The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is
Immanuel Kant
The Federalist Debate

is published three times a year and is promoted by the Jeunes Européens Fédéralistes (JEF), the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF) and the World Federalist Movement (WFM) under the auspices of the Einstein Center for International Studies (CESI)

Editor
Lucio Levi

Executive Editor
Stefano Roncalli

Editorial Board

Jeunes Européens Fédéralistes (JEF)
Jan Seifert

Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF)
John Parry

World Federalist Movement (WFM)
W. James Arputharaj
Keith Best
William R. Pace

Assistants to the Editor
Lionello Casalegno, Francesco Ferrero

Editorial Staff
Jean-Francis Billion, Grazia Borgna,
Vera Palea, Renata Pantucci, Anna Sarotto

Layout
Giampaolo Melideo
by order of FerrariMelideo Agency - Milano
e-mail: gp.melideo@ferrarimelideo.it

Printed in Italy
Azienda Grafica il Torchio
Viale Risorgimento, 11
I - 10092 - Beinasco

The Federalist Debate
Via Schina 26,
I-10144 Torino, Italy
Phone and Fax +39.011.473.28.43
e-mail: federalist.debate@libero.it

Jeunes Européens Fédéralistes (JEF)
Chaussée de Wavre 214 d,
B-1050 Bruxelles
info@jef.eu, www.jef.eu

Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF)
Chaussée de Wavre 214 d,
B-1050 Bruxelles
info@federaleurope.org
www.federaleurope.org

World Federalist Movement (WFM)
International Secretariat
708 Third Avenue
New York - NY 10017
wfm@igc.org www.worldfederalist.org

Annual Subscription Prices

Individuals
15 euros - 18 dollars

Institutions and Supporters
30 euros - 40 dollars

Money Transfer (no cheques) to
The Einstein Center for International Studies
acc. n. 10/10853, IBAN IT15 W010 2501 0001 0000 0010 853 BIC IBSPITTM
Intesa San Paolo, Filiale Torino Piazza San Carlo

Credit Cards
Carta SI, Eurocard, Mastercard, Visa
Aut. Trib. Torino n. 4878, 04.06.1999

Visit our home page:
www.federalist-debate.org
This review receives a financial support from UEF and WFM. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the position of the sponsoring organisations.
The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists in Europe and the World

• EDITORIAL
• COMMENTS
• BORDERLESS DEBATE
• FEDERALIST ACTION
• BOOK REVIEWS
• INTERVIEW
EDITORIAL
The End of Unilateralist Illusion    Lucio Levi
4

COMMENTS
Europe’s Place in the World in the 21st Century    Peter D. Sutherland
6
The European Union’s Role for Peace in the Middle East    Alfonso Sabatino
10
France and Europe    Robert Toulemon
14
Churchill and Hertenstein    Raymond M. Jung d’Arsac
19
The Hertenstein Programme, 22 September 1946
22
On Gun Licenses in the US    Mario Platero
23
Speakers’ Corner    Ted Wheatley
25
Mercosur: A Parliament of Dreams?    Fernando A. Iglesias
27
A Joint European Union-Africa Strategy    Jean-Paul Pougala
29
Richard Hudson: Love, Law, and Peace    René Wadlow
30
In memoriam: Claus Schöndube    John Parry
32

BORDERLESS DEBATE
GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD FEDERALISM
How World Federalism will Likely Come into Existence    James T. Ranney
34
Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society    Nicole Deller
37
An International Conference to Govern Globalization. Stiglitz and the WFM    Antonio Mosconi
40
Torrid Climate  Roberto Palea  44

FEDERALIST ACTION
Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly Launched  Andreas Bummel  46
Appeal for the Establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations  47
The Federalist Participation in Nairobi’s World Social Forum 2007  Nicola Vallinoto  48
Boutros-Ghali: Democratization at Global Level Needed  49
Indian Civil Society Takes the Lead in Promoting Small Arms Ban  50
Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Rome  51

BOOK REVIEWS
The Ethnic Trap  Francesca Lacaita  52
Globalizing Democracy  Laura & Renata Pantucci  54
Beyond the State  Giampiero Bordino  56
The Group of Eight  Sergey A. Belyaev  57
International Commissions and the Power of Ideas  René Wadlow  59

INTERVIEW
Andrew Strauss  62

CONTRIBUTORS
  64
The escalation of attacks by insurgent groups believed to be linked to al-Qaeda reached its climax on April 12, 2007, when a suicide bombing struck the Iraqi Parliament. The bomber penetrated the Parliament’s cafeteria where the lawmakers were gathering for lunch. This was in the heart of the ‘green zone’, one of Baghdad’s most stringently guarded areas.

The attack occurred on roughly the same date as the fourth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. The insurgency’s message was clear: it can infiltrate and strike anywhere. The American ‘Goliath’ intent on blowing the wind of democracy across the entire Middle East from Afghanistan to Iraq is still being harried by this reckless and impudent ‘David’ who should by now have been exterminated but instead is becoming bolder and bolder.

The lesson we can draw from this sensational attack is that the US cannot win this asymmetric war. In fact, the US Congress itself has voiced the general feeling that the occupying troops should withdraw from Iraq next year when George W. Bush leaves the White House. The attack on the Iraqi Parliament is reminiscent of a famous precedent: the occupation of the US embassy at Saigon on 31 January, 1968, when the US ambassador fled the country by helicopter, carrying the Stars and Stripes rolled under his arm. At that time too, President Johnson – like President Bush today – often proclaimed that the victory was at hand.

There is however a profound difference between the epoch of the Cold War and the current situation. The power vacuum left by the American withdrawal from Viet Nam was filled by the expanding influence of the Communist bloc. Today, withdrawal from Iraq would seem to open the way towards chaos, leaving a Middle East on fire and at the mercy of terrorism, organized crime, Islamic fundamentalism and nuclear proliferation. Instead of bringing a new democratic order to the region, the US has generated greater instability. The collapse of the Afghan and the Iraqi regimes under US military strikes has opened the way to state disintegration; and when states fail or collapse, non-state actors such as terrorist groups, warlords, drug and arms traffickers move in to occupy their territory.

To avoid the withdrawal from Iraq being seen as a defeat, it must take place against a less turbulent regional background. One major obstacle is the deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, now facing a new crisis. On the one hand, there is the Israeli government – discredited in the eyes of the public by its unsuccessful attack on Lebanon, unmoving on the issue of the settlers, and aggressive towards the Palestinians; on the other hand, Palestine’s progressive slide towards the ravine of a civil war. All this removes the prospect of peace negotiations leading to an overall political settlement.

Moreover, the Iranian nuclear program and President Ahmadinejad’s threatening declaration that the state of Israel should be wiped off the world map make the situation
in the region highly dangerous. At the same
time, the Afghan insurgency is becoming
more and more active.

* * *

But the US government is responsible for
yet another source of international tension
which could worsen the West’s relationship
with Russia and generate the possibility of
a new Cold War. Its recent decision to site
American anti-missile shield facilities in the
Czech Republic and Poland is seen as the
latest move in a US strategy of encirclement,
which includes plans to bring Ukraine and
Georgia into NATO, to grant independence
to Kosovo (the Ahtisaari Plan), separating
it from Serbia, to seek military bases in
Central Asia and to bypass Russia and
Iran by laying oil and natural gas pipelines
through countries over which it could exert
substantial political influence.

Russia’s reply has been the refusal to
withdraw its troops from the Caucasian
region, particularly from Georgia and
Moldova, the rejection of the Ahtisaari Plan,
and the suspension of the conventional arms
reduction treaty in Europe, thereby reviving
the ghost of a new arms race.

* * *

This unilateralist US foreign policy is not
even remotely justified by the defense of vital
national interests. It is, rather, the expression
of an outdated vision of the world order.
To solve international problems, the US is
inclined to rely on its military superiority
rather than negotiations, and to place
greater emphasis on competition than on
co-operation.

Had the US offered to suspend the extension
of NATO eastward, Russia could well have
responded by adopting a much more co-
operative attitude in relation to stopping
Iran’s nuclear program. Going still further
into this question, we should recognize that
today there are dangers equally threatening
both the US and Russia and which did
not exist at the time of the Cold War, for
instance international terrorism, and global
challenges such as climate change or nuclear
proliferation. No state can face these alone.

The world is evolving irresistibly towards a
multipolar distribution of power. The decline
of American power is matched by the rise of
new powers: large states such as China and
India, unions of states such as the EU, and
non-state actors such as global civil society
movements on the one hand, and terrorist
and criminal groups on the other. The power
vacuum left by the US in the Middle East
could be occupied by the EU, provided that it
endows itself with the means to speak with
one voice. The EU peacekeeping mission to
Lebanon, though insufficient, is a first step
in the right direction. Only Europe can offer
this essential contribution to the construction
of peace, since American soldiers are not
trained in peacekeeping.

No single strategy offers the prospect of victory
against any of the global challenges. There
is no military solution to those problems.
More specifically, the ordinary tools of war
are wholly ineffective as regards the fight
against terrorism. It is a fundamental error to
conceive power exclusively in military terms.
An increasing number of global challenges
need joint action. A new world order requires
multilateral institutions and co-operative
policies within these institutions.
In light of probable increasing threats to Europe during the 21st century, we need a more coherent and effective EU as an actor on the international stage. None of the 25 nation states of the EU (even the most powerful) can be truly effective or sometimes even relevant acting alone. Our publics seem to grasp this point better than our politicians. Eurobarometer polls across Europe highlight strong support for “more Europe” in foreign and security policy. There is an expectation among our international partners also that Europe should assume greater global responsibilities. On some global issue such as Kyoto and the international criminal court, the EU has already provided leadership, showing what can be done when we are united and speaking with one voice. There remains, as Christopher Hill wrote some years ago, an “expectation-capabilities gap” in EU foreign policy.

The world is likely to become more dangerous for Europe. The security, economic and demographic trends are not encouraging. Europe will continue to grow modestly – in GDP and perhaps membership – but such technological advantage as it may have in areas as information technology, biotechnology, and nanotechnology will be eroded. Europeans will by 2025 comprise a mere 6% of the world population, while Africa and the Middle East will see a high population growth. The prognosis is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe, at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on the rest of the world, especially for energy. It is forecast that by 2030 Europe will be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 65% of its gas. China and India will drive global energy demand, and seek new sources in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In this and other ways, European security interests may be directly or indirectly challenged by tensions arising not only in the near neighbourhood but also further afield.

Europe has the potential to rise to these challenges and to share in the new opportunities created by emerging markets and globalisation more generally but can only do so by continuing to adapt and develop institutionally.

From the very beginning the Treaty of Rome recognized that there could be no internal market without a customs union that, in turn, could not survive without a common trade policy. Today it is even more clear that internal and external policies are interdependent, especially in a world of open markets and free capital movements. Economic and monetary union has led to the emergence of the euro as the world’s second most important international reserve and trade currency, giving increased influence to the EU globally.

Most of the internal policies of the EU have substantive international implications. For example, the completion of the internal market has led to the adoption of EU standards in key technologies around the world (China’s motor industry, food safety, mobile communications and so on). EU competition policy not merely provides an important internal regulatory instrument, but addresses issues such as international cartels or abuses by dominant undertakings that may affect global markets. There are also strong demands from third
countries to cooperate with EU programmes like research policy, education and transport. The fast development of EU policy in the area of justice and home affairs is reflected in the external dimensions of these issues.

In many of these areas policy is a shared responsibility between the EU and the Member States and this presents particular challenges in achieving coherence.

The inaccurately named constitutional treaty tried to deal with these problems. In part this was by proposing a new position of EU foreign minister that would have given the EU – so it was hoped – more coherence, more consistency and more visibility. These were and remain good proposals. I deeply regret the lack of progress on them during the current “pause for reflection”. It seems to me that we have too much pause, and too little reflection. However cautiously, we must continue a process of giving responsibility to the Commission to develop policies in the common interest rather than relying purely on dialogue between capitals. We should recognise that intergovernmentalism has generally not worked in the past and is not the answer for the future. The euphemism used for this intergovernmentalism is often the word “co-operation”, but co-operation between sovereign states is not enough. This is essentially the failed model that gave rise to the need for the EU in the first place.

One of the main reasons for the EU’s success has been adherence to the rule of law. This fact of supranational law at its base distinguishes the EU from all other intergovernmental associations of states. Member States have accepted that they will sometimes be outvoted in the Council in some vital economic and social matters because the EU is a community of law. All Member States are equal before the law. Governments may protest and procrastinate, but in the end the system works because all members accept the primacy of Community law. This law-based approach also characterises the EU’s approach to foreign policy. It is sometimes excessively obsessed with agreements, rules and regulations. But I think there is great merit in the EU championing a rules-based approach to the international system.

From its inception, the EU has worked for the gradual opening of global markets and a rules-based international trading system. Had there been no EU there would be no WTO and Europe today would consist of a number of fragmented and protectionist areas totally incapable of contributing to globalisation.

The reason for our success in international trade is that we have adopted a supranational approach to decision-taking. We have a corps of highly professional and coherent officials in Brussels that produce timely and relevant policies taking into account a genuine EU perspective on issues. This allows the Commissioner to speak with the full authority of 25 member states in trade negotiations. Our partners may on occasion not like our policies but they do respect us as a major player.

There are important lessons we can learn from how we operate in the trade field that are equally applicable to foreign policy. The Union could be as effective in other policy areas if it wanted to, simply by providing for a single representation. The aim must be for the future EU foreign minister to speak under a similar mandate in the CFSP field where there is an agreed policy or common strategy. Member States would thus continue to enjoy bilateral relations with third countries but they would not discuss EU policy towards them in areas of agreed EU policy. Solana is already accepted as a spokesman in some key areas of foreign policy, for example in the recent nuclear talks over Iran, but the situation is complicated by the fact that the ‘big three’ EU Member States tend to operate separately in fields such as this. Other Member States are suspicious of this model, which resembles a directoire rather than a real common policy. I see nothing wrong with
smaller task forces being established, under a Council mandate, to deal with particular issues. However, these groups should be under strict reporting requirements to the whole Council and be subject to its ultimate authority when acting on behalf of the EU.

The foreign policy machinery works badly at present. European foreign policy has always been overly bureaucratic. There are numerous squabbles over issues of competence and too many actors involved – the Member States, the Council, the High Representative, the Special Representatives, the Commission, the Parliament, each with their bureaucracies, interests and ambitions. Some improvements have been made as a result of Solana’s appointment, yet he operates with woefully inadequate resources. The situation is further confused by the six-monthly rotating Presidency, often setting its own (national) priorities. A plethora of different legal bases for external action in different fields further complicates the picture, as does the fact that the EU itself has no clear legal personality, which would have been remedied by the Constitution.

In light of the challenges facing Europe we cannot continue to allow all decisions to be taken on the basis of the lowest common denominator. I recognise that you cannot have Qualified Majority Vote for military action, but for the vast majority of foreign policy issues there should be no insuperable problem in introducing majority voting. This could be done in stages. First, with an ‘emergency brake’ to provide for consultations at the European Council in the event of a major disagreement; second, moving to a super qualified majority; and then, some day, in a third stage, to the normal QMV procedures. I understand the Quai d’Orsay carried out a survey last year seeking decisions since 2000 where France would have been outvoted in foreign policy. With the notable exception of Iraq (and here military action was involved) there were no cases. I rather suspect there would be a similar result if the same assessment was made in the United Kingdom or Germany.

Whilst I believe we must move steadily towards QMV in foreign policy, I also recognise that this itself is not a panacea for an improved foreign policy and will take time to achieve. This is why I think there has to be action on a number of other issues. These include the designation of an EU foreign minister (combining the roles of High Representative and Vice President of the Commission), the creation of a European diplomatic service, legal personality for the EU, and the end of the rotating Presidency role in foreign affairs. Some of these improvements require changes in existing Treaty provisions. That may take time. If necessary, I think we can make the first two of these improvements without a new Treaty. These proposals were all in the constitutional treaty and I do not wish to underestimate that fact.

We need to go much further and consider what could be done even before any new treaty is ratified. One priority must be to enhance the complementarity of various policies and to reconcile different objectives (for example in trade, agriculture, development, environment or migration). There is already a high level of consensus on the broad framework of the EU’s external objectives. What is missing is a more systematic approach to setting strategic objectives and political priorities at both geographical and thematic level so that policy objectives guide the choice of policy instruments (rather than the reverse). There should also be improved up-stream co-ordination to promote consensus on issues of EU relevance that are subject to discussions in multilateral organisations, fora of global governance, and regional organisations.

Even when the EU has clear objectives and an agreed course of action, the impact and effectiveness of our action is often hampered by mixed messages as well as slow and complex implementing procedures. The EU therefore needs to ensure that once a policy decision has
been taken by the EU, all actors integrate this into their diplomatic and public messages as well as in their own policy development. This implies reinforced coordination in Brussels as well as better use of the EU’s diplomatic capacities to convey clear, single messages to partners.

There is considerable scope for Member States to co-operate more effectively in third countries. Jointly the EU and the Member States dispose by far the largest diplomatic machinery in the world. The EU has ten times more missions and three times more personnel at its disposal than the US. But is Europe as effective as the US in foreign policy? Are we using the human and material resources which we collectively invest in foreign policy in the most effective way? If foreign ministries do not ask the question, finance ministries will certainly ask why there needs to be 25 separate EU Member State missions, plus a Commission delegation, in countries x, y and z, when the EU is supposed to operate a common foreign policy. We must also ask ourselves what kind of people should we be recruiting to serve Europe’s interests. European diplomacy needs more experts on climate change, inward investment, migration and terrorism.

There is also much that could be done to improve co-operation between Council and Commission. There should be increased sharing of intelligence and a greater exchange of diplomats and officials between the Member States and the EU institutions. A major increase in the tiny CFSP budget is also necessary if the EU is to make any progress towards fulfilling its global ambitions. At the same time, there needs to be clarity as to responsibility for different budget lines. Defence ministers also need to become more involved in EU affairs. It is surely time that there was a European defence white paper rather than 25 separate papers. Finally, I am convinced that it will be important to enlist the support of the European public, through the involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments as well as the media and NGOs, for the goals of the EU in foreign policy.

In conclusion, the EU has developed steadily as an international actor during the past decade. Much has been achieved but the record could have been better if we had acted quicker through strengthened institutions. The proposals I have outlined would be seen in some capitals as being at the modest end of the spectrum, but if implemented they could lead to a significant improvement in the EU’s external performance. Of course, foreign policy remains a sensitive area and Member States are keen to retain their historic prerogatives and traditional links. Foreign ministries are also reluctant to negotiate themselves into a reduced role while there remain unanswered questions about legitimacy and significant differences of foreign policy culture, experiences and expectations. But if we are to meet the challenges of the 21st century we have to recognise that the adoption of the Community method would bring significant advantages. In the short-term, individual actors and institutions may see advantages in the freedom of manoeuvre that comes from exercising their responsibilities in an autonomous way, but in the medium and long term, the global influence of the EU will depend upon the ability of the Member States to speak with one voice – and to take the necessary decisions in a timely manner.

Excerpts from the Charlemagne Lecture - 22nd November 2006
Comments

The European Union’s Role for Peace in the Middle East*

Alfonso Sabatino

Nobody can easily forget the crucial crisis of summer 2006 on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The killing and abduction of Israeli soldiers by Palestinian extremists and Hezbollah militants, the heavy military reprisals launched by Israel in the Gaza strip and in Lebanon, and the incessant shower of Hezbollah rockets over Galilee have left deep and open wounds. We should also be conscious that the participation of some European contingents in the framework of the UN UNIFIL-2 mission may have created an opportunity for working towards a just and durable peace, but certainly does not solve the problems. However, the time for taking an initiative remains very tight. The war in Lebanon added to the worrying destabilization level reached in the region after the American invasion of Iraq, the rising of Iran as a nuclear power, and the lingering of the Palestinian question. Nor can we forget that last summer’s tragic events took place in the context of a standing and serious destabilization in the Middle East, from the Eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan.

Now let me introduce some reflections in order to better understand what the EU should do in the Middle East. My first consideration is about the United States of America. Since the Conference for the peace in the Middle East convened in Rome on July 26, 2006, we witness an international silence on the part of the Bush Administration. This is due not only to Washington’s precautions in view of the American invasion of Iraq, the rising of Iran as a nuclear power, and the lingering of the Palestinian question. Nor can we forget that last summer’s tragic events took place in the context of a standing and serious destabilization in the Middle East, from the Eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan.

Now let me introduce some reflections in order to better understand what the EU should do in the Middle East. My first consideration is about the United States of America. Since the Conference for the peace in the Middle East convened in Rome on July 26, 2006, we witness an international silence on the part of the Bush Administration. This is due not only to Washington’s precautions in view of the mid-term elections of November 8 and the following victory of the Democrats. It has more profound reasons.

It calls into question the strategy chosen for facing international terrorism after September 11, 2001. It calls into question the concept of pre-emptive war, the appropriateness of overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and waging the war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Today, both countries are in a mess, Al-Qaeda has not been dismantled, on the contrary it has continued to strike all over the world. The peace process in Palestine has gone backwards. Iran, which aspires to the role of regional power, has taken the lead of Shiite political movements in Iraq and Lebanon, and strives to acquire a nuclear capacity. The idea to launch a great project, the Great Middle East, was soon forgotten.

The solution to the Palestinian question, as devised in the Road Map, has remained unfulfilled. To say the truth, the US seems no longer capable of taking upon itself an evolutionary and stabilizing project for bringing peace in the world. Such a project was there during and after World War II. Still in the 1990s Washington had been playing a stabilizing role in the Middle East, making possible in 1993 the conclusion of the Oslo agreements, started by a European initiative. However, that role was wearing out already during the Clinton presidency, in the summer of 2000, in the last months of his mandate. His long mediation attempt between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak failed. President Clinton was unable to impose himself over the parties, as happened previously with Eisenhower in 1956 and with Nixon in 1973.

My second consideration is about Israel and its security. The Israeli political class finds itself in a dead-end street, after having tried for years to block the birth of a Palestinian State. Today the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is
certainly experiencing a serious crisis, but this
does not make Israel safer. Similarly, Israel is
not made safer by the issues still open with
Lebanon (the Sheeba farms) or with Syria
(the Golan Heights). Pursuing its security by
resorting exclusively to military deterrence
has proved counterproductive. The Hezbollah
disarmament and the end of the Palestinian
uprising is unrealistic. Instead, it is possible
to lower the level of military alert if a real
reconciliation process were under way. That
process, however, cannot be left to the good will
of the local parties only, but requires the creation
of a shared political environment, protected
by external powers, as happened in Europe
after WWII, when the unification process was
founded on the Franco-German reconciliation
and was made possible by the cover provided by
the United States to Europe’s security. Although
such a reconciliation process shall concern,
in a first instance, Israel, the PNA and Lebanon,
it could not neglect, in a second instance, the
other actors in the area (Syria, Iraq, other Arab
States and Iran).
My third consideration is about the nature of
the terrorist movements operating in the Middle
East theatre and threatening world security.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration
has adopted a strategy of global confrontation
with terrorism, which has proved unsuccessful
against Al-Qaeda, has helped the electoral
success of Hamas in Palestine, and has blocked
reforms in Iran. That strategy does not take in
due account the differences in the motivation of
individual players, and hence it is unable to find
suitable ways as to how to face up to them. In
fact, it did not take into account that Al-Qaeda
is a fish swimming in the water of anti-Western
resentment and anti-modernist reactions active
in the Islamic world. However, its leader, Osama
bin-Laden, did not succeed in his plan to stir
an ever greater consent in the Islamic society (in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria).
That is an important indication on the strategic
plane, that allows us to isolate Al-Qaeda from
the rest of other extremist movements like
Hamas, Hezbollah and the Iraqi factions. This
movements could become political interlocutors
in the presence of a serious pacification attempt
in the Middle East, and when arms are laid
down. In fact, it is not the first time that a political
movement, after having carried out a struggle
in hiding and having resorted to violence,
has later peacefully taken part in the political
reconstruction process once the conditions have
been defined in a credible way. This happened
with the European resistance, with the national
liberation movements in the decolonization
period, with the birth of the Jewish State too.
Actually, the water where Al-Qaeda is
swimming can only be drained in a long time,
with an evolution of Islamic societies freed of
colonial ties; instead, the water where Tehran,
Hezbollah, Hamas and the Iraqi factions are
swimming can be drained in shorter times,
inviting the sensible forces to the peace table
and putting forward concrete conditions for a
common shared future.
My fourth consideration is about the UN SC’s
Resolution 1701, welcome by many as the
return of the United States to multilateralism.
My opinion is that Resolution 1701 is just the
attempt to bring about a cease-fire, with all the
ambiguities it implies. It does not at all guarantee
peace for the future.
However, there is to appreciate the factors
for a positive turn that the Resolution can
bring. Resolution 1701 strengthens the United
Nations in the first place, as the institution
symbolizing the world political unity, and its
interventions in favour of peace. In addition, it
strengthens the UN because it created the gap
which the mobilization of European countries
for the Lebanese crisis managed to get through,
pushed ahead by Italy. But in this case too we
must be aware of the slippery terrain on which
the protagonists are moving.
The Italian government, keeping in mind the
vital interest it has in stabilizing the Middle
East, understood that the US could not ensure
the security of that area, and that the UN
moment had come. Its pledge to send a sizable
Italian contingent was a sign of both a strong
political will, and an awareness of its own
weakness. Coherent with these premises, the Italian government tried in any possible way to put its participation in the UN mission under the protective umbrella of the European Union, with a result, here too, partial and ambiguous. Also the EU Council of Ministers of August 25 in Brussels, which invited the UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, gave questionable results, partly positive and partly disappointing. The Council did not commit itself directly; it limited itself to acknowledge the willingness of the member countries to reinforce the UNIFIL mission. The positive result of the European countries’ commitment is then the deployment of European troops, amounting to more than half the UNIFIL force, and the upcoming considerable financial contribution to the Lebanon’s reconstruction. The disappointing aspect is the absence from that theatre of the EU as institution. The Solana document of 2003, stating the Union’s duty to intervene in international crises and in situations of “serious world insecurity” is not mentioned, nor has the rapid intervention corps, contemplated in the Helsinki agreements of 1999, been mobilized. However, there is still to stress that for the first time since the end of WWII the European countries have taken a strong autonomous initiative outside of the NATO framework. Therefore, we are at a turning point. In such a context, the presence of Italian, French, Spanish, German, Belgian, Finnish troops requires that the European Union becomes rapidly aware of the challenges coming from that region and then that it finds political solutions to them.

My fifth consideration is about the political initiative itself. It is necessary to urgently reconvene the Rome Conference on the Middle East, this time with all the protagonists, and put in the agenda: 1) the Palestinian question; 2) the reconstruction of Lebanon and Iraq, and 3) the Iran’s nuclear program. In such an uncertain and very dangerous context, the individual European States have tight and dangerous room for maneuver. The key problem remains the reduction of the offensive capabilities of both parties, and of course there is to place under joint control, in the interest of all mankind, Israel’s nuclear arsenal and Iran’s nuclear capability under development. So, the problem is political, and on that ground any international agreement shall be sought. A military, or rather a military policing, intervention is of a complementary nature and must be supported by a strong and courageous international initiative aimed at building a Kantian-type peace.

At this point it is clear that we are confronted with a serious impasse. The political initiative and the military and financial burden necessary to ensure a definitive peace in the Middle East cannot be taken by any individual European State. Instead, they could be taken by the EU, because it represents the only international actor that is considered credible by all the conflicting parties; but it is not prepared for tasks of peace keeping, peace building and peace enforcing, nor is it endowed with institutions to carry out its foreign policy. In particular, the EU has no instruments for giving a European democratic legitimacy to the use of military force, even in the framework of UN missions. Incidentally, two important observations can be added. First, the EU can operate in the framework of the “Quartet” that signed the Joint Statement in Madrid on April 10, 2002, following the Beirut Declaration of the Arab League Council of March 28, 2002, which made an overture to negotiations with Israel. That declaration is becoming topical today in Arab government offices, working to make possible an Al Fatah-Hamas coalition government in Palestine willing to talk to Israel. Secondly, it is to be underlined that the EU is at present the only member of the “Quartet” not represented in the UN Security Council, where instead France and Great Britain sit as permanent members and other European countries as rotating members. This is the reality that Europeans, political classes and citizens, have to be aware of and react to, in order to give to the Union a government able to act, represented internationally, and ready to deal with the problem of putting into effect the Constitution for Europe.
Despite its limitations, the EU and its member States can, however, already launch some initiatives. There is to give a sign that opens the way to an institutional strengthening at home and starts a diplomatic action abroad for peace, security and UN strengthening.

The first initiative can be taken by the countries that have adopted the Constitutional Treaty. A meeting should be convened of the EU countries that have ratified it and those who intend to ratify it shortly. There is to decide on the entry into force of the Constitution with the available countries. To that meeting, also France and The Netherlands should be invited. Secondly, those countries shall give birth to an enhanced cooperation between themselves, in addition to sending national French, Italian, Spanish and German troops, and prepare a plan for the reconstruction of Lebanon and Palestine. Thirdly, the two European permanent members and the three rotating members (Belgium, Italy and Slovakia) of the Security Council should commit themselves to promote within the Security Council those positions which are upheld by a qualified majority of the EU member states within the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This is the way leading to the overcoming of the veto in the European foreign and security policy and to the bestowal of a single seat on the EU in the Security Council.

The second initiative is the urgent reconvening of the Rome Conference on the Middle East peace and development, this time with all the protagonists, putting as a priority the Palestinian question; it should envisage the birth of a Palestinian State, Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the reduction of the offensive capabilities of all of the concerned parties, and the control of nuclear capabilities by a joint Authority for Security, composed of “the Quartet” and all the actors in the area. This implies, of course, the functional and territorial extension of the UN mission.

The third initiative, still within the Conference for peace and security, is to propose to Israel, Lebanon and Palestine, and to other willing partners, the institution of joint supra-national authorities for the management of waters, energy and transportation infrastructures, as already contemplated in the Oslo agreements, and also the mutual opening up of their domestic markets.

The fourth initiative is about the negotiations for the adhesion of Turkey and the western Balkan countries to the EU; that would be useful for stabilizing those countries, for giving a further and topical signal about Europe’s capacity to heal long-time confrontations and build a continental multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society, and finally for underlining the will to bring the EU borders to touch the Middle East, as a guarantee for the peace process itself. Finally, may I recall that the basic elements for an intervention in the Middle East have already been made clear in the European Commission’s document “EU position on the Middle East Peace Process”. They are presented also in the Barcelona process, in the institutional dialogue taking place in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, and in the MEDA aid program. Those ideas have to be re-launched with determination. We shall resume a dialogue that started with the UN Resolutions 181 of 1947 and 194 of 1948, went through the Venice European countries Declaration of 1980, the Oslo agreements of 1993 and the Arab League Council Declaration in Beirut in March 2002. There is the need of a strong political will, to send a signal that could make authoritative a European Union’s peace initiative for the Middle East.

*Introductory speech held in Brussels on November 25, 2006 at the meeting of the Political Commission 3 of the Federal Committee of UEF
Since the very start of that great, historic undertaking that was and still is Europe’s construction, the relations between France and Europe have been ambiguous. Two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, were the ones that started the process, but it was France too that, on several occasions, and not only in the time of General de Gaulle, turned down advancements that were possible then and are no longer so or more difficult today.

Most Frenchmen wish a Europe-power that should indeed be a bigger France. As they have no experience of federalism, they wish and at the same time fear a centralized European State. This schizophrenia has led French diplomacy to a contradiction consisting in wishing a strong Europe and refusing it the institutional and budgetary instruments without which it cannot but remain weak.

Being a federalist, I have never ceased to denounce that contradiction, which dates back to the Fourth Republic, but has been made more acute by General de Gaulle. I will show its consequences through a few episodes of a story that started in the middle of last century. I will then deal with the present crisis opened by the referendum of March 29, 2005.

A succession of progress and crises
The European construction, which is by far the most exceptional historical adventure in the history of nations, may be analyzed as a succession of progress and crises in which France has always played a great part. A promoter of progress but also the responsible of the difficulties that Europe always succeeded to overcome. I will consider six episodes of success followed by a crisis.

The first episode (1950–1954) is that stretching from the appeal launched by Schuman on May 9, 1950, to the rejection of the EDC by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954. The proposal, inspired by Jean Monnet, to put the steel and coal industries under a supranational High Authority, marked the starting point of the French-German reconciliation and of the European community, after the deception of the Congress of The Hague in 1948. Adenauer, who was expecting this act of reconciliation, and the Belgian Spaak, disappointed by the impotence of the Council of Europe, whose Assembly he was presiding over, joined it immediately.

When the defence of Europe led the United States to claim the participation of German soldiers, Prime-Minister René Plevé, him too inspired by Monnet, thought that the solution could be found in the creation of an integrated European army (the European Defence Community). Adenauer was seeing in it a guarantee against the risk of a revival of German militarism. But in France a coalition of the extremes was formed, from the Communists to the Gaullists, splitting the Socialists and the Radicals. The EDC treaty was rejected without debate on August 30, 1954. President Pierre Mendès-France did not support its ratification. Thus, France rejected a project it had taken the initiative for. The consequence will be the opposite of what the EDC opponents wanted. Germany’s rearmament will take place in the framework of NATO.
more: from the restart of Messina to the crisis of the empty chair and to the Luxembourg compromise (1955-1966). Jean Monnet, after the setback of the EDC, created a Committee for the United States of Europe, a term recently taken up again by Belgium’s Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt. Gathered in June 1955 at Messina (Italy), the ministers of the Six decided to relaunch Europe on the less-emotional fields of the economy and nuclear energy. After hard negotiations whose success is greatly owed to Spaak, two treaties were signed in Rome fifty years ago, on March 27, 1957: the Common Market and Euratom.

De Gaulle fought those agreements with less virulence. Coming back to power six months after their entry into force, he decided to enforce them. The experts he consulted convinced him of the usefulness of the Common Market for the modernization of industry and agriculture. But he remained opposed to the supranational principle of making decisions by majority vote, and suspicious of the “Anglo-Saxons”.

Great Britain, having tried in vain to absorb the Common Market into a great free-exchange area, begins negotiations since 1961, in view of its adhesion. De Gaulle considered the United Kingdom as the Trojan horse of the United States. The signing of the Nassau agreements at the end of 1962, by which Kennedy committed himself to deliver him some Polaris missiles, increased the General’s suspicion and drove him to break the UK adhesion negotiations in January 1963. More than his position, it was the brutal manner of the breaking that was criticized. A few months before, a project of political union supported by de Gaulle and Adenauer had failed in the face of the opposition of the Dutch Luns and of Spaak. The two of them were accepting a federal union without Great Britain, but, fearing a Franco-German directoire, were considering the British presence in a Europe of the States as necessary. Such a refusal of a British-style Europe without Great Britain was disguising a deep-seated disagreement over the relations with the USA, that will show up a little later with France’s withdrawal from the NATO’s joint command and its leaving from American bases.

The early success of the Common Market, his triumphant visit to Germany in 1962, the signing of a friendship treaty between France and Germany in January 1963, a few days after the breaking of the negotiations with the UK, leave untouched the General’s hostility towards the supranational ideology that inspires the Commission presided over by Walter Hallstein. The latter was trying to obtain an extension of the Commission’s and European Parliament’s powers, in return for the financial rules of EU agriculture, an essential element of the Common Agricultural Policy that France was keen on. de Gaulle’s answer was the suspension of France’s participation in the Council of Ministers on June 30, 1965, (the “empty chair”), and the announcement in September of his refusal of decisions taken by a qualified majority. The compromise reached in Luxembourg on January 1966 will put an end to the crisis, but will leave durable after-effects: a paralyzing search for unanimity.

Pompidou succeeded de Gaulle in the spring of 1969. He removed the veto to the UK’s adhesion. The UK, Denmark and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973. The ensuing détente will be followed by a new crisis due to the Kippur War (September 1973) and to the oil blockade by the Arabs that was the consequence of it. Pompidou, being sick, let his minister Jobert refuse any solidarity in the name of France’s Arab policy. He tried to oppose the creation of an Agency for energy promoted by Kissinger with the agreement of the other Europeans.

This third episode (1969-1974) ends with the election of Giscard d’Estaing and the agreements of the end of 1974. Giscard obtained the creation of the European Council, institutionalizing the summits in line with the Fouchet Plan. In return, he accepted the election by universal suffrage of the European Parliament, which was
a concession to federalism. But the situation in which the first election took place in the Spring of 1979 is another demonstration of French contradictions. Under the pressure of the Gaullist party led by Jacques Chirac, the government stressed not so much the importance of the election, as the limits of the Parliament’s powers.

The fourth episode (1981-1989) goes in the opposite direction: from the crisis to a step forward, from Premier Mitterrand’s willingness to break up to the achievements of the Delors’ era. Elected in 1981 with a program to break up, Mitterrand chooses a policy of rigour that allows France to remain in the European monetary system and to prepare for the single currency. This happy period is marked by the settlement of the budget controversy with Mrs. Thatcher’s UK, in Fontainebleau in 1984, the adhesion of Spain and Portugal on January 1, 1986, the doubling of the structural funds, and the Single Act of 1987, which established the date of 1992 for the single market. The Luxembourg compromise stays on, but the method of majority voting is at last admitted.

A fifth episode is the one that starts with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and ends with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992. After having tried to postpone Germany’s reunification, Mitterrand obtains by Kohl the monetary Union, but renounces to get a compensation, that could have consisted in a political, social and fiscal union. Germany, in the euphoria of its freshly-found unity, would have accepted that at the time. A new contradiction which is at the root of the present crisis. At the same time, the historical, heavy ties that linked France and Great Britain to Serbia, and Germany to Croatia stand in the way of a common policy to face Yugoslavia’s break up. The political Europe missed then a chance for asserting itself, just when the United States was encouraging Europe to intervene.

Sixth and last episode (1993-2000): France, due to institutional shyness, let enlargement take a preeminence over deepening. The adhesion of the three “neutral” countries takes place in ambiguity on January 1, 1995. A few months before, France had given no answer to a memorandum by Kohl’s two close aides (Schaüble and Lamers), proposing to set up within the Union a federal “hard core”. In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty did not succeed to reform the institutions. Under the pressure of the Länder, Kohl refused to extend the majority-vote issues that, this time, France was suggesting. On the eve of the great enlargement that will see the adhesion of ten Central European and Mediterranean states, the Nice Summit is another flop.

Thus, France, because of its institutional hesitation, gained a Europe which is an area of exchanges with no real political ambition. The disappointment of the French people will drive it to reject the constitutional treaty, certainly inadequate, but constituting a first step towards a more ambitious Europe.

A crisis of a new type
The worst of French contradictions is the one that led a majority of Frenchmen to refuse to ratify, on May 29, 2005, a constitutional treaty drafted under the direction of a former President of the French Republic, a text full of imperfections, but representing a considerable progress in comparison with the situation left by the Nice Treaty. I will try to analyse as objectively as possible the causes of what I consider as a catastrophe for both France and Europe.

I do not mention here the decisions that led to the referendum, starting from the Laeken Declaration, whose merit is owed to the Belgian Prime Minister. That document, adopted in December 2001, one year after Nice, gave the mandate to a Convention composed not of diplomats, but of politicians, on the model of the one that had drafted the European Charter of fundamental rights, proclaimed in Nice, to make a proposal for a reform of European institutions. The Convention was in session from...
the end of February 2002 to June 2003. The text approved by consensus has been little modified by the Inter-Governmental Conference that followed. The fact that an agreement could be reached on a set of so diverse issues between political forces, then between governments has something of a miracle. It would have been another miracle if the already 25 member-States would have ratified it by unanimity. But nobody was expecting that the rejection would come from two founding States, France and The Netherlands. Let us see the causes of the French rejection, before asking ourselves how to get out of this crisis.

Among the causes of this disaster, I will distinguish between the key ones and the secondary. Let us start from the secondary ones: the length of the text, the difficulty of its understanding by ordinary citizens (that drew upon us the irony of the Spaniards, who, they say, had no difficulty to understand it), its omissions (the keeping of unanimity for taxation, resources, revisions), a badly planned and badly explained enlargement, the opposition to Turkey’s candidature. Contrary to what happened in The Netherlands, it does not seem that the concerns over the losing of sovereignty played a significant role in France.

The main cause, in my opinion, is the presence of a mass protest and even more the feeling, quite widespread in the popular classes, that Europe not only did not provide them any protection, but contributed to accelerate the competition of emerging countries, and to delocalize many factories. The enlargement itself has been felt as a threat, even more so because it did not bring with it any social and fiscal harmonization.

That feeling has made it possible to pull together the discontent of two extreme currents of public opinion traditionally hostile to institutions, if not also to the European construction. Even worse, some federalists, disappointed by the text’s timidity, have added their voice to those of the traditional anti-Europeans. For that matter, Laurent Fabius’ stand was decisive, even though it did not bring him the domestic-policy advantages he was expecting.

Such coalition of the opposites saw in the referendum an occasion for a revolt against the elites in politics, the economy and the media. ATTAC got frantic. The Internet was used much more effectively by the supporters of the NO than by those of the YES. Some false truths were asserted without being belied, in particular the absurd statement that the euro was a factor in price increases, whilst the single currency is our only protection against devaluation, that, in the absence of the euro, the situation of our public finances would have imposed.

Finally, President Chirac, became very unpopular for having taken in no account the quite peculiar conditions of his election, he has always been pro-European by reason, surely not by heart. His performance in a meeting of youngsters ignoring everything about European facts was counterproductive.

How to get out of it?
We are faced with two impossibilities: make the French and Dutch people vote again on the same text, and submit a new text to the eighteen countries that have already ratified the Treaty. To escape such a contradiction, two solutions are proposed, both quite uncertain.

The first consists in adding to the Treaty some provisions allowing to answer the concerns of the Frenchmen, if not of the Dutch people, who have become Euro-sceptical; for example, an effective coordination of economic policies, a more generous care of the victims of delocalization, the acknowledgement of the principle of constant development, the creation of EU fiscal resources of its own, a softening of revision procedures. Some of these ideas that will not get the unanimity could be realized in the framework of the Eurogroup. This is the “Treaty plus” formula, that is favored by our closest partners.
The second is to negotiate a new treaty including some institutional reforms, as well as, in a form to be decided, the Charter of fundamental rights; but it shall be made less cumbersome by eliminating the provisions of Part III concerning the policies already present in existing treaties, and integrating, if possible, the improvements mentioned above. This formula, easier to present in France, is criticized by those who want to keep Part III, at least the new elements it contains.

A debate is under way in France between those who, like Nicolas Sarkozy, do not wish a new referendum, and those who, like Ségolène Royal, seem inclined to take the risk of calling one.

A meeting was held in Madrid, on January 27, on the initiative of Spain and Luxembourg, two countries that have ratified the constitutional treaty by referendum. It gathered the eighteen that have ratified it, which were joined by Ireland and Portugal, that declare themselves “friends of the Constitution”. The twenty have not put forward any proposal. They have declared that they are waiting to know which Europe do the French and the Dutchmen wish. The same question could be posed to the Britons, the Poles, the Czechs, the Danes and the Swedes, who remain in expectation.

I would like to conclude with a consideration on the nature of the European commitment. The European construction is certainly, in the first place, an undertaking of reason. It has been taken up by wise men, who were not able or did not try to mobilize the enthusiasm of the young and the public at large, except, maybe, Paul-Henri Spaak in Belgium. Governments, in particular in France and even more so in Great Britain, were not able to mobilize such an enthusiasm. Recently, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker observed that it is not possible to speak ill of Europe every day of the week and ask the citizens to vote on Sunday for Europe. Well, an historic undertaking of such an importance cannot advance if it does not enjoy an affective, I would dare say passionate, commitment. Its promise of peace through reconciliation, of progress through the market but also through solidarity, the example it offers to a world that is missing hope and governance, deserves and justifies such an affective commitment. It is in this spirit that I wrote last summer a short essay boldly titled “Loving Europe”. It has been published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. May it succeed in convincing those for whom these pages will not be enough.
Churchill and Hertenstein*

Raymond M. Jung d’Arsac

While still a student in July 1946, I was authorised by Europa-Union [Switzerland] to contact similar pressure groups in other countries inviting them to a conference to set up a federalist umbrella organisation to which we could all belong. The event took place at Hertenstein on the banks of Lake Lucerne and I was appointed rapporteur. Our conclusions – the Hertenstein Programme – set out the basic principles for a European Community on federal lines as ‘a necessary and essential contribution to world union’. These principles were publicly announced in Lucerne’s large Congress Hall on the 19th of September 1946 while – by a happy coincidence – Britain’s famous wartime prime minister Winston Churchill, speaking at Zurich University that very same day, called on our continent’s war-torn countries to work together to create what he called a sort of United States of Europe. ‘Let Europe Arise!’ was the key message.

Over our long history many thinkers and political or military leaders from Charlemagne onwards have spoken of our continent’s geographical and cultural unity. Some have tried to achieve political unity by force. But no such attempts succeeded. A Europe built by undemocratic inter-state agreements – that is, on a non-federalist basis – has no chance of survival.

With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire after Word War I the Viennese found themselves living in a world capital ten times larger than was necessary for the administration of a small country such as Austria. It was then that Count Coudenhove-Kalergi thought of restoring the empire in a new form: namely, a confederation extending over the whole of Europe with Vienna as its capital and the Hofburg occupied by a president, replacing the emperor. Coudenhove thus joined the long list of prominent persons aiming to unite Europe from the top down.

His campaign, under the name ‘Pan-European Union’, was the beginning of the modern movement advocating a European Union. By holding meetings, publishing books, but above all by organising congresses and influencing political leaders, Coudenhove won the support of the majority of the contemporary heads of state and government such as Masaryk, Stresemann, Benesch, Mussolini, Briand, Dollfus and others – an élite circle with no democratic base who believed they could reach their goal without taking public opinion into account and without support from the citizens of those states they wished to unite.

Not only did this constitute what was later to be called ‘unionism’ – that is, confederalism as opposed to the creation of an American-style federal state nor following Switzerland which, with 22 sovereign states and four different languages, would seem the ideal embryonic model for Europe. It also anticipated the ‘institutionalist’ principle which postulates the primacy of the economy over politics.

Supporters of the pan-European idea undertook certain initiatives, among others in the League of Nations. The Briand Plan was one example. In the interwar period the French foreign minister Herriot and other statesmen also tried to put Coudenhove’s ideas into practice, but without success. They were joined after World
Comments

War II, and after Churchill’s speech, by Robert Schuman [the Monnet Plan], Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri-Spaak, etc. What they all had in common was that they were addressing the heads of state and government, and at best the national parliaments.

Coudenhove’s initiative did not succeed in the interwar period, nor did it prevent the outbreak of a second World War. Nevertheless, it was in line with this tradition that, in 1946, Churchill re-launched the call for a European Union in his memorable speech at Zurich University. It found support in the European Movement led by his son-in-law Duncan Sandys and was later developed by the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak and taken up by the two Frenchmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, leading in the end to the European structure with which we are today familiar.

In parenthesis it must be said that under pressure from the changed situation after World War II, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s organisation lowered its sights from the dizzy heights of prime ministers and heads of state and turned its attention to the level of parliamentarians.

But the history of the European Union can be viewed from another angle. The participants at the Hertenstein conference of September 1946 were not politicians nor government representatives. They were members of voluntary organisations representing no-one but themselves and their views were rooted in the general thrust of public opinion. For them, the European unification process should begin with the election of a constituent assembly to draw up a European constitution. These ‘constitutionalists’ or ‘federalists’ expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the alternative, inter-governmental approach.

At that time the Swiss branch of Coudenhove’s Pan-Europe Union was led by Hans Bauer, then a young student, and the dramatic split in 1934 between these pioneers of the two different approaches will not be forgotten. Bauer dropped the word ‘Pan’, merged with the Young Europe organisation, and under the name ‘Europa-Union’ launched the Swiss Movement for the foundation of a United States of Europe by democratic means through the ballot box and on the basis of the majority expression of the will of the people. The historical impact of this change of direction, rooted in Switzerland’s long democratic and federalist traditions, should not be under-estimated.

As the centre for all such activity was in French-speaking Switzerland, the task of organising the 1947 Europa-Congress in Montreux also became our responsibility. For this event so many people registered that it became necessary to hold two separate congresses: one aiming for a world federation, and the other for European unification. This last led to the foundation of the Union of European Federalists under the leadership of Hendrick Brugmans.

There followed the May 1948 Congress at The Hague. All organisations promoting European unity were present, including Pan-Europa, the federalist UEF, and the unionist European Movement which dominated the proceedings. In the debates the dramatic and fundamental differences between the two approaches became very clear.

Under pressure from the institutionalist-orientated organisations and from the European Movement led by Churchill’s son-in-law Duncan Sandys the ‘constitutionalists’ began to give way. The fatal idea, by then established in the European Movement, that economic ties would slowly and automatically lead Europe towards political union predominated, while the ‘federalists’—including even committee members of their umbrella organisation, the Union of European Federalists – reacted passively, with disbelief, even naively to this development. The Congress, dominated by Winston Churchill, agreed to establish the Council of Europe and opened the door to ‘institutionalism’.
Both approaches shared the strategic aim of unifying Europe though they were divided on tactics. The politicians’ purpose was to foster a European awareness by establishing institutions such as the Coal and Steel Community, for example, which would lead more or less automatically to political union. Whether this ‘institutional’ or ‘functionalist’ tactic will lead to a clear strategic goal – namely, establishing what form of political structure Europe will adopt – is so far unclear. The evidence indicates that ‘institutionalists’ were and are mostly proponents of a looser European association – a position which led to the Rome treaties of 1957 and ultimately to the present status quo.

The question remains, is it possible – with their two different and often antagonistic visions of Europe – to celebrate the 60th anniversary of both the Churchill speech in Zurich and the Hertenstein conference? After a short hesitation the answer must be Yes! It was hard wrangling over disparate goals which led to the agreement to meet at Hertenstein in order to work out common positions which could form a programme for action.

For what is federalism? It is indisputable that the principle of equality first enunciated by the USA, then in the French Revolution, and accepted by western society is now the sine qua non of every community, whether long established or still in the process of formation. Federalism between nations is the equivalent of equality between human beings. If our aim is to unite peoples and nations through an interstate system, we cannot ignore this principle of equality. Any lack of autonomous freedom, or of equality of opportunity and power could have the consequence of leading to conflict and possibly civil war.

The wheel of history has no reverse gear. But we can learn from history. Our contribution to Europe should be to restate the values set out in the Hertenstein Declaration and to bring into the ongoing process of unification the insights then achieved – namely, that Europe must be federal in structure and be built from the bottom up. “Let Europe Arise!” Yes, but as a federal state with a constitution which is close to the people and drawn up by the European Parliament.

* Edited extracts from the speech delivered at the 60th anniversary celebrations, September, 2006
The Hertenstein Programme, 22 September 1946

1. A European Community on federal lines is a necessary and essential contribution to any world union.

2. In accordance with federalist principles which call for a democratic structure beginning at the base, the community of European peoples must itself settle any differences that may arise among its members.

3. The European Union is to fit into the framework of the UN Organisation as a regional union under Article 52 of the Charter.

4. The members of the European Union shall transfer part of their sovereign rights - economic, political and military - to the Federation which they constitute.

5. The European Union shall be open to all peoples that consider themselves European and conform to its fundamental rules.

6. The European Union shall define the rights and duties of its citizens in a declaration of European civil rights.

7. This declaration shall be based on respect for the individual and his responsibility towards the various communities to which he belongs.

8. The European Union shall be responsible for orderly reconstruction and for economic, social and cultural collaboration; it shall ensure that technical progress is devoted solely to the service of mankind.

9. The European Union is directed against no-one and renounces any form of power politics. It refuses to be an instrument in the service of any foreign power.

10. Within the framework of the European Union, regional unions based on agreements freely arrived at are not only permissible but desirable.

11. Only the European Union can ensure to all its peoples, small and great, their territorial integrity and the preservation of their own character.

12. By showing that it can solve the problems of its destiny in a federalist spirit, Europe will make its contribution to reconstruction and to the creation of a world community of peoples.

The two European federalist organisations least scarred by war were Federal Union and the Swiss Europa Union Schweiz. Each of them, unaware of the other’s plans, arranged an international federalist conference in the autumn of 1946. The Swiss convened a meeting on 15-22 September at Hertenstein near Lucerne, which concluded with a demonstration on the Rütli plateau, commemorating the first Swiss federal oath there 655 years before. Seventy-eight people attended the conference – 41 Swiss, 13 Dutch and small groups from a dozen other countries, including one British participant, and two Belgian members of Union Fédérale, which regarded itself as a branch of Federal Union. Alongside the contribution of the Swiss, the policy of the Dutch federalist movement ‘formed the basis of the Hertenstein Programme’, which was influential in establishing the UEF. It remains to this day the basic statement of aims for the organisation’s powerful German section, Europa Union Deutschland.

On a peaceful spring morning in 2007, a Korean student named Cho Seung-Hui, armed with two guns, killed 33 people in the dorms and classrooms of the University of Virginia Tech, where he was about to get his degree. The majority of the victims were young students, like him, some were professors. One of them was the survivor of Nazi concentration camps. This rampage, the most violent ever in the United States, shattered the conscience of the nation.

It happened while the Country was debating the outcome of the war in Iraq and the fate of its values of freedom and democracy. And it has re-opened a deep wound: how is it possible to reconcile the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which clearly asserts the right for citizens to be armed, with the change in attitude among a great many citizens, in favor of some sort of control over the nearly unlimited dissemination of all kinds of weapons?

The answer has come from Rudolph Giuliani, former mayor of New York, the man who imposed zero tolerance in his city against criminals, who claims to be the only real guarantee that the country will be protected from terrorism and who is running for the 2008 White House election as a Republican. His party has been an old time staunch ally of the National Rifle Association (NRA), which promotes the right to be armed and which asserts the inviolability of the Second Amendment of the Constitution. In May, Giuliani announced, among other things, that he would favor some form of weapons ban (on that occasion he also spoke in favor of the right to an abortion and the right for gay couples to form civil unions) creating a storm within the rank and file of his party. In fact, with his strong and outspoken statements, he was splitting the coalition of the religious right and fiscal conservatives that has dominated the party for the last 25 years, changing the character of the United States of America. If there were more people advocating the right to be armed in recent years, it was partly due to the wave of religiosity that has penetrated the country, searching for the original values of the Republic and in defence of tradition.

Among these is the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which states that a well-regulated militia is “necessary to the security of a free State” and prohibits Congress from infringing on “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. We can guess that the Founding Fathers were legitimately concerned that British forces might try to destabilize the young democratic American experiment. And we can understand the encouragement for keeping a revolutionary force ready to intervene in defence of freedom and independence. But trying to revive the indomitable spirit of the Founding Fathers by allowing all-comers to carry arms in 2007 is a failed proposition. The individual states making up the American federation have a National Guard at their disposal now, armed and dedicated in the first instance to protecting the individual state even from the danger of domestic ganglike mobs. And certainly there is no danger of a British attack in sight. Besides, by now the idea of the militia has warped into an ideology that is anti-federalist and hostile to the central powers which led to another tragic episode, the Oklahoma City bombing. While it
may be legitimate to believe that an American has the constitutional right to possess arms, including weapons like hunting rifles for sporting pleasure, it is harder to understand why there are no limitations on gun licenses. Proposals put forward in Congress have been rejected because of heavy lobbying from the NRA; even the simplest, like requiring people who buy firearms to be registered, having a thirty-day period to see if the buyer has a criminal record or banning the purchase of weapons like sub-machine guns and AK47 rifles more useful for war than for sport.

That is why we cannot ignore the connection between these two key developments in the early months of 2007: the Virginia Tech massacre and the revolutionary position of Rudolph Giuliani, who is courageously alienating established longstanding principles of the Republican party. We know that Giuliani will not promote a total ban on firearms, but establishing a position for some kind of control may end up changing the internal debate. We know that stricter regulations will not necessarily keep a lunatic from getting his or her hands on illegal arms to carry out a massacre. And yet, they may. They certainly help to lessen the number of guns in circulation; and to isolate those people in the United States who, disguised as the majority, insist on turning the 21st century into an epic tale of the Wild West.
Speakers’ Corner

Ted Wheatley

Speakers Corner is on the north-east corner of Hyde Park in London. Every Sunday crowds collect and listen to speakers talking about saving your soul, the Islamic faith, socialism, black power or just personal rants. I speak from the “One World” stand.

Hyde Park and Speakers’ Corner go back a long way. Crowds have collected there on Sundays for over 700 years. It was the place of public executions.

The gallows stood there from 1388. At first men were executed singly, but the volume of malefactors increased so greatly that a vast triangular gallows was erected in 1571 so that up to 21 men could be hanged at a time. This was always done on Sundays or public holidays and attracted thousands of people.

It was the custom for those about to die to make a final speech. We don’t know whether everyone took-up the opportunity. Certainly some apologised for their crimes and others protested their innocence. It did provide an outlet for criticism of the government, while it pointedly reminded everyone of what happened immediately after such criticism. So was Speakers’ Corner born.

The tradition was for the hangman to be allowed to prepare the body for burial and keep the victim’s clothes. This did lead to one strange incident. Three men were due to die together and the cart duly delivered them to the hangman, but suddenly a horseman arrived with a royal pardon. The hangman was peeved at losing three sets of clothes, so he stripped the men completely and kept their clothes. The men had to find their way home naked.

It used to be a pretty rough place. Stalls selling hatpins, orange-sellers and pickpockets all crowded together. “The stench of liquor, bad tobacco, dirty people and provisions conquers the air and we are stifled and suffocated in Hyde Park”, Charles Lamb wrote to Wordsworth.

In 1960 Denis Lovelace and I set up our stand and put the case for world government on behalf of what is now the Association of World Federalists. At first it was every Sunday afternoon, but then it moved into the mornings. When my family moved away from London I could only manage to come on the first Sunday morning of each month. Various other speakers have joined us, but it was a bit of a surprise in 1984 when our 14 year-old son Daniel asked to speak. He was rather good and has been speaking ever since. Our stand is for “One World” and makes the case that we are all world citizens now and need some form of world government created through making the United Nations more democratic and giving it the funds to do the job. We have been going 46 years so far.

In recent years the crowds at Speakers Corner have got smaller, but television cameras are taking the message all over the world. In all those 46 years I estimate that we have been heard live by one million people. One TV crew alone, C-span, a cable channel from America, said that every time they used one film they
made of us at Speakers Corner it was viewed by a million people; one regular viewer was apparently Bill Clinton. We are currently televised about once a year, although it may be either a brief or a more extended appearance. Camera crews come from all over the world, but so far never from Britain.

One of the other side-benefits is that sometimes one meets interesting people and other things develop. A contact at Speakers Corner led to me setting up the stand in the market square of Biberach in southern Germany. One lady in the audience was a headteacher and this led to both Carole and I giving a series of talks at her school. A passing contact with a visiting university professor from Japan led to an invitation to make a lecture tour of Japan, speaking to conferences, clubs and universities; all was paid for by the Japan Foundation, a quasi-government organisation and organised by the Japanese World Federalists.

It is always good to make a case for a World Parliament to be added to the United Nations and no doubt some seeds get planted in some minds. If a television camera takes the message further that is all to the good. But there is another benefit from the ‘One World’ stand that is not immediately obvious. It takes the internationalist pulse of global society.

When Denis Lovelace and I started holding forth in 1960 it was to a white, mainly British audience. The world has now shrunk. Most people today are tourists, and British people come in all colours. The audience is in many ways representative of the whole world. Eighty percent are from overseas. The faces in front of us are black, white, brown and yellow. They do not represent the poor of the world; the poor are denied the money to become tourists. Yet our audience is in many ways a microcosm of our global society.

A little story illustrates this. One day Carole and I were driving to a theatre in London. A taxi drew up alongside and the driver started shouting at me as we cruised up Shaftsbury Avenue. I assumed I had cut him up or that my wheel was falling off. “Armwivya, Armwivya!” he kept shouting at me. “Armwivya!” It seemed some foreign language until we came to the traffic lights. “I’m with you! I’m with you! Heard you at Speakers Corner. Just wanted you to know. I’m with you!”

The ground is becoming more fertile. The time for harvest is getting near.
Mercosur: A Parliament of Dreams?

Fernando A. Iglesias

Sixteen years after the Asunción Treaty which launched the Mercosur, its Parliament has become more than a dream. After its inaugural meeting, the trade association of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay has turned into a political entity endowed with parliamentary institutions. Chancellors and ministers from the four nations attended its first session, which was held in Montevideo (Uruguay) on May 7, 2007. The Parliament is composed of eighteen national parliamentarians from each member-State, but delegates from Venezuela, a nation that has recently started the procedures to become a full member, were also admitted to the assembly, with speaking rights but no voting power.

The Parliament is the first concrete effort to overcome the democratic deficit of the Mercosur, whose name (Mercado del Sur) perfectly denounces the restrictive economic/commercial conception that is predominating since its beginning. Unfortunately, this tendency has deeply marked the attempt: the Parliament has no legislative powers (it is a merely consultative body) nor directly-elected members, and it will be in session only two weeks per year. Although the direct election of permanent representatives has been established starting from 2010, there is not even an open discussion about attributing legislative functions to the Parliament, which is described by its own members as “a useful tool for harmonizing national legislations and regional directives”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EUROPEAN UNION</th>
<th>MERCOSUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>487 million</td>
<td>263 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>27 nations</td>
<td>4 nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>4 million km$^2$</td>
<td>14 million km$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>US$ 14 billion</td>
<td>US$ 2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>US$ 28.300</td>
<td>US$ 7.600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond the rhetoric pretending that through the creation of this Parliament the Mercosur is starting a political process that will lead to a South-American Union, on the model of the European one, the situation is – at least – controversial. Within the Mercosur there is not a Court of Justice accountable to the citizens and able to provide them a protection from the abusive policies put in place by national governments. Even its members-States have declared ineffective the Mercosur juridical system. Indeed, Argentine and Uruguay have asked the International Court of The Hague to intervene in the controversy about a pulp-factory on the East bank of the Uruguay river.

In addition, the dispute on financial and commercial interchanges among members, the
imposition of national quotas to imports from its partners, the claims by Paraguay and Uruguay over the lack of funds for the development of the less-developed members and the attempts by Uruguay to reach a commercial agreement with the United States mark the day-to-day life. This is still the rule in a region where words about the “Patria Grande” (the “Great Homeland”, as the South-American heroes that liberated the region from the Spanish yoke named the political unity of the continent) are usually effective for propaganda, but where a real will for integration is lacking. And this is not the worst.

The presence of the República Bolivariana de Venezuela led by Colonel Chávez adds a new set of unsolved questions to the Mercosur picture. Indeed, the violations of the freedom of speech and of the press by the Chávez’ government and the concentration of legislative powers in the Colonel’s hands (through the “exceptional” but permanent legislation that has been approved by the Venezuelan Parliament) foreshadow new trouble for democracy in the region. In fact, as there is no “democracy clause” in the Mercosur legislation, non-democratically-elected members could sit tomorrow in the Mercosur Parliament, thus giving a democratic cover to an authoritarian regime such as Mr. Chávez’. Not to mention that his recent threats to nationalize SIDOR, the main steel company in Venezuela (which is owned by an Argentine group, Techint), is hardly compatible with any policy of integration.

**More than a dream but less than a reality**

When, some years ago, Prof. Strauss and Prof. Falk wrote their famous article “Towards a World Parliament”, Prof. Nye opposed the argument that that will ever be a “Parliament of dreams”. Now, when the initial success of the campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly starts to demonstrate how a dream can turn into a real fact, it is at least paradoxical that in South-America the dream of a Parliament risks to truly become a Parliament of dreams.

More than a dream but less than reality, only the future will tell whether South-American leaders are for a regional democracy. In any case, the repeated failures of the commercial negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union, which are caused by the EU’s refusal to repeal subsidies to its agriculture, and the absence of a common European policy towards Latin-America do not – for sure – help.
A Joint European Union-Africa Strategy*

Jean-Paul Pougala

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 2 February 2007 – EU Commissioner Louis Michel and the Chairman of the Commission of the African Union Alpha Oumar Konaré launched a public consultation process on a joint EU-Africa Strategy, which shall develop a political vision and practical elements for the future partnership between the EU and Africa.

For the first time ever the European Union and the African Union will develop a joint strategy for the future of their partnership. This strategy should be adopted by the EU/Africa Summit to be held in Lisbon in the second half of 2007.

In 2005, the EU presented its own Africa Strategy, putting Africa at the heart of its political agenda. With the new EU-Africa strategy which will be agreed jointly between the European Union and the African Union, a decisive step will be made to further develop the existing political and strategic partnership between the two continents, a partnership based on common interests and mutual respect.

In order to define the main challenges, objectives and priorities of the EU-Africa Strategy, a wide consultation process of stakeholders in Europe and Africa has been launched by Commissioner Michel and Alpha Omar Konaré, Chairman of the Commission of the African Union. At this occasion Commissioner Michel said: “I would like to invite today members of the civil society, trade unions, entrepreneurs and all African and European citizens concerned with and committed to the future of our continents to make your voices heard and provide your valuable inputs to this important process.”

The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Konaré, said, “I request all Africans, whatever their social status, in Africa and in the Diaspora to participate in this consultation designed to collect opinions about the future of Euro-African relations, addressing challenges or suggesting solutions to issues that may shape the EU’s and Africa’s common future. In a two stage process, the consultation will feed first into a draft discussed at the EU-Africa “Ministerial troika” meeting in Brussels on 15 May and secondly into the final EU-Africa strategy which should be adopted towards the end of the year at the EU/Africa Summit. The consultation is carried out via a special website, http://europafrica.org.

* This article was first published on United States of Africa News, N. 4, Winter 2006-7
Richard Hudson: Love, Law, and Peace

René Wadlow

Richard (Dick) Hudson, director of the Center for War/Peace Studies in New York City, long-time editor of the NGO newspaper Disarmament Times, and active world federalist since 1949, died in New York in June 2006.

Hudson was primarily a journalist and editor having started his journalistic life in southern California before moving to Venezuela to edit an English-language newspaper there. In 1961, he went to New York City to start an independent peace journal War/Peace Report, hoping to analyse the evolution of the United Nations into an ever-stronger world organization. The early issues concerned disarmament, UN peace-keeping forces, and the entry into the UN of newly independent countries. In 1962, he came to Geneva to cover the disarmament negotiations of the UN, then called ENDC – the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. Each time that the UN has failed to make progress in the arms control field, it has enlarged the number of States involved. This allowed the UN to drop the END label, which was too related to dark humor as the Conference was the end of any serious negotiations on “general and complete disarmament” which was a theoretical aim but had become an empty slogan by 1962.

Hudson was one of the few world federalists who analysed UN activity closely from New York, looking for signs of growth and cooperation. Donald Keys, the World Federalist representative to the UN in New York, also wrote important analysis later collected in two books The United Nations and Planetary Consciousness (1977) and Earth at Omega: Passage to Planetization (1982), but most of Don Keys’ reports circulated only among world federalist members. Hudson’s War/Peace Report was read in the wider peace movement and was considered “the world federalist voice” on world affairs, although it was an independent publication.

However, just as War/Peace Report was getting established, from 1964 until 1975, the USA, the peace movement and its publications were consumed by the US war in Vietnam. The UN was able to play no role in bringing the war to an end or even to be a forum for negotiations. The only break in a Vietnam focus for War/Peace Report came in 1967 with the conflict in the Middle East, and Dick Hudson worked increasingly on Middle East issues. The Report became a possibility for voices seeking Middle East peace to be heard, but such voices were few. Discussion of the Middle East has always been the fastest way to loose friends.

The only positive, good news for those reporting on increased cooperation through the UN also came in 1967 with the call by Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo for the creation of the “Common Heritage of Mankind” in the oceans beyond the national jurisdiction. As the Law of the Sea Conference – “the longest running show on Broadway” – alternated, one year in New York, one in Geneva, I would see Dick Hudson on his reporting trips to Geneva, and we would compare notes. As the Law of the Sea
Conference drew to a close in 1982, Pardo remarked “All that is left of the Common Heritage of Mankind is a little seaweed and a few fish.”

Publishing peace journals, as I know from *Transnational Perspectives*, is not the fastest road to wealth. *War/Peace Report* ceased as a magazine and was replaced by a four-page newsletter, *Global Report*. Dick Hudson’s journalistic skills went into editing *Disarmament Times*, a publication of NGOs in consultative status with the UN in New York. During the 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, *Disarmament Times* was edited from Geneva as a twice-weekly paper to which the federalist author James Avery Joyce and I contributed articles.

Much of Dick Hudson’s later efforts centered on advocating a weighted voting system for the UN General Assembly. As he wrote “We are all living on this one small planet, and in the UN General Assembly we have the only semblance of a comprehensive, rational, humane global decision-making body.” Hudson’s “The Binding Triad” would be a weighted voting based on three factors: 1) one-nation-one-vote, 2) population, 3) contributions to the regular UN budget. Resolutions adopted with majorities on all three of these “legs” would become binding and enforceable.

Personally, I have never seen the possibility of a formal weighted voting system being applied in the UN, but there have been many weighted voting plans presented, well analysed by Hanna Newcombe in her *Design for A Better World*. Dick Hudson would sign his letters “Love, Law, and Peace” – his personal “binding triad” of values.
In December 1950 Altiero Spinelli was invited to speak at the second Congress of Europa-Union Deutschland which was held that year in Cologne. After his talk the chairman announced he did not intend to allow questions as it would be a pity to spoil such an inspiring message. But, according to Spinelli, one fair-haired, rather tubby young man got up to protest. Waving his arms, he proclaimed that this might be the old way of doing things, but the young who had grown up under dictatorship now demanded the right to debate. It was Claus Schöndube, and he and Spinelli became firm friends.

Claus was seventeen when the Hitler war ended in 1945 and he had not yet finished grammar school. It was two years later – in 1947 – that he took his end exam, the Abitur. He then worked for six months as a scientific assistant in a biophysical institute before beginning full-time studies in natural science and politics. In those days Germany still lay in ruins. Its economy was in a disastrous state. The Reichsmark was worthless and the country was under occupation, with British, French and American controlling the west, and the Russians the east. Yet in some circles the future of Europe, and Germany’s role in it, were already being publicly debated.

Most politicians could not see farther than the reconstruction of their own nation states, but some were more long-sighted and it was to their ideas that the young Claus was drawn: namely, that the only possible future for the peoples of Europe lay not in fighting each other but in working together for their common good.

Already in 1946, aged eighteen, Claus joined the Europa-Union movement in Germany and thus took the first steps towards becoming one of the great pioneers of European federalism. He became involved in establishing its youth branch, the Federation of European Youth. This eventually became the Young European Federalists which we know today under the French acronym, the JEF.

His theme was always to spread – through dialogue – the idea of a united, democratic and federalist Europe. So when, for the first time since the war, ten thousand young people came travelling from all over the continent to take part in a mass meeting on the Loreley, Claus was there playing a leading part.

It was his idea in 1950 to promote the establishment of a regular centre where Europe’s youth could study the concept of European integration, to debate the issues involved and in the process gain experience of democratic decision-making. To achieve this centre he had to work hard to gather both support and the necessary money, but despite the difficulties he was successful. The result was the foundation of the first Europa-Haus in Marienberg.

But that is not the whole story. He was also promoting debate through student journalism, writing numerous articles on European themes, and helping to found and edit a youth newspaper Junges Europa.

His parents would have liked him to become a doctor and I often wonder what they thought of his political activities. No doubt they often shook their heads over what they must have felt was a waste of his natural talents, but Claus was a man with a mission – namely, to bring about the integration of Europe within a democratic and federal structure. This took primacy over all other considerations.
This idealist’s goal became for him the launch pad for a brilliant career as a journalist and commentator critically examining each stage of Europe’s path to unification, supporting the genuine advances while, from the federalist position, pointing out the shortcomings.

For many years he reported on the proceedings of both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In this he was helped by his first wife Romi who was bi-lingual in French and German, having been born and brought up in the previously disputed territory of Alsace. Her sudden death in 1988 was a shattering experience for him. But he married again two years later. This time his bride, Carin, was a friend from his student days who had worked with him in Young European Federalists.

He edited journals ranging from Der Federalist in the 1950s to the weekly paper Das Parlament for which he worked from 1970 to 1987. He was chief editor of the Marienberger Hefte and Vaterland Europa. In addition Claus was a member of the editorial team producing the Europäische Zeitung published for Europa-Union Deutschland.

He wrote numerous books, several of them providing analytical accounts of each of the European treaties as they were negotiated and agreed. Others of a more general nature, also covering European questions, bore titles such as The Road to a United Europe, A Europe Pocket Book, and Trostbächlein für Europäer which is best translated as A Little Book of Consolation for Europeans – obviously a comment on the way Governments were dragging their feet over further European integration.

It is impossible to mention all the many books and thousands of articles Claus published at every stage of the European unification process, all aimed at spreading ideas, stimulating dialogue and thus educating the public. Some were specifically for pupils still at school and he also broadcast on schools radio in Germany and Austria.

Yet despite this work load he continued his activities in the grassroots organisations Europa-Union Deutschland and the Union of European Federalists, serving for many years on their top committees. From 1957-1997 he was a member of the UEF’s executive bureau, for many of those years as Vice-President, and in 1997 the UEF bestowed on him the Altiero Spinelli pro merito gold medal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.

He also received many other honours including: the German Federal Republic’s Order of Merit [Bundesverdienstkreuz mit Band]; the Europa-Union medal; and the right to use the title ‘Professor’ which he received from the President of Austria in acknowledgement of the very considerable amount of work he had done to promote Europe in that country; as well as several other honours for his journalism.

But as he grew older his health began to suffer. After several operations one of his legs had to be amputated and he spent his final years confined to a wheelchair. For a man as active as he had been, that must have been hard to endure.

We remember him at his best, as ready to listen to the opinions of other as he was to give his own views. A convinced European able to speak inspiringly not only in countries already in the EU but also at the UEF seminars in Central and Eastern European countries which at that time had not yet joined.

So often when speaking of the EU’s history we hear the names of the great politicians and heads of government, but it was men such as Claus Schöndube who helped prepare the public and in fact often educated the politicians.

All of us in the UEF gained from Claus Schöndube’s enthusiasm, his force of character, and his ability to get new projects off the ground. For us it was a privilege to have known him and to have been able to work with him towards the achievement of our common federalist goal.
How World Federalism will Likely Come into Existence

James T. Ranney

Most world federalists over the years have repeatedly split into two warring camps: (1) those who believe (with Emery Reeves) that “[t]here is no ‘first step’ to world federalism,” that “[w]orld government is the first step.” and (2) those who believe that there are short-term goals and functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches (including UN reform) which are worth pursuing on the way to world federalism. If one wanted to attach unfairly one-sided labels to the two groups, one could say that there are “World Federalist Fundamentalists” and “Thoughtful World Federalists.” It should be obvious on which side the author’s sentiments lie. I have in fact taken to describing myself, at times, as a “thoughtful world federalist.” And I would indeed submit that if one engages in a bit of “thought” about precisely how world federalism might someday come about, one realizes that it will almost certainly not be some kind of millennial moment of instantaneous creation of a global government (à la US Constitution), but will instead come about, if at all, more gradually.

If one takes a calm look at (a) the world as it is; and (b) how social change occurs, one almost inevitably reaches the above conclusion. The chances of world federalism occurring at one stroke seem to be pretty close to zero. For those of us who have long thrilled to the messages in the classic world federalist tracts, that is the bad news.

The good news is that if one takes a long view of where we are already heading, and merely projects that a decade or so (or even less time) into the future, one can envision a gradually accreting global constitution, piece by piece, brick by brick, international agreement by international agreement. What I am saying is this: imagine, if you will, a future in which the United States returns to its “glory years,” when we created the Marshall Plan (rebuilding our former enemies) and started the United Nations (as defective as it is), and, in short, began to act with some little semblance of maturity on the international stage. And what if, then, we finally adopted the ICC (International Criminal Court) Treaty, and the Law of the Sea Treaty, and all the other treaties which only the United States and a few other renegade (if not rogue) nations have refused to sign? What if, finally, we agreed to create, as representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union at one time (1961) agreed to create, what could be called a new International Disarmament and Peacekeeping Agency? Now it is true that in order to create any such agency we would need at a minimum to reform dramatically the United Nations (or bypass it altogether), such that the P-5 (Permanent Five nations) would no longer have their veto power in the Security Council. And it is also no doubt true that eventually (or sooner) we would want to address not only needed institutional reforms (such as the “democracy deficit” in international institutions) but also a whole host of global problems currently being neglected (including the usual list, global warming, poverty, etc.), via a variety of possible reforms to existing institutions or, again, via a completely new superstructure, or, more likely, via structures modeled after those created by the Law of the Sea.
This, I would submit, is how viable worthwhile changes are likely to occur. And if I am right about this, then we might actually end up almost sliding unthinkingly into what could be considered a world federalist structure, or at least something roughly analogous to Great Britain’s unwritten constitution (a trend toward “global constitutionalism” that some scholars already detect), even though it would consist in part of numerous subsets of writings. But its entirety would consist of not only such written treaties, but also a host of global institutions, working practices, and norms.

As difficult as it is to predict the future (it is axiomatic that only fools try doing so), if one has to make a calm probabilistic assessment of how world federalism might come into existence, then I believe this is how it will happen.

But if I am wrong in this guesstimate, will I be upset and get my nose out of joint because the “World Federalist Fundamentalists” are right after all? Of course not. As stated by my favorite author on world federalism, Professor Christopher Hamer:

“The direction we want to go is clear. Increased international cooperation, leading to an eventual world federation, will bring peace and prosperity for all. In time it will allow the abolition of nuclear weapons, and even the eradication of war itself. It will allow a joint attack on the problems of environmental degradation, over-population, disease and poverty. It will establish new standards of human rights and democracy worldwide, and it will open a great new era of progress and harmony in human affairs, as energies are released from the unprofitable business of preparing for war.

The principles of association are also fairly clear. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law would be taken for granted as founding principles. Important principles established by the European experiment include subsidiarity, to preserve national autonomy wherever possible, and solidarity, to promote economic and social cohesion within the community. The ideas of participation, flexibility and equity have also been discussed.

The route by which we shall achieve these goals is much less clear, but the important thing to recognize is that everyone is pulling in the same direction. World federalists, UN reformers, functionalists, neofunctionalists, regionalists or Atlantic Unionists, all are working towards increased international collaboration and integration as the answer to the world’s problems. We can see the new Jerusalem shining on the hill, and though it may take decades or even centuries to arrive there, the struggle will be well worthwhile in the end.”

Moreover, even though there is inevitably a need for peace activists and world federalists to choose which goal or goals they will pursue, it may not be all that abrupt or severe a choice. We may find that what is an action priority will change over time, or that we may want to pursue short-term goals and long-term goals more or less simultaneously, and what we are best able to do depends upon what suits us individually. And collectively we may find, all of us – peaceniks and punk-rockers, military leaders and Mayors for Peace, Softballers for Social Responsibility [a group I “formed” instantaneously when asked for the name of an informal group wanting to reserve a baseball field] and scientists, Abolition-Now-ers and aborigines, and just all kinds of ordinary people – that each of us has a role to play in this great mystery we call life.

Many years ago, I sat next to a ponytailed peacenik at a mid-winter peace conference held up in the mountains of Montana at a temporarily abandoned resort, and he said something that I have always remembered: he said his group believed in what they called “total tactics,” by which they meant that you
(both collectively and individually) push on this front and that front, changing tactics as circumstances change, and just keep plugging away until somehow or other we all come out right. Something very like this was said at the conclusion of another of my favorite books on the peace issue, by Professor Larry Wittner:

“Working together, citizens’ movements (on the grassroots level) and a strengthened United Nations (on the global level) could rein in war-making states until, like New Jersey and New York, these semi-sovereign jurisdictions would never think of resolving their disputes through war, much less nuclear war.

Adopting a long-term strategy of taming the war-making nation-state through the creation of an international security system does not eliminate the need for pursuing a short-term strategy of fostering nuclear arms control and disarmament. Indeed, the two are complementary. Without a program that goes “deeper” than the weapons – one that addresses their underlying basis in the nation-state system – we seem likely to be left, at best, with the present kind of unsatisfactory, unstable compromises between arms races and disarmament. Conversely, without an arms control and disarmament strategy, we are likely to be obliterated in a nuclear holocaust long before our arrival in that new world of international peace and security. But by pursuing both strategies simultaneously, we have the possibility of turning back the threat of nuclear annihilation and, along the way, transcending the disgraceful international violence that has accompanied so much of the human experience.

We live at a potential turning point in human history, for the latest advances in the “art” of war – nuclear weapons – have forced upon us a momentous choice. If nations continue to follow the traditional “national security” paradigm, then – sooner or later – their leaders will resort to nuclear war, thus unleashing unspeakable horror upon the world. Conversely, this unprecedented danger could be overcome through arms control, disarmament, and transformation of the nation-state system. Are the people of the world capable of altering their traditional institutions of governance to meet this challenge? … If one looked solely at their long record of war, plunder, and other human folly, one might conclude that they are not. But an examination of the history of the nuclear disarmament movement inspires a greater respect for human potential. Indeed, defying the national barriers and the murderous traditions of the past, millions of people have joined hands to build a safer, saner world. Perhaps, after all, they will reach it.”

The way forward is clear: we will need (1) a new global consciousness, which will lead to (2) a new global consensus, (3) a new global democracy, and, eventually, (4) a new global constitution. The coming Peace Revolution will obviously require fundamental social and political change. Social and political change will require attitudinal change. Attitudinal change will require education: education of ourselves and others. It is that simple, and also that difficult. Although the hurdles we face are immense, similar obstacles have been overcome in the past. We’re on the way.
Responsibility to Protect: Engaging Civil Society

Nicole Deller

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international security and human rights doctrine which aims to address the international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P, which was endorsed by world leaders in 2005, includes several important principles:

• states have a primary responsibility to protect their populations. This is a recognition that sovereignty includes not just rights, but responsibilities;
• when governments are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community has a responsibility to take action;
• the international community’s responsibility falls within a continuum of measures including prevention of violence and reaction, if necessary. R2P emphasizes peaceful measures including mediation and the protection of populations through humanitarian, human rights and diplomatic missions.

Since 2002, The World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy has been working to promote the responsibility to protect as a tool to hold governments and the international community accountable to halt and avert large scale threats of violence against populations. Through the Responsibility to Protect-Engaging Civil Society (R2PCS) project, we are increasing awareness, fostering the debate, and facilitating the development of networks of organizations that seek the promotion of the R2P principles.

Background on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

The term “responsibility to protect” was first presented in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS had been formed in response to a challenge by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to resolve when the principle of sovereignty must yield to intervention by the international community in the case of mass atrocities.

The R2P doctrine as set out in the ICISS report was introduced only months after 9/11, and this timing was devastating to its initial reception. After September 11, the international debate shifted away from consideration of measures to prevent another Rwanda or Srebrenica and toward measures for prevention and preemption of terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The invasion of Iraq, premised in part on an argument of human protection, was even more destructive to the R2P agenda. The invasion increased concern that R2P would be used to further erode the sovereignty of smaller developing countries. Efforts to codify the doctrine at the UN in this time stalled, as many governments objected that it was merely a re-packaging of the disfavored concept of humanitarian intervention.

Civil society organizations, particularly those dedicated to human rights and the protection of civilians also began consideration of R2P principles soon after the release of the 2001 ICISS report. WFM-IGP conducted consultations on the ICISS report with major human rights, humanitarian and faith-based groups to determine whether these principles could be of use to civil society and whether they should be the subject of advocacy campaigns. Our consultations reflected widespread support among NGOs for the expansion of the notion...
of sovereignty and a framework for improving international responses to genocide and other mass atrocities. However, the NGOs consulted showed little interest in the advocacy of a doctrine geared principally at justifying military interventions.

Although support for R2P was limited in the initial period after the release of the ICISS report, ongoing humanitarian disasters, including the ongoing international failure to protect the people of Darfur, signalled that more needed to be done by the international community to respond to genocide and other massive threats against populations. In this context, the Secretary-General and other human rights supporters began raising the responsibility to protect as a doctrine that could advance this issue.

Responsibility to Protect: Adoption by the United Nations

Most significantly, the Secretary-General raised the responsibility to protect in the context of the agenda on UN reform. R2P was raised as one of several peace, security, development and human rights issues that made up a package of proposed reforms to be adopted at the September 2005 world summit that coincided with the 60th anniversary of the United Nations. During the UN reform debates, governments remained reluctant to accept a new doctrine that they viewed was primarily about codifying powerful states’ ability to use force. In recommending that states adopt the responsibility to protect, the Secretary-General made clear that the issue was not merely about the use of force but a normative and moral undertaking that the state must protect its own civilians, and that if it fails to do so, the international community must apply a range of peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian measures, with force considered only as a last resort.

Throughout the negotiation process, an increasing number of developing states accepted that such a responsibility should exist and that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference should not result in UN members acting as bystanders to some of the world’s worst atrocities. Many governments and NGOs rallied around the idea that the UN should affirm the principle, as one government expressed, that “I am my brother’s keeper” and included a spectrum of activities for the protection of populations, emphasizing prevention and peaceful measures, with use of force as a last resort.

As a result, the General Assembly committed to a responsibility to protect in the Summit Outcome Document. Member states agreed to the following:

- That the responsibility to protect entails prevention, including incitement to these crimes.
- That the international community should encourage states to exercise this responsibility, including by supporting the creation at the UN of an early warning capability.
- That the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
- And that if national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community is prepared to take collective action through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII (meaning enforcement measures).

The outcome was welcomed as giving the international community a new tool to hold governments to account for the treatment of their populations, and also to ensure that the international community responds in an earlier and more effective way. The language endorsed by world leaders, however, leaves out some important elements proposed by the ICISS report, the Secretary-General and many NGOs.

One of the primary questions first asked by the ICISS report was what the international community should do if the Security Council fails to act. This issue was removed entirely from the debate at the UN. Rather than consider alternative methods to protect populations, the Outcome Document focused on strengthening measures to be taken by the Council and other UN actors.
Another important issue that was raised in the ICISS report but was not included in the Summit Outcome document was a recommendation that the permanent members of the Security Council agree to refrain from using a veto in circumstances of genocide or other mass atrocities. An early draft of the Summit Outcome included this provision, but it was opposed by several permanent members and other states and was removed from the final version. Finally, the language of the text does not commit the Security Council to a “responsibility” to take action, but leaves the Council to make the determination on a case-by-case basis. This was considered by some observers to leave too much discretion to the Council.

The supporters of R2P recognize that the Summit Outcome Document language is weaker than the recommendations of the ICISS report, however the outcome document does establish a framework that can be strengthened to develop stronger political weight and greater capacities in response to the worst abuses of populations.

Steps forward on R2P
Moving forward on the responsibility to protect at the UN has taken some time, as many governments remain skeptical about the concept. Some have returned to their capital to consider strategies on how they might implement R2P into their domestic policies. Others are still seeking to balance their existing views of sovereignty with this new doctrine.

Since the World Summit in 2005, the Security Council has made several references to R2P in its resolutions and discussions. On 28 April 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Resolution 1674 contains the first official Security Council reference to the responsibility to protect: it “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

On 31 August 2006 the Security Council passed a resolution which referred to and reaffirmed the responsibility to protect. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Sudan, in direct response to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Despite the language in this resolution, the standards set by the Summit Outcome Document commitment on R2P are not being met in Darfur.

For the responsibility to protect doctrine to be effective in responding to emerging crises, mechanisms and guidelines must be put in place at the United Nations to ensure that information about crisis situations are given attention at the highest political levels, to instruct the international community as to when R2P should apply, and what measures should be adopted. The Security Council and the Human Rights Council are two of the UN bodies that must consider how they will put R2P into practice. It is of the utmost importance that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon use his influence and leadership to see that the R2P principle is incorporated into the work of the United Nations Secretariat. The Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance are among the departments that must coordinate the gathering and transmitting of information, and must sound the alarm to activate Member States to take action.

Changes will require much broader understanding and support of R2P. WFM-IGP and a core group of NGOs are now making important strides in raising awareness among governments, civil society and the public so that the R2P norm receives global support. We are also promoting dialogue among key governments and UN actors. Our goals are to ensure political commitment by Member States to adopt resolutions containing R2P language, assist states in their capacity to fulfill their responsibility, and, in instances where states have failed, apply a range of measures to protect populations in need.
The 24th Congress of the World Federalist Movement, held in London in 2002, passed the resolution *A New Bretton Woods for a new International Economic Order*, proposed by Guido Montani. For the first time since the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, a new currency, the euro, was challenging the dollar in its role of international currency. Monetary unification had become a concrete goal to be pursued by regional organizations in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The Bretton Woods institutions, the market and the national states were proving unable to cope with the global financial problems and to assure a sustainable and equitable world development. In such a context, the WFM committed itself to support the creation of regional forums with the task of working out proposals for the creation of a world economic and monetary union, provided with limited, but real, taxation powers, which could stabilize international economy and further a sustainable development and a just international economic order.

Alfonso Iozzo and myself put forward, with the aim of putting that resolution in practice, a proposal published in this review on June of last year. I summarize its main points: the current, fundamental malfunctions of the financial system are not sustainable; the redistribution of weights in the world economy makes it unthinkable to replace one national currency with another (as happened in the passage from the pound to the dollar) in the role of international currency; globalization of the economy requires a multilateral and cooperative system of economic governance, founded on a world unit of account (an embryo of a single currency) linked to a basket of currencies where each currency is to be weighed according to the significant economic and human-development-related parameters of the area using it; the dollar reserves should be convertible into world units of account, upon payment of an exchange fee to be assigned to the UN; the International Monetary Fund, once so reformed as to give democratic representation to all regional areas of the world and to ensure that decisions are taken by a qualified majority, should carry out the functions of a UN (it too to be made more democratic) Council of Economic Ministers; the Bank of International Settlements should carry out the peculiar functions of a world monetary system; the World Bank should become the UN Agency for human development and environmental sustainability; new institutions should see to the evaluation of global risks and to overseeing the financial institutions and markets at the global level.

On the eve of the 25th Congress of the WFM, it may be useful to briefly consider some recent facts and new ideas that make it even more necessary and topical today to convene an international conference for the reform of the world financial system. Among the facts, a special importance have the continuous worsening of the dollar’s position abroad; the signs, on the part of important countries and areas, of unilateral strategies aiming to abandon it, and the creation of a special advisory group at the IMF. Among the ideas, Stiglitz’s proposal envisaging a reform of the global economic system and the emission of “global greenbacks” stands out.
The IMF (at the Singapore meeting of September 2006) has instituted a special advisory group on the fundamental malfunctions, with the aim of adopting concerted measures for relieving them. Members of the group are the United States and its main creditors: Saudi Arabia, China, Japan and the euro area. This decision is significant in many aspects.

It officially acknowledges a dangerous situation, kept for some time under severe scrutiny by the circles most interested in the economic policy choices made urgent by the enduring and worsening of those malfunctions. The deficit of the US current-account balance has reached in 2006 the amount of 850 billion dollars, or 6.5% of its GDP; the net foreign indebtedness has thus grown to about one third of GDP, and continues to rise unchecked despite the dollar’s devaluation. Decades of neo-liberist policies, instead of fostering an increase of savings, as forecast by the all-too-celebrated Laffer’s curve, have produced an excess consumption financed by the luring of savings from the rest of the world. The tax cuts to higher incomes and the increase of military expenditure have caused a negative saving for the government, while family savings too have decreased to zero. The continuous expansion of the dollar as international currency, after the declaration of the dollar’s non-convertibility into gold in 1971, was founded, so to speak, on the oil convertibility guaranteed by the US military supremacy in the cold-war context, which was freezing the emergence of other groups of countries and the rise of a multipolar-system configuration. Today, things have changed. The crisis of the US hegemony has created the space for the emergence of new economic powers and the formation of ever more autonomous regional areas. As resources are absorbed by the military industrial establishment, the provision of world public goods, vital for the globalization process to be physically supported and socially accepted, is impeded. The US deficit is no longer spontaneously financed by the markets, but by governments, in particular the Chinese and those of the other countries and areas called upon to be members of the IMF special advisory group.

This highlights another significant aspect of the IMF decision, the political one. The IMF control is shifting, for the first time, from the excessive indebtedness of poor countries to the financial situation of the superpower, and does so by creating an official consultation site among debtors and creditors in the IMF context. Moreover, for the first time the euro area is invited as a unitary participant in the advisory group, despite the continuing division of its national representatives in the Fund’s decision-making bodies. Such novelties can be interpreted on the one hand as the beginning of the end of unilateralism, at least in the economic field, and a signal of a tendency to look for cooperative solutions at regional (in the wake of the euro) and world level. On the other, the significance of such novelties is greatly diminished by the advisory nature of the group and by its composition: the fact that only China, among the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), is part of the group brings to mind the procedures of a preliminary agreement, rather than the spirit of a conference aiming to create a new international economic order. The creditor countries of the group, although they have initiated regional financial-unification processes that in due time could produce effects comparable to those already accomplished in Europe, are at the same time putting in place unilateral and bilateral strategies of the kind “every man for himself”. For example, China, after having unpegged the yuan from the dollar in 2005, has now instituted a Fund for investing and diversifying part of its monetary reserves. A wise decision, considering that US investments abroad (mostly direct investments) yield an average return of 7% and tend to revaluate themselves, while foreign investments in the USA (mostly bonds) yield a meager 2.5% and suffer heavy devaluations. A risky decision, if one recalls Japan’s painful experience: development model
based on exports, dollar accumulation and then dollar devaluation, portfolio diversification through real-estate investments in the USA and then burst of the real-estate bubble, huge investments in Wall Street and then collapse of the stock exchange market, with the result of years of recession from which just now an exit may be glimpsed. Anyway, China’s is a unilateral decision, that will affect the value of the dollar and the other currencies used in the international scene, and in the end will also affect the competitiveness and the real economy of countries that have to bear the burden of global interdependence with no possibility to participate in its governance. From the unilateral decisions to create “baskets of reserve currencies”, unjustified fluctuations of exchange rates are produced, which are not coherent with the goal to make macroeconomic regulations, remained national, correspond to the needs of the economy undergoing a globalization process. Examples are the euro’s appreciation despite its area does not contribute to create the fundamental malfunctions, the pound’s revival despite Great Britain is supporting the US in creating the fundamental malfunctions with a current-account deficit of 4.5% of its GDP, the yen’s depreciation despite Japan’s trade surplus. More in general, the proliferation of unilateral and bilateral initiatives contribute to increase uncertainty and the distrust in multilateral institutions, and to intensify the search for ways of better insuring oneself, as demonstrated by the increasing of currency reserves by all countries, the in-advance reimbursement of debts to the IMF, and the diversification process of reserves, implying the reducing of one’s dollar-denominated holdings. Therefore, it seems ever more urgent to create institutions and instruments that allow: to avoid that the decline of the dollar’s international role produces a financial crisis and an economic recession at the global level; to harmonize national macroeconomic regulations; to favor a proper use of the planet’s resources and their allocation to an equitable and sustainable development; to guarantee an adequate production of those public goods lacking which the world market would greatly suffer. This is what an international monetary conference, a “new Bretton Woods”, should deal with.

There is, as Stiglitz’ reflection points to, to make globalization work. On the one hand, globalization has brought with it a withdrawal of (national) public action in the fields of regulation, redistribution, correction of “market’s failures”, prevention and solution of financial crises. On the other, the crisis of national states and the delay in the creation of supranational institutions (similar to those that were set up to favor the formation of national markets) are by now compromising the globalization process. We are faced with the possibility and the necessity to bring about a U-turn. The attempt to exercise a unilateral governance of the global economy, of which market fundamentalism is the ideological guise, has failed. Market fundamentalists apply their “perfect competition” model as if that would exist in real life, whilst the actual free-exchange is characterized by power and information asymmetries, by cartels, oligopolies and monopolies, by non-rational choices. However, we must avoid that the rejection of unilateralism and fundamentalism brings with it attitudes of refusal of globalization, and nationalist regressions. In order to avoid that globalization fails, it must be governed.

Stiglitz won the Nobel prize for economics precisely for his studies on asymmetries, and at the same time he knows from within the mechanism of governance, having been Clinton’s advisor at the White House and Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist at the World Bank, a post he left in protest against how the Asian crisis was managed. It is no surprise then that it is him to provide the first great systematic contribution to the solution of the problems posed by globalization of the economy. In his work, concrete reforms of trade regulations, the book-keeping and use of
natural resources, environment protection and an equitable sharing of its costs and benefits, the control of multinational companies, the management of debt of poor countries and the guidelines for how to allocate funds are systematically arranged by integrating all of them through a clever use of existing organizations and mechanisms, the play of incentives and disincentives, and the creation of international tribunals. For the purpose of this article, suffice it to highlight Stiglitz’ proposals presented in the last part of his book: “a reform of the global reserve system”\(^4\), and “a democratic globalization”\(^5\).

All countries accumulate reserves in order for them to escape, should monetary difficulties arise, the conditions imposed by the “Washington Consensus” rules. The reserves-to-imports ratio has shot up after the Asian crisis. Such a form of risk protection, Stiglitz observes, is, first of all, too costly: at the end of 2005, world reserves amounted to 4500 billion dollars and were invested at a 1–2% interest rate, whilst the possible return from investments in developing countries could have been as high as 10–15%; secondly, it produces a lower, insufficient global demand; finally, it creates monetary instability, instead of constituting a protection from it. Thus he proposes to replace the present system, based on the dollar (in addition to which the euro is beginning to be used), with “global greenbacks”. Should the US refuse to support the new system, which would make it lose its privilege of getting indebted in the same currency it has the power to issue, the other countries should go on with a concerted diversification of their reserves, so as to make it necessary for the US to get indebted in the global currency instead of dollars. Stiglitz’ plan, to be carried out under the auspices of the UN, contemplates biennial 100 billion dollar-worth emissions of “global greenbacks”; they are to be added to the 100 billion dollar yield of the Carbon Tax, proposed in another part of his book, and to the 300-400 billion dollars coming from a better use and the decrease of global reserves: all these resources should be earmarked for the production of global public goods and for the realization of a better social justice to make globalization sustainable. At the international level, democratic public institutions should be created, as necessary to make globalization work, starting with several reforms of the existing institutions.

In sum, the international monetary system is on the brink of ruin and only decisions taken in Beijing, in China’s national interest, are so far preventing it from falling into it. Keynes suggested in the 1930s and 1940s the necessary corrections for the survival of the national systems of political economy. Similarly, Stiglitz is suggesting today the corrections necessary to make the global economic system sustainable. We have once again a “practical visionary”\(^6\), but there must be a strong political initiative for convening an international conference that avoids more unilateral steps and gives origin to a multilateral governance of globalization. The WFM should take upon itself the task to promote it.

---

4. *Ibid.*, Ch. IX
5. *Ibid.*, Ch. X
6. So is Keynes defined by his biographer Robert Skidelsky
Public opinion worldwide has been deeply shaken by the publication of three influential reports on the health of our planet. Their conclusions, highlighted in the world media, are a matter of concern for the governments of many countries. For example:
- the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report (on the consequences of natural Resources Consumption) asserts that if the current trend of world consumption continues, the demand for natural resources will be double that of the Earth’s extraction and production capacity, and we shall need a second planet by 2050;
- the report of the Stern Commission, presided over by the former senior economist of the World Bank Sir Nicolas Stern, and drafted on behalf of the British Government, claims that if we fail to undertake appropriate measures, the ongoing climate change “may lead to economic and social crises on a scale comparable to the crises generated by the two World Wars or by the Great Depression in the 1930s”;
- and the report issued in several parts by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) involving 2,500 scientists from 160 countries, outlines climate evolution in the past century, forecasts the likely evolution in the present century, and suggests measures to reduce the impact of human activities on climate changes.
This last exhaustive and well-constructed report is particularly impressive, not only for the reliability of its sources but also for its in-depth analysis, its courageous assertions and its attempt to show the world ways to avoid a situation developing which would have a dramatic impact on the survival of the human race.
First, it should be noted that this report claims that global warming is “unequivocal” and that it is “highly probable” that human activities are responsible. This probability, which it assesses at 90% as against 66% in the previous 2001 report, is evidence that climate scientists no longer have appreciable doubts on the subject. To support its statistics and probable outcome, the IPCC has analysed the results of many possible scenarios. Its bleakest scenario, based on the hypothesis of an excessive use of fossil fuels between now and the end of the century, foresees an increase in the average global temperature of up to 6.4°C with a consequent rise in the sea level of up to 59 centimetres.
A less dramatic scenario, based on the hypothesis of a massive introduction of clean energy sources, describes at best an increase of 1.1°C (as against 0.76°C during the 20th century) and a rise in sea level of up to 18 centimetres.
But one important detail should be stressed. Most of these forecasts imply an increase in average temperature of 0.2°C degrees per decade. Even if we assume that the concentration of all greenhouse gases remains at the level of the year 2000, we could still expect an average temperature increase of 0.1°C degrees per decade, in particular because of the slow reaction of the oceans. It should be born in mind that all these examples refer to average increases in the world temperature. In the Arctic Circle, subject to the risk of the polar ice caps melting, temperature rises are estimated at twice as high as the global average.
On the measures suggested to reduce average global warming to within the limits of at least the less dramatic scenarios, the IPCC urges the countries of the world to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as far as possible in order not to exceed the determined concentration thresholds of these
gases in the atmosphere. Detailed measures are recommended and analysed in the last part of the Report. They cover the choice of building materials, energy saving criteria in the building industry, an improvement in energy efficiency in all sectors, the use of renewable sources for energy production, changes in transport systems and in the powering of car engines, etc. Yet these IPCC suggestions are not in any way binding on the world’s sovereign states. They remain merely recommendations, not unlike those in the 2001 report, which were widely disregarded.

In fact, the publication of this Report was actually greeted by criticism and fiercely negative reactions from states such as the USA, China and Saudi Arabia, which clearly intend to continue their current energy-consuming development. In contrast, the EU has, through intergovernmental discussions, been able to move on to agreeing resolutions which are binding on all 27 Member States. For example, on March 8th, 2007, the EU European Council decided to:

- reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, in particular CO2, by 20% of the 1990 level, while at the same time declaring that, should its commitment be shared by the other major international actors, it was willing to aim at a 30% reduction together with a long-term target of 60-80% reduction on the 1990 level by 2050.

By reaching this decision, the EU has on its own undertaken to significantly exceed the prescriptions of the Kyoto Protocol, namely

- to increase the share of electric energy generated by renewable energy sources by at least 20% before 2020, thus officially acknowledging the validity of environment-friendly energy solutions;
- to reduce total energy consumption by 20%, before 2020, while improving energy efficiency and the rational use of energy in the building, industrial and transport sectors;
- to use biofuels in transport at a level not lower than 10% of the petrol and gas oil consumption.

Comparing these decisions with the proposals made long ago by most environmentalist organisations reveals that the European Council has essentially accepted their demands. It has accepted the validity and relevance of choosing energy produced from renewable sources and, implicitly and correctly recognising that nuclear power no longer has a strategic value, has not planned to extend its use.

Such strategic decisions are of fundamental importance. Taken together, they constitute a firm starting point for the implementation of an energy revolution based on renewable sources which could serve as a model for the whole world.

In my opinion, it is now necessary to move on at the international level from discussions, debates and negotiations between sovereign states to the next stage: namely, cooperation through the creation of common (supranational) institutions. It is significant to note that following the presentation of the IPCC Report some forty countries, among them France and Italy, signed an appeal which, while calling for a better environmental governance, identifies the creation of a true UN agency as the essential tool for effective action when confronted with environmental emergencies at a global level.

Now is the time for the World Federalist Movement to propose the establishment within the UN of a World Environment Agency endowed with real powers and its own funds, and for the WFM to support this proposal with appropriate political actions.

A World Environment Agency should be entrusted with the task of substantially changing the growth pattern that currently characterises the world economy. Its funds could be provided by a world tax similar to the carbon tax or the stamp duty on speculative financial transactions between currency areas, and paid by developed countries. I am aware that this environmental emergency tax does not involve any correlation between the taxable basis and the purpose for which the organisation is to be financed. Nevertheless, it is clear that such a tax would be very efficient, producing a high yield at very low unit rates, and it would always originate in international activities. All things considered, I believe this is the most appropriate method of financing, even partially, a world-level governance.
The proposal to establish a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) has gained considerable momentum with the launch of an international campaign in April and May 2007. The preparations go as far back as September 2004. Several hundred political leaders, civil society activists, scholars and other distinguished individuals, among them around 400 MPs from 70 countries, have endorsed the campaign’s core document, a public call for the establishment of a UNPA. The appeal has broad political support across party lines and world regions. Among the endorsers are also over 20 acting and former national government ministers including two former Prime Ministers, six former Foreign Ministers, the President of the Pan-African Parliament, four Nobel laureates, nine recipients of the Alternative Nobel Prize and more than 80 professors. The list of key individuals who have lent their support would be much too long to name them all here. One of the Campaign’s prime backers, however, is the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who also conveyed a statement to the Campaign participants, stressing the importance of a UNPA to promote the democratization of globalization. The campaign, called UNPA 2007 in its initial phase, is a joint international effort of parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations. Its Co-ordinating Committee is composed of the Committee for a Democratic UN, the Secretariat of UBUNTU Forum and the World Campaign for In-depth Reform of International Institutions, the Society for Threatened Peoples International, the World Federalist Movement and 2020* Vision Ltd. In the weeks between 21 April and 12 May 2007 Campaign events were organized in Berlin, Berne, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Dar Es Salaam, London, Madrid, Mumbai, Ottawa, Rome and Vancouver, with more than 30 MPs and various civil society representatives participating as speakers. Various news reports were published in the course of the launch events. Most notably, the well-known columnists George Monbiot and Gwynne Dyer covered the UNPA Campaign in articles which were reprinted in dozens of papers all over the world. UN Wire made the UNPA Campaign launch headline news in one of its issues, referring to a report published by Britain’s Independent newspaper. However, general media interest was rather low. At a meeting assessing the launch, the Campaign Co-ordinating Committee nevertheless considered it a full success. In a second step the Campaign will convene a conference to transform the Campaign’s network into an international Coalition for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. Taking the eventual success of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court as an example, the purpose of such a UNPA-Coalition would be to serve as a platform to exchange information, advance research, and co-ordinate members’ actions and strategies regarding the establishment of a UNPA. Since the campaign is based on the appeal, the latter will serve as a first common policy guideline for a UNPA-Coalition. The aim naturally is to build political support within civil society and among parliaments in order to convince governments to put the creation of a UNPA onto the international agenda. More information is available at www.unpacampaign.org.

1The complete list is available at http://en.unpacampaign.org/appeal/support/
2A selection of the coverage is available at http://en.unpacampaign.org/news/reports/
Humanity faces the task of ensuring the survival and well being of future generations as well as the preservation of the natural foundations of life on Earth. We are convinced that in order to cope with major challenges such as social disparity, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of terrorism or the endangerment of global ecosystems, all human beings must engage in collaborative efforts.

To ensure international cooperation, secure the acceptance and to enhance the legitimacy of the United Nations and strengthen its capacity to act, people must be more effectively and directly included in the activities of the United Nations and its international organizations. They must be allowed to participate more fully in the UN’s activities. We therefore recommend a gradual implementation of democratic participation and representation on the global level.

We conceive the establishment of a consultative Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations as an indispensable step. Without making a change of the UN Charter necessary in the first step, a crucial link between the UN, the organizations of the UN system, the governments, national parliaments and civil society can be achieved through such an assembly.

Such an assembly would not simply be a new institution; as the voice of citizens, the assembly would be the manifestation and vehicle of a changed consciousness and understanding of international politics. The assembly could become a political catalyst for further development of the international system and of international law. It could also substantially contribute to the United Nation’s capacity to realize its primary objectives and to shape globalization positively.

A Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations could initially be composed of national parliamentarians. Step by step, it should be provided with genuine rights of information, participation and control vis-à-vis the UN and the organizations of the UN system. In a later stage, the assembly could be directly elected.

We appeal to the United Nations and the governments of its member states to establish a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations. We call for all organizations, decision-makers and citizens engaged with the international common interest to support this appeal.
The World Social Forum (WSF) was held in Nairobi, Kenya from January 20-25. Tens of thousands of people from all around the world gathered for the 7th edition, six years after the first meeting held in Porto Alegre in February 2001.

Nairobi is the cosmopolitan capital of Kenya with 4 million inhabitants; three quarter of them live in slums covering only 5% of the city area, and have no access to water and other common utilities. This shows the incredible situation the WSF participants found in Nairobi. The gap in people’s access to resources is more or less the same as the gap existing at global level between the developing and richest countries. This is due to an economic globalisation process without any democratic control and political counterbalance.

The Nairobi WSF provided a remarkable opportunity for fragmented and weak African civil societies to speak about their problems and the solutions they propose to manage them. It was very useful for delegates coming from abroad as they could listen to the voice of African people directly, without any filter.

The WSF has changed a lot since its first meeting in 2001. It began as a counter-forum in opposition to the Davos WEF. Alter-globalisation movements focused their attention on protests against neo-liberal globalisation making different proposals on how to build another world.

After six years, the attitude has changed; the WSF process has developed and matured into a new trend that is project-oriented, and tries to increasingly expand the participation of social movements in Asia and Africa. This is the main reason for the Mumbai and Nairobi WSF editions. All the WSF participants and delegations are building networks at global level around critical issues such as war and peace, environmental pollution and sustainability, human rights, global democracy, etc. They are connecting with each other around global coalitions and organising worldwide campaigns.

Another positive change, from a federalist perspective, is that the last WSF editions involved a growing demand to reform the Bretton Woods institutions. This is amazing, if we think that only a few years ago the social movements’ attitude was totally against these bodies (for example in the 2001/02 WSF editions).

During the Nairobi WSF, European and World Federalists were involved in five panels as speakers and in a number of events as contributors. Thanks to our dedicated participation, we succeeded in bringing our federalist agenda to the debates and in creating greater awareness of our Movement and related issues (such as Responsibility to Protect, UN reform, World Parliament, European Constitution, peace building) among the WSF participants.

The Federalist Delegation was represented by Lene Schumacher, WFM-IGP Director of Programs, Faye Leone, WFM-IGP International Secretariat, Élena Montani, Jeunes Européens
On January 24th, the “Reclaim our UN” seminar was organised by the Peace Round Table. The appeal for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly was presented during this seminar. A press conference subsequently launched the new edition of the UN Peoples’ Assembly, which will be followed by the March from Perugia to Assisi (in Italy) from October 1st to 7th.

As you probably know the WSF is not a political party but a process focusing not only on the event itself but on campaigns and every-day actions. In order to continue the work in the period between the forums and to give more efficacy to the requests, it was decided to choose some actions to be pursued along each of the main thematic axes of the forum. On the last day of the WSF, the 21 networks held an assembly to propose and choose common campaigns for a global day of mobilisation in 2008.

The assembly dedicated to “International institutions” was led by Candido Grzybowski. He collected the main proposals of action from the discussions held on the previous days, during the forum, in the field of global democracy and international institutions. The WFM supported two topics included in the list for global mobilisation day: the reform of international institutions coordinated by Ubuntu and the campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly promoted by the Committee for a Democratic UN. This is a good result as it means that the WSF is the right place to find new allies for our campaigns to democratise international institutions.

The next alter-globalisation movement commitments are the global day of mobilisation in 2008 and the WSF in 2009. Let us organize our active participation in order to make another federalist world possible.

**Boutros-Ghalli: Democratization at Global Level Needed**

In a message addressed to the supporters of the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly in May 2007, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former United Nations Secretary-General, said: “If the process of democratization does not move forward at the international level, democracy at the level of the nation-state will also diminish. In the process of globalization, problems which can only be solved effectively at the global level, are multiplying and requirements of political governance are extending beyond state borders accordingly. Increased decision-making at the global level therefore is inevitable. We need to promote the democratization of globalization, before globalization destroys the foundations of national and international democracy.” According to Boutros-Ghali, “the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations has become an indispensable step to achieve democratic control of globalization.”
Indian Civil Society Takes the Lead in Promoting Small Arms Ban

In the occasion of several conclaves held in different locations across India in the first half of 2007, SASANET (South Asia against Small Arms Network) and CAFI (Control Arms Foundation of India) urged Indian civil society to rally against the dangers of illegal ownership, possession and transfer of small arms, light weapons and explosives, and urged the need for regulating the arms movement and a universal ban on their rampant proliferation.

Vijayam Raghunathan, Coordinator, SASANET India gave a broad overview of the efforts taken by SASANET in containing the spread of armed violence around the globe. The October 2006 resolution passed by the UN toward achieving this bears testimony to the initiatives of SASANET and other like minded organizations in the world.

At each meeting, many useful suggestions recommended by the speakers and the attendees were compiled to form the framework for the final resolution to be forwarded to the UN for inclusion in its Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which commits the world body to establish comprehensive and legally-binding norms for import, export and transfer of conventional arms.

Some recurrent suggestions are to:
- educate people about the use and misuse of small arms right from school;
- create more job opportunities to help in bringing down proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons;
- encourage civil society to contribute to disarmament through anonymous criminal intelligence;
- make legal proceedings more stringent and accelerate judgement on crimes;
- shut down illegal arms manufacturing units;
- subject to severe punishment officials involved in the issue of fake arms licences;
- tighten border security;
- reward and publicise surrender of small arms;
- involve corporate, religious and spiritual leaders, celebrities and media in leading the way for banning small arms;
- periodically conduct UN level international inspections on arms stocks;
- urge India to lead the way for a peaceful world by supporting the arms trade treaty consultation process.

To know more about the control arms campaign, please visit www.controlarms.org and www.iansa.org.
Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Rome

Europe is healing itself from hostilities and division. Learning from the bitter experiences of the 20th Century, European states and citizens now foster human rights, cherish the rule of law and work together to develop new forms of democratic governance. Former enemies are now loyal partners. Dictatorships and authoritarian regimes have been replaced by pluralistic liberal democracy. Equality of status is guaranteed for large and small states alike. Few areas of European public life are now untouched by the success of practical integration. And the peoples of Europe have more in common with each other than not.

The establishment of the European Economic Community played a key part in these developments, and the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome fully merits to be celebrated across Europe and in the wider world.

Throughout the post-war period, federalism has been a powerful driving force behind European integration. Federalists inspired the founding fathers of the European Union and have not ceased to work towards the goal of a close union of Europe’s states and peoples in which no single level of government is subordinate to any other but all are coordinate. In 2007 the Federalist Intergroup of the European Parliament is also commemorating the centenary of Altiero Spinelli who made a particularly important contribution to the constitutional development of the Union.

While Europe has achieved much since the end of the Second World War in creating and then gradually extending the political scope of unification as well as in widening membership of the Union, there remains much work to be done if the mission of the founding fathers is to be wholly fulfilled.

We Members of the European Parliament who are proud to call ourselves federalists believe that 2007 will be decisive for the success of the democratic project. We are convinced that the European Union needs to complete its constitutional process in order to be fully equipped to meet the demands of the 21st Century and the aspirations of a large majority of its citizens. With no constitution, Europe will lack internal cohesion and external strength, and the EU’s development into a mature, post-national democracy will be impaired.

Europe’s federalists commit themselves anew to the task of building a united, democratic Europe which will deliver peace, tolerance, prosperity and freedom to our own peoples and which may act as a beacon of hope worldwide.

Declaration of the Federalist Intergroup in the European Parliament. 104 MEPs from 22 countries and 5 groups have already joined this Intergroup. Steering Committee: Carlos Carnero Gonzalez (PSE, E), Thierry Cornillet (ADLE, F), Jean-Luc Dehaene (PPE-DE, B), Andrew Duff (ADLE, UK), Monica Frassoni (Verts/ALE, I), Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (GUE/NGL, D), Alain Lamassoure (PPE-DE, F), Jo Leinen (PSE, D), Gérard Onesta (Verts/ALE, F), Libor Roucek (PSE, CZ), Alexander Stubb (PPE-DE, FIN)
The Ethnic Trap

Francesca Lacaita

Norbert Mappes-Niediek

Die Ethno-Falle. Der Balkan-Konflikt und was Europa daraus lernen kann
[The Ethnic Trap. The Balkan Conflict and what Europe can learn from it]
Berlin, Ch. Links Verlag, 2005

The recent wars in former Yugoslavia are conventionally regarded as the work of evil ghosts from a benighted past. The ghosts of violent fanaticism, of tribalized religion and of rabid nationalism refusing to be laid to rest, as the post-nationalist Zeitgeist – at least in Europe – would require. This intriguing, thought-provoking book (written by a long-time correspondent from South-East Europe, who in the 1990s was also a political analyst in the staff of the Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General for Former Yugoslavia) makes a quite different point. The wars, that is, should be thought of not as the persistence of an undead past, but rather as the appalling outcome of policies that were in fact intended to deal with diversity – not unlike what is being attempted in Europe right now. After all, Yugoslavia itself had come into being as a peace project, too. Yet the final outcome was war. Its very atrocities grimly show what failure to manage internal diversity may result in. In this respect the Balkans have a lot to teach. What can “Europe” (i.e. that part of the continent committed to “an ever closer union”) learn from it?

Western commentators are generally inclined to look back wistfully on Tito’s Yugoslavia and praise it as a “masterpiece”, as the unique framework that, under his able leadership, kept fractious people from each other’s throats. Mappes-Niediek disagrees. In his view the seeds of war were sown and grown in Tito’s Yugoslavia itself. The system was based on the recognition of nationalities and on a proportional ethnic balance between them that was readjusted time and again to meet new arising challenges. In the long run this had fatal consequences. The ethnonational groups which were thus recognized did have equal rights; at the same time they found themselves in an “empty” competition of all against all for power and resources – a competition, that is, devoid of all content, but perpetuated by the very existence of the competitors. It was, Mappes-Niediek puts it, as if there were three applicants (in every respect equal) for one job: it might well be indifferent to the prospective employer who will get it, but it is certainly far from indifferent to each of the applicants concerned (p. 64), who will nurture (or even invent) their “small differences”, if only to stand a better chance in a fierce competition. Everybody in former Yugoslavia was bound to belong to a group, no matter which, and was reminded of it, for example, on the marriage certificate, the school-report, the social-insurance card, or the electoral register. While this hardly had any relevance in everyday social interactions, it was of paramount importance when it came to applying for a job, a flat or a place at university, to starting a career or going into politics. Inevitably, vindications of discontent, diverging interests, and struggles for power were all couched in the language of group belonging – all the more so, as the one-party rule blocked any other way to articulate conflict. Thus asserting the interests of one’s group and defending them against perceived wrongs was the be-all and end-all of political life in former Yugoslavia. The ensuing balance was necessarily fragile and precarious, doomed to collapse in such a major crisis as the transition to democracy after 1989. The fracture lines were already there, obviously not to be erased by mixed marriages, modern international youth culture, or what goes under the name of globalisation. It did not take long for them to acquire “cultural” and ideological content – the paraphernalia of ethnonationalism – and be mobilized to justify war and violence.

As Mappes-Niediek shows, two different paths led to the Yugoslavian conflagration:
consociational politics on the one hand, and a distorted myth of Western modernity as realized in the nation-state on the other hand. Let us start from the latter, from the attitudes of the so-called “techno-managers” and their effects.

The “techno-managers” were a class of technocrats who in Communist Yugoslavia were entrusted with the management of firms and other economic institutions. They were pragmatic, spoke English, were liked in the West, and chafed at the political ideology and the perpetual ethnic haggling, which notably impaired the efficiency of the system. Slobodan Milošević was one of them. After Yugoslavia collapsed, the techno-managers themselves came to the conclusion that the only way to achieve a cohesive “civil society”, a functioning state and an efficient economy was to establish a mono-ethnic nation-state. In this perspective, separation and ethnic cleansing were a price that was to be paid for the sake of modernity; war was just as inevitable, as the only way that could persuade undesirable Others to move elsewhere. Thus war gained the support of the one-time “modernizers”. Territory was to be “staked out”, and it was tacitly agreed that each “warlord” would have free hand in “his” area. The taking of Sребренica was in this sense part of the plan, which was known to and accepted by the USA as well (p. 97). But Mladić’s men went too far.

On the other hand, the consociational way has often been considered a solution to ethnonational conflicts. As such, consociationalism is the form of government theorized by the political scientist Arend Lijphart in relation to deeply segmented and conflict-ridden societies. It basically consists in multi-ethnic or multicultural power-sharing, based on proportionality, veto right and grand coalitions, in contrast to majority rule which, under the circumstances, would permanently exclude minority groups from power (and thus fuel conflict). Consociational arrangements have recently been provided in Northern Ireland by the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Mappes-Niediek argues, on his part, that such a way impoverishes democracy without fostering stability. Majority decisions being impossible, the “round-table” method (in which all parties sit each in representation of a particular group, in practice allowing only unanimous decisions) has in-built dynamics encouraging ethnonational extremism, because each party finds its legitimacy in the uncompromising defence of its community. In this constellation of “minorities without a majority”, decisions can only be taken, and the system can thus only work, through the mediation of an arbitrator above or outside the tussle – a figure commanding unquestioned authority and prestige, like Tito in former Yugoslavia, or an external actor. Without arbitration the system collapses (as the Yugoslavian case shows); its very dependence on it prevents an autonomous development and impairs its democratic functioning. This in turn fosters an authoritarian style of government, while the people are prevented from participating as citizens – they can at most participate as members of a nation or a community. And indeed, most of the political difficulties experienced in Northern Ireland after the Belfast Agreement to this day seem eerily to bear out Mappes-Niediek’s argument.

In the last chapter, Mappes-Niediek sets out to draw a few lessons for the benefit of Europe. As a matter of fact, present-day EU – having enlarged its competence, and with it the field of contentious issues, but having left its decision-making procedures as good as untouched, with unanimity still required in major areas – is coming perilously near to the Yugoslavian model. A single political economy is now developing, but the method remains that of the “round table”, where the participants are representatives each of their own nation (or state), and as such they are assessed and elected. Nobody represents the whole European people. The members of the EU Commission are rather to be compared to the “techno-managers”, bound as they are to an ostensibly “non-political” role. The minor role of the European Parliament in the decision-making process testifies to the fact that the EU can already take decisions like a state, but not like a democratic one. Much has been written
about the “democratic deficit” of the EU, yet few seem to have realized how baneful its effects are going to be. Centrifugal dynamics are already at work, making the EU framework creak.

What is to be done then? Mappes-Niediek puts forward several suggestions. In his view, in order to create a European demos it is vital to foster a sense of common belonging. This need not (or should not) be done by reproducing the ways national identities have been historically constructed. However, only a feeling of common identity and belonging can have a group accept to be a temporarily outvoted minority, or to undertake a consistent redistributive policy beyond occasional charity. In any case, a Constitution is the first essential step, not to be got round with seminars or exchange programs. Truly European parties must develop, truly European politicians (i.e. politicians able also to represent voters of other countries than their own) must emerge. Furthermore, the relationships with ethnic or national minorities should be dealt with at a European level; it cannot be a matter for the national state only. In keeping with his stance throughout the book, Mappes-Niediek argues against the introduction of collective rights, that is, rights that are granted according to how an individual is labelled on the birth certificate. Instead, he recommends tackling injustices from a social or economic perspective, paying more attention to the rights of migrants, of refugees, of Roma, or to gender discriminations than to “autochthonous” minorities, unless there is a long history of ethnonational oppression to redress. In other words, the state must be by definition inclusive. References to religion in Constitutions would be in this sense a legacy from a pre-liberal era. Surely, Mappes-Niediek’s views provide good food for thought to those aiming to build up a European polity – indeed, the only framework in which his recommendations are likely to be taken up and carried out. As the ways of the European national states are at present going in the opposite direction, what can save the EU from democratic crisis and disunion?

Globalizing Democracy
Laura & Renata Pantucci

Fernando A. Iglesias
Globalizar la Democracia. Por un Parlamento Mundial [Globalizing Democracy. The Stand for a World Parliament]
Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2006

World Federalists have been saying so all along: the real problem of today’s world is to “govern” economic globalization, endowing it with democratic institutions, and not to stubbornly oppose it. This book by Fernando Iglesias deals with that issue in depth, trying to provide concrete and constructive answers, historical and theoretical evidence, pitiless but not catastrophic analyses of the state of world relations and institutions. The thesis that he expounds in an extremely clear and convincing way in the book is summarized thus in the introduction: in order for globalization to be made democratic, democracy must be globalized; in order for democracy to be globalized, there must be a world Parliament. And upon an eventual world Parliament he dwells with details – including technical details – about its constitution, its functioning, its tasks, and even its venue and the number of representatives, pointedly answering to the objections on its alleged non-necessity, impossibility, insufficiency and dangerousness. Coming back, however, to the fundamental point (that is, the necessity to democratize globalization) and going to its root, Iglesias explains its causes with an argument that bears little dispute: the discrepancy between the political development and the techno-economy, and the injustice coming from a manifestly unfair global order have produced global crises that must be countered in a rational and democratic way, with global – not inter-governmental or
inter-national – institutions of a parliamentary type. The fact is that on the one hand the economy is ever more unconnected with the territory, and on the other the national institutions are proving inadequate to solve today’s problems: “to face globalization’s challenges equipped with national instruments is like trying to cross the sea with a bicycle” – is Iglesias’ telling example. And note that international institutions – from the NGOs to the various UN, IMF, etc. – are already proliferating, and the intergovernmental ones are already and dangerously taking the shape of an anti-democratic and potentially totalitarian world State! They must be made more democratic.

In addition, for those who still have doubts about the positive nature of globalization, here is just one figure among many: the richest 20% of the planet is the most interconnected and globalized, whilst the poorest 20% are the ones in the opposite condition. Any attempt at fighting globalization by closing oneself in his own nation-State – with an “every man for himself!” spirit on the part of the better-off, and with a third-world-supporter nationalism on the part of the worse-off – cannot be but counterproductive.

The ideas around which the arguments of the book revolve are those dear to the federalists: opposition to international anarchy, supranationality, transnationality, subsidiarity, universality of law and ethic anti-relativism in its most extreme forms … An anti-nationalist spirit is apparent in each page, with terms like “zombie” not rarely associated with existing national-State institutions. Today’s national democracies are considered as “unable to save the world, but able to destroy it”. Iglesias does not, in fact, want their complete destruction: rather, what he wants for them is deep renovation and retrenchment.

From the viewpoint of this South-American writer, also the viewpoint of many Italian federalists, from Altiero Spinelli to Lucio Levi, everything has an historical dimension. There are no institutions or forms of political organization that are absolutely good or progressive, whilst others are of an opposite type. If “being nationalists was progressive in the era of feudal, monarchical and papal powers, and being internationalists was so in the times of nationalist industrialism, in the era of globalization a true democratic and progressive thought cannot be but anti-nationalist and worldist”.

As European citizens and in particular as federalist activists, it comes immediately natural to ask ourselves: what does Iglesias think of the European Union? One does not have to wait for too many pages to find the first quotations, which will be repeated many times in the rest of the book. The author praises the project of European construction and highlights the many results it has attained, but is convinced that European unification essentially has two problems: a democratic deficit (and here he cites with irony Thucydides’ sentence against “the tyranny of a minority” placed as an epigraph to the EU Constitutional Treaty), and its limiting itself to the continental scale with, moreover, suicidal temptations of closing itself off from immigration from the poorer world. Being a Kantian, in addition, he believes that the world federation could be attained starting indeed from Europe (and here he quotes the Italian Federalists’ motto “unite Europe to unite the world”), and that Europe’s history from Westphalia onwards is, to a large extent, the forerunner of the history of the world: from the forming of the nation-States system to its collapse in the first half of the twentieth century and to the following reconstruction in the period after WWII, passing through the dramatic contradiction between the thrust to a world dimension coming from the techno-economy and the national restrictions operated by the political classes, that meant the end of the continent’s world supremacy.

With some optimism the author states that the time for instituting a world Parliament has come, and it is time now to pass from the countless isolated projects in existence (described in great detail in the second chapter) to a real “planetary debate” on the issue. He warns that “unless we create a world Parliament within one generation,
we are heading for a catastrophe”, but he does not take that for granted.

In conclusion, this book by Fernando Iglesias is innovating for the issues it deals with, rich for the historical data it gives, written in a bright style, and resolute, consistent and constructive in the ideas it proposes. It is worth being translated in English and published on a world scale.

Beyond the State

Giampiero Bordino

The contradiction between the process of economic globalization, which is well-advanced, and the still-dawning process of making the rules, policies and institutions global, is before everybody’s eyes, at least for those willing to see it.

Such a gap hinders the governance of the world, fuels the asymmetry among actors and consequently conflicts too, and produces unexpected outcomes and uncertainty. In the end it even goes against the economic globalization process itself, against the global market, because, like any market (given that the market is historically a “social construction”, not a Far West), it needs rules, institutions, certainty. The present global market, from that viewpoint, should rather be called a “quasi-market” or a “proto-market”.

Sabino Cassese’s book, in such a context, offers a significant conceptual and, what is more, empirical contribution, to our knowledge and reflection. In the first place, it gives documentary evidence, with an extraordinary analytical ability, of the great, on-going process of the development of a global law-system, that takes a lot of forms, subjects and experiences that only great specialists (like Cassese is) are able today to empirically observe and conceptually “master”.

There exist (Cassese observes) “about two thousand international organizations, more than one hundred international courts, as many quasi-jurisdictional bodies, a very great number of universal norms, applying to both national administrations and individuals”.

However, it is a still unstable, partial, precarious globalization of law, lacking both legitimation and effectiveness. The fact is that the State, the national, sovereign State supremacy of the Westphalian model – the great “regulator” of modern history – is today in crisis, or at least is undergoing a transformation; according to many, indeed, it is already waning. But the rise of a new regulating, post-national and global form of State is still in its infancy. Experiences of multi-actor and multi-level global governance do exist, but they are still at an early stage, and, moreover, our ability to monitor them and, even more so, to think of them theoretically is scarce. Nor is it clear, I would add, how to think with a new approach, one more suited to the world that is shaping up, of the relation between governance and government, between a “negotiated” governance and an “imposed” governance.

We are precisely, to use the title of Cassese’s book, “beyond the State” (at least the Westphalian one), but somehow midway in our journey: between de-structuring and re-structuring, between disorder and a new nomos, between no law/impotence of politics and a new polis.

What should we expect “beyond the State”? According to Cassese, a “global juridical order” is foreshadowed, endowed with some “constitutional substance”, although not with a constitution. Forms of State-ruling different from those we have experienced, with unprecedented, for many aspects, actors and ways of legitimation and efficiency. A new horizon, to a great extent still to be discovered.
This monograph on the Group of Eight is the first ever to be published in Russia. The author, Dr. Vadim Loukov, formerly a high-ranking Russian representative on the Group of Eight’s staff, is now the Russian Ambassador to Brussels. In his book he describes the steps leading to the formation of the Group of Seven (G-7), as it was initially called, and examines its transformation into the Group of Eight (the ‘Political Eight’ or P-8) paying special attention to the Russian Federation’s participation in this informal collective summit.

The work is based on a considerable range of material relating to the Russian Federation’s position from 1992 to 2005. Its basic sources are the official acts of the P-8 and the recollections of the statesmen who took part in its sessions, as well as on analytical and research publications. Dr. Loukov himself participated in the preparation of a series of Group of Eight meetings (1995-2003) and uses materials from his personal archives as a first-hand information source.

Dr. Loukov opens his study with the remark that while, over the two decades since its creation, the P-8 has given birth to a considerable amount of research and academic works on this international institution, the more practical aspects of its activities have until now been almost ignored.

In this book he uses a problem-chronological approach covering research into such basic aspects of the Group’s analysis as:
- sources, development and specifics of the P-8 Member States’ positions,
- reasons for the establishment of relations between the P-8 and Russia,
- evolution of the Russian position in respect of the P-8,
- particularities of the national positions with respect to Russia’s participation,
- implications and impact of Russia’s participation,
- perspectives for the future evolution of Russia’s participation and its role in Russian foreign policy.

Chapters 1 – 3 offer an analysis of political reasons leading to the creation of G-7, together with a discussion of the first results of its activities in 1975-1989 and their relevant strategic effects in the late 1980s.

The author identifies the 1975-1976 energy crisis as being the initial impulse which led to the establishment of the G-7 which, he points out, was in the midst of the “cold war”. One of this body’s subsequent tasks was to co-ordinate policies with regard to the Soviet Union which was the main “political enemy” of that time. Certainly, the “Soviet factor” determined the additional polarisation of G-7. Nevertheless, later, in the 1990s, the successor State of the Soviet Union – the Russian Federation – itself became a member of the group.

Chapter 4 examines the Soviet leadership’s first contacts with the G-7 during 1989-1991. Following the introduction of the formula “Seven plus the USSR”, a meeting was held in London on July 17th 1991 at which Mr. M. Gorbatchev, President of the USSR, met the members of “Seven” for the first time.

The Soviet Union was experiencing considerable budgetary problems but promises of financial support were, in the author’s opinion, more generous than the subsequent actual assistance. Related decisions concerning credits were not taken until the end of 1992 when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Chapter 5 describes Russia’s move from “guest status” towards full membership with the formation of the “Political Eight” (1992-1996) and discusses the motives behind “rapprochement”, the reform of Russian participation and the final establishment of a stable P-8 structure. The
author rejects certain Western interpretations of the reasons for Russia’s joining the Group of Eight as being too superficial. He presents an alternative, in-depth academic analysis of the reasons which led to this enlargement of the Seven.

Among Russia’s motives, Dr. Loukov stresses the Russian leadership’s need for Western financial support in dismantling the discriminatory barriers in their economic relations which dated back to the “cold war”, as well as their wish to enhance their image on the world stage, both politically and in the domestic sphere. On the other hand Western countries’ motives were linked to issues concerning their own security, in particular because of the former Soviet army’s withdrawal from Eastern and Central Europe.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the emergence of the “full-scale Eight” (1997-1998), examining in particular the summits in Denver (USA) and Birmingham (UK). The impressive report by a Commission consisting of R. Blackwill, R. Braithwaite, and A. Tanaka was published on the eve of the Denver meeting. Some of its points still remain interesting and valid today. It defined the Western partners’ position with regard to NATO’s enlargement and drafted a blueprint for Russia’s co-operation with West European institutions and world financial organisations, and thus influenced the decisions taken at the Denver meeting. Where the Russian interest was concerned, Dr. Loukov believes that one purpose of this meeting was to achieve equal treatment in several spheres of economic interaction.

The Birmingham summit, on the other hand, was marred by the financial crisis in Russia and its negative impact on the Russian economy. Despite the seriousness of the crisis, the Russian representatives were nonetheless able to uphold their own national interests and with the result that the organisational and procedural aspects of the Eight’s machinery were finalised.

Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the situation on the eve of the new millennium and its new challenges: terrorism, ecology, development aid, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the period 1999-2003, meetings were held in Okinawa, Genoa, Kananaskis, and Evian. It is obvious that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York influenced the meetings after this date and, in fact, the “Group of Eight” became one of the major tools of co-operation in the war against terrorism.

Chapter 10 examines the particularities of the differing national approaches towards the points under discussion, and specifically the underlying attitude towards the Russian Federation per se. Dr. Loukov analyses in detail the Member States’ diverse positions with respect to major world political issues and his account is particularly valuable in that he distinguishes the changes in national positions arising from each government’s internal political situation while at the same time identifying the permanent determinants which shape national attitudes.

The final chapter is especially interesting for both political analysts and lawyers. It covers the functions and the role of the Eight in the international system, in particular how it interacts with other international organisations such as the United Nations. It also examines the partnership of the “Eight” with other “clubs”. Finally, the author reviews Western analysts’ critiques regarding the Group of Eight.

Of special interest are the book’s concluding remarks setting out the author’s views on the future prospects of the Group of Eight. He foresees the Group being regularly challenged by destabilising elements, such as “the deepening crisis potential” of the international financial, commercial and economic system, the disappearance of the frontiers between external and domestic political issues, the dangers of regional and local conflicts, the variations in the economic and financial weights of Member States, and the decreasing tension between the Eight and developing countries. In recent months some of the author’s forecasts are already being realised: for example, in the more active inclusion of such states as China, Brazil, India, and Mexico in the Eight’s meetings.

Dr. Loukov predicts a potentially growing role for the Group of Eight in several international
policy areas, primarily in relation to global economic, financial, social and political issues, though without diminishing the dominant position of the United Nations Security Council. The 2006 Russian Presidency marked a new step in the direction of closer co-operation between the Russian Republic and the Eight’s other members. Dr. Loukov summarises the advantages of Russian participation in this “club” and draws a picture of the present and eventual future impact of the Group of Eight in world affairs.

Indeed, the world role of the Eight’s Member States is impressive. Four of its members are also permanent members of the UN Security Council and all four belong to the group of five ‘official’ nuclear powers. Members of the Eight have a predominant role in the World Bank, the European Bank of Development & Reconstruction and in the Paris Club.

The Eight’s agenda is comparable to that of the Security Council. Over fifty issues (dossiers) are permanently discussed and periodically finalised in the official acts. In fact the Group of Eight’s impact is unique in the world. First, because it is essentially a meeting of personalities rather than of governments’ representatives or diplomats. Thus the machinery of the Eight has gradually become an important instrument for the confidential exchange of views. The topics discussed touch mostly upon foreign policy, but domestic issues may also be aired.

Among the book’s other valuable ideas, it is significant that Dr. Loukov underlines the importance of the comparative approach, not only concentrating on historical or geographical comparisons between differing policies, but also comparing the different working methods in order to obtain several inductive conclusions. This work should lead to a renewal of the philosophy of co-operation by establishing certain common principles aimed at a more concrete synergy of strategies which have until now suffered from being diverse and individualistic in character.

His research therefore has the merit of taking a step towards establishing clear and precise criteria for co-operation between the Member States – their national interests, their mutual readiness to compromise, and a set of organic and reasonable values enabling the world’s most influential countries to work together as partners. Dr. Loukov thus identifies the objective tools for such interaction as the defining of the common, organic and intrinsic values necessary for cooperation.

Dr. Loukov’s excellent analysis and original interpretation of the Group of Eight’s internal structures reveal previously unnoticed elements which, hopefully, his new research will help him to refine and develop. His approach may lead to new conclusions and a fresh perspective on the Group of Eight’s potential development. This central analytical task, therefore, still remains valid and deserves to be carefully followed up.

There is a quip by Winston Churchill saying that God so loved the world that he did not send a committee. However, when the United Nations needs a platform of ideas, it creates an “independent commission”. Yet, as the editors write, “The role that international or independent commissions have played in linking ideas and institutions has not received the attention it merits. The names of many of the key commissions, often best remembered by the
individuals who headed them – Brandt, Palme, Brundtland, Carlson/Ramphal, for example – continue to be recognized. But the impact of commissions – what they have achieved, and how they have done it, both individually and collectively – has been too often neglected.”

This book from the United Nations University is an effort to look at the impact of ideas and recommendations put forward by different independent commissions. Independent commissions are created as a response to three challenges. The first challenge is to bring together in a single document ideas on which there is a large consensus but where no one expression of these ideas is a common reference. This was the role of the independent commissions on development issues. The Commission on International Development chaired by Lester Pearson of Canada – often called “The Pearson Report” – was a consensus document of the mainline thinking on development of the 1960s: Partners in Development (1969). There was a need to review the trends of development policy especially as they grew from the experience of the then newly independent African countries. The role of the Pearson Commission, largely sponsored by the World Bank, was not to explore new territory but to bring together in a document backed by well-known persons the basic development approach that had developed in the 1960s.

The second commission devoted to development – the Independent Commission on International Development Issues – chaired by Willy Brandt of West Germany was a response to the failures of development efforts of the 1970s. The 1970s was a time when the Non-Aligned Movement in the United Nations, encouraged by the impact of the OPEC states, had tried to create a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The effort failed, beaten back largely by the USA and the UK who slowed down and then destroyed all possibilities of discussion within the UN but who proposed no alternatives to the NIEO. The failure of the NIEO negotiations left a legacy of bitterness among the Non-Aligned which came to believe that the rich states were interested in neither development nor social justice. Willy Brandt who had actively opposed the Nazi government and who later had bettered relations between Germany, the Soviet Union and Central Europe was asked by the World Bank to head a new commission which would draw on the experience of the 1970s and yet show that there was a possibility for understanding. Brandt was not an economic policy maker, but as he had made efforts to bridge the East-West divide, so he could be a symbol of efforts to bridge the growing North-South divide. The report Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery produced few economic ideas that led to policies. As some have noted, the ideas in the Report were too radical for the industrial countries which feared that behind any reforms the ghost of the NIEO might rise and not radical enough for those Non-Aligned leaders who wanted radically changed economic structures. Brandt called upon “political will” as he had in national and European politics. Alas, there are no magic wands for creating political will. Economic thinking disappeared into the sands of neo-liberalism and vague “poverty reduction” measures and has not been heard of again.

A somewhat similar effort to propose ideas after failure was the “Brundtland Commission” – the World Commission on Environment and Development – chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway. 1972 had seen the rise of UN concern about the environment with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm. The conference led to the creation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and a short-lived series of activities. A decade after Stockholm, there were few environmental advances, and UNEP had largely faded from influence in the UN system. The Japanese government which was chairing the UNEP governing council felt that something should be done to give ecological questions a new start and was willing to put up funds for an
environmental commission.

The name “development” was added to show that ecology is a world issue, not just a question of industrial pollution. The Brundtland Commission echoed the Brandt’s call for political will. “The Commission’s hope for the future is conditional on decisive political action now to begin managing environmental resources to ensure both sustainable human progress and human survival.” The Brundtland Report incorporated concerns for the environment into the concept of development by coining the phrase “sustainable development” as a conceptual roof. While “sustainable development” as a concept is subject to multiple interpretations, it has entered the international vocabulary.

The third challenge for international commissions would be to analyse trends and to look toward the future. While future-oriented thinking has always been an aim of independent commissions, it has rarely been the practice. Commissions want to reach consensus, and consensus is reached more easily about the past and with difficulty about the present. It is nearly impossible about the future where ideas are nearly always produced by individuals and not committees.

Yet consensus-making about the present is a useful task, and International Commissions and the Power of Ideas is a welcome addition to the study of how ideas arise in the UN system.
Towards a World Parliament
Andrew Strauss, Professor of International Law
at Widener University School of Law

Interview by Ernesto Gallo

We are glad to talk with Andrew Strauss, a world-leading expert on international law and UN matters.

Professor Strauss, since long you have been promoting the idea of a Global Parliamentary Assembly. People are increasingly concerned about problems such as terrorism or global warming. Which answer could a Global Parliamentary Assembly provide to such challenges?

Since a global parliament is a way to begin to bring people into a political process, many feel the unfairness of a few countries holding almost all the power in the global system. The existence of so many alienated people provides a fertile breeding ground for terrorists. If we had a global parliament, we could offer the same deal to those who are inclined to support terrorism that democracies offer to their people. We could say, we will allow you – we even want you – participate, and we will give you the parliamentary means to do so, but your participation must be peaceful. Now I’m sure al-Qaeda terrorists won’t accept that deal, but I believe that if citizen groups had a peaceful global political outlet, terrorists would over time become isolated. As to global warming, the US and Australia have decided not to join the Kyoto Protocol. They can do this because states mostly don’t have to agree to follow international laws if they don’t want to. Political elites in national capitals are interested in keeping the system voluntary because it maximizes their own prerogatives. Global parliamentary representatives would find that their own influence would expand with that of the global parliament. Even if the parliament was to start as an advisory body, the parliamentarians would over time be likely to champion the idea that acts of parliament should be binding not only on states, but also directly on citizens. If citizens were part of the process, through participating in political campaigns, voting, lobbying, etc. then they would likely come to feel a corresponding loyalty to the parliament and its processes, and the political ground would be laid for them to accept the parliament’s decisions as binding. At least this has been the tendency in national parliamentary systems, and it is relevant that the European Parliament started out as a largely advisory body and has slowly gained legislative powers.

You mention the English Parliament, which overthrew the absolute monarchy in the 17th century, as a possible forerunner to a global assembly. Yet the parliament was an expression of well defined social forces, the ones of emerging English capital. Who is going to promote a global assembly?

It is true that, in addition to the aristocracy, the middle class became a support for the English parliament, but to suggest that parliament could only have evolved as it did is to believe that history is rigidly determined which I don’t. Much of history happens as a result of unpredictable forces that only seem somehow predestined in retrospect. For example, it was not historically inevitable that Henry the VIII would feel he needed parliament to support his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and break from Rome, and yet this was an event that strengthened parliament a great deal by giving it a claim to authority over religious matters. So today I think we can’t be sure what forces or events might be determinative in creating a global parliament. Having said that, I think the forces of global capital, or rather certain elements of global capital, could come to back a
global parliament. Now, some people might find it surprising. They see global capital as benefiting from the largely unregulated global economy and as unlikely to want to share power with a global democratic body. But in the US it is often said that President Franklin Roosevelt saved capitalism. This means that by introducing the welfare state during a time – the depression – when capitalism was under significant challenge, Roosevelt provided the accommodation that was necessary for the system to continue. Likewise, today I believe that many enlightened global business leaders could be brought around to the idea that the current system of globalization is not working and that, if it is to be saved, it needs to be established on a more legitimate footing similar to what is found in parliamentary domestic systems. Another important source of support for a global parliament is civil society. Some civil society organizations are resistant to this innovation because finally, having achieved some influence within the international system, they see a parliament as a threat to their turf, so to speak. I think they are wrong, however. Certainly, a global parliament would rearrange the global furniture in ways that could be temporarily uncomfortable for some civil society organizations, but over the long run they would have a more secure place in the global system. After all, civil society organizations have a place in parliamentary systems, supporting candidates and influencing the parliamentary process, in ways they don’t have in the international system. They are officially part of the process. Additionally, I think the citizens of powerless countries and developing countries in particular have a special interest in such a parliament. Clearly the global system is not representing their interests well at the present time.

Finally, I would hope the EU as an entity could become a force for such a body. In many ways the European experiment is the great hope for all of us. After millennia of war, Europe has created a new irenic ethos, and the European Parliament is an important part of it. Because Europeans already know from direct experience the possibilities of what we are talking about, they are in many ways the most likely to help carry the message to the world. Now, you may say that these groups I am pointing to are very different, and many of them have apparently opposing interests, but people who might disagree about substance still have the potential to come together over process. You know, people often think of governance as a zero sum game – for someone to win someone else must lose. But if we can achieve a system of democratic global governance that protects us from environmental calamity, avoids disastrous wars, and makes us all feel secure in our basic rights, we all win.

Many countries are clearly non-democratic. How would you consider their participation in a parliament?

I am inclined to say that any country, even non-democratic countries, can join a treaty to create a global parliament, but that in order for representatives to be credentialed to participate they must be “freely and fairly” elected. I think to allow for any government, democratic or not, to fix elections or simply appoint representatives would undermine the credibility and potential of the parliament.

You wrote also about several different paths towards a Global Parliament. Which is preferable? Why?

The greatest hope of success lies in a global parliament established by independent treaty. Most international organizations are created this way. I’m sceptical that a truly democratic parliament could spring from UN reform process, given that previous reform has been so difficult. Even if many UN members were not ready to agree to an independent treaty, it could still go forward, and once in place, citizens could lobby non-party governments to join. It is important, however, that no matter how the organization starts, it be seen as a way to strengthen the UN. For example, the treaty might provide that the Parliament vote on certain resolutions passed by the General Assembly. A resolution passed bicamerally by both assemblies would, for example, have a great deal of added legitimacy.
Contributors

SERGEY A. BELYAEV
Consultant on International and European Law in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, and Member of the European Arbitration and Conciliation Court based in Versailles, France

GIAMPIERO BORDINO
Professor in Contemporary History and political analyst

ANDREAS BUMMEL
Chairman of the Committee of a Democratic UN and leader of the Secretariat of the UNPA-Campaign

NICOLE DELLER
Senior Program Officer of WFM

ERNSTO GALLO
Researcher in Political Science at the Study Center on Federalism based in Torino, Italy

FERNANDO IGLESIAS
Editorialist, specialised in the political aspects of globalisation, and teacher in the University Lomas de Zamora in Buenos Aires. Funding member of Democrazia Global - Movimento por la Unión Sudamericana y el Parlamento Mundial, Argentina

RAYMOND M. JUNG D’ARSAC
Rapporteur at the Hertenstein Conference (1946)

FRANCESCA LACAITA
Lecturer Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe at the University of Frankfurt/Main, Germany

LUCIO LEVI
Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Torino, Italy, member of WFM Executive Committee and UEF Federal Committee

ANTONIO MOSCONI
Member of CESI Council

ROBERTO PALEA
President of CESI

LAURA & RENATA PANTUCCI
Writers and publishers

JOHN PARRY
Previous Vice-President of UEF

MARIO PLATERO
Journalist and author, is the US Editor of “Il Sole 24 Ore”, the leading financial daily in Italy

JEAN-PAUL POUGALA
Member of the African Federalist Movement, Cameroun

JAMES T. RANNEY
Attorney and Former Law Professor at the University of Montana, US, Chair of the Philadelphia Chapter of Citizens for Global Solutions and President of the Global Constitution Forum

ALFONSO SABATINO
Member of UEF Federal Committee

PETER SUTHERLAND
Chairman of BP Amoco, London. Chairman and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs International. Former member of the Commission of the European Community and former Director General of GATT/WTO

ROBERT TOULEMON
President of Club-Europe - ARRI-AFEUR

NICOLA VALLINOTO
Vice-Secretary-General of UEF Italy

RENÉ WADLOW
Editor of Transnational Perspectives, representative to the United Nations, Geneva, of the Association of World Citizens

TED WHEATLEY
Chairman of Executive of the Association of World Federalists, UK. Editor of “One World”