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The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World

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*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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- EDITORIAL
- COMMENTS
- BORDERLESS DEBATE
- FEDERALIST ACTION
- BOOKS REVIEWS
- NEWS AND NOTES
- INTERVIEW

Contents

EDITORIAL

Federalism, Regions, Europe and the World *Lucio Levi*
4

COMMENTS

Some Thoughts on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights *John Parry*
7

Proposals for Europe. A Political and Moral Essay *Robert Lafont*
10

The Establishment of the Fondation Internationale Triffin *George Lingbour*
15

Tobin Tax or World Currency? *Guido Montani*
17

Mundell for a World Currency
20

Globalization and the Birth of a World Left *Grazia Borgna*
21

World Federalism: Past, Present and Future *James Christie*
24

The Year 2001: The Start of a Creative Dialogue Among Civilizations *René Wadlow*
29

BORDERLESS DEBATE

DOMESTIC FEDERALISM

Federalism in the United Kingdom *Sir Antony Meyer*
31

Towards a Federal United Kingdom *Ernest Wistrich*
33

Thoughts for Our Future *Michel Monnot*
36

Many Homelands, All Beloved *Tommaso Padoa Schioppa*
38

Quebec Separatists and the European Example
39

Are Flamish Nationalists against Europe? *Ludo Dierickx*
40

A Dialogue between Federalists and Autonomists in Europe *Jean-Francis Billion*
42

FEDERALIST ACTION

Nice, or the Pride of Being a Federalist Militant *Sante Granelli*
46

Over 10.000 in the Streets of Nice for a Federal Europe
49

The South Asian People Summit *W. James Arputharaj*
50

A World Federalist Appointed to UN Delegation
51

The World Social Forum *Anna Viterbo*
52

BOOK REVIEWS

World Culture Already Exists *Bill Bryant*
53

The State of the World at the Turn of the Millennium *Roberto Palea*
55

Federalism without Frills *Antonio Mosconi*
57

NEWS AND NOTES

Two American Scholars Propose a World Parliament
The Hague Climate Convention Suspended: a Failure
61

The Fall of the Last Dictatorship in Europe
62

The Nuclear Policy of the Asian Subcontinent
63

Iraq's Oil Sold in Euros
The Growth of International Trade
A New Journal on Federalism
Agreement against Organized Crime Signed in Palermo
64

INTERVIEW

Daniel J. Elazar
66

CONTRIBUTORS

71

Editorial

Federalism, Regions, Europe and the World

Lucio Levi

We are currently living in political times when it is easier than ever before to clarify the meaning of the federalist message. Anywhere in Europe the great political leaders are facing simultaneously problems concerning the transfer of functions from the national governments to the European level as well as to the regional one. A new gap is now being formed in political life: the one between federalists and sovereigntists, which means between those who are in favour and those who oppose the power transfer to the supra-national and to the infra-national levels. The federalist political paradigm has in it the key which helps in understanding, explaining and controlling this double process of reorganisation of the State. Federalism may be conceived of as a political device for taming and domesticating the violent and authoritarian nature of the nation-state by imposing internal and external limits on it.

The federalist diagnosis

At the centre of this process of reorganisation of political institutions there is the crisis of the nation-state.

It is a model of political organisation conceived at the time of the French Revolution, when:

- a) the industrial revolution required markets of national size and national governments capable of ruling such markets, and the class struggle determined a deep split within national communities and kept regional and local autonomies from taking place;
- b) aggressive enemies at the borders threatened the existence of the nation-states, which were forced to centralise power in order to be able to react

promptly to the external dangers.

The formula of "one and indivisible republic", dear to the sovereigntists of right- and left-wing parties, both equally reactionary, is no more suitable for the needs of our time, characterised by:

- a) the scientific revolution of material production, which has determined a tighter and tighter interdependence among states and peoples at the European and world level;
- b) the lack of threats at the borders, at least between the member-states of the European Union.

In Europe more than anywhere else in the world, the nation-state has lost control of its most essential functions (economy and security), which have moved up to the international level. They may lose control of several more problems which can better be solved at regional and local level.

On the one hand the revolution in the fields of communication and transportation and the resulting globalisation requires the state to be organised to cover wider areas. On the other hand automation and new information systems determine the end of the large concentrations of workers and employees and make easier the power transfer to the regional and local communities.

The limits of an international community of nation-states are those of an institutional system which concentrates the whole power into the hands of the national governments, which are the only independent power centres to which any other power is subordinate (the European Union

and the UN, as well as regional and local communities).

The federalist remedies

The state needs to be reorganised by transferring power to higher and lower levels, by creating democratic and independent power centres at European level (and at the level of the other great regions in the world) and world level, and at the same time at regional and local levels.

In a federal Constitution, powers are shared between the government of the whole constituent political community (federal government) and the governments of the entities of which it is composed (federated governments). Each government is independent in its own sphere, separate from the other ones. Each governmental level is at the same time "independent and co-ordinate", according to the formula coined by Wheare.

The expression "independence of regional governments" in federalist theory does not mean secession, because regional governments have limited powers. In the same way the federal government has limited powers too. Everyone exercises a legislative power within its own sphere. None of these governments is subordinate to the others. They are co-ordinated among themselves.

It is the principle of subsidiarity, which establishes how powers are to be distributed between the various levels of government in a federation. Decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level of government, while the higher levels of government do not have the right of intervention except in the case of the lower ones being unable to act satisfactorily.

This system allows the conciliation of independence of all the power centres, even the smallest ones, with the unity of a large territory, which in the future may potentially include the whole

world. The world federation can thus be conceived of as a political organisation which could possibly be organised over six levels of government: the world, the great regions of the world, the nations, the regions, the counties (or cantons), the local communities.

As far as the concept of nation is concerned, it is better to distinguish between the nation as an artificial political formation, which is the product of the merger between the state and the nation and cannot be ruled, ultimately, but by the use of force, and the spontaneous nation, which coincides with what is often referred to as "nation-without-state" and which can exist independently from the imposition of a political power. In an undated reflection, published in a collection of fragments, Proudhon pointed out that, at the time, in France one could recognise at least twenty nations and that the unity of France was the result of the centralisation of political power. «Remove the police and the army», he stated, «and France will fall back into federalism». This shows his extraordinary intuition; the source of the revival of the nations-without-state which has taken place everywhere in recent years within the nation-states, is to be found in the crisis of this kind of political organisation.

The regionalist movements are right in blaming Joschka Fischer for considering, in his recent proposals that had the great merit of re-launching the European debate about the constitutional matter, just one half of the phenomenon of the crisis of the nation-state; for forgetting in other words that the federalist revolution requires also the transfer of functions to the regional and local communities. The European federalists recognise that the other half of the problem represents an essential aspect of the debate on the European Constitution which is under way.

The Union of European Federalists has conducted since 1996 a campaign in favour of a European Constitution. The principles which the European

Editorial

Constitution shall comply with are taken from the federal model which I just mentioned above. The institutional reforms of the European Union called for by the UEF are the following: bestowal of legislative co-decision power on the European Parliament; generalisation of majority decisions within the Council, which should give up all executive powers and should be transformed into a Chamber of States; transformation of the European Council into a collective Presidency of Europe; bestowal of the role of Constitutional Court on the European Court of Justice; bestowal on the European institutions of the exclusive competence on defence and money (currently in the process of being transferred), all the other competences being concurrent (which means shared between various levels of government of the Federation).

The project of the Europe of regions then, which would merely imply the elimination of the nation-states, and the transformation of the regions into members of the European Federation, is incompatible with the federal model such as we conceive it. It is enough, to be persuaded of it, to consider that national governments still have a reason to live on because of the existence of several problems of a national dimension (for instance the protection and promotion of national languages and cultures) and the impossibility for a multitude of regions to exercise an effective countervailing

power toward the European Government.

In conclusion it should be reasserted that federalism is a political and intellectual revolution which questions most of the traditional notions we are used to in thinking of political life. It is not an exaggeration, if we consider how much we are still prisoners of the "national" political culture. I would like to propose a few examples.

The nation is not the one and only legitimate basis for the construction of a state. Federalism advocates the overcoming of the principle "one nation one state" and leads to building multinational states and hence to creating the institutional conditions for the pacific coexistence of the nations of Europe, and in perspective of the whole world.

The nation-state is not the one and only conceivable basis for law and democracy. Federalism leads to the establishment of a supra-national government supplied with adequate institutions and independent powers to ban violence from among member-states and to impose the observation of federal laws over a multinational territory. At the same time federalism is the only political system which by its very nature ensures that democracy can express itself at all levels, from local to world, and thus combines local with international democracy.

Some Thoughts on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

John Parry

In June 1999 the Cologne Summit decided that the citizens' "fundamental rights at Union level should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evident". It was therefore clear from the start that, while the European Parliament and many NGOs took the view that this new Charter should have legal standing, this was not the Summit's intention.

Drawing up an EU Charter of rights was nevertheless an important innovation. It was to include [a] "fundamental rights & freedoms as well as basic procedural rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights" [b] "fundamental rights that pertain only to the Union's citizens", and [c] "economic & social rights as contained in the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers [European Community Treaty Art.136], insofar as they do not merely establish objectives for action by the Union".

The second innovation was that the task of drafting the Charter did not go to the usual committees of national civil servants answerable only to their Ministers. Instead, in a change from the EU's normal practice, it was given to a Convention made up of representatives of the European Parliament, national parliaments, member states' governments, and the Commission, together with observers from the European Court of Justice. It was chaired by Roman Herzog, formerly President of Germany and President of the German Constitutional Court and its work was to be completed in accordance with a strict timetable. The final text was in fact completed by Autumn, 2000.

Public reaction

Reactions to the Charter project varied. Federalists feared that the European Council's true motive was to sidestep their demand for a constitution. Other doubters held it to be unnecessary, EU rights being Treaty-based and therefore already justiciable. Some, with their eye on Article 17.2 of the European Community Treaty [TEC], thought it should emphasize that EU citizenship involves duties as well as rights, while many lawyers felt it posed a risk of overlap and confusion between the spheres of competence of the Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice.

Supporters, on the other hand, pointed out that the public's ignorance of their rights under the Treaties and ensuing legislation was one cause of scepticism about the European project. They saw the Charter as a way of promoting a "citizen's Europe". Non-Governmental Organisations in particular were aware that collating existing rights would also highlight how much was missing. They lobbied the Convention, though unsuccessfully, to include "new" rights which were outside the remit.

A democratic Union

The finished Charter is a remarkable and valuable document, though not without its weaknesses. One example is the way it handles political rights. The articles dealing with freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association are clear and unambiguous. On the other hand, the right to vote as a general principle is mysteriously absent. In both its Preamble and its fifty-four Articles the

Comments

Charter reiterates the values of the European Union listed in the European Union Treaty [TEU] Art.6.1 as being "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states". These values apply at both Union and member states levels. Respect for them are a condition of EU membership. Any member state found to be in breach of them may, according to the Treaties, be disciplined. As only democratic countries may be admitted to the Union, it could therefore be argued that the right to vote in one's own country constitutes an existing right under the Treaties.

Of course, the Charter recognises that any European Union citizen resident in an EU Member State of which he or she is not a national may nevertheless vote or stand as a candidate in European or municipal elections under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This is a limited rather than a fundamental right and mirrors the embryo nature of EU citizenship. We are a long way from the American arrangement whereby the citizen of any State in the federation automatically acquires full citizenship rights in any other such State on taking up residence there.

The Charter too is limited in its application. Article 51 makes it clear that its provisions "are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law". Nevertheless, several of its articles clearly apply at both national and European levels. The articles on entitlement to social security and health care are recognizably in this category and refer in the same breath to "Community law" and to "national laws and practices".

A federal constitution would be expected to contain both a catalogue of citizen's rights applicable throughout the federation and a clear statement of the divisions of competences between the

federal and sub-federal levels of government. The Charter, however, is not a constitution and it betrays at times an uneasiness about the relationship between Member States and the EU where basic rights are concerned. An optimist might say that such tensions are normal in a federation, and a healthy sign. A pessimist might take the different view that the EU has not yet travelled far enough along the road towards a constitutional federation.

Basic human rights

Further examples of this uneasiness can be found in articles such as those concerning such basic human rights as the right to life, to education, to liberty and security of person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, and others of a similar type. These are for the most part rights more commonly associated with the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] drawn up by the Council of Europe which has so far been the most successful internationally binding charter of its kind. It is justiciable and the protection it offers applies to all persons within the jurisdiction of its signatory States, with right of appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

All EU member states are also members of the Council of Europe, though the EU itself is not; nor is it a signatory to its conventions. Nevertheless, under Article 46(d) of the European Union Treaty [TEU], these same ECHR rights now apply to actions by the EU's own institutions and are justiciable before the Court of Justice. They should however be widened to cover all EU actions, including the second and third pillars. It is particularly important to ensure that the EU acts in accordance with its own high standards with regard to human rights in relation to immigration and asylum issues and the operation of the Schengen Information System.

Critics of the Charter predict a possible conflict between the Council of Europe's Court of Human

Rights and the EU's Court of Justice. Article 52(3) of the Charter attempts to forestall any such problems by stating that where its provisions correspond to rights guaranteed by ECHR, "the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention".

This relationship needs further examination. It is unlikely at present that the EU itself could apply for membership of the Council of Europe, even if that were desirable. Perhaps the way forward might be for the EU to become a High Contracting Party to the ECHR, though for this purpose a Treaty amendment endowing the EU with the necessary legal personality [see Court of Justice Opinion 2/94] would be needed. In addition, a special agreement could be negotiated, recognising the primacy of Strasbourg in Human Rights questions, thus avoiding confusion of competences between the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights.

Citizens and non-citizens

For the estimated 14 million non-citizens living and working in the various member states the principle of non-discrimination in Article 21, based on the TEC's Article 13, is an important factor in promoting equal treatment. This, together with most other articles in the Charter, applies to citizens and non-citizens alike, though a few – in particular Articles 39-40 concerned with voting rights – are for EU citizens only.

As one aim of such voting rights is to help the integration of EU citizens living in a member state other than their own, might they not also be extended for the same reason to permanently resident non-citizens, as is already the case with local elections in certain member states?

Alternatively, a mechanism could be established by which 3rd country nationals could apply for the status of EU citizen on the basis of residence rather than nationality. Such a move would help to foster a rights-orientated rather than ethnic or nation-based sense of European identity.

The Charter's legal status

From the text of the Cologne Summit communiqué it seems clear that the Charter was intended simply to draw people's attention to their rights rather than to have legal force. On the other hand the opinion has been voiced by some lawyers that even as a declaratory document it is likely to have some impact on court decisions.

However, it is difficult to understand how a non-justiciable Charter could have the required impact on public perception. Most people feel that, to be effective, fundamental rights should not be simply tucked away in obscure legal texts but, as well as being enforceable, should be clearly stated in language which can readily be understood. The great achievement of this Charter is its clarity.

Conclusion

The importance of the Charter in the development of the European Union must be clearly recognised. It underlines the democratic and rights-based nature of the European Union. But it needs to be matched by an equally clear description of the competences of the Union and its institutions.

In a protocol to the draft Treaty agreed in Nice the Europe Council sets out its provisions for a wide-ranging public discussion of the EU's future development, its competences, its relationship with member states and their parliaments, and the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. How useful this debate will be depends on how it is organised. If the focus is simply another round of inter-governmental horse-trading it could turn out to be a futile exercise.

The ideal focus for a public debate of the issues involved would be to establish a Convention of the type used to draft this Charter, but this time endowed with the task of drawing up a federal constitution of the European Union of which the Charter should form part.

Comments

Proposals for Europe A Political and Moral Essay

Robert Lafont*

The theses which follow will appear utopian, as indeed they are. But utopia becomes a necessity when change is a matter of urgency.

This is because:

- the dangers which threaten men and citizens at the start of a new millennium can't allow the political conscience to remain half-asleep any longer;
- societies' problems must be faced and tackled at a world-wide level due to the globalization of the economy and the worldwide spread of cultural information;
- a new historical subject is now emerging: Europe as a regional ensemble, and this in spite of the obstacles raised by the Nation-States, which themselves control the project.

Europe must become our hope now, and this hope must be realized in the future.

It will certainly be remarked, and it may or may not shock some readers, that nation-state has already been eliminated from our perspectives. But for the clarity of our thesis this was necessary. A true vision of the new Europe cannot be reached if a general and stubborn blindness to fast changing realities persists: among these realities, at the turn of the century, are the erosion of decision-making powers, the condemnation for

historical crimes and the loss of political pertinence of the State – this State which emerged between the XIII and XVI centuries, hardened by an authoritative rule and centralization between the XVII and XX century and reached its own frontiers through inexpiable wars.

As far as the concept of nation is concerned we will take it at the time when it was created in France after the American model between 1789 and 1793 before it degenerated into imperialism and centralization. Today, Europe can, in its turn, become such a Nation – and it seems there is no other model.

It is a negotiation of history – and all history is made by negotiations – which will tell how the State can become a mediator towards this indispensable mutation, and how the guarantees it offers, in spite of its functional tyranny, to men and citizens, can be safeguarded under the seal of a new historical subject.

According to what has become more and more obvious in recent years “re-founding the Republic” cannot be seriously envisaged. In Europe the days of the Republic are over. Only a European Constitution can help us to get out of four kinds of dead ends or deadlocks that appeared at the end of the century and which are the final phases of previous evolutions which have suddenly accelerated.

*Robert Lafont published a lot on the process of regionalisation, the internal colonisation in France and the reorganisation of the European space. See in particular *La révolution régionaliste*, Gallimard, Paris, 1968; *Sur la France*, Gallimard, Paris, 1968; *Décoloniser en France - les Régions face à l'Europe*, Gallimard, Paris, 1971; *Autonomie, de la région à l'autogestion*, Gallimard, Paris, 1976; *Lettre de Vienne à un ami européen*, Aubanel, Avignon, 1989; *Nous, peuple européen*, Kimé, Paris, 1991; *La nation, l'Etat, les régions: réflexions pour une fin de siècle et un commencement de l'Europe*, Berg International, Paris, 1993.

The dead end of State-nationalism

At the same time that the globalization of the economy and stock-exchanges put an end to "national markets" which had promoted and supported the building of nation-states in the period of history which goes from the XVI century to the 1960's, these Nation-States lived on in their shape, structure and nominal sovereignty.

In the Balkans we have seen a return of nationalism in the forms of cruelty and savagery we thought had disappeared once and for all with nazism. The remedies that the international community found to this series of savage conflicts, after two local wars (Bosnia and Kosovo), are merely local partitions which are nothing but a return to the sources of the trouble, i.e. State-nationalism, serve as a protection to war criminals and show their impotence to alleviate ethnic tensions.

The American military air intervention in Serbia was carried out practically out the limits of legality sanctioned by the U.N. This operation, after the war against Iraq, has proved that this organization of Nations to safeguard peace was but a Club of States where force prevails – in both cases the force of a self-proclaimed "world policeman". It has renewed the scandal of the great bombing raids of the second world war: the punishing of civil populations for the crimes committed by their oppressors.

However two principles have emerged which will stand as hand marks in the history of humanity:

- first: the right and duty to intervene in the defence of oppressed communities on condition that the strategies of great powers do not choose arbitrarily between groups (why Albanians and not Kurds?) and that a clear distinction be made between peoples and their oppressors;

- second: a supra-national responsibility in peace-keeping and protection of freedoms. If in this respect Europe has been absent or has lagged behind, the idea of a European military force of

intervention has, at least, taken shape.

But can these two principles be acted upon by this other Club of States which is Europe in its present form?

The dead end of Territory

National markets were organized in the capitalist phase of the XIX century as the regency of a central power over territory within its borders, coupling this, at time, with a free-trade policy as conditions required, which seems somewhat hypocritical!

In the case of a hyper-centralized State, of which France has been the model, the capitalist power has applied to its territory a strategy of regular exploitation of its peripheries which looked rather like an "internal colonialism" and was very strong between 1860 and 1970.

Stop-gap measures generally known as "*aménagement du territoire*" (i.e. town and country planning) taken in a final period (1950-1970) very closely followed the process of territorial imbalance. At the same time the weight of the Common Market worsened the imbalance at the periphery, making this "internal colonialism" more visible (cf. coal crisis and pit closures) by the end of the period.

In their turn the advances in the constitution of this Common Market which have led to the marginalizing of the strong areas of the national territory and the increasing globalization of the economy, have, since about 1980, created a new economic situation. The French center – the Paris area – is far from the center of Europe and cannot protect itself any longer except by means of a massive national investment in the "inescapable Capital" and a perverse use of regionalisation towards a further growth of the Ile de France region. "*L'aménagement du territoire*" is, in practice, forgotten.

On the contrary the French regions, like all those of Europe and in spite of the handicap of a biased process of regionalisation, have begun to "feel the

Comments

space", that is to say to discover the natural relations of their geographic situation which the artifice of a territory drawn by ancient wars and power diplomacy had blurred for centuries.

At the same time European contracts, credits and subsidies at the outset controlled by the States tend today to be freed from the supervision (cf. the Inter-reg. Programs). The Europe of areas and regions is in the process of being created as the limits and constraints imposed by States are weakening or fading out.

It is the very concept of "territory", a political boundary-marking imposed on socio-economic conditions, which has become outmoded and practically useless. It covers a reality which already belongs to the past.

The dead ends of globalization

Runaway globalization accelerated during the last five or six years of the XX century, this was largely a consequence of the collapse of state-socialism (here communism). It seems to be reaching a climax without serious obstacles in its path. But its triumph seems to beget its own deadlocks.

We see three of them:

- By suppressing or erasing national borders it allows the competition of large interstate regions which take shape on a global scale and whose chances suddenly look unequal. This unequal development that pertains to the very nature of capitalism, accelerated by the stock-exchange driven economies encompasses the whole planet. It renews and carries to its highest level the colonialism of the ancient colonialist powers, but also on a smaller regional scale, for example in Europe, it revives the internal colonialism of centralized States. Since globalization obeys no strict rules or laws it cannot but produce inter-regional social conflicts of which the current structuring of Europe between South and North, West and East seems to announce.

- As the whole world is covered by the global

market it makes traditional means of production obsolete and it disrupts ways of life and social-cultural habits which must fall into the melting-pot of a unified consumer society. This has already produced a kind of backlash. The fundamental cultural claims which emerged thirty years ago in Occitania (South of France) on the Larzac plateau have now manifested themselves in the demonstrations of Seattle and Davos in all their humanist impetus and picturesque riotousness. Thus all that was local is being moulded into the planetary. The conflict cannot but deepen.

- Finally the collusion between the political classes, the illegal fringe and the criminal classes, which were commonplace but relatively unusual in the old days, has just taken unheard dimensions. It has developed, with the most dangerous traffics (such as drugs and arms deals) at the very heart of the Wall Street stock exchange power. It has seized the substantial influence over some national governments. In Russia, for example, it has resulted in a paradoxical situation where a reinforced state-nationalism serves in its shape a Mafia-state as a screen or shield for international criminals. The danger has become huge.

The nuclear dead end

During the last half-century, atomic energy has supplied the club of powers who had the means with an arsenal of destruction capable of condemning the planet to death several times over. The equilibrium of terror has undoubtedly prevented a world-wide conflict. But this has now resulted in a deadlock from which we find no exit. It is obvious that this deadly arsenal must be destroyed (which is much more difficult than building it) but due to the weight and persistence of state sovereignties there is no world authority capable to take this decision. A stark paradox: planetary development has escaped from the hands of the States but the destruction of the planet remains in their hands and at the mercy of their petty quarrels and rivalries.

Civil nuclear power poses a danger as well. Chernobyl has proved and continues to prove that the gain in productivity brought about by atomic energy is paid back through a threat to the planet. A contest has now been undertaken between the maintenance of atomic power plants and the fight against the dangers they involve (which cannot be reduced to zero). Germany has made the first move, although insufficient so far, in order to deal with this dilemma.

France is coming to a turning point: its "all nuclear strategy", once a subject of great national pride, despite the destruction without pity of regional resources such as coal, cannot be reversed without a negotiation with its electricity consumers and European clients. Either France keeps its nuclear electricity supply and poses unacceptable threats to Europe or it joins a European plan to replace atomic energy with a mix of new energies and the use of other former non-renewable fuels.

In order to escape from these dead ends the proposal of European democracy, according to me, should have three dimensions.

The European government

There is no mystery about that Europe needs a unified government fully responsible to an Assembly elected by universal suffrage on a non-national list system, with regional modulations necessary to equalize chances, if needed. Her chief innovation would be the affirmation of a political subject of a new kind: the moral political subject. But if we look at things properly this is what the Nation meant in 1789. In order to reach this goal the laying out of democratic European institutions ought to be accompanied by four solemn declarations.

Declaration to renounce nuclear power and such industries destructive of the biosphere, within the framework of a European comprehensive plan of conversion spread over twenty years (Europe of ecology).
Declaration of acknowledgement of a right to self-organization by national communities, regional or

immigrated, in particular linguistic and cultural terms (Europe of Cultural Rights). *Declaration about power, which in a democracy cannot be but ascendant, which means that a decisional pyramid is established from the civic-base unit (municipality or country) up to the European top, passing through the level of regional government (Federal Europe).* *Declaration of acknowledgement of social solidarity, that is to say to replace the particular and ineffective fights against unemployment with a periodic re-valuation of employment distribution and financial supports (Social Europe).*

Such an organization propped up by such important pledges does not solve the world's problems but it defines a privileged area for civic experimentation and establishes at a planetary scale a pole of training and impulse for "universal peace making".

European Territorial Organization

The anarchy which the centralized State maintains in the development of regions and the recent intervention of globalization must be replaced by a rational organization, which poses three questions.

The question of the "civic area" of Europe

Currently the enlargement of Europe is defined on the basis of the application of Nation-States without any consideration of geographic, historical or cultural coherence. Originating in a local and conjunctural agreement at the world scale, between a group of occidental States the European area runs the risk of becoming a territorial monster brutally and carelessly traversed by insuperable contradictions. A debate must be established between the fifteen member States in order to decide a transition period during which a sound procedure for enlargement will be defined according to a strategy of internal complementarities and external links and connections.

The question of the basic organic unit

It will be necessary to balance globalization and the territorial weight inherited from States with a manageable form of local democracy which will

Comments

lead everywhere to the promotion of the relational geographic unit either traditional or post-modern which is known as "pays" in France, "kreis" in Germany, "comarca" in Spain, etc. But we must give this system a well-defined ecological function to protect and organize the local environment, together with a social function of resource equilibrium and work-distribution. It should be given a civic statute, i.e. an Assembly with concrete powers elected by universal ballot.

The question of strategic space organization

It must be clearly stated that it cannot be the State which has deliberately shown that it preserved territorial dysfunctions, the tyranny of center and isolationism. The basic founding unit must be the "European Region" as much as possible with a well-defined historical and cultural identity and with equal powers within the whole concerned area. The region being open by contract to inter-regional relations on the European scale but also to the outside world (for example on the Mediterranean). The setting up of institutions and the joint development of the Senate and a European Economical and Social Committee operating in close cooperation with the European Assembly. Regional autonomy must be guaranteed at its own level by a Parliament elected by universal suffrage based on the countries.

The creation of a European Area to regulate globalization

It has two basic aspect.

The economic aspect. We need to create at the European level what the States, by betraying their proclaimed sovereignty, have not been able to create and which does not exist in the Europe we have built so far: a tool for the control of global mobility of capital. This does not constitute an archaic form of protectionism. It actually consists in letting produced resources flow upward and investment flow downward through a European Development

Bank controlled by Civic Power at its three levels and which would implement the fundamental choices made by these assemblies. This is the present dynamic form which suits the functioning of a liberal economy of "regional ownership", which was formulated in the old days to correct "internal colonialism". This might be the beginning of a "third way" between dead socialism and a capitalism which has reached its dead end.

The cultural aspect. It is first of all linguistic. Always in the linguistic history of mankind the market of goods has been accompanied by a market of language. Globalization sustained by Internet has resulted in a surprisingly fast world-wide spreading of English. One can regret this new form of imperialism but it is vain to think opposing it. The game has already been lost. From this point of view the refusal of the French which has a tint of imperial nostalgia is only a series of ineffective and sometimes ludicrous diversions. In this field Europe has a positive choice to make whose economical aspect cannot escape anyone. But this choice of a practical tool for universal communication leaves intact the statement of a right, also universal, recently strongly put forward: the right of any language and any culture to its free development and the right of those who are in danger to be the object of rescue operations. This way another dimension of globalization has been defined which we shall call for cultural plurality. Of this plurality where French, in the same way as German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish but also Breton, Occitan, Gaelic, Welsh, Catalan, Frisian etc. have a chance to keep a place in the modern world, a European Bureau of Cultural rights should be responsible.

All these options not only would tune Europe up to the evolution of the world in its most positive aspects, but would constitute an example for others, or, as the Nations at a stage of power and self-celebration, liked to say of themselves in bygone days, Europe would become a "lighthouse" for the world.

The Establishment of the Fondation Internationale Triffin

George Lingbour

Robert Triffin was one of the greatest economists of the century just ended. Born in 1911 in Flobecq, Belgium, he graduated from the Université Catholique de Louvain. In 1935 he moved to the United States under a scholarship. He received his doctorate from Harvard University, where he studied under Schumpeter and Leontief.

Triffin's academic career began at Harvard and continued, after 1951, at Yale. He occupied many important roles in government and supranational institutions: from the Federal Reserve Board, where he dealt with the monetary problems of Latin America, to the International Monetary Fund, of which he was the first European representative, and the U.S. State Department. He was an advisor to the European Economic Community from its inception, as well as to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Triffin's name is linked with at least two key events in European history: the creation in 1950 of the European Payments Union, which played a decisive role in the continent's economic recovery after World War Two, and the launch of the European Monetary System and the European Currency Unit in 1979, which initiated the process that led to Maastricht and the euro two decades later. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, Triffin was convinced that the reorganisation of the international monetary system had to come about through the creation of regional areas of monetary stability. Such political and intellectual convictions induced him to return to Europe in 1977, where he became a professor at Louvain-la-Neuve. Triffin died in Ostend on 23 February 1993.

The desire to keep his works alive and continue his commitment to the major issues of the international monetary system and, in general, of the economy, finance, and the social sciences has led to the setting up of the *Fondation Internationale Triffin* (FIT).

The Foundation intends to continue Triffin's academic activities and his intellectual legacy. It will do this by encouraging teaching and research in the above-mentioned fields, notably through the creation of a chair, awarding scholarships and study grants, supporting the publication of individual and collective works, and organising conferences, seminars and colloquia. It will also promote the collection and the classification of Triffin's writings and records.

In particular, FIT intends to tackle the new problems facing Europe and the international monetary system in the 21st century. Such issues include the value of the euro outside Europe and the new tasks to be shouldered by the International Monetary Fund. Another issue is the potential monetary orders of regions such as Asia and Latin America, which, on the one hand, have the example of Europe's successful economic and monetary union and the euro, and, on the other, are influenced by the hegemony of the dollar as an international currency.

Besides the various individuals connected in one way or another with Triffin, the founding members of FIT include the Institut d'Études Européennes (where FIT has its premises) and the Institut de Recherches Économiques, both of which are based at the Université Catholique de

Comments

Louvain; the Turin-based Compagnia di San Paolo; and the Robert Triffin-Szirák Foundation of Budapest. The chairman of FIT is Alexander Lamfalussy, previously chairman of the Bank for International Settlements and the European Monetary Institute. Vice-chairmen are Alfonso Iozzo and Bernard Snoy. The general secretary is Michel Dumoulin, a historian and president of the Institut d'Etudes Européennes. Members of the board include Eric Bussière, Isabelle Cassiers, René Villareal, and Miklós Szabó Pelsóczy.

The Foundation was launched with an international symposium on the theme "The fragility of the international monetary system: How can we prevent new crises in emerging markets?", that took place on 14-15 September 2000 at the Institut d'Etudes Européennes in Louvain-la-Neuve. The meeting saw the participation of academics, representatives from international institutions, along with prominent personalities from the financial world, many of whom were pupils of Triffin from Yale, his friends, and his colleagues.

The first session, dedicated to the European Payments Union (EPU), was introduced by Alexander Lamfalussy, who presented an overview of "Fifty years of monetary crises". Sabine Godts-Peeters, from the ICHEC in Brussels, outlined Triffin's contribution to the EPU. Jorge Braga de Macedo, from the OECD, discussed what lessons can be learnt from the European experience with the step-by-step liberalisation of current and capital accounts, growth and integration from the EPU through to monetary union.

The second session was devoted to "the intellectual heritage of Robert Triffin confronted to recent financial crises". René Villareal, president

of Mexico City's Center of Intellectual Capital and Competitiveness, examined the lessons to be learnt from Latin America's monetary crises since the eighties. Shiji Takagi, from Yale, investigated the possible existence of a common source behind recent financial crises in Asia. Bernard Snoy, from the EBRD, discussed the origins of the Russian financial crisis and the pitfalls in that country's transition process.

The third and final session centred on the theme "Towards systemic reforms to prevent new crises in emerging markets". Ronald Anderson, of the IRES – Université Catholique de Louvain, and Albert Steinherr, chief economist of the EIB, highlighted the factors that may influence monetary relationships in Asia over the next decade, finally proposing the creation of an Asian Monetary System. Michel Aglietta, from CEPII in Paris, analysed the role of the IMF in the evolution of the international financial architecture. Christian Ghymers, advisor to the European Commission, assessed the importance of a regional approach as a contribution to a more stable international monetary system.

The symposium, which offered much material for further thought and analysis, also with regard to the activities of FIT, concluded with a roundtable session on "International financial flows: catalysts of change or threat to stability", chaired by Guy Quaden, governor of the National Bank of Belgium. The session saw the participation of György Szapáry, advisor to the president of the National Bank of Hungary, Andrew Crockett, general manager of BIS, Ted Truman, of the United States Department of Treasury, and Olivier Lefebvre, chief executive of the Brussels Stock Exchange.

Tobin Tax or World Currency?

Guido Montani

In the Fall 2000 issue of *World Federalist News*, in an article on the World Federalist Movement's programme (*Tobin Tax Campaigns Take Off!*), it is argued that federalists should support a campaign in favour of the Tobin Tax and fight for the introduction of a Currency Transaction Tax (CTT).

In-depth examination of the problem is advisable before venturing into an undertaking with ambiguous aspects. The fact that the Tobin Tax has become a very popular slogan among critics of globalisation is not a sufficient reason to make it an objective of the federalists' strategy. Federalists must support proposals conducive to overcoming the national state, by creating supranational instruments to govern the economy. Proposing a tax on monetary transactions has in it a nationalistic trait we have to be aware of, lest we fall into the trap of those defending the international *status-quo*. The anti-globalisation movement, which showed its strength in Seattle, may easily take the wrong way and be working for the King of Prussia. The fact that in France the Tobin Tax is supported by right-wing (Mr Pasqua) and left-wing (Mr Chevènement) *souverainistes* should ring an alarm bell in our minds.

The idea of the Tobin Tax has specific historical roots. In the seventies, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, brought about also by the first effects of financial globalisation, economists put forward several proposals to allow national governments and national central banks to regain control of the economic process, in a context of increasing monetary disorder and world-wide economic crisis. In fact, the seventies were the years of

stagflation. Tobin proposed to put "some sand in the wheels" of our excessively efficient international money market, so as to allow the central banks to control more efficiently their domestic interest rates by partially isolating their national economies from the world markets. Tobin was aware of the limits in his proposal, due both to the practical difficulty of its implementation, and to the fact that it was the "second best" solution after the radical one of creating a common currency, as the European countries were discussing at the time for the European Community. It is obvious, and Tobin says so very clearly, that the right cure for speculation on exchange rates is the abolition of the exchange rates themselves by the creation of a common currency. As to the infra-national movements of capital, nobody seriously proposes to tax capital moving from one region to another, for example, from Virginia to Arizona, or from Bavaria to Saxony. Entrepreneurs must be free to invest wherever better opportunities for profit are present. But the State must be free to tax profits, just as it taxes labour and other incomes. The real problem is to tax profits, not the movements of capital.

Compared to the situation of the seventies, the present world picture has changed in three significant aspects. The first concerns the increase in extension and importance of globalisation. International movements of capital have soared and production activities have become more and more multinational. The globalisation process has consolidated after the end of the cold war. Countries of the former communist area, from Russia to China, are pushing hard to become part of the western productive and financial system. They are

Comments

insistently knocking on the doors of the G7 and the IMF. A truly world-wide market is forming, more and more integrated but with very weak instruments available for governing it. As the world market strength grows, the ability of the USA and the international bodies, like the IMF, to counter economic shocks is decreasing. The crisis of 1997, according to a statement by Mr Camdessus, a former IMF director, brought the whole world to the brink of an abyss, luckily escaping a tumble into it, unlike in the thirties.

Secondly, third-world countries have thoroughly changed their attitude towards international investments. In the sixties, these investments were considered a form of neo-colonialism. Today, third-world governments vie with each other to attract capital and entrepreneurs. The case of the Asian Tigers is symbolic of this. Their swift development in the eighties and nineties would have been unthinkable without the flow of western capital. But the recent crisis, which propagated from Asia to Russia and Brazil, is a serious indication of the fragility of the international financial system. An individual in the Ardennes or in Ontario confidently entrusts his savings to a local Investment Fund, without knowing that it will in turn invest them in Thailand or Bolivia at very high risk. The world financial system is nowadays deeply integrated. But the information channels are made of clumsy institutions, lacking effective powers of control.

The third difference to take into account is the creation of the European monetary union. It is not yet regarded as a revolutionary novelty in the international scene, because the transfer of monetary sovereignty from the European national states to the Union did not bring with it the creation of a European federal government. The euro's weakness relative to the dollar and the yen is a symptom of this. But federalists must not be carried away by the current public opinion which is unable to see, beyond the euro, the next step leading to the European federal state. The birth of the

euro has put an end, forever, to the possibility of monetary speculation on exchange rates among European currencies. This is a big success in the struggle for overcoming national sovereignty, which opens up new perspectives for reform even at the world level. Among the European countries a Tobin Tax is no longer necessary and if the European federalists' fight for giving a democratic government to the Union is successful, Europe will become a new world power, comparable to the USA, but independent from it.

What shall we do then, in this new world situation? Which shall the federalists' strategy be for proceeding towards the world government of globalisation? Based on the above considerations and the European monetary experiment, it is possible to set down clearly the outlines of the ideal arrival point: a world currency and a democratic world government. Of course, as soon as the final objective is worded in such terms, the objection is immediately raised that this is a utopian view and that the urgent remedies must be found elsewhere. Politics is the art of the possible, it is true. But with a small correction. Jean Monnet used to say that politics is the art of making possible what is necessary. Now, globalisation is a challenge to governments and national states, which are losing control over the old levers of command. Today it is not possible to oppose the globalisation process, just as it would have been foolish two centuries ago to oppose the first industrial revolution. The Luddites did it at the beginning of the XIX century, but Socialists realised that the real issue was how to govern and control capitalism, not how to resist its technological and social achievements. The same must be done today: globalisation must be governed. This is possible if new *supranational* governing instruments are created. Although a democratic world government is not realisable in the present political cycle, appreciable steps in this direction are possible.

The federalists' strategy for a new economic world order could be based on the following proposals:

1) endow the UN with financial resources of its own, in order for it to act efficiently for sustainable development, manage sudden financial crises and free itself from the continuous blackmailing by national governments, which by not paying their dues make it unable to operate. Somebody may believe that providing the UN with its own resources is implicit in the proposal of a tax on monetary transactions - although national governments do not agree, because they intend to keep the proceeds of the Tobin Tax in their budgets. However, it is better to keep the two things separate. If the UN is to be financed, it is advisable to draw on other accounts, like a tax on airline tickets, on energy, on polluting materials, on multinational companies' profits, and so on. But just considering that the European Union, even though it already has a single currency, still lacks sufficient powers directly to tax European firms and capital, is enough to appreciate the difficulties to be overcome at the world level.

2) a New Bretton Woods for stabilising the exchange rates between big monetary areas and for strengthening the intervention powers of the IMF. Stabilising the exchange rates between the dollar, the euro and the yen means stabilising 80% of the world economy. Of course, the New Bretton Woods must involve the third-world countries, which today are important destinations of international capital movements and find themselves in great hardship in keeping their weak national currencies alive. The road proposed by the American government, that is, making the dollarisation of Third World countries feasible, as shown by the experiment in Ecuador and Timor, has to be rejected, because of its neo-colonialist nature and its danger for world stability. If this were the road followed by many countries, the USA would in the end wield the absolute power of deciding the monetary policy for the rest of the planet. On the contrary, the IMF, in the reformed Council of which representatives of all peoples should sit, should make available

to the countries asking for it a world currency of its own, free to circulate alongside the present major currencies, like the dollar, the euro and the yen. This IMF currency, or "world currency in embryo", could be of the same importance as the yen, the euro or the dollar in the financial markets, if a sizeable group of third-world countries adopt it.

3) make closer and closer the relationship between world monetary unification and democratisation of the UN. Europe's experience has shown that the two integration processes, economic and political, can proceed in parallel, strengthening each other.

In conclusion, the Tobin Tax is an ambiguous proposal. If the problem is how to provide the UN with resources of its own, then these should be openly asked for. The problem can be solved, provided the political determination is there, with other means. The Tobin Tax represents a treacherous instrument which national governments could use for imposing controls on capital (and people), strengthening in the end their national currencies. Protectionism is a typical instrument of the economic nationalism of the past, which it is better not to resurrect. Protesting against anarchical globalisation must by no means offer the pretext to nationalist forces for taking the world economy back to the situation of the thirties. Globalisation has to be governed by new supranational institutions.

A world currency is a supranational institution, albeit admittedly it is not a short-term goal. However, significant steps towards a world currency can be taken, such as calling for a New Bretton Woods in order to create a new global economic order, especially if Europe is able to become a new actor in world politics. The WFM must champion a strategic objective with expressly federalist contents. Only thus will it become the critical vanguard of the world people in the making.

Comments

Mundell for a World Currency

Robert Mundell, 1999 Nobel Laureate and Professor of Economics, Columbia University, is the father of the optimal monetary areas theory and a former supporter of the flexible exchange-rate system. At the IMF Economic Forum *One World, One Currency: Destination or Delusion?* (Washington, November 8, 2000) he declared:

"... Europe has moved towards a single currency... which is very different from... a common currency that would be shared by each country, but co-exist with national currencies... I myself think that the European currency would not have come into existence had it not been for the stimulus, the political stimulus, given to the whole episode by German unification.

... I think it is more interesting to talk about not "one world, one currency", but "one world, one currency area", defining a currency area as a zone of fixed exchange rate. I would define the gold standard not as a single currency, but as a single currency area... I think that if we think in terms of a world currency, there is no need whatsoever to have a single currency... Every country can have their own currency in the world, and you can still have the benefits of a common currency because you are all using the Canadian dollar, the Mexican dollar, etc. ... [The dollarization] would be a solution that would imply, because it is the US dollar, some kind of domination, and that might not be acceptable to the world.

... Well, we move forward to the question of what countries need to do when they form a currency area. Europe's example has given us a

lot of good lessons for it. There are five things you need to do when you form a currency area, and Europe has done all of these things: ... a common target for monetary policy, ... a common measure of inflation, ... to lock exchange rates, ... a common monetary policy, ... a system for dividing up the seigniorage.

... There are three types of anchor that you could use in the world economy. One would be gold, again. Nobody is interested in that too much. ... A second possibility would be to have a virtual kind of common currency, an indexed SDR (Special Drawing Rights). ... It would be stable and it would be in a way effective. The third possibility is to have a big power, or two or three of the big currency areas in the world, getting together and forming a common monetary policy and using that as the anchor for the world currency. That is the one that I am the most interested in right now, because I think the others aren't going to get anywhere at the present time. I think that if we took the G-3 area - the euro area, the dollar area and the yen area - and fixed exchange rates among these areas, it would work very well.

... Remember that throughout monetary history, the superpower has always rejected international monetary reform. The big opponent of monetary reform in the 19th century was always Great Britain. ... And the United States is the country that has been opposed to a world currency in the 20th century. ... But now the situation is different because the euro area has created for the first time the chance of a change in the power configuration of the system" (*a.m.*).

Globalization and the Birth of a World Left

Grazia Borgna

In June, the forum of World Social Democracy gathered for the third time. The first two meetings took place respectively in New York in 1997 and in Florence in 1999, while this last one was held in Berlin. These three meetings have been sufficient to shape a clear-cut position, known as the "Berlin Declaration", over the convenience of creating a worldwide network of progressive heads of government, willing to carry out a social and economic program based on common values.

Since the first encounter till the Berlin Conference, the support from countries run by a left or center-left government has been progressively increasing. In Florence, representatives of the Italian, French, German, and UK socialist governments were present, as well as Bill Clinton on behalf of the US government, the President of the Socialist International Gutierrez and Brazil's President Cardoso. In Berlin, besides the above mentioned people, the attendance included Kok from The Netherlands, Simiti from Greece, Persson from Sweden, and many other representatives of emerging countries such as De La Rúa for Argentina, Lagos for Chile, and Mbeki, the successor of Mandela, for South Africa. Hopefully, other countries, and above all the Eastern European States, will join during the next meeting.

Many conjectures have been made on the nature of these meetings. Do they have to do with the search for a "third way" between free trade and communism? Lionel Jospin said in Florence: "If the third way involves finding an in-the-middle position between social democracy and free-trade, this is not my stance". He quoted the French historian Fernand Braudel: "flexibility and

adaptability make capitalism a very dynamic force; however, it is a force that by itself doesn't have a direction, nor ideals or meanings. It is a moving force, but it doesn't know where it goes". Braudel added that the supremacy of global finance and information technology over the economy makes this aspect of capitalism all the more evident. Jospin maintained in Florence that the new European and world left, still building its own political identity, has no choice but to fight in order to create a set of rules for the world capitalist economy.

It is not even a matter of a "third way" considered as the intermediate position between the more free-trade-oriented approach of the current UK and US governments and the more social one of the French, German and Italian governments. As declared in Florence by Tony Blair: "What unites us in the center-left is definitely more important than what divides us". The "Berlin Manifesto" reflects the convergence of the European and American left. The first embraces America's faith in the new economy and internet, seen as tools to help developing countries to overcome their misery. The latter embraces Europe's faith in the political control of the market in order to overcome social inequalities and make social justice a reality.

In the "Berlin Manifesto", some common principles come out clearly and seem to collect the necessary agreement: 1) not only a condemnation, but also an active commitment in Europe and in the world to "a global fight against racism and anti-Semitism", 2) a commitment aimed at reducing inequalities, promoting economic

Comments

growth and a fairer distribution of wealth. In order to achieve this goal, Clinton, in Berlin, stressed the importance of overcoming the "digital divide", i.e. to bridge the gap in information and technology, currently existing in the world, and to invest in education. Moreover, in the text of the Declaration the necessity to rehabilitate politics as an irreplaceable tool to direct globalization is strongly underlined.

Strategies as well have become clearer. While in Florence the theme discussed was still purely theoretical: "How to conciliate the values of solidarity of the old left with the principles of an orderly capitalist free trade", in Berlin the discussion went as far as to debate over "what to do", with the theme "For a better government". Liberals are looking for a common strategy that will not repeat the mistakes of old internationalism which, unable to lead a global battle, fell back on "national ways to socialism", repudiating its own universalistic aspiration. Even though in respect of the characteristics peculiar to each country, the left governments declared their intention to pursue similar politics, aimed at balancing state finances and curbing inflation, as well as freeing up resources to support development and occupation. Such development - it has been underlined - should be based on a new "world social pact" redressing inequalities at the international level.

Clinton and Schroeder underlined that the creation of a network of progressive governments will make it possible to institutionalize these meetings, up to now occasional. Indeed the "Global Progressive Club", as named by Schroeder, expressed its intention to meet before every G8 summit with the purpose of taking up a common position there. This could weaken the hegemonic role played until now within the G8 by the United States.

The creation of a world left seems to prove wrong those who criticized the meetings in New York

and Florence as not leading anywhere. It is instead significant that the two souls of the world left, the European and the American, felt the need to discuss about their role in the future society, and that little by little left-wing parties of other continents become involved in the debate. We are witnessing a massive effort of the developed democracies to support the process of democratization in the less developed areas of the world.

However, it is legitimate to ask ourselves: is this umpteenth attempt at coordination bound to fail in the face of a prevailing *raison d'état* or is this marking a new phase in the history of humanity?

The end of the class struggle and the failure of the communist project seemed to demonstrate the superiority of the capitalist model over real socialism and could let us think that talking about right and left as antithetical visions of the world and as different answers to the peace and well-being of humanity does not make sense anymore. Some prominent experts of political affairs, such as Daniel Bell, claim that we have to confront the crisis and the end of ideologies. Others, such as the Federalists, maintain instead that a new phase of the history of humanity has opened up, a new phase in which it is possible to resume the struggle to achieve liberal, democratic and socialist values. These values, they claim, although not impossible to fulfil, have not fully materialized because in the last century they have been blocked by the too narrow limits of national states, which initially promoted them. Prisoners of the bipolar world logic of opposing states, such values have been systematically subordinated to the *raison d'état*.

Nowadays the situation has changed. The scientific revolution, with the spreading of information technology and the creation of a world market, is rapidly transforming the way to communicate and work. This is redefining space and time barriers, putting national states in a difficult position and requiring that political institutions adapt to

the new reality. The changes taking place are of such a magnitude that it is simply not enough for the political forces to revise their analyses and programs. A global rethinking and a thorough refounding of their political identity have become necessary. The birth of the progressive network reflects this necessity.

If the challenge of our time is finding the way to democratically discipline the globalization process, devising a way to control development so that the creation of wealth does not affect negatively the environment and social stability, it is to this project that the political forces have to measure up their strength. However, it has to be noted that, whilst the democratic process has still a national dimension, the problems to be faced break into many levels: local, national, continental and global. These levels are linked together and interdependent. Whoever makes plans for the future has to keep this complexity into account.

The current debate on the society of the future is very much alive and is losing its ideological and

utopian character of the past. Today, we are not discussing a perfect and final model of society, but a project for a new world order. Unfortunately though, what progressive parties do not understand (and this puts them on a par with the conservative parties) is the fact that without the creation of world-embracing political institutions it is impossible to govern the current new phase of the history of humanity. For instance, goals such as overcoming the deficit of world citizenship, advocated by Cardoso, a sustainable development and the respect of human rights, advocated by Amnesty International and the environmentalists, an effective fight against criminality and international terrorism, as wanted by the states, and, above all, peace, are not feasible without a World Federation. These goals cannot be achieved, contrary to what is often advocated, only by international cooperation and agreements among states. This path has always proven inadequate and temporary, and therefore ineffective to guarantee a new world order founded upon rules universally recognized, which only a world democratic government can enforce.



Comments

World Federalism: Past, Present and Future

James Christie

The last two decades of the twentieth century have been staggering. We have seen the transformation of global capitalism, the fall of the Soviet empire, ecological disaster spawned at least in part by climatic change resulting from ecological degradation, the growth of the womens' movement and the movement for human rights - the list goes on.

We have seen changing attitudes around the idea of global governance. The Cold War so polarized the planet that the very idea of world federalism seemed hopelessly naive. But in today's monopolar world, the idea no longer seems far-fetched, but almost inevitable. This is an era of globalization, free-trade and the world-wide web, in which borders seem increasingly irrelevant.

In June of 1992, at Wellesley College, near Boston, the Canadian World Federalists held a joint meeting with the World Federalist Association of the United States. I had the privilege of addressing the meeting and suggested that, to some extent, the goals of the world federalist movement had been achieved. It was clear that global governance mechanisms did exist. It was necessary only to look at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But this is not what world federalists really hope for. We are not so much concerned with the simple fact of global governance, but with the quality of that governance. We continue to argue that global governance must be accountable, that it be what Abraham Lincoln described in the Gettysburg Address, government "of the people, for the people, by the people".

"What dreams may come ..."

The idea of a united world is not a new one. It

belongs to poets, warriors, philosophers, theologians, politicians, even to businessmen - let us, after all, not forget the "peace ship" of the late Henry Ford in the context of the First World War.

But pacific visions followed close on the heels of the European experience of Napoleon Bonaparte, who like Alexander, Caesar, and Genghis Khan before him, and Hitler after, wished and sought a very different kind of unified world order: an order of hegemony of one nation and culture over all others.

Hegemony and federalism are diametrically opposed. As the late Golda Meir of Israel wrote, "World federalism does not mean the end of nations, any more than orchestras mean the end of violins". No, federalism means unity in diversity, or, perhaps more correctly, the unity of diversity.

Saints as well as conquerors have dreamed of the unity of humanity. The Biblical vision of the peaceable Kingdom of the prophet Isaiah is a constant reminder of the antiquity of such dreams.

For Christians, the declaration by angels to shepherds of the birth of the Christ is a signal of good will from God to all humanity. Each of the world's great faiths in its essence offers a vision of hope for the whole human family. In our most troubled twentieth century, one need only recall the life work of Mahatma Gandhi of India, or of Miyake of Japan, to be reminded of the commitment of the saints to a vision of a united humanity, given dignity through the love of the Creator by whatever name.

We must not forget the secular saints. Schweitzer

who gave a lifetime of service for the sake of human dignity; Einstein, whose brilliance made possible the release of the most destructive power we know, and whose humanity and morality helped to hold that power in check; or Norman Cousins, who so long held leadership in our movement, and who through pen and presence encouraged so many of us when it seemed all too often that the fragile flame of our movement would be extinguished by the winds of war.

I would be remiss if I did not give at least passing mention of the late H.G. Wells, who, from the end of the 19th century through to the middle of the 20th, gave form and voice to the world federalist vision, providing the intellectual inspiration for the founding of the ill-fated League of Nations and its more hopeful successor, the United Nations, and establishing the principles inherent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From his first novel, *The Time Machine*, Wells championed global community. In his *The Outline of History*, Wells wrote of the human story as a single history, not a collection of the deeds and misdeeds of nation states. In *The Shape of Things to Come*, he cast his inner eye to the far future, and gave us a vision of what we might become, if only we chose to live it.

Not only visionary, but practical, he sought to move politicians towards a peaceful and ordered world, with the terrible destructive powers of the new science harnessed for the benefit of all. That he died before even the modest advances of our lifetimes had been realized was not due to any lack of dedication on his part. In 1927, he published the first organizer's handbook for world federalists, *The Open Conspiracy*. Its strategies remain valid.

All of us who seek in various walks of life, economic, educational, political, scientific, artistic, religious, to promote the ideas of world federalism are open conspirators with Wells, seeking nothing less than the utter transformation of world affairs

and human reality.

Religion informs us through poetry and myth that humanity has one common origin. The Leaky's have demonstrated this to be so in their studies of the origins of humanity in the great rift valley of central Africa. Both our prophets and our common sense tell us that humanity also shares a common destiny. Perhaps it will be as Wells dreamed: "*the stars, or nothing...*"

"To act our dreams..."

The late Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, wrote in *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that: "All men dream but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds may wake to find that their dreams were but vanity. But the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams to make them happen".

What a century this last has been for people prepared to act their dreams, for good or for ill. Gandhi, King, Trudeau, Meir, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Dag Hammarskjold dreamed us closer to a world united in peace. Hitler, Stalin and Mao dreamed of a world united in fear., The realities which we have inherited from these "dreamers of the day" is a far cry from what we yet hope for.

The most superficial study of the founding and history of the League of Nations will demonstrate that it was sewn with the seeds of its own destruction. The so-called peace which ended the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles, was no peace at all, but merely the end of stage one in the great world drama which would re-emerge in the second world war, and culminate only with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. The League was as insubstantial as a dream, lacking authority, coercive power, even consensus as to its function.

That the United Nations has fared better is due

Comments

"more to good luck than to good management!". The UN as successive Secretaries General have insisted, was not intended to be even an embryonic world government. It has all the flaws of its predecessor, with one distinct advantage. The UN was born in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with the clear evidence that humanity now holds the key to the destruction of the entire planet. There emerged a new moral imperative to find a way to make the international order work.

That moral imperative has, in an age of virtually instantaneous communication, become an imperative not only for professional politicians and diplomats, but for the individual world citizen. Who can yet say how much John Paul II's support for the Polish trade union, Solidarity, in 1981 led directly and inevitably to the popular demonstration which tumbled the Berlin Wall and was the overture to the end of the Soviet Union?

And here, of course, is where the World Federalist Movement begins to emerge on the world scene, as subtle as H.G. Wells' open conspiracy, as inexorable as water over a rock, wearing first a channel, and ultimately a Grand Canyon.

The World Federalist Movement, as an idea, emerged spontaneously in those fragile and hopeful years after WWII. It coalesced into a movement in the Montreux Palace Hotel, Montreux, Switzerland, in 1947. It arose out of a conviction that a great opportunity lay before humanity to reshape the course of human affairs, and that the United Nations were inadequate to seize that opportunity.

At first the movement seemed so obvious, its truths as self-evident as those of the founders of the American Republic. The great and the good flocked to our banner. Philosophers, statesmen and poets declaimed in favour of our ideas. But the onset of the Cold War, a bipolar world, rendered the federalist vision irrelevant. Many of our members lost hope; we were marginalized

within the peace movement, at least in North America and Europe. But an idea does not lose its validity simply because it ceases to be fashionable. There were many around the world, some in this room, who were determined to keep the vision alive for a new generation.

The torch of World Federalism is being taken up by that new generation, but the strategies of the movement are changing. This has led to a new federalist debate, one that is changing the nature of our strategies, but not our goal.

The Federalist Debate

For forty years, World Federalists promoted plans and programmes which have been called "maximalist". They focused on the language of world government, and promoted the idea of lobbying governments to convene conferences dedicated to the writing of world constitutions and such. This is, of course, a caricature, and, like all caricatures, carries within it both truth and gross distortion. Let me say at once that many of the ideas and programmes of those years are still valid and may yet bear fruit. For example, the International Satellite Monitoring Agency, the Standing Force for the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly.

Yet these are sweeping programmes, requiring much more than our resources, material and human, can provide. In the early 1990's, with a new International Secretariat under the leadership of Bill Pace, the World Federalist Movement began to emulate Jean Monnet, the great European Federalist, and the practical originator of what I have called *incremental federalism*.

Monnet's thesis and strategy were simple. Undertake a small and manageable federal project, succeed, and use this success as the foundation for the next step. Thus the European Union of today was born out of the Coal and Steel consortium of the early post-war years.

Thus the World Federalist Movement embarked

on its most remarkable project ever, the Non-governmental Coalition for an International Criminal Court, which led to the landmark Treaty Convention in Rome in 1998.

At first blush, it has seemed to many Federalists to be a side-issue to our major themes. Not so: justice and peace are inseparable, and a world united in justice and peace must have a mechanism by which justice can be determined. Once that is in place, mechanisms must be established by which justice can be enforced; and then ultimately, a forum must be established in which laws themselves may be promulgated.

Federalist Factors

The Federalist vision must be functional in a multifaceted world. Myriad global questions impinge on the application of federalist principles at the dawn of this new century, among them the migration of peoples, global trade, electronic communications, indeed the media in general, ecological issues, religion, and, of course, the ongoing and continuing role of nation states, especially those emerging during the past several decades of the post-colonial era.

There has surely been no time when so many people were on the move around the world for so many reasons: refugees from war and natural disaster, and so-called economic refugees seeking a better life. We simply do not know how millions of migrant people will affect the political and economic life of humanity in decades to come. What is certain, is that people "without a flag" must be a concern for the transnational community, for no nation-state can respond in isolation to the needs and aspirations of such a multitude.

Globalization of trade has been a reality for a generation, yet its implications are still being assessed. The World Trade Organization hardly seems to be adequate to deal with all the ramifications. What appears to be self-evident is that

free trade requires some measure of regulation to ensure fair practice. A supranational body of some influence must be crafted to achieve such goals.

The implications of the world wide web are almost beyond calculation. For better or worse, modern technology has already exceeded Marshal McLuhan's wildest projections, transforming his projected global village into the global neighbourhood. No tyrant is free from scrutiny, and yet reasonable privacy is seriously at risk. How will the global neighbourhood organize its affairs?

Climate change based upon ecological degradation is now a regular feature of global newscasts. Floods in Europe and Asia, devastating ice-storms in North America, drought in the sub-Saharan are but a few symptoms of the risk of global warming. Ozone-layer breakdown is beginning to affect the ocean plankton so necessary to the delicate balance of life on earth. Water, not fossil fuels, may be the commodity of risk and war in the coming century. The Rio Summit may have been our last great warning call.

The world's great religions have been called the "missing dimension of statecraft". Seen by many intellectuals and world federalists as stumbling blocks to human unity and world peace, the world's great religions are beginning, as Dr. Hans Kung predicted nearly twenty years ago, to talk to one another. Through organizations such as the World Conference on Religion and Peace, the religious communities are recognizing a common moral obligation to act together for the good of humanity.

There are nation states. In 1990 at Mc Gill University, Professor Roderick Ninian Smart remarked on one of the great errors of Marxist theory. It is not people who are mobile, while capital is fixed, but reverse. The nation state is becoming economically obsolete, itself a victim of globalization. Smart suggested that, in the future,

Comments

the nation state might find itself taking on the role of trade union for its citizens, trying to ensure the best economic opportunities from an increasingly globalized economy.

In all these instances, the current structures of world governance are inadequate. The World Federalist Movement, today and on into the future, seeks to develop and promote alternate ways of thinking about how the world might work. We do so in three ways.

World Federalism's Triple Mandate

World federalism is first a global "think tank", more accurately a "thought web", concerned with developing strategies for global governance. We undertake research and writing on global issues covering the full spectrum of the factors enumerated above. We publish those ideas in such media as we may, and seek to generate comparable research among like-minded persons and groups

around the planet.

Secondly, we are a global lobby, seeking to influence policy-makers at national and international levels to become familiar with federalist principles, to explore our propositions, and, from time to time, as in the case of the International Criminal Court, to enact them.

Thirdly, and most difficult, we seek to be a popular movement. But popular movements with complex ideas seem almost to be an oxymoron in this day of the sound-bite. Perhaps we must inevitably rely on the poets and the artists sympathetic to our cause to find the means to touch hearts even as we hope to touch heads.

In the long run, I am convinced that our ideas and our vision will prevail. Humanity is like an adolescent, full of promise, constantly at risk. But the task of creating human unity is unavoidable. As the late Rabbi Harry Joshua Stern said, "There will be one world, or no world".

Excerpts from a speech to the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the Mundialization of Ayabe City, Japan, and the 22nd All Japan World Federalist Grand Assembly

The Year 2001: The Start of a Creative Dialogue Among Civilizations

René Wadlow

The United Nations General Assembly has designated the Year 2001 as "the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations". The United Nations in many ways reflects the deepest consciousness of humanity, and the designation of the Year 2001 as that of the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations is, in fact, the reflection of a profound need, a reflection of the "Spirit of the Times".

At one level, the dialogue among civilizations resolution was an intellectual reaction to the widely quoted article of Samuel Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations" in the US journal *Foreign Affairs* (Vol.72, No 3, 1993). Huntington, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, presented the thesis that world politics in the post Cold War period would no longer be a conflict between States divided by capitalist-socialist ideologies but would see a "clash of civilizations". He cited in particular the fighting then going on between Muslim and Orthodox in ex-Yugoslavia and the ex-USSR. The two wars in Chetchnya which took place after his article was written could be cited as additional evidence for his thesis.

Huntington wrote "Differences among civilizations are basic, involving history, language, culture, tradition, and most importantly, religion. Different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and Man, the citizen and the state, parents and children, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear".

While recognizing the truth that civilizations

change slowly and that the past is always embodied in the present, we must also recognize that we are at a time of major change in history. The accelerating pace of change in the political, social, technological, economic, cultural, and spiritual arenas of human affairs has created new opportunities for dialogue as the world is inexorably being transformed into a global society. One of the central tasks of today is to develop a problem-solving, future-oriented global view which addresses the important concerns, issues, and problems of humanity as a whole. We need to identify as clear a vision as possible of a feasible and desirable world society and to outline the specific steps required to move in that direction. We need to analyse clearly the challenges and the responsibilities related to the transition to a global society.

The Year 2001 should provide real opportunities for dialogue among civilizations. It is true that to an unprecedented degree people are meeting together in congresses, conferences, schools, and universities all over the globe. However, in itself such meetings are not dialogue. There is a need to reach to a deeper level. Reaching such deeper levels takes patience, tolerance, and an ability to take a longer-range view.

The Year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations provides a common framework in which we may analyse the past and set out visions for the future. It is an opportunity which must be seized. Yet United Nations-designated "Years" accomplish little if there is not significant action on the part of non-governmental organizations, academic bodies, and cultural societies. Often a "Year" is half over before people know that it has even started.

Comments

We must begin where we are. As Amiya Chakravarty, a literary secretary to Rabindranath Tagore has written "Each individual must strike the 'universal concrete' in terms of his own creative effort, in the milieu of his own cultural heritage; only by proceeding from wherever we are, geographically, spiritually or vocationally, can we make the integral effort for peace. The peace-worker belongs to the entire human family, using the language or religious associations to which he has been born, and which he transforms not necessarily by revolt but by inner transcendence"¹.

There has been in the recent past studies with civilizations as the center of analysis, notably Oswald Spengler and his *The Decline of the West*, Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, and Pitirim Sorokin *Social and Cultural Dynamics*². Some scholars conceive of civilizations as societies; others view them as cultures. Some consider civilizations as polycultures while others portray them monoculturally. Some define civilizations by criteria of interaction where others see them bound by similarities.

However, there has been less work on contacts

and dialogue among equal civilizations. Toynbee's work deals largely with the growth of a particular civilization prompted by challenges and responses followed by the decline and disintegration of the civilization. Toynbee tends to look at the contacts of the past as a central civilization and the "barbarians at the gates", rather than the situation of today which is that of a multifaceted dialogue among equal civilizations. Sorokin's work also stressed the shifts in values and attitudes within a civilization over time.

Thus, there are possibilities for breaking new ground intellectually during 2001. We are called upon to look at the possibilities of multi-civilizational dialogue. While there has been for some time multi-religious or inter-faith discussions, a civilization goes well beyond the religious dimension. The methods for such a multi-civilizational dialogue need to be worked out. The "clash of civilizations" is relatively easy to envisage. More effort will be needed to have meaningful dialogue, but such dialogue will respond to a crucial need of our time.

¹ Amiya Chakravarty, "World Faith for World Peace" in A. William Loos, *Religious Faith and World Culture*, The Church Peace Union, New York, 1951

² See David Wilkinson, "Sorokin versus Toynbee on Civilization" in Joseph B. Ford, *Sorokin and Civilization*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, NJ, 1996

Borderless Debate: Domestic Federalism

Federalism in The United Kingdom

Sir Anthony Meyer

For the past year Federal Union has been the British member of the UEF, and its aims are, as they always have been, those of the UEF, that is to say the promotion of a European Union closely integrated on federal principles, and with strengthened democratic accountability and built in safeguards for human and civil rights. Federal Union in the UK also included World Federalists, and for that reason, if for no other, we include among our aims the eventual creation of some kind of world federal governance, although most of us regard that as a desirable but extremely distant prospect. I myself prefer to point to the example which shared sovereignty in a federal system can offer to other areas, particularly in Latin America, and as a preparatory step for those states in Central and Eastern Europe waiting to join the European Union.

But, by an extraordinary paradox, the British, who bequeathed federal constitutions to their former dominions when they became independent, have allowed themselves to be deceived by their political leaders and their strange popular press into equating federalism with centralisation (whereas, of course, it means the exact opposite). Canada and Australia thrive with federal constitutions which enable them to combine effective safeguarding of their national interests with wide devolution of decision-taking to the constituent states. The British indignantly reject such an idea for themselves. They are blissfully unaware that they are actually living in the most highly centralised state in Western Europe.

It is Federal Union's role to dispel this misunderstanding. We start from a very low base. Over the

past forty years Federal Union in the UK has played a role analogous to that played by those few monks in the Dark Ages who kept the flickering flames of learning alive in their closed monasteries. We have been a tiny band of devoted men and women addressing mainly ourselves. We are now trying to erect something a bit more ambitious and to recruit more widely, but it is going to be a slow process. We are still fighting against the obstinate misconceptions as to the true meaning of federalism. Misconceptions which were greatly strengthened by Mrs Thatcher whose ghost is still able to terrify many Conservative politicians and whose political demise is still regretted by some newspapers. So much so that even strongly pro-European Conservative politicians (and, indeed, there are some) seem to feel it necessary to deny that they are in any sense federalists.

The prospect of enlargement of the European Union, which brings with it the risk of paralysis of decision-taking, gives urgency to the need for a proper constitution for Europe, and even some of those timid pro-Europeans politicians who reject the word federal are now beginning to acknowledge the need for a European constitution. This is encouraging for us at Federal Union; but there is a more immediately helpful development still.

I have already described the United Kingdom as the most centralised state in Western Europe (perhaps in all Europe). Local government has been gradually stripped of its powers, and nearly all its resources are provided by central government. This has been a gradual and not necessarily intended process, though it follows from the unquestioned doctrine of the supremacy of Par-

Borderless Debate

liament which is free to reduce or even to abolish local government (as it actually has done with the government of London, not once but twice in this century). It is because of this doctrine of the unchallengeable supremacy of Parliament that Britain, almost alone in the Council of Europe has refused to sign the European Charter of Local Self Government, surely the least binding of international agreements, but which does enshrine the principle that local people have the right to set up local institutions to look after their needs and to give these institutions the right to raise money locally.

The present Labour Government is making some effort to reverse this trend, by giving Scotland a measure of home rule, and a smaller measure to Wales, and it is also restoring some self-governing powers to London. But it has manifestly not thought through its policies, and it is still continuing to reduce the powers of elected local, as opposed to regional authorities. The results are becoming every day clearer; the system simply will not work. The most obvious flaw is the anomaly that Scottish MPs, who continue to sit in the Westminster Parliament can vote on purely English matters (where their vote could well be decisive), but cannot vote on Scottish matters; nor, of course, can English MPs. But there are many other anomalies. And there is a growing demand in some regions of England, particularly the North East, for their own regional assemblies and agencies. What is more the Government has started on a reform of the House of Lords without thinking through how their process is to be completed. And finally it has, very commendably, agreed to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, but without making it fully justiciable.

The solution is simple and is staring everyone in the face; a Federal Parliament for the UK dealing only with matters which concern the UK as a whole and regional assemblies and agencies for those English regions which require them, together with a restoration of the powers of elected local and municipal authorities. At the same time it is no longer respectable to ignore the lack of real democratic control which arises from the fact that the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy in effect means the almost unlimited supremacy of a government (indeed of a Prime Minister) who has a large majority in the House of Commons. There are no built in safeguards for civil liberties or even for the independence of the judiciary, for the Lord Chancellor, who is a Government Minister (moreover one who has been appointed, not elected) has the preponderant voice in the appointment of judges.

These worries are becoming day by day more apparent even to a public opinion systematically misled by the press; and Ministers are obliged to take note. It may be some time yet before they dare use the actual word Federal; but in the end they will have to.

In the meantime we at Federal Union, with our meagre resources, will do what we can to ensure that the European Movement, of which we are a constituent part, is not so mesmerised by the need to win an eventual referendum on the Euro as to forget the need for a wider reform of the institutions of the European Union. And that reform has to move us towards a federal constitution for Europe which will enable it to expand, to remain closely integrated, and to develop much closer links with the citizen and to protect his human and civil rights.

Towards a Federal United Kingdom

Ernest Wistrich

The election of a Labour government in 1997 signalled the start of major constitutional reform. Until then the United Kingdom had operated one of Europe's most centralised systems of government. The constitutional changes proposed in the Labour party manifesto ranged from the incorporation into domestic law of the European Convention of Human Rights to the adoption of referendums to approve the various constitutional changes. It included the abolition of the hereditary element in the composition of the unelected second parliamentary chamber, the House of Lords, and the introduction of proportional representation in place of the traditional 'first past the post' system of voting in European elections and in the newly created devolved levels of government.

The purpose of this article is to concentrate on the measures which aim to devolve power from the centre and put the United Kingdom on the road towards a federal structure of government.

Although not a unitary state, like France for instance, the UK had operated a unitary system of government over a union composed of several nations who became part of it on different terms and at different times. Furthermore, the union is highly asymmetrical with 48 million living in England, 5 million in Scotland, 3 million in Wales and 1.5 million in the northern part of Ireland. Past pressure for devolution from the centre has varied: strongest in Scotland and Northern Ireland, less so in Wales and minimally in the English regions.

In its first year of office the Labour government took five separate initiatives towards devolution,

each with a different dynamic but all aimed at transforming the UK into a multi-national and multi-regional state. These have dealt with devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the English regions and London government. To take account of the varying circumstances there has been no uniformity in the system of devolution applied in each part of the country.

Scotland

Scotland united with England voluntarily some 400 years ago under a single monarch, James the First. Whilst government was centralised in London, the Scottish judicial and educational systems remained distinct from those operated in the rest of the union. By a substantial majority, in a referendum held in 1997, proposals for a Scottish parliament and government were approved. Considerable powers had been devolved and the parliament can now legislate extensively. Powers reserved to the UK government include constitutional changes, foreign policy, defence and security, immigration and nationality, macro-economic policies and social security. Furthermore, Scotland's tax raising powers are limited to a small variation in the level of income tax. The Scottish parliament is elected from regional lists and is based on proportionality. Thus the first Scottish government had to be formed by an alliance between Labour and Liberal Democrats, as no single party gained an overall majority.

Wales

Wales was conquered by the English and incorporated into the Union in the middle ages. They had

Borderless Debate

no history as a separate integrated political unit and, therefore, demand for devolution has been much weaker than in Scotland. Indeed proposals for a Welsh assembly were defeated in a referendum in 1979 by a 4 to 1 majority. The referendum held in 1997 approved the proposed devolution by the slimmest majority of 50.6% on a turnout of just over half of the electorate. The Government of Wales Act of 1998 created a national assembly with 40 constituency members elected by 'first past the post' and 20 additional members by proportional representation. It has limited executive powers confined to secondary legislation, with powers to enact primary legislation remaining with the UK government and parliament. The first election resulted in a minority Labour administration which is trying to establish its *raison d'être* amongst an often indifferent Welsh population.

Northern Ireland

The turbulent Irish history has had quite distinct motivations for the devolution of power in that part of the UK. Ireland was first conquered by the Normans in the 12th century. The Scots invaded it in the 14th century. The English conquered it in the 16th century at the time of the reformation and establishment of the protestant church in England. After the catholic Stuart monarchy was briefly re-established, during the reign of James the Second war broke out in Ireland between James's forces and those of his successor, the protestant William of Orange. The latter defeated James in Northern Ireland and occupied the rest of the island. The 19th century was dominated by parliamentary debates on devolution of power under a system of home rule for Ireland. The failure of the British to grant it led to a nationalist struggle for complete separation. Independence was finally granted in 1922 but this excluded six northern counties with protestant majorities who threatened civil war if they were separated from the UK.

Thus Northern Ireland emerged with its own

government and assembly in which the protestants enjoyed permanent dominance over a catholic minority whose rights were unprotected and who were severely discriminated against and disadvantaged. Frequent violent conflicts exploded leading to suspensions of the devolved institutions and their powers. The last suspension occurred nearly 30 years ago. It ended with the power-sharing British-Irish "Good Friday" agreement in 1998. This brought about fundamental changes to accommodate both communities. The Northern Ireland assembly is elected in six-member constituencies by the fully proportional single transferable voting system. All sections of the community are represented in the assembly, in its committees and in the executive. The governing executive must contain representatives of the minority community and key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis by qualified majority voting. Its powers are similar to those devolved to the Scottish parliament, but exclude the right to raise or vary taxation.

English Regions

In its 1997 election manifesto the Labour party proposed to establish indirectly elected regional chambers consisting of local authority representatives. Subject to demand and by regional referendums, these could move to directly elected regional assemblies. Alongside these proposals a Regional Policy Commission was to be established which would create regional development agencies that would be directly accountable to the regional chambers. As demand for devolved and elected regional government varies widely across England, imposing a uniform system at the same time for all was judged to be wrong. The legislation introduced has concentrated on the regional development agencies, leaving the directly elected regional assemblies until later, when demand for them manifests itself. The agencies have limited budgets and limited powers, but it is likely that the greater authority and democratic legitimacy given to Scotland, Wales and London government will

lead to growing demand for devolved and elected government in the English regions, especially in the north of England.

London government

The Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher abolished the Greater London Council in 1986, depriving the capital of 8 million inhabitants of an elected government for London as a whole. Coordination of policies for London was transferred to joint committees of the lower tier of 32 London Borough Councils and to the central government. Following a referendum a new Greater London Authority has been established under the leadership of a directly elected mayor and an elected regional assembly. The mayor exercises all the executive powers of the new authority but is accountable to the 25 members of the assembly of whom 14 have been elected by area and the rest as additional members to ensure proportionality. The mayor's powers include the appointment of a London Development Agency, on the lines of the English regional development agencies, running a new transport authority and controlling the Metropolitan police force. In other spheres the mayor's powers are limited, but his influence is considerable as the spokesman for the whole of London. The authority does not however have any tax raising powers.

Other reforms under consideration have implications for devolution. For instance the House of Lords, which has had its hereditary element abolished, is due for further reform. Recommendations have been made for part of its membership to be directly elected from the UK's regions. Local government is also subject to reform which could lead to greater autonomy and less dependence on central government resources and control than in the past 25 years.

Conclusion

The lack of uniformity in the reforms for devolution are due to historical differences. The system that is emerging is a quasi-federalist one, within which powers of the devolved levels of government are likely to increase over time. The newly empowered parts of the UK will surely call for greater autonomy and increased powers, once conflicts develop between central government and the devolved authorities. Demand for regional government in England is also likely to grow as their citizens look enviously at the growing autonomy and self-government in Scotland, Wales and London. The process of reform will, however, take many years, as it has in France and Spain, but its movement towards a more federal system of government is unlikely to be reversed.

Borderless Debate

Thoughts for Our Future

Michel Monnot

Recent events brought to light with particular intensity regionalist problems in Europe. The most bloody, recent events, are linked to the murders perpetrated by ETA. This criminal drift shows unfortunately how fanatics can, regardless of the opinion of the vast majority of the Basque people, endanger a process by which the Basque country has anyway got a very wide autonomy from Spain. Equally preoccupying are the current events in Corsica, as the Matignon agreement did not allow to put an end to killings and bombs.

However, it must be recognised that this agreement, unless it will be broken in the future, is going to be an exceptional event in the long history of Frenchmen who want that things finally start moving, as to their rights to more liberty and autonomy where they live, recognizing their particular identities and aspirations. This character of exceptionality was not missed by people obsessed with Jacobinism, who, at the pace of their returning back from holidays, kept issuing statements against this agreement, assumed to endanger the "unity and indivisibility of the Republic".

On its part, the government appeals to the principle of insular exception, which in no way should be extended as a generalisation to other regions. The political class, with a few exceptions, reacted unfavourably to the idea of such a generalisation, which would be a frontal attack to the founding myths of the Republic.

How can we make things develop? The example of 10-years-back USSR shows that a system theoretically programmed for eternity may suddenly collapse and, in recent days, the tragedy of the "Kursk" submarine illustrates how leaders may be

brought to revise their attitude under pressure from public opinion and the media. This shows also that, in the likelihood of big demonstrations on this side of the Pyrenees in support of a "Basque country", it is essential not to act solely within the circle of political professionals.

There are two scenarios: either a political party is ready to accept responsibility for generalising to other regions the idea of a France *à la carte*, or the internal and external opposition encountered from the Jacobin side will force it to renounce. In the first case, a concerted action with this party should allow the regionalist fight to continue in association with a nation-wide line-up strongly covered by the media. The resulting amplifying effect would probably lead to accelerate the process of generalisation.

In the second case, a battle will be lost, and it will be necessary to place our trust on the public opinion. It will be necessary to get around the principle that this opinion normally is expressed only through its elected representatives, the professionals, and that politics should not be made in the streets. However, the right to make demonstrations being recognised in our country, there is nothing against using it. But to defend what?

At this point, it is convenient to go to the heart of the problem: what separates Regionalists and Federalists? Taking care to apply this term of Federalist solely at the national level, according to the federalist concept it is a matter of defending a "federal" or "pseudo-federal" France, without doubt *à la carte*. Spain is probably, in spite of its present drama, the best reference; it is true that

Spain is not formally a federal state, but where is the difference, considering the ample delegation of authority given by the central power?

As for the Regionalists, they never speak of France. Although they express themselves in its national language, they generally appear to have a negative vision of this country, reduced to its State. It seems that they devote all their efforts to their Region, in which their whole heritage, often a linguistic one, is concentrated and, as far as the future is concerned, they prefer their Region to be integrated into the "Europe of regions", which allows to short-circuit the national level, hoping to make it disappear eventually.

Here are two antagonistic visions, at first sight, which have however a point in common: the rejection of the centralised-to-the-utmost Jacobin State. Deepening a little more, it is possible to find a common value to both visions: the importance of the regional element. Where the gap gets wider, is about the role of France, in terms of State and in terms of nation. The Jacobin reactions to the Maitignon agreement prove that there is a real ideological war staged by a significant part of French politicians, which in itself is not astonishing. But the arguments by which the Maitignon agreement will lead to the destruction of the Republic would be weaker if some Regionalists would not lay themselves open by questioning the necessity of an everlasting France.

When, in effect, instead of considering a "pseudo-federalist" concept of a State *à la carte* on the Spanish model, the view is limited to one's own region, by integrating it directly into Europe there is nothing left of France. But this view will not be acceptable in the short or medium term for the majority of our fellow-citizens. Most of them are attached to all our country is, and often at the same time to a more limited environment, province or region or "people". They must be explained, because it is not obvious, of a modern vision of the France of the future, a 21st century vision. It is necessary

to show them that, getting over the antagonistic point of view, it is possible to conceive of a pacified France which allows for more room for regions, maintaining at the same time a role for the French Republic at the national level, and not only over the so-called regal prerogatives, like defence and foreign relations, but also over cultural matters. French literature and history, for instance, are part of our common heritage, they shall not belong exclusively to any regional heritage, although these have been fought against for so long by our State. On the contrary, at the European level there are certainly common values, but, except for the border regions, in general history has brought about less common a destiny than at national level.

If this coexistence between Federalists and Regionalists could lead to a synthesis, by their giving an appropriate prominence, respectively, to the regional and the national level, a big step forward will be taken. A greater strength could be displayed if, during meetings and demonstrations, the flags of both movements, contrary to the unfortunate deep-rooted tradition, were waved together, and if a way could be found to associate to the movement other French regions, which have been victims of Jacobinism, be they of "oc" language, "oil" language or any other language.

If the media react positively to the Maitignon agreement, they may as well get interested in the possibility of extending it to other regions, but, as they are so far setting themselves in a strictly regionalist context, it is more likely that they will limit the debate. However, the Spanish example shows that some sort of federalism may, step by step, be constructed starting from a regionalist approach. In any case, even with such an approach, the chances of success are higher, the less France will appear indifferent to the debate. Let's not forget that many among our fellow-citizens feel French above all, and sometimes only French. Then, let's be reasonable, positive and conciliatory, let's make way both to France and to the regions; the chances for the future have this price to pay.

Borderless Debate

Many Homelands, All Beloved

Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

In Italy a debate is under way which, despite some confusion and over-excitement, may rightly be considered among the most important and serious of the last decades. It looks like a hot-potch of unrelated discussions, often primed by the day's event: the governors' oath, the regions' charters, the Charter of Rights, the European Constitution, the death of the fatherland. Actually it is merely the same debate over the big question of the nature and *raison d'être* of "the common weal": the power of institutions, the meaning of citizenship, and the relations between individual, society and political system.

Elsewhere in Europe, old centralising States are creating autonomous local powers (Catalonia, Corsica, Scotland) and they are even experiencing violent separatism (in the Basque country, and in Northern Ireland). Strangely enough, the unitary States of more recent formation, like Germany and Italy, are the ones where the disturbances are less severe.

In Italy the process is made livelier and potentially more fruitful by specific circumstances. First of all, the question affects three levels with the same intensity and at the same time: the Regions, the State, and the European Union. Secondly, Italians have neglected their sense of the nation for decades, and it is only now that they are rediscovering it. Lastly, the ideological clashes and the refusals to acknowledge to this or that political group its right to be involved have just recently been put aside.

To which entity shall the name of nation, of homeland, be given? And what is the meaning to be given today to such words? The debate after all

is about that. Well, I would like to suggest that confusion and dangerous drifts could be avoided if it is recognised that everybody *always* belongs to more than one community, and that belonging to some does not exclude belonging to other ones. We can be, we are, we feel at the same time good Florentines, Tuscans, Italians, Europeans; and when a hungry African peasant appears on the screen we feel him to be our brother too. Belonging to many communities is a reality; when political orders are well conceived, this does not tear an individual apart. It reflects the multi-faceted nature of a person and is an antidote against the State's absolutism, against political oppression: all authoritarian States centralise power. The exclusive belonging of an individual to one and only political entity (it does not matter whether it be a region or a state), this is indeed a sacrifice of one's identity and the dangerous premise of every authoritarian system. The Superstate is not a State geographically large, but one that claims to be the only and exclusive ruler of its citizens. A Federal State (be it national or European) is that one that has eradicated from within itself the seeds of oppression.

Unique and indivisible is only the individual, as the term implies. Collectively, by the rule of democracy, individuals may ensure the cohesion of a multi-level political order.

If in Italian schools texts were still learned by heart, it would be nice if nobody were allowed to take a degree without having memorised the words with which, 70 years ago, Benedetto Croce concluded his *History of Europe*. "Already all over Europe you can witness the springing up of a new

awareness, a new nationality (because nations are not natural data, but states of consciousness and historical formations); and just as 70 years ago a Neapolitan of the old Kingdom or a Piedmontese of the sub-Alpine Kingdom made themselves Italians without disavowing their former being, but

raising and turning it into a new being, so Frenchmen and Germans and Italians and all others will raise themselves to Europeans and their thoughts they will address to Europe, and their hearts will beat for her, as before for their smaller homelands, not forgotten already, but better beloved".

Quebec Separatists and the European Example

Following the resignation of Lucien Bouchard, leader of the Quebecois Party and Prime Minister of Quebec, many people wonder whether the separatist experience in the region is over. This possibility seemed to be confirmed by Bouchard's words in his final speech to explain his resignation ("My efforts have been in vain"), quoted with great evidence in the English-speaking newspapers in Montreal (*Gazette*) and nation-wide (*Globe and Mail*, *National Post*).

This view is not shared by Bernard Laundry, deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister and candidate to Bouchard's succession to the party leadership, who stated: "[Bouchard's] resignation does not weaken the independentist project. We will continue working at forming an association with Ottawa like the one they are doing in Europe with the European Union. And as France is not a German Land, likewise Quebec is not just a province but a separate nation. In this regard Ottawa's government is lagging behind, while in Europe they are moving towards devolution, like in Scotland and Catalonia".

The matter is whether to call for a third refe-

rendum on Quebec's independence, after those of 1980 and 1995 (lost by only thirty thousand votes). To the question of what the conditions would be for him to call the referendum off, Laundry replied: "If we were recognized as a nation by Ottawa, we could accept a confederal formula, like the European Union. This is the only way the referendum can be avoided."

Laundry's words confirm a deep-seated conviction of the federalists: on the political choices in Europe in the coming years is depending much more than the Old Continent's future. If the road to federalism will be taken with decisiveness, as the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher recently urged to do, Europe will show to the whole world how the centrifugal thrusts coming from the independentist claims (think of Corsica, the Basque Countries, Catalonia, Northern Ireland) can successfully be diluted. If on the contrary the devolution process will bring with it the dissolution of Europe into a free trade area, it will in the end degenerate into a micro-nationalistic fragmentation, potentially unstoppable and leading to serious conflicts, which inevitably will propagate to the rest of the world (*f.f.*).

Borderless Debate

Are Flemish Nationalists against Europe?

Ludo Dierickx

Three ideas often recur in the speeches of Flemish nationalists – and sometimes of Wallon nationalists: Belgium is an artificial state which must disappear some day; the supporters of this state are reactionary; Flanders – and consequently the French-speaking province as well – will be member-states of the European Union.

A response to the first idea: all states are artificial constructs. No state ever had a natural birth. The theories concerning the "ideal" size of states are always of a political order; they aim at determining who belongs to what political entity and who must feel attached to whom for religious, historical, cultural (identity) reasons, because of the existence of national borders etc. Nevertheless the true reason why human beings have a brotherly feeling, or should have it, is because they know the capacity to suffer of their fellow men and that they can sympathize with their sufferings and feel the injustices of which they are the victims. This feeling of compassion is spontaneous, perhaps in-born, but it is the political and cultural leaders who explain that it is proper to feel closer to people who speak the same language, practice the same religion, live in the same economic prosperity, "live on the same side of the river" (Blaise Pascal), as other human beings.

Here lies the artificial element, the concept which is imposed, inculcated. Look at children who have not yet been indoctrinated, compare the behaviour of women with the attitude of many men: they don't bother so much with the artificial barriers put up by political leaders.

Second thesis: the supporters of this artificial Belgian state are reactionary "belgicists". Answer: in

all federations in the world there are centrifugal and centripetal forces. Everywhere these tensions are considered, if they are democratic, as normal, useful and fruitful. Everywhere, Belgium excepted. In Belgium Flemish nationalists and French-speaking nationalists have succeeded in bringing discredit upon the upholders of unity and national community by calling them conservative "Belgians". It is probably one of the greatest success of nationalism, obtained uniquely in Belgium, and nowhere else. In several places centripetal forces and conciliation efforts are at work: in South-Africa, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, Ireland, Israel... but nowhere are they considered as reactionary.

Still one must recognize that the supporters of the national community idea bear some responsibility for the label that has been attached to them. Too often they have forgotten to mention clearly that it was not so much a matter of preserving a Kingdom and cherishing nostalgic memories, but that it was a matter of defending a well established democratic idea involving a multicultural and multilingual community. They did not manage to explain clearly that the responsibility of Belgium reached beyond its borders and that a split-up of this multicultural state would be a bad omen for the European Union which, today, runs the risk to move in a direction which would fulfil the wishes of Mrs. Thatcher but also those of Jörg Haider and Jean-Marie Le Pen.

The crumbling down of a multilingual Belgium as well as European integration take all their importance in front of many transnational merges and the creation of powerful decision centers in the

economic world. These centers may create employment but they may also close firms or shrink enterprises as it happened at Vilvorde and at Manage. Even stock-exchanges now merge. In front of these evolutions of democracies, political parties and trade unions feel powerless. To say that these developments do not compel us to oppose these concentrations of powers of Parliaments, political parties, transnational and multilingual trade-unions comes down to adopt an antidemocratic and antisocial point of view – how can citizens defend themselves if they can't vote for or against political parties who can act at the level where the problems arise – or if they can't form such parties?

Third idea: Flanders must become a member-state of the European Union. Answer: Flanders is not too small to become a member-state. But a plurilingual state such as Belgium can also, legitimately, be a member-state. In federations components are not necessarily culturally and linguistically homogeneous as it is claimed by extreme right-wing activists who advocate a Europe of regions and ethnic groups. Switzerland has bilingual and trilingual cantons and in South-Africa all the provinces are plurilingual.

A more fundamental question: will Flanders be in a more advantageous position inside the European Union by getting rid of Belgium? Will the other member-states accept that a state splits up and creates a precedent for other states which may be under the pressure of centrifugal nationalist forces? We believe that they won't accept it.

But let us start from the hypothesis that Flanders becomes independent. Will it accept that this independence be immediately limited and narrowed by the regulations and directives of the EU and by the Central Bank?

Will Flanders be a loyal member or will it demand the maintenance of the paralysing rule of unanimity so as to use its vetoing right? Will Flanders be for a more democratic Europe or will it accept a dilution of Europe in a free-trade zone in which not only the firms but also the member-states practice a liberal and nationalistic competition by using unilateral measures of a social or fiscal type or others? It could well be expected from a Flanders which already claims its autonomy in the fields of taxes, public health and medicare.

Does Flanders want a democratic Europe with a true parliament, a parliament which can define guidelines and policies and not just a "visiting room"? If Flemish nationalists support a federal and democratic Europe, do they, then, accept to take an active part in the functioning of the multilingual structures of this Europe, to be present in its administrative departments, its parliamentary groups and committees, its political parties and European trade-unions, which will all be multilingual? Or do Flemish (or Wallon) nationalists think that Europe does not need plurilingual structures but that the future belongs to unilingual parliaments, parties, trade-unions and mutual aid societies? These being the goals they pursue in Belgium and which they have already in a large part achieved!

If nationalists are favourable to multilingual structures within the European Union why do they refuse all plurilingual structures within Belgium? Or are they, in fact, also against what can be considered as the most ambitious and promising political project in the annals of mankind, the peaceful and democratic unification of our continent? In this case they must say so, as indeed some of them do. The nationalists must overcome their contradictions.

Borderless Debate

A Dialogue between Federalists and Autonomists in Europe*

Jean-Francis Billion

The views put forward in the article by Mr. Robert Lafont published in this issue, lend weight to our analysis into the possibilities of building a federalist force which may span (in France, in Europe and in the world) from the autonomists and supporters of internal federalism to the World federalists including European federalists and all those who are struggling in other parts of the planet to assemble other federations (regional or continental) which may become components of a future world federation.

In 1984, Mario Albertini, decided after 25 years to bring out a review, *Il Federalista*, not only in Italian but also in English and French. He also founded a new journal, *The Federalist Debate*. He wrote that he was aiming at "working for world unification of federalists and constituting, to this end, a point of reference and an instrument for exchange of information"¹. Less than a year later he wrote "Indeed, many people are aware of the need for federalism... but without unity of organization, i.e. without the opportunity to know that what is being done in one's own region, country or city is being done in other regions, countries and cities of the world as well, nobody can gain confidence in his own action and thus maintain it, thus contributing towards making federalism into a political force"².

The breakdown of the ex-Soviet Union has confirmed to the world, as it is so aptly expressed in Robert Lafont's essay, "the impasse of state-nationalism" and has led in the Balkans and Central Asia to a "return to nationalism in the form of a savagery that we believed to have died with Nazism"³. Within the framework of globalisation it is

forbidden to federalists to forget this recent lesson and to hold for negligible these contemporary developments of history. Not to take into account the more and more pressing demands of cultural, economic and political autonomy would come down to pushing the people concerned into the arms of ethnic nationalists. European federalists have, for too long and for the most part of them, practically ignored this dimension of federalism.

In France, at least, those who have been aware of it have often sunk into the "ethnism" to the point of compromising, sometimes with the extreme right, out of political *naïveté* rather than conviction, save in the case of "entrism" of militant fascists into small federalist groups. This may have been the case in some French regions (Alsatia or Brittany in particular) and in some periods of the *Parti fédéraliste européen* (European Federalist Party) since its foundation in 1970⁴. Instad the most important and serious regionalist movements in France (those who have grouped today in the Federation *Régions et peuples solidaires*) have evolved considerably and from an often anti-European stance in the sixties and seventies they have progressively become convinced partisans of European integration. This is more in line with the left-leaning movements of the traditional political spectrum. This evolution has followed the democratisation of European institutions on one hand, the development of the regional policy of the communities and the establishment of direct contacts between the Regions and the European Commission on the other hand. What is true for the regionalist movements in France is also true for those of Europe grouped with the

R&PS in the *Alliance libre européenne-Parti démocratique des peuples d'Europe* (ALE-PDPE – Free European Alliance-Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe), a coalition of autonomist and nationalist parties whose ten representatives now sit in an intergroup with the Ecologists at the European Parliament.

Mario Albertini was the first to see and foresee that the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russo-American government of the world were going to accelerate globalisation and make imperative the unification of European and World Federalists. He understood that after the European election two new elements were going to emerge: the opening of the constituent process which underlines the proximity of the objective and the convergence of the federalist position with that of the various governments and traditional political forces. And that paradoxically they were going to result in a weakening of the federalist attraction and adhesion of younger people, who want and need longer objectives to commit themselves. Albertini recognized in globalism (i.e. world federalism) the new frontier which was going to be the equivalent of the European federation during the period of resistance against nazism and fascism, for a new generation of militants, and for the survival of European federalist organisations. Today the strong comeback of nationalism implies, especially to remain faithful to his ideal and pursue his work, to institute with the partisans of democratic autonomies and internal federalism (the only alternative to the balkanisation of the world) the same voluntary policy of mutual recognition and cultural dialogue. This is the prime condition, in the long run, of an organisational unification of the federalist force and its ultimate victory over nationalism.

One year ago the Summer University and the Toulouse Congress of R&PS brought about the first satisfactory results and R&PS showed its will to open a dialogue by welcoming, for the first

time, a delegation of UEF-France and adhering to our campaign for a European constitution⁵. Since that date positive and concrete results have been obtained. The newspaper of the *Union Démocratique Bretonne* (UDB, Breton Democratic Union, namely *Le Peuple Breton*) published in mid-summer 2000 an article by Bruno Boissière, UEF-Europe General Secretary, which addressed an appeal to regionalists and world federalists to demonstrate together with the European federalists at the Nice European Union summit. This appeal was favourably received and the President of the ALE-PDPE, the Euro parliamentarian Nelly Maes, and the local components of this organisation (*Parti Occitan* and *Mouvement Région Provence*) joined the demonstration which was also previously announced by other autonomist publications in various parts of France. During last summer, R&PS also invited Lucio Levi to take part in a round table at its summer university 2000 at Bénodet (Brittany). There, he expressed his own views but also spoke as a representative member of the UEF Federal Committee, of the WFM Executive Board and as editor of this publication. His intervention was noticed and approved by several autonomist publications and is summarized as editorial in this issue of *The Federalist Debate*.

In this dialogue some fundamental points have been firmly established and proclaimed, such as the most drastic rejection of violence and political clandestinity. The final perspective should be clear. We could sum it up in a formula coined by Guy Marchand: "to communal problems communal elects, to regional problems regional elects, to European problems European representatives and to world problems world representatives." On the other hand other concepts deserve a close study and should be explored: those of nation and of course, ethnicity, federalism - perhaps, the dichotomy and the alternative between a "Federation of Nation-States" and a "Federal Europe of Peoples and Regions"⁶ (especially at a time when some leaders of the European far

Borderless Debate

right or populist type rightwing politicians, the Austrian Jörg Haider in particular, are intent on making a Europe of regions as opposed to the "Europe of Brussels" (their battle horse). The participation in the electoral process may also raise a problem as it is usually part and parcel of the present strategy of autonomist and regionalist movements. On the other hand, the federalists reject it as they think that their task is to build a new state (the European Federation or the World Federation) which is a constituent task and condemns participation in electoral squabbles. Federalists must keep up a strong "community opposition" and not a "party-oriented opposition".

Now is just the right time to go deeper into this dialogue, beginning once more with Europe, for the crisis of the national state system makes and will make even more indispensable limitations of sovereignty from the nation-states in matters concerning the regions and local collectivities, as well as in matters concerning Europe or even beyond. The crisis of the nation-state is not merely a political one; evidence of it is accepted now by all autonomists and federalists. This crisis is the platform which makes and will make ever more obvious and necessary their coming closer in comprehension and respect of the strategic

perspective of each other. This crisis can only be overcome by the victory of federalism and it must be the melting pot for the unity of action, not to say for the future unification of European and World federalists and all those who in existing states work hard for internal federalism, the respect of autonomies and the principle of subsidiarity. The crisis of the national state system, by the confluence of autonomists and federalists will, thus, play the part which Mario Albertini had recognized at the end of the Cold War and of the Soviet-American government of the world for the coming together of World and European federalists.

What is true in France and in Europe is certainly true in the rest of the world and that is why federalism must be global in its perspective; this is also, why Europe, where the crisis of the nation-state has reached its climax at the precise moment when it was revealed by European integration, may and must become an example for regional or continental integration, and for the federal internal re-structuring of existing states in other parts of the world. It is precisely what Robert Lafont expressed in the conclusion of his article when he writes that Europe can become once more a beacon for the world.

* Translated from "Fédéchoses Pour le fédéralisme", 3-2000, N° 109

¹ "Towards a World Government", *The Federalist*, Pavia, XXVI year, N° 1, 1984, pp. 3-8

² "A Decisive Battle", *The Federalist*, Pavia, XXVI year, N° 3, 1984, pp. 177-180

³ Robert Lafont, *Proposals for Europe. A Political and Moral Essay*, in this same issue (p.10)

⁴ After having drifted into very dubious promiscuity with the "New Right" - the *Groupement de recherche sur la civilisation européenne, GRECE*, Group of Research on European Civilization - and its review *Nouvelle école*, the jurist Guy Héraud, President of the French *Parti fédéraliste européen*, and a former leader of the *Mouvement fédéraliste européen*, then the French section of the UEF, and of the Congress of the European People, has realized his error and denounced the ambiguous use of the word "ethnism" ("As the term 'Nation' has become equivocal and mainly conveys the idea of a state we have proposed the term 'ethnic' to designate the linguistic community. But in its turn 'ethnic group' has become uncertain and difficult to use, some ill-intentioned minds pretending it had racial connotation", Guy Héraud, "Les Communautés linguistiques en quête d'un statut", Presses d'Europe, Nice, 1990, p. 31). About the exploitation of certain vocabularies and European themes by the neo-nazi far right (and the "New Right" in particular), see Jean-François Billion, "Rhône-Alpes: le Front national, Millon et nous. Pierre Vial... la culture Rhône-Alpes dans la gueule du Saint-Loup", *Fédéchoses*, Lyon, N° 100, 1998. More recently one can read by Christine Chambeau "La croisade paganiste pour une 'Eurosibérie ethnocentrée'", *Le Monde*, May 30, 2000, in which this journalist writes an account of a round table organised by the association *Terre et Peuple* (Earth and People) on the themes of "Identitarian Reconquest (i.e.: how to reconquer one's identity) and the "future of regions". Pierre Vial, the President of this "Pagan" group, and Guillaume

Faye, a former official leader of the GRECE, have re-affirmed their ideological positions. In this respect, Pierre Vial has declared, concerning his stout opposition to Islam and the "collaborators of the invaders" (of Europe) that "the belonging to a religion in a people is a superstructure that can always be called into question. But, on the other hand, the dominant element is the biological superstructure... Yes, things must be named by their name – that is the ethnical dimension". As for Guillaume Faye, he has declared that "the problem of European identity, is not only cultural, civilisational... but that it is also anthropological... and that the future belongs to 'ethnic groups'". While he is critical towards the European Union, he intends, so he says, "to get aboard the plane and put a gun towards the pilot head" so as to steer the plane towards "a Federal ethnocentric Europe which will not be made up of nation-states, but of the great regions of the historical space of the Indo-Europeans... The nation-state must be enlarged beyond its limits, into an Eurosiberia, and it must be broadened at its base with the regions – which are the real mother-lands".

⁵ *R&PS* had by so doing underlined its own political line by insisting on its objective and making clear that " *R&PS* has decided to join the campaign launched by the UEF for a European constitution. According to its objective of a Federal Europe of Regions and Associated Peoples, *R&PS* will insist on the necessity of an integral federalism, that is to say, implementing the subsidiarity principle at all levels". Please refer to my previous article in this same review, "Regionalists Movements for a European Constitution", XIII year, April 2000, pp. 13-15.

⁶ Other texts of reference exist to feed this dialogue such as, for example, the recent answer of the representatives of the *ALE-PDPE* at the European Parliament to Joschka Fischer, an answer within which they oppose "state nationalism" and the "democratic and citizen nationalism" which they claim as their own. Also see the report by Mario Albertini at the Congress of the Italian MFE at Cagliari (cf. *Atti del XII Congresso*, Cagliari, 2-4 Novembre 1984, MFE, Pavia, pp. 13-25). At Cagliari, four years after his report to the Bari Congress where he had insisted on the cosmopolitan aspect of federalism and given impetus to the global mission of European federalists, Albertini was going, this time, to insist more particularly on internal federalism and the community aspect of federalist culture.

⁷ An excellent definition of this position, which was already the one of Mario Albertini and of the tendency he impelled in the supranational European Federalist Movement in the sixties, can be found in *Il Federalista*, Pavia, V year, N° 2, October 1963, pp. 160-161. "... does not believe one can reach the European Federation through the organisation and strategy of the political party for the following reasons: 1/ the essential action of democratic parties is to take part in national elections. They have no other means to acquire power. But the power at stake in national elections is the power to govern states. But this power, in fact and in right, is to preserve the division of Europe, not to unite it. 2/ the power at stake in the fight for the European Federation is the one which aims at its foundation. This power has a constitutive character and a European dimension. To try and build it up... one must channel the ideals and European interests of our fellow citizens at a supranational level. But this is not possible with a party which is compelled by electoral necessities to mobilize its forces inside a national framework". The UEF on the other hand does not forbid those of its members who want to do so also to belong to democratic political parties and thus some of its members and officials can take part individually and without committing the UEF itself, in electoral contests and fill elected positions, as it is at present the case with various militant federalists at the European Parliament.

Federalist Action

Nice, or the Pride of Being a Federalist Militant

Sante Granelli

"The Nice demonstration can, in human and political terms, be seen as hard evidence of the consummate strength, and of the reality, of European federalism; it represents hope for the future and a symbol of amity among militants. Saddened, like all of you, by what I have read in the newspapers, I have turned again to a page written by Jean Monnet in which, recalling a view expressed by his American friend D. Morrow ("there are two categories of men: those who want to be someone, and those who want to do something"), he remarks ... "Many times I have verified the truth of this observation. Many individuals of great intelligence worry mainly about creating themselves a personage and acting a part... but, generally speaking, those who prompt action and set things in motion are people of a quite different kind: *they are ones who seek, first and foremost, to identify the right places and moments in which to intervene in the course of events. These will not be the most visible of places, nor the most predictable of moments, and people wishing to seize the opportunity they represent must be prepared to renounce a place in the spotlight*".

"In Nice, I discovered that there are occasions on which it is possible to feel an almost tangible sense of history. Indeed, it was in the hope of experiencing such a sensation that I decided to become a federalist. In Nice, I also understood that friendships can be forged in five minutes, maybe even to last a lifetime".

Nothing expresses better than these succinct and effective words, written in the heat of a moment by two of the many militants active in the preparations for the demonstration in Nice, the feeling

shared by all those who, in the most diverse ways, contributed to the success of our initiative; nothing illustrates more fully its political and moral significance. We did, indeed, feel a tangible sense of history and were able to intervene (as we had done in the past: with the direct election of the European parliament, with the Spinelli Draft Treaty, with the single currency) in order to direct the course of events; but, since the "spotlight" was trained elsewhere, we did so almost without anyone realising it. What we are left with now is a Kantian awareness (and here we quote a third message delivered by another militant) of, nevertheless, having done our duty. We are left, above all, with the certainty that, in Nice, the European Federalist Movement (MFE), thanks to its militants, was able to give voice, loudly and clearly, to the demand put forward by the European people in the making (witness the headline in *Le Monde* on December 8th: *Une Constitution Européenne, maintenant! Now! Subito!*).

Drawing definite conclusions on the outcome of the Nice Summit in relation to our lengthy struggle (to achieve the foundation of an European Federation through a constituent action) is not easy, nor is it the task of this note to assess the real influence that the federalists' initiatives (at Nice and before Nice) may have had, not so much on the results of the Summit itself as on the future developments of the process of European unification. These topics and these assessments belong to the realm of the political debate that will, in the appropriate settings, including the now imminent MFE Congress in Ferrara, be conducted within the whole Movement. However, what does appear undisputable is that the battle has not been lost –

it is by no means over – and that federalist militants are now faced with the prospect of new and even more demanding deadlines and challenges. From this perspective, it can be seen that Nice marked not *the end* of a process of mobilisation (of the most forward thinking section of the European people) but its start – a rehearsal or test of the real capacity of the movement, and of its sections and militants, to achieve this mobilisation in a truly European context.

As it was pointed out by the General Secretary of MFE, Guido Montani, in his letter to the sections of December 14th, 2000, we were all filled with doubts about our real capacity to mount an "important demonstration" outside Italy and, what is more, in France, a country which still has a strong nationalist (Gaullist) element and in which the federalist movement is not deeply rooted, and in a city, Nice, whose political orientation is substantially pro-Le Pen, and in which no organised federalist group exists. Previously, we had been able to achieve something significant in Brussels in 1986, in the wake of the Milan demonstration, later followed, in 1991, by our presence in Maastricht. But the challenge this time looked particularly difficult, presenting many obstacles and offering very few guarantees. The only certainties were – and indeed have been confirmed – the will and capacity to act of the federalist militants who, as Guido Montani pointed out in his letter, ... "were educated in the years of the breeding of *Federalist Autonomy*", in other words, in the years of the MFE's battle, under the guidance of Altiero Spinnelli and Mario Albertini, to win real autonomy of thought and a corresponding capacity, when the circumstances and the course of events present them with the opportunity to do so, to intervene in the political struggle, thereby fulfilling a groundbreaking and revolutionary role.

It is, at this point, worth taking a brief look at how – through which tools – European federalism's militants trained themselves and acquired this capacity to intervene, in the right way and at the

right time, to influence the outcome of the political struggle. And they emerge as simple but essential ones: debates, within the sections and among friends, of problems and the political situation, recourse to federalist literature, interpretation of facts as they really are, and not as they are presented by the mass media, and by the system of national political power generally (governments, parties, unions, newspapers); and finally, intervention in the political debate through simple but well-timed initiatives aimed, mainly, at unmasking the false "Europeanism" of national governments through non violent actions, such as petitions in the streets and schools, the distribution of flyers, the adopting of stances, letters to the press, etc. In short, making each section of the MFE a centre of debate and political initiative, setting it up as a point of reference, as regards the European question, for a city's political class.

It is very useful, to this end, to return to a few notes that first appeared in "Popolo Europeo" in 1957, signed Publius (Mario Albertini) – and issued again in "The Federalist" dated September 2nd, 1959 where, under the title "A Technical Examination of the Struggle for Europe", they were directed to militants – to their making and to defining their role. Publius stressed that "... it is in the struggle, not in study clubs, that militants are made. Moreover, one cannot be born a militant, nor can one be a good militant without a clearly defined political character". Federalist militants must distinguish themselves from national politicians and acquire "a European way of seeing and a European way of acting". Not an easy task, however, given that "...everything that surrounds us and that prompts us to act and to judge, is national: newspapers, parties, governments and even, to a great extent, political culture itself... If we ourselves want to avoid falling victim to this situation, we absolutely must avoid, in shaping our political opinions and our political behaviour, drawing only on the viewpoints and political options that grow up within the framework of

Federalist Action

national politics. On the contrary, our primary basis must be our own ability to reason, which we must exercise with patience in every situation, in order to root out, from our own unconscious, the national reflexes buried deep in our personalities; we must nourish our political opinions from the European sources at our disposal, which we must also seek to develop..." imparting strength and vigour to a political structure based on the independent capacity to think and act federalist.

In a subsequent note, Publius describes what could happen to a "group of friends" (of militants) after following, for a time, a routine procedure of debate and action: "...from the outside, it could be observed that around thirty meetings had taken place. Attended, at the start by around twenty people ... down to around three or four a few meetings later; this number would then have risen to around ten towards the end, providing, that is, the three or four diehards had stuck it out, persevering with the meetings even when they might have lacked the inclination to continue. From the inside, meanwhile, you would observe that these three or four, and the others too, had changed considerably. At the start, they are likely to have been unsure of their judgement of political situations and problems, having their opinions fed to them by well-known journalists and politicians. Instead, by the end, they are thinking for themselves, using their own wisdom to weigh up the ideas of others, of whatever origin. Their characters, too, would be seen to have changed: initially unaware of having the capacity to be leaders of other men, they will, by the end, have grown into individuals confident that they possess this ability; they will also possess a will hardened by having been left alone on the battlefield, and they will have developed the steely character of those who know how to conduct a difficult political battle. *In other words, a European political class will have been born, and the organisational means of recruiting, maintaining and rotating it will have been established*".

And how might federalist militants influence

public opinion, or guide it away from the choices – European in appearance, but in reality geared towards the preservation of the national power – made by governments and by the political class? "When the time comes to choose – replies Publius – i.e when the moment of truth comes, when the guiding skills of the pilot (the militant) must be called upon – he (the militant) must speak out. But he will find that his is a lonely voice. Everything that exudes strength and importance will be against him. With him, he will have only other militants – obscure like him. *However, if these militants have the courage to speak out and to breach the wall of the national prison, many men will be ready to follow them because many men are waiting for Europe, and the group will continue to grow until, one day, to solve some severe crisis, it will no longer be possible to call upon the representatives of the cult of yesterday...*". Instead new forces will have to enter the field (the European parliament, enlightened European leaders, etc) which, acting on the initiative of the Movement, will make the necessary pro-European choices and set in motion a true constituent process for the foundation of a European federal state.

* * *

Nice was a test. It provided the proof that, through a process begun over 40 years ago (and which, importantly, has never been interrupted), groups of friends and militants who have "had the courage to speak" have formed and become established within all the local sections of the MFE. Groups who, by doing so, have gained an awareness of their capacity to "conduct a difficult political battle" and who proved able to take many thousands of Europeans to Nice and to lead them in a powerful peaceful demonstration under the "revolutionary" banner of a European constitution and Federation. This awareness – in which we cannot help but feel pride – allows us to look towards the challenges of the future with confidence, strengthened also by the friendship of which Publius spoke and whose existence was confirmed

in the messages circulated by the militants after Nice.

We are all familiar with the words of Machiavelli on the equal influence that "virtue" and "fortune" have on human events; however, it is also worth recalling the words of the Prussian general Moltke who said, "in the long run, fortune only comes to the able and the persevering". If we in our cities

and sections can continue, with perseverance and ability, the work of "debate and action" of which Publius spoke, and maintain and feed the spirit and the strength that we showed at Nice, then there can be no doubt that we will see our duty through to its end – to the foundation of a European Federation.

11th January, 2001

Over 10.000 in the Streets of Nice for a Federal Europe

Over 10.000 European citizens have demonstrated in Nice on December 7, 2000 for a European Federation while the Heads of State and Government of the European Union were starting the meeting of the European Council. The demonstration has been organised by the Union of European Federalists (UEF) and the Young European Federalists (JEF) in cooperation with the Intergroup for a European Constitution in the European Parliament.

Groups organised by JEF, in cooperation with other youth organisations, have arrived in Nice from France, Spain, Portugal, UK, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Austria, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Slovenia, Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Russia, making this pro-European demonstration a spectacularly international gathering. Over 30 members of the European Parliament, of all main political families and from various countries, and over 350 mayors and representatives of municipalities, provinces and regions participated in this peaceful and cheerful demonstration. At the end of the procession, the closing speeches have been given by Paolo Vacca, from Italy, President of the Young European Federalists,

Jo Leinen, from Germany, MEP and President of the Union of European Federalists, Jose-Maria Gil-Robles, from Spain, MEP and President of the European Movement and by other members of the European Parliament as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Alain Lamassoure from France, Cecilia Malmstrom from Sweden, Mario Segni from Italy, and Francesco Rutelli, from Italy, Mayor of Rome and candidate Prime Minister.

In the morning before the demonstration, JEF and a platform of youth organisations "Youth for Nice 2000", have organised a European Youth Convention, under the slogan "SayYES to a Europe of the People - A Federal Constitution and a Charter of Rights for the Whole of Europe". Over 1200 young people and representatives of European youth organisations (particularly JEF, European Youth Forum, AEGEE, CNAJEP, ECOSY, EYCE, YEPP, LYMEC, FYEG, and OBESSU) have engaged themselves into a lively discussion with representatives of the European Parliament, the French Government, the European Commission and have debated on the prospect for a European Constitution and for the enlargement of the Union.

Federalist Action

The South Asian People Summit

W. James Arputharaj

The South Asian People Summit organised by South Asia Partnership International (SAP I) was inaugurated at the presence of over 400 people at the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH) in Colombo, Sri Lanka on Friday 8 December. Conceived as a consultation led by civil society, the Summit aimed at the formulation of a comprehensive Peoples Agenda, that would, in time, influence SAARC governments. Ms. Jezima Ismail, Chairperson, South Asia Partnership International (SAP I) in her welcome address, and Executive Director of SAP I, Dr. James Arputharaj, reiterated the purpose of the People Summit - to recognize the continuous struggle of the people of our region and promote the many networks in their efforts in finding the solutions to regional problems.

The message sent by Her Excellency The President, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, to the People Summit states, "It is indeed commendable that SAP I has taken the initiative to bring together at a Consultation of this magnitude, the people of the region. This broad based participation and identification of core issues that beset the area would undoubtedly serve to set up a platform for effective action in the years to come". This was followed by messages from Mr. Nihal Rodrigo, Secretary General - SAARC and Mr. I.K. Gujral, Former Prime Minister of India.

Admiral L. Ramdas, Former Chief of Naval Staff of India, spoke on the dangers of nuclearization within the Sub-Continent while Dr. Kamal Hosain of the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) stressed the need to a common front in the region to ensure good governance and

social and economic transformation that would cut across national borders. Dr. Gamani Corea, Former Secretary General, UNCTAD, in his address, talked of globalization and the waning of enthusiasm about the concept since its benefits have not reached a large number of persons in the South Asian Region. Dr. Corea proposed a South Asian Children's Summit, based on the belief that children are the future ambassadors of peace.

Ms. Nandana Reddy, Director- Development, The Concerned for Working Children (CWC) actively working for the Rights of the Child referred to our children - the future generation, as the owners of the new millennium. Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana, former speaker of the House of Representatives, Nepal, was of the view that poor governance is the root cause of problems in the region. Therefore, the governments efforts must be supplemented by the efforts of the NGO's and civilians in this regard. Following him, Mr. Karamat Ali, Director, Institution for Labour Education and Research, Pakistan, advocated comprehensive ceasefire in the region in addition to promoting removal of visa restrictions between countries in South Asia. He was also of the view that governments in this region are intolerant of dissent, highly marginalized, nuclearized and insensitive to people's rights. Journalist Praful Bidwai, focusing on nuclear disarmament, outlined the evils of nuclear use and urged governments to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, stop the production of nuclear fuel and create a nuclear warhead-free zone in the South Asian region. Mr. Ravi Nair, Director, South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre, India, called upon the NGO's to report to international organisations failures by

the governments to ratify key conventions. Dr. George Mathew, Secretary, SAP I, and Director, Institute of Social Sciences, concluded the inaugural session stating that the frustrations of the people in the region are very high and we need a re-awakening towards the fundamental issue - democracy. He added that a handful are making the decisions that adversely affect billions.

At the Commissions sittings that followed (and went on till Sunday the 10th December) the focus was on the major issues of the Consultations - Viz: Peace and Regional Co-operation, Governance - Local and Regional, Human Rights and Human Development, Empowerment of

Women, and Convention on the Rights of the Child/Child labour/Trafficking. Participants and speakers represented a diverse group from civic organisations, NGOs, Women's Organisations and Student groups.

At the Valedictory Session, the moderators of the Five Commissions presented the recommendations. Mr. A.T. Ariyaratne of Sarvodaya was the Guest Speaker and he based his speech on the principles of good governance as advocated in the time of the Buddha. His concept was that there should be an economic and political system in the world based on three priorities of healing of the sick mind, the body politic and the environment.

A World Federalist Appointed to UN Delegation

Martin Hagvall, member of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Movement (WFM) and President of the Swedish member organisation SVF, has been appointed by the Swedish government to the country's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly this autumn.

Mr. Hagvall, who has been a member of the WFM Executive Committee since 1995, was appointed upon the recommendation of the United Nations Association of Sweden by nomination of World Federalists and will represent the Swedish NGO community in the UN delegation.

Federalist Action

The World Social Forum

Anna Viterbo

During the last decades the integration of the international economy has been more and more increasing: the so-called "globalization" is strictly associated with "neo-liberal policies". In this context a growing international movement advocates for greater participation of civil societies in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO): for years, these institutions have been making decisions that affect the lives of people all over the world, without a clear system for accountability and democratic participation. The idea of a World Social Forum developed as a consequence of this kind of analysis.

The World Social Forum will be a new international arena for the creation and exchange of social and economic projects that promote human rights, social justice and sustainable development; it will provide a space for building economic alternatives, for exchanging experiences and for strengthening South-North alliances between NGOs, unions and social movements. It will also be an opportunity for developing concrete projects, to educate the public and to mobilize civil society internationally. The World Social Forum will be a broad coalition of organizations working in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe discussing topics such as: building economic policies that promote human development; creating international strategies for grassroots organisations; building proposals to democratize international institutions, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank; studying the influence of multinational corporations in local communities; creating sustainable development proposals to eradicate poverty and hunger and to protect the environment; struggling against gender and racial discrimi-

nation; protecting and preserving the indigenous peoples and their culture.

The first World Social Forum (WSF) took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil, on January 25-30, 2001 attended by 3,000 delegates from 120 different countries; it will take place every year during the same period as the World Economic Forum (WEF), which gathers, since 1971, at the end of January in Davos, Switzerland, and has played a key role in formulating economic policies throughout the world. Over the five days of the Porto Alegre conference the dominant themes were the taxation of capital flows, the cancellation of poor-countries debt, the role of trade in development and genetically modified food. Through a tele-conference call, the debate included George Soros, the investor and now also philanthropist, and Michael Moore, Director of the World Trade Organization, who were in Davos at the WEF. Bernard Cassen, director-general of *Le Monde Diplomatique* and one of the principal organisers of the so-called anti-Davos conference, said: "the WSF is part of an effort to act against the hegemony of neo-liberalism on every aspect of our lives".

We can agree with Noam Chomsky: "the World Social Forum offers opportunities of unparalleled importance to bring together popular forces from many and varied constituencies from the richer and poor countries alike, to develop constructive alternatives that will defend the overwhelming majority of the world's population from the attack on fundamental human rights, and to move on to break down illegitimate power concentrations and extend the domains of justice and freedom".

World Culture Already Exists

Bill Bryant

John Boli and George M. Thomas (Eds),
Constructing World Culture,
Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1999

In this collection of articles published by Stanford University Press, John Boli and George M. Thomas offer support for the idea that we are living right now as members of a world culture. Yes, right here – right now. Not 50 years in the future. Not after some evolutionary transformation of the human consciousness. No matter where you reside, you may be a participant in this global culture. This is important for us to understand. It has sometimes been argued that a world federation is impossible or impractical because there are so many diverse societies on our planet. Without a common culture, it is said, a world federation is impractical. The authors of this book knock the legs out from under this argument.

Boli and Thomas are social scientists, and they write in the style of academicians. Here's what they say: "Our analysis can be distilled as follows: For a century and more, the world has constituted a single polity. By this we mean that the world has been conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, competition, and cooperation, such that actors have found it "natural" to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse. Such conceptualization reifies the world polity implicitly, in the often unconscious adoption of this cultural frame by politicians, businesspeople, travelers, and activists, and explicitly, in the discourse of intellectuals, policy analysts, and academicians".

Put in simple terms, people think about the world as a single, integrated society. Consequently, over the course of many decades, the world has become a single polity – that is, a single political organization. By regarding the whole world as a place where people can act and have influence, people around the world have transformed an abstract thought into a concrete reality. "Like all polities," Boli and Thomas write, "the world polity is constituted by a distinct culture – a set of fundamental principles and models... defining the nature and purposes of social actors and action".

To describe this global culture, Boli and Thomas have studied the social organizations that operate at the planetary level. Most of these social organizations are international non-governmental organizations (NGO's), which have been in existence in significant numbers for the last 125 years or so. There are thousands of international non-governmental organizations. Some of them are familiar, and some you've never heard of before. Think about the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, the International Olympics Committee, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). That is just the beginning of the list. The Yearbook of International Cooperation, published by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, provides the names of many others. "By studying NGO structures, purposes, and operations," Boli and Thomas write, "... we can identify principles of world culture".

While the theory and evidence offered by Boli and Thomas will undoubtedly be challenged by other academics, it is equally clear that their conclusions are grounded in solid research and analysis – 300

Books Reviews

pages worth, plus notes and references.

Here's what they say about the "principles" of world culture: there are "...five fundamental cultural themes reflected in the NGO population. These include universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, the dialectics of rationalizing progress, and world citizenship".

– Universalism. "Across any sector, the purposes and means of action promoted by NGO's are assumed to be useful and meaningful right around the world". "Everyone everywhere is a potential beneficiary of NGO activity".

– Individualism. "In the worldview embodied by NGO's, individuals are the only 'real' actors... This ontological principle is greatly at variance with many local cultures, for which the family or lineage is the fundamental unit and individual autonomy is highly circumscribed".

– Rational Voluntaristic Authority. "NGO's activate a particular cultural model when they organize globally, debate principles, and attempt to influence other actors. This model holds that responsible individuals acting collectively through rational procedures can determine cultural rules that are just, equitable, and efficient, and that no external authority is required for their legitimation".

– The Dialectics of Rationalizing Progress. What NGO's seek, say Boli and Thomas, "...is, in essence, rational progress – not the crude nineteenth century idea that steam engines and railroads will lead to heaven on earth, but the more diffuse and embedded concept of 'development' that now prevails. This concept includes not only economic growth but also individual self-fulfillment, collective security, and justice".

– World Citizenship. "Everyone is an individual endowed with certain rights and subject to certain

obligations; everyone is capable of voluntaristic action seeking rational solutions to social problems; everyone has the right and obligation to participate in the grand human project; everyone is, therefore, a citizen of the world polity".

There are critics who will argue that this world culture – with its vague and fragile "principles" – is weak compared to the more robust and fully-developed cultures that exist at the sub-global level. The critics are undoubtedly right. Boli and Thomas are not predicting that a world culture will replace all local cultures. Their only point is that there is a world culture that co-exists with many local, regional, and national cultures. The existence of this world culture can be seen in the many international social organizations that have been operating on our planet for decades.

Will the existence of this world culture lead inevitably to the creation of a world federation? Well, Boli and Thomas don't address this subject directly. Indirectly, they suggest that the formation of a formal, recognized world government is a distinct possibility. However, they also raise the possibility that humankind's need for economic growth, collective security, and justice may be alternatively met by voluntary associations rather than by a formal world government.

Regardless of the manner in which human beings organize themselves for action, the important thing to remember is this: the existence of a world culture increases the likelihood that a world government will ultimately be established. Whether one is actually established or not is a question of political will.

In conclusion, Boli and Thomas give us plenty of evidence to refute the claims of those who assert that world federation is an idealistic dream that is impossible until a world culture emerges. The fact is that we have a world culture already.

The State of the World at the Turn of the Millennium

Roberto Paleari

Lester R. Brown et al.,
State of the World, 2000,
Norton, New York, 2000

It is since 1984 that the prestigious Worldwatch Institute has been publishing its annual assessment on the earth's state of health, titled *State of the World*. This report, written in a clear, nimble and captivating way, examines environmental problems and trends using a global perspective and a non-common cross-disciplinary approach.

Since the first edition, the precise and well-grounded work of the Worldwatch Institute is a reference point for the green culture, and is an essential source of information, analysis, and debate to understand phenomena of environmental degradation as well as proposals to face these complex global issues.

In the year 2000 edition the focus is mainly put on seven environmental issues, that are: demographic growth, global warming, water shortage, reduction of cultivated land, collapsing fisheries, deforestation, species extinction.

A whole chapter is devoted to the problem of water scarcity, which has been mounting in the last decade. If the falling of water tables, observed all around the world, continues at this pace of growth, in 2025 more than 50 countries, counting for 40% of the world population, will lack water to produce enough food supplies for their needs. Not even the industrialised countries, and particularly those of Southern Europe, are safe from this danger. To face the spreading of water scarcity the Worldwatch Institute estimates necessary to

improve efficiency in the use of water everywhere, to reduce the wasting of this resource and to fix common limits to the overpumping of aquifer.

A general overview on the main environmental trends provides with a sad sight on the situation of our planet.

In fact the final statement of the report, which is a declaration of impotence and of failure for the entire world, says: "In 1984, when the first issue of *State of the World* was published, the year 2000 seemed far away. Demographic growth, high oil prices, the then new phenomenon of acid rain, were all causes of concern. But we believed that before the end of the century the world would have taken the way of a sustainable global economy. This didn't happen. Publishing the seventeenth edition of our report we find ourselves at the beginning of a new century without having solved old problems and in the need of facing new ones. Bright prospects for a new millennium are darkened by threats without a record over the future of humankind".

Also in this millennium edition the Worldwatch Institute tries to inquire into the definition of sustainable growth, a concept that still today lends itself to confusion and misinterpretation, and works hard to study and to propose the necessary measures to pursue it. In connection with this topic two chapters are particularly interesting. Those are titled *Harnessing Information Technologies for the Environment* and *Creating Jobs and Preserving the Environment*.

In the first one there is an analysis of the environmental problems caused by the so-called new economy. It is first pointed out that the introduction of new technology in the communication sector

Books Reviews

hasn't gone hand in hand with a reduction of people displacement; it is therefore illusory to hope that exchange of data and news by internet will reduce traffic, decreasing the urgent need for a rational use of the territory and of the means of transportation. Besides, the practice of e-commerce and the interactions between computer and television tend to increase the diffusion of advertisements, worsening the excesses of our consumer society. The production of semiconductors and of hardware for the new economy burns up huge quantities of water and energy. And moreover the waste produced by TV sets and computers, that quickly become updated, are difficult to recycle, and very polluting. However the application of the internet technology, combined with satellite observations, will become more and more important to provide weather forecasts, to observe natural phenomena, to prevent natural disasters and to spread news all over the world. These technologies are also important instruments for NGOs to exchange information and to launch campaigns of prevention and/or denunciation.

With reference to the relation between labour problems and environmental protection, the report describes and comments the great structural changes occurred to the production system, due to the evolution of technologies and the process of globalisation. It strives to understand how the necessary transition from the actual untenable model of development towards a more sustainable one will strike on occupation and labour market.

According to the Worldwach Institute it is not correct to describe sustainable development as synonymous of insecurity for subordinate workers. On the contrary, a sustainable economy, that produces optimising the use of energy and raw materials and based on recycling, will be able to offer remarkable job opportunities, superior to those of the present economic system, even taking into account temporary inconveniences and difficulties caused by the process of industrial reconversion.

Very promising fields to increase occupation both in industrialised and developing countries are those linked to the use of renewable sources of energy and to energetic efficiency, as well as those manufacturing products with such eco-qualities as durability, repairability and possibility of upgrading; all these activities are important for the sustainability of our economic growth, and also to guarantee future vital working skills.

Three simple reflections came to my mind while reading this interesting report. The first one is that the greatest obstacle to the development of a sustainable economy is that in reality very few people think in global terms. Even George Bush and Al Gore in their appointment speeches did not spend a word on the dramatic influence that the rest of the world will have on the USA in the coming years, and on the responsibility that their large and rich country should assume to face the severe environment emergencies that risk to compromise the future of the entire planet. As in the old Indian tale, politicians still live as frogs at the bottom of the well, unable to see what is going on outside.

The second consideration is that the diffusion of internet and the continuous development of television and telecommunications make possible for news to spread rapidly all around the world. 20% of the world population, living in the industrialised countries, continues to detain 80% of the world's wealth. Furthermore the so-called industrialised countries are the main responsible, through their economic activities without control and proper environmental rules, of the heavy deterioration of the environment; from these activities rich nations gain huge profits, but at the expenses of the world population. The difference from the past is that today the poor of the world are aware of this.

The third remark is that in this millennium report, compared to what happened in previous editions, there is no mention of those necessary changes of the world's power structure and to the indispensable reinforcement of international institutions in order to support and to govern the complex process

of transition towards an environmental friendly world economy, able to face up efficiently the main environmental emergencies, stabilising and reversing those dangerous environmental trends, so clearly described in the body of the report.

It comes to one's mind the attitude of the Catholic Church that believes to be able to change the world through its evangelisation activity aimed to convince, one by one, all the souls of the superiority of Catholic principles and of the necessity to apply them in order to obtain a bet-

ter world. In the same way the Worldwatch Institute seems satisfied by its attempt to convince, with the power of its arguments, as many people as possible (and especially statesmen, men of culture, journalists and opinion makers); however it refrains itself from proposing the necessary institutional means, able to collect the consent of those who are aware of the risks the planet is facing, and to suggest a strategy, allowing green movements to make their own requests listened at a global level.



Federalism without Frills

Antonio Mosconi

John C. de V. Roberts,
World Citizenship and Mundialism: A Guide to the Building of a World Community,
Praeger, Westport, Conn., 1999

John Charles de Villamar Roberts, Emeritus Professor of International Studies at the New England College, was a member of the Council of the World Federalist Movement for thirty years and president of its executive Committee for two. Only someone such as he, experienced in the search to unify both theory and practice, as testified by his numerous pamphlets and political activity in the WFM, could have undertaken with so much modesty the ambitious layout of a primer of world federalism. *World Citizenship and Mundialism* in fact constitutes an abc not in the reductive sense of the term, referring to the first steps of primary education, but in the thrilling

one of the exploration and popularization of the primer of a new world, more and more interdependent and that, like the historical "New World", will continue to be a cause of anguish for us up until the time when we will have learned to govern it. Roberts deals with nothing less than the governing of the world, with his brief statements, with his words from an encyclopaedic dictionary reading, it is not difficult to recognize as you continue, instead, like an inner voice, the "categorical imperative"¹. The evidence of the unresolved problems of the world, "the Super-Problem", provokes his indignation, and it is this that is to transform the "world government" from proposal to imperative and finally to political action that leads to the creation of institutions.

The problems are invisible only to anyone who is blinded by his own individual well-being, but are there for all others to see, for the

Books Reviews

overwhelming majority of the world population. War, the consequence of the division of the world in national sovereign states, is mother of all other ills, for war is corrosive of human values. It calls forth the best in human beings for immoral purposes. But the agenda of a world government certainly includes not only the maintenance of peace, through the disarmament of the states and the attribution to the UN of functions of international police; however, the peace is nothing but the precondition for facing the real problems, those that concern the future of humankind rather than the perpetuation of the privileges of particular national elites. In the agenda is included the management of money for a new world economic order, having noted the failure of the present IMF/WB and of each attempt to reform itself; the government of the environment, by means of the application of fiscal policies directed at stimulating a slow economy, raising employment of human resources and decreasing consumption of natural resources.

The government of the economy, because of the inadequacy of the nation-states (even of the government of the United States) as regards the task of preventing the formation of very powerful and uncontrolled global monopolies, appears more and more necessary.

The indignation stems from the painful recognition that, although what is to be done is already sufficiently clear to human reason, nationalism and war continue to orient world politics in a direction opposite to what is reasonable. True and actual genocides follow each other; human rights become of straw; poverty and inequality continue to increase; environmental resources, like the human ones, become sacrificed to the politics of power and to consumerism: twin pillars of the assent to the national regimes. The passage from indignation to the imperative and then to action is the task of the activists. As was in fact said by Mario

Albertini², "the militant is he who makes a personal matter of the contradiction between facts and values".

The imperative is the creation of a world government. Government, not 'governance', stipulates Roberts, without any concern to hide, under punctilious philological analysis, his radical choice.

The peoples, while also obedient to their own governments, do not trust them; for that reason, we must see the relevance of this fact to the use of the term "governance"³. In fact, it is employed to get round the notions of law, of strength and of responsibility (implicit in the word "government") that have accompanied the development of the nation-states, but these notions have been discredited by their enslavement to particular interests.

The accumulated distrust towards national governments provokes a foolish fear of any form of government including any global authority. Yet it should appear very evident that a world government, whose competences have been set out by a federal constitution, would by definition not have "enemies" and for that reason it could not degenerate into a tyranny, like the national governments, that are focused instead upon the creation and maintenance of strategic and competitive advantages of each over all the others. This is what inevitably happens in a world of nation-states. However, when the human race becomes united politically, it will be necessary to eliminate that particular function of government since there can no longer be competition between sovereign states⁴. Militant political action, inspired by the imperative of world government, has as long and fertile a history as it is little known and recognized.

The merit of Roberts is made greater for having retraced the steps of the movement, without omitting the errors, divisions and disappoint-

ments, but drawing out the lessons, and exposing the ignorance that surrounds the matter. Of every stupid battle, fought in the context of the most horrendous war, dates and circumstances are recalled, generals and victims, victors and defeated; but the long march toward the political unity of the "human race", to use the expression of Einstein, in school texts or manuals, does not seem to be worthy of report.

Roberts brings back again to mind the great precursors of the idea of world citizenship, from the Greek philosophers to those modern and contemporary ones, to understand the inner voice of the movements that have tried to transform this cultural inspiration into political objectives: Federal Union (1939); the World Movement for World Federal Government (1947), which through varied evolutions was to become the present World Federalist Movement; the World Citizens (1949) and the Peoples' Congress; Planetary Citizens; World Citizens' Assembly (1975); the courses of the CREPEM at La Lambertic (Dordogne, 1978-1993) under the aegis of Guy Marchand.

In substance the inner life of these movements was characterized by the struggle between maximalists and minimalists, at the end of which the bipolar freeze imposed by the Cold War made people lose all practical interest in this debate and pushed them towards united action with the mundialists. From the historical reconstruction by Roberts one can understand how the action of the world federalists would have stayed unrealistic, during the forty years dominated by the two superpowers, if the movement for the unification from Europe and that of the Non-Allied countries had not known how to elaborate different, but often concordant, strategies founded on the expectation of the crisis of the Balance of Power. The success of European unification, Roberts recognizes, constitutes one of the principal incentives for the development of other regional federations, for a relaunch of world federalism and for a legal defence of human rights. A functioning system of the type now working under

the Council of Europe is needed to protect human rights against member governments⁵.

The circumstances of the world's institutions are better known, but not better recognized, than those of the movements that have fought for their creation. The original sin of such institutions is incised in their DNA, in the pretence that law could replace violence in the final regulation of relationships between national states, that however continue to enjoy a monopoly of force and exclusive sovereignty over their citizens. From the failure of the League of Nations of Wilson to the paradox of the Charter of the UNO, this unreasonable pretence has still never lessened. The Charter, in fact, begins with the words "We the peoples", but it offers no scope to the people in the selection of their own representatives. Its first phrase spoke of a determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", but in fact the UN fought one bloody war in Korea, watched another in Vietnam for ten years doing nothing to stop it, and from its foundation permitted some three wars to break out each year. In Yugoslavia, after struggling ineffectually to do several contradictory things, the UN finally consented to countenance warlike strikes by Nato forces. Even the name is a conundrum. There is an Organization, but this is not the UN, which is an association - it is a mixture, neither one thing nor another⁶.

The drawing-up of the Charter preceded the Cold War and the nuclear terror which blocked the realization of the dream. But more than ten years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the restoration of the values of the Charter, which have inspired reforms of the decisional mechanisms, of the functions and of the organization of the UN, have come back strongly into the historical agenda. Roberts passes in review the different methods and contents of the many proposals of reform that have followed one another and his criticism has a guiding thread that, like that of Ariadne, allows one to get out of

Books Reviews

the labyrinth: the Charter speaks almost indiscriminately of nations, governments and "We, the peoples" when referring to members of the Organization. In fact legal power is in the hands of governments but progress will not occur until sovereignty is restored to the people⁷.

The only point on which I dissent from Roberts, for reasons not idealistic, but practical, concerns his warm defence of the adoption of Esperanto as a world language. The plea is developed in the chapter *Language and Democracy*⁸, one of those, on the other hand, in which one hears more deeply the inner voice of the democratic and universal values of the Author. But by now English is spoken without this language being identified with the imperialism that determined its spread. Probably English has also established itself by

linguistic selection, for the efficacy and efficiency of communication, by its closeness to the language of the new technological paradigm (from the Internet to the control-towers of airports, from operational rooms of the world finance to technical and operating standards). How could compelling people who already understand International English, to learn an artificial language whose only merit is that it does not evoke the spirit of departed dominations, contribute to the cause of the political unity of humankind?

In conclusion, the merits of this book by Roberts are great and in reference to his predilection for Esperanto I wonder if I am not responding to the need that every critic is warned against, to offer a tiny point of criticism that may appear to give added value to the work reviewed.

¹ Roberts, p.112

² Mario Albertini (1919-1997) taught Philosophy of Politics in the University of Pavia, Italy. President of the Movement of European Federalists and of the European Union of Federalists

³ Roberts, p.112

⁴ Ibidem, p.116

⁵ Ibidem, p.58

⁶ Ibidem, pp.52-53

⁷ Ibidem, p.63

⁸ Ibidem, pp.45-51

Two American Scholars Propose a World Parliament

The frequent demonstrations in different parts of the world when there is a big international meeting show that something new is developing. It started with the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle and is becoming an expectation when globalization is up for attack.

Flora Lewis on the January 8, 2001 issue of the *International Herald Tribune* signed an article titled *All Right, a World Parliament, but Tell Us How*. According to the viewpoint of the author, the goal of those demonstrations is "to regain control of a world somehow insulated from popular influence. Here is the "democratic deficit", the increasingly felt distance between the necessary organization and regulation of complex, interdependent societies and the will of the people who are affected. It is inevitably aggravated as states, the only legitimized democratic actors on the world scene, lose power to more fluid, unaccountable groups such as transnational business, labor, media, religious institutions and world organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO.

Nongovernmental organizations have flourished and become widely visible and sometimes quite effective spokesmen for various parts of what has come to be lumped together as "civil society," that is, communities weighing in spontaneously and without official designation. The Red Cross, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, various Human Rights Watch organizations are examples. Because they often act on initiative from below, they feel more democratic to their members than more formal institutions. But of course they are self designated advocates. Nobody has anointed them.

There is, in the international structure as it exists, no mechanism for democracy outside of the established states, but there is also a growing yearning for a more democratic world. The United Nations... decisions are all and only

made by states".

"And yet the global issues... require an approach from a global context. In order to assure that this "will be organized along democratic lines," two American professors have come up with an innovative proposal for a "global Parliament." They are Richard Falk of Princeton and Andrew Strauss of Widener University in Delaware... They do not suggest any arbitrary transfer of power to such an assembly. But no doubt they are right that if such a thing existed and if it established itself as a truly legitimate representation of the people of the world outside the constraints of their states, it would soon acquire great influence... They address the need for establishing a democratic body to sit and take note of a globalizing world system, and they argue convincingly why it is a perfectly logical extension of the principle of power arising from the citizen. But they fail to outline how to get there... They ask that interested people take up the idea, chew on it, examine all the possibilities, and perhaps come up with suggestions that they haven't yet thought of. That is a quite reasonable way to launch a new millennium" (I.I.).

The Hague Climate Convention Suspended: a Failure

In November 2000 the sixth Conference Of the Parties (COP6) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place at The Hague, Netherlands. The conference aimed at making the Kyoto Protocol operational and strengthening financial and technical co-operation between developed and developing countries on climate-friendly policies and technologies.

After two weeks of intensive negotiations, on November 24 the talks have been suspended, among disappointment and recriminations of

News and Notes

ministers and diplomats. Even the conference chairman, Jan Pronk, Environment Minister of The Netherlands, had to declare "It is extremely disappointing that political leaders were unable to work it out here and finalise guidelines for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, especially when the public had such high expectations".

The impasse was caused by EU opposition to USA proposal, based on "clean development mechanisms", which would allow to reach emission targets also by means of investments abroad in climate-friendly technologies; USA consider this solution cost effective, since it is cheaper to build abroad a pollution-free power generation plant than to change an existing domestic plant. This way, the plan seems to be very interesting for the developing countries, which would benefit by such investments.

On the other hand, EU considered "clean development mechanisms" and the international emissions trading system as loopholes to simply buy abroad emissions targets, avoiding to take domestic action, and asked that at least 50% of the USA targets be reached in the USA.

As causes of the impasse, some of the delegates reported also about EU inability to negotiate, due to many different national points of view.

The only effect of the conference is no effect: no improvement or progress in Kyoto protocol actual implementation has been obtained; and we have to remind that many environment analysts consider Kyoto emission targets insufficient to stabilise the world's climate.

Even if the suspended conference may be resumed – rumours refer that new talks might be held in May in Bonn, headquarter of the Climate Change Secretariat – significant results may hardly be obtained this way: The Hague suspension has undermined once more the credibility of the international community when it is working with an inter-governmental functionalist approach. And it has showed all the limits of the global governance: national states are inade-

quate to cope with globalisation. A global issue as climate change, which may have developments that could totally disrupt life on earth, cannot be faced by means of compromises between governments which do not have the courage to renounce a piece of sovereignty.

An alternative to the inter-governmental approach could be the institution of a world authority for the atmosphere, as proposed by 24 Heads of State and Government in 1989, on the basis of an idea of French President Mitterand supported, among the others, by Germany and Italy. Considering the preservation of atmosphere a vital, urgent and global matter, the 24 leaders signed the appeal "*Notre pays, c'est la planète*" ("Our country, the planet", in *Le Monde*, April 4, 1989) invoking the creation of a world authority endowed of real decisional and executive powers to save the atmosphere. Such new authority, instituted within the UN, should "develop new instruments and define new rules for the protection of atmosphere" and, most important, should "control the respect of such new rules". In few words, it would be an actual and effective guarantee for the future of our planet (*s.r.*).

The Fall of the Last Dictatorship in Europe

In October hundreds of thousands of people came out into the streets of Belgrade, storming the parliament and occupying the television buildings: symbols of that unlawful power which had been rigging the election results. The last dictatorship in Europe fell in this way, with a peaceful revolution.

Mr Kustunica, President of the new democratic Yugoslavia, immediately stated his will to take his country in Europe. In a speech delivered to the European Parliament on November 15th, 2000 he declared that the main objective of his foreign

policy is "the rapprochement to the family of nations that are part of the European Union and then, following, a full membership in the EU".

On November 24th a summit in Zagreb (Croatia) gathered the Union's as well as the Balkans' leaders, and decided on the leading guidelines for future co-operation. The rapprochement among the countries of the region, and among those and the EU ones, must take place by agreements of association and stabilisation that will open the way to their entrance in the Union. In the Zagreb meeting the EU engaged itself to deliver financial aid as well as assistance in various fields, to help the economic reconstruction and the democratic stabilisation of the Balkans region.

But it's certain that the historical objective of securing peace to the Balkans requires stronger European institutions than the present ones: in other words a Federation, a Constitution, and a Government (*l.l.*).

The Nuclear Policy of the Asian Subcontinent

Based on an article in The New Republic, written by Amartya K.Sen, Nobel Prize for Economy

In what measure do nuclear weapons give strength to a country? The question is obligatory when the country at issue is the new superpower of the Subcontinent, India. The first Indian nuclear test (Pokhran test) took place in 1974, near Thar desert border. The official position of the government – lead by Indira Gandhi – was that these tests had a peaceful aim, confirming the intention of maintaining the promise not to provide itself with nuclear equipment.

In summer 1998 a second series of nuclear tests took place in the same area (followed a month

later by a Pakistani nuclear test): on this occasion the event known as Pokhran II was supported by several political groups, but the public opinion reaction cut the Country into two parts. Indian people attitude was (is at the moment) characterised by a leading inconsistency: to believe that nuclear weapons are useful as deterrent against enemies and at the same time, to believe that they are unusable in case of war in the Subcontinent.

It is necessary then to distinguish two questions: World-wide arsenals must be dismantled quickly and in an effective way and the armament order has to be changed. West Countries underestimate Third World suspicions and grudges towards nuclear Powers. In the Human Development Report 1994 we can read that the main weapons-exporting countries are just Permanent Members of the Security Council, from which came 86% of conventional weapons during 1988-1992 years.

Indian nuclear policy exacerbates open conflicts with Pakistan and latent ones with China. This leads to greater insecurity, especially for the Subcontinent's population. India has everything to gain by not providing itself with atomic bombs and by requiring a change in world armament order. First of all a new fixing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The conviction that Subcontinent nuclearisation is a possible solution for world-wide nuclear disarmament is a foolish thought in this world, based on others' reactions and countermeasures! At least, no other country but India has to gain by a flourishing democracy in Pakistan. In the current context of insecurity (embittered by the diatribe on terrorism in Kashmir), a desperate Pakistan reduced to poverty could charge India for a penalty of impossible costs. That's why it is very important to increase Pakistan's wealth and its political stability, for prudential and ethical reasons (*e.b.*).

News and Notes

Iraq's Oil sold in Euros

Iraq has won its battle against the dollar: Baghdad oil export will be paid in euros, not any longer using greenbacks, the universally accepted currency in the oil industry. The committee of the UN Security Council on economic sanctions over Iraq accepted the Iraqi proposal. Therefore, since 6th November 2000, Iraq can ask to be paid in euros, instead of being obliged to receive as payment what has been called an "enemy currency".

The positive decision of the committee averts Iraqi menace to interrupt its oil exportation, which accounts for 5% of the world market and are carried out in the frame of the so-called "oil for food agreement". Iraq exports daily 2 millions oil barrels; and, with the clearing done in euros, there will be a sum of more or less 2.1 billions of euros required each day to fulfil the payment. Such a money transfer will not any longer contribute to push up the value of the dollar in the international exchange market, with important effects on the strengthening of the European currency (*f.f.*).

gether, increasing the differential between the north and the south of the planet and menacing peace and prosperity (*r.b.*).

A New Journal on Federalism

Federations (www.forumoffederations.org) is a new bi-monthly journal (the first issue has been published on November 2000), whose goal is to give readers reports on what's new in federalism worldwide. It is a publication of the *Forum of Federations*, established in 1998. Since then, through programs such as regional and international conferences and a variety of publications, the Forum has been facilitating the exchange of best practices, know-how and experiences between and among the "practitioners" of federalism and researchers and academics. The first two issues of *Federations* provide analyses on the United States, Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Spain, Russia, South Africa, India and Philippines (*l.l.*).

The Growth of International Trade

Statistics on international trade, drawn by WTO Secretariat and released on 30th November 2000, show a 10% increase in world trade for the year 2000. This remarkable rate of growth (twice that recorded for 1999 and one of the highest in the last decade) stresses the need for a world government of the economy and of the globalisation process.

It is becoming more and more evident that, in a world where economic barriers do not exist any longer, the lack of political control over the free-market system might seriously threaten a just and sustainable development of the society alto-

Agreement against Organized Crime Signed in Palermo

Representatives of 148 countries, out of the 189 UN member states, met in Palermo (Italy) last December, to discuss about how to fight transnational organized crime. The Conference approved the following three binding documents:

- the Convention against Organized Crime, signed by 121 out of 148 countries
- the Protocol for the Prevention and Repression of the Trade of Human Beings, signed by 80 countries
- the Protocol against the Illegal Traffic in Immi-

grants, signed by 79 countries

The Convention of Palermo is of historic relevance for the high number of participating countries and is the first legally binding international treaty of the 21st century promoted by the UN. In order to repress the illegal activities that a globalization without law is fostering and stirring up, and that no state jurisdiction is able to cope with, because its law enforcing domain has boundaries limited to those of the

state's sovereignty, a legal globalism is needed. And in order for globalization to open up perspectives of development and liberty, avoiding the risk of disasters in the globalized financial markets, a reference *Grundnorm* is needed, capable to counter frauds, manipulations and widespread insecurity. It is necessary therefore to grant anti-trust powers to a world agency, the setting up of which can only be managed by the UN (*a.s.*).



Interview

Daniel J. Elazar

Interview by Anna Loretoni

Federalism, Democracy and European Constitution

Daniel J. Elazar, an American of Jewish origin, has been no doubt one of the greatest experts in Federalism. He was Director of the Center for the Study of Federalism in Philadelphia and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, as well as Professor at the Bar Ilan University in Jerusalem. He was also the founder and editor of Publius, The Journal of Federalism since 1970. A considerable part of his work, a vast mass of books, essays and articles, is devoted to the study of federalism, first of all the American one, to the rediscovery of which Elazar's reflection has given a significant contribution. Later on, as he liked to recall, his research turned more and more from an exclusive interest in one federal system towards a perspective of a comparative kind, investigating from several sides the applications of the federal principle. An important aspect of Daniel Elazar's work has to do with the rediscovery of the biblical origins of federalism. And it must not be forgotten that he has directly participated in the attempts at a federal solution for the conflict between Arabs and Israelis, and that he has collaborated in finding solutions of a federal type for Cyprus, South Africa, Italy and Spain. Among his numerous publications it is worth mentioning American Federalism: A View from the States, published in 1966 and Exploring Federalism, published in 1987.

I met Professor Elazar in Florence on the occasion of a meeting organized by the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War in December 1998. On that occasion I had the opportunity of knowing him as an alert and elegant researcher, very passionately fond of his studies. I remember the meeting with him and his wife with the greatest pleasure. Professor Elazar died in Jerusalem on December 2nd, 1999. This interview is part of a broader research plan on "Federalism and Conflict Resolution", which I developed at the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War. Together with others interviews, it has been included in a book, edited by me, to be published shortly by Carocci in Rome, entitled Interviews on Europe: Integration and Identity in Globalization.

This interview, although given two years ago, still maintains intact its interest for Prof. Elazar's views on the many aspects of federalism in general and in Europe in particular, and for this reason it is presented here now, in quite a condensed form. It is also a homage paid to the memory of a great researcher and open-minded promoter of federalism. The integral version of the interview was published, in Italian, in the review "Tride" (XII, 1999, n. 28, pp. 477-497), that we thank for the permission to reprint it for the first time in English. (a.l.)

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It is difficult, maybe impossible, to sum up all the work you have done on federalism. But there is an aspect that seems to me very interesting and innovative in the tradition of the federalist thought, and

that is the difference that you make between the federal principle and the fulfilment of this principle, i.e. the Federation, the Confederation, the Federal Pact, the Leagues, etc.

When we talk of federalism today, most people think about just one, formal structure of government, "the federation", that is to say a national government with sub-national units, and power shared between the two. The fact is that federalism is a much broader concept than that. The federalist idea originated as a religious concept, in the Bible. It did not have a particular political connotation, nor a specific political dimension; it was about how the relationship should be between God and Men, a relationship based upon a covenant or a pact. This originated more than three thousand years ago in the Bible. During the Protestant Reformation, in the XVI and XVII centuries, it was revived as a theological system, a kind of organizational system of the relationship between God and the world; its influence was significant particularly in Switzerland, in Scotland and with the French Huguenots. Rather than a specific government structure however, federalism was representing a social principle, a way of relating among several people. When finally, at the beginning of the XVIII century, the concept took on a specific political connotation, it was still very different from the type of federalism we know today. A federation was what we mean today by confederal pact, a confederation. It was the Founding Fathers of the United States, the authors of the American Constitution of 1787, who took over from Montesquieu and previous authors the term federalism, and radically changed its meaning. In *The Federalist*¹ the old meaning is still present, so much so that Hamilton, Jay and Madison felt the need to spell out that the structure of the future State will have to be partly federal and partly national. Later on, during the constituent process and after the Constitution was put into effect, the meaning of the term federalism underwent a final transformation, coming to signify not anymore the form of a confederation, but that of a federation. In a certain sense I wished to go back to history to state that federalism is a genus which gives birth to several forms of political applications: from the federation to the confederation, from the federal pact to the league, to the union. Federalism is basically a *genus* of how political power can be organi-

zed, of which several *species* may exist. I believe anyway that it is really important that the original meaning of the term federalism be recovered, so as to regain its meaning of covenant, pact: what Latins called *foedus* and in Hebrew is *brit*.

I would like to ask you some questions about the European Union. First, I would like you to explain us why you define the European Union a confederation.

In my opinion the European Union is a confederation, and more precisely a new-style confederation. This is the great historic significance of it. Confederation, one time, was a situation in which there was a general overarching government for limited purposes, that worked through the member states to carry out its functions. For instance, it was delegating taxation to the member states, so that it was depending on them for all of its financial needs. In fact, the purposes of historical federations were primarily for defence. Those confederations faded away at the end of the 18th, early 19th century, because they did not meet the requirements of modern statism. Statism became at the time the cutting edge and the model of political organization, of ideology. Federation came along just because it could appear as a State, although a federal one. State is a term that Europeans frequently use to describe federations, despite it applies to a kind of role that does not exist in true federalism. But in any case confederations of states gradually disappeared, as most were destroyed by Napoleon after the French Revolution. The Swiss restored theirs but abandoned it in 1848; the Germans tried to establish a confederation in 1815, and it lasted on paper until 1870, but had broken into parts even before that, and then was replaced of course by the Second Reich after the Franco-Prussian war, a very centralized federation. So too with other confederations.

You often stress the paramount importance of the state-centered model, especially in Europe. And it is true that in Europe there has always been little talking about federalism, at least until recent times.

Interview

Not even when, immediately after World War II, they were going to discuss about the United States of Europe, the possibility of establishing a true federation was taken into account, as it looked utterly unsellable. Those who favoured federalism for Europe tried to devise a new way of doing it, which could appear less threatening for the States' sovereignty. Functionalism, as they called it, was not involved with the changing of formal government, but was just adding functions to those areas in which the original six members of the European Economic Community, and later the others, were willing to put something in common. And functionalism became the basis for this new confederal agreement at the time. It was very fortunate for Europe that it was based on economics and not on defence, as the defence issue was at that time clearly unresolvable on the European level. It was NATO – which included the transatlantic sphere, the US, Canada and other states that were not going to be members of the European Community – that handled the problem of defence. So the European Union was free to concentrate on the problems of economics, which seemed less threatening to state sovereignty. This functional arrangement led to the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and to the Treaty of Rome in 1957; starting from there, competence at the center was gradually expanded.

But such emphasis on functionalism by part of many people who wanted something more, wasn't it just instrumental?

Of course, most of the founding fathers of the European Community, advocates of the federal model, were not interested in functionalism *per se*, but tried to use it – as you say – instrumentally, in the best way they could. In doing so over the years, by the late 1970s they actually had a confederation in place, albeit they still did not know it as a confederation. It was what you may call a federal arrangement, and it did not become a confederation until after the Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht, come into effect on November 1st,

1993. But what is significant is – as I already said – that in Europe they invented a new-style confederation, without broad over-arching government, but with pillars². Pillars for every particular function that they thought was important, and that they agreed it was important to be done on the European level, and not any longer at the national level. With those pillars, they even allowed the legislation of the European Commission, the Council and the other institutions to apply too *within* the member states, as well as to the member states. This was the starting point, easily accepted by the States because the competences relating to the various pillars were very narrow, and they affected clearly limited areas. Representation is still by the States, and decision-making is on a collegial basis among the member states, through institutions which are all collegial, in one way or another, but have to do about the pillars. That's a new invention, that's a new-style confederation, different from what we have seen in other times and in other places of the world. What the US Constitution of 1787 did for the federation, that is inventing it and then spreading it in the world, I believe the European Union is doing with the confederation in this new era, displaying an unprecedented form of it.

There is a lively discussion going on among political scientists as to how a Constitution for Europe should be, and opinions differ very widely. What's your opinion about it?

I think that constitutionalism is absolutely essential to any federal arrangement and to democracy in general, but there are many varieties of constitutions. The US, for example, has a short, elegant Constitution. Even the constituent states' constitutions – although Americans think they are very long – are short and elegant, quite different from European constitutions. The reason for this is in history, because for Americans it was simpler to figure out what they wanted and to put it on paper, black and white, as they did not have to come to terms with any past of theirs. For Europeans it is different. Ivo D. Duchacek, my old colleague and

respected scholar, who came to the US from Czechoslovakia as a refugee, was referring to constitutions as power maps. For the European states, which have experienced many regimes – some democratic, some not democratic, authoritarian, oligarchic, totalitarian – constitutions had to be very detailed, because they had to make sure that practices not consistent with the democratic order would be difficult to maintain. So, European constitutions are typically hundreds of pages long. However, there is no need for a confederal system like the European Union to do that, there has never been a prior European regime to write a Constitution against. Indeed, the Treaty of Maastricht is pretty long, but it is so because it had to specify all the things that Europe needed to become a Union.



I think it is a mistake to believe that a future European Constitution should be written along the lines of some previous model, be it the American one or that of the modern European states. The European Constitution will be invented *ex-novo*, according to the specific needs posed by European integration.

Professor Elazar, do you think there is a strong link between federalism and democracy?

Absolutely, I am convinced there is. I think that there cannot be a federal arrangement without democracy, due to the necessary capability to self-rule that both democracy and the federal system bear with them. There may be well-functioning federalism even in non-liberal democratic governments. In such circumstances the federal system survives, but tends to become a regime of a democratic type, as happened, for example, in the Soviet Union. It must be noted anyway that that was not a case of true federalism. In the Soviet Union communists were using federalism as a means, as it were, to keep at bay the most dissatisfied ethnic groups, but in actual fact everything was firmly in Russian hands. The Soviet experience has not been a democratic one, and for sure it has not been a federalist one. In the 1970s Khrushchev decided to modify the federal structure, he was thinking that the Soviet Union was mature enough to free itself of its ethnic dimension, and started on a constitutional reform whose main objective was to eliminate the federal structure. Well, he disappeared well before the reform was completed, and when it was finally completed there were changes all right, but no changes as to the ethnic federalism of the Soviet Union, which after a few years collapsed, letting the ethnic republics get their independence.

Among the various kinds of federalism, could you express a preference? For instance, between the cooperative and the competitive federalism?

There are in existence dual federalisms in which the federal government is doing what it has to do,

and the same are doing the local governments, in a totally separated fashion. I do not think, however, that this dual model can work anymore; the world is too complex, and functions cannot possibly be separated in any clear-cut way. And this, to say the truth, despite the federalists' inclination to separate functions very scrupulously. This, as I just said, does not make sense anymore, is practically untenable. About competitive federalism, I can say that it is useful

for certain purposes. Also the cooperative federal system can prove efficient, and it is not by chance that it has prevailed and will continue to prevail, provided it takes in it some dualism and some competition. For example, I think that a cooperative federal system can work really well if the general and the local government have a full set of institutions working together in implementing their programs, better yet with some competition between the two.

¹ See A. Hamilton, J. Jay, J. Madison, *The Federalist*, New York, McLean, 1788

² The term pillar is meant to formulate, through an architectural metaphor, the idea of a gradual setting up of Europe as the common building. Of the three pillars, which are currently sustaining the Union, the first relates to the economic field, the second to foreign and security policy, and the third to justice and home affairs

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