-8th, 2000 at Nice will finalise the work of the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform and give official approval to the Charter of

Fundamental Rights in the European Union as drawn up by the ad hoc Convention.

After Maastricht and Amsterdam Europe will have a new treaty. To judge by the narrowness of the agenda which is now under revision and taking account of the unanimity required for all modifications to the existing treaties, one can seriously fear that the future draft treaty of Nice will once more reflect the lack of political will of the Member States most opposed to any strengthening of the political dimension of the Union.

For, without a qualitative leap in the political system facing an Union enlarged to 27-30 Member States, Europe will be condemned to institutional paralysis, abandoned to financial markets and impotent to face the challenge of globalisation.

There can be no strong Europe with weak institutions; and there can be no strong institutions unless they are supported by democratic legitimacy.

50 years after Robert Schuman's declaration it is time for Europeans to relaunch Europe, a Europe which is no longer an expression of the will of the sovereign states, but instead that of the citizens.

We as federalists have as common denominator the strengthening of the legal basis, the protection of human rights, solidarity between our peoples and the democratisation of the institutions at all levels. Regional, European and global federalists active throughout Europe, let us unite in the campaign for a European Constitution, let us enrich our diversity and march together towards new achievements! Let us add our voices to those of all European citizens, the organisations of the civil society and our elected representatives who have decided to make the voice of the sovereign people heard by demonstrating before the European Council at Nice on December 7th, 2000.

No Stable Euro Without Europe

Jean-Jacques Schul

Let us start by reminding ourselves that the miracle has happened: 11 countries have abandoned their national currencies in favour of a common currency. Two years ago, no one really expected this. Europe therefore has its capital market at last. And in the space of a year the volume of euro issues has overtaken that of the US dollar. Better still, issuers previously experiencing difficulty in accessing the international capital markets (municipalities and regions, including the less advanced ones, and businesses) have tapped the euro market heavily. The euro therefore facilitates investment in the Union and economic growth. It also makes the distribution of capital more equitable. These very gratifying results are cause for congratulation.

On the forex market, the euro had the misfortune to be born at a moment when both the might of the US economy and the structural weaknesses of the German economy emerged into broad daylight. The European currencies linked to the German Mark could only continue to lose value, as has happened since 1995 when the ecu, the euro's precursor, was worth USD 1.3. The euro has simply followed the same pattern.

Without the euro, the situation would doubtless have been worse. The Member States' tighter budgetary policies and European Central Bank (ECB) independence have been factors making for stability in the money markets. The wild exchange-rate fluctuations of the European currencies during the turbulence that buffeted Europe's money markets in 1993 and 1994 are nothing more than a bad memory. The European currencies and the euro displayed great stability during the Asian, Russian

Jacques Rueff, a former President of the Banque de France, once wrote: «Europe will have its single currency or will not exist».

Now that Europe has this, one can say: «The euro will be supported by a united Europe or will not survive».

and Latin-American crises. It is proving to be a great ally despite the wave of economic shocks. What would have become of the currencies of Belgium and France in the wake of the dioxin crises, the storms, or the oil spill catastrophe and so on if they had been floating freely? The idea that Europe could have kept its 11 independent currencies is a shuddering thought. The late Alain Prate, an Economic Adviser to General de Gaulle and Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, wrote: «True reform of the international monetary system is inconceivable as long as Europe keeps its 11 national currencies»¹.

In brief, while the euro is clearly not a strong currency – fortunately, as it happens – will it be a stable currency? Fluctuations of over 15% a year on the foreign exchanges are excessive. They far exceed the margins regarded as acceptable under the pre-1993 systems of “tunnels” and “snakes”.

To answer this question, let us look first of all at the euro's equilibrium level against the dollar. It is too early to say, but what is clear is that the rate on 1 January 1999 does not represent a stable level. An alternative approach is to take its historic value. The first European unit of account – the EUA – was created in 1950 with the same weight of gold as the US dollar (0.888 grammes of fine gold) and therefore had a value equal to the dollar (1 EUA = 1 USD).

In their great wisdom, the fathers of Europe moved systematically from one unit of account to the next on a one-for-one basis². Thus, 1 EUA (1950) = 1 Unit of Account (1962) = 1 ECU (1979) = 1 euro (1999). According to this logical sequen-

ce, a situation where 1 euro = 1 USD is in no way surprising, and variations between 1 and 2.2 USD to 1 euro are inevitable in a system of floating rates. The truth doubtless lies between the extreme values of the ecu: from 1.30 to 0.744 USD to the euro.

What factors will enable the euro to climb above parity? This does not of course depend solely on Europe. The interplay of relative interest rates set by the central banks will influence the rate at least in the short term. Were certain inherent weaknesses of the US economy – over-consumption, growing trade deficit, widening income gulf between rich and poor – to emerge into the open, this would be sufficient to take some of the gloss off the USD as a reserve currency and make the euro more attractive.

Even so, the European economy will need to overcome a number of major shortcomings, both economically and politically. Europe must demonstrate its capacity to eliminate the dysfunctional aspects revealed by the euro. In particular, it must show that it can continue to hold inflation down below 2%. It has managed to do this in a period of economic deflation. Will it succeed in a period of rapid growth? What this will require from Europeans is a capacity to deregulate and to eliminate the structural rigidities that still affect commercial, financial and social relations within the EU – a capacity they displayed in the distant past and now need to rediscover.

Politically, the least one can say is that the extent of European integration leaves much to be desired. Apart from the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice, the European institutions are much more of a mosaic of national interests than the expression of a true European vision on which the euro could be based. And even in these areas there are numerous shortcomings. The national central banks continue to load cross-border payments with charges justified by their "statistics". Banking supervisory regulations still differ from

country to country. Moreover, little progress has been made in tax harmonisation and European company and patent legislation.

All the European monetary unions of the XIXth century unaccompanied by political union failed to deliver on the promise of peace and, indeed, failed to survive. The strength of a currency depends also on those who manage it, namely the political masters. The weaknesses of the Italian lira, for instance, owed much more to mistrust of the country's political environment than of its economy.

A further failure at the Lisbon inter-governmental conference in June, following the failure of the Amsterdam summit 3 years ago, would be fatal for the euro. So, the question is, where will the impetus needed to drive European political integration forward come from? A majority of citizens have expressed themselves in favour of the euro and are calling for fundamental reform of the European institutions. On the other hand, polls show that they do not have much feeling of being European (43% do not identify themselves as citizens of Europe) and fewer than 2% have switched their bank accounts into euro. The euro is not yet therefore «this symbol of our belonging to a single community in Europe»³. That is the disquieting aspect of this low percentage.

As in a democracy, it is the citizens who decide the political reforms. It will take a considerable effort to make a majority of citizens aware of their responsibilities as holders of an international currency. But as Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg's Prime Minister, reminds us: «A single currency has to be worked for».

The strength or weakness of a currency is also measured by its points of reference. Now that currencies have lost gold as a standard, they are left with the willingness of their central bank, their government and their citizens to put up with temporary discomforts for the sake of undertaking the

Comments

necessary reforms. But the euro has neither government nor citizens to defend it. If it continues to lose value on the foreign exchanges, Euro-

pe's citizens will have only themselves to blame. After all, an international currency has to be worked for.

Article written in February 2000

¹ "Perspectives de l'Europe financière et monétaire", *Revue Banques*, October 1988, No 487

² This is demonstrated by the authors of "L'Euro pour l'Europe: des monnaies nationales à la monnaie européenne", *Promeuro asbl*. De Boeck University, second edition, 1999.

³ Giacobbi & Gronier, "Monnaie, monnaies" in *Le Monde Poche*, éditions Marabout, 1994, No 8610



Federalism in Russia: Old Problems and New Perspectives

Igor Kossikov

1. Federal relations in Russia are still in their formative stage. The delimitation of powers and areas of competence between the federal authority of the Center and the regional authorities was completed with the adoption of the Constitution in 1993. This process is still going on and is being modified by the political and socio-economic reforms taking place in the country. We are still in the initial stage of transition from a unitary state to a genuinely federal one, and so the shape of the future state system and the mechanism of its functioning are not yet quite clear. Mutual relations along the Center-Regions axis have not yet been integrated. And, such relations are essential to the stability and development of a vast polyethnic state like Russia.

The incomplete and contradictory character of these relations and the absence of a balance between the interests of the Center and those of the Regions causes recurring fits of panic: «Russia is falling apart! The state's disintegration is unavoidable!»

The Russian Federation has already proved to be strong on several occasions. We have lived through more than one "sovereignty parade" and witnessed several outbursts of both national and economic separatism. Fortunately, so far none of the 89 members of the Russian Federation, with the exception of Chechnya, has declared its desire to secede.

2. Russia's continued territorial integrity does not mean that the federation is developing without conflicts. There are many unresolved problems in the sphere of federal relations.

These problems fall into *three main groups*:

- politico-legal problems;
- economic problems, including budgetary and financial ones;
- ethno-political and ethno-cultural problems.

Prominent in the group of *politico-legal problems* is the issue of the delimitation of powers between the bodies of the federal authority and the authorities of the members of the Federation: the question of how to combine the development of federalism and the broad powers of the Regions with a strong state Center.

The process of concluding treaties between the Center and the Regions has been halted, although it has already embraced half the members of the Russian Federation (over 40 treaties have been signed). The practice of concluding such treaties is still being sharply criticized as leading to violations of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as a form of lobbying the interests of individual regions, and as a brake on the economic reforms in the country where all the regions must "play according to the same rules on the same economic field". Nevertheless, treaties and agreements do exist and with them unequal relations between the members of the federation and the federal center. In June 1999 President Boris Yeltsin signed a law approved by the Federal Assembly (the Parliament of the Russian Federation) on delimiting the powers of and areas of competence between the federal bodies of state authority and the bodies of state authority of the members of the Russian Federation. A law has been drafted at the Center concerning the responsibility of the heads of the Regions for violating the Russian Constitu-

tion, which provides for various punitive measures, including their removal from office. Such a law would introduce a kind of "institute of federal intervention" which would give Moscow the right to dissolve regional legislative bodies for adopting unconstitutional laws and to remove the heads of the Regions from office.

On the other hand, there is a tendency on the part of the Regions to limit the authority of the Center, obtaining more political, economic and, most important of all, financial independence. In that respect the interests of the regional elites coincide with the political interests of a number of members of parliament, particularly those belonging to the communist faction. The goals pursued by the Communist Party (CPRF) are to limit the powers of the Russian President, to amend the Constitution of the Russian Federation following the elections of the year 2000, and to establish a parliamentary republic. The communists believe (and their views are often voiced in the State Duma by its speaker, Gennady Seleznyov) that it is in a parliamentary republic that the independence of the Regions can be strengthened. The governors and the presidents of the republics, members of the Russian Federation, seem to be more interested in economic independence, since they have already received sufficiently extensive political rights and legal powers.

The group of *economic problems* comprises issues relating to the delimitation of property rights, financial, budgetary and tax relations, as well as industrial and social policy matters.

Many of the Regions, primarily large and industrially developed, reject the tendency towards excessive centralism in economic matters which has gained prominence in recent years. While the financial rights and levers are concentrated in Moscow, the responsibility for resolving social problems furthering the reforms and stabilizing the economy are being shifted more and more to the members of the Federation.

Gaining prominence in the group of *ethno-political problems* are questions relating to the establishment of regional (national) elites and the redistribution of powers in the course of on-going reforms. The struggle for real power and property in the regions which outwardly have the status of national republics may have ethnic coloring. This struggle has been stepped up in the North Caucasus, which is reflected in the recent events in Karachai-Cherkessia and Daghestan. The regional elites' struggle for economic power under national slogans is a conflict-breeding factor. Any intervention by the Center here is regarded (and interpreted for propaganda purposes) as infringement on the rights of particular ethnic groups.

The diversity of the problems to be solved in the sphere of federative relations requires special knowledge and a comprehensive approach in a number of areas, including the practical administration of the country. Clearly, there is a lack of such administrators today, as testified, if indirectly, by the endless reshuffling of the federal ministries in charge of the national and regional policies in Russia.

3. Having listed the main groups of problems in the present-day relations between the Center and the Regions, I would like to stress in particular that the solution of these problems has been frozen, as it were, at the level of the past years. The problems are old, and no new approaches towards their solution have been devised. Hence the conflicts. Let's examine them one by one.

The politico-legal group:

(3)1. The most acute problem here is Chechnya's special status. The solution of this question has been postponed. There is still no formula for mutual relations between Russia and Chechnya. The stumbling block is the difference in the interpretation of the term "independent state". The Chechen Republic (Ichkeria) insists on its vaguely formulated status of an independent state "outsi-

de Russia but together with her". As negotiations on this matter have shown, Chechnya would not be satisfied with the status of an "associated member state" – similar to the present status of the Republic of Tatarstan. The Russian side has insisted that Chechnya is a member of the Federation which can have very broad rights and considerable independence. Such a status is regarded as the main condition for Russia's help in restoring the economy and the social sphere of the Chechen Republic. But there is no meeting of minds on that issue. Meanwhile, tension on the border with Chechnya is growing; sections of the Chechen administrative border (actually a state border) with the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan are being fortified; new military operations are in progress.

(3)2. Another unresolved problem is the practice of concluding treaties and special agreements between the Center and members of the Federation. It is not clear whether the number of the members which have already concluded such treaties and agreements should be expanded or whether this practice should be stopped because it violates Russia's legal domain. Likewise, it is not clear whether there should be fewer but larger members of the Federation (an idea advanced by the governors).

Nor is it clear what to do about the treaties and agreements which have just expired – as in the case of the Republic of Tatarstan. Should they be annulled or prolonged? This treaty has been in effect for five years – since February 1994, and now it must be either renewed or discontinued. Meanwhile, the republic's "associated member" status, which has no parallel within the Federation, keeps turning up as an issue in international relations. For instance, many legal experts believe that it became the stumbling block when Russia and Belarus discussed establishing a union: it was not clear what place Tatarstan would occupy in the new union state. And in the legal sphere in general, the problems of Russia's relations with the other

CIS countries and its internal relations with the Regions are closely interwoven and should be resolved with the utmost circumspection.

(3)3. Yet another unresolved politico-legal problem relates to such composite members of the Russian Federation as the Tyumen Region with its autonomous states (the Khanty-Mansi and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Areas). Treaties on the division of the natural resources, property and even territory are already being concluded among them, but the Center has not yet reacted.

The economic group of problems:

The problem of which of the taxes collected in the Regions should go into the federal budget and which into the local budgets is still an outstanding issue. The Taxation Code (expected back in 1997) has not yet been adopted. And it is still not clear what to do about the transfers from the Federal Aid to the Regions' Fund.

Particularly acute in the economic group of problems are questions of administering property on the territory of the members of the Federation, particularly in cases where at the same time there are enterprises constituting federal, regional and local property. It is no secret that privatization "Chubais-style" was carried out on a unitary principle. Most of the Regions have lost the ownership of large enterprises (these remain federal property and pay no taxes into the regional budgets). At the same time the Center has willingly delegated the solution of social problems to the Regions; go ahead and yourselves find the money for social grants, regional development programs, etc. Hence the acute problem relating to the payment of wages and salaries and similar matters.

Only a couple of years ago it seemed that *ethno-political and ethno-cultural problems* were not particularly acute, that all the ethnic conflicts boiled down to socio-economic contradictions. Such ethno-political and ethno-cultural aspects of coo-

peration between the Center and the Regions as the correlation between federal and republican citizenship, the status of national languages, religion, education, etc. seemed less acute than political and socio-economic issues. Following the abolition of the "nationality" paragraph in the new Russian passport, the problem of citizenship has again become critical especially in Tatarstan and Bashkiria. There also is a language problem in the national republics concerning the unequal status of Russian and other languages (during the election of republican leaders there the rights of candidates who had no command of the national languages were curtailed). In that sphere of federative relations there is no clear-cut state policy either.

4. Looking back at the development of relations between the Center and the Regions, we must conclude with regret that many of the decisions in the sphere of state development were not dictated by the logic of the reforms, nor the logic of promoting federative relations in a polyethnic state, but by short-term political considerations, the immediate aims of the President's administration and the personal ambitions and wilful decisions of the President. That is why there was repeated shifting along the Center-Regions axis, when the process of power decentralization now gained momentum, now slowed down, giving way to vigorous centralization processes.

5. In the past two years we have witnessed different, often contradictory tendencies in the development of federal relations and in the regional policy of the Center.

From early 1998 on, there were clear tendencies towards the centralization of power and financial resources. The worsened economic situation, difficulties in repaying foreign loans, attempts to influence the gubernatorial elections taking place in a number of regions – all this prompted the authorities to try to strengthen the power of the Center at the expense of the Regions. Thus, the Ministry of Finance, the federal financial agency,

tried to establish control over the Regions' foreign loans by tightening the terms of the issue of regional Eurobonds. The Ministry for State Property, the federal executive body in charge of the privatization and management of property, placed its territorial representatives on the staff of regional administrations in order to supervise the local agencies on bankruptcies, the securities market and the industries. There is an obvious tendency to establish control over the property of the Regions at the stage of monetary privatization and redistribution of the rights of managing the assets of privatized enterprises. Conclusion of new treaties with the members of the Federation on delimiting powers was halted. Sergei Kiriyenko's cabinet was drafting a new Tax Code and preparing to alter the system of inter-budgetary relations.

From August 1998, and well into the spring and summer of 1999, directly opposite tendencies – greater decentralization of power and state administration – were gaining momentum. The financial and economic crisis, the dismissal of the cabinet, the collapse of the banking system, the devaluation of the rouble and the default on foreign debts – all weakened the Center so much that the Regions were simply compelled to act in defiance of the federal laws in order to survive economically and to prevent social upheavals.

The 1998 financial and political crisis in Russia led to a second "sovereignty parade". Taking part in it were not only the national republics (as in 1992-93), but all the Regions without exception, even those which depended on the Center financially most of all. Examining the actions taken by the regional authorities in the autumn of 1998, we see such manifestations of economic voluntarism, or even economic separatism, as: a ban on the export of food to other regions, control over the pricing policy, non-payment of taxes into the federal budget, setting up regional banks subordinate only to the governors, establishing their own gold and currency reserves, introduction of a regional

monopoly on alcohol, etc. These actions by the regional authorities were possible only because the crisis in the country revealed the weakness of the central authority, its inability to solve either regional or federal problems. Ensuring greater independence of the Regions became an objective necessity.

6. So what are we in for? The country's final disintegration?

It seems that the financial crisis and the completion in the year 2000 of the President's term of office present an opportunity to restructure relations within the framework of the Federation. But any fundamental changes will require a revision of the country's Constitution, which will only be possible under a new President and a new State Duma.

In the sphere of inter-budgetary relations two tendencies will continue to clash. On the one hand the Center is compelled to give the Regions more financial independence, allowing them to keep a significant part of the taxes, and, on the other, it is not yet possible to stop making transfers from the federal budget altogether. There are two reasons for that: fear of separatism within the framework of the Federation and the great dependence of the regional budgets on subsidies. Pending the 2000 elections, the federal authority is unwilling to give up its levers of exerting pressure on the Regions.

The strengthening of horizontal ties between regions and the start of inter-regional integration,

now in the conditions of a market system, are a notable new tendency in the development of the economies of the Regions. At the beginning of the reforms there was a gap in the ties formed earlier under a planned economy. Then the emphasis was on strengthening the regional autarky of the territories which tried to ensure their economic independence after they had acquired political freedom. Whereas the interregional ties used to be weaker than the foreign economic ones, now there is a weakening of the latter, especially as far as imports are concerned. Cooperation between neighboring regions is on the increase; a regional industrial policy is being worked out. The above processes are a response to the incomplete economic independence of some members of the Russian Federation, as well as to inefficient state regulation.

Economic integration among regions, based on an awareness of their particular interests, is a positive tendency. In the long term, it may lead to new territorial combinations – up to an enlargement of administrative territories and to a more logical rearrangement of the country's map. This should not be done in haste, however: any administrative reforms must be allowed to "mature", and any arbitrary actions are bound to come to no good. All changes should be evolutionary and in keeping with the logic of the reforms. In other words, they should correspond to real economic, political and social transformations, ensuring a balance of interests between the Center and the Regions.



Oil and the Islamic Question

Antonio Mosconi

Islam and oil represent respectively the spiritual and the material resource of western Asia and northern Africa. In no other regions in the world such a tight association between theology and geology can be found.

If Pakistan is excluded from western Asia, in the optimistic perspective of a peaceful Indo-pakistani federation (although not supported by the present state of relations between the two countries), and if Africa is considered as a whole, taking for granted the bold and sorely tried ambition of the OAU, the two areas would contain one billion people (240 millions the first and 760 millions the second). They make up that one sixth of mankind which appears to be more distant from the attainment of a "federalist behaviour" (cosmopolitanism and communitarism, according to Albertini¹) and from the possibility to become part of the leading group attempting to give a political direction to globalization; but they also make up the one sixth of mankind that would benefit the most from it.

Many people believe that the problem with the Islamic world is deeply rooted in a fundamental difference between that religion and Christianity. Only Islam would be imperialistic, in the sense that it wants to convert all infidels in the world, and totalitarian, for its pretension to subject to religious laws all aspects of human life: individual and collective, physical and moral, economical and political. I believe that it must be acknowledged that also Christianity, with its temporal power, in a less advanced phase of European history, had the same ambitions, later reshaped on account of the economic and social development that laid the foundations for the Reformation. Catholic inte-

gralism represents nowadays only a Paretian remnant of that remote historical contingency, buried by the Enlightenment. Islamic integralism, instead, after the great attempt to laicization initiated in Turkey by Kemal Ataturk, is regaining influence on every aspect of political life in a growing number of countries. Also Sionism provided fuel to Islamic fundamentalism, thus contributing to weaken the lay post-colonial ruling classes in the Arab world. The economic underdevelopment, the fear that modernization and laicization bring with them a loss of identity, and the assimilation of the entire West with the American Empire are the main reasons for the new fundamentalist virulence. Only economic and social development could open the doors to an Islamic Reformation and to the establishment of federalist behaviours.

The oil age, that according to present estimates could last for another century, is reproducing in western Asia and in northern Africa the uninterrupted chain of atrocities that the coal and steel age caused in Europe. The OPEC countries in the Middle East, that thirty years ago were covering 80% of the requirements of the industrialized countries, have fallen today to under 40%. They are thus afraid of losing their political influence compared to the emerging producers: Caucasian Republics, Black Sea region and former Soviet Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan). On the other hand, non-producing countries, like Armenia, Georgia, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Dagestan have become strategic due to oil and gas pipelines projects². Russia plans to reach the West through the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and the East through Afghani-

stan. The United States, with the support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is considering its own pipeline which, also from the Caspian Sea, should reach the Arabic Sea through Afghanistan. That is why Arabia and Pakistan (both Sunnite) are financing the *talibans* (also Sunnite), with the American approval; whilst Russia, Uzbekistan, Tagikistan, India, Turkey and Iran (Shiite) are supporting the Afghan opposition. So it happens that the oil routes cross the faith routes, and that the West, under the American hegemony, one day is financing the nationalists and the next is inspiring humanitarian wars. The Caspian Sea represents the navel of western Asia, and also a crossroads of world interests, which are moving not only in *bits* but also through *pipelines*. To the north-west of this umbilical area there lie the poorest European countries; to the south-west the best quality oil, available in the biggest quantities and at the lowest extraction cost. The per capita income in western Asia is 8-9 % the American, and is distributed very unevenly; it's no surprise that 10 % of the population (half the young adult males) officially is in the army. To the "official" soldiers there would be to add guerrillas and irregular troops of any kind, on top of those "civilians" serving in various "mafias".

With a GNP of \$500 billions, Africa is the poorest continent in the world. Per capita incomes greater than \$5000 are found only in some Maghreb countries exporting oil and in those of southern Africa richer in gold, diamonds and other mining resources. Moreover riches, even where they exist, are systematically plundered by the new post-colonial alliance between the strong powers of the Western countries and the local ruling classes, subordinate to them. Hence it's no wonder that in Africa the maps of wars and poverty coincide more than anywhere else.

The attempts to regional integration, Islamic or pan-African, have been strongly influenced by world politics. The Arab League was formed in March 1945 to unite the Middle East countries (including the PLO), those of Maghreb and of the

Nile Valley, Somalia and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, under the banner of the lay anti-European pan-Arabism. It did even succeed in instituting, in 1965, an Arabic Common Market; however, already weakened by the attainment of the decolonization goal, it was finally paralyzed by disagreements among its member States over such crucial questions as the conflict with Israel and the one between Irak and Kuwait. Only with the "thaw" did the aspiration to African unity overcome the limits of the Arabic glueing factor, so to expand to the whole continent. The Organization for African Unity (OAU, 1963) was founded by 32 countries which had just achieved independence. In the same year the EEC produced one of its first fruits, the Yaoundé Convention, pillar of the tariff and aid to development policy towards eighteen EEC-associated African countries, and Pope John XXIII issued the Encyclical *Pacem in terris*. In 1971 the Islamic countries, willing to promote cooperation, to protect the Holy Places and to support the Palestinian cause, but also to prevent and to counter the threat to their government posed by the fundamentalist terrorism, founded the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to which at present 51 Asian and African countries, one European (Albania) and the PLO belong. The OIC too proved to be unable to prevent or to repress such aberrant events like the Algerian massacres and the ethnic cleansings in former Yugoslavia. Instead, the seed laid in Yaoundé with its "communitarian method" yielded its fruits, since as soon as the EEC was enlarged to Great Britain, a new convention was stipulated (Lomé, 1975), extending from the sub-saharian African countries to those in the Caribe and in the Pacific (ACP). The "Lomé policy" was based on contractual relations, with rights and obligations on both sides, rather than on unilateral concessions as in a system of generalized preferences; it was defined by regions, excluding from the benefits the countries non-adhering to the convention; it devised several tools for cooperation; it was implemented through a constant dialogue within common institutions. However the numerous African

regional organizations, although inspired by the communitarian method, did not prevent tribal wars to recur inside a nation and to extend to neighbouring nations, often members of the same economic group. A few conflicts have deteriorated into actions of systematic massacre of civilian population. Hence African unity appears today an illusion, while the alternative of an Arab/Islamic unity of African and Asian countries is facing, on a wider scale, the same difficulties found in western Asia. This picture, already gloomy, is further complicated by the different policies pursued by the United States (which in 1997 has announced its intention to enter into closer and closer relations with Africa) and by the European Union (and sometimes by its single states); by the resulting misunderstandings; by the native or fundamentalist reactions, culminated in the recent terroristic aggressions against American embassies and in the US military response.

The infra-capitalistic contradictions interact, mostly in northern Africa, with those shaking the Islamic world over the question of the relations between religion and politics. Northern Africa may be listed among the hinge-countries, in this case among Europe, sub-saharian Africa and Arab/Islamic world. Europe should have an autonomous and well defined idea about what type of neighbours it would like to have on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean Sea; this means it should have a foreign policy directing and conditioning aids and preferences, funds and investments, energy imports and technology exports, having in mind the goal of African unity.

In conclusion, western Asia and Africa cannot any longer be considered regional groupings capable to perform the functions of model and engine in the process of political unification of mankind.

This does not mean that a billion human beings shall be ruled by others, in a kind of neo-colonialism, but only that the burden to define the conditions whereby they could live peacefully and participate in the government of the world is to be firstly upon the shoulders of the politically more mature regions. In the countries composing this variegated and fertile area, as a matter of fact, the first and basic condition is missing, whereby a federative process can start, which is a political guidance. There is nothing in sight comparable to the "convergence of the *raisons d'état* of France and Germany", to the "federalists, or Mazzinian activists" or to an "external federator" (the three agents of European unification in Albertini's analysis, see note 1). On the contrary, one may easily imagine how, at international level and for the duration of the oil age, the Russian-European interests will be diverging from the Saudi-American ones.

The federalists' task is not to support the first ones against the second ones (both are already backed by powerful champions, or better yet *lobbies*, as they are now called), but rather to indicate incessantly the political solutions which could avoid the recurrence on a world scale, in the oil age, of the tragedies that the french-german conflicts produced in the coal and steel age. The political unification of Europe into a federal state, necessary for her to actively pursue a policy of peace, has not yet been achieved after more than half a century of commitment by part of the European federalists. This is the reason why this is still their primary objective. However federalists do not want Europe in order to play war from stronger positions, but to achieve peace through reason and example. Europe is not only a geographic expression, nor even an ultimate goal. It is the medium through which the value of federalism, peace, could reach a first reasonable approximation.

¹ Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was professor of Philosophy of Politics at the University of Pavia (Italy). He has been President of the European Federalist Movement and of the Union of European Federalists.

² A concise analysis, which can anyway do justice to the boundless literature on the matter, is found in: Alessandro Corneli, "La nuova geopolitica, guidata dagli oleodotti" ("The new geopolitics, driven by oil pipelines"), in *Il Sole-24 Ore*, August 26, 1999.

The Internationalisation of Jerusalem: a Difficult Political Task

Paolo Di Motoli and Francesco Pallante

Pope John Paul II's recent journey to Palestine has brought up again the dispute about the sovereignty over Jerusalem. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, which is slowly approaching a solution, is therefore re-emerging as in the past, whenever the "problem of Jerusalem", which still sharply divides the two communities, is raised. Palestinians have always asserted that *Al Quds*, the Holy City, should become the capital of a future Palestinian state, as is also stated in para. 3 of the draft Constitution of the Palestinian Authority. The Israelis on their part have always stressed that Jerusalem, in a distant past, has been the capital of a Jewish state, and never of any kind of Arab entity (and truly the word Zionism, which defines Jewish nationalism in its many variations, indicates the return to Zion, that is one of the hills on which Jerusalem is built).

The city, formerly the administrative seat of British Palestine, was divided in two, from 1948 to 1967, by a north-south line that crossed city quarters and houses with barbed-wire and concrete walls. Since the end of the Six Day War, Jerusalem has been firmly held by the Israelis, who consider it the capital of their state, whilst almost all governments in the world and international organisations refuse to recognise it as such.

The proposal to solve the conflict by internationalising the city, presented many times, has always been rejected, first by the Arabs and now by the Israelis. The most important official document where the internationalisation of Jerusalem is discussed is UN Resolution No. 181, dated 29 November 1947. This resolution ratified the partition of Palestine, creating a Jewish state with an

area of 14,100sq.km, with 558,000 Hebrews and 405,000 Arabs; an Arab state with an area of 11,500 sq.km inhabited by 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Hebrews; and a zone under international jurisdiction which included Jerusalem, Bethlehem and other minor villages, with 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Hebrews. An economic union among the two states and the international zone was to balance the partition.

The definition of Jerusalem's status is found in Part 3 of the Resolution. According to this, the city was to be *a corpus separatum* under a special international law and administered by a fiduciary administrative Council (*the Trusteeship Council*) on behalf of the United Nations. The Council was to draft a Charter for the City of Jerusalem, based on the numerous provisions already written down in the resolution. Such a Charter would have had the objective of ensuring religious peace, coexistence and co-operation among the various communities present in the area.

As far as the institutional organisation is concerned, there was to be a Governor, chosen by the Council on behalf of the UN, in charge of the administration, of the management of international relations and of the custody of the Holy Places, and of the other religious buildings and places located in any part of Palestine. As a guarantee of impartiality it was established that the Governor could not be a citizen of either the Arab or the Jewish state, that the force at his disposal be an international police, and that he be assisted by an administrative staff composed of a majority of international personnel.

The only body elected by the inhabitants of Jeru-

salem was to be the Legislative Council, which had powers in legislative and tax matters. However the Governor had veto power over decisions considered dangerous for the safeguarding of the Holy Places and for the peaceful coexistence among the communities.

The integration of the Jerusalem zone in the context of the territorial partition of Palestine was to be eased by the economic union and by the presence of diplomatic representations of the Arab and the Jewish states in Jerusalem.

Finally, section D of Part 3 of the resolution stated that the Charter drafted by the Trusteeship Council (which should have come into force no later than 1 October 1948) was to remain in force for a period of 10 years, unless the Council deemed it necessary to re-examine some measures. After this period the whole Charter was to be subjected to re-examination by the Council and, by referendum, also the citizens of Jerusalem could express their will to modify the law of their city.

The UN plan, accepted unwillingly by the Hebrews and openly rejected by the Arabs, became anyway unrealisable because of the 1948-49 war, which resulted in the Israelis occupying the western part of Jerusalem, and Jordan its eastern part (including the "old City", heartland of the Holy Places of the three monotheistic religions).

The internationalisation of the city was anyway proposed again by the UN General Assembly, which made it the *conditio sine qua non* for the admission of Israel to the United Nations. This position was reaffirmed also after Israel's admission to the UN, with the approval of Resolution No. 303, dated 9 December 1949, by the General Assembly, and on 4 April 1950 the Trusteeship Council approved the Charter for Jerusalem. Pope Pius XII also declared himself in favour of the internationalisation of Jerusalem in his encyclicals *Auspicia quaedam* and *In multiplicis curis* in 1948, and in the *Redemptoris nostri* in April 1949.

Ben Gurion, after having accepted the UN posi-

tion and given a formal written warrant not to oppose internationalisation, did not keep his pledge: disagreeing with his foreign minister Moshe Sharett, in December 1949 he declared West Jerusalem an integral part of the Jewish state and on 23 January 1950 he transferred the capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Meanwhile Jordan had already annexed the eastern part of the city just after the end of the 1948 conflict.

On 29 June 1967, after the victory in the Six Days war, Israel unilaterally declared the "reunification" of Jerusalem, committing itself to safeguarding freedom of access to the Holy Places, and the autonomous administration, on the part of the various confessional communities, of their shrines and institutions. However the differences between Israel on one hand and the Holy See and Palestinians on the other worsened when an urban development plan was drafted, which, by expropriating land owned mostly by Arabs, was to build around the city a ring of new residential quarters for housing Hebrew immigrants.

As the prospect of internationalisation had by this point faded away, the Vatican began to support an "internationally guaranteed Charter" for the Holy Places, thus separating the question of the legal safeguarding of the religious shrines from that concerning sovereignty over the city. In July 1980 however, the dispute over the city worsened further, when the government headed by Menachem Begin approved the Fundamental Law (a kind of constitutional law, as Israel does not have a Constitution), which declared Jerusalem "the only and eternal capital of the Hebrew state", openly in contrast with the views of the international community, which to this day considers East Jerusalem an "occupied territory".


In the present state of affairs, Israel does not appear to be willing to renounce its sovereignty over the city, but it is open to discussions about international custody of the Holy Places. The Vatican, initially very inclined to internationalisation,

has, with the encyclical *Redemptiois anno* (written by Pope John Paul II in 1984), formalised its availability to accept Israeli and/or Palestinian sovereignty, limiting itself to call for suitable international guarantees for the "old city". This position was confirmed by the Pope in his recent journey to Palestine. The Palestinian prevailing position is now apparently seeking to obtain the eastern part of the city, inhabited mostly by Arabs, in order to make it the capital of their future state.

The compromise solution that presently is the most regarded provides that Israel keep its full sovereignty over Jerusalem, assuring the safe-

guard of the Holy Places with a Charter of special international guarantees. To the Palestinian Authority only a small city district would be given in its eastern part, not very far from the Mosques esplanade and connected through a narrow corridor to the territory of the future Palestinian State.

The internationalisation idea, that in the past looked feasible, is still favoured by those (like the Israeli movement Peace Now) who refuse to surrender to the logic of separation, in the belief that only a solution of a federal type will be able to guarantee for the two peoples, still divided, a lasting, peaceful and co-operative coexistence.



An Unfinished Democracy is a Threatened Democracy

Grazia Borgna

Democracy is never acquired for ever; it is a regime in need of constant care. Without widespread and continuous participation it falls prey to the strongest groups. This is particularly true for countries that are currently struggling to conquer and establish democracy, such as Iran, but also for mature industrialised countries, where big economic and financial groups tend to impose their strategies in ways which are beyond democratic control.

At the end of May, three months after the elections of the 18 February (2nd Khordad), the new Parliament (Majlis) is supposed to take office. Eighty per cent of the population went to the polls to vote for the candidates of the Reformist Front (...and of the Conservative). A prominent figure in the Reformist Front is Mohammed Reza Khatami, the leader of the Front for the Participation of Islamic Iran, and the younger brother of the President of the Republic, Mohammad Khatami, who was triumphantly elected on 23 May 1997 (1st Khordad). He is in favour of maintaining good relations with the West in order to trigger the economic take-off of the country. The leader of the Conservative Front is Ali Khamenei - the Supreme Guide - successor to the Ayatollah Khomeini, and bulwark of religious fundamentalism. The Conservative Party had a majority in the outgoing Parliament, but the democratisation process, which started after the election of Khatami as President of the Republic, overturned the situation. In the new Parliament, expected to take office in May or June, the Reformist Coalition will have an absolute majority. This victory is particularly significant since it took place in spite of fraud, threats, and the exclusion from the lists of candidates of influential

reformist candidates. At the end of April, however, when the sweeping victory of the reformists had already become clear, the tension at the top started to grow dangerously. With a true *coup de main* the Judiciary, controlled by the Ultra-conservative Islamic Right led by the spiritual guide Ali Khamenei, closed 11 liberal newspapers which had come into existence after the reform of the freedom of the press carried out by Khatami in 1997. The papers were accused of having published articles against the precepts of Islam. Directors and journalists were arrested; homicides, bomb attacks and attempts on people's life were perpetrated.

The confrontation between Right and Left is not only religious, but also about economic issues. For example, the Foundations control more than one third of the economy of the country, but do not pay taxes, and answer for their actions directly to the supreme guide. The Right, as underlined by many international editors, is trying to prevent the new Parliament from taking office and from bringing about the reforms deemed necessary by a large share of the new Iranian middle classes. We refer to the Reform of the Constitution, the privatisation of the banks and of the currently state-owned companies, the Reform of the Civil Code, and the overture to the West. Iran ranks fourth among oil-producing countries and second for gas reserves, but this is not enough to ensure development.

In the past three years, in fact, the free newspapers have denounced the heavy intrusions perpetrated by the regime into the private lives of Iranians, but crimes committed by the secret services

and the parallel police forces of the Pasdaran and of Bassiji are still unpunished. The conservatives intend to provoke popular protest and seize the opportunity to cancel the results of the election. The reformists, however, have not reacted to provocation. Khatami called on the population to keep calm and show solidarity, as he had already done in July 1999 during the revolt at the University of Teheran. Then students demonstrated following the killing of five progressive dissidents perpetrated by the secret services led by the supreme guide, and not by western spies as claimed by conservative propaganda.

It is now a top priority to manage to install the new Parliament. Khatami wants to play the card of democracy to the very end, showing that his way of doing politics is different and uses only legal protest. According to the writer Mohammed Boulatabadi, "Iranians have learned a lesson from the terrible mistakes of the past, the ideological and revolutionary cleansing, and the war. They have realised that only legal and democratic protests and the safeguard of human rights can lead to true change. We are not revolutionary – he adds – we are in favour of democracy".

The sweeping victory of the Progressive Party is mainly due to women and young people, who can no longer tolerate the religious authorities' interference in every little detail of their private life (such as, how to live, what to read, how to dress, which music to listen to, and so on). In Iran, the right to vote starts at the age of 16, and the majority of votes for the reformists came from young people in the 16 to 24 age bracket who did not take part in Khomeini's revolution (20 million out of a population of 38.7 million). This demographic bomb is the force behind social change. In the past three years Iran has changed dramatically. For example, about 300 new daily papers have come into existence. Many reformist leaders are actually former Khomeinists who have been disappointed because, as stated by Abbas Abdi, a reformist candidate, "revolutions come into being against regi-

mes which are closed, authoritarian, and do not respect public opinion...but we did not know that we were sharing the same culture. Trial-and-error, however, ends up opening your eyes to things... Little by little I realised that the will of the people had not been respected and understood that our main goal, in other words, to give power to the people, had been betrayed... With the election Iranians showed that they are willing to take power..., but not to run the risk of another disappointment or degeneration, we must promote a true democratic society, with parties, associations, and free papers. Institutions must be created, since this is the only way to decrease the risk of involution". In Iran people say that the dictatorship of slippers (of mullahs) has replaced the dictatorship of boots (of the shah). The mullahs, however, will have to give up some of their power over lay society since the religious presence in the new Parliament will be a minority. Therefore the flick of the tail of an increasingly weak religious power is indeed very dangerous.

The Khomeini's revolution created religious institutions that are parallel to civil institutions. The Supreme Guide offsets the power of the President of the Republic and often is superior to him. The Council of Guardians of the Revolution, whose decisions are not open to appeal, offsets the Majlis (for example, it validates the election results). The Judicial Power offsets the Justice Department. The College of Experts offsets the government. An armed body formed by Pasdaran and Bassiji offsets the regular Armed Forces. In addition, a network of mullahs is just about everywhere.

It is very unlikely that they are willing to abdicate their old privileges and a large part of their political and economic power without putting up a struggle.

In fact, the Council of Guardians of the Revolution, besides closing down the reformist newspapers, annulled in places the vote obtained by the Reformist Front, eliminating some of the liberal

politicians who had been properly elected, and put down the spontaneous protests of the population with bloodshed.

In addition, members of the Council announced their intention to have the ballots handed over to them for re-counting, giving the strong possibility of tampering. Facing the poor results of the former President of the Republic Hashemi Rafsanjani, for example, they arranged to have the vote given to his daughter Faezeh converge on him, avoiding a second ballot. Before the election he asserted that he wanted to hold the balance between the Progressive and the Conservative Front. Controlling the greater part of wealth, officially state-owned, he wanted strict control over economic reforms. In any case, the time of Rafsanjani, according to the movie director Abbas Kiarostami, was over with his electoral defeat.

What are the perspectives in store for Iran, a country balanced on a knife-edge between dictatorship and democracy? Certainly, western countries can

encourage the implementation of the economic and democratic reforms promoted by Khatami, granting substantial financial aid and supporting the creation of a wide integrated area of Muslim countries of which Iran may well become the leader.

As already stressed several times, Europe in particular could carry out a key role in the peace process and in the promotion of development. Today, however, Europe is silent because it lacks a unified political will, a democratic government representing the continent on the world stage.

In May and June of the year 2000 the democratic world will have to follow with attention what is taking place in Iran and react strongly if the results of the election are invalidated and as a consequence the new Parliament is not able to take office. This reaction would be consistent with the long struggle to safeguard human rights.

Article written in April 2000



Mozambique, why Africa Needs European Unity

Guido Montani

Europe barely noticed the dramatic events that unfolded in Mozambique and later in Madagascar, as defenceless villages were first battered by a violent cyclone on February 21st last, and shortly afterward swept away by devastating floods.

It has been estimated that the tragedy touched some seven hundred thousand people, and it is far too early to start counting the missing and the dead. For days, and sometimes even weeks, survivors sought refuge in makeshift treetop shelters and on rooftops. South Africa immediately sent five helicopters, whose pilots worked around the clock for as long as they could endure the physical strain. Many of those who had mustered every ounce of their strength to survive the cyclone were later drowned by the floodwaters, as they waited for aid that never arrived. America and Europe stepped in after about a month. Without the rapid response of volunteer organisations and the alarms raised by several major television networks, the governments of the world's rich nations might never have lifted a finger.

It's the same old story, especially in Africa. If the emergency is caused by local conflicts, the wealthy countries hide behind their all too convenient policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. However, in the case of a natural disaster, this is just an embarrassing alibi. The truth is that governments are not charitable organisations. The national ruling class is concerned about gathering votes and wielding power, and since Africans do not vote in Europe or the USA, what's so surprising if the newspapers devote only a few sketchy lines to these

distant tragedies on their international news page?

"What's so surprising?", is the usual response; "people primarily look out for their own interests." And the doctrine of political realism also explains why it is that in relations between sovereign states, governments need to act in order to maximise their power, independently of ethical motivations. Yet, in today's world, change is afoot. Information and pictures travel so quickly that it is almost impossible to ignore those who are suffering and dying before our very eyes, though they may be thousands of miles away. Once we have seen real suffering in the eyes of another human being, it is hard not to ask what can be done about it. This is probably what has led to the creation of thousands of religious and secular volunteer organisations which promptly rush to deal with emergencies in far-off lands to help the local populations, although their material resources are lamentably scarce. These organizations are something of a novelty, which can be considered as a side effect of globalization. In the age of Marco Polo, Columbus and Livingstone, transcontinental solidarity, as a social phenomenon, would have been materially impossible, and hence unthinkable. Today, on the contrary, global interdependence is apparent not just in the business and financial arenas but also in the field of ethical relationships. We are on the path of a global civil society.

However, despite their generosity, non-governmental organisations have clear limits: Mozambique is a case in point. Helicopters were the only way to reach survivors isolated by the floods.

Hundreds of people were condemned to death by drowning because there were simply too few helicopters on hand to carry them to safety. But once rescued, the survivors still had to contend with shortages of food and medicine, which needed to be shipped in from other countries in vast amounts. It is obvious that the State is indispensable as an organiser of material and human resources for the benefit of the common good: the peaceful coexistence of interdependent peoples. But what kind of (supranational) State is needed to sow the seeds of this nascent sense of supranational solidarity and foster its growth and development?

The federalist project is essential. To deal with that problem, Federalism does not advocate changing human nature, or preach solidarity and altruism (in order to forge the "new man" as other ideologies have done in the past, in some of their utopian variants). Since Kant and Hamilton, the federalist idea belongs to the tradition of political realism – if political realism is not conceived as having any regard for values, but rather as a political way of thinking that indicates the most fitting way of fulfilling certain values. In point of fact, politics is a human activity which is intimately related to Max Weber's ethic of responsibility. In accepting mankind for what it is – something in between the feral and the divine – federalists are fighting for federation as the only mean of guaranteeing peace. Peace between sovereign States will not come about thanks to the goodwill of some individual or government. Peace is an Organization. It is a (federal) State made up of (national) States.

With federalism, some political behaviour that already exist at the national level, including solidarity, can be institutionalised at the international level. In the national State, the ideal of solidarity between generations is realized in the form of pension systems (though these may differ slightly from country to country); solidarity between the healthy and the sick is realized by the public

health care system; and solidarity between those who are employed and those who are jobless by the unemployment subsidies. With federalism, entirely new forms of solidarity can be forged between nations. It is a little known fact that the European Union has already created institutions of this kind. Structural funds, especially regional funds and funds for economic and social cohesion, transfer resources from the wealthy countries and regions of Europe to the poorer countries and regions. Though the European budget is limited, the mechanism for a supranational redistribution of resources already exists and is running efficiently.

But what could a European government have done to ease a situation like that of Mozambique and Madagascar? Firstly, it should be noted that the African nations are already united with the European Union through the Lomé Convention, which is a North-South partnership for development, with shared institutions for the management of common programmes and policies. Today, the Lomé Convention is little more than a symbol of what Europe could do if it really wanted to. Regrettably, however, it allocates a pitifully small amount of resources to implementing the Convention. The countries of the EU prefer to manage their aid funds at the national level, so that they can preserve their "zones of influence" in Africa. Hence, the division of Europe fuels the division of Africa: each individual African country is obliged to enter into dozens of separate bilateral agreements with different European countries.

Instead, a European government could concentrate all the resources it decides to allocate to Africa into integrated projects for the development of the whole continent. At present, with European aid reaching Africa from a host of separate countries, it would be inconceivable, for example, to plan and build an African railway network. Instead, a European government could set out to implement far more ambitious projects, which would have significant political repercussions: a

united Europe would help Africans to unite and to grow. The existence of a European government would also raise expectations and lead to initiatives that are today impossible. For instance, when an emergency arises which triggers an emotional tidal wave of solidarity, volunteer organisations put their wheels in motion and, if grassroots pressures persist, national governments get their act together too. However, no thought is ever given to the idea of Europe operating as one. Since no single national government has the power to implement long-term policies, such as creating a standing task force to deal with emergency situations anywhere in Africa, no one even dares to suggest such a solution and every new emergency brings everyone back to square one. Instead, a European government could create Euro-African institutions that would be the cornerstone for the systematic organization of supranational solidarity.

Secondly, the word "natural" to describe the disaster in Mozambique and Madagascar is a glaring misnomer: it should actually be called an "artificial" disaster, since it seems that it is the greenhouse effect that, as many scientists have been warning for decades, is leading to dramatic climate changes. The average temperature of the planet is constantly rising and environmental catastrophes are being reported more and more frequently: we need only mention recent events in France, China, Honduras, the United States and Africa. The UN raised the alarm in 1988 at the Toronto Conference and adopted some preliminary measures at the Kyoto Conference in 1997, but so far very little has been done. Countries all have good reasons for believing that their neighbours should make the first move. One for one and God for all. Meanwhile, the years speed by and the world is on course for an inescapable global ecological disaster. On its own, no European federal government could turn back the tide, but

it would at least force Europe to adopt a severe environmental policy and press for the US and other polluting nations to do likewise.

Thirdly, as federalists never tire of repeating, the political unification of Europe would represent a new model for political relations between nations based on supranational democracy. Today, when people think about their political community, the community within which relations of solidarity are fostered, they think about their own nation. Only a few political vanguards look beyond their national borders. If the struggle for a European Federation proves to be a winner, solidarity will no longer be trammelled by national borders. A new way of thinking will emerge. Europe could become a model for other people who favour supranational integration, in other continents and even at the global level. Ultimately it would be necessary to reform the UN in order to establish a cosmopolitical federation, in which every citizen has the power to shape the common destiny of mankind.

There are, therefore, several good reasons to stand up and fight for European unity. Through European federalism it is possible to raise the level of morality and political engagement, weaving close-knit bonds between nations that can make possible tomorrow that which today seems impossible.

Solidarity can exist at many different levels: volunteer organisations have brought inter-individual relations into a vast network which does not balk before the *raison d'état* and has occasionally even swayed international politics.

However, the federalist struggle to unite Europe is a decisive step. Only with a European Federation will mankind experience the first institutions of supranational solidarity.

The first summit meeting in Cairo this week for

Euro-African Summit

Only a Federal Europe Can Show Africa the Way of Unity and Development

leaders of European Union and African countries can mark an important step for the European Union and its relations with Africa. It demonstrates that, when acting united, the countries of the European Union have the potential of becoming an active and responsible force in world affairs, able to bring about new solutions to international problems. Europe has a particular responsibility towards the African continent, the only part of the world still at the margins of world growth and development, and this Summit can mark the start of a new progressive partnership.

JEF wholeheartedly welcomes this Summit, and hopes it shows that, rather than creating a "fortress Europe", European countries, united through the European Union, can work with other parts of the world towards mutually beneficial objectives and for a more secure and fair international order.

JEF stresses however that helping the African continent to move out of poverty and division, towards internal peace and security, economic development, integration in the global markets, is

an immense and historic task. The European Union will be able to give a real contribution to Africa's future, and achieve real and long-lasting results, only if it completes rapidly its political unification, develops soon a real single foreign and security policy, and thus becomes able to act effectively at world level.

Commenting on the event, Paolo Vacca, President of JEF, said: «The unification of the European continent can have a huge progressive impact on the global level. This Summit is an important step for the European Union in its development as a partner for countries in other parts of the world. But warm declarations at a Summit are not enough. If the European Union wants to be serious in its commitment to become a progressive factor in the global affairs, a comprehensive and radical reform of the Union's foundations, institutions, and policies is needed: only a federal Europe can become a model and a strong driving force for the growth and development of other regions of the world».



Alexandre Marc and Integral Federalism

Lucio Levi

Alexandre Marc died on 22 February 2000 at Vance in France, where he emigrated in 1919 from Russia. In the dark years of the uncontrasted domination of nationalism, a federalist group grew up around the review *L'Ordre nouveau* published in Paris from 1931 to 1938. This group continued to be active even in the postwar years in France in particular, whose most representative exponents were Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu, Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont. They developed an "integral" conception, i.e. not just an institutional but also a social, economic and philosophical conception of federalism. Integral federalism is an overall response to the problems of our times and is based on an overall assessment of the contemporary world: the worldwide crisis of our civilization.

Underlying this crisis there is an individualistic culture, whose roots lie in Jacobinism and which has pulverized society, crushed all intermediate bodies and laid the bases for contemporary Fascist and Communist totalitarianism. Following Tocqueville's and Proudhon's analyses, integral federalism criticizes the centralizing character of the state which emerged from the French Revolution. By conceding no space for intermediate organizations between the individual and the state, this type of state has a potentially authoritarian character.

The federalist alternative is a complete reversal of this situation. In practice, according to this school of thinking, federalism is a form of political organization which is capable of reconciling liberty and authority, unity and diversity. When federalism is defined in such vague terms, traces of it can

be found in every age, even "from those uncertain origins of history in which human communities ... grouped our distant forebears into units animated by the same spirit and the same faith, but divided up without effort into independent tribes and clans with free articulations" (R. Aron, A. Marc, *Principes du fédéralisme*, Paris, 1948, p.43). Thus Marc finds elements of federalism in ancient Greece, Rome, among barbarian peoples, in feudalism and at the time of the free cities (A. Marc, *L'Europe dans le monde*, Paris, 1965, p. 4). The struggle between federalism and centralism is essentially the same as that which opposed the Celtic tribes to the Roman Empire (R. Aron, A. Marc, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44).

The economic and social aspect of integral federalism may be defined in opposition to capitalism and collectivism. Inspired by Proudhon, integral federalists do not question the principle of private ownership of the means of production, even though they claim that the distortions should be corrected. It is not, however, possible, nor is it desirable, to abolish private ownership. If anything, this should be generalized. They support the idea of co-operatives in agriculture and workers' participation in company management in industry.

As regards planning, this should be based on the participation of regional and local bodies, unions, professional groups and companies (even financially speaking), on their contractual co-operation and on the territorial articulation in line with the federal scheme of distribution of powers. Moreover, planning operates with different instruments: in essential goods (heavy industry, agriculture, housing, basic services, clothing, health and edu-

cation) it is compulsory, whereas it is optional in consumer goods and non-essential services.

Finally, we should recall two proposals designed to encourage the democratization of the economy. The "guaranteed social minimum", i.e. a minimum wage which gives everybody the chance to satisfy their basic needs, and general compulsory "civilian service" which distributes the least qualified and least gratifying jobs not removed by automation among all the population and makes it possible to feed the fund that ensures the "guaranteed social minimum" with adequate resources.

These interesting and innovative proposals do in fact put forward the basic outlines of a "third model", an idea for which growing interest has recently been expressed in various quarters.

The limit to political orientation of integral federalism consists in conceiving the federalist alternative as the total overthrow of the social reality it fights. It is a position that is limited to simple negation, the abstract refusal of this reality, and counteracts utopia with reality. The objective of the federalist revolution, wrote Marc, "is a radical reworking of all the structures [of our society] whether they be social or political, economic or mental" (*L'Europe dans le monde, op. cit.*, p. 27). Thinking in terms of the overall transformation of society means dreaming up a project that has never succeeded in any revolutionary group: destroying this badly made world and reconstructing it from its bases. No political group can claim to change society as a whole, nor, moreover, does it have the power to do so. Politics is that human activity which is entrusted with achieving self-government of society over itself by means of coercion and consensus, two ingredients both indispensable and present, albeit in differing proportions, in every society that has existed so far. In politics there is always the imposition of a few (governors) over the many (the governed). But historical experience demonstrates that political power does not last long without consensus. In other words, it is not possible to make a policy prevail if this does

not correspond to the needs of the people. It may thus be affirmed that politics is the sphere in which revolutionary human action can change the course of events.

It will be a question merely of adapting political institutions to the changes that have taken place in society. This means that revolutionary action has never had the objective of radically transforming society, but of destroying the political institutions that block its development and impede historical progress. It means creating new institutions capable of freeing the trends developed in society towards higher forms of political coexistence.

Integral federalists conceived their political project because of the historical situation in which at the beginning this movement of ideas developed as a distant, ultimate goal, which had no influence on the decisions of the moment. And even when with the collapse of nation-states at the end of the Second World War, the conditions for European unification matured, their priority political objective was identified in the affirmation of integral federalism in all its aspects rather than in the struggle for a European federation.

Certainly, a European federation has been fought for within the European Union of Federalists, but the main objective of integral federalists was the radical transformation of society in a federalist direction. As Marc states, "a good constitution could only accompany, express, and crown this necessary revolution and not precede it, or, still less, replace it" (*L'Europe dans le monde, op. cit.*, p. 27). This political current expressed the doubt that it was not enough to pursue the limited objective of struggling to change the political institutions and that the European federation might not have led to a freer and more just society. Consequently it did not show sufficient commitment in pursuing the objective of the European federation and in confronting power relationships where power must be changed if the federalist project is to triumph.

Does the Parliament of the World's Religions Point to a New Age of Human Harmony?

Reflections after attending the Parliament's third meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, 1-8 December 1999

Charlotte Waterlow

I spent twelve days in Cape Town, in a delightful middle grade hotel on the edge of the town, surrounded by rocks and trees and full of fellow members of the Conference. The staff, nearly all black or "coloured", were exceptionally kindly and efficient. Some 4,700 people attended the Conference. There is no public transport in Cape Town, and although buses were laid on for us, it was difficult to organise a programme based on over a thousand lectures, seminars, workshops and symposia¹ held in locations all over the city and in the University outside the city. Apart from the major speeches given by Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama, I concentrated on the religious implications of secular topics: a first class talk on nuclear weapons by Jonathan Granoff, representing Senator Alan Cranston, head of the Global Security Institute, was badly attended; another badly attended meeting with three conventional professors of economics, who seemed to have no idea of the growing threat of global warming to the world's economy; a talk by a black woman about daily life under the Apartheid system; a discussion with some North American indigenous Indians. We were entertained in the open air by Japanese drummers. The crowning event of the Parliament was Nelson Mandela's speech, given in a huge auditorium. He emphasised the importance of "religion" to the solution of the world's huge problems, particularly the problem of the gulf between the 20% of the world's population who are rich and the 80% who are

poor, in the sense that they have an inadequate standard of living to enable them to develop their human potential. He said that religion and religious visitors had helped to keep him and his companions going during their long years in prison.

The main reason why I did not go to meetings organised by the great religions is that throughout my life I have been studying them - though history, not theology, is my academic field. I wanted to know how they are affecting the modern, secular, globalised world. At present this world is expressing creativity on a world mental plane, producing amazing scientific inventions, accompanied by capitalist greed which is stirring up hideous conflicts under the shadow of the nuclear bomb, of the huge gulf between the rich and the poor in the context of the exploding population and the depletion of crucial resources. In 1992 two of the world's most prestigious scientific bodies, the British Royal Society and the American National Academy of Sciences, stated in a joint paper that "The future of our planet is in balance. Sustainable development can be achieved, but only if irreversible degradation of the planet can be halted in time. The next 30 years may be crucial".

The ethical principles for turning this situation around have been laid down for all human kind in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, endorsed then by almost

all countries with the exception of South Africa, Saudi Arabia and a few Communist states. The implementation of these principles threatens many traditional religions' ethical and social codes, regarded in most cases as divinely revealed. For example, the Indian Buddhist Association pointed out in a short paper prepared for the Parliament that in India 200 million Dalits, or "Untouchables", live a miserable, impoverished life as a result of the legacy of Hinduism, even though Untouchability is constitutionally illegal.

Islam's ethical social code, laid down as revealed truth in its scriptures, conflicts with many of the Rights listed in the Universal Declaration. A British clergyman commented, in a paper discussing the proceedings of the Parliament, that "It was suggested at a workshop I attended that many Muslims intending to be present had subsequently withdrawn under pressure from their community."²

The modern universal ethic of Human Rights needs, therefore, to be complemented by a universal religion, by the spirituality of celestial love which provides the motivation to implement the ethic of Human Rights - God, Allah, Jahweh, Brahma, Great Spirit, Creator. From time immemorial until the modern age people everywhere have believed in, and experienced, the spiritual quality of the universe. Today people of all religions affirm that "God is love". The experience of the love of God is the force which can avert the threatening disasters of today and secure the implementation of Human Rights, disarmament and the management of the environment in the common interest. A Conference whose aim was to distil this underlying love from the ancient reli-

gions and thus provide the driving force for averting the threatening disasters was obviously of crucial importance. In the first meeting of the Parliament in Chicago in 1893 the religions began to talk to each other; in particular those of the East made a major contact with those of the West. The second meeting, a hundred years later, also in Chicago and attended by 7000 people, produced "A Global Ethic" in a short booklet. More significantly, its members agreed to meet every five instead of every hundred years, and in different venues. If this is put into practice the fraternal energy generated will transform the traditional religions (See "Why Christianity must Change or Die" by Bishop John Shelby Spong of the USA³) and produce an explosion of the love of God which could transform the world.

After the Conference, in glowing summer sunshine, I stayed on in the hotel for four days with an American friend to sight-see. We went up Table Mountain by cable car, were driven by a relation of mine round the mountain block behind Cape Town, visited Robben Island and saw Mandela's cell, and were driven by a toothless black man to the point where the great oceans meet. Dark clouds hang over the South African situation. Forty per cent are unemployed; there is an epidemic of aids; no government-financed education, and massive crime. Yet the combination of the glorious scenery, the friendliness of the South African black people, and the spiritual energy generated by the Parliament filled me with a new energy and a new vision of the future. Why did the Parliament have so little media coverage in the world generally? Perhaps because it points to a future which the majority of people are not yet prepared to face.

¹ Rev. Michael Ingrave, "A Report and Reflections on the Third Parliament of the World's Religions", (Typescript), p.4

² Ibid. p. 6

³ John Shelby Spong, *Why Christianity Must Change or Die*, San Francisco, Harper Collins, 1999

Citizenship and European Identity

Marita Rampazi

1. European citizenship is a realistic and topical objective

1.1. The rise of a "post-national view"

Until just a few years ago, the concepts of citizenship and European identity have been given little consideration, and indeed there has often been a lot of nonsense talked about it, as Mario Albertini was complaining in his final essay in "Il Federalismo" (1979), where he observed that in so doing the necessity to tie the subject of European identity to a serious reflection on the revolutionary meaning of the construction of Europe was again being dodged. In that same essay Albertini was foreseeing that that reflection will be anyway imposed by facts, first by the first direct election of the European Parliament: "...People could not vote without asking themselves what is the sense of Europe; and without the question starting to appear in everybody's mind for what it also is: the first supranational voting exercise, the first step towards democracy in the international field. This question is therefore to be dealt with and it is not enough in the present state of things to start from a bibliography: the whole history of Europe is under scrutiny, but in a post-national perspective which has not been very successful among scholars, intellectuals and ideologists - even though it corresponds to the flow of events- maybe because it does not bring success, in any case because it requires overcoming the usual way of seeing things, changing one's way of thinking and acting" (M. Albertini, *ibid.*, page 295).

From 1979 to the present day, many other facts have added up to the European election, and they have so radically changed the European and world

picture, to make it dramatically urgent to change our way of thinking and acting that Albertini was talking about. Only from this perspective is it possible to appreciate the revolutionary nature of the principle of citizenship upon which the pact among citizens and the European Federation would be founded, the first example in history of a post-national state. Likewise only from this perspective is it possible to understand that today the birth of such a state and, with it, the achievement of a new model of citizenship, is a realistic political objective, and indeed it is the only objective able to offer a future to democracy.

1.2. The statute of European citizenship today

The first fact to remember is the end of the Cold War, which has put an end to the confrontation between blocks, making thinkable the peaceful cooperation among the great regions of the world. The other side of the coin has been the disintegration of the Soviet empire, which gave rise to micro-nationalisms and tribalisms, letting the barbarism emerge which was hidden in the identification between state and ethnic belonging, upon which the national ideology is based.

The second fact is that the process of European union has recently produced a political event without precedent in history. With the creation of the euro, a group of sovereign national states has delegated to a superior authority their power over currency, renouncing one of the two key competences, the purse and the sword, upon which state power and legitimacy are founded.

The need to create Europe has become so intense as to drive the heads of state and of government to include in the Maastricht Treaty, beyond the step of the single currency, the institution of a "European

citizenship". From a legal point of view, it is a citizenship only in theory, instituted by a treaty that has not filled at all the present democratic deficit of the European institutions, still managed with an intergovernmental logic. As it does not provide for the creation at the same time of the political Union, with a Constitution defining the functions and powers of a democratic European government and transforming the European Parliament into a real legislative Assembly, the Maastricht Treaty itself ends up denying the citizens the possibility of exercising at European level the first of their democratic rights: to be governed in an efficient way, to influence the decisions made by the Union's governing bodies and to control its actions.

In spite of all this, the very fact that European citizenship has been instituted represents a very important development in our civic and political tradition, because it represents a major step towards transcending the national principle of citizenship, which has characterized the European legal and political culture from the eighteenth century to the present day. And it allows some constitutionalists, like for instance Dominique Rousseau (1997,1999), to start looking at the constitutional set-ups of the European states not so much to stress their specificity - as it has done so far - but to carefully observe the elements they have in common. It begins to be seen that there exists a European constitutional heritage, already consolidated. The outlining of this heritage and the changes in the material and cultural basis of our lives produced by globalization, are creating a situation where it appears not only desirable, but by now possible and urgent to put the ideal of European citizenship into practice as a political and constitutional fact, definitive and revolutionary for the history of the world: the birth of a supra-national state in Europe.

This is the form of state consistent with the world picture that is taking shape from the thrust of the scientific and technological revolution and from its most important corollary: globalization. This third

order of facts has favoured the development of forms of interdependence, economic, cultural and social, among all regions of the Planet, so strong as to make the national borders too "tight": the crisis of the national state has come to maturity.

2. Crisis of the national state and citizenship

2.1. The state in the era of the scientific mode of production

The world is experiencing a transition phase from the industrial mode of production to the post-industrial (or scientific) one. As always happened with changes of such magnitude, the change in the material basis of our life combines with the development of new social arrangements, of new cultural horizons and of new political and institutional configurations. The structure of the state is changing, and likewise the way the relationships between the individuals and the institutions are defined. The industrial revolution, as an example, coincided with the birth of the modern national state. Such a form of state transformed the subject into a citizen, establishing democracy within the national borders. It could not however complete its journey: democracy remained an imperfect realization, as long as it could not assert itself also on the international plane, dominated by the power logic implied in the *raison d'état*, in a world divided into sovereign national entities.

Today, as has already been mentioned, events are taking place which make urgent and possible a step forward of fundamental importance for the establishment of democracy as a universal value, through the realization of the first example in history of a post-national citizenship: the European one, to be sure. This possibility does not always stand out in the current debate, because the "glasses" through which people look at the advancing new are still too much conditioned by the culture of the "old establishment" and also because, in a transition phase like the present one, it is difficult to sort out the tangle of economic, cul-

tural, social and political reasons of the change.

Although changes do not occur in a linear fashion, nor according to a strictly sequential logic, and the "new" comes out of a hard work encompassing tradition and modernity, need for continuity and the coming to maturity of many reasons for breaking off, it is however already possible to identify a few non ambiguous elements to bring to the debate's attention. To this end, the first consideration concerns the effects of globalization.

2.2. Globalization and the crisis of people's belonging

With the very rapid display of the effects of the scientific and technological revolution on the world economic, social and political order, the spatial and temporal coordinates which are structuring people's individual and collective experience are changing: the same coordinates define the boundaries and the timing of acting, on the individual and collective plane, at the daily, biographical and historical level. This can be seen mostly in the field of work, where the spreading of information technologies, coupled with the opportunities offered by automation, lets new expertises and functions appear, essentially dematerialized and extremely specialized; at the same time, it draws more flexible and complex ways of organizing the everyday and biographical timing, while the centrality of the factory system and the rigidity and intrusiveness of the rhythms imposed by its organization are attenuating; and it is redefining the traditional separation among places of work, of education, of after-work life.

Secondly, in the macro-economic area, the increasing markets interdependence is made possible and, at the same time, prompted by the possibility of establishing real-time communication forms among areas of the world separated in the past by almost insurmountable distances. The space in which complex financial, commercial, manufacturing operations are developing is no longer just the physical one of the territory. It is also, and mostly,

the abstract one of telematic networks, where the time of their performance is getting progressively shorter, altering the very concepts of distance and speed, and allowing the development of private transnational economic networks, which escape, by definition, state jurisdiction (see Forrester, 1996).

Thirdly, change is reflected in people's life experience: their horizon broadens to include the world, thanks to devices such as the more and more refined, fast and accessible communication tools, which favour a high degree of mobility; and the diffusion of mass-media and telematic networks, which allow the world to enter directly every home at any moment.

All this causes a deep transformation in the bonds between individuals and territorial communities, first of all the one defined by national identity. Actually in the political and institutional order, in addition to the fact that the processes, along which people's everyday life is developing, are constantly overriding the state borders, as everybody nowadays agrees, also a change is taking place, less readily evident than the first one, in the historical and cultural justifications of national identity and of the consensus toward institutions, defined on the grounding of a set of prevailing collective memories (M. Halbwachs, 1968). These are the memories that are providing the reference frame to live in the present and to design the future, and within which the meanings are inscribed that inspire historians in their work of reconstruction of the past. The traditional reference marks for memories, for the very reason that they are shown inadequate to orientate action in a modified world, appear in all their relativity: not a natural, unmodifiable and perennial datum, but a partial and historically contingent reconstruction, that can be changed. It is not a chance, for instance, that today historians are asking themselves "how to make history", above all "how to make contemporary history", and that this is reflected in a substantial disorientation of the teachers, faced with the task to give room to

contemporary history in their educational practice. What is lacking is a commonly agreed focus on the most appropriate viewpoint to look at the past, reconstructing it in a different way than that prevailing until now, dominated by the need to create a sense of substantial historical and cultural homogeneity over the whole national territory.

This process has upset the "strong" belongings of the past, freeing and emphasizing the specificity of individuals and groups, and giving to the protection of diversity the patent of an objective that cannot be renounced in contemporary culture. This is the background on which the conditions for the realization of European citizenship are developing.

2.3. Two conditions for the realization of the European citizenship

The continuous overriding of the boundaries of the state -whose sovereignty stops on this side of the border - by part of the processes of people's everyday life, determines in the citizens' conscience a crisis of their public spirit and political commitment. With regard to the ever-growing opinion that ascribes this fact to the crisis of the state in general, it has to be stated clearly that actually what is in trouble today is a particular model of state: that which founds citizenship on the national principle, i.e. on the absolute identification of state, nation and territory. In the past, as a result of the achievement of the national state and its ideology, this identification was configuring itself in the social perception as an obvious datum, always existing and unmodifiable. Actually it is not: it's a matter of an historical build-up, that in the long run could very well change. It is demonstrated by the very fact that today we can talk of European citizenship -that is, of a model of post-national citizenship- as a realistic objective.

In order to fully accomplish this objective, it is necessary that two conditions, tightly interconnected, become consolidated. The first is of a constituent nature and implies the fact that it is not possible to talk strictly of citizenship where there is not

a state, with a Constitution that defines its structure and the content of the pact with the citizens. In Europe, in this respect, we are living a hybrid situation. We have citizenship without state and without Constitution.

The second condition is of an ideological nature, and involves the deep cultural re-orientation that Albertini is talking about referring to the necessity to take on a "post-national view": a perspective recently proposed again by Habermas (1992,1998) and by those who seriously started to think about identity and citizenship in Europe. Even in this respect the situation is ambiguous. On one hand such a re-orientation of our political culture is mature, because the crisis of the nation-states has weakened the national identity and the reasons for consent and political participation associated with it. On the other hand, this crisis is not always correctly interpreted, as we already mentioned: not only in the common public opinion feeling, but also in the diagnosis of some commentators the idea is asserting itself that today we are confronted with the crisis of the state as such, as an institution regulating the economic and social life, which mankind can start to think can be done without. This is a dangerous idea, and a wrong one. There is no assurance of peaceful coexistence, freedom, democracy, equality outside a state framework. This perspective can be taken seriously only by those who refuse to admit that citizenship and identification of state and nation are two distinct elements.

3. "A plurality of belongings within a common political culture": the post-national principle of citizenship

3.1. The world between ethnic state and supra-national democracy

Citizenship is a universal principle, which asserted itself thanks to the French Revolution; the national state is a construction that promoted and let this principle live on in a given moment in history cha-

racterized by conditions in the production and reproduction of collective life that are now disappearing. When the material bases that supported a specific state model change, it may be reckoned that it takes on new forms, as always happened in the past.

If we do not admit this, we must accept a progressive decline of the sense of state, or we must accept the extremization of the national principle that is taking shape in some parts of the world, with the perspective of the ethnic state, tied to the principle of self-determination. Nowadays it is commonly taken into consideration as a possible solution, in order to try and put an end to conflicts stirred up by the dissolution of the bipolar order. However this is a remedy worse than the disease, if considered in the long run. Let's think of the progressive fragmentation of former Yugoslavia, and of the drama of an area where ethnic cleansing -more and more detailed, more and more miniaturized- is spurring hatred and mourning among neighbours, relatives, friends. Where could the boundaries of the ethnic group be placed in an area that for centuries has experienced migrations, mixed marriages, interlacing of a multitude of peoples? Any boundary would be inadequate and would set in motion an endless chain of new conflicts and attempts to divide. The ethnic state is an aberrant conjugation of the idea of state. Just when globalization is making the world more and more interdependent on the economic, cultural, social plane, somebody thinks of giving this same world a political and institutional arrangement divided up into territorial sovereign micro-particles, justified by an idea of ethnic group that science refuses to accept as a biologically founded discriminator.

Neither is it true that the national state is the only one able to assure democracy. The fact that in the past it has been the vehicle for it, does not have to prevent us from observing that today this same form of state is an obstacle for the safeguard of democracy inside it and for the establishment of supra-national democracy. The national state can-

not answer the most important questions posed when considering the future of democracy in a world that has to face multiculturalism, the control of processes of planetary dimension, the extending of the protection of civil, political and social rights to all of mankind. The only form of state consistent with these needs is the supra-national one, with a federal structure. And the only way to conceive citizenship in such a state is to found it upon multiple belongings -local, national, supra-national- made cohesive by institutions governed by the subsidiarity principle and by a symbolic "cement" of an essentially cultural, instead of territorial, nature. This cement, according to Habermas, is the patriotism of the Constitution.

3.2. Patriotism of the Constitution and the cosmopolitical vocation of the European identity

In order to explain the meaning of constitutional patriotism, Habermas starts from the observation that the state's universalistic principles of rights need a political and cultural anchorage. Such an anchorage, as the existing examples of pluricultural societies, like Switzerland and the United States, show, does not imply in principle "any ethnic, linguistic, or cultural origin common to all citizens. A liberal political culture has as the only common denominator a constitutional patriotism which is sharpening sensibility towards diversity and at the same time towards integration of the various ways of life that coexist in a multicultural society. ...It is anyway to be reminded that, although the democratic citizenship should not necessarily root itself in a people's national identity, it requires in any case, in spite of a plurality of cultural standards, that the individuals socialize within a common political culture" (Habermas, 1992, pages 28-29). So, "European constitutional patriotism must be bound to the same common universalistic principles, although setting out from different perspectives marked by national histories... In this context, our task is not so much to find common historical roots in medieval Europe, as to create a new European awareness, corresponding to the role that Europe will be able to play in the 21st century"

(ibid., page 38). In this regard it has to be noted how in the current debate about identity and citizenship in Europe also those who clearly recognize the value and peculiarity of a project to European identity fail to underline an aspect which indeed represents the specificity of the journey undertaken by the Old Continent and that in the long run could become the historic heritage that it could leave to the world. Beside founding itself on the values of democracy, freedom and social justice that the great revolutions have inserted in mankind's culture, the European identity has got as its specific mark to be born on a fact – the free and peaceful union of sovereign states, which for centuries were divided and enemies – asserting in that same culture the value of peace. Hence with the European citizenship the right to peace can at last be inscribed in the horizon of the new millennium as a component, not to be renounced, of the list of rights of man and the citizen.

European citizenship, as it originates from the post-national principle, has got a cosmopolitical vocation, because at its core there is an identity having as its primary reference the adhesion to and the defence of universal principles, instead of belonging to a community which is forcefully homogeneous, defined once and for all by closed territorial boundaries. This does not mean that the European state will not have any territorial marks, but only that these marks will not be rigorous. The relative flexibility of borders, open to the entrance of new members, and the multiplicity of government levels and of belongings, are characteristics inherent in the very nature of the federal state.

3.3. Communitarism and active citizenship in Europe

Coming back to Habermas and to constitutional patriotism, it must be said that identity founded on this principle, by separating political culture from traditions and from similar forms of cultural life that are growing in different ways in the everyday interdependence over particular territorial areas, allows us to protect and to revive some types of

belongings, so far crushed by the intrusiveness of the exclusive national principle: in the first place, the local communities.

This observation is particularly important as far as the possibility is concerned of reviving the community expectations that were suppressed by the establishment of the national state due to the need for bureaucratic centralization, on the one hand, and of linguistic and cultural homogenization, on the other. In a post-national perspective, communitarism and cosmopolitanism change from tendencies harmful to state cohesion into a twofold element of democratic vitality. To the extent that the reevaluation of diversity brings people's attention also on the specificity of local culture, a new sense of belonging, not exclusive, can originate in territorially limited communities. And autonomy – organized according to the subsidiarity principle – of government levels of a state no longer centralized and of such size to sustain the challenge of the globalized world, can represent a powerful incentive for the citizens' direct participation in the management of public affairs.

Already there are signs showing the need to revive the local dimension, as the field in which to develop forms of participation, where the individual does not perceive himself as an isolated atom in front of the institutions, but feels himself incorporated in the community, with a personal identification in it and a willingness to act collectively in its bosom. To the extent that people feel themselves directly involved and taking part in the solution of problems regarding a group governed by face-to-face relations, they are empirically experimenting the meaning of solidarity implied in the idea of citizenship. This is the basis for the development of a public spirit and for active citizenship, which can avoid the risk of becoming a localistic closure, to the measure that it has, as its frame, an identity open to several levels of belongings and stressing diversity as a value to safeguard. It's the citizen's identity that is being outlined by adopting a post-national view, capable of

widening the individual's perspective to include in it his participation in the destiny of mankind.

3.4. A European constitutional heritage is taking shape: the cultural and legal basis of a political Constitution for Europe

The concept of a European constitutional heritage has been recently focused by a French constitutionalist, Dominique Rousseau, who wanted to distinguish the *political* Constitution, that is the formal legal order establishing the ways by which in every single state the principles are applied on which the "contract" between citizens and the state is founded, from the *social* Constitution, that is the definition of these same principles and the configuration of a project that could hold the sense of a common destiny.

The first differs significantly from state to state in Europe. Just to make some macroscopic examples, let's consider that in the European states we find: monarchies and republics, presidential systems, Parliaments with one or two Chambers, and so on. However, if we look at the principles that inspire the bonds between state and citizen -the social Constitution- we see some very strong fundamental identities coming out, all concurring to form the European constitutional heritage. First, all Constitutions draw inspiration from a set of rights of man and citizen safeguarding the values of freedom, equality and justice on which the modern political culture is based. Secondly, Rousseau observes, these similarities stretch also to the way such rights are interpreted and sanctioned by constitutional judges.

The European constitutional heritage takes on a twofold aspect: philosophical, as it defines a democratic culture within which the European identity is being built, and legal, because it favours the formation of a European constitutional law, and hence it helps in the identification of the constitutional bases on which the structure of a state is to be designed.

By bringing such a heritage into existence, two

purposes are attained. The first is to belie those who state that Europe is still a distant objective, because there are too many differences among citizens of the various states at the political and cultural level: to the extent that a more and more converging social constitution is making way, it is possible to believe that the least common denominator -in fact the set of values upon which the patriotism of the Constitution is founded- already exists.

The second is to define precisely the unique character -multiple belongings, constitutional patriotism, potential universalism- of the European identity which is taking shape, over which it is possible to trace the new constitutional pact among the citizens of Europe. Given these premises, what is missing now to Europeans, above all the young people who are looking with a mixture of hope and confusion at their future as citizens, is an act of political will: the decision to work out and adopt a constitutional Charter, which would give shape to the first example in history of a state born out of the negation of the national principle as the exclusive grounding for the citizen's identity and rights. A fundamental step forward toward the establishment of "a culture of unity of mankind" (M. Albertini, 1979), which the whole world is today dramatically in need of.

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Democratic Decisions vs. Diplomatic Decisions

Ludo Dierickx

The chasm dividing the citizen from the political world is today denounced as a major problem. Because of its increasing complexity and its more and more international and supranational peculiarity, politics is moving away from the citizen, who is, among laws and decrees, subject to European rules: treaties, directives, regulations, which have the fundamental and constitutional force of law as well. The reason of the deepening of this chasm must be found in the citizen's loss of influence towards the legislator; he cannot either stimulate or sanction him. He is the victim of this increasing democratic deficit. This happens both at a European level and at the level of the Belgian federal state.

First Question

First difference: in a democratic system, citizens are the first subjects of right; in a diplomatic one, this is the role of the states.

A democratic system creates laws, decrees, constitutions, and laws which enforce diplomatic decisions. The diplomatic decisional system produces texts having the force of law (or constitutional force): treaties, pacts, protocols and in our country, Belgium, co-operation agreements among the state, the communities and the regions. In the first case, legal texts are voted into effect after a public debate in a Parliamentary Assembly plenary session, and facing the media, public opinion and with the participation of the opposition parties. The citizens can follow the debate and intervene directly or indirectly. In the other case, legal texts are established in sittings in closed session, without the participation of the political parties representing the majority and obviously the opposition; media and

public opinion are excluded as well. How is it possible to warn and inform citizens promptly? In a diplomatic system, the texts come from negotiations among governmental representatives who speak with "one voice" in the name of the states, member states, and regions.

The opposition is always excluded and not considered at all. In contrast, a democratic system allows and gives the right to every party to discuss and amend the texts, to control their application, to sanction their non-execution and to propose alternative law proposals. In a diplomatic system, a person elected from the people cannot make use of this possibility.

For treaties, protocols, European directives, and co-operation agreements, the choice in the best case is between taking or leaving them. The deputy who tries to modify texts by proposing an amendment is considered ridiculous. The diplomatic system leaves to the parliaments a "fait accompli". The legislative assemblies can of course refuse ratification, but with high risks. In this case, however, it is necessary to begin the negotiations again which are often very laborious.

The negotiators who conduct the negotiations, of course, are rarely sanctioned. The EU Council of Ministers, which deliberates on regulations and many directives, and the Belgian "Interministerial" Conferences, which elaborate the co-operation agreements among the communities and the regions, cannot be reversed by anybody, not by the European Parliament, nor by the Belgian one, nor by the Councils of the Communities or the Regions. The democratic deficit is even weightier than in a situation of the exercise of Executive powers. Indeed, a government which wields such

powers can, in turn, be overturned by a majority of the Chamber.

The diplomatic system certainly has its advantages, especially for the decision-makers. It is often easier to come to an agreement between partners on the basis of give and take, far from prying eyes, and to agree on a package deal than to spread out the problems in a public session of the Parliament.

Apart from the institutional aspect, in a diplomatic system (confederation or union of states) there is another problem concerning political parties which do not intervene because they do not exist. It is useless to talk about a Belgian and European citizenship worth the name without political parties at a European and Belgian level. One cannot be a complete citizen if he or she cannot participate in political life by expressing at least one vote against some parties. Without political parties acting at an adequate level, there is no space for political programmes sustainable by the citizens, nor any awareness, nor educational participation.

The democratic deficit resulting from a diplomatic decision (which is however difficult to avoid) can degenerate into a minority dictatorship if the states, the member states, the regions or communities make use of the right of veto they have, thanks to treaties, constitutions, or de facto. This is the case of decisions requiring unanimity or consensus, as it frequently happens in the EU and the Belgian Federal state. The people who hold the political responsibility could be tempted to renounce the diplomatic system (confederal) and to prefer self-determination and pure national sovereignty, which nowadays is becoming however a utopian desire. Furthermore, apart from this relationship between states and nations, there is another conflictual point not considered here.

Second Question

The second question must be addressed to those conditions which allow the transition of pure self-

determination towards diplomatic relationships, democratic relationships or vice-versa.

Which are the necessary acting centripetal, unifying or centrifugal, regionalist or nationalist forces? Which is the way to turn on their motor?

Essential condition: political forces showing firmness, resistance or at least patience. There are several reasons which provide for union or separation. They have been interchangeable in the course of history. Religious, dynastic, linguistic, cultural, economic, social, geopolitical (natural frontiers), ideological (political intentions and visions), and historical (common life memories, cruelties, humiliations) questions are capable of bringing differences or convergences in mentality, cultural identity, habits, life standards... in South Africa, Switzerland, the European Union, differences are not obstacles; in the Balkans, Corsica, ex-Czechoslovakia, Pays Basque, North Italy, Belgium, differences are exploited to force separation and to replace democratic relationships among men with diplomatic relationships among states.

History teaches that democracy, and above all federal democracy, if supported by the will of politicians, is the instrument capable of assembling every difference among human beings. Democracy teaches us that differences can be exploited to divide, create new centres of power, sow the seeds of discord and cause hostilities which could come to the worst extremes.

If human beings agreed on the way of discovering values and truth, they could live together in states of right. Democracy has been invented because people are different: if they were identical, if they wanted the same things, we would not need democratic systems, decisional systems or whatever. Belgium and Europe can be considered as grounds for reflection and experimentation. They have a global responsibility and they cannot allow the triumph of centrifugal and nationalist forces to menace democracy and solidarity.

Does the WTO Need a Parliamentary Assembly?

Fergus Watt

In the aftermath of the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), prospects for a new round of global trade talks seem dim indeed. Most analysts suggest the earliest that talks on a new round might get underway would be well into 2001, once a new U.S. President is installed in the White House.

In the meantime, governments, NGOs and others have been addressing what needs to be done to reform the WTO and to resolve the strong differences that emerged at the Seattle meeting. The following summarizes some of the broad contours of these discussions, with special focus on the idea of a WTO Parliamentary Assembly.

WTO decision making

The WTO has a large membership (135 member countries) and makes decisions by consensus. In the past a few large developed states have been able to work out deals among themselves and then sell them to the rest of the world. In Seattle, developing countries served warning that they can no longer be excluded from the process in this way. How then to proceed? Some have offered the idea that the WTO needs some sort of representative Executive body. Canada's Pierre Pettigrew offered his support, although drawing the unfortunate comparison to the UN Security Council (Please Pierre, no vetoes!). WTO Director General Mike Moore noted that the WTO must tread lightly regarding any reform around membership and representation. "There are a number of smaller countries fearing that a reform based on a constituency (e.g. trade-weighted) basis or a committee would leave them out."

Other developing country concerns

Many developing countries lack the capacity to implement WTO rules. For some, even translation of documents is problematic and time-consuming. They are also calling for dramatically increased market access for the least developed countries.

Coherence issues

What place should the WTO have in the multilateral system? Trade rules affect regulation of international finance, environmental protection, international development strategies, product safety standards, labour standards and other rights. What proper relationship should evolve between the WTO and other international agencies and treaty regimes? Are there mechanisms which might allow a reformed multilateral framework of global governance to function in a more coordinated manner? Do the means exist to forge a shared political vision? Some more conservative WTO watchers circumscribe the 'coherence debate' and focus only on the WTO's relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank). Others say that involving other parts of the system, including UN agencies like the ILO, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNEP etc., is unavoidable.

Democratic accountability

In a recent speech to a committee of the British House of Commons, Moore said. "Many people feel that decisions which are having a fundamental impact upon their lives are being devised behind closed doors. ... If the WTO is to succeed,

it must reinforce its democratic credentials." Accordingly, there have in recent months been a flurry of proposals which would enhance the openness and transparency of the WTO (e.g. allowing wider and earlier access to WTO documents; opening dispute settlement proceedings to public observation and consideration of amicus briefs). Further openness would be achieved through expanding NGO rights to observe and participate in WTO proceedings.

Of particular interest to World Federalists have been recent high level calls for some sort of Parliamentary body attached to the WTO. Consider the following:

- EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said recently (at the Davos Economic Forum) that he envisaged the establishment of a consultative Parliamentary Assembly at the WTO, "in order to strengthen the democratic control of [WTO] work." But he cautioned, "we should make no mistake: such an initiative runs the risk of being seen in developing countries as yet another attempt by industrialized countries to impose structures they are not able to support, given their limited resources and capabilities."
- Canada's Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew said recently that, "The idea has also been mentioned of a Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO and I have no problems with this idea. ... In Canada Bill Graham has mentioned this in his report from the Foreign Affairs Committee. ... This Assembly would not only take ideas from civil society but the communication would work the other way too, helping to explain the WTO to the world's people."
- And, from the man at the top, WTO DG Moore, these rather more circumspect reflections: "We need to involve Parliamentarians in a more focused, orderly and organized way. ... How to ensure that people feel ownership in a real sense is the challenge of those who cherish the democratic

principle and have a vision of a world managed by rules not force, agreements not power. How the representatives of the people face this challenge will be a key factor in providing a more peaceful, stable world. To do this the international institutions must be more open and accountable. ... I am working with representatives in Geneva in creative ways to advance this proposal. We will in a few days begin discussions of how we can be more transparent. Reports have been called for, we will do this without ever surrendering the principle of consensus and that we are a government to government institution."

Last year, World Federalists of Canada recommended to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) that Canada support creation of a Parliamentary Assembly for the WTO. The Committee agreed, although its recommendation used a weaker formulation: "giving consideration to the establishment of a Standing Conference of WTO Parliamentarians, composed of representative delegations from member-country parliaments."

The rationale for a WTO parliamentary chamber is fairly clear. The WTO is presently made up of representatives of governments who ultimately represent institutional interests within a nation-state system. A Parliamentary Assembly would provide a counterbalancing voice for the world's citizens. Whereas NGOs usually represent specialized interests, Parliamentarians on the other hand, having been democratically elected, are more legitimate voices for the common interest.

Trade and governance debates often boil down to a need for compromise, for reconciling competing public policy objectives. In any mature political community, the most appropriate and important institution for enabling citizens to be represented and forging political compromise is a parliament. The European Parliament offers an example of how a Parliamentary Assembly, beginning as a

consultative body composed of parliamentarians drawn from national parliaments, can evolve to become an elected body with more legislative powers. This evolution can take many years and proceeds along with the trade-driven integration process.

So what are we to make of the sudden and surprising high level endorsements of a WTO Parliamentary Assembly? Is the beginning of the democratization of the WTO at hand?

Don't bet on it. More likely, one suspects, it is the hope among trade ministers and WTO officials that parliamentarians can be rallied to the cause of "selling" the WTO. This could occur through governments mandating ever more public consultations by national parliamentary committees, or more extensive parliamentary associations or conferences which may meet internationally on occasion but do not take on any meaningful deliberative function.

However, it is nevertheless a very positive sign that the debate has been "well joined." As organizations like the WTO draw power away from national parliaments, it is entirely appropriate that parliamentarians be centrally involved in development of new forums for the participation by citizen representatives in global economic governance.

In order to avoid being derided by a skeptical

NGO community, which has already demonstrated its capacity to block negotiations, a WTO Parliamentary Assembly will need to be constituted in such a way that it is taken seriously, by member governments and the public. Although it would necessarily be a consultative chamber, it must be seen to be broadly representative of the world's people and must have a mandate which allows for serious and sustained debate. Even in its initial phase, such a consultative parliamentary chamber would help in:

- recommending new treaties and laws;
- enabling new forms of international cooperation, including relationships with other parts of the international system; and
- facilitating technical support for national parliaments struggling to implement existing WTO agreements.

Most importantly, a WTO Parliamentary Assembly would provide an important forum for the WTO's critics and supporters. Both sides of these still very polarized debates are far too frequently talking past each other. There is much room for compromise on the many important issues of global governance and international trade which must be reconciled in the years ahead. A bona fide WTO Parliamentary Assembly would help.

A panel discussion on the proposed WTO Parliamentary Assembly, featuring SCFAIT Chair Bill Graham will form an important part of the World Federalist national conference June 2 to 4 in Ottawa.



The President of UEF writes to the activists involved in the C-week

Dear friends,

I heard with great pleasure that many JEF and UEF sections are actively involved in our joint campaign for a European Constitution and that they will contribute very much to the upcoming "Constitution Week". It is particularly encouraging to see that our ideas will also be spread by young people from countries which will soon join the European Union.

From my experience as a Member of the European Parliament I can tell you that European support from the civil society is needed more than ever. Major steps towards further European integration are undertaken, for example the Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the successful Intergroup for a European Constitution in the European Parliament and generally speaking a pronounced emphasis on the political dimension of the European Union.

On the other hand it is absolutely clear that the European governments will only be willing to decide on major reforms if they feel pressure from the citizens, if organisations like UEF and JEF remind them of their responsibility to go a major step further 50 years after the Schuman Declaration. We have to underline that these steps will only be successful if the project is taken out of the hands of the governments and instead placed in the hands of the citizens and their elected representatives. The diplomatic method of European politics has to be replaced by a fundamental democratic method.

This is exactly what we have to communicate with our campaign for a European Constitution. Our goal is not a simple summary of the existing treat-

ties. The constitution we are campaigning for should be the result of far-reaching reforms of the European institutions, democratic decision-making processes and above all a Union which will be capable to meet the challenges of enlargement and deepened cooperation in all fields of European policies. A Constitution can certainly give the power to the European institutions to work efficiently and transparently.

Carrying out events like the Constitution-week or the upcoming demonstration in December on the occasion of the European Council meeting in Nice we have the chance to express our views and ideas on a 21st century's Europe and to show that there is a broad support among Europe's citizens for a European Union beyond a free market, a peace project as it was drawn up after World War II.

The strength of our organisations lies in its regional and local sections. You can all become part of a network of events, which will result in a strong common sign for a reformed and deepened European Union. Any kind of activity, a letter to a local politician or your MEPs, a press release, a stand at your local university or meetings with other organisations can be an important and valuable contribution to our campaign. I would like to thank you all for your work in the following weeks and months and wish you a successful campaign week..

Best Federalist Wishes,

Jo Leinen
UEF President

«Nice 2000» Appeal For a European Citizens Summit

The Heads of State and Government of the European Union Member states, meeting as the European Council on December 7th- 8th, 2000 at Nice (F), will conclude the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform and proclaim the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights elaborated by the *ad hoc* Convention.

After Maastricht and Amsterdam Europe will give itself a new Treaty. Judging by the limited agenda for the revision underway and given that unanimity is required for all changes to the current Treaties one cannot but fear that the Nice draft treaty will once again reflect the reluctance of those Member states opposing any strengthening of the Union's political dimension.

If the EU does not manage a qualitative leap of its political system in view of its enlargement to 27 or 30 Member states, Europe will be condemned to institutional paralysis – left to the financial markets and incapable of facing the challenges of globalisation.

There cannot be a strong Europe with weak institutions; and there cannot be strong institutions if their democratic legitimacy is not reinforced.

50 years after the Schuman declaration it is time to build Europe with the Europeans, it is time to re-found Europe on the basis of human rights and on the fundamental principles of democracy, Euro-

pean citizenship, and solidarity.

Today Europe should no longer be built by the will of states alone; it should also be the expression of the will of the people.

We call on the organisations of the civil society, the European citizens, and their elected representatives to make their voice heard and to join the demonstration at the European Council meeting in Nice on December 7th, 2000.

First signatories

Members of the European Parliament:

Elmar BROK (Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Human Rights, PPE, D), Carlos CARNERO GONZALEZ (PSE, E), Daniel COHN-BENDIT (Verts, F), Harlem DESIR (Verts, F), Andrew DUFF (ELDR, UK), Vitaliano GEMELLI (Chairman of the Committee on Petitions, PPE, I), Heidi HAUTALA (Co-Chairman of the Group Verts, SF), Alain LAMASSOURE (PPE, F), Paul LANNOYE (Co-Chairman of the Group Verts, B), Jo LEINEN (PSE, D), Marie-Noëlle LIENEMANN (Vice-President of the EP, PSE, F), Pasqualina NAPOLETANO (Vice-Chairwoman of the Group PSE, I), Gérard ONESTA (Vice-President of the EP, Verts, F), Mihail PAPAYANNAKIS (Member of the Bureau of the Group GUE, GR), Anne VAN LANCKER (Vice-Chairwoman of the Committee on Women's Rights, PSE, B).

The UEF and JEF on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Dear Mr. President, Dear Members of the Convention,

The Union of European Federalists (supranational UEF, chaired by Jo LEINEN, MEP) welcomes the initiative for the elaboration of an EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Such a Charter will undoubtedly contribute to the transformation of the Union into a community of values. Europeans need to have a point of reference linked to a clear set of values, notably the protection of freedom and human dignity as supreme juridical values. The notion of the human being belonging to a pluralistic, free and responsible community needs to be placed in the centre of the European project.

Anchoring the fundamental rights at the top of a constitutional treaty or – better – of a Constitution the European Union will prove that its task is to serve the human being.

The fundamental rights shall be at the core of the EU constitutional treaty and shall protect the individual from all abuses of power by the public authorities. The fundamental rights, explicitly guaranteed by the constitutional treaty, shall be implemented in the framework of the European Union's juridical order and shall be directly applicable legal provisions. All of the Union's institutions shall respect them. The fundamental rights shall be recognised in the whole Union and can be claimed at the European Court of Justice. Besides, the duties allowing the individual's participation in community life shall also be laid down in the constitutional treaty.

The fundamental rights must not only include the classical human rights but also social, ecological and cultural rights as well as new rights in connection with the information society. Furthermore,

re, the UEF demands that the European political rights should also include the right to elect the Members of the European Parliament and to determine the future "European Government".

Dear Members of the Convention, beyond this limited audition it will be up to you to open a broader public debate involving the European Parliament, the national and regional parliaments and the organisations of the civil society.

By elaborating a Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights you are contributing to the realisation of a – no doubt – important step towards the constitutionalisation of the European Union. But this must not be an alternative to a European Constitution.

It is because you are not only representing the governments of the Member states but also the elected members of the European Parliament and the national parliaments and because you are consulting the organisations of the civil society that the method for the elaboration of the Charter is truly innovative and represents a democratic move forward compared to the old diplomatic method of intergovernmental conferences.

This is why the UEF solemnly asks you to pursue your work on the fundamental rights which you will – as we hope – conclude successfully by elaborating the other elements of a European Constitution, notably the fundamental principles defining the political nature of the European Union, the distribution of competences between the Union, the Member states and the local and regional levels of government, the EU's institutional set-up and

the question of constitutional revision.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the "list of concerns" that the Union of European Federalists addresses to the Convention. This is also the view that the UEF will express in Nice on 7 December together with all citizens and their elected repre-

sentatives who claim a Europe corresponding to the will of its citizens. That is to say a Europe based on fundamental rights, the principles of democracy, primacy of law, citizenship, solidarity, and subsidiarity.

Petition by the Union of European Federalists (UEF) presented by Bruno BOISSIERE, Secretary-General on the occasion of the Audition of the civil society (Brussels, 27 April 2000). This declaration is based on the resolutions by UEF's Federal Committee on the Charter of fundamental rights (20-21 November 1999, 1-2 April 2000, sent to the members of the Convention) and the document *12 Main Elements of a European Constitution* (Preamble and chapter "Fundamental Rights") by UEF's European Congress (Bonn, April 1999).

The Young European Federalists welcome the decision to establish a Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union and stress the following points.

The establishment of a Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European citizens is a crucial achievement and could be the first piece of a real European Constitution. The European Union and the European Communities are still dominated by the economic dimension, the Single European Market and the Monetary Union. Most of the citizens feel the Union as distant, bureaucratic and far from their problems. The establishment of the Charter could mark the start of a new Europe focused on the citizens and moving forward to a real Political Union. However, the Charter can unfold all its potential only if its creation is soon accompanied by a radical and comprehensive reform of the Union's foundations and institutions, that lead to a true European federal Constitution, to give the Union the capacity to pursue effectively the values and goals that the Charter will solemnly enshrine. It would be very important if the Convention kept such point in front of the member states, specially considering the

parallel ongoing process of the Intergovernmental Conference.

It is vital that the Charter becomes a legally binding document, integral part of the Treaties, and does not remain a simple Declaration. The European Union has already seen many Fundamental Rights declarations (see for example the European Parliament Declaration of 1989). Many international organisations have issued Declarations and Conventions of Rights, without having the powers to enforce them. What the Union needs now is a visible and transparent Bill of Rights of the European Citizens which gives the people awareness of their rights and access to the European Court of Justice for their enforcement. A binding Charter – by defining clearly the values, principles and goals at the heart of the Union – would also enhance the legitimisation and credibility of the future work and actions of all the Union's institutions. This is even more important in view of the enlargement of the Union to new members.

The Charter should acknowledge and enshrine the unique features of the European model. A mixture and balance of individual freedom, in all its aspects, and solidarity and welfare make the European model unique. This should be reflected

in the Charter. Moreover, European unification marks the historic achievement of European pacification by the creation of a Union among nations and peoples that fought each other for centuries: the inclusion in the Charter of the individual's "right to peace", and the Union's obligation to defend it, would symbolise perfectly such novelty of the European experiment. Another important way to transform "empty rights" in the Treaties into tangible rights would be to guarantee the right of direct access by individuals to the European Court of Justice, and to extend the civil rights to all residents of the EU, regardless of their citizenship.

The Charter should acknowledge and enshrine the achievements of the European political tradition paving the way for a clarification of what the Union is and how it works. Centuries of political fights in Europe have established the basic principle that "sovereignty lies in the people" and that of the division of powers. These historic achievements at national level are still opposed in the European Union, which is therefore not yet a democracy. The "European citizenship" has been created by the Amsterdam Treaty, but it remains an empty word as long as the citizens are deprived of the fundamental right of citizenship: the power to decide on Government and policies of the Union. The institutions of the Union are the

embryo of a real supranational democracy, but the European Parliament is still denied full legislative powers, the Council combines legislative and executive powers ineffectively, the Commission is not a real Government – all this makes the Union still undemocratic and ineffective. If the Charter reaffirmed the basic principle of "people sovereignty" in the Union, this could pave the way for a comprehensive redefinition of what the Union is and how it works, and thus for a real European democracy.

The Convention process to draft the Charter is very innovative and should be extended to the reform of the Union's institutions. So far, the building of Europe has left aside the citizens and their elected representatives in the European Parliament, it has been the exclusive domain of the representatives of the member states governments. The involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments, as well as the dialogue with the civil society, makes the mechanism to elaborate the Charter profoundly innovative and more democratic than any other procedure experienced at European level so far. This method should replace the elaboration of fundamental texts of the European Union by Intergovernmental Conferences. The Convention could make its voice heard on this point already during the current Intergovernmental Conference.

Petition by the Young European Federalists (JEF) presented by Laura DAVIS, Secretary-General on the occasion of the Audition of the civil society (Brussels, 27 April 2000). This declaration is based on a resolution adopted unanimously by the Federal Committee meeting in Wroclaw on March 26.



Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government

**As more leaders demand a federal Europe
young European citizens demand an initiative
to unite West and East in a federal Europe**

Fifty years ago the declaration of Robert Schuman paved the way for the birth of the first European Community as the "first step towards a European Federation". The process of European integration has made major steps forward when a vanguard of countries was willing to challenge the opposition and resistance of the most cautious. Time for major steps forward has come again. If some of the current Union member states don't feel yet ready to participate in the project, this should be respected, but the others should pursue it with determination.

JEF, which gathers over 30.000 young members in 30 countries across Europe, is campaigning for a federal Europe and will help creating support among the political class, the organised civil society, the public opinion, and especially the young Europeans.

It is a disgrace that, over ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, half of the countries of Europe are left in the waiting room for the delay of the old members in reforming the Union's institutions and policies. But the historic challenge of a wide and successful enlargement can only be met if it goes hand in hand with a radical reform of the Union establishing a federal Constitution for an enlarged Union. If the enlarged Union is based on the intergovernmental method, it would become increasingly impossible to govern and it would fail in meeting the expectations of the new members. Moreover, new responsibilities are

today on the Europeans, as proved by the tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the weakness of the Euro, and they need to be addressed seriously.

Although it is widely acknowledged that Europe is on the brink of an historic turn-around very little is being done to tackle the problem at its roots. Therefore JEF welcomes the initiative by the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on May 12 proposing the Union to move from a Confederation to a European Federation. JEF also greets the speeches by the President of Czech Republic Vaclav Havel in front of the French Senate and the European Parliament advocating a European Constitution and a federal Europe including all the countries of the continent. JEF also welcomes the initiative of the French President Jacques Chirac to establish a commission, chaired by Alain Juppé, to prepare a draft of European Constitution during the French presidency.

JEF appeals to all the Heads of State and Government in the European Union to take the occasion of the ongoing Intergovernmental Conference and the process for enlarging the Union to make an open proposal to all Europeans, mandating the European Parliament and the national parliaments to prepare a Treaty-Constitution, including also a binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European citizens, to establish a real federal Union open to the European Union as well as the new applicant countries.

We need to transform the Commission into a Government, responsible to a Parliament endowed with full legislative powers in all Union

matters, composed of a directly elected Chamber, evolution of the current European Parliament, and a Chamber of the States, evolution of today's Council divested of its executive powers and acting always by majority voting. This is the only way to ensure European democracy, European citizenship and an open and effective Union. Such an ambitious project cannot be achieved

without the active involvement and participation of the citizens. It needs the full involvement of the public opinion, throughout Europe, in a wide public debate on the future of the Union. Ambition and will are needed to give a new turn to European history and lead the entire European continent to its political unity.

Text of an "Open Letter to the Heads of State and Government" launched by the Executive Bureau of JEF on 20 May 2000. The letter was widely distributed to the Heads of State and Government, MEPs, Commission, youth organisations, newspapers.



More Intergroups for a European Constitution

After the establishment of the Parliamentary Forum for a European Constitution at the European Parliament's session Strasbourg on 15 September 1999, a similar Intergroup has also been formed in the Italian Parliament on 21 October, thanks to the initiative of Marco Pezzoni, member of the Chamber of Deputies. At the moment 113 members of the Chamber of Deputies have adhered to it.

The goals of the Intergroup are:

- the elaboration of a "new European pact" to blend citizens and states;
- a reform of the institutional system of the EU;

- the strengthening of common policies;
- the strengthening of the Union's own financial resources.

In December, the Italian Senate took the same initiative. In the same way, on 3 April 2000 a Parliamentary Group for a European Constitution was established in Germany's Bundestag, thanks to the help of JEF, the European Movement Germany and Europa Union Deutschland: the proposals aim to improve co-operation between the European Parliaments and national Parliaments in the field of treaty reform. We hope that these examples will be followed by other national parliaments! (*e.b. & b.f.*)

Ventotene 2000 International Seminar

As every year, the Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies – together with the Young European Federalists (JEF) – is organising for next September (from Saturday September 2 to Friday September 8) the Ventotene International Seminar on *The European Union, Federalism and International Democracy*.

The seminar, organised under the auspices of the European Commission, will be held in Ventotene, a small island in front of the Naples (Italy) coast, where Altiero Spinelli was imprisoned during the fascist regime and from where he launched the *Ventotene Manifesto for a Free and United Europe* that inspired the birth of many federalist movements. Aimed at the recruitment and training of federalist activists, the Ventotene International Seminar offers the unique chance to discuss the roots of the federalist thinking and action, together with federalists, young and adults, from all over Europe and from other regions of the world.

This year's leading topics will be the most pressing issues of today's European political debate (the enlargement of the Union and the reform of its institutions, the controversial issues in the debate towards a European Constitution, the citizens' demonstration in Nice in December, the role of Europe in the new world order, etc.) alongside the general issues of the history of federalism, the theory of the federal state, federalism and internationalism, federalism and nationalism, federalism and the other political ideologies, federalism and the prospects for international democracy. As usual, the role and actions of the federalist movements will be given a special focus. Reports by activists of UEF and JEF will open each session. Speeches by representatives of the World Federalist Movement are also planned. About 50 young people from all over Europe will join the 50 participants to the parallel Italian seminar.

Details on the Seminar can be found on www.ventotene.org.uk.



The Millennium Forum

Rik Panganiban

The Millennium NGO Forum, which took place from May 22-26 at UN headquarters was an overwhelming experience: approximately 1,200 NGO representatives from more than 100 countries met in sixty separate meetings, over the course of only five days. The final declaration that came out of the Forum was largely a success from our own perspective, containing several of the key provisions of our own action agenda including:

- UN dues should be paid in full, on time and without conditions
- Reform and democratization of the Security Council
- The creation of a UN parliamentary assembly
- Extension of NGO rights of participation to the General Assembly
- Consideration of alternative revenue sources for the UN such as the Tobin Tax.

It should be noted that these proposals obtained the support of non-World Federalist organizations such as the Third World Network, the Global Policy Forum, ATTAC, Charter 99 and the Baha'i International Community. The evidence that the world is catching up to us grows every day.

This declaration, along with the supplementary thematic papers, will be shared with Heads of State attending the Millennium Summit in September as well as at various fora between the Millennium Forum and the Summit.

World Federalists from Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, India, and the United States participated in the meetings. Notable was the work of the World Federalists of Canada in facilitating the participation of a dozen participants from the Global South at the Forum through the Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry. WFM will come forward with specific proposals for action coming out of the Forum shortly and *The Federalist Debate* will return on this event on the next issue.



A German Proposal for the UN Reform

On the occasion of the Millennium Forum, the Society for Threatened Peoples International has published the report "Towards a World without Genocide", drafted in co-operation with the German world federalists. It aims at a new world order through a reformed UN and based on the principles of the protection of human rights, democracy, separation of powers, subsidiarity and federalism (*a.b.*).

Turbo-capitalism and the Decline of the American Empire

Antonio Mosconi

Edward N. Luttwak,
*Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the
Global Economy*,
New York, Harper Collins, 1999

Where will unchecked liberalism and the excesses of globalization lead to? Edward Luttwak tries to answer this question in "Turbo-Capitalism". There is something truly surprising in the latest book written by this wealthy and conservative American that represents somehow of a departure from his previous stances; an analysis of the decline of the American empire that takes on a startlingly different tone from Kolko¹ to Kennedy² right down to Thurow³, with his dissection of America's evils and his warning against Europe following in the footsteps of the US, he ends up somewhere between mourning the passing of controlled capitalism and welcoming the arrival of liberalized capitalism. Readers therefore have to wait with bated breath till the very last page to discover, as in any self-respecting thriller, just whodunit. Ruffolo, in a most cogent comment, credits Luttwak with "summoning up the liberal tradition which, from Smith to Stuart Mill, and from Marshall to Keynes ... has constantly warned against the dangers of unchecked market development"⁴. I must confess to a wary and perhaps even prejudiced attitude, along with a healthy dose of restraint. The suspense, you see, comes to a head in Chapter 11, when Luttwak eventually finds the euro guilty of causing Europe's high unemployment, with Exhibit A being the monetary orthodoxy imposed by the Maastricht treaty. Those who believe that Keynesian theory, duly revamped and de-nationalized, and

applied by supra-national governments, will bring us closer to the ideal of economics-as-a-means, as opposed to warding off the horrors of economics-as-an-end, should beware of Luttwak-style anti-monetarism. So in spite of a great deal of blue-pencilling, this review still bears traces of the writer's original distrust.

Luttwak maintains that the two reasons why the US system works the way it does, returning relentlessly to Schumpeter's creative destruction, lie in the stringent rules of America's Calvinist roots and a strong legal system. The American system benefits from the principles of Calvinism⁵ in the following three ways:

- 1) the belief that wealth earned by the sweat of one's brow is not a hindrance to virtue, but rather proof of sainthood, and as such fundamental for justifying the accumulation of capital;
- 2) the corresponding identification of failure with divine disgrace, i.e. with sin, and not with misfortune or injustice; this means that those who fail blame themselves and would never dream of rebelling against the system;
- 3) the foregoing principles generate sufficient consensus so that those who are not paralyzed by a sense of guilt or who lack enough education to express their resentment legally, inevitably end up in jail.

The legal system takes care of everything else. There are anti-trust laws, laws controlling the business community and the Stock Exchange, tax laws (that abet tax evasion, but reserve ruthless criminal punishment for those who get caught), and the practice whereby attorneys in reality earn their outrageously high fees from clients who win

their cases, since most apply a clause that states they will be paid only if the case is successful. As a result, the two million lawsuits a year that are filed against corporate America by seven thousand attorneys would constitute evidence that American capitalism, unlike its European cousin, has well and truly come of age.

So over the past twenty years, Calvinism and the American legal and economic system have enabled turbo-capitalism to grow unbridled while the corresponding spread of injustice has failed to trigger social revolt. Luttwak does not offer any ready-made answers, though his description of how the massive re-distribution of wealth has driven up inequality fills a large part of the book, including its most poignant pages on: the gradual centralization of wealth at the top of the pyramid and corresponding impoverishment of the underclass; the deskilling of the workforce and corresponding decline in wages and trade union strength; the rising tide of social outcasts and the corresponding increase in "rational" crime and the prison population (which now counts five million Americans, who are obviously overlooked by unemployment statistics); dollar-worship, corresponding to a weakening in values and family morals, for which shopping is the only antidote and escape.

In Luttwak's theatre, the wings (religious and juridical) are blazingly vivid and the backdrop (depicting poverty, injustice and empty lives) is a real tear-jerker. However, the leading man - the lonely but powerful United States - never sets foot on the stage. And accordingly, the plot remains indecipherable. Readers wishing to understand the scene must conjure up the actor in their own imagination. Only thus can we begin to understand why the rest of the world ends up footing a bill of almost 300 billion dollars a year for America's obsession with shopping, when what they really crave, and lack, is affection; why the Land of Plenty is also the most highly indebted country in the world; why the monopoly of

power has so far allowed the United States to export fascism into the countries that supply energy and raw materials, while preserving a relative consensus at home; why the US instigates nationalist groups one day, and promotes humanitarian wars the next; why the affirmation of "turbo-capitalism" in Russia has taken on the criminal forms denounced in Chapter 9.

Luttwak's growth without employment is nothing other than Keynes' technological unemployment. However, it takes a federalist view of the economy to correctly attribute the current inapplicability of a non-inflationary full-employment policy to the crisis of the national state and not to the failure of Keynesian theory. The states are no longer up to the challenge, the EU is not up to it yet, and the IMF is dominated by the United States. As soon as the phantom actor reappears on the scene, i.e. America's monopoly over world power, never evoked by Luttwak, the stage is once again bathed in light.

The withdrawal of Luttwak's state is actually none other than Albertini's crisis of the national state⁶. But Luttwak is merely stating what even the blind can see, whilst forty years ago, Albertini showed evidence of an intellectual farsightedness that would inspire more than one generation of federalists. Indeed, the only indication that Luttwak can provide, faced with the retreat of the state, is the optimistic expectation that the pendulum of history will spontaneously swing back from deregulated capitalism to controlled capitalism (perhaps reminiscent of the Viconian courses and recourses?) The whole notion of the crisis of the national state is consistent with the course of history and calls for the formation of supra-national democratic governments at the regional and world level, with the ability to tame savage capitalism and return it to serving shared human goals. What Luttwak interprets as a cyclical crisis has thus been recognized for many decades as a structural crisis - indeed the final crisis of the national state endowed with exclusive sovereignty.

Lastly, the orthodox monetarism that according to Luttwak has become a form of religious fanaticism in Europe but is unknown in the United States, corresponds quite simply to the need for Europe to finish paying the war reparations bill, now that the cold war is over, and at last regain her autonomy. In fact after the last war, reparations were in the form of massive dollar-denominated financial assets held by Japan and Europe. They were destined to either be invested in the United States or be written off. Without this initial sacrifice, the euro and European independence would never be peacefully affirmed.

The euro is not enough to make Keynesian policies possible (starting with the still frozen Delors plan) because the Union still lacks democratic legitimacy and sufficient resources to fulfil the

responsibilities Europe must shoulder under the principle of subsidiarity. To do what Luttwak does, and recommend a return to Keynesian policies on the part of Europe's individual national states is - quite simply - to torpedo the euro. Instead, federalists must fight for the EU and UN to strengthen their democratic legitimacy and replenish their balance sheets with the resources needed to regulate capitalism first at the regional and then at the world level.

In conclusion, Luttwak's dilemma - unchecked capitalism versus controlled capitalism - cannot be resolved by the swing of a pendulum, as it was in the great gambling hall derided by Keynes: the solution can only come from institutions capable of managing capital wherever it flows.

¹Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, New York, Harper & Row, 1972


²Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Vintage Books, 1994 and *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York, Random House, 1987

³Lester Thurow, *The Future of Capitalism*, New York, Morrow, 1996 and *Head to Head*, New York, Morrow, 1992

⁴Giorgio Ruffolo, "La rivoluzione fasulla del turbocapitalismo", in *la Repubblica*, 18 August 1999. Ruffolo (Rome 1926) is a member of the European Parliament and President of the European Research Centre

⁵Though no direct reference is made here, the influence of Max Weber is obvious (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Los Angeles, California, Roxbury Pub. Co., 2000)

⁶Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was professor of Philosophy of Politics at the University of Pavia (Italy). He has been President of the European Federalist Movement and of the Union of European Federalists



On English Nationalism

John Roberts

Edwin Jones,
The English Nation: the Great Myth,
Thrupp, Gloucestershire,
Sutton Publishing, 1998

Historians of nationalism have not agreed on how to date the earliest true manifestations of the nation-state. Many of them incline to the date of the French Revolution, whilst the better-informed have wished to set its origin much earlier. Dr. Jones puts that English innovation squarely into the 16th Century and the era of the Protestant Reformation. His argument is significant and convincing, although one might suggest that he dismisses the medieval manifestations of nationalist feelings too cavalierly.

Europeans must have long been puzzled to account for the peculiarities of the English, doggedly persisting in a host of nonsensical attitudes and modes of thought and seeing themselves as somehow different in kind from their neighbours. Readers on the mainland must shudder at the crude and ignorant rantings of the British tabloid writers, now oblivious of British blame for the disasters of BSE and frothing at the mouth over the cheek of the French in suspecting that UK beef may still be infected.

History lies at the root of the misconceptions that clog the minds of the British and above all the English. This book argues that most of them stem from a deliberate policy by the chief agent of the monstrous king Henry VIII, Thomas Cromwell, in planning and executing the administrative mea-

asures that enabled Henry to make himself the unfettered ruler of his kingdom. He thus furthered the Protestant Reformation in England and instilled in the English mind an ideal of apartheid that has endured.

The propaganda that was embodied by Cromwell in the Preambles to the Reformation Statutes from 1530 to 1534 set out a view of Englishness and abroad that is still potent. This was demonstrated very recently when Margaret Thatcher announced that God had separated the island of Britain from the Continent for a purpose. She was continuing a line of thought, or rather prejudice, inculcated in order to make Henry a despot on lines of Machiavelli's *The Prince*, one which has held sway in England almost to the present day.

That line of prejudice was continued in Foxe's officially sanctioned *Book of Martyrs*, which demonized the Papacy and its holders and damned all Catholics, reaching its culmination with the work of the historian Gilbert Burnet in planning and guiding the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. As a result, when the 19th Century saw the British lording it over nearly a quarter of the globe, the English took that gift of their industrial lead as little more than right reflection of the place in the world that a Protestant God had determined upon from earliest times. The view was created and nourished by a continuing 'Whig interpretation of history' that saw every historic event as leading to the inexorable rise of progress, England, and the Protestant religion.

Dr. Jones shows how England, after many earlier less emphasized attempts, became a successful

imperial power in the 16th Century, and how suitable for that purpose was Henry VIII's new ideology. Other peoples within the British Isles were seen by the ruling class as simply minor sections of English society. The identification became almost complete in the minds of the English. Before the naval victory at Trafalgar by the British navy - at the time of the greatest challenge from Napoleonic France -, Admiral Nelson's signal, still regularly recorded in popular history-books, was: 'England Expects Every Man This Day to Do his Duty'. Lest anyone should think that the two hundred years since that time have changed things, our village war memorial to the local dead of two World Wars bears a simple inscription: 'Live Thou for England: We for England died.'

Other contributory forces lead to these perverted ideas. Until recently few English families - except royal cosmopolitans - have had friendly connections with Europe but many have had close relatives in America, Australia, India and South Africa. Emigration for the English has been to far distant parts, whereas for centuries they have seen the continent of Europe as an area of conflict better to shun. With the English myth so strong it has been easy for recent history to be written as a corollary to the past five hundred years of English difference from other Europeans.

John Lingard, an early 19th Century historian of sober judgment and calm consideration whose Catholic priesthood did not delude him into partisanship, emerges as the hero of this book. Not until the writings of S.R.Maitland appeared after another 50 years, did any academic historian have the standing and the non-Catholic credentials to be attended to and have his views on medieval England taken seriously. Even in the past 20

years, so iconoclastic a historian as Geoffrey Elton, a Jewish immigrant from Hitler's Europe, after a lifetime spent exposing Thomas Cromwell's machinations, could fall victim to the English nation-state idolatry that Henry's agent had spawned.

Dr. Jones is a Catholic and it may be thought that accounts for various things which his Church and its supporters share responsibility for not appearing in the book. That Europe was the birth-place of most of the worst atrocities against human beings recorded in history is left unmentioned; also that the Protestant reformers sought to go behind the earliest times of Papal hegemony in the Church to a time when primacy was not of Rome. Nor, in his examination of the role of Cromwell in creating a myth of false history that has turned into 'folk-myth', does the author mention that even greater European falsification of history, integral to Christianity, which led to 1500 years of persecution of Jews. Thus the author might be seen by sceptics as altogether too kind, by omission, to organized religion.

But that does not seriously diminish the importance of this pioneering work in British historiography. As a junior member of the generation of historians led by men such as Patrick Collinson and Jack Scarisbrook, and not suffering from any strong version of the myth, I long ago concluded that 'the religion of the English is England'. But Dr. Jones awards the palm for bringing accuracy of historical perspective to Conrad Russell, eminent descendant of a leading supporter of Henry VIII and now, by a splendid twist of irony, leader in the House of Lords of Liberal-Democrats, the successors to the Whigs whose interpretation of history he is out to bury.

Big Dams and the Atomic Bomb in India

Elisa Zanardi

Arundhati Roy,
The Cost of Living,
New York,
Modern library, 1999

The Greater Common Good and *The End of Imagination* are two essays which make up this book by Arundhati Roy, who also previously wrote *The God of Small Things*. Her invective against the Indian government and the prevailing corruption in the allocation of funds for development projects by part of the World Bank is really audacious.

The first essay, *The Greater Common Good*, deals with the issue of the construction of dams in India. In fact, this country is the third major builder of dams in the world: as many as 3000 in the last fifty years. The big dams are built for the sake of national development, but it does not look like they are bringing any improvement in the quality of life, since as many as 250 million people still have no access to safe drinking water. Many families have been uprooted from their land to allow the construction of the dams, and have been evacuated, without any national reintegration program available for them.

This is the starting point of A. Roy's harsh analysis; she sees the cause of this dramatic situation in Western economic interests and in her country's corruption. As a matter of fact the dam construction industry in the First World seems to be highly depressed, and it is being exported to the Third World countries under the name of Aid to Development. This is already by itself regrettable enough, but it is astonishing to learn that this enor-

mous waste of resources and energies is not only essentially useless, but is causing damage of gigantic proportions at the ecological and, most of all, humanitarian levels. Indeed, there have been 50 million victims evacuated in India in the last fifty years due to the construction of the big dams.

The World Bank funded the *Narmada Valley Development Projects* two years before the completion of both the environmental feasibility studies and the cost estimates. Roy defines this mechanism as "a circus of great acrobats, where the artists know each other well and now and then exchange their parts: a bureaucrat is hired by the Bank, a banker appears as project consultant. At the end of the show, the greatest part of what is defined Aid to Development is channelled back to the countries where it was coming from, disguised as costs for advisers or wages for companies employees. Often the aids are openly made conditional" (Roy).

Indian popular protest against the construction of big dams construction is very strong; in the case of the Narmada Valley, a committee has even been formed, named NBA, Narmada Bachao Andolan. Its campaign activities to stop this destructive development are systematically repressed by police, often with the use of force (note that Roy herself was arrested during the last demonstration by the Narmada Valley inhabitants, on 12 January). Due to the strong opposition of civil society, the World Bank in 1992 created a commission to conduct a thorough review of the *Sardar Sarovar Projects*. This inquiry produced the so-called *Morse Report*, an extract of which may be suitably quoted: "We believe that the *Sardar Sarovar Projects*, as

they presently are, are imperfect, that the eva-
cues' reinstatement and reintegration is not possi-
ble, given the circumstances, and that the envi-
ronmental impact of the project has not been
taken in due consideration or studied with the
appropriate means. Furthermore we believe that
the Bank shares with the borrower the responsi-
bility for the situation that has been created. It is
clear that technical and economic directives have
led the project to completely disregard human
and environmental needs. India and the other
involved countries have spent big sums of money.
Nobody wants this money to be wasted. But our
advice is this: to proceed without a full awareness
of the human and environmental costs could lead
to even greater losses. Hence we believe that the
most sensible behaviour for the Bank would be to
withdraw from the project and reconsider it from
the start".

In spite of this, the Bank continued to fund the
project, until the tension became so high that in
1993 the Indian government was forced to ask it
to withdraw. The Gujarat government has
announced that it will itself collect the two hun-
dred million dollars still needed to complete the
project. Although the work has stopped, the
government has continued to "clear" the area of
its inhabitants and of trees from the forests, and
now, even if the dam has not yet reached its final
height, its impact on the environment and on the
people is already violent: malaria cases are six
times above normal. To those asserting that the
World Bank investments always bring, regardless
of other factors, work and welfare to local people,
one should present the case of the old inhabitants
of the Narmada Valley. These were formerly inte-
grated in a delicate but well-functioning man-
forest equilibrium, which was capable of assuring
them all they needed, and are now confined in the
slums of some big city, with a maximum of 10-20
rupias a day on which to live. This is life on the
brink of poverty.

In recent years, India has been referred to in the

international debate as a model of development
and democracy, but if we stop for a moment to con-
sider these aspects, and that in most of the country
there is no sign of real development, measured not
by GNP, but by roads, schools, wells, and medical
care, we realise that when we say India is progres-
sing we are not talking of its people.

Perhaps more philosophical, but still meaningful
and clearly marked by the author's political belief,
is the second essay, *The End of Imagination*, which
expounds on the criticism of the recent acquisition
of the atomic bomb by the Indian government.
The official justification given by the government
for its decision to proceed with the nuclear tests is
the deterioration of the security climate, with refer-
ence to the war with China in the 1960s, the ten-
sions with Pakistan, and terrorism. These are three
questionable reasons, if analysed one by one, and
it is easy to demonstrate that nuclear weapons are
not the solution to such problems, neither as a
deterrent nor, all the more so since it would be a
suicidal action, should they be deployed for attack.

Roy sees the only reason as being an attempt by the
government to arouse a non-existent national
identity, by convincing the citizens, or, rather, in the
case of India one would still call them subjects, that
the bomb represents cohesion, the fulfilment of an
"us" distinct from a "them". She argues that it is
absolutely not clear who is "them" and who is
"us", since "every Indian citizen could, in case he or
she so desires, state his or her belonging to this or
that minority. Crevices, if one searches accurately,
run vertically and horizontally, outward and
inward, and they are in layers, in spirals, circular,
helical. Fires, once ignited, run up along any one
of these crevices, and in the process they release a
tremendous amount of political energy. Similarly to
what happens when an atom is fissioned".

Arundhati Roy's ideas and accusations can be
quite easily shared, but it is worthwhile to note
that the analysis of the Indian situation should not
stop at a mere criticism of the present: it is right

and proper to identify some way out, which is completely missing in these two essays which offer little hope. Nothing is ever black and white, and what happened in India, and certainly in other Third World countries too, with the World Bank's useless and dangerous investments, is the result of an international vision that leaves the task of helping developing countries only to economic co-operation.

This does not, in the majority of present-day international organisations, establish a truly political entity for decision making. Such practice is therefore lacking in democracy. After all, this is also the limit of EMU in its current form, which we federalists criticise, the Europe of merchants, where everything is decided by governments and banks. It is impossible to base a system where people act and have the right and duty to participate in the decision-making mechanisms which determine their lives only on economy and free market principles.

Naturally, where political control over choices made at the economic level does not exist, because even the structures that allow it to be exerted are missing, rationality and efficiency are not always found in the strategies and in the methods followed. It is also natural, although not justifiable, that in systems of this kind there is more scope for corruption than there could be if there the choices were made at a decisional level of a parliamentary type, democratically elected.

Roy perhaps does not believe in, or has never considered, such a solution, but we have always thought that in Europe (and in the world) it is necessary to proceed toward complete integration, that should have been political before being based on economics, although history has reversed the phases. Institutions certainly do not change human nature, but at least they lay the foundations for the realisation of better and ever perfectible systems.



Towards a Federal World Republic

Andreas Bummel

Otfried Höffe,
Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung
(*Democracy in the Age of Globalization*),
Munich C.H.
Beck, 1999

The controversial debate in Germany on how global governance should be shaped in a world facing major social, technological, security policy and economic challenges is conducted in terms of "management of international affairs", "governance without government", "public-private network structures" and "collective decision processes of governments". The discussion is greatly influenced by the contribution made by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 which explicitly stated that "global governance does not mean world government or world federalism". Particularly in Germany the term "world state" generally has the pejorative meaning of a "global leviathan" which absorbs the diversity of human life in an uncontrollable, technocratic system, clearly neglecting to incorporate the very different concepts the term can in fact encompass. The discussion hence implies unclear models of multilateral cooperation of governments and intergovernmental bodies on the one hand and new actors on the world stage coming from the private and public sector on the other: "The challenge consists of advancing punctual, institutional and procedural reforms at different levels towards the disappearance of a cooperative global governance project in order to develop [...] workable policy-networks out of fragile policy patchworks"¹. Seen as indivisible, the sovereignty of nation states remains untouched in the discussion and thus

also international integration remains at the level of intergovernmental contracts as actual basis of the world order. In this respect it is characteristic that German Foreign Minister Fischer spoke of a "constitutional contract" rather than of a constitution when portraying his vision for the further development of European integration on May 12 in Berlin.

From the broader viewpoint of political philosophy and in a systematically argued and convincing way, Otfried Höffe shows in his recent study that the traditional structure of individual sovereign states only has limited power to cope effectively with the challenges which arise from globalization and hence international cooperation needs to be improved.

The first part of the book combines the development of a basic model of a legitimate political order with a meticulous diagnosis of what globalization actually means and the implications it has on politics, science, education, culture and not least in areas such as organized crime and environmental devastation. Höffe derives basic political and social principles as well as basic principles of justice from philosophical considerations. He applies these to different levels of social life up to the global level and concludes that the existing world order of classical diplomacy, international treaties, international law and the United Nations based on completely independent nations is not meeting the needs of democracy, human rights, solidarity, rule of law, separation of powers, subsidiarity and federalism.

This leads to the precise development of a basic

model of a "complementary world republic" in the second part of the book.

The most important political innovation which is necessary, as Höffe points out, "consists of a global system of government and law with a democratic character. What is needed in order to obtain collective ability to act is a democratic world state: a world republic" (p. 227). While Höffe explicitly confronts his model of a subsidiary, terraced world state with common objections derived from the general discourse on global governance, he discusses various institutions, the social surroundings and tasks it necessarily would have to include, for example: legislation about the obligations of the still-existing nation states on the one hand, and directly to the citizens on the other, leading to at least two appropriate world chambers embedded into a world society; an executive branch controlled by these whose military power may not be exceeded "neither by sole states nor by associations of these" (p. 395); and a workable world judicial system which settles disputes between the world

republic's entities and fights impunity.

The contribution of Höffe to the discussion of long-term worldwide integration in Germany cannot be exaggerated, as until now there exist only few, if any, serious German publications dealing with world federalist approaches with the exception of the often disregarded volume *Weltföderation – Modell globaler Gesellschaftsordnung* by Maja Brauer (Lang Publishers, 1995). As Höffe develops a profound world federalist model of a future world order it is quite conspicuous that the term of "world federalism" does not appear at all.

The impression is given that the author either has no knowledge of world federalist concepts developed by WFM since World War II or that he preferred not to refer to them explicitly. However, the piece *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* could not provide a better argumentative basis for a democratic world federation. If world federalism is taken up once again in Germany, Höffe's book will certainly be reconsidered.

¹ Dirk Messner, "Architektur der Weltordnung. Strategien zur Loesung globaler Probleme", in *Internationale Politik*, November 1998, p. 21



Federalism and Tribes

Gianfranco Draghi

Pedro F. Miguel,
Talamungongo,
Bari
No-Zap, 1999

I met with Pedro F. Miguel at a convention held in Milan, "Eredità della Tribù" (Tribal Heritage), and I liked him straight away for several reasons. His nice and jolly facial expressions, his contagious smile, his very simple and communicative diction, his way of proposing the most important subjects, facts, stories so straightforward to be assimilated and to be involved with. I like to define his book as "my little book" which, if it is small in size, is actually dense in stories, facts, and important themes for all of us in the contemporary world.

His short and comprehensive presentation took place in the pleasant and co-operative atmosphere of a meeting which was inspired by the ideas of Riane Esler, F. Capra, Terence McKenna and all the psychology so-called transpersonal by Carl G. Jung, Roberto Assagioli, Alan Watts. He attempted to displace the dynamics, from an antithetical patriarchal/matriarchal world to a joint man/woman one. As a matter of fact it is a submerged world, and not only submerged, an aspect of society life which somehow stays underground and other forms mostly sclerotized of the so-called establishment like the nation-state and all it is connected to, such as colonial violence.

During the course of the convention, which was basically originated following the proposal of Pier Luigi Lattuada, a new technology of the sacred was dealt with. May this meet the needs or requirements of young generations who are unsatisfied with the crumbling and reactionary structures of most of the world we are in?

This little book, whose title is "Talamungongo",

printed by the editor No-Zap in Bari within the collection "The Third Millennium", tells us about "a look over the world from above". This is the meaning of Talamungongo, a Kimlundu word, one of the Angolan languages. It also tells us about the inextricable link in the history of Africa between nature, language, land, poetry, religion, and dance as forms of respect and of the belonging of the individual to the community. It shows us the historic values of such a great culture, which need to be renovated, which have mostly been destroyed by occidental colonialism, with its oppositions and its contrasts and its crazy devastation of the world. At the same time I read an article by Lucio Levi issued in "The Federalist Debate" and I was struck by the accordance with Lucio Levi's proposal to introduce the federalist ideals into a deep requirement of rooting. Here Simone Weil and the many other researchers following this line of thought come to my mind, the whole school which goes from Thoreau up to Emerson, Tocqueville and so on. I also recall the actual proposals by the end of the book for regional African federations, in a status of deep reciprocal hospitality (the theme of hospitality has a great momentum in this little book). In that way the different cultures, instead of annihilating each other, may give hospitality to each other in the ideal of a great world federation which discovers once again or reinvents in a new way the historic values of the ancestors. This is valid for Africa and for Europe as well, in order to avoid falling back to local tribal negative values, again nationalistic and offensive, but to allow us to have and to regain the sense of differences within our new great human tribe.

This little book by Pedro F. Miguel both gives and receives hospitality, which I have had the opportunity to come across so dearly.

Russia Ratifies START-2

Mr Putin's era started out with an event of great international importance. The Russian Parliament has approved by a great majority the ratification of Start-2, the second treaty for the reduction of strategic weapons. The treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in 1993 and already ratified by the US Congress in 1996, sanctions the commitment to reduce the number of nuclear warheads stockpiled by either country from 6000 down to 3500 by 2007. Considering also the commitments formerly undertaken with Start-1, the total reduction in long range nuclear weapons will amount to about two thirds the initial Russian and American nuclear arsenals. Moreover, ratification by Russia has opened the way to the start of negotiations for Start-3, which provides for a further reduction of nuclear warheads, down to 2000-2500 each, although Mr Putin apparently would favour a greater reduction, considering Russia's economic straits, which make it difficult to maintain its post-soviet nuclear stockpile.

The international situation however presents contradictory perspectives as far as security and arms control are concerned. On the one hand, ratification of Start II was followed by Mr Putin's approval of a new military doctrine, whereby Russia could strike first with nuclear weapons in order to counter an attack delivered with conventional weapons. On the other hand, the United States could resume the "armament race" of the Cold War years, as it is asking to renegotiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972, which rules out national systems of missile defence; its intention is to build an anti-missile shield to cope with possible attacks from states like Iran and North Korea. The US position not only aroused the strong opposition of Russia, which actually warned the US of the risk of disrupting the whole system of nuclear disarmament set up so far, but has also contributed to create a climate of suspicion and scepticism at the opening of the Conference for the revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (*f.si.*).

Earth Day 2000

More than 500 million people in 85 countries all over the world celebrated Earth Day 2000 on April 22. The event has been marked annually since 1970 to promote awareness of environmental issues. It aims at bringing together everyone to "promote a healthy environment and a peaceful, just, sustainable world". This year, the events around the world have been on the theme of clean energy with parades, tree-planting ceremonies, nature walks, conferences, and live Internet link-ups organised by governments and NGOs. Earth Day has been organised by the Earth Day Network (<http://www.earthday.net>), a non-profit co-ordinating body headed by the organisers of the original Earth Day in 1970, Gaylord Nelson and Denis Hayes, and based in Seattle, Washington, in the United States (*s.r.*).

Fitoussi: a Weak Euro or a Politically Weak Europe?

The French economist and advisor of Lionel Jospin, Jean Paul Fitoussi, interviewed by the Italian Press Agency Adn-Kronos stated: "Two years from the birth of the Euro, we see that the Euro is the first 'non political' currency in history. The reason of the weakness of the Euro is exactly the democratic vacuum Europe is witnessing today. How many submarines has the Euro? A currency is not a merely technical issue, affected only by the currency rate relations and interest rates. The real problem is that the Euro is an international currency, but it is impossible to have an international currency without an international policy... The strength of the dollar is in part determined by the performances of its economy, but most of all by the strength of its military capacity and by the diplomatic action behind it. The developing countries prefer to be linked to a currency that has a government behind, not only an isolated central bank, and this affects the international faith in the Euro" (*f.fa.*).

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