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New Series

The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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The Springtime of Democracy

Lucio Levi

Certain Middle-East countries such as Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, have begun to experience the seeds of democracy.

The political climate following the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has brought an unprecedented display of political activism, as shown by the massive public demonstrations, the successful withdrawal of Syrian troops and the achievement of free elections. In Egypt the People's Assembly approved an amendment to the Constitution allowing multi-candidate elections to the presidency. In Saudi Arabia elections were held from February to April 2005 for half of the seats on municipal councils, the remaining half being appointed by the government. Women were excluded from both voting and candidacy. Partial though this first exercise of democracy has been, it nevertheless represents a significant sign of change in the Saudi Arabian political scene.

If we then add the presidential elections in the Palestinian territories and, in spite of the climate of civil war, the parliamentary elections in Iraq we can conclude that all these events testify the will of the peoples of the region to take their destiny into their own hands. Although these moves need confirmation, they do seem to point to a new and welcome trend toward democracy in the Middle-East.

The idea that democracy is a luxury for the wealthy is an old-fashioned viewpoint and not in tune with prevailing tendencies in the contemporary world. First of all, there is the case of India, a fifty years old, deeply rooted democracy in a developing country. The success of democracy in other Asian countries such as Japan immediately after WW II and, more recently, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia, show

that democracy is not incompatible with Asian values, as Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations wrongly maintains. The case of Indonesia is extraordinarily interesting, because it shows how the world's biggest Islamic country has adopted a democratic political structure. Turkey is now no longer the only exception to a 'rule' which was supposed to prove that Islamism presents an insuperable obstacle to democracy.

Is the springtime of democracy evidence of the success of the Bush doctrine of bringing democracy to the Middle-East? In small part only. Military occupation cannot significantly reshape the fundamental social and economic structures needed to enhance the likelihood of a successful democratic transition in Iraq or in Afghanistan. The real impediments to democracy lie not simply in economic inequalities, but also in social inequalities in, for example, education and health care. Furthermore, the frequency with which we see weak or failed states plagued by corruption and violence suggests that the rule of law is an indispensable requirement for democracy. As regards Iraq, the deep ethnic and religious cleavages among Shiites, Sunnites and Kurds present another serious obstacle to democracy. Each group is divided between fundamentalists and secularists as well as along class, tribal and regional lines. Lastly, it must be taken into account that Iraq has no experience in democracy, unlike Germany, Italy and Japan which experimented with democracy at the beginning of the last century and, in the post-war period, received a decisive help from the US in restoring of democracy.

Of course, the factors which might either

enhance or possibly reduce the likelihood of a successful transition to democracy are not independent of the international context. In this connection, we have to ask ourselves whether the US intervention in Iraq which allowed the elections to take place has truly paved the way to democracy and generally improved the overall situation in the Middle-East.

One of the consequences of the Iraqi war not foreseen by the US government has been the growth of terrorism, which did not exist during the Saddam Hussein era, but has now taken root, and the strengthening of fundamentalism in the country. A real movement toward democracy is clearly impossible in a society suffering from daily terrorist attacks. The tragedy of overwhelming American military superiority lies in the fact that, although the US can win wars, it is unable to rebuild the states it has defeated.

This observation leads to a further reflection. The US is waging an open war against international courts, since it is not willing to recognize any international jurisdiction. Its refusal to recognize the pre-eminence of the rule of law contradicts the liberal spirit of a power whose ambition is to play a role in the promotion of democracy abroad.

The EU also wants to increase the number of democracies in the world. Lacking a powerful military apparatus, it aims primarily at promoting democracy in its neighbouring countries.

EU enlargement has been an extraordinary success and proves the effectiveness of an innovative form of foreign policy. The so-called Copenhagen criteria setting out the conditions which candidate countries have to meet – respecting the principles of democracy, the rule of law and a market economy – have given a powerful impulse for political and economic change, first in Southern Europe where three fascist regimes (Greece, Spain and Portugal) survived until the 1970s, and then in Central and Eastern Europe. It is no exaggeration to say that the attractive force of the EU made a decisive contribution to bringing about the end of those hateful regimes.

The process has not ended yet. Bulgaria and

Romania are supposed to enter the EU in 2007. Negotiations with Turkey will start in the near future, and the mere expectation of accession to the EU has already produced deep changes in its laws and institutions, such as the abolition of the death penalty, the recognition of the rights of the Kurd minority, and the elimination of the political privileges of the army. On the horizon we can discern the prospect of the pacification and democratisation of the Balkans. This is the way to bury the horrors of civil war. The entry of Slovenia in the EU in 2004 was the first step in this direction.

Democratic changes can only succeed and endure within a framework of security linked to a prospect of development. Both these elements can be brought to the Middle-East by a process of regional integration. This is lacking in the American plan for a Greater Middle-East. The EU could promote such a regional integration process, starting with a peace-keeping intervention by European security forces to assure peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine. This could create a climate of *détente* in the Middle-East and foster international co-operation in the region. Moreover, a development plan is needed, similar to the Marshall Plan which promoted European integration after WW II, whose task would be to stimulate the economic integration in the region and contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq.

Broadly speaking, the EU is now a big market without a political head. This is the idea of Europe the UK supports. For this reason, the UK has chosen to stay out of the euro area. The rejection of the Constitution by the French and Dutch citizens shows how a divided and powerless EU, able neither to stimulate economic growth nor to speak with one voice at international level, is losing the support of the citizens and opening the way to the return of nationalism and fear of the future. The voters' "No" to their leaders unmasks the ambiguity of all those, and in particular Mr Chirac, who claim to be independent of the US, but are unwilling to transfer foreign and security policy powers to the EU.

The Relations between Politics and Culture in the Experience of the European Federalist Movement in Italy

Francesco Rossolillo

Francesco Rossolillo passed away last February. He was Honorary President of the Union of European Federalists and the editor of the review The Federalist. We remember him with this article, published in The Federalist in July 1984, which illustrates his viewpoint on the relations between politics and culture.

I

The movements which compose the UEF have more or less different ideas as regards the relations between politics and culture in the federalist struggle, from which they have drawn different consequences as regards their organization and their character. So it cannot be denied that, within the UEF, we are confronted with pronounced diversities, with deep roots in the history of its component parts. It would therefore be unrealistic to think that the same model could be imposed everywhere. Such a purpose would produce only the consequence – catastrophic indeed – of breaking up our international organization. What matters in reality is that each of us respects the experience of the others, especially as we can see, within each of our movements, many admirable examples of self-denial and devotion to the cause of European unification. It must moreover be remembered that each of our movements, for all their differences, always represents in its country the vanguard in the struggle for European unification. This does not mean, of course, that we should refrain from comparing our points of view and seeking to identify as clearly as possible our divergences. As a matter of fact, each of our organizations, with its own identity stemming from forty years of history, is a living and open reality and can thus find, in the experience of the others, important stimuli to evolve and enhance its capacity to act and to mobilize people's energy. That is why we must

talk with each other and know one another better. As for myself, my aim is to explain briefly the concept of the relation between politics and culture on which the historical identity of the Italian MFE is founded.

II

The idea which is at the basis of the historical identity of the MFE in Italy is that the problem of uniting Europe in a federation is not merely one of an institutional order and a regional scope, *but is the main political and cultural problem of world history in the second half of the twentieth century.* In this view, the federalist enterprise takes on the same global character as those which gave their sense to the great historical transformations of Europe in the last century. The liberal, democratic and socialist movements promoted both great institutional changes and great cultural revolutions. They affirmed new values, changed the terms of the political debate, brought in new canons of historical interpretation and above all fashioned the cultural instruments for thinking the future in a new way.

The great revolutions of modern history took place at points of time in which the culture produced by the existing order of things was no longer able to give men a vision of the future in terms of progress towards the emancipation of mankind, freedom from oppression, affirmation of reason. The effervescence of revolutionary historical phases is accounted for by the fact

that a new culture, promoted by the agents of change gives back to men, and to young people in particular, the capacity to imagine a future, i.e. the perspective without which politics necessarily degenerate into a mere power-play, driving away from it the very best forces of society.

III

We believe that the federalist turning-point of world history will have the same cultural significance. Federalism became a political movement in the course of World War Two. Some men, drawing their inspiration from the political reflections of Kant, the British federalists and Einaudi, understood that the destructive potential of war had by then reached such a monstrous degree as to give Kant's philosophical scheme the reality of a concrete political project. Federalism therefore started in Italy as a reflection on peace and a struggle for the realization of peace, and has since remained true to its original inspiration. Its relation to peace is the same as that of liberalism, democracy and socialism to liberty, equality and social justice. In this perspective, the struggle for European unification must be viewed as an episode of a much more long-term historical endeavour, aiming to realize peace through a world federation. Founding a European federation thus appears as the first step in the progress of federalism in world history. This significance can be already delineated, if only in embryo, in the segment of European integration which is already behind us. For, even though the federal unity of Europe is far from having been achieved, thanks to the presence of this goal an unprecedented work of peace-making has been realized in the ending of the historical enmity between France and Germany, which had been soaking Europe in blood during the whole course of modern history since German unification.

IV

This is the kind of awareness which has formed the historical identity of the MFE in Italy. What had to be done in the years of its foundation,

and still has to be done today, is to fight a battle which is both for an institutional change and for affirming a new culture: the culture of peace, which has to appropriate what is permanent in the cultures of freedom, equality and social justice and go beyond them in a larger perspective. In this way the character of federalism as a comprehensive cultural concept comes to the fore. In fact, it implies, on the one hand, the awareness that peace cannot be realized except by overcoming state sovereignty, and it presents us, on the other hand, with a difficult and fascinating intellectual challenge: to revise the Marxist conception of history as a history of class-struggle, and to go beyond it through laying the foundations of a new conception of history as a history of the coming of peace (a clear argument for the need for such a revision is to be found, among many examples, in the *impasse* of traditional historiography in face of the problem of interpreting European fascism). We have moreover to elaborate new models of society, whose realization would be made possible by overcoming state sovereignty. This means giving back to men and women, and to young people in particular the capacity to look to the future, to think of the history to come as a history of the accomplishment of what is specifically human in man. This is what the liberal, democratic and socialist ideologies are no more able to do. Hence, after having been the great driving force of the history of Europe in the nineteenth century, they are today but empty shells, deprived of any power to attract and to mobilize support.

V

That the problem of peace is the crucial problem of our age is shown with the utmost clarity by the tremendous echo evoked by the initiatives of the peace movement in Europe. We have not, in this context, to take sides for or against the peace movement: as long as no institutional solution to the problem of peace is advanced, everybody is both right and wrong in the debate which is under way in Europe. It suffices to remark that, since the end of the war, no other problem has

acquired the capacity to provoke such a vast and profound popular mobilization. Such a stirring does not happen by chance, for it is with respect to this problem that the destiny of Europe is at stake. But, if this is the case, the decisive challenge is to succeed in making the peace movement (and all those who, while not taking part in the public manifestations, are aware of the danger threatening Europe) become aware that there is no solution to the problem of peace except in federalism. It is – be it said once more a political task indeed, but also a cultural one: to bring the peace movement, and all those who want peace, to adopt the culture of peace.

VI

Creating the culture of peace, however, is one of our responsibilities. It cannot be found ready-made in books. The official culture does not call state sovereignty in question. To be sure, the culture of peace has forerunners: from Kant up to the British federalists and Luigi Einaudi. But the federalist aspect of these great thinkers' works has been forgotten, almost removed by the culture of war. It is our task to reassess their thought, bringing its real value to the fore, to continue it and to deepen it.

VII

The great institutional and cultural transformations of history occur when they are made possible by objective modifications of people's everyday behaviour. When such modifications are so radical as to make the existing power structure obsolete, they are not understood by those in power, who always try to control the new reality – which eludes them – with the material and cultural instruments of the past, thus causing contradictions to accumulate and problems to become more and more intractable. *In reality the great historical transformations are never effected by the existing power structure.* In order for them to break through, a force must emerge able to take on in its own right the responsibility for effecting the change and to make this the reason for its political existence. This is our situation, and

herein lies the great difficulty of our task. There is a passage in Machiavelli's *Prince* which has an important place in the cultural stock of the Italian MFE. It is said in it that « there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful, of success, and more dangerous to carry through than undertaking the introduction of new orders. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience ».

VIII

This is our situation. We must know that we cannot expect anything from the existing order, i.e. from the national one: neither from political nor from economic power nor from the media nor from official culture. This means that the essential condition of our survival as federalists (since we can always survive as an advertising agency of the European policy of national governments) resides in our capacity to build up, on our own account, the basis of our influence, to create our own information channels, to finance our organization ourselves and, first and foremost, to work out our own culture. That is, in a word, the primary requirement of *autonomy*, in the fields of politics, organization, finance and culture. Here is to be found the fundamental criterion which determined the basic choices that account for the specific nature and structure of the Italian MFE.

Let me point briefly to the way in which the choice of autonomy has been put into effect as regards i) our relations with political parties, ii) our criteria for selecting and training active members and iii) the raising of our financial resources.

i) Autonomy in our political relations has as its main manifestation the refusal by the group of members who provide the leadership and

management of the MFE to identify themselves with any national party. We are but ourselves, neither right-wing nor left-wing, neither Christian Democrat nor Socialist, since such distinctions belong to the order we want to overcome. It must be noticed, however, that it is just because of this position of independence (which is anyway compatible with tactical alliances) that we have been allowed to establish and maintain very good collaborative relationships with all democratic parties in Italy.

ii) The selection and training of active members are guided by the purpose to avoid restrictions which would be imposed on the movement by a too burdensome and costly administrative apparatus, which would inevitably depend, for its survival, on external funds. That is why *ours are all part-time active members*, each having a job which assures him economic independence, while leaving enough time to devote to federalist activity. In this way our organization is not expensive, and we are sheltered from any possible pressure or blackmailing by any centre of political or economic power.

iii) The specific institution of financial autonomy, however, is self-financing. Every young man recruited in the Movement knows that being active in the organization will never procure him financial advantages, but rather will cost him money. Here lies the financial basis of our independence. To be sure, all this does not prevent us from receiving external contributions sometimes: but these are mainly used to finance particular actions, whereas the organization's permanent structure functions thanks to our own resources. This shelters us, once more, from any outside influence.

IX

But the real foundation of all such choices is cultural autonomy. The sole motivation, in the absence of power and money, which can push active members to persevere, sometimes for decades, in a toilsome and difficult commitment, is the awareness of our irreplaceable historical role, i.e. of being those who are tracing a new way, who have a point of view allowing them to

grasp, before others do, in their true sense the inarticulate ferments and aspirations of society in our epoch, that the others see with a biased eye, or do not see at all. Such awareness is a thoroughly cultural one. That is why we think that politics and culture are two inseparable aspects of our activity. This means, let me repeat once more, that it is the federalists themselves who have to produce their culture. This is the reason why each MFE section in Italy strives to be at the same time a centre of political activity and of cultural creativity, in which lectures, training courses, etc. are given by the active members themselves. And it could not be otherwise, since federalist culture is in the making, and who could make it but the federalists? It is a task that certainly could not be entrusted to academics, nor to other exponents of official culture, who represent the old order and who, as such, can have but the function of supporting the existing power.

X

This figure of the activist, being at the same time a man of action and a man of culture, is the ideal to which the MFE has oriented itself throughout its history. To be sure, as always happens, reality has fallen short of the ideal from many points of view. Models, however, are important in the life of a movement which wants to be revolutionary (though this word, in the case of the MFE, has to be carefully stripped of any violent connotation). I am convinced that the influence exerted in Italy by the MFE lies in its always having attributed a primary importance to the selection and formation of men. Let me conclude with another quotation from Machiavelli. In the *Discourses* he asks whether it is true that money is « the sinew of war ». And he answers that, « contrary to the general opinion, (...) the sinews of war are not gold, but good soldiers; for gold alone will not procure good soldiers, but good soldiers will always procure gold ». And good soldiers, in the current struggle for peace, can be found only if we are capable of working out a culture opening up a new outlook on the future of mankind.

The Fate of the EU and The European Constitution

Francesco Ferrero

The French and Dutch peoples' NO to the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has opened an unprecedented crisis in the European constituent process. Indeed, whilst it was the national political elites who rejected the European Defence Community and the Spinelli project, the refusal this time has been by the *citizens* of two founding countries of the European Community, and in both cases the referendum turn-out has been so high as to exceed those of all recent elections. This happened, in addition, in clear contrast not only to their governments but also to the overwhelming majorities in their Parliaments. To complete the picture, we have to add that of the ten countries that have so far ratified the Constitution, only Spain put the question to the people and there the turn-out was quite low.

This being the scenario, one cannot but pose the question: have European citizens become hostile to the very idea of European integration? Do they cherish the illusion they can cope with the challenges of an ever more globalized world by going back to the more familiar structures of the nation state? Although a part of the no's certainly came from that ideological background, we do not think that this is the prevailing sentiment among the overall majority of European citizens. Our assumption is that the vote has not been against the European Union *per se*, but against the method used in recent years to pursue integration.

Lately, many crucial decisions have been taken by member states' governments without any real democratic debate. That was the case with the introduction of the single currency, with the decision to enlarge the Union from 15 to 25 members without having first consolidated

EU integration, and even with the decision to convene the Convention that drafted the European Constitution. No doubt national elections acted in effect as an indirect check on those decisions, but European policies have seldom been the most important issues debated during such electoral campaigns. It is worth recalling that the Laeken Declaration itself, which instituted the Convention, resulted from an awareness of the citizens' growing distrust of the European construction process, as disclosed by the Danes voting No to the Maastricht Treaty and the Irish voting No to the Nice Treaty, as well as the steady drop in turn-out in the European elections. It was for that reason indeed that it was decided to pass from inter-governmental conferences to the Convention at which representatives of the national and European Parliaments, and of the Commission, would for the first time take part in the European constituent debate together with representatives of the member states' governments – although, to protect their right of veto those same governments limited the assembly's prerogatives to such an extent that the significance of that move was essentially negated. The Convention had, in effect, to proceed by almost unanimous vote while at the same time knowing that the draft would later be reviewed by the 25 governments in an inter-governmental conference at which each one could, if it wished, veto every individual proposal. Partly because of these constraints, partly because of the decade-long habit to delegate to the governments the management of European issues, neither the European nor the national political leaders, including those that today are inciting the peoples to vote no,

really fought so that the text of the European Constitution be the outcome of a veritable public debate, in which national and European parties, and through them the citizens, were involved.

This, in our opinion, is the fundamental deep-seated meaning of the votes of the past days: the citizens wish to become protagonists in building the future of Europe. A survey by Ipsos¹ on May 29th (the day of the vote), indicated that 39% of the French who voted No did so because, among other things, "this will allow for renegotiation of a better Constitution". And it is obvious that for renegotiation to result in a better Constitution the method by which it is drawn up must be changed.

On these pages we have already fully analyzed the limits of the Constitution project. The main elements include the continued presence of the right of veto in fiscal, budgetary, defence and constitutional revision matters. Despite these limits, the European federalists decided to defend the text, mainly because they thought that, given the political will of a group of States, it would have allowed further progress towards the building of the European federation. This would be possible through the provisions regarding structured cooperation in matters of defence, the citizens' legislative initiative, and the possibility for the European Parliament to call for a new Convention for revising the Constitution. Activists from many different countries have upheld this choice with passion and courage, participating with astonishing generosity also in the French referendum campaign.

This ability to see the text in an historical perspective, and to evaluate its long-term effects, could be expected from federalist militants, but certainly not from the European citizens in general. To those who followed the French referendum campaign, as we did, the difficulty of defending this text became immediately evident, for after all it did not answer European citizens' expectations such as how to give a new impetus to the European economic growth, preserving our social model. How to speak to the world with one voice, and become emancipated

from the American dominance? If we want to regain the consensus of European citizens we must start again with these questions.

The Commission and the Luxembourg Presidency, supported by the French and Dutch governments themselves, have so far limited themselves to calling for the continuation of national ratifications. The European Parliament, divided in its interior, did not even manage to adopt a resolution on the matter. Such a request rests on the content of Declaration 30, included in the Constitution, which states that if, on October 29, 2006, four fifths of the member States have ratified the Treaty, the matter shall be referred to the European Council. In principle, it is a correct proposal, based on the intention not to leave the power to block the entry into force of the Constitution in the hands of one or a few States. However, for it to be politically more effective, it should have been put in black and white *before* the referendum day, there being the precedent of Art. 82² of the Draft Treaty establishing a European Union approved by the European Parliament in 1984. If the French and the Dutch had known, when voting, that other States would go forward without them, the outcome of the ballots would probably have been different.

To remedy that mistake now is quite difficult. In all probability, the no by France and the Netherlands will adversely influence the following referenda which will take place even in traditionally euro-skeptical countries. The UK, followed by other States, has decided already to freeze the ratification process. The British intention is clear: to declare clinically dead this project, and with it the idea, never really accepted, that Europe shall have a Constitution. There is only one possibility to save the Constitution: the States that have already ratified and those that, even if they have not yet ratified, do not intend to ditch *sine die* the constituent project, must solemnly declare that the Constitution, *as it is*, could enter into force if it will be ratified by at least twenty States,

before the next referenda on ratification take place. Only such a declaration can give back a significance to a popular vote on a text which, in any other case, would be dead even before seeing the light.

A confused and in some way dramatic phase is opening. Already loud voices are being raised by those who, in a partisan spirit, attack the entire European construction, preaching the need to go back to national currencies and to close their borders against the invasion of the chimerical Polish plumber.

Europe will emerge from this situation in two ways: either resigning itself to its decline and to the progressive dissolution of its political and monetary integration, which will make us impotent in the face of Asian competition, slaves of the American hegemony and once again exposed to the nightmare of nationalist hatred, or else by finding the courage to turn down the logic of compromise, and to start a new era of European democracy, launching a political project capable of regaining the consensus among its citizens. Whatever the outcome, one thing is certain: the people have stormed into the constituent process, and will never leave. No governmental alchemy will ever pass their judgment unhurt

In case the last tentative to save the Constitution fails, the only way the European project can be re-launched is by convening a true Constituent Assembly whose representatives shall be elected by the people. If the European Constitution dies

in the ballot-boxes, in the ballot-boxes will return it to life. The debate preceding its election will for the first time seriously confront the citizens on the future of Europe and on a European plane at last, unlike the debates in France and the Netherlands which were strongly conditioned by their national political contingencies. As with every genuine constituent assembly it will have the legitimacy and the mandate to adopt a draft Constitution by qualified majority. It would then be directly submitted to the European citizens through a consultative referendum to be held on the same day throughout the Union, and would eventually enter into force in those States that have ratified it, providing they represent a majority both of the citizens and of the States of the Union.

The European Parliament's federalist inter-group has been in the front line defending the text, organizing demonstrations both in the assembly hall and in the city of Paris. It is now the primary duty of the European Parliament to launch this new proposal. We know that very powerful voices will be raised against it, and that it will not be accepted by all of the EU member States. For this reason it is necessary that a group of States should declare themselves ready to support it and to go forward with it together with those who share the same aim.

Today the survival of European integration is at stake, and with it that of the federalist project in the rest of the world. It is a choice on which we cannot allow anyone to have the right of veto.

¹<http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/8074.asp>

²"This Treaty shall be open for ratification by all the Member States of the European Communities. Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the Governments of the Member States which have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the procedures by and the date on which this Treaty shall enter into force and on relations with the Member States which have not yet ratified".

Prospect of Ratifications of the European Constitutional Treaty

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date of the ratification</i>	<i>Way of ratification</i>	<i>YES share on the overall vote</i>	<i>Result</i>
Lithuania	November 11, 2004	Parliamentary	92,3%	YES
Hungary	December 20, 2004	Parliamentary	94,2%	YES
Slovenia	February 1, 2005	Parliamentary	87,8%	YES
Spain	February 20, 2005 April 28, 2005 May 18, 2005	Non-binding referendum Vote of the <i>Congreso</i> Vote of the <i>Senado</i>	76,7% 94,2% 97,4%	YES
Italy	January 25, 2005 April 6, 2005	Vote of the <i>Camera</i> Vote of the <i>Senato</i>	93,0% 93,1%	YES
Greece	April 19, 2005	Parliamentary	94,0%	YES
Slovakia	May 11, 2005	Parliamentary	78,9%	YES
Austria	May 11, 2005 May 25, 2005	Vote of the <i>Nationalrat</i> Vote of the <i>Bundesrat</i>	99,5% 95,2%	YES
Germany	May 12, 2005 May 27, 2005	Vote of the <i>Bundestag</i> Vote of the <i>Bundesrat</i>	95,8% 95,7%	YES
France	May 28, 2005	Referendum	45,1%	NO
The Netherlands	June 1, 2005	Non-binding referendum Now waiting for parliamentary decisions	38,4%	NO
Latvia	June 2, 2005	Parliamentary	86,6%	YES

Updated June 30, 2005

A Pope in Passing: Reflections on the Pontificate of John Paul II

James Christie

Throughout the long, sultry Roman morning, the crowd had gathered in St. Peter's Square. Nearly one hundred fifty thousand souls from around Europe and the planet waited patiently. Then a Pentecostal rumble of languages was hushed suddenly, then given full throat as the familiar, perspex armoured scarlet and white "popemobile" turned into the square, the unmistakable figure of John Paul II standing in the truck bed, right hand raised in greeting and blessing as the weekly audience unfolded. Halfway to the raised dais before the steps of St. Peter's, the chanting of a group of Spanish teenagers overwhelmed the background cheering: "*Juan Paul Segundo, premiere in el mundo!*" To the obvious dismay of the bullet catchers, the popemobile ground to a halt, and the stooped figure climbed out, touching hands, conferring blessing. Like a rock star? Yes – and no. There was something more – always something more. Later, after the multilingual homily and blessing, I waited with the rest of the "*prima fila*", the front row, along with some thirty others including the Spanish Ambassador to the Holy See and a Nicaraguan priest on furlough, for my brief moment with the Pope. My friends at the Canadian Pontifical College had briefed me on his deaf ear. He listened to my greetings, smiled brightly enough to edge out the Mediterranean sun, said, "United Church of Canada! Thank you, thank you very much." Then he blessed me. And I felt blessed. Whatever else, John Paul was a man of God...

The personal is political, we're told. In John Paul II's case, the personal was pontifical and political. His personality and his history defined his twenty-seven year pontificate, the third longest

since Peter himself. He redefined *charisma* for the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the dawn of the twenty-first. He translated the role of Bishop of Rome into a religious icon for much of the world, and not the Roman Catholic world alone by any means. For the *Star Wars* generation, "J2P2" was the Roman Catholic Church. For Protestants who remembered the great reconciler, John XXIII, from whom this pope took his name, along with those of his two immediate predecessors, John Paul II has both built on the foundations of Vatican II – and, in some measure, dismantled them.

Few pontiffs have been more embracing of the wider world, of Protestant and Orthodox Christians, of other faiths, of Christ's poor. Few have been so relentlessly traditional in enforcing Roman doctrine.

Karol Wojtyla, coming of age in Nazi-occupied Poland, preserving the faith in the Stalinist Eastern block, and ascending to the throne of Peter in a global, secular, plural age, was staggeringly intelligent, multi-faceted, but not so complex as many would make him. Athlete, actor, poet, linguist, theologian – he was all these things, but mostly, he was a priest who sought to do nothing but Christ's will. This meant ensuring the freedom and integrity of the Roman Catholic Church in the late Soviet Empire, and demonstrating that the love of God in Christ is for the whole world, much of which he visited. All the issues that perplex and bedevil Catholic and non-Catholic alike, from priestly celibacy to the ordination of women to birth control have not been part of his agenda. He has left them to his successor and to his church, confident, in his lifetime, in the efficacy

of longstanding doctrine.

Seen in that light he succeeded admirably. Later generations are unlikely to credit Ronald Reagan's military spending spree for bankrupting the Soviet Union and causing its implosion half so much as they are to acknowledge the impact of John Paul II's support in 1981 for Lech Walesa's Solidarity Movement and the shipbuilder's of Gdansk in his native Poland.

Then, and through his papacy, John Paul II understood and made use of international media. His was a film clip pontificate, inviting the world to adopt him as a spiritual leader. The moments are legion and legend: his trips abroad, with his trademark kiss of the tarmac; the throngs at every rally; his stoicism in the face of the attempt on his life in the early years, and in the face of Parkinson's in the later; quietly sitting as a participant in the Riva del Garda conference of the World Conference on Religion and Peace; his prayer at the Western Wall in Jerusalem; his staff surmounted with a poor person's crucifix; his blessings from the balcony of the papal apartment.

He understood that personal exposure, done well, meant influence. He spoke out against the soulless greed of unbridled capitalism, and the deadening hand of totalitarian socialism. He stood with the poor and the marginalized, yet eschewed political engagements for his priests. And in the great balance of life, it must never be forgotten that he was silent in the face of genocide in Rwanda, when his influence might have made a difference, and that his principled but surely debatable stand against birth control continues to exact a terrible price in HIV/AIDS plagued Africa.

Under his leadership, the Roman Catholic Church established a new relationship with Judaism, expressing contrition and forswearing the demonization and oppression of the past. He has led the way in establishing a new Christian relationship with Islam, an exercise which the rest of Christianity is just beginning.

In Canada, John Paul II's pontificate has seen the

full membership of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops in the Canadian Council of Churches – an historic "first", and clearly in the spirit of John XXIII. But statements like Cardinal Ratzinger's *Dominus Jesus* are stark reminders that this has been a very Rome centred papacy withal, and it is beyond the ken of the best analysts to foresee the future for which John Paul II has laid the foundation. Irish scholar, statesman and dean of letters, Conor Cruise O'Brien, warned in the 1994 Massey Lectures of a sobering, even dangerous liaison between the conservative Catholicism of John Paul II and fundamentalist Islam.

But now he is dead, and, as was said of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and others, he belongs to history. A new Pontiff reigns in Rome: new, and yet familiar. Joseph, Cardinal Ratzinger, a German national, and now Benedict XVI, is not so much a pope of transition as of continuity. He was John Paul II's "Chief of Doctrine", and, so far, it appears little will change.

Much will depend on this new Pope. John Paul II leaves a high profile house in the eyes of the world, but the domestic affairs of the Roman Catholic Church are in serious disarray, perhaps more so than at any point since the great schism of the 14th century, which saw popes reigning concurrently in both Rome and Avignon.

Benedict inherits the *curia* of his predecessor. It is conservative, most cardinals having been appointed by John Paul II over more than twenty-five years. This will sit well with much of the global south, if Philip Jenkins is at all accurate in his assessment of the *Next Christendom: the Coming of Global Christianity*.

European and American Roman Catholics are dismayed, with perceived hopes and aspirations delayed for the unforeseeable future.

On the other hand, Europeans have hardly been overly sensible to religious dogma since the end of the second world war. Witness the late Pope's desire to see the rights of religion enshrined in a European constitution repeatedly, now finally, dashed.

Of greater importance to Federalists is the sense that both John Paul II and Benedict XVI represent in some measure the new Europe. The nature of the European Union was forever changed by the events triggered in part by John Paul II, which saw the end of the old Soviet regime. Benedict is a reminder that Germany is to be a player in the unfolding future.

John Paul II refused to uphold western ambitions when they seemed unjust and imperialistic as in the tragic Iraqi conflict. Benedict XVI takes his name from his early twentieth century predecessor who opposed the 1914-1918 conflict, and sought a peaceful and just Europe.

Both the late pope and the new one have a

global perspective and a global reach; both see the world as their parish; both see the human community, regardless of creed or politics, as one global household. Both argue for respect among peoples, religions and nations, and for what the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Jonathan Sacks calls, "*the dignity of difference.*"

Federalists should have worked more with John Paul II; we should certainly find ways to work with Benedict XVI.

So, *vale*, John Paul II; *ave*, Benedict XVI. May the former rejoice with the angels; may the latter be on the side of the angels. In the building of a truly new world order we could use a few good saints and a few good Popes.

The Need for a European Plan for Growth and Employment

Guido Montani

The European economy is either stagnant or it grows so slowly that it does not create new jobs. In the last decade, the average rate of unemployment has been above 9%. The curse of unemployment among the young is even worse. Without growth, the European social model is threatened by tensions that in the long run cannot be sustained. For too many years the European economy has not been able to keep up with world development. The warning comes both from the capability of the USA and of Japan to defy the challenge of globalisation, and from the comparison with the extraordinary dynamism of China and India.

The national governments are responsible for this serious situation because they created a Monetary Union, but not a Political Union. In the year 2000, in Lisbon, the national governments declared that they wanted to make Europe the most dynamic economy of the world, by 2010, founded on knowledge and innovation. Five years later, the facts prove that the governments ignored their own recommendations. The cause of this failure is due to the method adopted: the coordination of the national economic policies, without giving up adequate powers of economic policy to the European Commission. If the government of Washington just limited itself to coordinating the governments of California, of Ohio, of Virginia, etc., even the American economy would probably stagnate and would not be competitive at world level. Europe's currency is just as strong as the dollar on the world market, but Europe does not have a federal government with the necessary means to kick-start its economy. The plans for growth at national level are necessary, but they must be

part of a coherent European plan.

In order to overcome the resistance of the national governments to the launching of a European Plan, two current myths should be disproved. The first is that the euro is so strong compared to the dollar that it stifles European exports. The truth is that the national governments, a few years ago, lamented the strong dollar and now they complain about a weak dollar, because a European policy of exchange rates is non-existent. The Washington government controls its external monetary policy according to its internal needs. Europe suffers, because national governments do not have the guts to entrust the European Commission with the task of defending Europe's interests in international organisations, such as the IMF, the WTO and the UN. Europe must speak with a single voice, also on economic issues. The first step is to agree, at least with the Washington and Tokyo governments, on the levels of pegged exchange rates. Monetary stability is essential for the development of European and world economies. It is in the interest of the European Union to promote a new Bretton Woods, in order to build a new world monetary order to which the Third World Countries will also take part.

The second myth concerns the relationship between the Stability Pact and economic growth. The Pact is necessary in order to ensure financial stability within the eurozone. The maximum limits to the deficit and to the public debt are a guarantee of a healthy financial administration. The fact that some countries are not capable of respecting the restraints of the Pact is only a sign of the ineffectiveness of the European economic

policy for growth, not an irreparable fault of the Pact. The Pact must however be rendered more flexible so as to appraise the difficulties of the economic trends of each country. But the thrust for European growth cannot come from the Stability Pact. European economic growth must be guaranteed by European means of government. There are public goods that can be efficiently produced at the local level, others at national level, others at European level. A European plan for growth and employment is a European public good and requires European means.

Since the European economy does not respond adequately to the challenge of international competition some political and social forces present two false solutions. The first one is protectionism, the closing up to worldwide competition. It would be an admission of defeat. The beginning of the sclerosis and decline of European economy. The second is that of reducing labour costs, to recover profit margins. The job market must certainly be made more flexible in some countries, but it is an illusion to think that European industry will become competitive only by reducing its workers' standard of living. Are European wages to be reduced thirty fold, to match Chinese wages? The fall in internal demand would depress production even more. It would be the beginning of European underdevelopment. The only forward-looking way is that of increasing productivity in all economic sectors. The advantages acquired by means of excellent know-how from industry, workforce, and from the public and private research centres are the real wealth of the nations.

High-tech industries, innovative skills and excellent research centres are not wanting in Europe. Nonetheless, these qualities cannot be expressed at maximum levels because the national governments hinder an effective organisation at European level, by not providing the European Union with the necessary means. Where it has been possible, notwithstanding the

limited resources available, the European Union has obtained worldwide important results. The Galileo project of satellite communication will replace the American GPS navigation-system and it will probably also be adopted by China and India. The European Space Agency has shown with the rocket Ariane and its first missions of space exploration, such as the space probe Huygens on Titan, that the European technological know-how can face any competition. The civil aircraft industry, with the Airbus, thanks to a clever pooling of private and public capital, is becoming the world's number one. These successes, nevertheless, are thwarted by national jealousies once the threshold of the twofold application of civil and military resources is reached. It is incredible that the European governments have decided to limit the use of Galileo to civil usage, thus forcing the military to depend on the American navigation-system GPS. It is a servile and suicidal choice.

The Barroso Commission is moving in the right direction. It intends to dedicate more resources to the improvement of human capital, to research, to innovation, to European infrastructures and to industrial policy, with the aid of "European champions". But Europe's resources are scarce. The European budget is just above 1% of GDP and some governments would like to reduce it even more. Therefore, the Commission is forced to cut other issues, among which the social and regional funds and environmental policies. Moreover, the structural insufficiency of funds that could be addressed to help the development of the Mediterranean, of Africa, of the Middle East is well known. Finally, the European budget does not envisage funds for European defence. National governments say they want to create a European defence, but with national resources. In this way they intend removing security policy from the democratic control of the European Parliament. However, the USA and Japan manage to obtain important competitive advantages for some high-tech industry thanks to interaction between civil and military industries.

The European Union must be able to rely upon a greater amount of financial resources. This does not mean increasing fiscal pressure on European citizens, but doing at European level what cannot be done, or is badly done, at national level. First of all, the European Commission must be able to draw resources from the European financial market, as the High Authority of the ECSC did in the past and as Delors had suggested in his 1993 Plan, in which the emission of Eurobonds was envisaged. Secondly, certain resources which are badly managed or wasted at national level can be concentrated at European level. For example, part of the national aid for development, if assigned to the European budget, could allow the Commission to launch a Marshall Plan for the Middle East and for Africa. Thirdly, the European budget should be financed with its own resources, such as an ecological tax on CO2 emissions or a tax on capital (eliminating the shameful inter-European tax havens).

An action programme will impel social and productive forces only if it arises from a public discussion between the representatives of the citizens in the European Parliament and all civil society organisations. The Union must move ahead even after its enlargement: a group of

countries can decide to support the initiative, even when no unanimous agreement exists. The Commission must nominate its "Minister of Economy and Finance" and assign him the task of proposing a European Plan for growth and employment, clearly indicating the objectives that can be attained and the necessary means. A relevant precedent is the 1993 Delors Plan, which proposed to create 15 million jobs thanks to investments in trans-European communication networks and with other means. The Delors Plan was never financed by Ecofin. At this stage, responsibility for possible failure must be jointly taken by the European Parliament and by the Council of Ministers. Some objectives can be achieved in the short term and without further institutional reforms. Others will require changes of the European Constitution, when it becomes effective, to ensure a real power of co-decision of the European Parliament for budget procedures. However what matters is that European citizens be aware as soon as possible that their representatives in the European Parliament and the European Commission, which has obtained a Parliamentary vote of confidence, are now actively working to assure economic security and a prosperous future for the European peoples.

From the Monetary to the Economic Union

Dario Velo

The history of the European unification process shows that every advance was made possible by the ability to identify a crucial problem which had just reached maturity and to find an innovative solution for it, in tune with the economic, social and political situation of the time. Each step in the integration process has thus brought the establishment of a new institution devised for governing that phase. The European Constitution, now in its ratification phase, constitutes the formal assimilation of all that has been so far achieved and makes it possible to progress to a new stage in this process.

The crucial problem confronting Europe today is how to bring about economic Union. Our need now is for a European economic government able to put in place European policies and to guarantee the development and autonomy of the European social model. In sum, the citizens should be granted the right to democratically build their own future.

Globalization has promoted a 'market-without-a-State' ideology. This is an anti-liberal vision, alien to our European historical and political traditions. Liberalism has always conceived the market as remaining within a state-ruled order. The ideology of Economic Union means, in the first place, asserting the centrality of the state – a new form of state which is being gradually and steadily shaped through the European unification process. It is the state's duty to compound market and solidarity, government efficiency and participation, and to orient development towards the long term, and along far-reaching lines. The problem

now is how to launch the economic Union: which new institutions should be devised and established, which issues should be used as levers for transferring the required powers from the national to the unification level? The choices cannot be arbitrary, but must be in tune with our present historical situation.

Past experience can help focus our reflections and initiatives. A parallel can be drawn between the monetary crisis of 1968 and the energy crisis which began with the Iraqi war: a parallel, that is, between the European currency established as an alternative to the crises in the international monetary system and today's need for a European energy policy.

The monetary Union was launched in 1968 at the start of the international monetary crisis, when it was clear that monetary disorder would sweep away much of what had been so far achieved in integrating the European economies. Until then the system instituted in Bretton Woods, based on the dollar, had ensured a stable and growing monetary order in the Western world, including Europe. The European integration process could rely on monetary stability, assured from the outside by international monetary stability and by the dollar. But, in 1968, the declaration of the dollar's technical non-convertibility marked the beginning of a long period of instability. Revaluations and devaluations of the European currencies reinstated *de facto* the barriers between European States that the common market had gradually and laboriously eliminated. In such a situation it became apparent that, in order to preserve what had

been achieved and to progress further in the unification process, it was necessary to create a European Monetary Union.

Just as the monetary system based on the dollar had provided stability to currency relations from the post-war period until 1968, likewise the energy policy established at the world level by the United States has given a relative stability to the energy market, allowing it to develop as required by the needs of the world economy from the post-war period until today. In this period, only one serious energy crisis has occurred, and it was overcome. The risk now is that we may find ourselves on the eve of a new energy crisis, as disruptive as the monetary crisis of 1968. At the time of the previous energy crisis, a contradiction emerged between the world dimension of energy demand, fuelled by the countries of new and old industrialization, and the national dimension of the governance of energy supply, heavily concentrated in the hands of the United

States and a few oil-producing countries, its allies. There is therefore an urgent need for a thorough analysis to help us understand how the experience of the success of the European currency can be repeated today with the launch of a European energy policy.

But which energy policy? What kind of institutions? Which powers should be transferred to the unification process? These are the key questions. A starting point might be the creation of a European Energy Authority which could, if the assumption is sound, tip the scales in favour of the establishment of a European energy policy. This in turn would stimulate the start of economic Union, and thereby initiate a new phase in the integration process. Mario Albertini taught us that the crucial problem is to identify a clear issue on which to work in order to set in motion a process, in a cascade-type progression. Is the European Energy Authority that clear issue? The answer is up for discussion.

The EU Should Tax Airline Fuel

Richard Laming

The debate about taxing airline fuel has sprung back into life, thanks to the German government. The money could be used for development assistance, they say. Actually, it could be used to do much more than that. At present, fuel used for international air passenger flights goes untaxed, unlike the fuel used in cars and road haulage. Air travel is the most environmentally damaging form of transport but pays the lowest tax rate on its fuel. This is crazy. Furthermore, a tax on airline fuel would also be socially progressive, falling most on those who can afford to pay most, the richer people who fly frequently. The sums involved are substantial: billions of euros a year. This argument has gone round for a while, but governments have said they have been held back by the law. This has always puzzled me.

Surely the difference between being in government and being out of government is that in government you have the power to change the law. The question is whether the national governments within the EU have the courage to do so. The problem is that the law in question is an international agreement reached through the International Civil Aviation Organisation rather than a domestic law. But that doesn't make it unchangeable. The real problem is political.

It is not really possible for a country in Europe to introduce such a tax unilaterally. For example, if the UK were to introduce some kind of taxation of airline fuel on its own, it would place its own airline industry at a competitive disadvantage. Intercontinental flights would

switch from Heathrow or Gatwick to Charles de Gaulle or Schiphol. There would be no overall environmental benefit from this, only the loss of jobs from the UK.

This problem does not arise if the tax is introduced throughout the EU. Isn't this precisely the kind of cross-border problem the EU was set up to deal with in the first place? The EU could insist that any plane taking off or landing within the EU should pay tax on its fuel at a given rate. It could enter into agreements with third countries so that tax paid on fuel there could be offset against tax payments due in the EU. From an environmental point of view, it does not matter where the tax is paid and there is no reason for the EU to steal tax revenue from third countries.

Measures could be taken against airlines that sought to evade the duty by moving their intercontinental flights from EU destinations to ones outside the EU, such as Zurich. Airlines that did this could pay their EU airline fuel taxes at a higher rate, for instance. But it is to be hoped that such punitive measures would not be necessary. Much better would be a cooperative approach with the EU's neighbours. After all, it is in everybody's interests to levy this tax: the only problem is that the intergovernmental nature of the ICAO prevents it.

The key to a breakthrough is concerted action in Europe. The member states of the EU have sufficient strength, if they act together, to bring sense to the tax system and plug a gap in European environmental protection. All that is needed is the political imagination to see past

the problems at the European level to reach for solutions. Are Europe's political leaders imaginative enough?

As a postscript to this article, the council of EU finance ministers agreed in May 2005 to introduce a levy on airline tickets, with funds raised being earmarked for development purposes. How far does this go towards meeting the goals set out above? It increases the tax burden on air travel, certainly, which from an environmental point of view is a good thing. Whether it increases it to the same level as is applied to other forms of transport remains to be seen. It depends on the level at which the tax is set and there was no agreement on what that tax level should be (and it will probably vary from one member state to another). The agreement is a purely intergovernmental one – member states of the EU can choose whether or not to apply the tax. Furthermore, it is possible

that the fact that money is raised this way for development purposes will reduce the pressure for any other increase in the proportion of GDP devoted to development – the UN recommends 0.7 per cent of GDP but most member states fall far short of this figure.

The EU seems to have gone as far as it can in establishing airline taxation without crossing the line between an intergovernmental arrangement and a supranational one. For several reasons, the fact that the EU refuses to cross that line means that the fundamental problems are still not being addressed. Perhaps this initiative is most interesting as an example of "enhanced cooperation", in which those member states that wish to proceed without the others, may do so. Looked at that way, it may well be the first of many such initiatives, particularly if ratification of the Constitution should stumble.

The EU and World Federation: a Baha'i Viewpoint

Esther Zana-Nau

The Baha'i faith originated a hundred and sixty years ago in Persia. Though little known, since the beginning of their young religion the Baha'i have professed federalist ideas. They advocate, sometimes at the risk of their lives, principles of tolerance and the unity of peoples in their diversity. With a consultative status in UNICEF and ECOSOC, associated to the WHO and UNEP the Baha'i Community is well represented in UN-organized conferences, and this international recognition allowed the presentation of Baha'i principles at various European Parliament exhibitions.

To speak of the construction of European unification is to speak of one of the most ambitious and stimulating projects for peace of the XX century and a project which is spreading and deepening in the XXI century. But we must not fall into some form of European chauvinism or Europecentrism, for Europe is only a small spot on the world map and it cannot offer itself as a provider of lessons for the rest of the world. It is the birth-place of such great discoveries as humanist civilization but it has also produced wars, Nazism, various forms of fascism, nationalism and hedonism. What Europe can offer is experience, hope without triumphalism or fine words, for the work is not finished and must constantly be renewed.

The message of the Baha'i faith is the unity of humankind accompanied by recognition of its diversity. It is a message of universal peace and the construction of a world order capable of preserving this peace. The Baha'i thought and activities therefore extend beyond the limits of Europe. Nevertheless, Europe can be considered as a sort of laboratory in which these great visions for humanity's future can be tested by trial and error against the realities of everyday life through small practical steps forward on a relatively small scale. In this way, it is interesting

for us to see concretely how this peace process is being realized step by step under the simultaneous dynamic of the competing forces of integration and disintegration, and also how principles such as unity in diversity, with the means of attaining them such as consultation and subsidiarity can affect the daily life of a group of nations.

Our purpose in this paper is not to dwell on current discussions or events but to draw from this half-century of European construction the characteristics of a method which is both specific and also rich in lessons for other regions of the world torn by apparently insoluble and desperate conflicts. It is not a question of wishing to apply the European model to the rest of the world – no single model can be transferred in this way because historical and cultural conditions vary – but to draw inspiration from the principles lying at the root of the method used for the construction of Europe.

Over more than fifty years Europe has demonstrated how ideas once thought to be impossible have entered into everyday reality, and then become the rule. One could quote, for example the reign of dialogue, the search for consensus and the resolution of conflicts

through negotiation and the rule of law rather than the recourse to arms and war.

Its latest enlargement, on a scale never been envisaged before, gives Europe the chance to reconcile its past and its present, and to face its future with a common vision. The question is no longer whether to continue with this European adventure but to marvel at what has been achieved: peace between the nations and a level of collaboration scarcely conceivable ten years ago. A single currency managed by an independent central bank! Voluntary renunciation of certain areas of sovereignty! Peace missions in the Balkans to promote democratic values and help rebuild a *modus vivendi*, and now a new Constitution arising out of discussions involving twenty-eight states, including Turkey!

Yet faced with this formidable enterprise Europeans have become confused. They feel helpless when faced with the technocratic nature of EU programmes and the complexity of the EU institutions' working practices. The talk is of money and constitutional reform, but about the purpose behind it all, the final objective, there is only bureaucratic babble. Or silence. We must not confuse the end with the means. It is the final goal which provides the vision. Certainly the Euro has helped familiarize the citizens with the European Union, giving them some sense of common identity, but monetary unification is only one stage in a journey whose objective is even greater than peace among the nations. It is inscribed in the first lines of the Founding Treaty: "an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe". The unity of peoples transcends the unity of nations.

This theme is close to the hearts of Baha'i, although as a principle rather than as an objective. It is a pre-requisite which inspires all their actions. Awareness of the unity of mankind is a state of the mind, our way of being in the world and which guides us in working out our action programmes for constructing

universal peace. As Shoghi Effendi¹ pointed out, "The unity of the human race, as envisaged by Baha'u'llah, implies the establishment of a world commonwealth in which all nations, races, creeds and classes are closely and permanently united, and in which the autonomy of the states and also the personal freedom and initiative of the individuals that compose them are forever safeguarded. This commonwealth must, as far as we can visualize it, consist of a world legislature... a world executive, backed by an international Force... a world tribunal... a world metropolis... a world language."

In May 1950, Robert Schuman said "Europe will not be made overnight, but by concrete measures, creating first a *de facto* solidarity". This pragmatic approach has enabled Europeans, step by step, to build a common edifice and to live and work together after so many conflicts and battles. Today, this interdependence renders peace not only possible but necessary and ineluctable. Perhaps could we say the same thing of the situation of the world, but there the will is still lacking, and so too is a common vision. How can we find *universal* validity for the principles of the peace we have won in Europe?

Today Europe is reaching a crossroads and needs to find new inspiration, a greater common vision, values which transcend the geographical space of this continent whose borders are so difficult to define. With so much of our everyday life now influenced by EU decisions, we cannot understand its absence in the field of international politics. In effect, we expect it to fulfil the prerogatives of a real political entity which it has not yet become. However interesting the proposed EU draft Constitution may be, Europe must go beyond texts and treaties and undertake a real revision of its values and procedures. To acquire a political personality in the eyes of the world, to become a full member of institutions such as the Security Council, to speak with one voice on all international matters and in the quest for peace and global welfare, to rethink how to live together in accordance with

the principle of unity in diversity: these are some of the challenges for the Europe of tomorrow.

Technological and economic advances have opened up the world, with disturbing cultural and political consequences. People fear the dangers and violence of today's world. They also fear that their roots and their identity will be crushed. On the other hand, this open world can be seen as an opportunity to use globalization to serve humankind and promote the brotherhood of men by clearly identifying the challenges and producing suitable answers.

The first challenge is to reconsider the notion of absolute national sovereignty. International law after World War Two strove to formalize the concepts of national independence and sovereignty. It should now examine the modalities of a collective sovereignty within the framework of a world governance. The EU's progressive creation of a consensual transfer of sovereignty from its member States to the supranational union could show the way. Is it not equally obvious that the world urgently needs a supranational institution capable of responding to planetary challenges which are far beyond capacity for action of either nation-states or today's international organizations, and yet are essential to ensure prosperity, justice and security?

The second challenge is the fear of uniformity. This is the reason why we see a rise of nationalisms, ethnic conflicts and tensions between local and global cultures, tradition and modernity, short term and long term, the spiritual and the temporal – all of them evidence

that our world is the process of transition between the old order and the new. To set up a new, unifying world order needs both unshakeable faith and a new vision. In meeting this challenge the principle of unity in diversity proclaimed by Baha'u'llah – now the motto of the EU – is deeply significant.

It means far more than simply people of different kinds living together, and more even than toleration and mutual respect, however valuable they might be. It is in fact a creative principle, like a seed sown in fertile ground which grows to become a new plant which in its turn will bear fruit. By living and working together, learning from each other, facing up to our prejudices and uprooting them, we do not destroy our identities but enrich them. By not seeing each other as rivals but as partners we transform our relationship into something more creative than simply the sum of our differences. What is proposed here is a federalist vision of Europe and of the world, a vision in which state sovereignty is meaningful only in so far as it gives states the power to forge a universal alliance whose sole purpose is to serve universal peace and the interests of all mankind.

All this may seem like a dream, yet the existence of the EU and the recent liberation of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe show how dreams may become reality. Indeed, the construction of Europe is an illustration of the fact that God's design is moving forward today and the whole of mankind is ready to harvest its fruit. It is this message of hope that the Baha'i faith offers the world.

¹Shoghi Effendi, *L'ordre mondial de Baha'u'llah*

The European Parliament for the Strengthening and Democratization of the UN

Lucio Levi

On 9 June the European Parliament (EP) reacted to the proposals formulated by the UN in view of the summit of the Heads of State and Government to be held in New York next September. What distinguishes the EP's position is the support of the strengthening of the UN, since it constitutes "the most appropriate and only global institution". This is important if we consider the opposite position of the US administration. In fact, the EP endorses multilateralism as "the most appropriate tool for solving the problems and threats faced by the international community, provided it is based on well-adapted institutions and efficient decision and enforcement processes".

Considering that the EU is a civilian rather than a military power, it is remarkable to see how the EP's proposals in the sector of security reflect the EU's inclination to promote the peace in the world. First, the EP invites the EU member states "to transform their armies into units suitable for deployment to peace operations, and to place contingents on stand-by for UN purposes". It welcomes the proposal to create a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat, in order to rebuild states devastated by violence and calls for the establishment of a civilian peace corps (*white helmets*) for performing non-military functions. In addition, it "endorses the 'emerging norm' that there is a collective international responsibility to protect in the event of genocide and other large scale killing". At the same time, it supports the Secretary-General's recommendation to strengthen the IAEA's verification authority in the fight against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Lastly, the EP confirms its commitment to

achieve the Millennium Goals and appeals to the developed countries to contribute with 0,7% of GNI for development assistance.

As regards the institutional reforms, the EP stresses the need for adapting the composition of the Security Council to the changed state of the international system. First, it is necessary to increase the representation of developing countries in the Council, since all geographic areas should be represented in this body. According to this guiding principle, a single EU seat remains the aim to be pursued by the EU. The European Constitution, creating a legal personality for the EU and a European Foreign Minister, opens the way to a single EU seat.

It is worth recalling that the African Union on 8 March 2005 adopted a resolution which has strengthened the prospect of a renewed UN based on regional groupings of states, stating that "Africa, not member states, should be represented within the Security Council". This statement is to be interpreted as a refusal of the Secretary-General's proposal to entrust, beside permanent members of the Security Council, regional gendarmes (like Germany, Japan, India and Brazil) with the responsibility to assure world order. If Africa wants to occupy the place which belongs to it in the UN organs, where the crucial decisions concerning humankind are taken, it should be capable to speak with one voice. The hegemony of the great powers and inequalities among states can be progressively overcome if the poorest regions of the world will be capable to unite and to find through their political and economic unification the way to free themselves from their condition of dependence.

This reflection applies also to the European Union, which should have a single foreign and

security policy, if it wants to be independent of the United States, and a single representation within the Security Council, if it wants to contribute to the construction of the peace in the world. "The extraordinary novelty of the representation of the great regions in the Security Council lies", according to a resolution of the latest UEF Federal Committee, "in the recognition of the right of all the states to be represented in this body through their respective regional organizations without distinction between permanent and non permanent members".

In addition, the EP suggests that, in order to coordinate the various UN institutions and agencies dealing with economic matters, finance, trade, development and environment, the ECOSOC should be transformed into an Economic Security Council. On the other hand, the Trusteeship Council should be transformed into a Council for Failed States, which would be responsible for coordinating international cooperation and conflict prevention in failed states.

As regards the democratization of the UN,

the EP "calls for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) within the UN system, which would increase the democratic profile and internal democratic process of the organisation and allow world civil society to be directly associated in the decision-making process; states that the Parliamentary Assembly should be vested with genuine rights of information, participation and control, and should be able to adopt recommendations directed at the UN General Assembly". As a first step, the EP suggests the holding of a parliamentary event before the gathering of Heads of States and Government next September, which would be complementary to the Second World Conference of Speakers of Parliament scheduled for 7-9 September 2005.

After the resolutions of the Socialist International in 2003 and of the Liberal International in 2005, which backed the proposal to establish the UNPA, the stand of the EP shows that a new approach is needed to heal the democratic deficit of the UN.

Community of Democracies

Laura and Renata Pantucci

The meeting of the Community of Democracies (CD) held in Santiago at the end of April closed with few novelties, thus disappointing many participants and observers, among them the Italian government representative Emma Bonino. Mali's presidency has started with unresolved contradictions and indecision. Because of its non-exclusive and tolerant approach towards non-democratic regimes some member States were explicitly thinking of reducing the organization to a simple consultative forum. Yet, the Community of Democracies could still become an efficient multilateral vehicle for exporting democracy.

The foundation stone for the Community of Democracies was laid in Poland in 2000, when some 100 governments, headed by the Clinton Administration, signed the Warsaw Declaration, committing themselves to build a Community of Democracies, to work together to strengthen democratic principles and institutions worldwide and, to this end, to establish special caucuses of democratic countries within international institutions. Only a few months later, a "convening group" of Foreign Ministers of the Community of Democracies (Chile, Czech Republic, India, Mali, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea and the United States) launched a project to establish a democratic caucus at the United Nations. Since then, many meetings of CD high-representatives have taken place, especially during sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights. At the second intergovernmental meeting (Seoul, 2002), the CD member States formally approved an Action Plan. Chile being the Convening Group's current chair, they also

decided that the third meeting should be held in Santiago in spring 2005. Parallel with the ministerial meeting, a non-governmental forum also took place, attended by some 250 activists and experts. Meanwhile, in September 2003, a CD Convening Group meeting with high representatives from Italy, Peru and Romania officially endorsed the formation of coalitions and caucuses within the UN and other multilateral organizations. In preparation for the 2005 Santiago meeting, several Chilean civil-society members developed a special strategy to involve NGOs and political parties in the project with the aim of providing governments with recommendations concerning democratic and human rights deficits.

The human rights issue is undoubtedly striking a chord in the UN. Suffice it to mention the election of Libya as President of the Commission on Human Rights in 2003, a country condemned for terrorism by the United Nations itself. It is precisely these contradictions which are highlighted by those who support the creation of democratic caucuses more or less linked with the UN. Studies on the activities of the UN Commission on Human Rights have proved that democratic countries tend to vote for resolutions favouring democracy and to censure countries which violate it. On the other hand, it often happens that countries regarded as democratic, such as India or South Africa, choose to vote on a regional basis, regardless of the actual state of democracy in the countries under consideration. Even worse, undemocratic countries tend to show solidarity in defending each other, regardless of their regional loyalties. All in all, though some positive results have

been achieved, such as the adoption by the UN Commission on Human Rights of resolutions with CD endorsement, the caucus has still much work to do. Foremost among supporters of CD governmental action to form a Permanent UN Democracy Caucus is a coalition of NGOs and political personalities, including the Democracy Coalition Project, Freedom House, the Transnational Radical Party, the Council for a Community of Democracies, Citizens for Global Solutions, Human Rights Watch, the World Federalist Movement, former USA Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Michael Ledeen from the American Enterprise Institute, the Chairman of the Open Society Institute George Soros.

Public debates have been organized, international appeals launched, and institutional reforms proposed, urging CD member states to actively respect their Warsaw and Seoul pledges. Unsurprisingly, the USA is the country on which the future of these caucuses is thought to depend, partly as the main protagonist on the international political scene, and partly because the US shows a particular sensitivity (how genuine no-one exactly knows) towards the promotion of democracy and human rights issues. Yet, in the US there are signs of movement in the right direction, not only in media debates, but also in legislation, as demonstrated by the adoption in 2004 of a law directing the administration to pursue a reform of international organizations in order to ensure the exclusion from both leadership and membership of countries that violate those organizations' principles, or that are subject to UN Security Council sanctions, or deemed by the US Secretary of State to have supported international terrorism. In Santiago, in addition,

the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has confirmed the US commitment to form democratic caucuses both within and outside of the UN. In the meantime, numerous newspapers and columnists are expressing views on the opportunity to work for a community, or league, of democracies within the UN system or, if necessary, as an alternative to it. In two recent articles published by the *Washington Post* and the *Financial Times*, the Clintonians Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay explain that "like NATO during the Cold War, the Alliance of Democratic States should become the focal point of American foreign policy". The authors add enthusiastically that such an alliance, as well as defending democracy within its borders and promoting it in the rest of the world, should "work toward eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers among member countries": not too dissimilar to what the EU has done. Daalder and Lindsay make clear that the Alliance of Democratic States they have in mind should not be confused with the Community of Democracies founded in Warsaw, because of what they regard as the latter's weakness in granting membership – that is to say, its excessive openness to countries of questionable democratic character such as Egypt or Qatar. In the *American Prospect*, Laura Rozen expresses strong support for a democratic caucus at the United Nations, remarking on the problems caused by the numerical superiority of undemocratic countries. Finally, in *Libération*, Karoline Postel-Vinay writes that Europe should accept the American "exporting democracy" challenge, even though it neither perceives itself as being at war with the rest of the world nor as being invested with some special mission to spread freedom, and act in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in China and Russia.

America's Policy Shift on ICC Brings New Hope to Darfur*

With what has already been defined an historical step, the UN Security Council decided, on Thursday March 31st, to refer 51 suspected war criminals in Sudan's Darfur region to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was indeed the first time the UN had used its powers to send suspects to the Court since its establishment as the first permanent world criminal court in 2002. But though the chances that the worst culprits may eventually be brought to justice have improved, there are few signs as yet that the state-sponsored campaign of murder, rape and torture in the troubled region is coming to an end.

For a year and a half now, Sudan's Arab-dominated government has been ethnically cleansing Darfur by arming and giving air support to mostly Arab militias called the janjaweed, who kill, rape and rob black Africans. The government admits to arming militias but insists that this is only in order to crush a rebellion that began in February 2003. A British parliamentary report put the death toll so far in Darfur at up to 300,000, a figure the Sudanese government furiously disputes. The UN greatly increased its estimate of the number of people left homeless after fleeing the conflict, to 2.4m, and said large numbers were continuing to stream into refugee camps. America has called the attacks on black Darfuris "genocide", though a UN report in January stopped short of describing it thus.

The list of 51 accused of war crimes includes Sudanese government and military officials,

janjaweed leaders and some rebel leaders and foreign military commanders. The Security Council is able to send war-crimes suspects to the ICC if the country where the abuses took place is unwilling or unable to bring them to justice. Anxious that none of its senior members be charged, the Sudanese government announced pre-emptively that it had arrested 15 members of its security forces suspected of war crimes and would bring them before local courts.

The UN decision depended entirely on a significant policy shift in the US. Though the Clinton administration had signed the 1998 treaty creating the ICC, the Bush administration pulled out of the court on the grounds that it could be used to bring politically motivated cases against American peacekeepers. Thus it had threatened to veto any Security Council motion sending the Darfur suspects to the ICC. However, America finally agreed only to abstain, allowing the resolution to pass. In return, it won a guarantee that no citizens of America (or any other non-signatory of the ICC treaty) would be sent to the court in connection with the Darfur conflict.

This decision came after a long period of inaction, in which hundreds of thousands of innocents lost their lives. America, with its reluctance to back the ICC, is not the only culprit: China has blocked effective sanctions, fearing the consequences for itself if precedents are set for tough UN action against human-rights abuses. The compromise reached at the UN is an ugly

Comments

one, with the immunity offered to American citizens creating double standards. But it seems to have been the only way forward.

Despite this historical step, few observers imagine that peace can be achieved without a much larger and more robust foreign military intervention. On March 24th, the UN decided

to send a 10,000-strong peacekeeping force to Sudan, mainly to police the peace settlement in the south of the country, though some of them could be sent to Darfur, in the west. Currently, there are only 2,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers there, lacking the resources to face down the janjaweed.

* Excerpts from *After 300,000 deaths, a modicum of justice*, in *The Economist*, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=382970



Nepal: Darkening Clouds in the Shadows of Mount Everest

René Wadlow

On 1 February 2005, Nepal's King Gyanendra dismissed the government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba claiming that the government was incompetent in the fight against the 'Maoist' insurgency which began in 1996. The King assumed direct power and declared a state of emergency, suspending constitutional provisions on freedom of the press, speech and expression, peaceful assembly and the right against preventive detention. Three leading human rights organizations – Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists – warned that «Nepal's last state of emergency in 2001-2002 had led to an explosion of serious human rights violations, including increased extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and a breakdown in the rule of law.»

The King has now appointed a 10-man cabinet under his chairmanship with no prime minister. The short-term consequences mean probable repression, especially in the Katmandu area, of the press, non-governmental organizations, and political leaders. The longer-range significance of this most recent state of emergency is that it is the start of the third and final act of a drama which is likely to see the end of the monarchy as an institution, increased suffering among the already poor population and the danger of a 'power vacuum' between India and China.

Nepal, landlocked between India and China, has a terrain which ranges from the flat river

plain of the Ganges in the south, through its large central hill region to the Himalayas in the North. Each ecological area has been populated by different peoples, some coming from India and others from Tibet. It was only late in the 18th century that the country took its current shape with the elimination of local chiefs in favour of a monarchy with its seat in Katmandu. The monarchy has tried to impose one Nepalese language and the Hindu religion as a cement on this diversity of ethnic groups, languages, and religions.

The often antagonistic relationship between India and China is a sub-theme of the drama. Nepal is strategically situated between Tibet and the northern border of India. Both powers view Nepal as a buffer zone over which each has jockeyed for influence. India considers Nepal as part of its 'zone of influence'. China is concerned that Nepal not be used as a base for Tibetan independence activities as it had been in the 1960-1972 period with Tibetan insurgency with its headquarters in the Mustang area of Nepal. China wishes to prevent India from being the sole influence in Nepal and is concerned that India might invade Nepal to prevent a change of regime. India, for its part, is concerned that China could take advantage of any upheaval in Nepal to strengthen its hand against India in the whole region. Thus, one has to see the action in Nepal against a background of major regional politics and not simply as an insurgency in a far away area of interest only to mountain climbers and Buddhists going to the birthplace of the Buddha.

There is a long prologue to the first act of the drama during which a more-or-less constitutional monarchy is put into place and a parliament with political parties created in 1990. Unfortunately neither the Monarchy nor the Parliament has done much to restructure the economic and social life of the country. The poorer Nepalis, although they constitute the bulk of the population, have remained on the margins of public life. Nepal's economic policies have been shaped by the development ideologies and strategic interests of the donor countries. This has led to short-sighted, dependent forms of development based on playing aid donors one against the other. Development has been in the interest of the elite and of a growing urban middle class which has benefited without making sacrifices or building up domestic savings. There has been little land reform or modifications in the land-holding patterns. With an increase in population but without adequate growth in education and jobs, the young are discontented and open to political violence as well as crime.

The first act of the drama starts with bangs in February 1996 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) initiated an armed struggle against the Nepalese government with simultaneous attacks in different areas of the country. The leadership of the armed movement is 'Maoist' – having read books of Mao on the importance of rural guerrillas holding the countryside while letting the cities rot and fall. It is not influenced by the current Chinese government. The real nature of the revolt is more 'Naxalite', named after the village of Naxalbari in north Bengal where tea plantation workers revolted in 1967. Such rural revolts against persistent injustices are often linked to utopian ideologies of equality but do not have a coherent alternative program for government. The 'Maoists' are not a single movement with a well-defined chain of command but many separate revolts with local leaders. This makes negotiations

or mediation difficult.

The 'Maoist' insurgency spread to most parts of the country feeding on poverty, class and caste discrimination, ethnic divisions and a lack of government development activities. The 'Maoists', however, do not administer the areas – they are only able to prevent the government from administering the areas. Thus, the bulk of the rural population must cope for themselves. The first act ends with another bang on 1 June 2001 when King Birendra, his wife and seven other members of the royal family are murdered by his son, the Crown Prince, who then kills himself¹.

Act II begins with the brother of the murdered king becoming King Gyanendra. The King decided that he will play an important political role directly, having little taste for parliamentary life. His first major decision is to call for a ceasefire and negotiations with the 'Maoists'. Thus between July and September 2001, there are three series of talks between representatives of the 'Maoists' and the royal government. The 'Maoists' called for an end to the monarchy, the drafting of a new republican constitution, and an interim government in which they would have a major influence.

No common ground was found between the two sides. Thus in November 2001, the 'Maoist' guerrillas began a new offensive, and the King responded by getting more and newer weapons. The rest of the act is taken up with more fighting, more repression, a few inconclusive talks off stage, but with a larger audience starting to look at the play as government officials in the USA and the UK join Indians and Chinese in looking at what is going on. A few non-governmental organizations in Asia, the US, and Europe have become interested in the conflict and seek to play a positive, mediation role, but with little impact as yet. The divide between the government and the 'Maoists' is very

wide. Some independent non-governmental groups in Nepal have proposed some peace measures such as the Birat Declaration for Action: Challenges for Peace and Development in Nepal (November 2003).

February 2005 is the start of the third and probably final act. The clouds darken, increased fighting within Nepal is probable. A greater flow of arms to the area is likely – government to government – from the US and the UK to the Royal Nepal government – from arms dealers via non-governmental groups in India to the ‘Maoists’. The danger is real that India and China can be ‘sucked into’ the power vacuum or more likely willingly stepping in.

What is to be done? I had written in September 2002 for the New Delhi-based *Tibetan Review*

an article “Nepal Watch: A priority” indicating that «The situation requires careful study to see if there are ways to help the forces of democratic change.» It is still not clear to me what we outside Nepal can do usefully. There seems to be no ‘middle ground’ between the King and the ‘Maoists’. Each wants the other to disappear. The political parties which functioned when there was a parliament are weak and have little base among the people. Non-governmental organizations outside the control of political parties are weak, but there might be ways to strengthen them. For the moment, I believe that our priority should be to alert a wider group of people to the dangers of the situation, stressing that non-military means of conflict resolution should be found, and that we should be prepared to help quickly when we find proper and useful channels.

¹See Jonathan Gregson, *Massacre at the Palace: The Doomed Royal Dynasty of Nepal*, New York, Miramax Books, 2002

Einstein and Federalism: Yesterday and Today

William R. Pace

*"You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war"
Albert Einstein*

Albert Einstein was honored by *Time Magazine* and others as "The Person of the Century" in 2000. This year, his life is being celebrated on the centennial of the publication of his extraordinary papers, that in 1905 "revolutionized" the intellectual understanding of our world. He was also one of the greatest world federalists. It was Einstein who introduced me to WFM-IGP when I stumbled upon *Einstein on Peace* in the Denver Library 35 years ago. His first recorded public political statement was the *Manifesto to Europeans*, drafted shortly after the beginning of World War I. «We are stating publicly our faith in European unity ... we hope this public affirmation of our faith may contribute to the growth of a powerful movement toward such unity.» Signed by only four scientists, it had no impact at the time, but they kept pressing over the years.

The EU delegation to the US published an article in the latest issue of *EU Focus*, entitled, "The European Constitutional Treaty." It states: «The Constitutional Treaty proposes neither a federal state nor a mere confederation of states, but rather continues on the path of developing the EU as a unique political entity in the world: a federation of nation-states, each ceding sovereignty to a larger union through common institutions while maintaining a unique society, culture, and political structure.»

Europe cascaded into unimaginable, murderous darkness in 1914, and again 24 years later, devastating entire generations and introducing highly sophisticated warfare that made civilians a primary target. From the ashes emerged first the League of Nations, then in 1945 the UN. A few years later, the beginnings of the European unification movement that Einstein called for began to materialize. Political realists denounced the EU as a liberal pipe dream for decades – yet within the next months, 25 nations will vote on the constitution of this new "federation of nation states".

During the formation of the League of Nations and the UN, extreme US nationalists in our government were the main opponents of international law and institutions. Yet individuals like Andrew Carnegie and President Woodrow Wilson were among the main proponents. Today, this infuriating paradox continues. UN headquarters remains in the US world capital, New York City. New York is home to many institutions, human rights groups and foundations that provide the strongest support for the UN.

Yet the US government and rightwing political organizations are clearly the greatest and most dangerous opponents of the UN. President Bush has nominated a man reviled in the international community for his UN-bashing and disdain for international law to become

the new US Ambassador to the UN. Best known for declaring that there is no United Nations, and “the happiest moment” of his government service was when he renounced the Rome Statute on the ICC, John Bolton is to be the US leader in preparation for what is to be one of the most important UN reform and strengthening summits ever this September.

Still, in reading the galleys of *WF News 49*, I am amazed at the depth and breadth of the issues relating to our promotion of international federalist principles. WFM-IGP was one of the first groups with whom the new Special Adviser to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide met. WFM-IGP supported the first public launch of the report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change. We

are working to garner support for the world summit in September. Our leadership role within civil society in promoting international democracy is described in the article on the International Conference of New or Restored Democracies. Other articles tell of WFM-IGP’s work on promoting the Responsibility to Protect and a UN Emergency Peace Service. The center-spread illustrates WFM-IGP’s considerable work at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. We also report on some developments of the African Union, the next likely “federation of nation-states.” Compared to 1914, 1939, 1945 and 1955, those of us seeking to “save future generations from the scourge of war” have infinitely greater resources than we had at any other time in the last five generations. Step by step.

Peace through Law: a Project to Work for

David Soldini

The first sentence of Hans Kelsen's work *Peace through law* is a statement we can define as Kantian: «Peace is a state characterized by the absence of force». So peace does not come from a balance of forces capable of guaranteeing the *status quo* (a truce), but from the absence of force. Yet both Kant and Kelsen acknowledge that social peace is guaranteed in the human community not by the absence of force, but by the monopoly of force by the State. Indeed, Kelsen considers the monopoly of force, hence the effectivity of a sanctioning legal system, as a principle for governing the social order.

To step from a theoretical notion of peace to its practical application which contemplates not the elimination of force but their concentration, together with a monopoly of their use, must not be regarded as the negation of the theoretical idea, which remains true, but must be interpreted in a strategic sense. It is appropriate to note here that such a dual approach is also present in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*: it can be inferred by the very structure of his essay, divided in two parts corresponding to two historical stages of the pacification process. The first contains the provisional rules the States must observe for guaranteeing the progressive realization of a condition of true peace as described in the second part: the definitive articles. If we accept the idea that the march towards perpetual peace can only be accomplished through the pursuit of a state of peace guaranteed by the monopoly of force, then we may place Kelsen's essay in the Kantian tradition. In fact, Kelsen's essay does not negate perpetual peace, but has the objective of examining a precise moment in

history, the year 1945, to discover which is the most suitable route for fulfilling Kant's project. Kelsen's answer is contained in the title: law.

Law as an instrument for the pacification of conflicts

The objective Kelsen sets himself to attain pacification: «War is a mass murder, the greatest disgrace of our culture... To secure world peace is our foremost political task, a task much more important than the decision between democracy and autocracy, or capitalism and socialism; for there is no social progress possible as long as no international organization is established by which war between the nations of this earth is effectively prevented.» How can we ensure the progress towards pacification? Kelsen devotes his most political work to answering that question, proposing to the international community a realistic route, acceptable to the States. For that reason Kelsen rejects the idea of a world federation as too ambitious a project to be realized straight away and his many reasons essentially concern the organization of a world democratic system. Although an international political organization would appear difficult to create, he sees the possibility of subjecting the States not to a new State-like organization, but to a juridical system which forces the States' decisions to conform to previously agreed rules. Thus the theory of a 'social contract' appears here in a new form. While Kelsen rejects it as a historical hypothesis for the formation of national States, he supports it in the case of the birth of an international order founded on right.

Acknowledging international law allows political, social or economic international conflicts to become legal disputes regulated by law. Therefore even without a supranational State, law can be an instrument of pacification because it offers a method of conflict resolution not exclusively founded on force. Moreover, law does not exclude the presence of force: «Force and law do not exclude each other. Law is an organization of force».

The origin of war, according to Kelsen, is not to be found exclusively, nor even largely, in the economic sector. Citing Robbin's analysis, he maintains unlimited sovereignty to be the decisive cause of war. This being so, it becomes necessary to limit the State's sovereignty. To that end, he proposes an International Court of Justice which would rule on all conflicts between States. The International Court would be able to function even without a supranational State. The principle of equality of States must be asserted, but this is of course equality in a juridical sense, meaning that all States are equal if they are treated equally by an independent authority, such as a Court of Justice for example. Those States that decide to institute the Court must also accept its jurisdiction and abide by the rulings of its judges even if unfavourable to them. This is no guarantee of course that States will not resort to force to protect their own interests. However, in that case such use of force will be judged by the Court.

The question of effectivity of law: the just war and the International Criminal Court

Kelsen does not underestimate the problem of the effectiveness of law, and consequently of sanctions. He has abandoned the idea of an international monopoly of force which could mean forming a State-like system, but recognizes nevertheless the need to establish a sanctioning system to deal with violations of international law. To ensure the enforcement of sanctions, a treaty instituting a Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace would be

necessary. Kelsen is aware of the difficulties of such a project but remains convinced that the only way to put the pacification process into practice is by building an international legal system. Of course, enforcement of sanctions need not be carried out by an international organization. It is possible to allow States the eventual use of force for this purpose. War is not ruled out in Kelsen's system, but it can only be justified as legal or just as a reaction against an aggression. The definition of a just war (*bellum justum*) also permits a war to be declared illegal, thereby condemning any act of aggression or other military action as an international crime which can and must be punished.

Responsibility in the realm of international acts is comparable to the classic notion of penal responsibility. More precisely, there can be both collective responsibility (mostly, but not exclusively, the responsibility of States) and also individual responsibility. This is already recognized in several international systems regulated by treaties, and could be extended to the global level for any act with an international dimension. Establishing such a system would require a treaty that recognizes such responsibility and institutes an International Criminal Court. This Court, together with the International Court of Justice, would guarantee the functioning of the international juridical system – a system which must have the authority both to regulate disputes between the classical international subjects (the States and the international organizations), and also to deal with individuals within the framework of international as well as national law.

In this case too the question of law enforcement can be settled without resorting to a monopoly of force: «The orders and sentences of the international court should be executed by the State designated in the order or in the sentence of the Court. If a State fails to fulfill its obligation to execute an order or a sentence

of the International Court, collective sanctions provided by the Covenant constituting the League as a judicial community should come into operation». From this conclusion it is evident that by this approach the problem of peace is not definitively solved. In fact, only by creating a political authority in whose hands force is concentrated can the problem of respect for international legality be solved.

Conclusion on the right to peace and the European perspectives

Besides being an important contribution to the debate on resolving the juridical problems involved in setting up of an international juridical order, Kelsen's essay is also worth considering for another reason, namely because it clearly illustrates the role of law as an instrument of pacification of conflicts. But we have to accept that war cannot be ruled out. Indeed, to be in a position to limit armed conflict it is necessary to recognize the juridical basis of a right to wage war. There cannot, therefore, be a right to peace, as it is impossible in a juridical order to have two absolute and yet incompatible rights. The right to peace can exist only if war is declared to be totally illegal. The juridical pretence of the illegality of war (as proclaimed by the Briand-Kellogg Pact, or Pact of Paris, of 1928) favours only those who decide to break the pact, as there cannot be any sanctions without a monopoly of force; hence war remains *de facto* possible. The only way to protect a right to peace would require the complete elimination of force in international relations: that is to say, the political unification of the entire world. But the pacification process has not yet reached this final stage. We recall that the three definitive rules of Kant's project have not yet been met: namely, that all States must be republics, bound together by a federal pact that guarantees the resolution of conflicts, and guaranteeing the cosmopolitical right to hospitality. It is necessary, therefore, to create the pre-conditions for the maturing of the

international order. The first step, Kelsen says, consists in putting a limit to wars through law, even if, paradoxically, this means recognizing a right to war.

I would like to conclude with some observations on the construction of Europe. The role of law and the European Court of Justice in the European integration process are an example of Kelsen's pacification-through-law procedure. Without a Court with international and mandatory jurisdiction, European law would have never been able to establish itself as having primacy over national law. The same is true of the autonomy of the Community juridical order. For those who appreciate the pacifying virtues of law, these processes are fundamental to the maintenance of peace in Europe and for the construction of a political community that may, in the long term, create a supranational monopoly of force. In discussing European unification it is however also necessary to emphasize the world perspective which alone can ensure attainment of the main objective: peace. For the reasons indicated by Kelsen and specified in Kant's project for Perpetual Peace, this world objective cannot be achieved today through the classical process of political integration. It is necessary today to assert the need to put in place the pre-conditions which Kelsen has indicated and which appear to be the only approach allowing the unification process on the world scale to start. While on the one hand the institution of the International Criminal Court certainly marks a step forward towards the completion of the peace-through-law project, on the other the disputes surrounding the Iraqi war and the juridical debate on the interpretation of the Security Council resolutions show how limited our progress has been in resolving conflicts through international law. It is evident that the establishment of an International Court of Justice, with mandatory jurisdiction, remains a goal for federalists and pacifists the world over.

Finally, the European integration process highlights a route for solving the problem of sanctions at the international level. The creation of regional organizations, and concentrating force at that level, surely demonstrate the possibility of establishing a sanctioning system able to overcome the obstacle of the sovereignty of national States. The European approach has been effective particularly in respect of the economic stability pact and the single-market rules, but it has also proved to be so in the case of decisions by international bodies concerning controversies with parties outside the

regional organization. A telling example is the significant progress achieved in the resolution of trading disputes within the WTO, due essentially to the Union's single-body representation in trading matters. Setting up large integrated regional areas reduces the complexity of the international juridical system, thus favouring its efficiency and its acceptance as a pacification method. These two processes, namely political unification on a regional scale and the working out of an international juridical system, are complementary and highly interdependent objectives.

“The White Rose” Sixty Years On

Antonio Longo

There are at least three good reasons for suggesting once more to the new generations the reading of Inge Scholl's *Die Weisse Rose*¹. She was the sister of Hans and Sophie, two of the main figures in the group of the same name which, between the spring of 1942 and February 1943, campaigned in German Universities in opposition, simultaneously political and moral, against the Nazi regime. Their action was the most generous, noble and shining example of German Resistance: «A tenuous ray of light in the darkest hour», as Theodor Heuss later said. The first reason is from the presence to this day in Germany (and elsewhere in Europe) of movements which regard themselves as Nazis, and from the spread of historical revisionism, which tends to belittle the tragic significance of that period: a rediscovery of that terrible past (and of its noble moments) is as necessary as ever. The second reason is that the White Rose makes the Resistance's pro-European and federalist roots stand out. The third reason lies in the splendid example of heroism and total devotion to the Idea that those young students were able to convey by their action.

Who were those young students of the University of Munich? Almost all of them came from the *Jungenschaft*, juvenile associations of Catholic inspiration, and decided, while little more than teenagers, that it was necessary to stand up against the advancing Nazi barbarism, and not to renounce the principles of liberty, tolerance and solidarity of their democratic culture. Nobody can tell us better than Inge who Hans, Sophie and their friends were. «They were making week-end excursions, living even in periods of freezing cold in huts, in camps

like the ones the Laplanders build ... One of them used to read aloud while they were seated round the fire; other times they were singing together, playing guitar, banjo or balalaika ... They were painting and taking photographs, they were writing and composing poems. That is how they wrote their wonderful diaries and inimitable journals. They used to camp in the winter in the most remote Alpine meadows and were skiing in the most difficult places. They loved fencing in early morning. They could run at breakneck speed in the forests and were used to plunge into ice-cold rivers in the first hours after dawn. They could stay flat out for hours watching wildlife or flying birds, and sit at the concerts, holding their breath, to discover music ... They walked on tiptoe in museums and loved in a special way Franz Marc's blue horses, the glowing fields of wheat, Van Gogh's suns and Gauguin's exotic world».

Beside the Scholl siblings, other members of the group included: Alex Schmorell, elegant, fanciful, bright; Christl Probst, who was passionately studying nature; Willi Graf, reserved and introvert, who at fifteen noted on his diary: «Come what it may, we stand firm in our ideas».

Theirs was a natural group, their individual histories practically identical. All had deliberately chosen to study medicine in order to avoid the regime's ideological control; had they been able to choose freely, they would have studied philosophy. The great figures of the German spirit, Keller, Goethe, Schiller, Hölderlin, Rilke, Nietzsche had formed them. They were tormented by the thought of having to do something, of arousing the people from

the numbness and abjection that had stricken them. A courageous stance by the bishop of Münster against the horrors of war and the persecutions by the regime helped them come to the decision to turn to action. At the end of June 1942, clandestine leaflets headed *The Pamphlets of the White Rose* were distributed in the Universities of Munich and other towns of Southern Germany, stimulating a surge of emotion among the students. Within a few weeks, four leaflets were written. The first described the passivity of the German people and spurred them on to oppose the regime by passive resistance and without waiting for somebody else to make a start. It was a moral and individual rebellion that was solicited. In the second, one can feel very clearly the sense of guilt hanging over them as people watch the persecution of the Jews without reacting («if we tolerate this government, which has perpetrated such dire crimes, we too are guilty ... we cannot be absolved, because everybody is guilty, guilty, guilty!»). And they hope for a wave of rebellion to spread across the whole country, whatever the price to be paid, because «a dreadful end is still more preferable than an unending terror». In the third, the political proposition starts to emerge more clearly. They openly break with loyalty to the State, calling for its military defeat: «The main concern of every German shall not be the victory over Bolshevism, but the defeat of National Socialism». There ensues the exhortation «to commit sabotage in war-producing factories, ... in the sectors of information, culture, scientific research ...».

In the fourth, for the first time the idea of Europe appears, deemed to be the result of Christianity and its peace-bringing action: «only religion can wake Europe up; ... if the perspective of a supra-national State (*ein Staat der Staten*), of a political doctrine, flashes before our eyes, ... should a hierarchical order be the foundation of a union of States (*Staatenvereins*)?».

At the end of July, Hans Scholl, Alex Schmorell and Willi Graf left for the Russian front, having

enlisted in the Medical Service. Before leaving, they decide that when they come back «the action of the White Rose will fully develop; its daring start will turn into a hard and accurately planned resistance ... The circle of conspirators will be enlarged». At the meeting, Kurt Huber, Professor of philosophy and psychology in the University of Munich, was present. We can presume that it was indeed Professor Huber that made the group politically mature towards professedly federalist positions. In fact, from the trial proceedings it is clear that «he was talking of federalism as a necessity for Germany, instead of teaching National Socialism». Inge Scholl tells how Huber argued that it was necessary «to take advantage of the wonderful moment of liberation for building, together with the other European peoples, a new and more humane world». In November 1942 the main members of the group came back from the front, decided to make a quantum leap towards action. They established connections with other opponents (among them the conspirators who on July 20, 1944 attempted unsuccessfully to murder Hitler), while in several military barracks and all across the country the first acts of sabotage were carried out.

In the first days of January 1943, the group distributed a document, probably prepared by Professor Huber, entitled *Leaflets of the Resistance Movement* (with the subtitle «Appeal to all Germans»), almost meaning that the White Rose aspired to turn itself into a real resistance movement. Its circulation was very large: Munich, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Freiburg, Mannheim, Saarbrücken, Vienna, Salzburg, Linz, Karlsruhe, etc. This document is of the highest political level. The themes of the previous leaflets are briefly repeated (war is already lost, the goal is the defeat of Nazism, it is necessary to rise in rebellion before it is too late) and, above all, pro-European and federalist issues appear for the first time. «The imperialist idea of power must be made harmless forever ... Any centralizing power of the kind the Prussian State tried to impose in Germany and in Europe

must be suppressed at its very source...».The identification of the nation State as the source of state centralization, of nationalist ideology, of militarism and imperialism is very clear. So is also the identification of the alternative: «Germany of the future cannot be but federal. Only a sound federal State order can bring a new life to a weakened Europe. The workers must be liberated through a fair socialism from the complete slavery to which they have been reduced. The deceptive image of autarchic economy must disappear from Europe. All peoples and every individual must have the right to the fruits of the earth».

It would be interesting to know how the idea of a future federal order in Europe also grew at that time in the heart of Germany. Was it solely the fruit of the Kantian Professor Huber or was it the long surge of thought and debate which was already circulating in other European countries? This theoretical novelty of German Resistance did, however, not have time to develop because on, February the 18th, Hans and Sophie were arrested while distributing leaflets in the University corridors, expressly addressed to the students who, a few days before, had staged a harsh demonstration in the streets of Munich, clashing with the Gestapo police. Later, all the others were also arrested. They

were immediately tried, and six of them were sentenced to death. Three were immediately beheaded: Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christl Probst. Large posters in Munich announced there execution. Then came the turn of Professor Huber and Alex Schmorell. Finally, on October the 12th, after many months of interrogations and cell segregation, Willi Graf was killed.

As Altiero Spinelli said, «the heroic, short-lived adventure of the White Rose constitutes the most beautiful and purest example of German Resistance. Here there are no subtle calculations of past or future political parties, no refined meditations on the possible or the probable, no paralyzing hesitation before the myth of the fatherland at war that must not be undermined. Here there is only the simple, straightforward moral courage which, once the right path is identified, decides to take it, and resolutely proceeds on it to the end». More than sixty years on, the struggle for the European Federation no longer requires the defeat of the political terror of that time, but “simply” of the same shell which was its cradle: namely, the absolute sovereignty of the national State. The spiritual, moral and political tension of the young people of the White Rose still offer an example to young militants struggling for Europe’s unity.

¹Inge Scholl, *The White Rose*, Wesleyan University Press, 1983

²Lacking a theoretical knowledge of federalism, a union among peoples was envisaged in the continental tradition only in terms of a forced union based on the principle of the hegemony of one State over all others. With this citation from Novalis the pamphlet’s authors express doubt that such hierarchical form of union be the only one possible

A Unified European Army: the End of the European Dream?¹

Fernando A. Iglesias

The current attempt of transforming the United States into some kind of global gendarme of Peace and Democracy by the American government, and the consequent planetary interventions of the US Army have altered the previous balance of forces within the international framework. In front of the menaces raised by *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*² and the belligerent policies unilaterally applied by the Bush Administration, a consistent part of the political forces of the world propose military strategies of opposition to the American strength. These positions are particularly diffused in Europe, the only other political unit of the world whose geographic dimensions, technological advancement and economical relevance can be compared with those of the United States.

The creation of a unified European Army and the transformation of the European Union into a state are proposed by diverse European political sectors, many of whom claim to be “pacifist” and “progressive”, as the only suitable way of opposing to what they call “the hegemonic vocation of the American Imperialism”. I want to discuss and combat these ideas with the help of an attentive consideration of the recent European history.

The fragmentation of the political unity has always been the crucial factor that promoted conflicts and wars. The fact that the mother of all the wars and totalitarianisms of the Twentieth Century started in the Balkans is more than a mere episode. It expressed the inevitable crises that are unchained each time that the technological development of the means of production, transport and communication turns

obsolete the geographical limits of territorial states. Indeed, it was neither by chance if the bloodiest episodes of the past century occurred in Europe, the continent where the development of modern technologies and the reduced dimensions of the political units were the highest of the world.

Today, due to the globalization of social processes and systems, the human civilization confronts similar problems and crises to those that Europe faced at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The obsolete limits of the political unity within a context determined by global technologies, capital flow, economic markets, human migrations and cultural processes that overcome them and abolish the territorial character of the political unity are – again – the center of a vast polemic. Now as then, the crucial options of the historical hour are constituted by the necessary but highly problematic way towards a vaster democratic political unification or the renewed source of territorial nationalisms, militarisms, authoritarianisms and wars.

The importance of the debate on the building of a continental state and an European Army overcomes largely the European limits. It concerns the global political order and, consequently, the entire humanity. My theses are:

1. The creation of a unified European Army and a very European State contradicts the values established through the democratic unification of Europe.
2. Within the current context determined by globalization, advanced states which dimension is continental can rise new threats on modern civilization and develop a destructive role similar to which European national states played within

a continental framework during the first half of the Twentieth Century.

3. Beyond the intentions and objectives of their promoters, the creation of a very European State and a unified European Army would worsen each and every of the troubles raised by the American hegemony and constitute a relevant obstacle to the democratic unification of the world.

4. The insistence on continental/regional states as a rational way of facing the challenges raised by the globalization of social processes and systems is the product of a partial and biased comprehension of the unification of Europe and other globalizing phenomena.

The proposals on the military unification of Europe are based on territorial-nationalistic assumptions. They are part of a general common sense whose falsity and obsolescence was demonstrated by the facts, more particularly, by the blooded history of the early European Twentieth Century and by the successful building of the European Union. Among them:

1. The idea that whereas national states are inherently militaristic and imperialistic, continental states constitute an intrinsic guarantee of peace and democracy. Therefore, the crimes against humanity committed in the past by national states (totalitarianism, genocide and war) cannot be repeated in the future by continental states.

2. The idea that the successful building of the European Union demonstrated the obsolescence of national states but keeps intact the role of the state in modern societies.

3. The idea that the European national armies can not be dismantled unless a unified European army is created because the existence of an autonomous army constitutes a *sine-qua-non* condition of the security and well-being of citizens, the development of the economy and the defense of national-continental interests.

4. The idea that the existence of a continental state constitutes a *sine-qua-non* condition for the internal pacification and the empowerment of the rule of law in Europe.

5. The idea that the current American administration is perfectly representative of the historical totality of the American society and its policies express the predominant and permanent tendencies within the United States. The American society is intrinsically competitive and egoistic and the United States are militaristic, imperialistic and neo-liberalist, whereas the European Union is inherently devoted to the solidarity, the pacifism and the social-democracy. Consequently, there are no risks that a European army became the belligerent arm of a militaristic, imperialistic and authoritarian state.

6. The idea that, as the only limit to a military power is the existence of another military power, the creation of a European army which power would be similar to that of the United States would lead the American administrations to a more pacific and multilateral behavior and contribute to the pacification of the world. In spite of being imperialistic, hegemonic, militaristic and unilateral, the United States will peacefully and passively accept the gradual source of an equally-powerful military opponent.

7. The idea that the most destructive episodes and the worst menaces to the peace of the world came from the unipolar character of the current balance of power and from the American hegemony. A bipolar or multipolar scenario in which two or many political entities have similar economic, political and military strength would improve the global security and favor a perpetual peace.

8. The idea that the creation of a European state and army would improve the conditions of the European intervention in the Middle East and provide a necessary balance in front of the American-Israeli alliance.

9. The idea that international institutions are able to manage the emerging global crises. The reinforcement of the United Nations and other multilateral/international organizations is a suitable answer to the challenges posed by the globalization of social processes and systems.

I discussed each and any of these theses,

developed by Pistone in his work. As I have no space here for developing my objections, I will try to show them in a more synthetic and propositive way³.

Deep down, this polemic is about the choice between a future world in which continental states (perhaps an American, an Asiatic and a European states) will take the central position within a global scenario or a democratic unification of the world in which national and continental states would lose their current centrality in benefit of universal democratic representative political institutions based on the principle "one man - one vote". Consequently, I want to raise a crucial question: *Are we for an European Army or for a World Parliament?* (on the political tasks of European and global progressive forces).

The creation and development of the European Union starts to repeat the ambivalent double sense that characterized the building of national states. Whereas nations begun as a step forward towards universality, once consolidated, they tended to establish insurmountable obstacles to Democracy and Peace. Similarly, within a global context, continental projects are like the Roman god Janus, one of whose faces looked to future meanwhile the other one continued to be fascinated by an undead past.

If the building of the European Union constituted the most progressive political event of the past century, it also could represent the last tentative of keeping into territorial frameworks what has become de-territorialized and global. The European migratory Apartheid; the apparition of neo-nazi sects in the core of Europe; the first pogroms (like in El Ejido, Spain) *against extra-communitarians*⁴ and the ascent of populist leaders as Le Pen, Haider and Bossi show the worrying effects of applying territorial logics within enlarged scales.

The building of a democratic, pacifist and advanced Europe within a global context determined by unbalance, injustice, poverty and authoritarianism is a mere mirage which costs

the European society will pay the first. A closed Europe protected by a territorial Apartheid, a Europe who tried to become another global gendarme of Peace, will be the grave of the best European dreams. In this context, the project of building a unified European Army⁵ would mean the institutionalization of all the worst European nightmares.

Even if Europe and Japan will hardly continue to be "economic giants and military dwarfs" as they are by now, the opposition to the unacceptable American military hegemony offers two opposite alternatives. The first one leads to a "equal" militarization of the human world society throughout the continentalization of stateism and nationalism. The second one leads to a progressive de-militarization of the globe throughout three consecutive steps: 1) the eradication of mass-destructive weapons (nuclear, chemical and biologic), 2) the disarmament and defuse of national military forces, 3) the gradual and complete de-militarization of the human society.

Within a post-national world strongly determined by the experience of industrial wars and genocide, the European continentalism resuscitates the two inseparable demons of the totalitarianism: state and nation. In fact, all the human experiences in totalitarianism and genocide were based on both of them. Thus, the raising of a Pan-European continental nationalism constitutes a treason to the principles that founded the European Union. Nationalism, which was a progressive force during a past period of social evolution, became reactionary and destructive at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. At the start of the Twentieth-first one, continentalism incarnates a similar process.

The necessities of coordination, collaboration and integration derived from the globalization of social processes and the emergence of huge global crises that affects the economy, ecology, demography and security of the world make difficult to think that some kind of political

unification of the world can be indefinitely avoided. The very challenges posed by Globalization exceed, therefore, the mere question about the institutionalization of the political unity of the world. Rather, they refer to other central trouble: First, they concern the form that this unification will adopt (democratic or elitist?, representative or despotic?, subsidiary or centralized?, liberal or authoritarian?, global or inter-national?). Secondly, they respect to the method that will lead to it (pacific or belligerent?, participative or elitist?, planetary or controlled by the most powerful states?). Finally, they imply the processes that the emergent world society must pass throughout before to acquire a developed conscience on the necessity of the democratic and federal political unification of the world. In order to defend and promote the common goods of humanity (first at all: the peace of the world within an age determined by the global range reached by destructive technologies), a globally developed conscience and a participatory process are the only tools that can avoid elitist and undemocratic attempts of controlling the course of history on behalf of national or continental interests.

The process of the building of the European Union offers an invaluable experience on each of these topics but raises a worrying question: shall it be necessary a new episode of massive destruction (such as the Second World War) before the humanity adopts a concrete program for its political unification? In this sense, the way that leads to the repetition of the early Twentieth Century European scenario in which autonomous and sovereign territorial states hold the center of the social universe leads probably to the unification of the world through the repetition of the European tragedies.

The pacific and participatory creation of a World Parliament able to debate, sanction and impose a global plan of general disarmament that started

by the abolition of all mass destructive weapons (according to the Bush's higher desires) is the only concrete tool that the citizens of the world can held against the promoters of a perpetual war. In this direction, the existing democratic and advanced political units, starting by the European Union and the United States, can play a decisive role through:

1. The immediate reform of the inter-national institutions according to the principle "one nation - one vote".
2. The proclamation of the UN Assembly as the embryo of a future Senate Chamber of the World Parliament of the Federative Republic of Earth.
3. The successive call for a planetary, a-territorial and democratic election of a Chamber of Deputies of the World Parliament, which should have, during a short time, just consulting and advisory functions (among which the redaction of a World Constitution and a World Code of Justice founded on the principles of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed for most national states of the world).
4. The progressive renounce to its territorial and military sovereignty according to the rules autonomously and gradually fixed by the World Parliament⁶.

Unthinkable? Utopian? May be. In any case: not more than preparing, by 1941, a complete program for the democratic unification of Europe meanwhile you are the prisoner of a Fascist regime whose allies control almost the entire territory of the continent.

In honor to Altiero Spinelli and his fellows Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni, we should remember the very lessons and spirit of the Ventotene Manifesto: «Feelings today are already far more disposed than they were in the past to accept a federal reorganization of Europe. The harsh experience of recent decades has opened the eyes even of those who refused to see, and has matured many circumstances favorable to our ideal... The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be!⁷»

Changing paradigms on Global Peace⁸

The Concept of Peace During National Modernities	The Concept of Peace in a World-Modernity (or Global Age)
International peace-keeping	Global peace-building
National Sovereignty	Individual Sovereignty
State autonomy	Human Rights
National self-determination	Individual self-determination
Stability	Dynamism
National coexistence	Human cooperation and solidarity
Independence	Interdependence and integration
Past-based	Future-oriented
Balance of national forces	Democratic global order
Diplomacy	Democratic representation applied - according to the subsidiarity principle - to each political level
Treaties and alliances	World federalism
League of Nations and United Nations	Federative Republic of Earth

¹Most of this work is also part of my book *On Democracy in the Country of World*, in process of edition
²(17-09-02)

³This article is an excerpt of a more complete paper, which will be soon available at www.civitatis.org. I have carefully considered the theses held by Sergio Pistone, professor in History of European Integration at the University of Torino, Italy, and vice-president of the Union of European Federalists, as a consistent exposition of the academic doctrines and political postures I want to contrast, and also take under special consideration the *Ventotene Manifesto*, which – by the times of the Second World War – was the most advanced and concrete proposal on the federal unification of Europe, and which is proposed by Pistone as the fundament of his own work

⁴A meaningful word that basically means “alien to community”

⁵Originally promoted by Charles de Gaulle and curiously raised and hold, nowadays, by many “Leftists” in a sort of “Gaullism without de Gaulle”

⁶For a more detailed program, see Fernando A. Iglesias, *Global Democratic Realpolitik*, 2004

⁷A. Spinelli, E. Rossi, E. Colorni, *The Ventotene Manifesto*, 1941

⁸From my book *Ten Global Laws on Globalization - a Copernican Revolution in Human Affairs*, in process of edition

Third International Conference on Federalism

March 2005, Brussels, European Parliament

Florina Laura Neculai

The Third International Conference on Federalism (Brussels, 3-5 March 2005) convened by Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium, and co-organized by the Forum of Federations brought together high-level politicians, civil servants and academics from all over the world, mainly from federal states. The conference was preceded by a youth meeting (1-2 March 2005).

The youth part of the conference took place on the 1st and the 2nd of March 2005 and gathered – in the historical place of Val Duchesse – young people aged between 18-30 years old. Divided into three workshops, the young participants gave, in a first instance, a definition of federalism and tried to explain the way federalism is implemented in their countries. At this point, it was very clear that a consensus on a definition of federalism is difficult to reach and that federalism has different practices in different countries. In the second part of the workshops, the young participants approached the way policies (and particularly the youth ones) should be applied within federal states.

The discussions were very animated, which made the tasks of the moderators very difficult in keeping the discussions on the mainstream, which underlines the high involvement of the youth in understanding federalism and their enthusiasm to share the federal experience in their countries with the other participants.

The youth meeting was organized by the three youth agencies in Belgium that belong to the three communities: the Dutch, the French and the German one, in collaboration with the Forum of Federations (based in Canada).

The main conference took place in the hemicycle

of the European Parliament (Brussels), between 3rd-5th March 2005. The conference was opened by Josep Borrell, President of the European Parliament, in the presence of His Majesty the King of the Belgians. Josep Borrell underlined in his opening speech that there is no model of federal state and that each state has its own model and that one should carefully use the term ‘federalism’ in Europe because for some states, such as Italy, Spain and Germany, it may mean ‘decentralization’, while for other states, such as UK, Ireland and Greece, it means ‘centralization’. Josep Borrell approached also the term ‘federalism’ within the framework of the European Constitution, where the notion of ‘federalism’ that is a general one was replaced with that of ‘community’ that is also general and he underlined that the debate today is independent of the history and of 20 years of development from Schuman to Spinelli.

Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium, pointed out the latest achievements of the European Union, underlying the creation of a position of a Foreign Minister and that federalism is a democratic and peaceful instrument that was used in the 19th century Germany and in the 20th century Europe. Guy Verhofstadt underlined the benefits of a federal organisation of a multi-cultural state in terms of conflict resolution and unity maintenance through diversity preservation, insisting also on the fact that federalism is a dynamic process that requires adjustments.

During the three days of conference, other high-ranked speakers were invited to address to the participants, such as Mrs. Wallstrom, Vice-

President of the European Commission, who reminded that the European Union evolved from a peace project and underlined that common citizens do not know the European Union and the way it is affecting their daily lives. Mrs. Wallstrom pointed out the need for a new communication strategy to build human bridges and to develop a democratic infrastructure. The Vice-President of the European Commission also discussed the reasons for which the European Commission supports the European Constitution that is mainly because it makes the EU simpler, more democratic and more transparent.

The Chancellor of Austria, Wolfgang Schüssel, approached federalism as the best form of organization that is not perfect but also the best in so far. Mr. Schüssel discussed the federal dimension of the Austrian political parties underlining that the Christian-Democrats are the most federative. The Chancellor also pointed out the benefits of economic competition among the *Länder* as being very stimulative and he underlined the need for Europeans to have a vision for Europe.

Jo Leinen, Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament, remarked that the Americans were

always more optimistic in speaking about the "American Dream", while the Europeans are more sceptical in approaching the "European Dream". Jo Leinen considers the ratification of the Constitution as a first layer for a united Europe that is a process that will require time and he underlined the double legitimacy the European Union has now as "a union of states and citizens".

Elmar Brok, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, underlined that Europe is not a federal state just because it is not a state, but that it works. He also stressed out that although the term "federal" means different things in different states, this should not constitute an obstacle in the federal process.

Among other speakers there were also the President of Nigeria, President of Cyprus, Vice-President of Sudan, Prime Minister of Macedonia, Prime Minister of Quebec, representatives of the Government of Brazil, Ethiopia, Philippines, South Africa, etc. In the last day of conference, the rapporteurs of the youth meeting had to present a short report and held a discussion in the plenary session. The closing ceremony took place in the presence of the H.R.H. Prince Philippe of Belgium.

Action for Arms Control in a World Awash with Weapons

A Report on the Recent Global Conference on Small Arms

Vijayam Raghunathan

'Action for Arms Control in a World Awash with Weapons', was the theme of the global conference that was held recently in Nairobi from 15 to 17 April 2005. Organised by the Control Arms Campaign, an international anti-arms lobby group, this global conference brought together charities and pressure groups like Oxfam, Africa Peace Forum, Amnesty International, Saferworld, as well as the International Action Network on Small Arms and ARIAS Foundation for Peace and Human Progress.

Two hundred activists from 75 countries met in Nairobi (Kenya) between 15-17 April to share campaign experiences on regulating the arms trade and preventing gun violence. The Kenyan Minister for Foreign Affairs inaugurated the conference and confirmed Kenya's support for an international Arms Trade Treaty. In his opening remarks, Kenyan Foreign Affairs Minister Chirau Mwakwere called on governments to agree on a set of clear universal standards for arms transfers and noted that previous agreements signed to control proliferation of illegal firearms have often been violated. "Since the signing of the Nairobi Protocol in April 2004, more than five million new weapons have entered the market. This is in addition to the estimated 640 million already in circulation. Sub-Saharan Africa alone is reported to have close to 30 million weapons in circulation, the vast majority of which are in private hands." Uncontrolled global trade in arms brings weapons into the hands of abusers of human rights and violators of international law. "Most critical to the developing countries, however, is the fact that the proliferation and easy availability of these weapons, fuel

conflict and hinder development, by creating an environment of fear and insecurity," added Mwakwere.

The conference was an opportunity for activists from around the world to meet and exchange ideas on campaigning, to learn more about the international arms trade and to develop methods for removing guns from our communities and to address the proliferation of and misuse of arms. The conference was held to promote the Control Arms campaign for an international Arms Trade Treaty to stop arms for atrocities.

Ochieng Adala, Director of Africa Peace Forum, which promotes peaceful conflict resolution policies in the Horn and Great Lakes regions of Africa, urged African governments to cut their defence budgets so as to reduce the proliferation of weapons. "Governments should urgently reduce their budget on small arms and ensure transparency by providing information to the public on production, possession and transfer of arms," Adala told journalists in Kenya's capital Nairobi. "Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by civil war which creates a high demand for arms", he added. Around 30 million illegal arms are in circulation in sub-Saharan Africa, fuelling conflicts and destroying lives and property across the continent.

"We are talking with governments about establishment of an International Arms Trade Treaty, which will be a binding mechanism to control the international transfer of arms. Already fifteen governments have made a statement of support, fifteen others are interested. We are involved in debating with them, so that everyone will play by the same

rules," Brian Woods of Amnesty International told journalists. He said, "we are talking about a global set of principles, more of a soft agreement trying to convince them that the world needs a level playing field for arms so that you do not get a situation where one country supplies arms when another one refuses."

For the treaty to be effective, it should address all elements surrounding the supply of arms. "We have to address all parts of the supply chain as well as demand for arms. Reducing the demand for arms means ensuring human rights, better safety and security, at the same time tightening the controls on the supply side, not just the factories, the producers, the intermediaries and the brokers," Woods added. The campaigners want the treaty in place before the next United Nations arms conference in New York in 2006. The meeting will review progress that has been made so far in reducing the flow of small arms.

Experts say the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by both government forces and armed rebel groups also directly increase poverty. An estimated 22 billion dollars a year is spent on arms by developing countries, a sum that would be enough to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of ending extreme poverty by 2015. The UN

estimates the goals of achieving universal primary education at 10 billion dollars a year, and of reducing child and maternal mortality at 12 billion dollars a year.

According to the Control Arms Campaign, 1300 people are killed each day around the world by conventional arms, begging for immediate action from governments. "The challenge to all governments is urgent. They must co-operate to control and limit the flow of arms and arms production. At the very least, arms-exporting countries must not supply arms where there is a clear danger that they will be used for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law," said the Control Arms Campaign in a recent report.

The control arms report, titled Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control, says the world's most powerful governments are the world's greatest suppliers of arms and have the responsibility to control the global trade. The UN Security Council's permanent members – France, Russia, China, Britain and the United States – together account for 88 percent of the world's conventional arms exports, the report says. To address the problem of proliferation and misuse of arms, tougher action is called for to regulate the flow of the deadly weapons. Will the challenge be taken? Are the countries of the world listening?

A History of World Federalism: Lessons for European and World Federalists

Roberto Castaldi

Joseph Preston Baratta

The Politics of World Federation

Westport, Praeger, 2004

Vol. I *United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control.*

Vol. II *From World Federalism to Global Governance.*

Introduction

This well-documented history of individuals and groups favouring world federalism in the US, focuses on the period between World War II and the consolidation of the Cold War, and also considers related groups in other countries. It has an extremely useful Annotated Bibliography of world federalist writings, showing that people all over the world thought about world government, especially during, and immediately after, World War II. Also the list of federalist journals, archives and collections, constitutional clauses limiting absolute national sovereignty in different countries, make Baratta's book indispensable to world federalist scholars.

In a letter the author summarises the book's three main theses:

1. "After first use of atomic bombs on Japan, the Baruch plan for the international control of atomic energy was the nearest official US approach to world government. Today, the European Union is the nearest practical realization of the dreams of federation."

2. "The world federalist movement left behind a large literature, including two practical yet visionary plans: Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn's *World Peace through World Law*, and Robert M. Hutchins, G.A. Borgese, and the Chicago Committee's *Preliminary Draft of a*

World Constitution."

3. "The book recounts a deeply principled alternative to the Cold War that now could offer a vision for foreign policy."

When the post-war order took shape, an action for World Federation may have succeeded, as there still was cooperation between the US and the USSR. But most people focused on winning the war rather than on the future settlement, and a popular movement for world federation did not develop. Clarence Streit, William Curry, Wendell Willkie and Emery Reves were among the first to call for a federation and getting to the public at large, while the atomic scientists mobilised for effective international control of atomic energy, that is for limited world government. But the Cold War and the Korean War showed the possibility of non-nuclear war, and when the USSR built the atomic bomb, the doctrine of mutual deterrence reassured many people, even if it meant living on the brink of destruction. In that period many people and groups followed different strategies without uniting. It is impossible to recall all those who are mentioned in the book, but some lessons from their history can be drawn.

The crucial issues

Baratta identifies four divisive issues among world federalists, dealing with the final goal and with the transition. What should be the institutional structure of a world federation? I.e. What form of representation of individuals and states? And which powers should be vested in the federation? A direct and proportional representation of the people would be more democratic, and would give a huge power to

poor and populous states like China and India, while weighted representation could consider also wealth, education, military power and other criteria. Almost all American world federalists favoured the second solution – because neither the US nor the USSR would accept the first – and discussed several weighting formulas. Minimalists and maximalists discussed the powers to be vested in the world federation. The former favoured a limited transfer of power to deal with peace and war and enforce national disarmament and the control of atomic energy. The latter asked for a world government to ensure justice on a global scale, dealing with the issue of poverty, decolonisation, etc., to mobilise all the people of the world, and not of just a few rich countries.

In relation to the strategy disagreement focused on the prospective membership of the federation, and the transition from anarchy to federation. Universal membership was the final goal, but who could start a federative process? Streit favoured a federation of the democracies, i.e. of the emerging western bloc; but most American world federalists supported a universal federation, based on an east-west settlement. Those favouring universal membership worked to reform the UN, eventually with a gradualist approach. Others, like Henry Osborne, favoured a revolutionary act by the people through a world constituent assembly, or the people's convention approach.

Similarly, the pro-European movement was initially split among federalists and confederalists, and on membership "With or without Britain?" was the question. The confederal Council of Europe was made with British leadership. But the first delegation of sovereignty, with the European Coal and Steel Community, started without the UK. Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli foresaw that the benefits of integration would force the UK to join. This may help world federalists: Union is the creation of a common power, not an organization with many members and no power, as successful integration can attract other people. On the strategy Monnet's gradualist approach¹ confronted Spinelli's

advocacy of a European constituent assembly. And as many world federalists worked without success to reform the UN, many in Europe hoped the EEC would turn by itself into a political union.

Some lessons

Both strategic proposals proved wrong in Europe. A constitutional act is necessary to reach a federation, but it could not be obtained without a previous process of pooling of sovereignty. In the 1960s Mario Albertini developed the theory of constitutional gradualism to exploit both insights. He recognised the unification process' two crucial aspects: integration, the transfer of competences to the European level; and construction, the building of common institutions endowed with power to deal with those competences. Thus, he suggested to campaign for European election, European currency, European government. The election would create a democratic forum, which would demand growing powers on the basis of its democratic legitimacy, and promote further integration. The currency would imply a real and visible transfer of sovereignty at the European level. This would make the European economy unmanageable without a European government. Once a democratic federal institutional structure with a judiciary, a legislative and an executive was in place, they would ask for more powers also about foreign and security policy. Eventually this process would result in the creation of a European federal state. It would have been possible to try with the army, as in the 1950s, but the currency seemed more feasible at that time. Looking back, Albertini's strategy proved right. After the Euro, a constitution was set up and is now under ratification, but Europe still lacks a government. This should be the focus of the European federalists' future campaign. Again, here there may be a suggestion for world federalists. Building embryos of democratic institutions at world level may be a useful starting point. At the same time it is also necessary to identify the competences that may really be transferred. The difficulty is that in

the world there are a number of international organizations, and the most powerful – the economic ones – are not really within the UN control.

The political role of European and world federalists is also similar. Grenville Clark believed in the possibility, and hence duty, for individuals to take the initiative to tackle great issues if governments fail to act – as they usually do when faced with supranational problems. Albertini said “The militant is one who makes a personal issue of the contradictions between facts and values”. Individual commitment is the basis of all vanguards, including the federalists. Therefore, recruitment and cultural training of the activists are crucial for the future of organised federalism. Only somebody deeply convinced of the federalist ideas – who has thought them out at some depth – may sacrifice throughout for the apparently distant goal of European or world federation. The federalist role is precisely to take the initiative. If they were a party, they could not be in power at the same time in all the states involved in a federative process to decide to federate. They have the little, but important, power to try to provide useful answers to difficult problems. When there is a widely perceived crisis on a supranational problem requiring a federalist answer, the political class may take up the federalist proposal as a course of action. Albertini identified this sequence crisis-initiative-leadership to guide the federalist action. Clark also stresses the role of crisis in setting the agenda, the role of the federalists in taking the initiative, and the need to find a strong political leader ready to follow that path. Crisis and leadership are out of the federalist’s control. They can only prepare to seize the opportunity that a crisis may open up, mobilising as many people as possible to convince some political leaders to follow the federalist path. As Machiavelli recalled, virtue and fortune are both needed for political success. The federalists must have the virtue to seize all opportunities with appropriate initiatives, then they will have more chances to find a listening political leader.

The European and world unification processes confirm this. The greatest world federalist mobilization came after the first use of the atomic bomb, when a possible nuclear war risked the survival of civilization. But, as Baratta suggests, the time when federalists could have succeeded was during World War II, when the US, the USSR and the UK were still cooperating and planning the future, and a committee of the American State Department discussed world federation. When their cooperation diminished, great powers favoured a confederal system, where each would keep sovereignty and have a veto. In the impasse of the coming Cold War Monnet successfully proposed the European Coal and Steel Community to manage the resources for which France and Germany had been fighting for a century. Schuman was the national leader who took up the idea. The Korean War made people expect a war in Germany, and Monnet proposed the EDC, supported by Plevin. When the latter lost his power, and Stalin’s death made the world look more secure, the French Assembly postponed indefinitely the ratification of the Treaty, already ratified by Germany and the Benelux countries. Similarly, world federalists were unlucky that Henry Osborne was not reappointed vice-president by Roosevelt for his last term. Osborne’s confirmation would have made a world federalist president of the US at Roosevelt’s death. The issue of leadership comes up times and again throughout Baratta’s book, which confirms that the federalists can have only the role of initiative.

In what conditions can a leadership be found? Baratta recalls members of the British government in favour of world rule of law or some form of world government, feeling their decline and thus unable to take the lead. Leadership requires power. The Philippines and other states proposed radical reforms of the UN Charter – even weighted representation to count little, rather than pretending that each state was equal, thus making the UN Assembly powerless, and the five permanent members of the Security Council the only relevant actors

– but they could not force the great powers to consider them. In Europe France and Germany had a leading role, as powerful states that, unlike Britain, had lost enough wars to accept renouncing part of national sovereignty. At the world level the US could have taken the lead in the 1940s, when they had not yet developed an “imperial” manner. Now the US opposes world rule of law, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Agreements. As non-democratic states cannot lead in proposing a delegation of sovereignty, only Europe, if united, may have enough power to take the lead in a world federative process. The goal of uniting Europe to unite the world should help the European federalists to continue their efforts.

The crisis-initiative-leadership scheme helps to think about the federalists’ role and organization. Today there is a wide recognition of global interdependence and problems. The expression global governance indicates a goal, since good governance requires good government, but hides the fact that without global government there cannot be any effective or democratic

global governance. There are several global crises for the federalists to exploit to promote a world federal government, even if the situation of power seems unfavourable to the emergence of a leadership.

Are the federalists really prepared to seize their chances? Baratta rightly identifies the weakness of the world federalists, since the 1940s until today, in their inability to federate. But success requires common discussions, decisions, campaigns and action at a European and world level, according to the goal pursued. This requires a great deal of humility by all activists, since it is difficult to get anybody work voluntarily on a strategy that s/he may disagree with. But if we admit that all other activists have the same goal, and are just as reasonable, all shall be able to accept that it is better to take a common decision and work together on a given campaign rather than splitting the forces by running separate campaigns. The challenge of building strong European and world federalist organizations is still ahead, and should be taken up by all activists. “Federate or perish” is true for federalists as well.

⁴But Monnet was not a neo-functionalist. He clearly aimed at a federation, as the Schuman Declaration of May 9 1950, clearly shows. Then, he proposed the European Defence Community (EDC), i.e. the integration of the armies, at an early stage of the process

H.G.Wells & World Government

John Parry

John S. Partington

Building Cosmopolis: The political thought of H.G.Wells
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003

The British author H.G.Wells is mainly known today for novels such as *Kipps*, *The History of Mr Polly*, science fantasies about Martian invasion in *War of the Worlds* or the experiments of a ruthless transplant surgeon in *The Island of Dr Moreau*. Very few present-day readers are aware of his political writings and his campaign for World Government. John S. Partington's analysis of Wells' political thought in *Building Cosmopolis* is therefore particularly welcome.

Born in 1866, Wells studied biology under T.H.Huxley, the leading Darwinian of Victorian times, and came to see the ethical principles underlying humanity's social systems as being rooted in the evolutionary process, and therefore having the potential for onward development. Early in his career he proposed extending social structures to the global level by means of a "permanent international Congress ... which will insure the peace of the world".

His initial account of how such a Congress would function remained in some aspects tantalisingly vague. He foresaw national governments continuing as the custodians of the common law and international trade while acting as an intermediary between

the Congress and their own municipal governments, thus combining some centralised power with subsidiarity wherever possible. This sounds basically federalist, yet the centralised competences he suggests would cover criminal law, prisons, registration of births and deaths, and the right to direct people to work in whatever part of the world they may be needed. In addition everyone would have identity documents bearing their thumb-print, and English would be the world language.

Such a world would hardly be regarded today as a utopia, though the ideas are not untypical of some of the wilder theories being discussed in late Victorian Britain, partly at least as a reaction to the growth of state nationalism in Europe. Declarations of patriotic pride were too often accompanied by a determination to build and maintain military superiority while expanding overseas empires; though in some cases, such as Greece, nationalist movements were primarily linked with the fight for liberty and independence. At the same time ethnically-based cross-border groupings were beginning to appear. Wells quotes Anglo-Saxon, Pan-Germanic and Pan-Slav movements, each expressive of shared cultural identity, and he foresaw a role for such regional groupings within the world Congress.

Some groupings, such as the British, French and other empires, would evolve systems of democratic autonomy in each of their subject states, leading them gradually to the point where they could join their imperial masters

as equal group partners within the world community.

Understandably, his ideas developed with the changing political scene, and much of the value of *Building Cosmopolis* lies in its demonstration of how this occurred and the arguments at each stage. With the outbreak of World War I Wells refined his proposal, envisaging a League of Free Nations endowed with a common law and a tribunal or court with the task of ensuring peace by settling disputes through arbitration, protecting weaker communities, and suppressing member states' preparations for war. But although the subsequent establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 might have seemed a vindication of Wells' own ideas, he saw it as being tainted with traditional diplomacy – that is, with the very methods which led to wars in the first place. He wanted, in effect, not only a new approach to handling international affairs but also to find a fresh way of looking at the world.

In this respect his relationship with federalist organisations is particularly interesting. He was impatient with their insistence on the need to work through existing political structures to achieve world federation and accused Federal Union of being “under the spell of the nation-state”. Under his plan, for example, all military forces with the exception of small militias should be transferred immediately to the world federation, yet he had no faith in the willingness of national politicians to surrender such a sensitive aspect of sovereignty to the global authority, nor in the parliamentary system which supported them in office. Equally, he did not agree that a European federation could lead to world government. It was more likely, he felt, to

result in wars between regional blocs.

His distrust of parliaments led him to new concepts such as the use of specialised international agencies to take over many of the functions of modern administration, using as a model the work of the International Postal Union which operates both efficiently and independently of national governments. Several other similar inter-national, *functional* agencies have already come into existence. While not wishing to abolish elections, he felt there was a need for citizen-juries to monitor politicians' decisions and agency functions at both national and world levels, and hold them to account in a way which is not possible through normal electoral mechanisms.

H.G.Wells died in 1946, never knowing how far some of his ideas have been put into practice. Had he lived he would have been very impatient with the course events have taken. In a far-sighted comment written before the development of air travel, electronic communications and satellites, he stated that “the increasing facilities of communication, the abolition of distance, render the federal association of the free communities more and more imperative.” Both in his fiction and non-fiction he was essentially a visionary, intolerant of delays and difficulties. Some of his proposals are impractical; others contain hidden threats to personal liberty. Yet, as the author of *Building Cosmopolis* points out, he was also a fierce defender of human rights. It was this conviction which inspired his proposals for political change, even though his preferred societal structures reveal a greater faith in mankind's ethical progress than events can often justify.

Rifkin and the European Dream

Roberto Palea

Jeremy Rifkin

The European Dream

New York, Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2004

The American author Jeremy Rifkin, best known as a “futurologist”, after having announced the end of the work, proclaimed hydrogen potentialities, envisaged the advent of a new globalized society – based on new information technologies – and stood up for animal rights, now reveals himself to be a good political scientist in his recent book, *The European Dream*.

One of its most important theories is enunciated in the subtitle: “How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream” – that dream based on faith in individual achievement and responsibility, promising personal wealth and economic growth to those who commit themselves to hard work and risk-taking, and which is now plainly fading. In fact, in the United States people spend increasingly more time at work, receive lower salaries, have no time for leisure, and see their hopes for a better future slowly dissolving.

Europe, on the other hand, emphasizes “community relationships over individual autonomy, cultural diversity over assimilation, quality of life over the accumulation of wealth, sustainable development over unlimited material growth, deep play over unrelenting toil, and universal human rights, global cooperation rather than the unilateral exercise of power.”

The fact is that most European citizens can benefit from more social protection, longer life expectancy, a wider culture, more time for leisure, less poverty and crime, less blight and sprawl than Americans. The Old Continent seems to be overtaking the New World in many respects. In part this is the result of the unification process, which restored peace in the entire European territory, thereby allowing economic integration, business growth and the formation of a political transnational space without precedent in history.

Rifkin regards the European Union as an impressive success. Exploring European history (despite some lacunae and inaccuracies) in the post-World War II period, the author expresses, in a chapter entitled “United States of Europe,” his positive judgment on the European Constitution’s achievements, which he defines “the texture and the warp of the new European Dream.” However, Rifkin has a static vision of this Union. He looks at the way it is, and not at what it should become in order to fully develop its potential and reach its goal. He gives a picture of the existing situation, neither venturing to comment, nor advancing proposals about what remains to be done to complete the European unification process. In fact, by signing the Constitution, the EU has taken only the first step towards federalism, though a very important one.

Further in his book Rifkin states that the European Union is the most avant-garde example of a new form of transnational government which is essential to regulate the globalization – a theory with which I completely agree. Moreover,

Rifkin points at the European Union as a model for the entire world, a Dream which could be potentially universal. Europe becomes the new "city upon a hill" and its example will necessarily be contagious because within twenty-five years no nation will be self-sufficient. Europe has been the first to understand this. Others will follow.

Attempts to create free-trade areas and common, transnational institutions in different geographical regions - such as Mercosur in South America, African Union in Africa and particularly Asean in South-East Asia - are the first signals of such a tendency. Nevertheless, Rifkin writes that to extend the European Dream to the entire world requires the spread of a universal morality, entailing the will to fight for universal human rights.

In the book's final chapter the author suggests the possibility of creating a moral connection between the "self" and the "other than self" on a global scale and in a universal perspective. According to Rifkin, this might occur as a result of natural catastrophes, such as climate change, the spread of new viruses or lethal bacteria, famine, terrorist attacks, etc., showing the world that humankind is destined to be a single community.

Moreover, the commitment of youth will be essential, young people being more and more interconnected through the diffusion of new information technologies, redoubling the

contacts among people. On this point, Rifkin finds it unacceptable that billions of people use these new means of communication for the sole purpose of exchanging information, trading in a worldwide market or just for fun. He reckons it necessary to find a unifying common purpose binding all these connections together so that everyone feels part of a huge whole: the biosphere.

From Rifkin's viewpoint, to stimulate awareness of the unity of humankind throughout the world (with the aim of realizing and asserting people's rights) it is necessary to appeal to the power of good ideas to conquer inhibitions and guide people toward a common good - a view which I personally find places too much reliance upon individual morality and strong will. In my view, Rifkin does not identify the incentives which would mobilize the citizens to recognise the need to extend democracy to a global area in which, with the passing of globalization, new interests and new rights must be regulated on the basis of the broader common interest. Furthermore, Rifkin proves to be completely unaware of the means of extending local rights to the entire world: namely, through federalism as a political formula combining different nations together. By this means countries will lose the power to wage war (all being associated) but acquire the ability to face problems relating to world safety, wealth and progress, not by individual action, but collectively.

Tzvetan Todorov

Philosopher and Anthropologist

Interview by *Ernesto Gallo*

Professor Todorov, how do you assess the French NO to the European Constitution? What is missing in this document in order to move European people's feelings? What about citizens' passions?

Does the European project need passion or only rationality? I think that a rational calculation of benefits and costs is not enough. The European people need reasons to *love* Europe as well. Human beings and their behaviours are usually driven by feelings and emotions. In this perspective, I believe it's important to return to the issue of European values so that we can support Europe because it involves our feelings, and not only for we think in rational terms. To my mind, an *emotional support* is a really crucial element. I think that this aspect was unfortunately missing in the French campaign. To be sure, this NO vote has been biased by other variables, which deal with French politics, internal struggles for power, political careers... all but European issues, and – as we all know – I'm not the only one who thinks so

You wrote about a "new world disorder". Do you think that a European Government, deriving from the Commission, and accountable to the European Parliament, would be a proper solution for a more adequate world order? Do you think it could be feasible in the short run? What about the consequences of the French and the Dutch NOs?

Predicting the future is a tricky job... I'm not that confident about it... However, I believe that Europe, in order to play a stronger role on the world stage, has to speak with a single voice. It is essential that it has something similar to

a Government, at least as far as Foreign and Security Policy is concerned. Europe needs also its own defence. Without it, a country can't be really autonomous. Provided with such tools, Europe could really follow its own way, not against the USA, which is a liberal democracy as well, but *modifying* the American approach to international affairs and to the current world order. The French and Dutch NOs are very bad answers. However, I don't think they represent the end of the story. We have just lost a battle, not the war (and luckily it's not a war!). I'm pretty convinced that the movement towards European integration

Do you think that Europe should have a proper Army? Which kind of role should it eventually play?

Going back to the issue of the Army, I think that it should have a well-defined role: it's not our concern to compete with the US. It's neither possible nor easy – due to very high costs – let alone the fact that nowadays wars are different... The European Union doesn't need to be involved in, for instance, Indian or Chinese conflicts. Europe should be a "quiet power", that is, a limited one, mainly devoted to the defence of its territory. Well, I'd like to say: "No one threatens us!" but I think that unfortunately that wouldn't be true. Something bad might come from East: Russia is nowadays quiet, but who knows how it will look in ten, fifteen or twenty years? A new nationalism, or religious fundamentalism could bring Russia back to the aggressive role that it played in the XX century.

Weapons of Mass Destruction can't be

overestimated. We must control them and their destructive potential. The same applies to international terrorism, and I don't mean only the Muslim one. Nowadays every small group could easily build small arsenals, for technology spread quickly and without obstacles. In the end, we must avoid civil wars at all events. Therefore we must think how to hinder conflicts such as the Yugoslavian one. Considering all the above mentioned reasons, we need an Army, although not as powerful and costly such as the US one. I don't think it would mean a waste of money because it would give the Europeans a tool to live together in peace.

Some scholars hold that the European Union, with or without its Constitution, is already a kind of federation; other ones believe on the contrary that Governments are still the Lords of the Treaties. What do you mean by federalism in the XXI century

As far as federalism is concerned, I'm neither a specialist of the federal state nor a jurist: I don't think I'm the right person to give a proper answer. I'd like anyway to stress a point that seems to me crucial: the European Union is the expression of something which has never existed in the past. We don't have proper models and we don't know where we are going to. Our federation is neither an empire – where all states are subject to a more powerful one – nor a federal state, such as Switzerland or Belgium, where some entities gave up their sovereignty in order to build up a single state. We are a federal union, but we're discovering it on the way, step by step. To sum up, I don't think that power is still completely in the hands of Governments. States have given up parts of their sovereignty, which lies to some extent in European institutions. We're building Europe step by step. The Constitution was just one of

them; let's not dramatize its rejection in the French referendum.

You spoke about passions and emotions, which were missing when French people went to vote but are still present in the souls and hearts of people who are active in pacifist movements, no global movements, and so on. By the way, some of them were supporting the NO side in France. Which are to your mind the true European passions? Which role can pacifist movements play in the construction of Europe and in the world?

The so-called "No-global" movement is important as its message is spread worldwide, but in electoral terms, it represents only a tiny minority of voters. I think that more than half of the NO vote is due to the Extreme Right. Several "No-global" ideas have already entered the public debate and have been captured by political parties. Let's think about sustainable development, working conditions, and so on and so forth. With regard to passions... well, it's not a philosopher's task to decide which ones they ought to be. It's up to all of us. However, I believe that especially during the Iraqi War we all felt that a crucial European value is the rejection of the use of force to impose the Good. We must defend and strengthen this ideal which is a legacy of our history – featured by colonialism and totalitarianism.

There are other values as well: for instance, secularism. You might have heard of the French movement *Ni pute, ni soumise* (Neither whore, nor submitted), formed by young women in peripheries who defend their chance to avoid what some people would like them to do. Such movements are inspired by a strong idea of secularism. Individuals must have the chance to choose their own life. It's an important ideal. We must go ahead giving them the right place. They mean something more than barely technical issues – customs, or whatever.

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