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The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*
Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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
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Constitution or Directoire

Lucio Levi

The failure of the intergovernmental conference to adopt the European Constitution last December proves that the intergovernmental method has become obsolete and unfit to reform the European Union's institutions. The survival of the right of veto in the institutional revision procedure – and in other key issues such as foreign, security and fiscal policies – is the symbol of the old Europe of the nation-states. Bestowing on a single State the power of blocking the other twenty four is clearly incompatible with Europe's present degree of unity. In the building of the European institutions it does not suffice to say "no".

We can draw a lesson from the success of the Convention method in drawing up constitutional documents such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Constitution. A body made up of the people's representatives (national and European Parliaments), national governments and the European Commission, working in public meetings, can succeed where intergovernmental conferences have failed.

Of course, the European Constitution is a stage of an unaccomplished process. It does not eliminate the contradictory character of the European institutions' architecture, even though, after ratification of the Constitution, the Union will be stronger and more democratic. But what is more important is the incorporation of the Convention method in the body of the Constitution and the bestowal on the European Parliament of the power to convene the Convention, although the Intergovernmental Conference retains the last word in the constitutional revision. In future, there will be a

need to solve the ambiguity that so far allows the coexistence of two heterogeneous systems: the national which wants to perpetuate a deceptive sovereignty in vital sectors like those of taxes, foreign and security policy and constitutional revision, and the European, that wants to exert its sovereignty, i.e. its power to govern in place of the States in those vital sectors, as already happens for the currency.

A rule must be introduced that allows the Constitution to be amended without the agreement of all the States. No rigid Constitution, and more specifically no federal Constitution, provides such strict conditions for its revision: the vote is always by qualified majority. Even for amending the UN Charter a two thirds majority is required. Likewise, for the coming into force of multilateral international treaties the ratification by a given number of States is required, but not by all, and often not even by the majority of those who participated in the negotiations.

The serious disease of the European Union lies in the right of veto. Only a Constitution can heal it. The old European institutions must be reformed to pave the way to a "more democratic, more transparent and more efficient Union". This is a quotation from the Laeken declaration that summoned the Convention, which drew up the European Constitution. This means that even governments are aware that a deep institutional reform is necessary to allow the European Union to fill the democratic deficit, to manage the European economy, to keep the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries under control

and to speak with one voice in the world. Failing a European Constitution, the intergovernmental logic is destined to prevail and the spirit of the Founding Fathers of the European Community will end by being forgotten. The danger of this prospect lies in the fact that the Franco-German leadership cannot suffice for the purpose of steering an enlarged Europe made up of 25 member states. The change in size of the European Union demands that France and Germany seek the support of the United Kingdom, in order to reach the critical mass that is necessary to lead the European Union. The problem is that the United Kingdom is ruled by a eurosceptic government. Since the Anglo-Franco-German *directoire* is conceived as acting out of the European Union's rules, it represents a real alternative to a European federal Constitution.

This means that small states, if they want to exert an influence on the European Union, have a vital interest in the ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, the replacement of relations of force with law always aims to protect the weakest. Also within the Philadelphia Convention, which framed the United States Constitution, small states played a decisive role. They did not only confine themselves to accusing big states of seeking mastery over the other states, but also proposed a formula of representation of citizens and states within the federal institutions (the Connecticut compromise), which was deemed satisfactory by the contending parties. It is noteworthy that the disagreement on the majority voting formula brought about the failure of the intergovernmental conference on the European Constitution.

Thus, a group of member states can refuse to proceed at the speed of the slowest and decide to adopt the Constitution. This, therefore, should be ratified by a qualified majority of member states. Of course, this *avant-garde* group should leave open the door for the other member countries. Likewise, the United States Constitution was ratified when nine out of thirteen states approved it. Afterwards the other states followed the core group.

But a grouping of governments, however large it may be, is not enough to provide the necessary impetus to assure the adoption of the Constitution. New actors should make up for the lack of governments' leadership: above all the European Parliament and national Parliaments. If they have the courage to exert their power, they can decide to adopt the Constitution. This decision can become the resolute element for carrying out the constitutional design.

Outside the framework of the Constitution, the European Union is going adrift. The European elections, which will take place next June, represent a unique opportunity. In fact, it is hard for political leaders to win the consent of the citizens with a failure behind them. After the elections it will be much more difficult to relaunch the constitutional process. This is the reason why a commitment for the ratification should be taken before May 1, when the ten new members will enter the European Union. If this goal is achieved, it will become easier to convene a new Convention according to the rules of the Constitution, in order to accomplish the construction of federal institutions.

A European Constitution Open on the Future

Dusan Sidjanski

Working under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing the Convention has ended with a remarkable achievement. This is all the more remarkable given the contradictory demands of governmental representatives of the present and new Member States, not to mention the problem of arriving at a consensus between the 105 members of the Convention. The diversity of opinions and concepts failed to win out over the unanimous desire to agree on a draft with a good chance of consensual support. This was achieved under the masterly chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing thanks to the support of national members of parliament and the awakening conscience of governmental representatives to the common interest.

A first observation hits one in the eye: the text is long and complicated, in spite of the efforts of its drafters. So it does not meet the criteria of legibility and transparency. Along with the succinct and clear articles on the institutions sprawl long and technical pieces on the Court of Justice, the internal market and common policies. The result is a disequilibrium, the text being difficult to read when it should be succinct, clear and comprehensible to the European electorate. The principles governing the distribution of competences and operational responsibility should stay, whilst the more detailed definitions and rules on the common policies, which can vary according to political majorities, should be moved in the form of basic laws to an annex to the central text of the Constitution. It should be the same for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and for the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Without modifying the balance of powers and

without making the text easier to understand, the impact of its central message to the citizens would be at stake. These changes would enable the present text to be retained, one part being the European Constitution as such, concise, simple and readable, the other consisting of an annex containing the basic laws, protocols and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Preamble is concise and forceful. Apart from the absence of the regions, many positive points should be appreciated: the primacy of Union law, its legal status, and the distribution of Union competences, which clarify the respective roles of the Union and the Member States. As could be expected, shared competences extend over the largest number of areas. A second positive feature is the flexibility clause of Art. 17 which, as in the Rome Treaty, foresees the unforeseeable. A third concerns the general method: (the Union) shall exercise in the Community the competences they (the Member States) confer on it.

The single institutional framework does not exclude a diversity of roles but also provides for the decision-taking process of the institutions and the place of the Commission in areas of Community competence, as those of the CFSP and the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). In the long run, this diversity could give rise to malfunctionings in the Union and an artificial separation between economic and social operations, and sovereign, or pre-eminently political ones. More especially, as the single currency and the co-ordination of economic and budgetary policies straddle these areas of competence, the Union is subject to tensions

and differentiated speeds, in particular those arising from the Monetary Union and Schengen. Certainly the role given to the European Minister of Foreign Affairs should contribute to a more coherent and harmonious functioning of these areas of high policy. However the Iraqi war has revealed the impact that these divisions between Member States can have on the solidarity and capability of the Union. The observation that the Union is torn apart between the *communautaire* and intergovernmental approaches does not seem to have lost its pertinence. To this axis of tensions now has to be added a difference of conceptions and attitudes accentuated by the enlargement to 25 members. The Union is seeking an effective and coherent framework. It can well be asked if the draft Constitution adequately responds to this.

As for the institutions, progress has been uneven. *The European Parliament* emerges strengthened from the Convention, thus bringing a more democratic dimension to the Union. Apart from the legislative and budgetary functions and its powers of control over the Commission, it will henceforward elect the President of the European College. In this way it consolidates its authority. It exercises a power of initiative through the Commission, it receives petitions, it nominates the European mediator and has the power to set up commissions of enquiry. This panoply of instruments which brings it closer to the citizens, remains incomplete failing the power to hold auditions allowing it to examine the heartbeat of society.

The leading innovation concerns the President of the *European Council* elected by qualified majority. The President directs and animates the work of the European Council, assures the preparation and continuity of its work in co-operation with the President of the Commission, based on the work of the General Affairs Council. In addition, it works to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council. It represents the Union in its external relations at the level of Heads of State or Government

regarding common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the competences of the Union's Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Here one could add: "nor those of the President of the Commission". Indeed, frequent meetings require the presence of the two Presidents and that of the Foreign Minister. All the more so as foreign policy has an important economic dimension, while in its turn security goes far beyond the narrow concept of military security and tends also to involve economic, social, cultural as well as scientific and technological activities.

Even if the European Council prefers to act by consensus, voting as such is not excluded: qualified majority is foreseen for the election of the President and simple majority for the adoption of rules of procedure. The confidence acquired through the practice of collaboration should allow the European Council in the future to widen the use of qualified majority voting.

In its turn, the *Council of Ministers* undergoes a number of innovations. Jointly with the European Parliament, the *Legislative Council* exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It consists of one or two Ministers per country, depending on the subject to be discussed. Certainly, it is a step towards the formation of a second legislative Chamber, the Council of States. However, ambiguity is not wholly removed, the General Affairs Council perpetuating a certain confusion of powers.

One small step consists of a new system of equal rotation for the Presidency for periods of at least one year, which takes account of European political and geographical equilibria and the diversity of Member States. One exception: the Foreign Affairs Council is permanently presided over by the European Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Unanimity is demanded as regards fiscal policy, as well as in cases expressly provided for by the Constitution, notably for CFSP and CSDP. It is a Damocles sword even more threatening

in a Union of 25. From which the need for a flexibility clause allowing progressive resort to a qualified majority vote. Beyond the simple majority, the new qualified majority is supposed to enter into force from 2009. This implies the majority of Member States representing at least three-fifths of the Union's population, in cases where the Council takes position on a proposal from the Commission or the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union. On the other hand, in the absence of such proposals, the qualified majority will require the vote of two-thirds of the Member States. This distinction corresponds to a traditional practice based on the idea that the proposal incorporates a guarantee that the interests of the small and medium-size states will be protected and that the general equilibrium, notably among the large Member States, will be taken into account. In addition, the proposals of the Commission engage its responsibility before the European Parliament.

In its traditional role the *European Commission* promotes the general European interest as a whole, takes initiatives, keeps a watch on the application of joint decisions and represents the Union, with the exception of matters covered by the CFSP. Taking account of experience, the Constitution confirms that a *legislative act* can only be adopted on a proposal of the Commission, except in special cases. Contrary to the general rule, the other acts are adopted on a proposal from the Commission only when it is explicitly provided by the Constitution. In order to ensure, in the future, more efficacy and democratic control an evolutionary clause could prevent a continuous succession of reforms.

The importance of the Commission is testified to by the debate arising over its composition and the strengthened authority of the President. Without calling into question its independence and its high level of competence, which form the basis of its authority, contradictory demands fuel the discussions regarding its being composed of 15 members from 2009: the President, the Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice-

President, the 13 European Commissioners chosen according to an "equal rotation system" indiscriminately among the Member States. So as to preserve the general equilibrium, each of the successive Colleges should reflect the whole demographic and geographic gamut of the Union's Member States. In the same spirit, the President of the Commission will choose the non-voting Members coming from all the other Member States.

This formula is intended to simultaneously guarantee the efficacy, the competence and the authority of the Commission. It aims to avoid neglecting certain countries while providing for an increased familiarity with a more diverse Union, creating a core of 15 decision-takers supported by 10 other members with the right to speak but not to vote. The question that remains is to know if this equal position of the States in the allocation of Commission members does not risk weakening the Commission. Indeed, the members from Malta will be present as often as those from Germany, the two countries with the maximum disparity in terms of population. The insistence on equality in rotation embodies the underlying idea, purveyed by the media, according to which Commission members are "representatives" of their countries. And yet, the independence of the Commission is the keystone of the European institutional system. The solution proposed by President Prodi consists of having one member per country, but in compensation for the unwieldiness of the 25-member Commission, in setting up a sort of ministerial cabinet of seven, each of whom would preside over a group bringing together a series of sectors. Although this would be a concession to the need for equality, this formula would leave a margin of choice for the leaders of the sub-groups and would allow an allocation of responsibilities taking account of competence. As a result, while maintaining its contacts with all the Member States, the Commission would be well-placed to operate effectively, with a strengthened political authority prefiguring a European government.

Independently of the formula adopted by the IGC, the essential point is that the choice of Commission members and the allocation of their responsibilities should be made with uppermost the criteria of a high level of competence and of sound knowledge, but also of influence and European commitment. In order to carry out its role of federator, the Commission should be able to count on political personalities of high-standing. Past experience of the Commissions demonstrates the central role played by the personalities who have led the European Colleges: such figures as Monnet, Hallstein, Davignon, Delors have strongly influenced the building of Europe. In view of this lesson from European history, shouldn't the President of the Commission be granted a wider margin of manoeuvre?

The Constitution confirms the practice of *consultations* with concerned interest groups and the general public, thus strengthening their proximity to the decision-taking centres. The preparation of the directive on chemical products is an example of the divergent pressures of industry and environmental protection organisations. At the institutional level the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions are spaces of participation. The latter, consisting of regional and local elected members, is destined to a political future in so far as it is able to reduce the distances between the institutions of the Union and local collectivities. Each in its own way responds to the need for consultation and proximity.

The principal weakness handicapping the Constitution remains the cleavage, even the ditch, separating Community affairs from a common foreign, security and defence policy. In these sovereign spheres the Commission can act via the intermediary of the European Minister who, furthermore, can make proposals in the name of the Commission. In this way the door is open to more responsibility before the European Parliament. But there remains

none the less the case that on sensitive matters consensus is an imperative. The President of the European Council and the European Minister presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council have the task of promoting consensus. This will in turn contribute to keeping the decisions within the institutional framework and to avoiding their being by-passed by resorting to such external channels as the letter of the Eight, that was written to support the Iraqi war. If it is admitted that the only instance capable of conducting a real common foreign policy is the European Council, the role of its full-time President and of the European Minister will help to bring about a Union foreign policy, at the same time limiting the domination of the Big Countries which tend to prefer extra-Community actions. The Community framework will allow the small and medium-sized Member States to make their voices better heard and have some influence over the decisions. The essential goal is strengthening the role of the Commission in the preparation and follow-up of decisions of the European Council. Is it necessary to recall that long experience shows that the Commission is the best guarantor of the common interest and the democratic equilibrium within the Union?

Flexibility enabled significant progress in the past, witness the *Euro and Schengen*. At the outset a tacit clause has made provision for *enhanced co-operation*, according to which a group of member countries can decide to go ahead as a sort of *avant-garde* or pioneering core group with the approval of the others and on condition that the door is left open for them. It would thus assume the role of pioneer aspiring to attract in its wake those member countries hitherto lacking the will or the means to participate from the outset. It is a promising approach for the future.

On the other hand the procedure for approval and ratification of the European Constitution appears to be in contradiction with the spirit of flexibility. Indeed this procedure requires unanimity at two levels: on the adoption of the draft Constitution, and then at the time of ratification by the Member States.

This requirement goes even beyond the conditions of entry for international intergovernmental organisations. Should only one of the however-many Member States refuse, two possible scenarios arise: the Constitution is dead in the water or the States which have ratified it set up a sub-group equipped with a new Constitution. The national referenda make the unanimity requirement even more difficult to attain: for example, another negative vote from Denmark or Ireland would distort the democratic rules in the entire Union. Clearly, a minimum proportion of the Union's citizens voting negatively in one of these countries could block the wishes of the millions of voters or parliamentary majorities favouring the Constitution. The decisive choices for the future that the Convention was designed to make are not always clear. Often they represent compromises between Community desiderata and intergovernmental pressures. A balance seems to be outlined between the European Council and the Commission, between their two Presidents who, while respecting a division of responsibilities, are condemned to close collaboration. And, in its turn, the European Minister of Foreign Affairs builds a bridge between the intergovernmental institutions and the Commission. In addition, wearing his Vice-President of the Commission's hat, he can make proposals in the name of the latter to the European Council, thus opening the way to parliamentary responsibility as regards the

CFSP. This represents an uncertain step towards the democratisation of the Union.

The Iraqi war has opened up a fissure between present and new members which has affected the cohesion of the Union. In the light of this experience and under the pressure of European public opinion, the wounds are healing, witness the meeting of the three, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Owing to their responsibilities and political weight, their leadership in the sphere of the CFSP is unavoidable; but it would be better accepted if it was exercised within the European Council and with the support of other Member States. With the present international disorder, more than ever the USA, NATO and the UN need a United Europe as a contribution to stability and equilibrium. This is the mission of the Union in the world, which is working for a return to multilateralism and the emergence of new regional and world powers. These profound changes facing us pave the way for regenerating the UN on the basis of respect for federal principles and dialogue between cultures. Apart from the attraction that the Union has for its neighbours, it is developing a vast network of partnerships and associations making recourse to its "soft powers", to the dialogue based on respect for different identities, as well as voluntary participation. This outlook confers the adoption of the European Constitution all its significance in this decisive moment for the future of the world.

Need for New World Organisation

P.B. Sawant

Mankind has always been confronted with the challenge of eliminating the divisions in it, which are more psychological than physical, and more social and political than natural. These divisions have obviously been created and successfully utilised by the vested interests to serve their narrow selfish ends. The divisions will not, therefore, end until the scope for utilising them for the selfish purpose is eliminated. The need is to evolve a social order which will leave no such scope. Can we devise such social order internally in each country, and internationally the world over to tackle these common problems of the world?

Nationalism was once a force which served to unite the sub-national groups, to form a nation for united effort for common development and progress, and to eliminate the group conflicts and bring about peace and tranquillity for a large section of the humanity. But the narrowly conceived national interests soon gave rise to misguided patriotism and jingoism, resulting in wars between nations, one more deadly than the other.

The first and the second world wars, which were the result of misdirected spirit of nationalism, led to the half-hearted attempts at organising the nation-states first into the League of Nations, and then into the United Nations, for preventing future wars and for the common development of mankind. The first body, on account of its loose constitution, feeble structure and ineffective operation was never taken seriously by anyone, whether the strong or the weak. The constitution and the operations of the second organisation have more than proved the worst fears that were expressed at the time of its establishment. The dice were heavily loaded, by

its constitution, in favour of the strong, and with their veto power, they were free not only to defy the assembly of the nations, but also to resort to any unilateral action for their own advantage. The forum so far has failed to prevent wars, give relief to the needy and to uphold the rights of the weak and the just. On the other hand, the forum has been used by the powerful for justifying the unjust, for blocking the desirable measures, for promoting their selfish interests, and for deriving the maximum benefit to themselves.

The constitution and the functioning of the present UN is power-oriented and not people-oriented, and they have, in fact, accorded power a legal status above that of the people. The adage that might is right has been legally sanctified, and power is granted a licence for its unbridled play. The assumption that those with greater economic and military power have a higher sense of wisdom and responsibility betrays a feudal tendency. It is neither rational nor democratic. On the other hand, the psychology of man works to the contrary, and history has proved it more forcefully in international life.

History repeats itself because man commits the same mistakes. In spite of the horrendous experience of the power play of the past, we have been forced to create the structure of the UN giving primacy to power. The result was foregone. Even since its establishment, no less than 130 small and big regional wars have taken place, many times more human beings have been killed, injured and maimed, property destroyed, the environment ruined and resources wasted, than the two world wars together did, and the process goes on unrequited every day. What is worse, there is the emergence of an absolute

power, figuratively called the super power, which has arrogated to itself the power of policing the world and has virtually displaced the UN.

Power is being ostensibly used in defence of democracy and humanity, but is in effect being unashamedly exercised for self-aggrandisement. The uncontrolled naked dance of this power has become an international terror. No nation state, no section of humanity nor even democracy in any part of the world is safe, unless it pays its obeisance at its altar. Along with it has come a pile of the deadliest nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the increased insecurity for the entire planet.

We were forced to accept the power-based structure of the UN for without it the powerful nations would not have joined it, and without them, the purpose of the organisation would have been frustrated. But even with them, one now experiences the futility of the organisation every day. How can one create a world organisation devoted to world peace and progress, disarmament, security of life, to raising the standard of living of every human being, devoted to the protection and promotion of the environment, to bringing about equitable distribution and consumption of resources, and to the planning of population, and which, at the same time, is democratically organised both for policy-making and its implementation, and maintains effectively the rule of law and punishes its violations through democratic process.

There is no problem without a solution. A world parliament consisting of the representatives elected by the people from the constituencies drawn on the basis of the population spread across the nation-states and a world government elected by such parliament seems to be an obvious answer. But in such an arrangement it may be feared that the populous nations may have an undue advantage, unless the value of the votes from such countries is suitably reduced to ensure a balanced representation.

This done, parliament so constituted, and the government elected by it, should have all the powers to devise measures to solve all common problems facing mankind, and to enforce the

solutions. The international judicial forum suitably structured can help the parliament and the government, wherever necessary, to implement the objectives of the world organisation.

The obstacles to this desirable measure will be many. The powerful nations will not cooperate, the nation-states will refuse to forego their sovereign power, the regions rich in resources will not share them with others, the vested interests in the present economic, political, social and religious orders will resist the changeover, and the militarists will refuse to part with their privileges. Fortunately, the European Community has shown the way, though that experiment is confined to a limited area. To facilitate the eventual establishment of the world parliament and the world government, we may begin with the constitution of the organisations on the pattern of the European Community, across the appropriate regions of the world with suitable modifications, if necessary, to accommodate the regional peculiarities.

What is most necessary is to change the fossilised mindsets of the peoples everywhere. The most difficult thing in the world is to change the human mind, and when the concepts such as those of the world parliament and the world government demand of the people to switch over their minds from the age-old beliefs, biases and prejudices, the resistance is bound to be stronger.

But on the positive side, we have the instances of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the UN and the European Community. Even these ideas were new and unfamiliar when originally conceived. The threat of common dangers to mankind, which cannot be averted except by common efforts, has also been dawning on the minds of the people everywhere for some years now. The time is ripe for an intellectual revolution to push the world towards a new era by launching such a revolution. Only a revolution of this kind will help us eliminate the present malignant forces, and realise the goal of the world parliament and the world government for the benefit of all.

A Coalition for a World Parliament

Mumbai, World Social Forum, 16-21 Jan 2004

Nicola Vallinoto

The 4th World Social Forum has been held in Mumbai between 16 and 21 Jan. This World Social Forum, the first to take place outside of Porto Alegre, Brazil, featured over 1,000 events including workshops, lectures, and panel discussions. For five days more than 100,000 delegates from 132 countries crammed into vast, dusty exhibition grounds on the outskirts of Mumbai, united in the dream that Another World is Possible.

Mumbai is a city of ugly contrasts between the filthy rich and the wretchedly poor, which has given up on the ideal of building a relatively equitable, shared community in which there is social opportunity for all. Mumbai, India's financial capital, with its gleaming chrome-and-glass buildings in affluent enclaves, generates more than a fourth of the country's direct tax revenue. But two-thirds of Mumbai's people live in indescribably dirty shantytowns, where there are no water taps or toilets in most homes. The people's present is sordid, their future bleak. Mumbai in some ways is a microcosm of India, although its urban existence bears sharp contrast to the rest of the country, 70 percent of which is rural. The main reason to organize the world social forum in Mumbai has been the widening to the Asian movements of new global effort to build a different world.

Federalist participation in the World Social Forum aimed to find new alliances for global democracy. With respect to the previous editions an increasing number of events concerned global democracy, international institutions democratic reforms and world parliament issues. Many movements self-organized events

on these arguments. Movimento Federalista Europeo, the Italian section of WFM, promoted a World Parliament initiative following the proposal made by Italian federalists during the last Copenhagen WFM Council, in October 2003, concerning the importance of WFM participation in World Social Forum that is considered the right place where to find allies to create a coalition of global civil society movements for a World Parliament.

On January 19, 2004, from 9 am to 1 pm "Towards a World Parliament. Let's create a network for glocal democracy" workshop has been organized by Movimento Federalista Europeo. 50 persons from 20 countries participated in the discussions. Nicola Vallinoto of the World Federalist Movement, from Italy, was the convenor. Leo Rebello, Co-President of World Constitution and Parliament Association, from India, chaired the session. The following persons spoke: James Arputharaj, Sri Lanka, World Federalist Movement; Rasmus Tenberger, Germany, The Global Democracy Experiment; Dick Burkhardt & Mona Lee, USA, Bike for Global Democracy; SICHENDRA BISTA, Nepal, eParliament.org; Rob Wheeler, France, Forum for a World Parliament; Carmo D'Souza, India, Lecturer in Goa Law College; Mikael Nordfors, Norway, Vivarto Co-operative; Troy Davis, USA, World Citizens Foundation; Werner Bulling, Germany, Citizens Initiative for For the Europe of the Citizens; Andrew Strauss, USA, Widener University, School of Law; Manuel Mononelles, Campaign for Indepth Reform of International Institutions; Seshrao Chavan, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Aurangabad Chapter, India; Shishir Srivastava, World Unity and Peace Education

Deptt. CMS, Lucknow. The talks were followed by comments from the audience in which every one participated. The following resolutions were adopted unanimously: 1) Establish World Parliament by 2010. 2) World Democracy as the main theme at the next WSF. 3) Website on World Parliament with web-links to other Mundialist organisations. 4) Network or Federation of World Democracy Organisations. 5) World Parliament E-Forum to evolve World People's Basic Manifesto. During the workshop *The Federalist Debate* has been presented and distributed. Some of the participants will contribute to the next issue of the review with an article about global democracy.

At the same time of the workshop the British writer and activist George Monbiot addressed the plenary session titled "Globalization and its alternatives". He told delegates that "without global democracy there could never be national democracy". Monbiot gave the example of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (popularly known as Lula), the Brazilian President, who won last year's presidential elections mainly on a promise of delivering basic services to the poorer sections of the society and implementing policies that would close the gap between the rich and the poor. Monbiot argued that it is not enough to have good local policies and intentions while the current global system is skewed in favour of policies that are aimed at enriching developed countries and the rich sections of many countries. He called for more organised global action that will enable the establishment of a 'new world order'. "It is not enough to think globally and act locally. We also have to act globally," said Monbiot, also calling for the dismantling of the IMF and the WB and the transformation of the United Nations. According to Monbiot, in his latest book titled *The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for New World Order*¹, which was widely circulated at the forum, there must be a world parliament where representatives will be elected by citizens in all countries and held publicly accountable for the decisions that they take. This will replace the current United Nations. Turning

to the WSF itself and whether the forum can be a stepping stone towards a 'world parliament', Monbiot said that the forum is important but not enough. The WSF, according to Monbiot, is not enough "(because) we self-select ourselves. We have passports, money and time to attend this kind of gathering". While the WSF is important, the parallel platform of the 'world parliament' must be initiated which will have more "moral authority." It is this moral authority that brings about real people's power. "Power lies where moral authority is," said Monbiot to loud applause.

The last day of the forum debates all global democracy activists decided to organize a common event just to find the way to cooperate for the common aim. On January 20 evening, a "Workshop on Global Democracy" was held with the topic "Organizing a Coalition for a World Parliament". Approximately 40 people stayed for this meeting after a panel between two expert advocates for world parliament, Professor Andrew Strauss and author George Monbiot. This meeting was a culmination of several forums, workshops, and organizational meetings held throughout the World Social Forum. Participants at this meeting were committed activists who favour a world parliament and want to carry forward a series of initiatives to see that goal realized in the not-too-distant future. Rob Wheeler facilitated the meeting, assisted by Dick Burkhart and Mona Lee. Rob Wheeler gave a brief summary of several current initiatives on World Parliament that the coalition could choose to support: World Citizen Campaign, City Montessori School, 27,000 students educated and promoting world parliament, World Student Assembly modelling how a WP could work, several direct democracy initiatives, several E-Parliaments.

The following initiatives were suggested at earlier workshops for the coalition to focus on for the coming months:

A. Establish global democracy as a focus of the World Social Forum: 1) request to include

world democracy as a primary theme for the World Social Forum; 2) include speakers on world parliament at plenary panels on World Democracy; 3) participate in international commission committees to lobby for these; 4) focus on deepening democracy, especially global democracy; 5) hold a "World Democracy Forum" or "Global Peoples Assembly" at each World Social Forum.

B. Planning for World Social Forum at Porto Alegre 2005: 1) include different themes on different days. Relate these to other thematic events at the Forum; 2) attract and interest people in our events by various means such as include more countries, not just big countries; 3) include Eastern Europe as well; 4) contact people who support democracy in non-democratic countries; 5) concentrate on Universities with many foreign students; 6) organize workshops in Universities; 7) introduce the concept of world parliament to local communities; 8) advocate for improvement of simultaneous translation systems; 9) provide more opportunities for people to speak out; 10) prepare a brief flyer explaining what we mean by world parliament.

C. Develop a call for a World Parliament Referendum, which should be as widely circulated as possible; 1) diversity should be a major consideration in circulation; 2) take referenda to local media and public officials; 3) take signatures via a web site.

Details of structure and functioning will be decided by means of a democratic process via the internet and/or at face-to-face meetings. The following basic framework was generally accepted: 1) We are a network of assemblies, partner organizations and individuals. 2) We will have a delegates council with a liaison representing each organization. This would be the governing body, subject to review by larger plenary sessions. 3) We will have a coordinating team to move the process forward and obtain non-profit status for fund raising. 4) We will conduct a membership campaign. A minimal membership fee may be requested to carry our initiatives forward.

Initial communication and decision-making processes will take place via the internet. Germa Pelayo of the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural, and United World offered to serve as translator to French and Spanish. Rasmus Tenbergen offered to develop his Democracy Experiment web site as our central means of communication. The web address www.world-democracy.org met with approval. We will also hold alternative face-to-face meetings as needed. The following alternative face-to-face meetings were suggested as preparatory to the next World Social Forum (These meetings would likely have more regional representatives than global, so Internet validation / modification will be necessary): 1) San Francisco, CA, June 2004, to piggyback off a Conference on UN Charter Review to be held there. Use of facilities has already been offered for our meeting by the conference convener, Dr. Lucille Green, a very dedicated and senior promoter of world parliament. 2) Lucknow, India, December 2004, where facilities have also been offered to "piggyback" off the Chief Justices meeting conducted by City Montessori School. 3) A meeting in conjunction with the European Social Forum in November was suggested.

The name of the coalition has not yet been decided. The following possible names were suggested: Coalition for a World Parliament, Coalition for Global Democracy, Coalition for a Global Peoples Assembly, World Democracy Movement and others. This coalition would replace, or relaunch, the prior efforts of the Global Peoples Assembly movement under the name and mission chosen by a new Charter discussion. Rob Wheeler has been appointed as coordinator. This is the partial list of the organizations and initiatives that expressed an interest in becoming a member of the coalition for a world parliament: Alliance 21 for a United, Plural and Responsible World (www.alliance21.org), Bike for Global Democracy (www.world-democracy.org), City Montessori School Lucknow, India (www.cmseducation.org), EParliament.org (www.eparliament.org), Global Democracy Experiment (www.tgde.org).

org), Global Peoples Assembly Network (www.world-democracy.org), Mehr Demokratie (www.mehr-demokratie.de), Sammondano (www.sammondano.org), Student World Assembly (student.worldassembly.net), Vivarto Co-operative (www.vivarto.com), World Citizen Foundation (www.worldcitizen.org), World Federalist Movement (www.wfn.org), World Parliament & Constitution Association (www.worldparliamentgov.net), World Parliament Experiment (www.world-parliament.org).

The final consideration about the federalist participation in Mumbai is that it has been

very positive. The following are the two main aspects: the first is that most of global democracy organizations and initiatives now are starting to work together under the umbrella of the coalition for a world parliament. The second is that, even if global democracy activists continue to be a minority group inside the newglobal movement, the idea of a World Parliament is becoming more and more popular thanks also to George Monbiot's support. Many Indian newspapers, such as *The Hindu*, *The Times of India* and *The Tribune*, published articles about the World Parliament during the WSF.

¹ See *The Federalist Debate*, XVI, 3, November 2003, p. 61, for a review of the book

A World Citizen Initiative for Reforming International Institutions

Whilst markets are becoming global, the influence of political institutions required for their democratic, equitable and efficient functioning has dramatically decreased. The consequence is the coexistence of deplorable poverty in some regions of the world, with unsustainable economic growth in others. Finally, the break-down of the international system for peace and security (stressed by the recent war in Iraq) has caused serious consequences for the system of international institutions, particularly the UN. In such a context, people all over the world are beginning to claim their democratic entitlement to participate in decisions that affect their lives so directly.

UBUNTU (the World Forum of Civil Society Networks) is playing a key role in promoting the democratisation of the system of international institutions. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), it launched the World Campaign for in-depth Reform of the System of International Institutions. Its key objective is to establish a consistent, transparent, responsible and effective global system of democratic governance, based on developing international legislation whose democratic value and legitimacy is widely accepted. At the heart of this system would be a stronger, more democratic UN, with effective control over all its bodies and agencies and over global multilateral organisations.

A Manifesto, fostering a "world citizen legislative initiative", will be submitted to the UN General Assembly, calling for the organisation of a World Conference on Reform of the System of International Institutions. The campaign aims first at all NGOs and voluntary associations all over the world and has the initial support of many international organisations (such as the Peace Round Table) and individuals of the academic world (*r.r.*)

From Baruch to Bush: an Initiative that Deserves Federalist Support

Ira Straus

The program President Bush spelt out at the National Defense University on February 11 amounts to a revival of the Baruch Plan of the late 1940s, to the extent that it can be revived in today's conditions. It brings us back to the most urgent purposes of our movement at the time of its founding: securing the world against the threat of nuclear proliferation. What Bush announced was a 7-point plan for pushing back the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The points include:

- Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in three ways, including an Additional Protocol to require nations to declare their nuclear facilities and let IAEA inspect them more thoroughly, with the incentive that suppliers should sell only to nations that adopt the protocol.

- For the 40 countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to stop shipping enrichment and reprocessing materials to countries that don't already fully have them, in order to close the loophole in NPT under which, in helping countries building peaceful nuclear programs, the suppliers have also been helping them develop weapons-usable equipment and materials.

- Extending the Proliferation Security Initiative which aims at interdicting illicit nuclear shipments.

- A UN Security Council resolution proposed by US to strengthen control of all nuclear materials; and other ways to strengthen laws and international controls governing proliferation.

The plan is realistic, since it provides incentives and does not wait for everything to move lockstep before getting on with what can be done. This gives it a fighting chance of

succeeding overall, and a positive likelihood of accomplishing a decent fraction of what is trying to do meanwhile. Some of the steps in this plan are already underway in part. What killed the Baruch Plan 55 years ago was the Soviet veto and the Cold War. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to revive it – or rather, something like it, taking into account all the subsequent experience, the actual proliferation that has taken place in the interim, and the interim institutions and laws developed meanwhile. What needed to be done was to upgrade all these laws, institutions and arrangements, and bring them nearer to the standards of the original Baruch Plan.

It could finally be done after 1991. And none too soon. Proliferation had gotten well underway meanwhile. However, it still wasn't done under Bush I or Clinton. Even though it would have been a natural follow-up for the first Gulf War, it seems we had to wait for still further prods. The prods duly came, tragically, from 9-11 and from the revelations of a nuclear proliferation mafia ranging from Pakistan to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.

Now it is finally being done. It is everything we could reasonably ask for in the way of multilateral initiatives to deal with these matters. It will face objections from nationalists and special interests, and obstacles from vested interests of national regimes and national sovereignty. All great international initiatives face these obstacles, and many fall victim to them. The obstacles need not be insuperable obstacles in this case, given the strong elements of realism in the plan. It belongs on our priority program and it deserves our unstinting support.

A Federal Iraq?

John Roberts

In the *Times* Simon Jenkins, a busy conservative journalist, last month elaborated his belief that the U.S. will have to plump for an Iraq divided into three parts. Correctly he pointed out the country has only ever been held together by force and that has always meant using local groups to control different areas. Since the Americans decline to cast themselves in the role of the Turkish conquerors but want to get out, that requires some drastic and speedy action in order to avoid becoming more a part of the problem than the supposed solution to it. The possible division into three parts looks suspiciously simple, but it will be fraught with difficulties.

The three parts that potentially could become the federal constituents of a new Iraq are the Kurdish north, although the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul have substantial other population groups, Arab and Turkoman; the south parts, which are of Shia belief, and the central portion, including Baghdad. That is where most of the problems already lie and no doubt will continue to fester. The mixture of Sunni tribesmen (often still loyal to Saddam Hussein) and others in a great city and a heartland of opposition to change will constitute a problem whoever rules the country. Nevertheless, some form of federal structure may prove essential. Nothing else, short of reversion to a unitary dictatorship, might work.

The US rulers of Iraq have recently inclined to favour a federal Iraq, less perhaps from a devotion to democracy than their cognizance of the depth of feeling among the Kurds that they will not accept a return to the rule of the Sunni Arabs who gave their backing to Saddam

Hussein. It was that ruthless dominance which permitted and lengthened the tyranny of his Baathist minority that led Iraq down a path of aggression at home and abroad. Now it may be that a centralized autocracy, the sole previous method of keeping Iraq stable under one government, is no longer feasible.

The Kurds, having enjoyed the temporary northern haven for over a decade, are already set on some form of permanently devolved autonomy. If they can avoid again dividing into warring factions that could be a basis for a stable province that might successfully embrace their two cities; and their political parties have already sought advice from beyond the Middle East about the practicalities of federalism, which they have guessed might offer help to their political dilemmas. Released from the threat of Saddam's intrigues, which were aimed to destabilise Kurdish politics, they may be better able to handle the external hostility from Turkey and Iran (and even Syria). But it will not be easy.

In the south, the threat may come from the ayatollahs, those religious leaders who will want to ensure that their Shia followers are permitted to establish a government either dominated or largely influenced by fundamentalist Islam. Even if they can be persuaded not to travel the Iranian road to theocratic dictatorship, it is unlikely that such a regime would be very willing to embrace the modern world. Saddam's rule was brutally secular, as well as being egocentrically efficient at centralising power in Iraq. The question will be what lessons the Iraqis generally have learned from their experiences under him. Did those

convince them of the need for tolerance and inclusion, or simply of the need to control the central power for themselves?

Unless a new strong leader emerges whose capacity is so outstanding that he can conciliate the warring parties within the Iraqi state and also convince the U.S. that he will be sufficiently pliant to allow American exploitation of Iraqi oil and use of the country for strategic purposes, he is unlikely to do very much to keep Iraq in one piece. But the real fears and worries of neighbouring states cannot be forgotten. Saudi Arabia may yet implode; Iran has its own internal struggles of the fascist ayatollahs and an incipient popular revolt, Turkey is plagued not only by the Kurdish insurgents but also by the fact of fundamentalism amongst the rural population.

And what of democracy? Americans may fancy the vision of a Middle East converted to universal freedom and new democratic systems, which they generally identify with commercial market and the making of profit. However, they usually see those in terms of growing markets that will allow more scope for U.S. corporations

to take over and run swathes of new enterprises. The reality would be very different. If democracy spreads in the rackety regimes of the Arab world the first consensus to develop will be a determination to do something about Palestine. A democratic Arab league would be a nightmare for US policy, devoted as it is to the protection of Israeli supremacy and freedom of action.

Nor is it likely that Arab democracy would be easy to create: the patterns of Arab society do not seem usually to offer openings for women and the resulting social revolutions that would ensue. On the other hand, not only do the Arabs as Moslems have a strong belief in a universal brotherhood - which is what Islam means -; there are religious reasons why such pan-Arabism needs to extend itself towards other, non-Arab, Moslems. That is only part of world citizenship and Moslems, like Christians, will have to shed their dreams of exclusivity. We all now constitute part of one minority or another. Until the human race comes to the only unity possible, that is its own natural identity, there will be no real peace. We may be a long way from full acceptance, but facts and the alternatives available are driving us inexorably towards it.

The World Summit on the Information Society

Rik Panganiban

Implement e-government strategies focusing on applications aimed at innovating and promoting transparency in public administrations and democratic processes, improving efficiency and strengthening relations with citizens...

Support international cooperation initiatives in the field of e-government, in order to enhance transparency, accountability and efficiency at all levels of government.

Paragraph C7.15 of the Plan of Action of the World Summit on the Information Society. December 12, 2003

Currently at the United Nations, governments are debating the role of information communications technology (ICTs) on society. Dubbed the "World Summit on the Information Society," this two-phase UN-sponsored summit held its first phase from December 10-12, 2003 in Geneva, Switzerland. This convocation brought together 11,000 representatives of governments, non-governmental organizations, and corporations to discuss the impact of information communications technology on the world's economy, politics and culture.

Nearly ignored by mainstream media, as well as by many governments, corporations and NGOs, the WSIS has suffered from the impression that it is only about esoteric, technical issues about the functioning of the Internet. In fact, this process presents new opportunities to advocate for global democracy, human rights, and a more just globalization.

The December summit was an incredibly diverse, colourful, at times bewildering series of events that took place in the cavernous Palexpo facilities in Geneva. The ICT "fair" hosted hundreds of exhibitions organized by private

companies, civil society groups, governments and UN agencies on an enormous range of technology and societal issues – from web software for the blind to environmental waste from computer products. Meanwhile, groups from across the political spectrum organized hundreds of parallel meetings on various economic, development, political, cultural and technological issues.

The official government negotiations in plenary were the least interesting part of the entire Summit, with 44 Heads of State and other dignitaries reciting bland and tendentious speeches that seemed to all come from the same script. Much more interesting were the various multi-stakeholder projects and initiatives that have sprung up around the WSIS, bringing together NGOs, governments and the private sector in innovative ways.

Some important issues being debated in this process include:

- **How to use new technologies to stimulate economic development in Africa.** Some argue that information communications technologies can help "jump start" the economies of less-

developed countries, helping them skip forward from agrarian- or light-industry-based economies to information and service economies. Others argue that technology is not a “magic bullet” for Africa, and that debt relief and investment in basic infrastructure and public services are more important subjects for the region. The UN Secretary General has been mandated by the WSIS to establish a multi-sectoral working group to discuss and make recommendations on ICT financing issues.

-The Right to Information, the Right to Privacy:

New technologies create new challenges for governments in the area of human rights. On the one hand, these technologies make possible new forms of surveillance and monitoring of citizens (such as the United States’ “Total Information Awareness” initiative) challenging their right to privacy. On the other hand, government transparency and accountability can be greatly facilitated by internet technologies, such as through putting official documents on government websites and webcasting meetings on the internet. The decision to hold the next phase of the WSIS in Tunisia, a country with a questionable human rights record, calls into question how much these human rights issues will be highlighted in the second-phase of the summit.

- Who owns the Internet? Important questions remain around the control and governance of the Internet. Private corporations are exerting greater and greater influence over the management of this global network, many seeking to convert it into a vast shopping mall. Meanwhile, governments are often helpless to regulate internet traffic and financial transfers, challenging their national sovereignty. At the same time, citizens groups argue for the need for a “public commons” on the internet to allow for the free exchange of ideas and sharing of experiences and information. These ICT global governance issues will be debated in a special working group to be established by the UN Secretary General.

- Intellectual Property: New technologies make it possible to cheaply copy and distribute music, movies, and other intellectual property, cutting into corporate profits. At the same time, groups working on open source and free software projects challenge the traditional intellectual property model. All governments agree that enforcing the current intellectual property system is increasingly difficult in an age of high speed duplication, distribution and manipulation of information.

e-Democracy

Most interesting for World Federalists, these technologies make possible new forms of democratic governance, from the local to the national and international levels.

At the national and local levels, the internet is becoming a powerful tool for citizens to use in getting information about their governments, monitoring their meetings, and making their views known. The recent presidential campaign in South Korea as well as the current campaigns in the United States highlight how ICTs are changing the way politics is run. As more and more governments develop their own “e-strategies,” the WSIS can play an important role in ensuring that they include mechanisms for citizen oversight, feedback, and participation.

At the international level, institutions such as the European Union, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank are experimenting with mechanisms to increase citizen information, monitoring, participation in these institutions. For example, the World Trade Organization website allows people to comment on and discuss the policies of the WTO on an electronic bulletin board. The European Union hosts “webchats” allowing EU officials to discuss important European economic, political and security issues with European citizens online.

The United Nations meanwhile lags behind other international institutions, with only a few experiments in using ICTs to bridge the democracy divide. Whether or not this august

body will transform itself from a closed-door “old boys club” to a more participatory, open and “wired” institution has yet to be seen. World Federalists have an important responsibility to promote new proposals and visions for creating a more democratic United Nations in the Information Society.

WFM continues to co-ordinate a working group on “e-democracy” issues related to the WSIS, which brings together various programs, initiatives, and proposals being put forward by NGOs, governments and corporations in this area. In December I spoke on a number of panels on e-democracy and UN reform issues, which was very well received by various audiences. Much more work in this area is clearly warranted and worth supporting.

I have written a monograph entitled “e-Democracy on the United Nations,” which analyzes the ICT activities of the UN and

recommends particular strategies to use these technologies to enhance the democratic character of the global organization. It will be published by the Center for UN Reform Education in early Spring 2004.

What Next?

With the completion of the first phase of the WSIS in December, the process moves toward preparations for the next phase of Summit in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005. The principal negotiating activities will likely revolve around the two special working groups to be established by Kofi Annan on financing issues and ICT global governance. However, other regional, issue-based and other specialized fora may be established as well. WFM should continue to play an active role in the WSIS, bringing forward these critical democratic global governance issues.

For more information on the WSIS, go to www.itu.org/wsis. The Center for UN Reform Education can be found on the web at <http://www.unreformcenter.org>.

The UN is still Relevant, but Needs Restructuring

Visvanathan Muthukumaran

The United Nations faces a crisis now that America has hurled a major challenge at it so audaciously, with a unilateral attack on Iraq. America is unchallenged as a political, economic and military super-power and has marshalled a worldwide drive against Terror (*Newsweek*, Dec. 2002). The American Imperialism has found a new “-ism”, that is Terror-ism, with which it is trying to justify any military action anywhere in the world. A single major terrorist attack on the American soil - smaller in human toll than the Bhopal (India) tragedy - has plunged the country into a paranoia of insecurity. This fed into the compulsion for economic and military domination and activated the logic for war that defied the authority of the UN. Now America and Britain are widely seen as occupation powers and not as liberators by the Muslim world, although the aggression war is called “Operation Iraq Freedom”. Earlier both America and Britain claimed and preferred the terminology for their war as liberating forces and now after the war they acknowledge that they are indeed the occupying powers.

There is an urgent need for the UN role, because before the dust has settled over the first unprecedented invasion, America has begun to target a second nation, Syria, with warnings and sanctions, alleging that it supported the Iraqi leaders and preventing it from developing its own chemical weapons capabilities. Targeting Syria has less logic, since it is not a signatory to any chemical weapons convention and therefore it will not be breaking any international law if it seeks to possess these weapons. The uncalled for act by America must alert the international community to the continuing dangers of America’s unilateralism. The American empire

has not been averse to dividing nations. Apart from divisions created after the Second World War, Korea remains divided, Yugoslavia has been split, and Grenada suffered a divisive onslaught. The Middle East is in ruins. Southeast Asia suffers even now. Not a word about Israel’s open violations of international norms and gratuitous attacks on its neighbours, which include the Headquarters of Yassar Arafat and the recent missile attack on the convoy of the Hamas Co-founder Abdel Aziz Rantisi, and again its air raid into Syria, a blatant act of military aggression against a sovereign country without any provocation.

Mr. Jimmy Carter, the former American President, in accepting the Nobel peace prize in Dec. 2002, remarked that it is clear that global challenges must be met with an emphasis on peace, in harmony with others, with strong alliances and international consensus, which can best be done through the UN. There is no forum except the UN through which the rule of international law can be achieved, and it is the only multilateral organization which has nearly universal membership and which at least in form, if not in actual practice, is democratic, as it is based on the concept of the sovereign equality of states. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the late and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and special envoy in Iraq, said that the military actions of the US and the UK must not lead us to think international stability can be ensured by force. If the international system is to be based on something other than might, states will have to return to the institution they built: the United Nations. But the very same institution is facing a major crisis. A vast

majority of nations, individuals and movements are concerned and have serious doubts about the relevance and significance of the UN in the context of the aggression of Iraq by US-led forces and the UN's inability to prevent the aggression. The UN has ceased to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. The economically strong countries have long succeeded in putting themselves beyond the reach of the UN's scrutiny and surveillance.

Whatever the varying perceptions about the UN, it is important to the international community for two reasons: one, it represents multilateralism for issues of international concern, and two, it still wields the great seal of interpretational legitimacy.

The UN should be restructured and updated by resorting to the Charter's functions it has lost and introducing in it changes which reflect the transformations that have taken place in the world in the fifty years or so since its inception, so that it becomes truly democratic. To make this possible, all the member countries, especially the members of the Security Council, should be able to make a common cause in restructuring and revitalizing the world body, and will have to go through the various proposals on UN reforms submitted in the 1990s, like the report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, that of the independent working group on the future of the UN, and that by Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, of the Dag Hamarsskjold Foundation, titled *Renewing the UN System*. They made extensive suggestions on restructuring and strengthening, including the administrative and financial management of the UN.

Here I would like to refer to the article written by Prof. Shunsaku Kato in the November 2002 issue of *The Federalist Debate*; on the UN reform he says it has been nearly 30 years since the special Charter Committee was established in 1974 to examine in detail proposals regarding the Charter, the strengthening of the UN role in maintaining peace, security, cooperation among nations and promotion of the rule of international law in relations between the states.

He says that there are two types of reforms: one is without revising the Charter, and the other is by revising the Charter, but he feels that revising the Charter is very difficult in the near future, and so we should give priority to the first option. He further says that Mr. Donald Keys drafted many UN reform proposals when he was the UN representative of WAWF (WFM), and they are excellent plans even today.

The decision-making process in the Security Council on issues of war and peace must reflect the vastly enhanced membership of the UN. It should find ways and means to ensure that the voice of the people's power is heard and its opinion is brought to bear in the above process. Among the suggestions made in this regard, one is to create a separate organization called the U.N. Parliamentary Assembly, or a Forum of Civil Society Organizations, to be convened at the U.N. just before the annual session of the General Assembly. The peoples of the world did not get together and vote to grant just 5 countries the permanent membership with veto powers. The UN Security Council should truly represent all the peoples of the world. As quoted by Sergio Vieira de Mello, it has to be apparent that the time has come for all the states to redefine global security, to put human rights at the center of this concept and, in doing so, all nations must exercise their responsibilities with their strength. Only then will the responsible states, rather than only the strongest, be able to bring a lasting stability to our world through the UN. What we need is a truly international veto-free body, one that is dedicated to championing, promoting and preserving human rights and civil liberties in every corner of the world.

A proposal was made by the former Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his report "Agenda for Peace" to create a revolving fund for peace-keeping operations and further to create an endowment fund of \$1 billion, the returns of which could be used for peace-keeping operations before contributions are received. Sir Brian Urquhart, pioneer of peace-keeping

operations in the UN, proposed the creation of a Rapid Deployment or a UN Voluntary Force 10,000-strong or so.

Mr Bruce Richie, of the UK Association of World Federalists, in his paper circulated during the 24th International Congress held in the UK in 2002 on armed forces and peace-keeping, comments that it is a basic belief of world federalists that world peace can only come from world law and that the national armies of sovereign nations are not suitable to enforce this. Ultimately, the world Body needs to create its own Police force, made up of volunteers recruited and trained for the task. This may seem a distant goal, but it is a realistic one, and so the WFM should encourage people to recognize that no single nation can afford to be a policeman; the UN Charter should give the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council and to the Military Staff committee or the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations. The Peacekeeping force should come under the preview of the International Criminal Court.

The big economic powers have successfully evaded the role and functions of the UN by illegally withholding the payments of their contributions. For the same reason, they have spurned all the suggestions for providing the UN access to automatic and practicable source of financing, such as through taxation on global goods. The UN should be allowed to breathe freely, independent of financial blackmail, by finding ways to increase its income, and the James Tobin's proposal can be considered for imposing a tax on the flow of capital for speculative purposes, both for limiting such speculation and for raising the resources for financing agreed activities of the UN organizations. If the UN succeeds in making its decision-making

truly democratic, it can subject all states -the developed, developing and the least developed, poor, rich, weak and powerful- to its scrutiny, policy-making and norms-setting. Further, it is essential to bring the global economic issues back in the UN agenda. It should be able to assess on a continuing basis the overall state of the world economy, to provide a long-term strategy and policy framework in order to promote a stable, balanced and sustainable development; and promote consensus on international economic issues. The UN should once again be the venue for discussing the harmonization of financial, monetary and trade policies pursued by the major governments, the transfer of resources and technology for development, the functioning of the commodity markets and the international financial markets. This will help the UN to monitor the emerging international financial architecture that is going to be more and more discretionary and less rule-based. The aim should not be a confrontation with the US, but to reach the democratic impulses of the American people so that peace and democratic development could be ensured through consensually arrived at decisions within the international system and within the UN framework.

The most important and urgent task for everybody is to build a world-wide campaign for the UN reform and strengthening, which should be spearheaded by the WFM, since it is committed to a strengthened and reformed UN. The goal is to work towards a more effective, democratized UN, in particular the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, with the support of all the countries, including America, and the civil society organizations, thus preventing the unilateral spreading of wild bushes!

World Organization of United Cities and Local Governments:

A Project for Local Democracy in the World

Mercedes Bresso

The international movement of local bodies and governments and the development of their associations occupies today a relevant place beside the NGOs in the so-called civil society sector.

First of all, the local bodies are acknowledged to be forms of government. They have a territory, a population and several levels of competences and decisional autonomy. Even if these features are present in a quite non-homogeneous fashion and can vary appreciably from State to State, an important factor they have in common, which represents the basis of the legitimacy of their status and their activity, is the democratic election by which the local community awards its mandate to the elected members.

They have been created for making the local voice recognized and better heard at the decisional levels of the central governments and the international community. The most representative international associations of local agencies and governments have earned the privilege of receiving the advisory status with many UN agencies; in particular, the United Nations Advisory Committee on Local Authorities (UNACLA), created in 2000, a UN advisory body composed of the Mayors of many big cities in the world and by the representatives of the main international associations of local bodies; IULA – International Union of Local Authorities; UTO – United Town Organization; Metropolis – International network of metropolitan cities and governments; ATO – Arabic Town Organisation.

UTO and IULA are for sure the two bigger,

historical world associations of local bodies, that have interpreted and developed the themes of good local government, linked to the role the local bodies play in international relations for furthering dialogue, solidarity and cooperation. IULA, which can be proud of its 90-year history, is gathering today about 120 national associations of local authorities in about 80 countries.

In 1996 IULA and UTO, which for decades had been working in parallel on matters of international and local-bodies collaboration, decided to start a merging process in order to found a single worldwide organization of local authorities, capable of bringing the unified voice of dialogue and cooperation to the international system, for developing local democracy, the growth of local-government capacities, the decentralized cooperation, the local bodies' international action in favour of peace, the fight against poverty and sustainable development.

In May 2001 IULA and UTO held their congresses in parallel in Rio de Janeiro, and in a unified session they took the decision to build by 2004 a new and common worldwide structure in which to pull together their supporters. Then the two organizations set out to rapidly prepare the unification project, appointing in unified sessions their executives bureaus and making clearer the project of the new, single world organization:

- In October 2001 in Turin, it was decided that the foundation Congress shall be held in Paris in May 2004

- In June 2002 in Guadalajara, Barcelona was chosen, from a long list of candidate cities, as the seat of the new unified structure

- In November 2002 in Tunis, the name of the new organization was chosen: World Organisation of United Cities and Local Governments

This organization will count on an initial representation of about 1500 local authorities adhering directly, 160 national associations, 7 regional chapters, a special section of metropolitan cities; it is present already in about 135 countries of all continents. Recently the two historical organizations have been joined in their project by Metropolis, the worldwide network of metropolitan cities and governments, formed in 1984.

Since 2001 UTO and IULA, presided over by, respectively, Mercedes Bresso, President of the Province of Turin, Italy, and Alan Lloyd, Counsel of the County of Swansea, Wales, have produced a remarkable convergence on the political plane and on the performance of actions and programs.

At the heart of this work, the commitment has been placed to operate according to the agenda and towards the objectives of the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations Assembly. In particular, they assured the presence and the contribution of the international associations of the local bodies to the Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September

2001, to the World Water Forum in Kyoto (March 2003), to the first World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva, December 2003), where Mercedes Bresso gave a speech in the plenary session to the government representatives in the name of local bodies.

The actual unification between UTO and IULA will be sanctioned at the Congress to be held in Paris on 2 - 5 May, 2004, but a transition phase has started already since 2003, and will be completed in 2007 at the second Congress of the new organization. In this phase the organization is engaged in the construction of decentralized structures in its seven regional sections: Europe, Africa, East Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, North America. In particular, in Europe a Center has been established to coordinate the Council of European Commons and Regions, and the network of National Committees of local bodies.

At the great assembly of African Mayors, Africité, held in Yaoundé in December 2003, a new African organization of local authorities has been formed, the Council of African Commons and Regions. Other processes of the same kind are under way in other regions of the world, where the exchanges and the coordination among the FMCU and IULA decentralized structures are giving origin to new, more efficient regional programs and activities.

The Crisis of the EU Stability and Growth Pact

Annamaria Viterbo

The November 25, 2003, Ecofin Council conclusions on France and Germany budget deficit can threaten the European integration process. To explain why, it is necessary to examine the events which have led to such conclusions and to describe the legal framework involved.

In the context of the EMU, the Treaty establishing the European Community states that Member States shall conduct their economic and monetary policy in accordance with the principles of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources.

Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern (Art. 99 EC) and they shall avoid excessive government deficits (Art. 104 EC). The main objective of the single monetary policy is to maintain price stability, while supporting the EU general economic policies (Art. 105 EC). Therefore, euro area countries are expected to manage public finances as to guarantee a sustainable growth.

Member States shall comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria defined in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure annexed to the EC Treaty: a deficit to GDP ratio not exceeding a reference value of 3% and a debt to GDP ratio not exceeding a reference value of 60%. To ensure the respect of this criteria, Art. 104 EC sets a procedure, the so called Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), to identify an excessive deficit and to request the Member State to correct it.

In December 1997, with the aim of ensuring lasting fiscal convergence and the continuation of budgetary discipline after the entry into force

of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a political agreement on the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact was reached at the Dublin European Council. In June 1997, the Pact was then adopted by the Amsterdam European Council.

The Stability and Growth Pact formally consists of three legal instruments:

- the Amsterdam European Council Resolution, in which the Commission, the Council and Member States agree on the full and timely implementation of the budget surveillance process.
- Council Regulation 1466/97, which reinforces the multilateral surveillance process of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, also rules that Member States will submit to the Council their stability and convergence programmes, setting out national medium-term budgetary objectives and other relevant information.
- Council Regulation 1467/97, which speeds up and clarifies the implementation of the EDP. Such Regulation also contains dissuasive elements which, in the event of the 3% reference value being breached, require Member States to take immediate corrective action and, if necessary, allow for the imposition of sanctions. So Council Regulation 1467/97 and Article 104 of the European Community Treaty jointly define the Excessive Deficit Procedure.

In November 2003, there were three ongoing EDPs: in October 2002, the Commission initiated the procedure against Portugal, since its budgetary deficit for 2001 achieved 4.1% of GDP; in 2003, an EDP was opened also towards

France and Germany whose budget deficit reached respectively 3.1% of GDP and 3.8% in 2002.

Based on the evidence that the government deficit in France and in Germany exceeded the 3.0% of GDP in 2002, the Council adopted recommendations establishing a deadline for the French and German government to take appropriate measures to bring the situation of excessive deficit to an end in 2004 at the latest. In October and November 2003, the Commission recommended the Council to assert that the action taken by the two Member States had proved inadequate and, as a result, the excessive deficits would persist in 2004. Then, the Commission adopted a recommendation for the Council to request France and Germany to take new measures to reduce their budget deficit and remedy the situation of excessive deficit by 2005 at the latest.

In both cases, the EDP reached a stage in which the Council was expected to give notice to the Member States concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction (under Article 104.9 EC): the failure to comply with the notices would lead the Council to the adoption of sanctions against France and Germany.

However, on November 25, 2003, the Ecofin Council decided not to act under Article 104.9 EC, regardless of the Commission recommendations and of the procedure. Instead, the Ecofin Council adopted by qualified majority conclusions (an instrument of an intergovernmental nature) to hold the EDP for France and Germany in abeyance. Due to the fact that France and Germany have made a substantive adjustment adopting several measures, the Council only recommended to put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible and by 2005 at the latest.

On January 2004, the Commission – in its quality of guardian of the Treaties – decided to challenge the Council conclusions before the European Court of Justice. The Commission complained that the Council reached non-

binding conclusions instead of taking a decision with precise legal effects. The Council could have rejected the Commission's recommendations: on the basis of its own evaluation of the objective economic factors, and explaining clearly and unambiguously why, the Council could have adopted a decision not based on the Commission recommendations. But in the present case, the Council has confirmed the Commission economic analysis. Consequently, it recognised that additional measures were necessary to address the excessive deficit of the concerned Member States. In those circumstances the Council, although it could have amended the substance of the Commission's recommendations, had no margin as to the choice of the legal instruments and should have given notices to the concerned Member States as provided for by the Treaty. Therefore, the Council conclusions of November 25 constitute a violation of the control mechanism laid down in Article 104 EC, Regulation 1467/97 and the Stability and Growth Pact Resolution. Furthermore, and leaving economic analyses aside, it is evident that the Ecofin Council conclusions violated not only procedural requirements, but also the principle of equal treatment, one of the fundamental principles laid down in the Treaty. In fact, the procedure against Portugal was not suspended.

The Ecofin conclusions could have a negative impact on the institutional order of the European Community, an impact that can threaten the progress of the integration process. Since we strongly believe that the European Community is a community of law, legal clarity and predictability are essential to strengthening the economic governance between the European Member States. Otherwise, the decision to take such issue to the European Court of Justice could only result in worsening the institutional clash between, on the one hand, the Commission and the ECB, and, on the other, Germany, France and a number of other States worried about the need to combine stricter discipline with flexibility in the conduct of national budgetary policies.

Euzkadi: the Long Fight of the Nationalist Basque Party for a Federal Europe

Jean-Claude Larronde

Within the limits of this short essay I would like to stress the following fact: the pro-European ideas of the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) are both ancient and deeply-rooted. How could it be otherwise? We are used to think of the Basque movement as implicated in terrorism, but that is not the case until 1968¹.

Indeed, the Basque people belongs to the mosaic of European cultures: for centuries it has been at the confluence of three cultures; its own and the French and Hispanic ones. The Basque, and more especially the Basque nationalists, the most ardently European among them, have a feeling that in the Europe which is being built it will be but fair to give a place to the oldest peoples of this continent, who also are among the most dynamic and the most modern. The Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV) was founded in 1895 – that is to say 108 years ago – at Bilbao by the *bizkayen* Sabino Arana-Goiri². Of course, for Sabino Arana there were more pressing tasks than to launch oneself into international action; the first aim was to create and develop a Basque national consciousness and give the Basque country – Euzkadi – a political party capable to spread the nationalist doctrine. But, for all that Sabino Arana-Goiri did not neglect international politics, on the contrary. He was resolutely anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist, a striking exception among the politicians of his day. He carefully studied the results of the International Conference for peace of The Hague, which, in 1899 adopted juridical principles taking into account the rights to existence and development of peoples. Unfortunately neither the Conference

of The Hague of 1899, nor the one of 1907, could prevent the declaration of what is now generally known as the Great War. The PNV sided with the Allies against Germany; at the same time, in its daily *Euzkadi*, founded in 1913, many leading articles show its interest for European nationalities.

At a time when the world war was still raging, in June 1916, a delegation of the PNV took part, at Lausanne, in the III Congress of the Union of nationalities, an organisation born in Paris in 1912; for the first time Basque nationalism was represented in an important international forum. The report presented by its delegation at the Congress was to make known the foundations of the Basque nationality and work towards a recognition of Basque nationalism within a European and international framework.

The PNV entirely subscribed to the famous speech of the President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, pronounced before the Congress in January 1918³; among the principles which were enumerated there was, in fact, the creation of new independent states in Europe and the guarantee of the rights of national minorities.

From 1923 the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera considerably reduced the possibilities of political expression of Basque nationalism; however the daily *Euzkadi* continued its fight in favour of the European idea; in 1926, several articles were published under the heading “the United States of Europe” and in 1929 the PNV adhered to the project of a European Union presented by Aristide Briand in his address to the League of Nations.

From 1931 the advent of the Second Spanish Republic permitted the establishment of a period of freedom and democratic elections which allowed the PNV to affirm itself as, by far, the most important political party of the Basque Country. In 1933, it sent 12 representatives to the *Cortes* in Madrid, that is to say half of the deputies elected in the Basque Country. 1933 marks also the date of the *Aberri Eguna* (the day of the mother-country) which gathered at San Sebastian tens of thousands of people behind the slogan "*Euzkadi-Europa*" (Basque Country - Europe). All the speeches of the day mention Europe; it can be said that Europe is the fundamental space of the "foreign" policy of the PNV. One of its representatives, who would later become a minister in the Spanish republic, Manuel de Irujo, wrote "The Basque country has asked for its seat as a nation at the banquet of the free peoples of Europe". 1933, at a time when Germany and Italy sink into the abyss of nazism and fascism, the Basque country delivers to the face of Europe a message of union, peace and freedom.

During the whole period from 1931 to 1936, the PNV reaffirms federalist and pro-European theses. From 1930, every year, it sends a delegation to the Congress of European nationalities, an international organization whose aim from 1925 to 1938 is to represent the nationalities and minorities of Europe. In September 1935 at the XI Congress at Geneva the president of the delegation was José Antonio Aguirre, the future president of Euzkadi; he could but notice the hypocrisy and cynicism of some delegations: the Basques could not make them adopt a resolution to condemn fascist Italy which was making ready to attack Ethiopia.

The Spanish Civil war would be, from 1936, the prefiguration of the cataclysm which would surge through Europe a few years later. On October 7th of that year at Gernika, José Antonio Aguirre, aged 32, a representative of the PNV, formed the Basque government that he was to preside. The Basque government

was established to implement the statute of autonomy approved by the Basque country in November 1933 by more than 96% of the valid votes.

As a vast democratic and anti-fascist coalition it gathered, beside the PNV whose tendency was demo-Christian and had the strongest representativity of all the parties hostile to the franquist rebellion, be they republican, socialist or even communist. The bombing of Gernika, a defenceless Basque city, on April 26th, 1937, by the Nazi aviation to the orders of Franco, aroused the indignation of the civilised world. Intellectuals and politicians began to get interested in the "Basque case", the fate of this small catholic people which, by itself, had shattered the myth of Franco's "crusade". An International League of the Friends of the Basques presided over by François Mauriac was created in Paris in 1938.

When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, José Antonio Aguirre confirmed "the total solidarity" of the peninsular Basques with the cause of France and the allies against nazi tyranny, the destroyer of the most elementary human values. We know that during all the period of hostilities many Basques volunteered in allied forces or Resistance movements to fight against the nazi occupant. The PNV provided most of the men fighting in the Gernika battalion, who in April 1945 fought side by side with allied forces to liberate Médoc and the Pointe de Grave, North of Bordeaux.

From the end of 1941, in New York, President Aguirre remained in touch with many European personalities of the democratic camp. In November 1942, he was among the signatories of a manifesto by 42 refugees, European catholic personalities, living in the USA. This manifesto entitled "Facing the World Crisis", was meant to be a political reflection about the future of Europe and its institutions. Among the signatories were Luigi Sturzo, a leader of Italian Christian democracy, the philosopher Jacques

Maritain, and the former Belgian Prime minister, Paul Van Zeeland.

On the eve of the ceasefire, on May 7th, 1945, a meeting took place in Paris, the aim of which was to reconstruct the International League of the Friends of the Basques; on that occasion François Mauriac affirmed that the behaviour of the Basque from 1936 to that day deserved the thankfulness of all the democrats. He expressed himself in these words: "you have marked the turning point of Christian democracy in Europe". He meant that, in 1936, the Basques had been the first to take arms against the totalitarianism of the fascists, the first, too, to distance themselves from the hierarchy of the Vatican which was definitely favorable to Franco.

From then on, encouraged by this moral authority, the PNV and the government of Euzkadi, exiled in Paris, took part in all the struggles for the construction of a democratic Europe. It was the time when strong Christian democratic parties were being organized all over Europe, with the exception of the Iberian Peninsula and the countries of the Soviet bloc. It was the case in France, in Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Low Countries and Austria.

The Basques were part and parcel of the New International Teams (NEI) who were a structure to federate the Christian democrats of Europe. Their first Congress took place in 1947, in Belgium, at Chandfontaine near Liège with the representatives of 12 countries; a notion of sympathy was passed for the Basque resistance to Franco's regime and José Antonio Aguirre was elected a member of the Committee of honour.

The government of Euzkadi in exile was soon to be distinguished in a particular way: it was at its Parisian headquarters, 11 Avenue Marceau, that the Executive Committee of the NEI met on March 21, 1948. During this meeting a German team was admitted and the definitive text of the statutes was adopted.

One may notice that Euzkadi was recognised as a fully fledged national team on the same footing as the other national teams who represented eleven states. In April 1949, the national Basque team of the NEI was definitely constituted and uniquely formed of personalities of the PNV; from then on the Basque delegates attended all the party congresses and were among the most assiduous and active delegates.

But they were not content just to belong to NEI, they had a hand in all initiatives towards the construction of Europe, especially those which were favourable to a federal organization.

In May 1948, some members of the PNV attended "the Congress of the European Union" at the Hague, a meeting of 800 personalities belonging to the most varied currents of European thought, politics, industry, the arts or the trade-unions. The Basque delegates were happy to hear that for many politicians, among the most important of the day, "Franco is incompatible with Europe".

A European Union of Federalists (UEF) was soon to be created at Geneva: the Basque group that belonged to it was named the Basque Federalist Movement. Some members of the PNV also attended the Congress of the Communities and European regions which met at the *Palais de Chaillot* in April 1949; the main ideologue of the PNV in European matters, Javier Landaburu, could say about this Congress that it gathered "the popular soul of Europe".

In 1950, the same Javier Landaburu, a convinced federalist, presented a report to the Federal Council of this organization which was unanimously adopted. The title of the report could not be clearer: "The respect of the rights of European minorities, nationalities and regions within a State is the condition indispensable to the development of a European and international spirit".

The PNV was particularly attentive and active

in the European Movement, a coordinating organism of pressure groups and currents of opinion which worked for the European Union, presided over by a Committee of honour which counted among its members Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, the Italian Alcide de Gasperi and the Belgian Paul Henri Spaak. The unflagging activity in favour of Europe was relayed by solemn declarations from the supreme authority of the PNV until 1977, the pro-European conceptions were strongly re-affirmed. This orientation was to be underlined once more in the fifties when it became more and more obvious that the U.S. could very well put up with the regime of Franco's Spain, which the United Nations were ready to receive as a member, and the Cold War ruined many hopes of the Basque people.

The rejection by the French Parliament of the European Defence Community in 1954 was severely criticized in a leading article of the *Alderdi*, who clearly took position for "the constitution of a supranational political entity, elected by universal, direct and secret ballot by all the citizens of the European peoples". These declarations found a concrete expression in the works of group of Basque workers (ELA-STV) founded in 1911 and which had between 70,000 to 80,000 members in 1936. This Union, whose chairman was a former PNV representative, belonged, since 1934, to the international Confederation of Christian Trade Unions and had been in 1949 one of the founding members of the International Confederation of the organisations of free trade unions (CISL). It would be the only trade union to belong to two international workers' unions. Consequently the contacts between the ELA-STV and its European counterparts, especially French and Belgians, were ancient and gave it a genuine European colour.

In 1956, the publication of Javier Landaburu's book "The cause of the Basque People" deeply renewed the Basque nationalist doctrine and made it more actual. This book formulated the

Basque question on the international plane, but first and foremost in a European perspective. The ideas developed by Javier Landaburu, one of the closest advisers of President Aguirre, were those of a European federalist for whom the European construction must serve to avoid a new conflagration.

There is no good reason to oppose Basque nationalism to European federalism, since these two ideas are not antagonistic but definitely complementary. Even if the Europe which is being built in the mid-fifties, under his eyes, is a Europe of States, Landaburu never loses the hope to see the emergence of a Europe of peoples, which, for him, is the only guarantee of a durable peace. Indeed, it was his custom to distinguish two types of federalists: "those who try to make Europe a simple federation of States" and "those who believe that this system, to be sensible, logical and viable, must achieve a true federation of peoples".

As for President Aguirre, he would insist, every year, in his Christmas address to the Basque people, on the definitely European dimension of his government's policy. His stout commitment to the European ideal, his aura and his popular figure allowed him to deal as equals with the founding fathers of Europe, those he called "the best men of Europe, Adenauer, de Gasperi, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet... In 1960, with the death of President Aguirre, a page of Basque history was turned. In the Peninsula, Franco's regime was to remain in place until the death of the old dictator, at the end of 1975.

It was in June 1962, on the occasion of the Congress of the European Movement at Munich, that a broad union of the democratic opponents to Franco's regime was realized: the PNV was an active promoter and partner of what would come to be known as "the Pact of Munich". The Congress defined a certain number of conditions necessary for the adhesion of the Spanish State to the European Economic Community: among these conditions was "the recognition of the

Comments

personality of the various communities”.

Finally, reaching the end of this short historical exposé, I think we can say that during all its long existence the PNV has evinced an unusually strong European faith. It has constantly and

strongly expressed universal human rights by proclaiming the right of the Basque country to live, its right to be different and fully take part in the construction of a political Europe, which, at the end of the XX century has not yet been achieved.

¹The more recent history of the movement will be the subject of another article

² Arana-Goiri died in 1903 at the age of 37

³The famous “fourteen points” speech

A European Response to the Global Challenges

John Pinder

When Federal Union was launched in London in 1938 it had extraordinary success, with membership rising rapidly to ten thousand and support from leading politicians, academics and newspapers. The background to this was, for many British people, the perception of an existential challenge to the nation-state from the ruinous impact of the international economy in the 1930s and the rise of aggressive fascism leading to war. But the second world war was won and the British emerged confident that their nation-state had served its purpose and future challenges could, like that of the war, be overcome under American leadership. So Britain dragged its feet at the start of European unification and has, with some exceptions, done so ever since.

On the European Continent, to the contrary, federalist movements before the war were generally weak, whereas the war brought home the existential challenge to the nation-state and its citizens in the clearest possible way; and this led to the growth of strong federalist movements together with widespread acceptance of the idea of a federal Europe to ensure peace and security for the future. So the European Community was established by six core states, with pre-federal powers and institutions to provide a framework for that purpose; and it has been deepened to deal with other problems of interdependence, notably in the economy and the environment, as well as widened to include most European countries. The United Kingdom came to participate as a reluctant and anti-federalist member state, with governments which never understood that the stepwise but radical reform of powers and institutions to create a working

federal system was required in order to deal with the challenges of increasing interdependence in Europe and the world.

New existential challenges have, however, become more and more evident, in the fields of security, climate change and economic globalisation. British people feel as strongly as other Europeans the need to improve the world system in order to overcome them. But they lack a clear idea of what to do about it. They sense that American hegemony is not the answer but have scant conception of what, beyond protesting, can in fact be done. There are however two ways to avoid absolute hegemony of the United States, which in the not-so-long run would be as disastrous for the Americans as for the rest of us.

One is to wait a decade or two in the expectation that China will become an equivalent superpower which, even if it happens, would be a dangerous delay in an explosive world and a dangerous combination in view of the profound differences of political culture and international experience between Americans and Chinese.

The other is to convert the European Union into a power at least equivalent to the US in all respects save military capacity, while substantially developing the Union's military strength as well.

Altiero Spinelli, in his speech to the founding congress of the UEF at Montreux in August 1947, observed that Marshall Aid was a remarkable manifestation of liberal America which gave Europeans the chance to unite.

But he predicted that, if a European federation was not established which could become an equal partner, the United States would become an imperial America. Slowly but surely his prediction has been fulfilled.

In its internal affairs, the EU has moved far towards becoming a federal polity, and the Constitution drafted by the Convention should take it some steps farther. But in foreign policy and defence it remains overwhelmingly intergovernmental, thus ineffective and undemocratic. The British and a number of other governments insist on keeping the veto over decisions on a common EU policy; and they resist any adequate role for the Commission and the Parliament, together with the creation of essential common instruments for policy in these fields. So long as this is the case, the Union will be unable to bring balance into the global system and the attempts of member states to exert substantial influence on American policy will remain fruitless, as will American efforts to bring order into the affairs of the world. It is naive to suppose that Europeans can have such influence without the power that can be exercised only by effective and democratic common institutions endowed with the necessary competences backed by policy instruments: in fact by a federal European Union.

Only a federal EU can convert American hegemony into partnership and lead a multipolar world in building effective multilateral institutions. The Union does already possess quasi-federal powers and institutions in the fields of trade and aid; and here it is at least an equal partner with the United States. It has also used its environmental powers to lead the world, despite intransigent American opposition, in the first steps towards controlling greenhouse gas emissions enough to avert potentially catastrophic climate change. With the euro it has an instrument that should give it similar weight in the international financial system.

But not only is it weakened by the opting out of Denmark, Sweden and the UK; the member states have also failed to give the Union the powers it needs to conduct an effective external monetary policy.

These examples illustrate the Union's potential to become not just equal to the United States but a more powerful actor in fields other than military might, i.e. in most of the fields that determine whether the world will become a safer and more prosperous place: in short, the EU can be the principal partner in matters of 'soft security' just as the United States is in 'hard security'; and the EU can use its strength to influence a multipolar world to accept the need for increasingly effective multilateral and global institutions.

But there is a vast gap between the potential and the performance, due to the inadequacy of the Union's powers and institutions which would be remedied by reforms going beyond those in the draft Constitution to a properly federal Union. Underlying the Union's failure to undertake these reforms and use its powers to good effect is a failure of vision as to what a European federation could achieve.

For the influence of a fully federal European Union offers the world's best hope for dealing with the existential challenge to a civilised life, and perhaps even to life itself, on this planet. If this is understood, the British will surely join other Europeans who are determined that, having exported to the rest of the world Europe's nation-state system and the wars it generated here, we shall now complete the process of converting the Union into a truly democratic and effective federation, and thus together play the key part in meeting the challenges that confront the world, including the eradication of mass poverty, the stabilisation of the climate and the establishment of permanent peace.

Europe's Global Mission is to Win the Peace

Christian Glöckner

What the EU means today

The European Union is one of the wealthiest regions in the world. With a population of nearly half a billion inhabitants by next May, delivering more than half the aid to the developing countries, producing around a quarter of the GDP of our world, having successfully integrated former fascist countries and trying to integrate a lot of former communist states, it has guaranteed peace on our continent for more than 59 years now.

The European currency has become the second currency after the dollar. The euro has to play a role in fighting the fundamental imbalances between rich and poor countries, and in financing a fair world trade. Already today the EU is an economic superpower on its way to become one of the most competitive markets by 2010.

So, the EU is asked to carry out an important role in the world, under two conditions: first, the EU, in its decision-making process, has to give up very quickly the intergovernmental method in favour of the community method; and second, the Union must be enabled to manage successfully its worldwide tasks or missions and not collapse under the tasks it has to shoulder.

In order to fulfil the first condition, we urgently need a Constitutional Treaty according to the compromise reached in the Convention; for the second, we need the strict application of the Federal Principle, it is to say, that the EU should say NO to obligations it cannot shoulder and which are better handled by others, like strong

partners in other regions of the world.

The consequence of this modified strategy of Global Play is the following: the EU has to develop a clear idea of what can be done and what can or should not be done by the EU alone. And: the EU should encourage the construction of World Regions according to its own very-well-developed and still developing model. A region is defined as a geographical unit with common interests, structured cooperation and democratically managed in the framework of the UN Charter.

Some examples by World Regions and their specific interests:

- Democracy developments in Islamic parts of the world can never be promoted directly by our European civilization. That is an important and exclusive task of progressive Islamic - not Islamist- States on their way to democracy, as Turkey, our ally in this area.
- Africa is a highly diversified continent. From South-Africa to Ethiopia, from Somalia to Morocco, this continent is searching its own way to wealth. This big challenge could never be solved by, for example, Morocco joining the EU, as it was discussed seriously during the Barcelona Process. It is the exclusive responsibility of the African Union in Addis Ababa.
- Both Americas have to find their own way to a Free-Trade Area in order to fight, among other problems, poverty, illiteracy, drugs and environmental disease. This is up to Washington DC, Brasilia, etc.
- Russia tries hard to re-establish its old zone of influence in former Soviet times, from Belarus and Ukraine to Kazakhstan. Maybe this is a

suitable way to stabilize this region of the world, if democracy, fair federalist structures and a chance for equalized regional development is offered by Moscow.

- The nuclear powers of Pakistan, India and China have an important role to play by creating and maintaining peace among themselves and among their neighbours. In this world region they are responsible for limiting population growth, protecting the environment, searching for sustainable energy-resources, food production, mass-hygiene, health-care and schooling for children and women.

- Australia, as a modern and wealthy democracy, is influencing, and is influenced by, the developments in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Oceania. It should, it must find a democratic and federalist way to respect the independence of all the states, and at the same time find a way to support a balanced regional development, the protection of natural resources, ethnic and religious tolerance, and to master the refugees movements etc. Why not try an ASEAN II treaty?

There are many other problems that cannot be mentioned here, certainly. These examples remind us of at least five matter-of-facts

- The EU, with 500 to 600 million inhabitants within the next 10 years, is already a World Region, and in addition the most developed and the most progressive federalist structure in the world

- For a global cooperation for peace, the EU needs a transmission belt, so to speak: a structure of World Regions. This idea should be brought forward by the World Federalists much more clearly than it is done today. A World Government, if there will be any one day, will be legitimized only by these functioning regional structures. The EU should pursue this as a strategic aim

- The EU, with its 59-year-long and successful experience of constructing and winning peace in our old continent, is as such a model for other world regions in searching for sustainable

development, in protecting natural resources and in reducing social, ethnical and religious tensions

- All these elements enable and even challenge the EU as nothing else to fight for and to win peace in the world. The EU, marked by its cruel historical experiences of centuries of war, is asked to play a global role as a superpower in the political field also, in order to prevent social, ethnical, religious and economic tensions. The EU has to help consolidate and promote the attempts of regional cooperation like ASEAN, African Union, Mercosur, Nafta etc. in order to win global peace

- Turkey is part of another World Region.

But the EU alone can't manage peace. Our most important ally is the UN and vice versa. The UN has to undergo a lot of reforms and become politically more effective. That's why the EU shall have a permanent seat in the Security Council. The EU Federalists regard the UN as a guarantee for good governance of the global family of men.

A second important ally is the US. In the face of problems of global dimension as famine and water shortage, drugs, poverty, genocides, terrorism, dictatorships, organized crime, slavery of women, children and other weak people, ruinous exploitation of natural resources and young democracies in danger, it is an illusion to believe that the EU alone would be able to solve all those problems, as it is an illusion by some person in charge in the US to be able to cope alone with all those challenges. The US may be able to win a war (almost) alone. To win the peace they need capable partners as the EU and others.

A "security bouquet": excellent soldiers and more

These problems can't wait until "tomorrow". To stay in the picture: it is a threat already for the next "hour". As it is seen in the Balkans, the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Africa, a serious threat

to peace, genocides, an imperialistic dictatorship as in the case of Milosevic and friends, ask for an immediate and militarily robust reaction, involving also, and even more so now than ever before, us, the EU, surely under a UN mandate.

For the time being, we are unable to do so, in spite of 1,9 million well-trained soldiers in the EU and a budget comparable to the US budget for that purpose, because the intergovernmental method does not allow to avoid double investments in armaments and infrastructures. This means a waste of billions of euro and a "security effect" of less than 20% of that achieved by the US.

The European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in addition to effective military capacities, needs a sizeable "security-bouquet" of political, diplomatic, economic, technical and scientific means to be able to play a global role for winning the peace:

- a strategy for using all means of CFSP for better preventing conflicts and tensions,
- a majority voting in the field of CFSP, backing the executive power of the EU Foreign Minister
- a European Parliament having an effective say in this field too, combined with the power of removing the EU Foreign Minister from his office,

- a European Parliament able to criticize and even sanction double investments by uncoordinated national activities in the CFSP field,

- a EU police force organizing and controlling security and fighting against crime

- a EU corps of technical assistance similar to the Technische Hilfswerk in the Federal Republic of Germany to fight environmental catastrophes, to re-establish water, energy and transport services, etc.

- a military Rapid Reaction Force, as the one under construction now, but with more financial means (2 to 3% of GDP), and more personnel

- a EU armament agency for highly standardized equipment, under a central EU command, as a nucleus of a EU Federal Army.

This security bouquet is a good instrument for helping in the construction and better performance of federations in other regions of the world on the EU model, for example in Africa. The EU's competence in this field and a permanent reform of the EU itself will enable it to better fulfil its global mission. The test-bed for this global strategy in enabling world regions to function, to develop and to be able to guarantee wealth by their own means, should be the EU position concerning Turkey and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The European Parliament Calls for a EU Seat on the Security Council and a UN Parliamentary Assembly

On January 29, during the visit of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who received the Sakharov Prize, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by 367 votes to 62 with 14 abstentions, in which it called for the EU to strengthen its cooperation with the UN. The resolution asserts the importance of “a multilateral international system based on efficient decision and enforcement processes, respectful of democracy and the rule of law and promoting sustainable and harmonious development”. Since the EU and its Member States provide more than 50% of the UN’s operational funds and peacekeeping forces, as well as over 60% of development aid, it should play a more active role within the UN by helping reform its organization. In addition, the Parliament recommends expanding the areas in which the EU and the UN could work more closely together, not only on development and humanitarian aid but also on conflict prevention and crisis management. Other areas of cooperation with the UN are the environment, public health and the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

The EU Parliament suggests that the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council be increased to better reflect the current situation in the world. It argues that the EU should become a fully-fledged permanent member as soon as its legal personality is recognized. Africa, Asia and Latin America should each receive an extra seat. It suggests replacing the current veto system with a “double veto”, i.e. a veto by a minimum of two permanent members. This right would only be allowed for issues covered by Chapter VII of the Charter: threats to peace, acts of aggression or violations of peace.

The resolution also calls for the EU to take part in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Committee and the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the administration of agencies and funds to which the EU budget contributes. The future EU foreign minister, provided for in the draft Constitutional Treaty, should represent the EU on the Security Council. The EU Parliament highlights the urgent need to improve the exchange of information and coordination between the Member States with a seat on the Security Council and the EU Presidency. By way of example, every time a declaration is issued in the name of the European Union, the Member States should refrain from making their own national declarations, apart from exceptional cases.

It is proposed to create, “in cooperation with regional or world Parliamentary Assemblies (e.g. the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly), a network of parliamentarians, which should meet on a regular basis in a Consultative Parliamentary Assembly under the UN, to discuss major political issues related to the UN’s activity and the challenges it faces”.

Jo Leinen, MEP and President of the UEF, stressed that “The UN of the future cannot remain an exclusive circle of governments. The parliaments as direct representations of the citizens have to be included in the decision-making at the UN level”. The civil society movements demonstrations during international conferences stress the democratic deficit of international organizations. This means that a large part of active citizens do not feel represented by their government at international level. Hence the need for international democracy (*l.l.*).

GALILEO: The Potential for a World-Wide Success

Francesco Ferrero

In the last few months several events proved that the popularity of GALILEO, the European Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) launched on the initiative of the European Commission and developed jointly with the European Space Agency (ESA), is rapidly growing all over the world.

On Oct. 30, 2003, during the EU-China Summit, a Co-operation Agreement on the project was signed between the European Community and the People's Republic of China. The agreement provides for co-operative activities on satellite-aided navigation in a wide range of sectors, notably science and technology, industrial manufacturing, service and market development, as well as standardisation, frequency-usage and certification. It also opens the way for China to take a substantial financial part (around € 200m) in the programme through a stake holding in the GALILEO Joint Undertaking, the body established to manage the programme. In the same context, the "China Europe Global Navigation Satellite System Technical Training and Co-operation Centre" (CENC) was inaugurated on Sep. 19 in Beijing. The centre, which is the result of a joint effort by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Remote Sensing Centre, the European Commission and the European Space Agency, will serve as a focal point for all activities on GALILEO and will promote industrial co-operation. With the assistance of the EU's 6th Framework Programme for Research, several European companies are in fact planning to invite Chinese partners to join forces to submit proposals for developing the application market for GALILEO during the next few years.

A few weeks later, on Dec. 1, 2003, during

the fourth EU-India Summit, India joined the family, by signing a trade co-operation agreement with the European Union and pledging to invest money in GALILEO. Indian and European officials will hold talks over the next few months to determine the value of India's initial investment in GALILEO but several reports say New Delhi could contribute € 300m to the satellite project. For the Indians, the GALILEO membership might be seen as a recognition of India's own space programme, which has launched several satellites, mostly in partnership with ESA.

On Feb. 16-17, 2004, the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Seminar, organised by the European Commission, was held in Cairo. This was the first of a series of actions planned to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its regional transport policy through GNSS. A project to launch demonstration and training activities in the region is being established and discussions are on-going to establish a cooperation office as the focal point for satellite navigation activities in the area. Several Mediterranean countries have submitted bids to host this centre. The seminar was attended by 200 officials and business executives from both the EU and the MEDA partners (MEDA aims to help the gradual establishment of a free trade area between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partner countries by 2010). The discussion focused on the benefits of satellite navigation to address the needs of the Mediterranean countries in fields like transport safety, agriculture, fisheries, water management, mining, and trade, including the various applications already in use.

Finally, considerable progress has been made during the last months in the negotiations with the USA on arrangements for cohabitation between GALILEO and the American GPS system, which began four years ago. Initially, the USA disputed the merits of the GALILEO programme itself. The GPS provides two different signals: a high-precision reserved signal, controlled by the US military, and a low-precision open signal, at the disposal of civilian users. The US is concerned that GALILEO could provide to any user, including the bad foes, a high-precision signal, which could be harmfully exploited against its national security. Now, the main obstacles to an agreement between the two parties have been removed. The USA recognises the importance of the GALILEO system for all satellite radio navigation users and has taken on board the EU's objective of achieving full interoperability between GALILEO and the GPS system to the maximum benefit of users. On 29-30 Jan. the US and the EU had two intensive days of discussion on a possible cooperation agreement. The atmosphere was constructive. Even though a final agreement could not yet be reached, a number of issues were clarified and for the first time the shape of a possible

agreement has become visible to the parties.

The popularity of GALILEO should give the European leaders a hint of the potential of the future European Foreign and Security Policy, and also of its guidelines. First, GALILEO is popular because it counters the US monopoly on GNSS. Second, because it is being designed for civilian rather than military applications. Third, because the EU is showing a clear will to open the project, which has evident strategic implications, to as many partners as possible, thus committing itself to promote a multilateral world order. If the Union will be able to act along this path, possibly by strengthening the role of the Commission in the field of Foreign and Security Policy, it will exert a world leadership, and at the same time attract significant investments from crucial, emerging countries like India and China. Significantly, during the EU-India summit, the two partners referred to each other as "global actors in the multi-polar world committed to strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security", and Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, added: "we share a common vision of how to run the world".

The WFM Strategic Planning

Ramin Shahzamani

In 2002, the World Federalist Movement's International Secretariat (WFM-IS) initiated a strategic planning process in response to a request by its Executive Committee to bring clarity to the short and long-term needs and objectives of the organization. A process was developed and WFM-IS held both structured and informal consultations over the course of a year, culminating in 2003. These consultations focused on three sets of issues: 1) WFM-IS objectives; 2) Strengthening programmatic work; and 3) Strengthening organizational infrastructure.

The planning process involved an ongoing assessment of the challenges involved in pursuing WFM-IS' objectives. This was achieved primarily through meetings held by programme staff and the Executive Director with primary stakeholders, including NGO colleagues, programme "targets" such as UN officials and governments, and potential funders. Internal meetings were subsequently held to report on the results of these consultations and realign WFM-IS' objectives accordingly.

With regard to strengthening WFM-IS' programmatic work and organizational infrastructure, a team of senior staff worked closely with the Executive Director to identify the key challenges facing the organization and develop recommendations to address them. The management team consulted broadly with all staff on these issues in several ways. First, a series of individual meetings were held involving all WFM-IS staff members with a view to addressing personal concerns while obtaining candid insight into the challenges facing the

International Secretariat and soliciting ideas for solutions. This was followed by internal team meetings to foster a group dynamic and further narrow the focus on WFM-IS' most important issues. Finally, a retreat was held, facilitated by a consultant, to deepen the discussions and allow for a full group consideration of key issues. A report was presented to the WFM Council at its annual meeting held last October in Copenhagen, Denmark.

The following text elaborates on the findings of this report with respect to the three core sets of issues, including the challenges that WFM-IS needs to address to best utilize its resources and effectively pursue its objectives.

1) WFM-IS Objectives

Through this planning process, WFM-IS adopted a new system for categorizing organizational objectives to distinguish amongst different types of programmes and identify varying levels of human and financial resources to be devoted to them. Three categories of objectives were identified: i) Action Objectives, relating to a well-developed programme to which significant human and financial resources are devoted; ii) Position Objectives, relating to issues for which WFM has a well-defined public position and undertakes some education, outreach and limited advocacy; and iii) Research Objectives, relating to areas of development for the organization that may become Position or Action Objectives depending on the research findings and consultations.

It has been determined that WFM-IS, as it is currently constituted, has the ability to effectively

pursue at most two large-scale campaigns or Action Objectives, while also continuing to work on a number of smaller Action Objectives and various Position and Research Objectives. WFM-IS envisions the large-scale campaigns to be, first, a continuation of the existing NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) project, and second, the development of the Responsibility to Protect – Civil Society (R2P-CS) project. These activities are briefly highlighted below.

A) Large Scale Action Objectives:

NGO Coalition for the ICC

The role of WFM-IS has been one of coordination, support and facilitation, with an enormous amount of behind-the-scenes effort by the Executive Director and a team of professional staff worldwide. This role has been essential to the effectiveness of the global ICC campaign, as well as to the more than 2,000 NGO members of the Coalition who continue to support WFM as their Secretariat.

While the progress made to date in the establishment of the Court has been overwhelming, many challenges remain to be addressed in the first years of the Court's operation to ensure that its potential can be realized. Decades of efforts by governments, UN officials, NGOs and other legal experts hang in the balance. Some of the most important ongoing challenges are: ensuring universal ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute; United States opposition to the Court, and responding to the enormous needs for training at national and international levels.

Responsibility to Protect – Civil Society

In 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with the support of several major foundations to examine the controversial issue of "humanitarian intervention". Such interventions have come to be understood as "military interventions" and

have been controversial both when they have occurred (as in Kosovo and Somalia) and when they have not (as in Rwanda and numerous other countries).

The ICISS Report, released in 2001, attempts to reframe the debate by shifting the focus from the rights of nations to the rights of individuals. Consideration is given to a broad range of appropriate responses of governments, in particular through the United Nations, as a serious humanitarian crises emerges, such as a potential genocide. WFM-IS has become actively involved in reaching out to NGOs and other civil society actors to deepen the debate and discuss next steps.

B) Small-Scale Action Objectives; Position Objectives and Research Objectives

Other WFM-IS programmatic areas were identified to fall under either Action or Position Objectives. These include: Promoting Rule of Law; Defending Human Rights, International Peace and Security; Strengthening and Democratizing the United Nations; International Democracy and Democratization of Multilateral Institutions; Global Environmental Governance and Sustainable Development; Promoting Federalism and Constitutional Democracy; Education, Research and Publications

The Research Objective identified during the strategic planning process focuses on the "Information Society" and governance of Information Communication Technologies and their use in the promotion of human rights and sustainable development.

2) Strengthening Programmatic Work

In order to strengthen its programmatic work, it was recommended that WFM-IS map out the tasks related to each programme and those carried out by each staff member. This exercise would allow the International Secretariat to

realign itself and, if necessary, redistribute staff responsibilities to best match the needs of each programme. Recommendations were also made as to how WFM-IS could strengthen its membership and public outreach through better utilization of its electronic and printed resources.

3) Strengthening Organizational Infrastructure

The following key organizational issues were also identified, together with a number of recommendations on how to address them:

I) Strengthening the capacity of the management team and staff

Additional support for all areas of management is critical to the organization's effective functioning in light of the organization's expansion in response to the success of the CICC project and WFM-IS' development of other programmatic work. Similarly, additional support is required for the financial, developmental and human resource aspects of the organization are essential to match WFM-IS' recent growth.

II) Funding Diversification

The need to diversify and expand WFM-IS' individual and organizational donor base has been identified as a primary organizational objective. The achievement of this objective is linked to two factors: developing new programme areas and ensuring the opportunity for staff resources to be devoted to the cultivation of new donor relations.

III) WFM-IS Offices

WFM-IS continues to operate from its New York office near the United Nations Secretariat. However, the hiring of additional staff has led it to seek additional office space to ensure the overall effectiveness of the organization and the well-being of staff members. The establishment of a European Office for the International Secretariat has also been identified as a central organizational objective and an office was opened in the summer of 2002 in The Hague, Netherlands. This office has already played an extremely important role in allowing the CICC and Coalition member organizations to work effectively with the host government for the ICC, as well as with those tasked with setting up the Court itself. It is envisioned that this office will continue to expand as the locus of activity for the International Criminal Court shifts increasingly to The Hague from UN headquarters in New York. This office will also provide a base for other WFM-IS related activities in Europe.

Conclusion

The strategic planning process undertaken by WFM-IS has been extremely important in clarifying its organizational objectives, identifying programmatic and organizational challenges, and developing approaches for addressing these challenges. The primary recommendation by the Executive Committee flowing from this process has been to initiate a committee to review and develop WFM-IS' policies on an ongoing basis.

Results of JEF-Europe XVII Congress, Stockholm

100 delegates and 60 observers from more than 30 different national JEF sections came together last weekend to look back at the work done in the past two years and to decide the JEF policies and organisational priorities of the next 2 years.

Faithful to the JEF slogan "Simply A Generation Ahead", the Congress has adopted strong positions on the draft Constitution and current IGC process, as well as on the upcoming European elections. Strong organisational priorities have also been set up, with the creation of a JEF "Southeast European Initiative" and the definition of the work plan for 2003-2005.

Last but not least, after the Congress thanked the outgoing Executive Bureau for its hard work during the challenging past 2 years, the new JEF-Europe team was elected to bring JEF into the European election campaign and the future

challenges of European democracy. A total of 14 nationalities are represented among the new Bureau and directly elected Federal Committee members.

President: Jon Worth. Vice Presidents: Silke Kaul, Nikos Lambropoulos. Executive Bureau Members: Peter Bancroft, Marko Bucic, Jessika Hazrat, Elina Kiiski. Federal Committee: Presidium: Astrid Arnslett, Peter Stempel, Jan Kreutz; Chairs of Political Commission 'IGC and Constitution': Florian Rodeit and Giovanni Biava; Chair of PC 'New Europe': Ingvild Stub; Chair of PC 'External Relations': Imre Teder; Chair of Working Group 'New Sections': Steven Attard; Chair of WG 'Communications': Arielle Rouby; Chair of WG 'Finances': Daniel Gerer; Other FC Members: Siri Holland, Jana Novotna, Georgi Markov, Philipp Hessel, Dominique Ostyn, Virginie Delaury (*j.w.*).

The American Federalist Association Has a New Name: Citizens for Global Solutions

The association of American federalists, the World Federalist Association (WFA), has voted on November 8, 2003, in Boston to form a new partnership with their long-time sister association Campaign for UN Reform (CUNR), and become one organization called *Citizens for Global Solutions*.

The decision to bring WFA and CUNR together was the result of hundreds of hours of work by volunteers, staff, and professional consultants who conducted member surveys, focus groups, board retreats, meetings and interviews with policy makers. Board members participated in task forces to determine the organization's name, message, strategy, and structure. "The research we conducted gave us both good and bad news," said Heather Hamilton, WFA's program director and a member of CUNR's board. "The bad news is, the way we've traditionally worked to communicate our vision doesn't work in today's world. The good news is, if we present our vision and organization in ways that folks understand, we have even more support than we thought!"

In the rather complex organizational structure set up by the consultants, the WFA does not

officially disappear, as it remains one of the two corporations composing the new organization, but "it shall also be known and legally do business as the 'Citizens for Global Solutions Education Fund'", which means that its name most probably will never be heard of again. Also, a World Federalist Institute will be created "to facilitate efforts by members interested in developing a greater understanding of and interest in the values, concepts and principles of world federalism and its components, democratic international institutions and the rule of law".

It is our duty to report that the cancellation of any explicit reference to federalism in the name of the new organization (and, for those who have had a chance to read it, in its declared "Vision and Mission") has come as a shocking surprise to militant federalists the world over (see below). However, it must be accepted as an ascertained fact (and a surprise in itself) that in the US, the oldest, most important and better-functioning Federation in the world, the general public, and the young in particular, are not informed about their federal history and suspicious of similar endeavours (see the two articles by Gil Jonas in the last two issues of our review) (*l.c.*).

Statement on the Future of Federalism in the US and the World

The decision taken by the WFA to change its name is an event that does not concern the US federalists only.

The USA is the country

- that adopted more than 200 years ago the first federal Constitution,
- from which the federalist culture disseminated in the world,
- where there is the largest federalist organization in the world.

The new name, Citizens for Global Solutions, assumed by WFA implies a weakening of confidence of the American federalists in their traditional identity.

The UEF, that is promoting in Europe the great design of a Federal Union, is seeking its full membership within the WFM, so as to strengthen the impact on world politics by a single federalist actor. The construction of the peace in the world and the re-launch of federalism at international level demand a partnership between the US (the oldest federation) and a European Federation. In order to achieve these goals, the European and the American federalists should share a common design.

Philipp Agathonos (UEF-Austria), UEF Vice-President

Jean-Francis Billion (UEF-France), UEF Rhône-Alpes President and WFM Council

Bruno Boissière (UEF-France), UEF Secretary General

Alain Calmes (UEF-Luxembourg), UEF-Luxembourg Secretary General

Michael Cwick (UEF-Germany), UEF Federal Committee

Daniel Hulas (UEF-France), UEF-France Secretary General

Alfonso Iozzo (UEF-Italy), UEF-Italy President

Ivo Kaplan (UEF-Czech Republic), UEF-Czech Republic Secretary General

Jo Leinen (UEF-Germany), UEF President

Lucio Levi (UEF-Italy), UEF Federal Committee and WFM Executive Committee

Bob Molenaar (UEF-Netherlands), UEF Federal Committee

Guido Montani (UEF-Italy), UEF-Italy Secretary General and WFM Council

John Pinder (UEF-UK), UEF Honorary President

The New World Disorder

Francesca Lacaita

Tzvetan Todorov

Le Nouveau Désordre Mondial.

Réflexions d'un Européen

Paris, Robert Laffont, 2003

In the spate of works which have recently appeared on the “new world disorder”, this slim book should not be allowed to go unnoticed. First of all, because it is written by one of the most remarkable and clear-minded intellectuals of our time, whose very life-circumstances have taught him to see the world from different angles and think in terms of nuances; a philosopher who has already given us much food for thought about political, cultural, and ethical questions, especially those concerning the Other, dialogue, diversity, conflict, totalitarianism, the Holocaust (of his numerous works suffice it to mention here *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*; *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*; *Life in Common: an Essay in General Anthropology*; *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*; *The Fragility of Goodness: Why Bulgaria's Jews Survived the Holocaust*; *Facing the Extreme: Morality and Heroism in Auschwitz and the Gulag*). Then because much of what he writes concerns the very identity and future of Europe, and is of direct relevance to federalist ideas and proposals. And finally because his arguments and implications are apt to raise questions and stimulate discussion in federalist circles as well. Each of us, in short, can benefit by reading this book.

Apparently it is not an assuming work. Its “genre” is rather that of the “reflections” of an

intellectual, addressed to a large reading public, and which everybody can follow and appreciate. The first four chapters are devoted to an analysis of the present international crisis, starting from the war against Iraq. Calmly, following a sober and commonsensical line of reasoning, Todorov points out the flaws in the case for the “preventive war”. Some of his arguments have indeed been common currency among the opponents of the war, and seem here to be put forward almost by way of review (Iraq did apparently not possess the deadliest weapons of mass destruction, such an honour is in fact due to the West; no proof has so far been produced of its involvement in international terrorism, which was highly unlikely on ideological grounds anyway; far from weakening terrorism this war may well have strengthened it, etc.).

But Todorov also prompts us to rethink assertions which have been thrown around so much that are almost taken for granted: for example, the notion of making war in order to “bring freedom” to other peoples. Such a phrase, Todorov argues, is a contradiction in terms, a “bait” that distracts from the real interests at stake, part of an Orwellian “newspeak”, pretty much like Robert Kagan’s (actually Robert Cooper’s) “liberal imperialism”, Vaclav Havel’s “humanitarian bombs”, former General Jay Garner’s “compassionate war”, or Kagan’s “universalistic nationalism” (similar propaganda devices are the obsessive comparison of present-day tyrants to Hitler and the moral reference to World War II, which the current wars are supposed to replicate). As it is, the very interests of the United States in the Middle East stand opposed to the assertion of the “will of

the majority" in the area. In any case, Todorov points out, liberal democracy renounces the presumption of forcing one's own views on others, even if one's views are construed to be the best on Earth, and abhors the sacrifice of the individual for the sake of high, abstract ideals.

Similar arguments are employed by Todorov when dealing with the "right of interference", which has been so popular of late. But those intellectuals and/or politicians who are generally known as "neo-conservatives" and who are at present so influential in American foreign policy, do not have much to do with democratic liberalism. Todorov calls them rather "neo-fundamentalists", for their aptness to think in terms of absolute Good and absolute Evil, their penchant for the use of force, their "permanent-revolution" attitude (indicative of the Trotskyist past of several of them), and their willingness to employ all means – including war, violation of international law, and ruthless sacrifice of human lives– to reach their ends.

As it is, the United States neo-imperial course has not made the world safer or more democratic. On the contrary, Todorov notices a disquieting fall in the standards of human and civil rights, a stultifying insensitivity to such matters, an increasing intolerance of differing opinions, which reduces all relations to the dichotomy friend/foe, and a tendency to plead emergency to justify the recourse to violence, the suspension of "normal" rules or the erosion of the fundamentals of constitutional liberalism. To this approach Todorov replies by asserting the value of these very fundamentals and of the *pluralism* they entail: limitation and division of power, independence between legislative, executive, and judiciary power, multiplicity of political parties and of information sources, respect for minorities, hence *politics*, dialogue, recognition of the sovereignty of other states and of international law, search for consent and compromise, hence negotiations and diplomatic pressure.

It is against *this background* that Todorov goes on to introduce, as the core of his book, a couple of arguments which have always been staple fare in the federalist case: the United Nations is impotent, in its existing structure and organization, to enforce international law, to mediate in conflicts or to prevent massacres if powerful national interests decide to thwart it; indeed, *all* international institutions are cripplingly dependent on national interests and power relationships; and the hope of achieving international peace and justice only through solidarity and cooperation, irrespective of power, is only wishful thinking. Hence Europe (the European Union) should unite into a "quiet power" – a power allied with the United States, but not submissive to it, a power without imperialistic or interventionist ambitions, but able to have its weight felt in the balance of forces, with its own single army, able to defend itself from external attacks and to succour its own allies, and, last but not least, also willing to take on more expenses for its own defence. Once Europe attains military autonomy, it should even withdraw its forces from NATO, which should now become the framework of military cooperation between the European Union and the United States.

I have underlined against *this background* because it is easy to concentrate on this last point, overlooking what goes before, so that the gist appears to be "soft voice urges Europe to carry a bigger stick" (as the title of an article in the New York Times has it), and Todorov is misrepresented as a sort of European Kagan. On the contrary, only by keeping every aspect in mind is it possible to appreciate the implications of his stance. All the more so, as the European army is only an aspect in his proposed restructuring of the European Union. Todorov advocates a tripartite structure of Europe: first a core of all the countries that are ready to found a "European federation"; second, the European Union in its present form, a space unified in economy, police and the judiciary, culture and education, and made up of those

countries which are not (yet) willing to take the federal step (possibly one day including Turkey as well); third, those countries adjacent to the EU which on geographic grounds cannot be part of the Union, but wish to establish special relationships with it. At the same time, central institutions should be made more democratic, so as to “reflect more clearly the will of the European citizens, and less that of the states – superseding and incorporating them is just the goal of the Union”.

Todorov’s book is perhaps one of the most significant restatement of the federalist case written in relation to the present international situation, and is – given its svelte form and the stature of its author – most likely to be read by a wide public. One should not, however, be misled into thinking that its contents are obvious, or somehow to be taken for granted. On the contrary, this is a book federalists should earnestly debate. Here I will try to raise some points for discussion.

The call for a single European army which should be autonomous from NATO remains of course central to any plan of restructuring the present European Union along federalist lines. Not only for the reasons outlined by Todorov, but also because a new military framework is indeed crucial to rethink afresh military and strategic problems at policy level and to *effect* sorely needed changes. Todorov’s construction of the military question, however, is quite conventional and commonplace. He berates pacifists for undervaluing “human aggressiveness” or for believing that “no ideal and no noble goal are worthy of sacrifice” (actually pacifists have already died in conflict areas, but their “sacrifice” is never deemed “worthy” of high-sounding words, and is soon forgotten); he evokes the spectre of an outside attack on Europe and the necessity to be equipped to repel it – but no mention is made of structures and institutions for crisis prevention, conflict monitoring,

mediation, reconciliation. Yet these are highly topical matters, if only because public opinion has had to grapple with them repeatedly over the last decades. The European Parliament on its part has voted for the formation of European Civilian Peace Corps, and the European Convention has provided for their employment within the allocation of humanitarian aid. Others would rather like to see the Civilian Peace Corps within the framework of European defence. Can any discussion of the European army fail now to include alternative defence or non-violent intervention?

Todorov argues that Europe should become a “military power” and be prepared to spend more for its defence if it wishes to emancipate itself from American tutelage. Is European military expenditure really insufficient? Is Europe really a military dwarf? It is in fact only in comparison with the United States. Is a military emulation of the USA really possible, advisable or desirable? In order to mobilize hearts and minds, as well as material resources, in military aggrandizement, national states have always needed to build up images of some enemy or other. For all professions of friendship with the United States, the way to Europe’s military aggrandizement passes through a mobilization of Anti-Americanism which would indeed be repugnant to European people.

The European Union is in fact one of safest places in the world to live in. What it is at present most vulnerable to, terrorism, is impervious to traditional military might, as the latest events abundantly demonstrate, and can be defeated most effectively through *politics* (i.e. making choices, not acquiescing in others’ games, not accepting that there is only one solution), and by strengthening and developing that “soft power”, that “civilian power”, which Todorov has shown to appreciate too. Isn’t it a bit sad that in order to give the federalist project an aura of common sense we should adopt the language of the national state and of military power?

From Enlightened Dictatorship to a Democratic Economic Government

Ernesto Gallo

Jean-Paul Fitoussi

La règle et le choix.

De la souveraineté économique en Europe

Seuil, Paris, 2002

Although Jean-Paul Fitoussi is basically an economist and this new essay focuses mainly on the European Central Bank (ECB)'s structure and activities, his main concern is a political one, and deals with a democratic government for Europe and its economy. We, as European citizens, do suffer the effects of our lack of control of both the fiscal and the monetary policy of the EU.

According to Fitoussi, the current governance of the European economy has something of an enlightened dictator: through its instruments (the European Central Bank, the Stability Pact, and the European Commission) it carries out a rigorous and well-defined economic policy, centred on the virtues of free-trading and stability and far from the risks of a supposed democratic irrationality. What can't absolutely be neglected is the fact that, while some economists and "technocrats" promote the idea of the need of giving even more power to "rules" and "experts", such kind of a policy suffers from an increasingly evident, and dangerous, democratic deficit.

As far as the European Central Bank is concerned, for instance, Fitoussi underlines the limits of its accountability, for it is totally independent of the control of any kind of assembly, and it lacks transparency, as the debates leading to the decisions taken by its Council take place behind closed doors, without being made public.

Also its credibility can be argued, especially because a "young" central bank can't rely on a long-standing reputation, as it was the case with the Bundesbank or it is still with the US Federal Reserve: both enjoyed a high degree of reputation after decades of fighting against inflation and devaluation.

As it is often heard in the current public debate, the democratic quality of the Stability Pact can be seriously discussed as well. What shall we say about rules which inhibit the possibility for national governments, which are part of the democratic process, to implement the measures they promised to their electors? What about the credibility of early-warning procedures coming from people who have not been democratically elected and addressed to states which, in broad terms, are pursuing their citizens' well-being, such as Ireland in 2001?

Beside the so-called "democratic deficit", also the efficiency of the current European architecture and procedures can be put under question, particularly if we take into account the scanty results in terms of economic growth and employment. In this sense, the Stability Pact is arguable also from a theoretical point of view, even if Fitoussi stresses the generally responsible role played by the ECB, which had to cope with a series of shocks, from the Asian crisis to September 11th, and, excepting some uncertainties, followed quite a linear path in achieving a stable level of prices without damaging the general economic performance of the Euro-zone countries.

Even though the EU economy is still far from recession, problems are likely to increase. A first

challenge, as it is well known, is constituted by the enlargement. The quality of an ECB with a Council of thirty, or more, members is hard to imagine. Fitoussi fears that such a Council might be paralyzed by inefficiency and, worse, by a possible league of small countries representing not more than 20% of the overall European GDP.

In the face of these problems, many suggestions can be of interest. What this book considers a priority is the need for a general reform of the European economic governance in the direction of a well-structured, credible and transparent democratic process. The Stability Pact, for instance, can be maintained, but investments should not be considered in the same way as the other public expenditures: huge support to high-tech, Trans European Networks, education, Research and Development are both a source of sustainable wealth and a way to increase cooperation among European states.

The European Central Bank, on the other hand, can be reshaped according to two different schemes: on the one hand, we must think of a better link of the ECB with other political institutions, for instance a greater political accountability to the European

Council; on the other the rotation of the members of the ECB Council would be a good method for ensuring a more efficient activity and an increase of the European spirit, getting rid of national biases.

In broader terms, Fitoussi's concern is about the deep need for a stronger European democracy, where choices, and not rules, would be the tool for shaping policies. His request to foster politics and to put it before economy, especially a market economy, focuses on a problem which is widely recognized as an issue of the new millennium. His care for a true sovereignty of the European citizens on economic matters can't be overestimated.

This book doesn't deal, however, with the general structure of the EU polity. A real sovereignty of the European citizens on European economic matters could be granted only through a genuine federal constitution and the enlargement should be the occasion for building up a structure capable of coping with our future basic needs. The need for a European government is widely recognized, but should it be made up of experts and technocrats? Fitoussi provides us with strong arguments in favour of democracy and against the "rule of rules".

Do We Need a World Parliament?

Maria Cocciolo

**Saul H. Mendlovitz
and Barbara Walker (Eds.)**
*A Reader on [a UN] Second Assembly
and Parliamentary Proposals*
Wajne, NJ, Center for UN Reform
Education, 2003

The Center for UN Education has published last May 2003 *A Reader on Second Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals*, a collection of nine articles edited by two of the Center's Board members, Prof. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker. It presents the analysis of the international debate on the necessity to create a world Parliamentary Assembly, and singles out the key issues concerning the democratization of the UN. The authors analyze the international system and find a series of features in it that can be ascribed to the world democratic deficit.

The premise they start from is based essentially on the decay of the States' sovereignty, due to the contradiction between the market, that has become worldwide, and the governments, that remain national. They, in fact, are no longer the exclusive actors of international politics. New subjects emerge on the world political scene: the big multi-national companies and the NGOs. These are the protagonists of the global civil society. The decline of the States sovereignty brings with it the decline of democracy. At the national level, where there are democratic institutions, no longer the decisions are taken that affect the future of peoples. At the international level, instead, where the big decisions for the solution of global problems

are taken, there are no democratic institutions, but powerful political and economic power centers, which are not accountable to the world citizens. Hence there is a democratic deficit in the decisions taken at the global level.

The international meetings grow exponentially in number, and the phenomenon of international organizations, expression of the governments' need to find solutions to the problems they can no longer solve alone, is spreading more and more. For defining this way of managing globalization, the formula *global governance* is used ever more often, a formula which allows to justify the existing world order, based on the principle of national sovereignty and the supremacy of the multi-national companies in the world market.

Rebus sic stantibus, the civil society is increasing its influence on international politics, even though the big concentrations of economic power have gained the bigger benefits from globalization, which has allowed them to dodge government controls. Some of the civil society movements have taken the role of protesters against the international organizations and globalization itself. It is to note, however, that several NGOs are integrated into the States system and have been recognized by several international organizations: they participate in international conferences with an advisory role and exert a concrete influence on negotiations. However, their actual representativity is questioned, because, lacking elections at the international level, it is impossible to measure the degree of consensus that supports them.

The two American scholars Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss argue that the role the civil

society movements have assumed in the international arena has opened the way to new modes of political activity, which have been given the name of *New Diplomacy*. To mention one of the most significant examples, the alliance between reform-minded States and NGOs has represented the critical mass necessary for establishing the International Criminal Court. An alliance of the same type could also lead to a treaty instituting a World Parliament, initially outside of the UN system. Once instituted, it could gain progressively more powers, as happened with the European Parliament, and be finally included into an evolving international constitutional order. It is important to remind that a process aimed at the UN democratic reform has started already, and this is proven by the presence of an NGO coalition pursuing this goal.

In the article *A Parliamentary Dimension to International Cooperation*, Anders Johnsson, General Secretary of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), proposes for the same IPU the role of world Parliamentary Assembly, arguing that there is no need for a second UN Assembly or a new directly-elected Global Parliament". "The Inter-Parliamentary Union is the international organisation that brings together the parliaments of sovereign States. It is the sole organisation that represents the legislative branch of government on a global scale. Its membership today stands at 144 national parliaments". In November 2002 the UN General Assembly decided to grant the IPU observer status with the additional right to distribute its official documents in the General Assembly. He believes that the same IPU can also give a parliamentary dimension to the WTO, as it is often called for, "by organising parliamentary meetings on a regular basis – initially once a year – that focus exclusively on the work of the WTO, ... [in order] to oversee and promote the WTO activities, maintain dialogue with government negotiators and civil society, ... and to exert influence on the direction of discussions within the WTO".

G. Monbiot, political journalist, Honorary Professor at the Department of Politics in Keele and Visiting Professor at the Department of Environmental Science at the University of East London, underlines the gap between rich and poor countries, and sees the cause in "a widespread tacit acceptance of a model of benign dictatorship in which rich and powerful nations govern the world on behalf of everyone else... There is only one means by which this crisis of legitimacy can be effectively resolved. We need a world parliament". Even a parliament with limited powers would do, because, especially if it could have resources of its own (for example from something like a Tobin tax), "this modest function could transform the way the world works. Multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, whose role is to police the debtors on behalf of the creditor nations, would disappear immediately". This democratic parliament could originate from civil society meetings like the World Social Forums and People's Global Action. "These are, of course, unelected, unrepresentative bodies. But if these gatherings could transform themselves into representative bodies, whose members are chosen democratically by populations all over the world, we could rapidly find ourselves building a world parliament in exile".

An interesting article is *Extension of Democracy to the Global Level*, by Dieter Heinrich, for many years member of the Executive Committee of the WFM. Taking for granted that in democracy the citizens have a *human right* to be represented as directly as possible in political decision-making, it is not only right, but would also add to the efficiency of the institution to provide the UN with a Parliament. "It could be a consultative Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) made up of representatives chosen by the national parliaments... This would enable a UN parliamentary chamber to be created easily and inexpensively... as a consultative body under Article 22 of the Charter... Once established, a Parliamentary Assembly could lead the process of its own evolution by proposing appropriate

ways for governments to increase its function and responsibilities on the way to transforming it eventually into a directly elected parliament. A Parliamentary Assembly would be useful on its merits from the very beginning, even in its initial stages with only a consultative role. It would be a vital new link between the UN and national parliaments and could increase awareness and support for all aspects of activities". The article mentions some problems, none insurmountable, that such an idea, as maybe any idea on this matter, requires to discuss, like representation (proportional or not to population; whether also from non-democratic countries; whether non-parliamentarian delegates can be eligible, etc.), its powers, size, financing, etc.

Jeffrey Laurenti, Executive Director of Policy Studies at the United Nations Association of the United States of America, from the very title of his article, *An Idea whose Time has NOT come*, is the dissenting voice on the necessity of a world parliament. He questions the feasibility of a world Parliamentary Assembly from a pragmatic, sometimes sarcastic, but admittedly well-reasoned point of view; in sum, there would be three major problems. The first is the criteria to be used for choosing which nations shall be admitted to be part of it, since if, for example, democracy or the respect of human rights should be a requisite, a lot of countries (e.g. China and most of the Arab and African countries) should be barred, disqualifying such an Assembly in the eyes of probably the majority of the world people. The second is its actual powers, that is, how binding its deliberations or "world laws" could be, since in almost every country, not just the US, the national publics would oppose a strong resistance to decisions imposed by "aliens", as such a body would be felt, at least for the time being. The third is whether elected but inexperienced parliamentarians are really better than professional diplomats in understanding different cultures, working

out complex compromises, or influencing their governments and constituencies at home into the approval of wise but unpopular decisions, if those public opinions are disengaged, as it looks to be the case almost everywhere, in foreign affairs. J. Laurenti's conclusion is that "it may be far more productive to concentrate reformers' energies on restructuring the UN agencies dominated by well-connected private interests, the UN Economic and Social Council and the permanent core of the Security Council, until "the spirit of 'international community', still in only a germinal state, [will] ripen into a shared sense of political community".

In *Globalization, International Democracy and a World Parliament*, Lucio Levi, Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Turin and member of the Executive Council of WFM and of the Federal Committee of UEF, makes a detailed analysis that goes beyond that of other authors; he states that for democratizing globalization a global Parliament is not enough. He argues that the experience of the democratic regimes shows that no Parliament can govern a country alone, without a government that receives its confidence or is directly elected by the people. Therefore, the world Parliament must be considered an essential stage on the road to the formation of a democratic government, endowed with the powers necessary for enforcing the laws approved by the World Parliament. However, the project of subjecting the globalization process to a democratic control has to face the resistance of formidable opposing forces. For defeating those forces, a power center must emerge that could be the vehicle of the project for a democratic world order. This power can be the European Union, which, however, must bring to completion its federal unification process. With its Parliament elected by universal suffrage, it is the laboratory of international democracy and it can become also the motor for the formation of a new generation of global institutions.

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Are we Heading for an Illiberal Democracy?

George Lingbour

Fareed Zakaria

The Future of Freedom – Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
New York London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2003

Liberty and democracy go side by side in the contemporary world, and free elections are the highest expression of democracy: how many among us would not agree with such statements? Fareed Zakaria, an American of Indian origin, former managing director of *Foreign Affairs* and presently editor of *Newsweek International*, in his book *The Future of Freedom* invites us to rethink the relation between the two terms, both in the West and in the other areas of the planet.

“We live in a democratic age” is the peremptory statement Zakaria uses to open his book. A process of democratization is under way in the world, which leads to the shift of power downward. But we often see, in the developing countries or in countries coming out of long periods of dictatorship, democratically elected regimes that abuse their power. It is what Zakaria calls “illiberal democracy” and on this distinction he builds the key concepts of his work. What we in the West call “democracy” is in reality a “liberal democracy”, and it has to do not only with the choice of who will govern: it presupposes the rule of law, the separation of powers, the protection of the basic liberties of the individual, that is to say the constitutional liberalism. In this sense, according to the author, today “democracy is flourishing; liberty is not”. The first part of the book is devoted to a brilliant

historical, political and economic digression on the relation between democracy and liberty. Zakaria argues that “liberty in the West was born of a series of power struggles”: between the Church and the temporal power, between land aristocracy and monarchy, between Catholics and Protestants, up to the rise of capitalism and the middle classes. The author is rightly suspicious of theories trying to explain the different developments in other areas of the world with vague cultural references based on the idea of “culture as destiny”: “economic crises, war, political leadership - all these things change culture”. At the same time, he notes how the most successful non-Western countries have been those that have followed a route similar to that of the Western countries: “capitalism and the rule of law first, and then democracy”. Besides the South-East Asian countries, China is the most evident example of economic reforms that (hopefully) come ahead of political ones; to the other extreme there is the case of Russia, with its mix of elections and authoritarianism that have come ahead of the economic reforms.

Zakaria places in the first place the economic success as the premise for arriving at a liberal democracy, to the point of stating that “when countries become democratic at low levels of development, their democracy usually dies”. However, countries with abundant natural resources, in particular oil (the ones Zakaria calls “trust-fund states”), usually do not make laws and rules suitable for an adequate economic and political development. This is because “easy money means a government does not need to tax its citizens”, therefore it is not committed to give

them in exchange services, accountability, good governance, and at the same time it possesses resources more than sufficient for maintaining a repressive control upon its society.

A complex case we have to deal with is the one Zakaria defines "the Islamic exception": "the Arab world today is trapped between autocratic states and illiberal societies", a strained situation that has its outburst and extreme display in terrorism. However, Islam and the West have lived together for at least fourteen centuries. Hence "the real problem lies not in the Muslim world but in the Middle East" and in the first place in what has happened in the last forty years. Zakaria underlines the consequences of the crisis of Nasser's socialist pan-Arabic attempt, which ended in bureaucratic authoritarianism, economic stagnation and pro-Soviet attitude, and objects to the links, asserted so many times, between fundamentalist terrorism and poverty: "the problem is wealth, not poverty", and "if there is one great cause for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab world". Therefore "the key is not religious reform, but political and economic reform". However, despite the fact that "Israel has become the great excuse for much of the Arab world", it is in the interest in the first place of the United States to give a decent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also what will be (or will not be) possible to do in Iraq after the war and Saddam's fall is clearly crucial for the entire area.

But the tensions between democracy and liberalism are growing in the West too, and in Zakaria's mind in no other country are they so evident as in the United States, so much so that "most Americans have lost faith in their democracy". To this theme the author devotes the second part of his book.

Zakaria's is a ruthless criticism to what he defines "democratization of politics", to the point of arguing that "the more open a system becomes, the more easily it can be penetrated by money,

lobbyists, and fanatics". His basic criticism is that "reforms designed to produce majority rule have produced minority rule". This can be seen in particular in the decline of political parties ("political parties have no real significance in America today"); among the causes for it, the author emphasizes the resort to primaries, the new rules introduced for the "campaign-finance reform" and the extensive use of referendums (as the California case would prove).

The democratization process has imbued the entire American society, with two fundamental consequences: "the first is the opening of many American industries and professions to outsiders, and the breakdown of old structures of power and control. The second, associated with the first, is the eclipse of the class of elites who ran these institutions", so as to configure a true "death of authority". Zakaria multiplies examples: "deregulating, decentralizing, and democratizing the economy" is seen as an unstoppable process (but it could be objected that in this field it is more a matter of liberalization than democratization processes). In the field of religion, in the United States the "democratic wave" has shifted power towards evangelical groups with mass appeal. In fact, movements born for offering a radical alternative to modern culture are apparently lined up today with the basic trend: "the key feature of all successful and growing mass Christian sects today is an emphasis on individual choice and democratic structures". More arrows Zakaria reserves to the democratization of culture, which underlines the relationship between democratization and marketization, whose guiding principle of "quality" has been displaced by that of "popularity".

The harshest criticism - and the most interesting for the European reader - is that to the "suicide of elites": "for much of the twentieth century, professionals formed a kind of modern aristocracy, secure in its status and concerned with the country's welfare and broader interests". Today, instead, the place of doctors,

bankers, auditors, lawyers, journalists who were the expression of the WASPs has been taken by “a much more heterogeneous, meritocratic, and dynamic elite”, often not equal to the former one in interpreting its role in society: “the rich and the powerful will always be with us. We can only ask that they recognize that with their privileges come responsibilities”.

“The twentieth century - Zakaria believes - was marked by two broad trends: the regulation of capitalism and the deregulation of democracy. Both experiments overreached”. It is not by accident that, according to the polls, the institutions most respected by Americans are all non-democratic: the Supreme Court, the armed forces and the Federal Reserve System. In the era of globalization, the difficult decisions often required from governments can only be taken, according to the author, “by insulating some decision-makers from the intense pressures of interest groups, lobbies, and political campaigns - that is to say, from the intense pressures of democracy”. A classical example is that of the Central Banks’ independence, but Zakaria mentions also the WTO and the European Union. The real or presumed “democratic deficit” of the Union becomes a virtue: “the EU has been effective precisely because it is insulated from political pressures”. The most far-sighted reforms made in Europe were largely due to choices made by the EU, whilst when it was not possible to pass them it was because of the resistance of the democratic governments of the

member countries.

The book ends with a citation of James Madison and his fellow Federalists, who “were prescient in recognizing – in 1789! – that popular government would be plagued by one problem above all else: that of special interests”, and that the basic answer was in “delegation of government”. Zakaria concludes: “Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a challenge to make the world safe for democracy. As we enter the twenty-first century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world”.

This is a book full of interesting cues, worth being pondered on, in particular when the author analyses the Islamic phenomenon and the Arab world. If on the one hand it risks resulting, against its intention, in a kind of praise of technocracy, on the other it may be related to the sociological current of “the masses storming into history” (which had in Tocqueville its first and unsurpassed figure). In Zakaria’s analysis it is striking to note how little weight Europe (labelled as a simple “international organization”) has as an eventual actor called in for collaborating in the reform processes on a local and global scale. But it looks more fair to blame this, more than on the author’s learned and brilliant pen, on the strategic short-sightedness of many European national leaders: another case of “suicide of the elites”?

Mundell Calls for Global Currency

Robert Mundell, a Nobel-prize winning economist and a supporter of the European single currency, has called for a global currency. In an interview published in the French paper *Libération* on January 5, 2004, Mr Mundell said, "with the emergence of the euro and its instability against the dollar, Europe, the US and the Asian powers should come together and create a new international monetary system".

However, this would not mean the end of the euro and the dollar. Mr Mundell continues, "Of course, one would keep the dollar and the euro. This international currency would be used in the large international exchanges, for movements of capital and commercial transactions".

This is not the first time the idea has been proposed, however. In the 1944 Conference at Bretton Woods, which resulted in the establishment of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, several countries proposed a global currency. Mr Mundell said, "I think we should again consider this scenario". The year 2003 did indeed see some large fluctuations on the foreign exchange markets, with the euro hitting record highs against the dollar (*l.l.*).

Vajpayee Moots Single Currency and Open Borders in South Asia

Delivering the keynote address at the first Hindustan Times Leadership Initiative on The Peace Dividend, Prime Minister of India A. B. Vajpayee on 12 December 2003 laid the roadmap for a harmoniously integrated South Asia. He said open borders and even a single currency

for the region were not unrealistic and utopian.

He said, "We have to seek every possible way to banish hostility and promote peace" in South Asia. And added, "If we provide legitimate avenues of free commercial interaction, we can eradicate the black market and underground trade... Once we reach that stage, we would not be far from mutual security cooperation and open borders and even a single currency. Let us remember that the world did not anticipate the sudden end to the Cold War or the collapse of the Berlin Wall. No one thought apartheid-plagued South Africa could be transformed bloodlessly into Mandela's rainbow country" (*l.l.*).

US Gives Up Protectionist Measures on Steel

In March 2002, the United States adopted safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products, in the form of additional tariffs ranging from 30 percent to 8 percent, and for a period of three years. This decision was taken following an investigation on whether certain steel products were being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage to the domestic industry producing similar or directly competitive products.

The European Union (together with Japan, Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand and Brazil) immediately initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure against such measures and notified the WTO that it reserved its right to re-balance the adverse effect of the US steel safeguards, in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards on the right to rebalance the negative effects of illegal safeguards.

Waiting for the decision of the WTO, the European Union adopted Commission Regulation n. 560/2002, imposing provisional

safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products. Subsequently, the EU adopted Commission Regulation n. 1694/2002, which determined the automatic application of additional tariffs as definitive countermeasures on a wide range of imports originating in the US. The rebalancing measures provided by the EC Regulation would be applied starting five days after the condemnation of the US measures by the WTO, and until the withdrawal of the US safeguard measures.

The WTO Dispute Settlement Body's Panel of July 11, 2003 ruled in favour of the Complaining Parties that the US steel safeguards were inconsistent with WTO rules, because the US: 1) failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts supported its determination with respect to "increased imports"; 2) failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation that a "causal link" existed between any increased imports and serious injury to the relevant domestic producers; 3) failed to comply with the requirement of "parallelism" between the products for which the conditions for safeguard measures had been established, and the products which were subjected to the safeguard measure; 4) failed to demonstrate that the alleged increased imports were the result of unforeseen developments. Hence, the European countermeasures entered into force. Without repealing the safeguards, on August 11, 2002, the United States appealed certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Reports.

In November 2003 the WTO Appellate Body released its Report, and confirmed that the US had failed to meet the basic pre-requisite conditions required before any safeguard action could be implemented, regarding unforeseen developments, increased imports and exclusion of imports from specific sources.

On December 4, 2003, the United States announced the full and immediate termination of the steel safeguard measures. The day after, welcoming the US decision, the European Union (Commission Regulation n. 2142/2003) repealed the counter-measures which were adopted in March 2002 to guard against the risk of a flood of steel imports as a result of the US safeguards. The American and European decisions demonstrate the importance of a rule-based international trading system and avoid a dangerous "domino effect" which could undermine international trade relations (*an.v.*).

A Free-Trade Area in the Balkans

Last November 13, 2003, Albania, Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro have signed 21 bi-lateral agreements for abolishing customs duties and bringing down trade barriers among themselves, enacting in practice a Free-Trade Area in the Balkans.

It is an important step towards the economic development of the Balkans, which lays the foundation-stone for the construction of the Union of the Balkans, necessary for joining the European Union in the next decade.

Besides leaving behind once and for all decades of internal conflicts, this event also shows that the experience the European Community went through from the 1940s to the present day can be an example for those States that have been fighting each other but are willing now to group together for their economic and democratic development and their common good (*f.o.*).

James Wolfensohn

President of the World Bank

Interview by *Paolo Mastrolilli*, from *La Stampa*, November 24, 2003

James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, has just finished opening the eyes of the rich and powerful of New York during the annual gala dinner of the International Rescue Committee, when he stops for a moment to explain why we are taking the wrong theoretical and practical approach in the fight against terrorism.

“Today we are spending in the world about 800 billion dollars a year for defence, 600 billion in the rich countries and 200 billion in the developing countries. By contrast, we invest a mere 56 billion dollars a year in fighting poverty. I believe it is obvious to everybody that there is a striking disproportion.”

Such a disproportion also occurs in Iraq and Afghanistan, which should be the test beds of how terrorism can be defeated not only by military force, but also with democracy and development.

For the time being, if my numbers are not mistaken, the war in Iraq has cost more than 150 billion dollars, considering the 70 billion spent during the conflict proper and 87 billion that President Bush has asked Congress to continue the military operations and for financing the reconstruction. By contrast, at the donors' conference held in Spain in October, there were commitments made for investing about 13 billion dollars for the country's development, in addition to the 20 promised by Washington; but we have reckoned that about 56 billion dollars will be necessary for the reconstruction over the next five years. Yet again the numbers speak for themselves of the disproportion, considering also that the annual domestic current expenses and the question of Baghdad's foreign debt

are not taken into account in the calculation. The problem poses itself in similar terms in Afghanistan too. President Karzai said that the country will need about 30 billion dollars over the next five years for being revived, but so far we have scraped together less than 5.

If such is our performance in the two countries symbolizing the fight against terrorism, let us imagine the rest. And in fact Mr Wolfensohn takes only a moment to widen the problem to include the whole planet.

There are about six billion people in the world today and five billion live in poor or developing countries. At least three billion human beings have only two dollars a day to spend, and one billion and two hundred million people survive with just one dollar. About 150 million children do not go to school, while global epidemics like AIDS are spreading. Our commitment to the 50 million people in Iraq and Afghanistan can be understood, because we have responsibilities towards them. But we should think over the fact that for the Iraqi war we have spent more than 150 billion dollars, whilst for investments for development in the rest of the world only a little more than 50 billion dollars have been devoted. We should not underestimate the connection between the lack of hope and of personal interests to defend, and the people's behaviour.

This is a great disappointment for the President of the World Bank, as he had hoped that September 11 would be felt as a telling tragedy in the Western world.

On that day, besides the tragedy of the three

thousand individuals killed, I saw the falling down of a wall. In the rich countries we have the impression of being separated and immune from the problems of the poor countries. As a boy I thought like this until I started travelling around a little in the developing areas. Later, I came back to the West to be a banker, but as far as I am concerned that veil of untouchability did not exist any more. The Twin Tower's fall, in my mind, symbolized the fall of the wall that in our mind was separating us from the problems of the poorer regions, and showed that in today's world it is no longer possible to isolate yourself. The disproportions pour over and in the end everybody is hurt. In the beginning this was so, and we noted a real increase of attention paid to organizations like ours, because people realized that in order to solve the problems raised by September 11 it was necessary to face fundamental questions like poverty. Now, however, conflicts are back again, and that interest has faded already.

You are saying – we ask Mr Wolfensohn after he left the stage – that a direct connection exists between the phenomenon of terrorism and the scant attention the richest countries give to the fight against poverty?

Yes, exactly. I believe that there is a direct connection between poverty and terrorism. This does not mean that every destitute person goes around trying to shoot you. But poverty creates an environment where people with

evil intentions can prosper. And when there is no hope, human beings end up doing strange things.

What should we do, in your opinion, to break this vicious circle, attacking at the same time poverty as a moral problem and also as a practical emergency, linked to international security?

We must commit ourselves to resolutely solving the question of poverty at a global level. This, as you Italians know well, is also the earnest request His Holiness John Paul II has been making for many years.

You have stressed the disproportion between the 800 billion dollars spent every year in the military sector by both the rich and the poor countries, and the 56 billion invested in development.

Certainly, – Mr Wolfensohn interrupts me immediately – I believe it is an obvious problem.

But how can we convince governments of the necessity to revise the ratio of these two items in their budgets, in a time of war like the one we are experiencing?

Maybe you, living closer to the Holy See, would start as an act of faith; on the political plane, it is a matter of making people understand that investments made in fighting poverty are part of the money invested for international security and stability.

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