The Federalist Debate

**Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World**

*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*
Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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
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Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World

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Will Democracy Survive in the Globalization Era?

Lucio Levi

Democratic peace theory holds that democracies do not wage war against one another. Two false consequences are drawn from this theory. The first is that the spread of democracy to every state would in itself be sufficient to achieve universal peace. The second is that spreading democracy should then be the first foreign policy priority of all democratic states. These views ignore the fact that historical conditions may either promote or hamper the success of democracy and its stabilization. As asserted by James Madison at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, "The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home". This law of politics explains not only the erosion of freedom in the US after 9/11, but also the collapse of democratic institutions in Italy, Germany and Spain between the World Wars, and more generally the authoritarian degeneration of political regimes caused by the political and military pressure they experienced on their borders. The lesson we can draw from historical experience is that peace, or at least international *détente*, is the principal prerequisite of democracy.

A more recent lesson can be learned from the setbacks in the US doctrine of bringing democracy to the Middle-East and from the experience of failed states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Efforts to establish democracy in this region are frustrated by the climate of insecurity, violence and corruption prevailing in those countries, which worsened after the US military interventions. This experience shows that an additional preliminary condition is needed in order to pave the way to democracy: namely, a

stable government that assures the rule of law. Moreover, regrettable as it may be for the idealist, there are material requirements for a democratic society, i.e. the eradication of poverty, disease and illiteracy. They enable people to become rational and intellectually aware actors in the decision-making process.

And yet, in spite of these obstacles on the road to successful democracy, past decades have seen a sweeping advance of democracy in the world since the Portuguese revolution in 1974. It has spread to Southern and Eastern Europe, the ex-Soviet Union, Asia and Latin America. For the first time in UN history a majority of member states' governments are elected through a democratic procedure. According to the latest Freedom House Report (January 2008), there are 121 electoral democracies in the world, among which liberal democracies number 90, partly free countries 60 and only 43 not free. This extraordinary progress of democracy depends to a high degree on two parallel processes: the effect of globalization and the end of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, we should recognize that democracy has never shown such worrying signs of weakness as today. At world level there is a widening gap between the market and civil society, which have become global, and politics, which remain substantially confined within national borders. Consequently, the decisions on which the destiny of peoples depends, such as security, control of the global economy, international justice or protection of the environment, tend to shift away from representative institutions.

The feeling widely shared among citizens is that the most important decisions have migrated away from institutions under their control and towards international power centers free from any form of democratic supervision. Globalization thus brings about the crisis of democracy. In fact, seen from a global viewpoint, the decisions made at national level, where democratic powers exist, are relatively minor. At international level, on the other hand, where the most important decisions are made, there are no democratic institutions.

The danger we are facing is the depletion of democracy. More precisely we should ask ourselves how long democracy can last in a world where citizens are excluded from participating in decisions which determine their destiny. Globalization must be democratized before it destroys democracy entirely.

International relations, which are still the jousting ground for diplomatic and military rivalries among states and antagonism between non-state actors, can only be brought under popular control by international democracy. Analysis of the structures of international organizations shows that they are diplomatic machines within which governments pursue co-operation. Recently some of them have been endowed with parliamentary assemblies which represent their national parliaments' response to the globalization process but are also an admission of the erosion of their power. In other words, they attempt to shift parliamentary control of governments to international level. Most such multinational assemblies are made up of national parliamentarians, although the European Parliament, which represents the most advanced evolution of this category of international assemblies, is directly elected.

The European Parliament is the laboratory of international democracy. Since the introduction of direct elections it has increased its legislative and control powers over the Commission – that is, over what is potentially the European government. This means that

the democratization of the European Union has been a mighty tool for strengthening European institutions. It is worth recalling that the dilemma which arose during the process of European integration, namely whether to concentrate on strengthening the European Community first or to democratize it first, has been solved in favor of the second option. The same question can be formulated as regards the problem of democratizing the UN.

The plan to bring globalization under democratic control is meeting with formidable opposition not only from states with authoritarian regimes, but primarily from the US government which is unwilling to let its own freedom of action be lessened by the international organizations to which it belongs, nor by movements arising in the global civil society. This is a further demonstration of the premise that, to be a promoter of international democracy, it is not enough to have a democratic regime – a necessary, but insufficient condition. To overcome US opposition, a centre of power must emerge, capable of supporting the plan for a world democratic order. It is reasonable to believe that Europe will play such a role. For instance, the European Parliament supports the project for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. The significance of European unification lies in surpassing the nation-state, a form of political organization that develops power relations with the other states. Therefore, it is fairly safe to assume that the EU does not have hegemonic ambitions, nor will any future European Federation. Although the EU aspires to independence in its relationship with the US, its objective will not be to replace the US as the stabilizer of world order. Europe will rather pursue a policy of co-operation with the US with the prospect of joint management of the world order, open to participation of other regional groupings of states. On the other hand, Europe will hold sufficient power to relieve the United States of some of its overwhelming world responsibilities and thus have the authority to persuade it to support the democratic reform of the UN.

In What Respects will European Federalism be Different?

Robert Toulemon

According to many superficial observers of European reality, the widening of the European Union (EU) would mean the end of all perspective of federal evolution. On the contrary, the increase of the number of its members leaves no choice but between either paralysis or federalism. Some people, for example in France, believe they can find an alternative solution in a directorate of the bigger States. They forget that such an orientation is rejected by the others and that its efficiency is far from being guaranteed. Its first result would be to foster inner tensions and push smaller states towards an extreme pro-American attitude. This return to interstate tensions would be a definite step backward. It would not allow Europe to achieve a real political presence.

Federalism is the organizational form the best adapted to the community of peoples and States of Europe, which corresponds the most exactly to the motto proposed for the Union, "Unity in Diversity", combining the greatest autonomy of the federated entities, in other words subsidiarity, a federalist term *par excellence*, and a supra-state authority in the fields of common competence. However, to federate nations several of which in turn have occupied firstrank positions in the world and which still believe themselves to be first rate powers, is a difficult undertaking. The federal systems of the American States, of the German *Länder*, of the Swiss Cantons, of the Canadian provinces, of the States of Australia or India, while they provide useful examples, cannot simply be transposed to Europe.

In the present period of constitutional crisis we are going through, it is not without interest to consider the lessons offered by historical experiences in federalism, but also to define the peculiar features of a future European federal model.

The lessons we can draw from historical experiences

The historical examples are first to be considered from the point of view of the institutions. But how much freedom of choice is kept by the federated entities in their inner policies is also a matter to be carefully considered.

Institutions

The first experience to be considered is ours. The distribution of competences between different levels, some being exclusive and others shared, the decision-taking by majority vote, the primacy of community law over States' law, the existence of a common currency managed by a Central Bank are the federal elements to which the EU owes its main achievements.

In the same way, the semi-proportionality of citizens' votes in the Council and representations in the Parliament is not far different from the current systems of representation of federated entities in existing federations. Some combine equal representation in one assembly (the Senate in the US, the Council of States in Switzerland) with the representation of populations in another assembly (the House of Representatives in the US, the National Council in Switzerland). Others add to the assembly representating the populations another chamber where the federated States have a semi-proportional representation; such is the case in Federal Germany. The provision in the European Reform treaty of a double majority of States and population in the Council of Ministers is inspired by the same philosophy.

Indeed, the ambition of federal systems is to find a balance between the equality of States and the equality of citizens. History tells us that this equilibrium is not easy to reach nor to preserve. The crises of federalism may lead to conflicts; the most bloody was the one which tore the US during the Civil war. The adversaries of federalism put forward these crises to support the thesis that all federations are threatened by a sudden breakdown. They quote the example of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. So doing they forget that those federations were purely formal constructions which hardly masked the dictatorship of a single party and a crushing hegemony in the former USSR as in the present Federation of Russia. There remains that keeping the balance between the influence of the most populated and less populated States is as essential as the balance between the federated States and the federation.

The tensions peculiar to federal systems result most of the time from the sharing of competences and their exercise. The feeling that "Brussels" meddles too much in minor matters which could remain in the field of responsibility of the States, or even local entities, feeds the demand for a better respect of the subsidiarity principle. The Reform treaty gave national Parliaments a power of caution in this field, the last word pertaining to the Court of Justice.

The existence of a strong judiciary is necessary to the good functioning of federalism. The greatest merit of federalism is to substitute judicial arbitration to armed conflicts. This substitution means that the arbiter must be recognized as independent of the federated entities and of the federal institutions as well. The independence of judges depends as much on the duration of their mandate and the conditions of its renewal as on the authority who designates them. The extreme solution is the appointment for life, as in the Supreme Court of the USA.

Until now the member-States of the EU have refused to extend the competence of the Court of Justice to matters of defence and foreign policy; in the same way they refuse to extend the competence and the power of initiative of the Commission to these same fields. As it had been remarked by the founder of the College of Bruges, Henri Brugmans, until now Europe has just practised federalism the wrong way round. Without competence for the questions which normally pertain to federalism, it often deals with matters which, somewhere else, concern the States themselves. The formula contemplated by the Reform treaty that creates a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy linked to the Council and the Commission, with a diplomatic service of its own, would be a real step toward a federalism going in the right direction.

Another lesson drawn from federal examples: the necessity to have a strong executive at the head of the federation, strong meaning legitimate and visible. In this respect the Reform treaty marked only a limited progress. The creation of a President of the European Council with a larger mandate and no longer fulfilling national functions is useful, but the appointment procedure is far from democratic and creates a duality with the president of the Commission. However, the supporters of a Federal Europe must see to it that these dispositions are adopted, whatever the fate of the Reform treaty.

What Autonomy for the States?

The promoters of federalism have to answer the fundamental question posed by their adversaries: what autonomy will be left to the federated States in a European Union? From this point of view the experience of the other federal systems deserves to be considered.

Everywhere education remains the concern of the federated entities, as well as, for an important part, the tax system, welfare policies and protection of the environment. We may, for instance, notice the choice by California to endorse the Kyoto Protocol that the USA government has not ratified. Be that as it may, political and social choices are basically made or arbitrated by the federal elections in the Federal State. In a European Federal Union these choices will be decided, for a large part, as they are now, by national elections, but

the importance of European elections should increase together with the competences of the Union. However that may be, European states will keep more latitude in the choice of their economic, social or environmental model. For example, differently from other federal states, there is a consensus about maintaining at the national level the mechanisms of social welfare and to exclude the taxes on individuals from a fiscal harmonization, however advisable the latter may be. The system of ownership of firms will equally remain a national competence, even if the necessity of a fair competition, essential condition for the single market, remains under the competence of the Union.

Nevertheless, there is the field of ethical values and fundamental rights where, even today, the EU has greater powers than the US. Such is the case, for example, of the abolition of the death penalty. However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in Washington tends to place the fight against discrimination above the traditional States' rights.

The Specifics of a European Federalism

The particular character of a European federation will be to be pluri-national. The US, Germany, India, Switzerland, in spite of the latter being plurilingual, conceive themselves as forming one nation. Only the Belgian federation is bi-national, but its recent and very complex structure combining regions and linguistic communities makes it a model difficult to transpose. Rather than a federal State, Europe will define itself as a federal "Union of States and Citizens", a formula which seems to me more accurate than Jacques Delors'"federation of Nation States"– which was coined to appease the "*souverainistes*". Indeed, to quote Jean Monnet: "we do not form a coalition of States, we unite men". Moreover, several members of the EU, for example the United Kingdom, are pluri-national.

The first consequence of the pluri-national character of the EU is that it must foster a patriotism of values, of citizenship, a constitutional patriotism, and, in no case, an ethnic or geographical patriotism. This form of patriotism seems to me of a superior ethical level and certainly better adapted to the aspirations of younger generations, consequently it will be easier to make them share it. It is also a response to the perpetual adversaries of the EU who like to caricature it as an empire designed to be dominated by Germany, while one of its essential values is the refusal of any hegemony.

A second consequence concerning the institutional organization of the federation: national organs, governments and parliaments will have to work together with the federal government, especially in the fields of foreign policy, defence and domestic security. In existing federations, federated entities only partake more or less in the Union government through their representative assembly: the US Senate, the German *Bundesrat*, the Council of States in Switzerland. But neither the Governors of the American States nor the Minister-Presidents of the *Länder* take part in the definition of the federal foreign policy. It should not be the same in the European federation.

The institution of a President of the European Council relieved of national functions was one of the most important innovations of the Reform treaty. It raised reservations among federalists and supporters of the *communitarian* method, who could see it as a strengthening of the "Europe of States". We hope that a president who has only European responsibilities will act as the champion of the common interest. His role will be to associate the chiefs of national Governments to the management of EU's affairs.

From this innovation two evolutions seem possible. The more likely, at least for some time, will be the division of the government of the EU into a community domain where the Commission will have the main influence and an inter-governmental domain mostly concerning the States. In the medium term another evolution would be advisable: the two domains progressively coming together. This merging could take place by a progressive community of decisional procedures (an extension of the

majority vote to foreign policy and defence, being understood that, as long as no integrated army is in existence, the minority would not be obliged to take part in an armed intervention that they would not approve of), by the fusion of presidencies and the creation of a European Cabinet composed of several ministers with a double function, on the model of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, another innovation of the Reform treaty. It would be a clever means of conciliating the desire of each State to have a Commissioner and the necessity to ensure the coherence of the Community's Executive.

Each of these ministers would have a vast range of responsibilities and would receive a power of coordination over the corresponding commissioners. In this way it would not just be Foreign Affairs, but also defence, domestic security, the economy, sector policies, the quality of life, including the environment and welfare, education, communication, culture and youth, which would represent seven or eight portfolios. Chosen without consideration of nationality by the President of the Commission, with the approval of the Parliament and the European Council, these ministers would constitute a select cabinet within the Commission. They would be closer to the government but they would benefit from the independence of the Commission; they would, so to speak, realize "smoothly" the passage from the inter-governmental to the community method before the completion of the federal system. The existence of a restricted cabinet sitting under a unified presidency would reduce the risk of incoherence deriving from the multiplication of the number of commissioners. The mode of designation of the federal President and his cabinet is another subject which requires specific solutions. Several formulas can be envisaged according to the system to be preferred: more parliamentary or more presidential. A strictly parliamentary or definitely presidential one would not be well adapted to European complexity. The keeping of double presidencies, a solution retained in the Reform treaty, leads to parliamentarism, the

president of the Commission acting as a Prime Minister. Nevertheless, it remains only half parliamentary, the essential role in defence and foreign policy being devolved upon the President of the European Council. The merging of the presidencies would leave the option open.

An evolution toward a parliamentary system could take place through the creation of a real post of Prime Minister, when the conditions of transfer of governmental power in all fields to a Cabinet responsible to Parliament are obtained. On the contrary, the election of the President of the European Council by universal suffrage would lead to a presidential system. A more original formula might perhaps better answer European specificities. It would be to propose to popular suffrage a reduced and collegial team on the model of the Swiss Federal Council. In this hypothesis the federal President designated by an agreement between the governments and the Parliament would keep his (or her) role of representation and arbitration, and the main powers would be endowed to the executive college.

These speculations about the various possible forms of a European government may seem irrelevant in the present day when the EU goes through an existential crisis. But we can also argue that we may seize the opportunity of the crisis to ponder over the medium and longer term institutions. Indeed, one of the causes of today's difficulties lies precisely in the lack of vision and the absence of debates on the future.

The emergence of a strong executive cannot be conceived without the strengthening of the role of the Parliament, which should be endowed with the initiative to introduce laws and the power to control the Executive, which would be conceived according to the more parliamentary or more presidential model which will finally prevail.

Recognizing the part played by national parliaments in the affairs of the EU is already, and will be even more tomorrow, an original feature of the European federal system. Beyond the control of subsidiarity, for which the national

parliaments will be called to play an ever increasing role, it would be useful to give them the possibility to deliberate with the European Parliament on the general policy of the Union. In the same way, they could be associated to the process of amendment of the Treaties, thanks to a Convention composed of national and European MPs and representatives of the various Executive authorities. These revisions would not be submitted to the unanimity rule, but to a reinforced qualified majority, for example two thirds of the States and populations; minority states would be allowed to exert their right to opt out.

This right to abstain recognized in the Reform treaty would be another specificity of a European Federal Union, different from a federal State. One of the European values is the settlement of conflicts by law and conciliation. The recourse to force against a member state is not conceivable within a European federation. On the other hand, economic sanctions must be allowed in case of breach of contract and, if necessary, political sanctions in case of severe or persisting default. Indeed, this possibility does exist today. The withdrawal from the EU is not a sanction but a safety valve; it should render it possible a relaxation of the amendment procedure: minority States would have a choice to opt out, and ask for a special dispensation or to transform their membership into an association.

Less radical than withdrawal, the granting of the possibility to opt out could conciliate the desire of a majority to move forward and the timidity of some members. In this way, a vanguard could be constituted, not by selection but by voluntary self-exclusion. The result would be the same, but the political impact would be quite different. Selection is unacceptable for those who are not chosen, but those who exclude themselves must consider it is their own decision and should be able to go back to the majority at any time. The failure of "enhanced cooperations" can be explained by the fact that this formula is felt as selective rather than dispensational. We must add that the term cooperation was poorly chosen to name ambitious actions. Rather then "hard core" it should have been "soft core". It would be much better to say consolidated integration. The opting out formula can lead to an improved integration, as can be seen with the monetary union. It can be observed that a temporary exclusion of a country which has the will, but not the capacity, to take part raises no difficulty, since it will be resolved at the proper time. Finally there is the question of the voting right at the Council and Parliament for countries which are temporarily excluded or opting out on the issues in question; it would seem logical, at least, to ask countries who opt out not to exercise their voting right.

To reflect upon federal forms adapted to European specificities is all the more useful as in several countries, among others France and the United Kingdom, federalism meets with a hostility which comes from a lack of understanding. For many Frenchmen and Englishmen federalism means centralization, for others, the Germans for example, it offers a guarantee against the encroachments of centralization. Therefore the battle for federalism is difficult. We must rely on a clear vision of what is possible in a Europe which remains more attached to national sovereignties than it was in the post-war years. The worst criticism from which federalists must defend themselves is that they advocate the death of sovereign States. By devising formulas which will allow the states not to alienate their sovereignty forever, thanks to the right to opt out, to preserve some freedom of choice in domestic policies, especially in social and fiscal matters, and to take part in the definition and running of the affairs of the Union, it may be possible to convince those of our adversaries who are sincere and in good faith.

From Gettysburg to Global Governance

Emerging Issues in Federalism at the Local, European and Global Levels

James Christie

I have been thinking much about the American Civil War recently. Responsibilities as President of the Canadian Council of Churches in July of last year found my wife and me on a "road trip" to Oberlin Ohio where, in 1957, the Faith and Order Commission of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America was established. In an early example of transborder cooperation, the Canadian Council of Churches played a key role then, and was invited to celebrate now. By way of a holiday side trip, we detoured through Pennsylvania, and spent several days in Gettysburg, the site of the most decisive battle of the American Civil War, and the bloodiest action ever to occur in North America.

2007 could be seen as a summer of anniversaries. Besides that which took me to the United States in the first place, it was the two hundred twentieth anniversary of the Constitutional Congress held in Philadelphia, a gathering which produced a document which, in the long run, may even be more significant than the Declaration of Independence, at least to federalists of all persuasions: the Constitution of the United States of America.

The framers of this extraordinary parchment are rightly considered to be among the most intelligent men ever to have graced a conference table, witness John F. Kennedy's White House tribute to Thomas Jefferson nearly two centuries later. Yet their best efforts could neither adequately predict nor at all deter the near dissolution of the federal union between 1861 and 1865 in a conflict from which the United States is still recovering. I do not think it farfetched to suggest

that the at best ambivalent attitude of the US to the United Nations is reflective of its complex feelings towards federalism as a system in light of the Civil War.

The unhappy history of that conflict and its continuing reverberations brings into sharp relief the questions faced by world federalists – whether local, European or global – in assessing the evolving, or perhaps to be honest, devolving, world order. Four at least are pertinent: 1. What is the world we want? 2. How shall we achieve it? 3. How shall we sustain it? 4. What price are we willing to pay?

Our American friends have gone before us in wrestling with these questions, and their participation in addressing them at a global level is critical. The price they paid was in blood and a continuing political schizophrenia, which until resolved, leaves not only the future of America but of the world in some doubt. These questions ought to be kept in mind as I review five tendencies, five areas of challenge confronting federalists at the beginning of the new century.

The economy vs. ecology: an intrinsic and institutional challenge

In Canada, every indication is that the degradation of the global ecosphere with its dramatic symptoms of the melting of polar ice caps and utterly unpredictable climate change is the hot button political issue on the minds of the electorate. While there are those who still argue that the evidence is inconclusive and even occasionally contradictory, it appears that former Vice President and Nobel laureate, Al Gore, really has articulated an inconvenient truth, and

that uncontrolled human activity is contributing to what may be, within a very few generations, a crisis of disastrous proportions. We may even have achieved that dubious accomplishment already.

But widespread recognition of the problem and its dire consequences has yet to issue in anything like concerted global action within the human community. This can be hardly surprising giving the platitudinous nature of former President Clinton's oft quoted mantra from the 1992 presidential campaign, "*It's the economy, stupid*." There's the rub: at every level. Arguments against the comparatively modest Kyoto accords were primarily economic. Jobs would be lost, economies collapse, and widespread suffering would ensue.

The highest minded citizens of the developing world are not quite ready for that degree of sacrifice required in the present to limit the risk of Fiji disappearing beneath the Pacific in the future. Nor is the developing world likely to be enthralled with lectures from the wealthy, self-righteous and hypocritical north and west about the need to monitor energy consumption when there is finally a chance to achieve some semblance of parity with the two car North American middle class.

And there are emerging institutional issues even, perhaps especially, in federal systems. Former Alberta Premier, the Hon. Peter Loughheed has noted an impending constitutional crisis over the exploitation of the Alberta tar sands in the generation of fossil fuels. The environment is a largely federal issue, the development of resources, provincial. Serious confrontation over the economy *versus* ecology is, he believes, inevitable.

Still, can anything but a global perspective be employed in addressing the danger and the disparity? Is there any political system other than federalism which offers the promise of bringing something like balance to a table of competing interests?

Global poverty and migratory populations as a problem in human solidarity

When I first joined the World Federalist Movement, not too long ago, the prevailing wisdom suggested that there were some twelve million refugees in the world. This was considered a question of great moment at the time. The latest figures I have heard quoted suggest the actual number of displaced persons at the beginning of the third millennium is closer to thirty-six million: a number roughly equal to the population of Canada. The phenomenon is global.

Marginal and disadvantaged human beings, many but by no means all from conflict riven emerging nations, are on the move *en masse* across Africa, from Eastern Europe to the West, from Latin America to the flesh pots of the United States. They are seeking not only a better life, but, in many cases, life itself. This is particularly true as the HIV/AIDS pandemic begins to emerge beyond the tragic arena of sub-Saharan Africa. As they cross over the boundaries of their more prosperous neighbors – at least in a global sense – the human community is witnessing a widespread "NIMBY" effect – "not in my back yard."

The fear is economic: they will take our jobs. The fear is cultural: we will disappear by attrition. The fear is religious, especially when the refugees are Muslim in quasi-Christian Europe. Even in the tolerant Netherlands and the inclusive Scandinavian nations we see the rise of individuals and movements reacting vigorously to threats, real or perceived, to a way of life built over generations of hard work and social struggle. The image of burning Parisian suburbs is very much with us. Meanwhile, the staggering gap between the world's richest citizens and her poorest continues to widen at a rate that long ago transcended the simply alarming.

To whom does the world belong if not to all

her inhabitants? Is there any system other than federalism that even stands a chance of defining a fair distribution of resources and opportunities within the global commonwealth?

World cities as a "wild card"

We have become an urban species. It is a truism to observe that the majority of the world's people live in the major urban centers of both the first and two thirds world. New York, Los Angeles, Rio, New Delhi, Mexico City, Tokyo, Beijing, Nairobi even Toronto – the list goes on. Few cities have the infrastructure required to prevent their deterioration into sinkholes of misery; fewer seem to be engaged in serious planning. Even fewer nation states seem willing to address the reality that cities are rapidly demanding a redistribution of political power to match their economic problems and possibilities.

It is now well over a decade since the government of Michael Harris in the Canadian province of Ontario acknowledged that the City of Toronto and its surrounding metropolitan area was a *de facto* economic region capable of an economic life of its own apart from the balance of the province. Is this a sort of medieval city state economy *redux*? How will federalist political thought accommodate this new reality of world cities?

Human Rights and the International Criminal Court: mutually compatible or mutually contradictory?

World Federalists around the globe are justly proud of the role we have played in the nongovernmental/civil society initiatives which have issues in the Rome Treaty, its subsequent ratification and the partnership with Dr Lloyd Axworthy and the Government of Canada in the development of the Responsibility to Protect Protocol.

Nevertheless, even in what seem to be unequivocal steps forward in the protection and preservation of civil and human rights, unanticipated complications have, perhaps

inevitably, emerged in practice. For decades, opponents of apartheid in South Africa anticipated a blood shed when the white regime was ultimately replaced by one which represented the black and colored majority. But miracles do happen and under the inspired leadership of Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the transference of power occurred in a manner unprecedented and even unimagined. In particular, Archbishop Tutu's Truth and Reconciliation Commission accomplished what no one had imagined possible: a national exercise in forgiveness that transcended the quest for justice in terms which can only be understood religiously.

It has been correctly observed that in a significant number of cases, justice by any definition was foregone for the sake of a healthy societal evolution. Just so, in Uganda, the question has been whether to engage the Lord's Resistance Army in a manner compatible with the Responsibility to Protect with subsequent prosecution of certain horrific war lords, or to seek something more like a South African resolution.

Put simply, why would an insurgent leader seek peace if the inevitable consequence is trial and punishment? There are no easy answers, but is there any perspective as flexible as federalism in seeking a satisfactory strategy to keep the demands of justice and the hope of peace in some kind of healthy and dynamic tension?

Religion in the building of world community: a new "axial" age?

Among world federalists, as among other communities of the "intelligentsia" throughout the twentieth century, there has been a transmitted and received wisdom that religion is but the vestigial remnant of primitive superstition, and that, given time and education enough, the religious project would disappear from the human agenda in the manner in which we anticipate the humble vermiform appendix

to disappear through the ongoing process of evolution.

But lo and behold, the appendix has purpose, and religion continues to dominate the hearts and minds of close to 90% of the human community. There is no doubt that this domination has all too often proved tragic in the extreme. The new century began, after all, with the immense shock wave which was 9/11. But only the most sophomoric of thinkers, accepting a level of popular opinion as valid without the test of time or historic context, see religion as nothing but problematic.

Karen Armstrong is perhaps the most prolific and accessible of current historians of religion writing in the English language. In her 2006 book, *The Great Transformation*, Ms Armstrong chronicles, across centuries and civilizations, the origins of the world religions extant at the beginning of the 21st century. She argues, with the late German philosopher, Karl Jaspers, that the roots of modern religion grew not out of dogmatism, mindless or otherwise, but out of an "axial age" in the last millennium before the Common Era, marked by the attributed birth of Jesus of Nazareth. This axial age was characterized by the emergence of sages across cultures and regions who, determined to address and reverse the almost indescribable violence of their own times, developed the religious insights that emerged in the virtually universal religious ethic of the "Golden Rule," commonly stated, "*do unto others as you would have them do unto you*."

Since 2005, at Gleneagles in Scotland, religious leaders have held concurrent summits with those of the leadership of the G8 nations. The first iterations of these summits were largely European and Christian, but in 2007, in Cologne, at the instigation of Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury and under the leadership of Bishop Wolfgang Huber of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 59 religious leaders, from a variety of world faith traditions, and from all the G8 nations and across Africa gathered to debate, adopt and transmit to the leaders of their nations gathered in summit at Heiligendamm, an historic document, *Just Participation: A call from Cologne.*

The document called upon world leaders to take seriously and seek to implement the millennium development goals established less than a decade before through the United Nations under the leadership of Secretary General, Kofi Anan. Those same leaders pledged to meet each year, whenever and wherever the G8 leaders met, and to continue to act as the conscious of the world for those who have no voice in the courts of the mighty.

Does this herald a new axial age? Well, it is too early to tell. But there were world federalists among those religious leaders; for as one of them, I can attest that the only political system with which religious freedom is truly in harmony is federalism.

A long and winding road

The road from Gettysburg, Pennsylvania to Oberlin, Ohio is long and winding. The political road from the Constitutional Congress of the United States of America to a viable vision of global governance is even more so. It is not a road for the solitary traveler, but for a pilgrimage in solidarity with the human community. We are still a long way from clearly articulating the world we want, let alone achieving and sustaining it. The price has yet to be computed.

But in the remarkable achievement of the European Union, the preservation of the United States, the balancing act which is Canada and in experiment after experiment around the world, there are signs that the road is passable, a destination in sight. Shall we away?

A Bill of Rights
for the Internet Universe

Stefano Rodotà

Almost at the same time as a UN commission in New York City was passing the proposal for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty with an historic vote, in Rio de Janeiro the representative of the same United Nations was closing the big Internet Governance Forum stating that the many problems to be faced in this network require an Internet Bill of Rights. These two events, which may look unrelated and qualitatively very distant can be placed side by side for three reasons. In both cases, the importance of a global policy for rights has leapt forward. In both cases, we are not in the presence of a final point of arrival, but of a process requiring ingenuity and political determination. In both cases, the outcome has been made possible by a far-sighted Italian initiative.

As far as the death penalty is concerned, it was a matter of honoring a cultural primogeniture, almost a historical duty, in the name of Cesare Beccaria and Tuscany, the first State in the world to abolish the death penalty, "convenient only to barbarian people", as the Grand-Duke Pietro Leopoldo declared in 1786! The Internet situation is quite different, as Italy can certainly not be considered a leading country in the field of scientific and technological innovation. And yet this is precisely where a movement started from two years ago, that has progressively involved ever wider sectors everywhere, thus demonstrating that a good culture is necessary to a good policy. Which policy? The final outcome in Rio was possible also because a joint declaration was made one day before by the Brazilian and the Italian governments suggesting the Internet Bill of Rights as the instrument for guaranteeing freedom and rights in the widest public space that mankind has ever known.

However, this very significant development now requires adequate capability of taking action. In the discussions leading to the declaration, the Brazilian Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, has explicitly mentioned the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. We are faced with a situation that is becoming paradoxical. Still underestimated and opposed by some in Europe, the Charter is becoming a constant reference for those who are committed to the establishment of a new system of rights protection worldwide; so much so that US scholars speak of a "European dream" that is replacing their "American dream". It is time, then, for the European Union to be fully aware of its force and responsibility towards the entire "human community", as explicitly written in the Preamble of the Charter of Rights. Precisely because we are aware of the limits of Europe's influence, its political future is ever more clearly connected to its being able to be the protagonist in this planetary "struggle for rights".

In this perspective, the Internet Bill of Rights provides a valuable opportunity. Just because an unexpected support has come from the UN, the newly-started process must be made strong and concrete. I would list the first stages of its development. The Italo-Brazilian declaration is open to adhesion from other countries. This is not an easy operation. But the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs has proved to be very clever in guiding the process towards the moratorium

on the death penalty, so that one may believe that he will not grasp this new opportunity with indifference.

An easier course of action would be, similarly to what happened for the moratorium, to work for turning the Italian initiative into a more general stand of the European Parliament. In this case, however, a more general question arises. While the Charter of Fundamental Rights is going to become legally binding, and is looked at as a model, the European Commission is taking initiatives that, even with the use of questionable procedural expedients, greatly restrict the protection of fundamental rights; one example concerns the collection and storage of personal data. It is necessary to get out of such an institutional schizophrenia, where grand proclamations on rights are too often contradicted by real and significant restrictions, dangerous for democracy and technically unnecessary or disproportionate.

A third path of action concerns the United Nations itself. Not long ago Google, aware of the necessity to ensure better personal data protection, proposed to institute a "Global Privacy Counsel" at the UN. This suggestion was taken up because it gives a concrete opportunity for starting a reflection over the UN presence in that sector in the future. But, above all, this proposal is posing a more general problem. In the course of the past year we have witnessed a vigorous activism in the economic world. In addition to Google's proposal, there was a joint initiative by Microsoft, Google, Yahoo! and Vodafone, which announced the publication by the end of the year of a Chart for the protection of freedom of expression on the Internet. In July, Microsoft presented its Privacy Principles. But is it possible to leave the protection of fundamental rights on the Internet to the initiative of private subjects only, who will tend to provide just the guarantees compatible with their interests and who, in the lack of other initiatives, will appear as the only "institutions" capable to act? Can we accept a

privatization of the Internet governance or is it indispensable to have a plurality of actors at the most various levels discuss and work out common rules, according to a model defined, exactly, as multi-stakeholder and multi-level?

The Internet Bill of Rights is not conceived by those who have envisaged and are promoting it, as a transposition into the Internet sphere of the traditional logic of international conventions. The choice of the old formula of the Bill of Rights has a symbolic force, it underlines that the aim is not to restrict freedom on the web but, on the contrary, to maintain the conditions for letting it continue to prosper. To do so, "constitutional" guarantees are required. Let us not forget that Amnesty International has denounced the increase of cases of censure, "a virus that can change Internet's nature, making it unrecognizable" unless adequate measures are taken. But, in conformity with Internet's nature, the recognition of principles and rights cannot fall from the sky. It must be the result of a process, of a large participation of a plurality of subjects, who have already taken the form of "dynamic coalitions", groups of different kind spontaneously born on the web; they have found in Rio the first opportunity to exchange ideas, work together, have a direct influence on decisions. In the course of such a process, it will be possible to achieve partial results, combine self-regulation codes with other forms of discipline, establish common regulations for particular world areas, as once again shown by the European Union, the world region where the protection of rights is more advanced.

Traditional objections – who is the legislator? which judge will enforce the proclaimed rights? – belong to the past, as they do not take into account that "the avalanche of human rights is sweeping away the last trenches of State sovereignty", as Antonio Cassese quite rightly wrote, commenting the vote on the death penalty. At the very moment the Internet Bill's progress accelerates, a change will have occurred already. A new cultural model, originating from

the awareness that the Internet is a world with no boundaries, will start to be visible. A model that will further the circulation of ideas and could immediately constitute a reference for the"global community of courts", the crowd of judges who, in the most diverse systems, are currently faced with the problems posed by the scientific and technological innovation; it will thus give voice to those fundamental rights that represent today the only power that can be opposed to the force of economic interests.

It is no Utopia, nor an escape forward. Even today, one day after the Rio Conference, many people are already at work and the program for the coming months is clear: inventory of the "dynamic coalitions" and creation of a platform allowing dialogue and cooperation; inventory of the many existing documents, to find which principles and rights could be the bedrock of the Internet Bill of Rights (a list is already in the Italo-Brazilian declaration); drafting of a first blueprint to be discussed on the web. The sowing was good. But the harvest will come if fervent spirits support future actions.

The Nobel Peace Prize and Climate Emergency

Roberto Palea

The award of the Nobel Peace Price to the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and Al Gore – for having drawn international attention to the risks of global warming caused by the CO_2 emissions released in the atmosphere by human beings, and for having launched a warning to act "before climate changes are totally out of control" – was a particularly significant event.

Following this solemn and prestigious international acknowledgement, it becomes more and more difficult to deny that the correlation between the continuous use of fossil fuels and the increase of the Earth temperature is a univocal fact that has been scientifically proved and not a mere theory (one among the many possible) proposed by a group of scientists.

It has allowed to overcome the offensive led by the powerful oil and automotive lobbies, with huge expenditure of financial resources through the media channels worldwide, with the aim of minimizing the risks and inducing doubts, to support the theory of prevailing "natural" causes in climate changes, against which – being inevitable – deep changes in the energy economy and in the lifestyles and development models of the industrialized countries are ineffective.

The theses developed in the respective reports by the IPCC and Al Gore were subsequently spread all over the world and helped realize not only the seriousness of the situation, but also the extremely short time available: failing to implement severe and appropriate measures, the continuous emissions of CO_2 in the atmosphere would produce, within 2015/2020, catastrophic and probably irreversible consequences for every living form, both animal and vegetal.

"The time for doubts is over and the time for action has come" the IPCC chairman, Rajendra Pachauri declared as he expressed his hope for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, held in December 2007 in Bali, to be able to turn the verdict pronounced by the scientists awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize into political decisions. Scientists, experts in political affairs and politicians can and must now focus their attention on what should be done (which measures should be taken at global level) and with what means (political and institutional).

Among the measures to be taken, there is no doubt that the major issue to be solved is the energy issue. Energy is the most significant factor in human growth, as it is the main resource for development, and a crucial factor for food, transport, industry and so on. In 2004, the primary energy production in the world amounted to an average power of 15 million megawatt, corresponding to the production of 15 billion tons of carbon.

On the other hand, the International Energy Agency anticipates a 2-3% increase of the energy requirements per year, taking into account the ever increasing energy savings and improved energy efficiency worldwide. Therefore, the estimates provided by the scientists who, as a consequence of the foreseeable world economic growth and

population increase (expected to reach 9 billion individuals), predict that the energy requirements will have doubled by 2030, appear realistic and cautious.

If we want to achieve, within this date, a drastic reduction of the CO_2 emissions (estimated at 50% or more compared with today's levels) from now until the middle of the century, the planet should not only intervene on the emissions generated by the current production of primary energy, but also fulfil the *whole increase in the requirements*, using "carbon free" sources.

Whether we like it or not, solar energy is the only source of renewable energy that has the capacity to compensate for the huge deficit of "carbon free" energy from now to 2030, since we know that the energy transmitted by the sun to the Earth in one day is sufficient to fulfil the energy requirements of the whole humanity for one year. This is the reason why it is critical to focus basic research and technological research on the solar energy sector, in its various forms and technical processes (photovoltaic, thermodynamic, concentration, etc.), with the purpose of increasing quickly its technological reliability and performance, reducing at the same time the electricity production costs (up to 10 cents of Euro).

It is also necessary to implement and launch on the market the technology that allows to "store" solar energy in the form of hydrogen and to distribute it through intelligent networks, to use hydrogen as an energy carrier when the sources of renewable energy, irregular by nature, are not capable of producing energy, and to move the means of transport.

In any case, we are starting to understand the path we must follow to convert – with inevitably huge efforts, high costs and significant changes – the world energy economy into "carbon free" economy. An even more complex issue is the answer to the question concerning the means, both political and institutional, to be used.

The Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon, merely sustained that the greenhouse effect can be defeated by using 0.12% of the world GIP, thus containing the average increase of the Earth temperature, in the last century, to no more than 2 °C. The IPCC, Al Gore, scientists, experts in political affairs and politicians who are more aware of the issues at stake, call for a political initiative at worldwide level to launch a world plan that should set the maximum global limits for carbon emissions and define obligations for the passage to a sustainable energy economy. Considering that all this is indispensable, many questions are still without answer. I will only mention a few of them.

Will a new international treaty (a second Kyoto) and an international alliance, even including the countries (United States and China) that weigh most on the scale on which the Earth is balancing, be sufficient? Who will guarantee that the international commitments are fulfilled? Is it possible to prescribe, in an international treaty, all the actions to be implemented, each time, to guarantee the achievement of the objectives? How will it be possible to adapt these actions to the progress of technological innovation and to transfer technologies in favor of developing countries? What overall efficiency can be expected when the States will use autonomously the resources on their territory to achieve the common objectives set? Who will guarantee the investments in the developing countries where maximum efforts should be focused, and how? Who will manage the complex reconversion process of the world energy economy and who will evenly distribute its significant cost? What instruments will be used to find the resources and use them?

The experience acquired with the Kyoto Protocol, widely disregarded, at least until now, is not encouraging. In the same way, the ambitious Action Plan against poverty and underdevelopment launched in September 2000 with all due ceremony by all the UN

States, focused on eight main objectives (Millennium Development Goals) to be achieved within 2015, using 0.7% of the GIP of high-income developed countries, was disappointing.

During its recent World Congress in Geneva, the World Federalist Movement has shown the way to obtain efficient results in fighting global environmental crises, confirming in a motion carried unanimously, that: a) the Industrialized Countries, which are the main countries responsible for the greenhouse effect and the environmental degradation of the planet, should take upon themselves, as a priority, the costs for the reduction of carbon emissions in the atmosphere; b) a World Environment Agency with appropriate powers and own means should coordinate and manage the actions required to share the costs equally and to guarantee the commitment of all countries and promote an ecology-oriented conversion of the world economy; c) the necessary financial resources should be supplied to this World Agency through the implementation, in the industrialized countries, of world taxes with environmental purposes, like a world carbon tax for example.

Utopia or blind pursuit? None of these. The question is to give clear inspiration, new perspectives and precise objectives on the initiative of 52 countries – among which Italy and France – that have created a common Association for the establishment, within the UN, of an Agency capable of facing environmental emergencies at global level (World Environment Organization).

The UN General Assembly Against the Death Penalty

Paola Delrio

The General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution on the death penalty moratorium on November 18th, 2007, with 104 votes in favour, 54 against and 29 abstentions. Italy conducted the last months of negotiation in an incisive and effective way, but the history of the capital punishment moratorium began more than a decade ago.

The endeavour started in 1994 when the Italian Government proposed to the UN General Assembly a resolution on the suspension of capital punishment. This first proposal did not pass for 8 votes only; the abstention of 20 countries, now EU members, that skipped off at the last minute, was decisive. It then became clear, beyond the issue of the death penalty, how important the role of religious-cultural implications and factors connected with sovereignty and geopolitics was.

In spite of this first failure, the Italian resolution was approved by the UN Commission for Human Rights in 1997 and since then it was confirmed every year. Starting from 1999, the EU, overcoming internal divisions, has become the sponsor of the resolution, even if not wholeheartedly convinced: in fact, in 1999, after presenting the resolution to the GA, it drew it back at the last minute. There was another European hesitation in 2003 when, though supported by the European Parliament, it was precisely the Italian presidency that decided not to present the resolution to the GA.

In 2006 things started to change, partly because the Italian Government had changed, and partly because of the failure of the negotiations on the Security Council reform re-launched by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the 60th UN anniversary, so Italy and the other European countries had more freedom in diplomatic negotiations. In 2006 the Italian Chamber of Deputies passed a motion inviting the government to present a resolution on the death penalty to the GA, after a previous agreement with the EU, and in 2007 the European Parliament approved a resolution that called on the EU presidency to warrant the presentation of the resolution on the death penalty moratorium. In June 2007, the Italian Foreign Minister presented the text of the moratorium resolution to the EU General Affairs Council which approved it unanimously, warranting its presentation to the UN General Assembly. On November 18th, 2007 the GA approved the moratorium by an absolute majority.

This resolution does not oblige the States to stop capital punishment or abrogate the national laws on the matter, but it invites them to do so. The value is certainly symbolic but not only.

Firstly, from now on, the Governments willing to abolish the death penalty will have one more argument to convince public opinion in favour of it, and civil society movements will have a strong instrument to use in their struggles and denunciations. Secondly, as from now, the death penalty will be entered automatically in the UN General Assembly agenda, so that it will be brought into question every year, together with many other

political issues: the state sovereignty taboo on discussing capital punishment has fallen.

Moreover, not only will the High Commissioner for Human Rights deploy a task force to assist the countries willing to limit or abolish the death penalty, but the Secretary-General will have to report to the GA on its application in the UN member states. The latter will have to provide information in order to draft reports on the application of the moratorium, therefore the state secret normally applied to death penalty (e.g. in China) is going to fall. Moreover, the resolution forbids to apply the death penalty to individuals under 18 years of age at the time of the crime, pregnant women, new mothers, or individuals who have become insane, stating once more that clear evidence and a fair trial are strictly required for death penalty. Finally, the States which still apply the death penalty will have to respect the international standards, including guarantees and respect for the human rights of those who are sentenced to death.

No doubt this success is due to the diplomatic strategy that tried to involve all countries, overcoming religious barriers and possible neo-colonialist prejudices; in that way this common struggle for civilization was prevented from becoming one of the many instruments in favor of a clash of civilizations. By trying to overcome the States' resistance and their claims for non-interference in domestic affairs, and pursuing instead a strategy of highest involvement and mediation, this strategy has confirmed the strength of the supra-national dimension in politics.

The human rights paradigm won by overcoming the barriers of nation-states, barricaded behind the hardest resistance of the state sovereignty issue, wavering only with difficulty even in front of the human dignity statement. On the contrary, it seems that human rights, strongly coupled with a trans-national and multicultural policy addressing everyone are the actual lever which can be used to build a political dialogue on the most important issues on the agenda. This victory also shows the leading role which the EU is able to play in world politics when it finds a common position, uses its soft power and supports the human rights paradigm.

Africa United Against EU Arrogance

Sukant Chandan

When in Geneva, on August 27, 2007, during the 25th Congress of the World Federalist Movement, I made the proposal, as an African federalist, that the WFM take the initiative of a reconciliation conference between Africa and Europe under the aegis of the United Nations, this proposal caused a lot of curiosity and interest, but also puzzlement for all the reasons I mentioned to invite the movement to support that initiative.

The failure of the recent Lisbon Summit of December 2007 between the AU and the EU, and the very hard words used by the African leaders against Europe during that meeting are an indication of the bad climate in the relations between the two regions. As for Mrs Thatcher's son in Equatorial Guinea, the recent humanitarian problem of the French NGO L'Arche de Zoé and the attempt to remove 103 Chadian children passed off as orphans of the Darfour, aroused in all Africa a political and sociological uproar and the desire of popular vengeance for a humiliating past never closed in the minds of the Africans.

After 500 years of painful relations between Africa and Europe, without any awareness that the wounds are healed in Africa, we are entering a period of very tumultuous relations. The hard reaction in Africa against Sarkozy's speech in Dakar and the unconditional support to Mugabe in all Africa, and against Great Britain at the Lisbon Summit, are the revealing signs of the beginning of a new era of tension between the two continents, that are on a route leading to divorce. The article below, written by an African intellectual, has already massively circulated in the magazines and media in Africa with a huge popular success, just for the virulence of the contention and the frontal contraposition

against the former colonial power.

The more the rate of literacy increases in Africa, the more it overtly criticizes the past pro-slavery and colonial Europe, and the more the supposed African doves (Wade, Konaré) change into hawks. In Europe, the more the economic crisis becomes evident, due to a badly-mastered globalization, the more the ideas of the extreme right advance, with the foreigner, namely Africa and the Africans, as the scapegoat. Has not the moment come for us Federalists of all sides to think about the necessity of a reconciliation conference between the two continents, to avoid a worse future between the two belligerents? Or is it better to pretend that everything goes well, putting our heads in the sand to avoid seeing what is coming? (Jean-Paul Pougala)

The recent summit between African heads of states and the EU has shown that Europe has failed to move beyond its colonial-era past-times of economic and political bullying. The African delegates gave Europe an unmistakable cold shoulder on the two big issues of the conference: trade, especially the European proposed Economic Partnership Agreements, and European political interference in African affairs, centred on British arrogance towards Zimbabwe.

This African-EU Summit in Lisbon was possibly Portugal's most important international meeting in its history. The intention of the summit was to discuss peace and security, human rights, international trade and climatic change. 40 presidents (5 from Europe and 35 from Africa) and 27 prime ministers (15 from Europe and 12 from Africa) took part in a summit which

summed up the state of African-European relations today.

To give some background to the events in Lisbon, it is worth taking a short look at the history of these summits. The first African-EU Summit took place in Cairo in 2000 on the initiative of Egypt's President Mubarak and the then Organisation of African Unity's president, Algeria's President Bouteflika. Ever since then Britain has been unable to get over itself on the issue of Zimbabwe.

From the first summit, Blair refused to attend in protest at Mugabe's presence. Already back in 2000, Britain's puerile games on the issue of Mugabe was given a firm rebuttal by Africans when they insisted that Britain had no right to dictate who should or should not attend the summit. There should have been a second summit in 2003 but it failed to materialise and was postponed indefinitely after the imposition of illegal sanctions on Zimbabwe by the EU and due to Britain's continued objection to the attendance of Mugabe. So the Labour Government's attitude towards Zimbabwe and the rejection of it has been an on-going issue in European-African relations ever since.

The British mainstream press likes to present the problems at the summit as the fault of the Africans, rather than the reality which is, it is the behaviour of former imperialists who engaged in fruitless antics, resulting in them looking the fool on the international stage.

Countries such as Britain and Germany seem to put more importance on dictating to Africa how it should deal with its internal affairs than grappling with the critical issues of African development and progress. Britain has turned what is essentially a bilateral political rift between itself and Zimbabwe into an international issue in the face of opposition by Africa.

Even the head of the Commonwealth, Mr Don McKinnon, while being a critic of the Zimbabwean Government, agreed that Mugabe must be allowed to attend. José Manuel Barroso, head of the EU Commission, expressed the Portuguese position which has consistently argued that the prospective rewards of closer ties between Africa and the EU are more important than the problems between Britain and Zimbabwe. Barroso made the headlines when he scolded the British apropos their pre-conditions: "If you are an international leader then you are going to have to be prepared to meet some people your mother would not like you to meet. That is what we have to do from time to time." Portugal's position has been appreciated by Africa. The summit was in itself in question if it weren't for Portugal's insistence that it should go ahead.

The Africans at the summit, the African Union, the Southern African Development Countries, and South Africa's President Mbeki held firm to the view that Zimbabwe must be represented by Mugabe despite the EU travel ban on him. Without Mugabe in attendance the whole of Africa would boycott the summit.

This stand of African unity in the face of what Mugabe rightly calls European 'arrogance' is a sign that Africa cannot be pushed around like it has been for centuries by countries from which they have gained their independence in the last five decades.

As an indication of the strength of feeling on the issue, Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni told Brown last month "Mugabe is a revolutionary who fought to emancipate his people. When you are dealing with a revolutionary, you listen to his points, rather than give him orders."

Indeed Mugabe has a valid point when he reportedly said at the summit that it was Africans who taught the British about democracy when they won their fight for democracy against British-backed Apartheid colonial-settler states.

Whatever one's view of Mugabe and the internal

situation in Zimbabwe, Mugabe's stance and his defence by African leaders resulting in a row of British red faces, could not but be an inspiration to those who believe in the Pan-African strength of the continent, in its struggle for independence and development.

European pressure on Zimbabwe's Zanu-PF government is unlikely to gain any popularity with African governments as the controversy focuses on the emotive issue of land distribution to the indigenous peoples, a land that was forcibly taken by European colonial settlers.

There may be problems in the details of the land distribution process in Zimbabwe, but the main problems are at root ones that can be traced back to the failure of the British to honour their commitments. This being the case, Africans are not going to back down from defending a fellow African state that is the main target for annihilation by Europe.

When the same interests who are supporting a regime change in Zimbabwe are behind all kinds of intrigue to grab more wealth from the land and people of Africa, such as the plans for a coup against Equatorial-Guinea led by Mark Thatcher in 2004, it somewhat exposes the real meaning behind European clamours about 'human rights' & 'democracy'. Thatcher's coup plans are merely the very tip of the iceberg. It is in this context that a closing of ranks by Africans at the summit can be understood.

When Africans show an effective united front against neo-colonialist behaviour, there will always be a few Africans who, conveniently for the British, pop up to assure Western white society that these African upstarts are just being wholly irrational.

While the British media occasionally and reluctantly admitted that all the Africans are behind Mugabe, the Archbishop of York John Sentamu attempted what must have been seen as a pathetic attempt to cover up the big issues at the summit by removing and cutting up his dog collar in protest at Mugabe on Andrew Marr's politics program on BBC 1.

The debates around economic relations between the two continents also did little to create the impression that Europe is moving on from its colonial past. Europe wants to replace old trade agreements with EU-proposed Economic Partnership Agreements that have been widely criticised by African states and anti-poverty groups. Certain trade privileges exist between European countries and their former colonies but have been declared illegal by the WTO, which is demanding that they be scrapped.

These new EPAs would open up African markets to European competition which will have the effect of further devastating African economies. African Union Commission president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, denounced the EPAs and stated: "No one will make us believe we don't have the right to protect our economic fabric. It is time to bury definitively the colonial past. We can no longer be merely exporters of raw materials. We can no longer accept being solely an import market for finished products", and if anyone was in any doubt about African attitudes to the EPAs, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade told reporters: "It's clear that Africa rejects the EPAs."

There was no agreement on this issue, however this did not stop Barroso from saying that the EU would go ahead with the imposition of tariffs on all but the poorest countries if they do not meet the deadline for accepting the EPAs. So much for Europe exorcising it's colonial past.

The BBC News website too has conceded that it is China which is one of the primary reasons for Africa's new found confidence, which is 'cause for worry in Europe'. The twin causes for worry in Europe being both an influential China and an increasingly assertive Africa.

Since China became independent and socialist

in 1949, it has enjoyed especially close relations with Africa. Many newly liberated African states joined Chinese Premier Chou En Lai at the historic Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 1955, which initiated the Non-Aligned Movement, and where Africans demanded that China be a member of the UN Security Council.

This relationship of solidarity saw China directly assisting African states in their liberation struggles and also lending all manner of support in helping the development of the newly liberated African nations, as Chinese Premier Hu Jintao stated at the historic Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in Beijing November 2006: "China did what she needed to do to help ensure that Africa freed herself from the yoke of colonialism and apartheid." Ever since 1949 Chinese strategies of development and foreign policy have been controversial across the political spectrum in Europe. Apart from winning UN awards for poverty alleviation in lifting over 200 million people out of abject poverty in the last two decades, China's economic rise has also enabled poor countries to develop political and economic strategies that many would not have perceived possible during the years of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s.

There is another rather important advantage of favouring relations with China in comparison to the West: China will not criminalise you, starve your country with sanctions and possibly blitz and occupy your country, whereas the West might.

China's strict policy of non-interference and what it terms 'win-win' relations with other countries is winning it ever more friends. The internal and external effect of China's development is possibly the most important political question in the world today. It is a crucial issue for those who are confronting the challenges posed by aggressive Western unilateralism and hegemony and those of developing a multi-polar and peaceful world.

As in Latin America, Africa's relation with China is enabling it to develop a new-found confidence in lifting itself up in the world, and as China rises ever further it allows Africa to free itself from the negative relationship with its former colonial masters. In comparison to the West, China has an incomparably better deal to offer Africa, leading President Wade to comment at the summit that "it is very clear that Europe is close to losing the battle of competition in Africa." Therefore Africa is able to put into effect the non-aligned method of getting the best deal it can between bigger powers, although there is no indication that Europe is about to back-off from its unpopular policies towards Africa, although some observers like the BBC's Mark Doyle know that Europe has to address its problematic relationship with Africa, especially in the face of China's growing prestige: "African trade with China is forcing Europe to take Africa more seriously and not just as a collection of former colonial possessions."

It is argued from left to right-wing circles in the West that China is merely a new neo-colonial power replacing the old ones in Africa. This is an issue that has been rigorously raised in the Western mainstream press. This media offensive is unsurprisingly having some success in affecting the attitudes of the political classes in the West, but the West is sadly mistaken if this argument is going to turn Africans against China in appealing to their anti-imperialist sentiments. China's involvement in Africa is warmly and broadly welcomed. Nevertheless, the Chinese are keen to argue their case in response to what they see as hypocritical slurs. It was on this subject that Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai said about China's share of total oil exports in China the previous year of 9% compared to 36% for Europe and 33% for the US. The minister asked: "If an 8.7% share could be suspected as an act of plundering resources, then what about 36% and 33%?" In the chorus of attacks on China as a neo-colonial power, there are very few African voices to be heard,

it is the West, which is so vocal about losing its opportunities in Africa.

The African states at the summit showed great strength in standing up to Europe, with the latter so far unable to move away from its intransigent positions which are pushing the Africans away from the West in an eastwardly direction towards China.

The way Britain and Germany treated Mugabe, and the unanimous defence of (President) Mugabe by the Africans shows that Africans are in no mood to shift one inch from their positions of unity and respecting their sovereignty in African affairs. The consensus amongst Africa is that if there are any problems in any African state, it requires an African solution.

The Mugabe issue should be seen in connection with the disagreements over the EPAs, as both issues represent African demands for non-interference in their affairs so they can find their own ways of resolving and progressing from the problems which have been sown by colonialism in Africa. Maybe not in this writer's lifetime, but perhaps a time will come when European countries can disengage from their colonial past and find new ways in developing a mutually respectful relationship with Africa.

Pan-African Parliament Calls for a UN Parliamentary Assembly

On 24 October 2007 the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) convening in Midrand, South Africa, unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a Parliamentary Assembly at the UN. "The UN is an important advocate for democracy in the world. […]. To maintain its credibility it has to become more democratic. A UN Parliamentary Assembly would be a means to achieve this", Mokshanand Dowarkasing, a legislator from Mauritius who introduced the motion, commented.

"A growing number of decisions affecting the African citizens are taken beyond the borders of their nation state and even of Africa itself. In times of increasing globalization these decisions cannot be left to government diplomats alone. The voice of the citizens has to be heard in the halls of the United Nations", said Kante El Hadj Diao, Chairman of the PAP's Committee on Co-operation and International Relations.

"We recommend to the governments of the African Union to take the initiative in the UN and other diplomatic fora to establish a UN Parliamentary Assembly. Since the body could be created by a vote of the UN General Assembly such support would be instrumental to build strong political momentum", Mr. Dowarkasing added.

The resolution envisages a gradual approach, with the body being established, initially, with consultative functions only and composed of national parliamentarians. However, according to the motion, the UNPA "eventually should have participation and oversight rights" and "should be directly elected".

Observers from abroad have hailed the decision. "The resolution paves the way for a joint initiative of the Pan-African and the European Parliament", Jo Leinen, President of the European Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee, noted.

Middle East Nuclear-weapon-free Zone: A Serious Start?

René Wadlow

Rarely, if ever, has a single intelligence report so completely and suddenly altered a foreign policy debate as the US National Intelligence Estimate partly released on 4 December 2007. The Estimate is a synthesis of the findings of 16 US intelligence agencies, of which the CIA is the best known. The Estimate concludes that there has been no on-going nuclear weapons program in Iran since the fall of 2003 – two years prior to the election as President of Muhmoud Ahmadinejad.

As the Director General of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei noted, the Estimate "should help to defuse the current crisis" in which there was talk of a US or an Israeli attack on nuclear facilities in Iran. By reducing the agitation around Iran's nuclear program, it helps to see Iran in a calmer light, though the internal politics and foreign outreach remain complex. Therefore, earlier calls of Mohamed ElBaradei need to be acted upon.

Mohamed ElBaradei had called on 15 April 2007, following talks in Jordan with King Abdullah II, on Iran and Israel in particular to enter into serious negotiations to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East – a zone in which both Israel and Iran would be members. Jordan, caught between Iraq and growing tensions between Israel and Palestine, has been trying to play a more active role of regional peacemaker.

ElBaradei said "This is the last chance to build security in the Middle East based on trust and cooperation and not the possession of nuclear weapons." He stressed that a peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors "must be reached in parallel with a security agreement in the region based on ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction."

The hazards of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East have existed since Israel developed its "bomb in the basement" and was widely discussed in the early 1980s after Israeli forces destroyed the French-built nuclear reactor near Baghdad in June 1981[1]. Among the community of international relations scholars and strategic theorists, nuclear proliferation has always had its ardent supporters who believe that security is increased by enlarging the number of states with credible deterrence. This view of nuclear proliferation is often referred to as the "porcupine theory" because it suggests that a nuclear weapon state can walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to its neighbors, too prickly for predators to swallow.

It was the French Air Force General Pierre Gallois who was the most eloquent champion of the porcupine approach writing: "If every nuclear power held weapons truly invulnerable to the blows of the other, the resort to force by one to the detriment of the other would be impossible." However, the Middle East is filled not with porcupines but with men who may not be immune to irrationality. Irrationality at national leadership levels is known in world politics, and risk-taking even by rational leaders can get out of control. Thus, with the current impossibility of having a nuclear-weapon-free world, the concept

of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones has spread.

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been an important concept in disarmament and regional conflict reduction efforts. A nuclear-weapon-free zone was first suggested by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1957 – just a year after the crushing of the uprising in Hungary. The crushing of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet troops and the unrest among Polish workers at the same time showed that the East-West equilibrium in Central Europe was unstable with both the Soviet Union and the USA in possession of nuclear weapons, and perhaps a willingness to use them if the political situation became radically unstable.

The Rapacki Plan, as it became known, called for the denuclearization of East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Plan went through several variants which included its extension to cover the reduction of armed forces and armaments, and as a preliminary step, a freeze on nuclear weapons in the area. The Rapacki Plan was opposed by the NATO powers, in part because it recognized the legitimacy of the East German state. It was not until 1970 and the start of what became the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that serious negotiations on troop levels and weapons in Europe began. While the Rapacki Plan never led to negotiations on nuclear-weapon policies in Europe, it had the merit of re-starting East-West discussions which were then at a dead point.

The first nuclear-weapon-free zone to be negotiated – the Treaty of Tlatelolco – was a direct aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. It is hard to know how close to a nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR the Cuban missile crisis was. It was close enough so that Latin American leaders were

moved to action. While Latin America was not an area in which military confrontation was as stark as in Europe, the Cuban missile crisis was a warning that you did not need to have standing armies facing each other for there to be danger.

Mexico under the leadership of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia-Robles at the UN began immediately to call for a denuclearization of Latin America. There were a series of conferences, and in February 1967 the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico. For a major arms control treaty, the Tlateloco Treaty was negotiated in a short time, due partly to the fear inspired by the Cuban missile crisis but especially to the energy and persistence of Garcia-Robles and the expert advice of William Epstein, the then UN's Director of Disarmament Affairs. The Treaty established a permanent and effective system of control which contains a number of novel and pioneering elements as well as a body to supervise the Treaty.

On 8 September 2006, the five states of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan – signed the treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The treaty aims at reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear-armed terrorism. The treaty bans the production, acquisition, deployment of nuclear weapons and their components as well as nuclear explosives. Importantly, the treaty bans the hosting or transport of nuclear weapons as both Russia and the USA have established military airbases in Central Asia where nuclear weapons could have been placed in times of crisis in Asia.

The treaty was signed at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan which was the main testing site for Soviet nuclear tests. Between 1949 and 1989, some 500 nuclear tests took place at Semipalatinsk, leaving a heritage of radioactivity and health problems. A non-governmental organization "Nevada-

Semipalatinsk" was formed in the 1980s by persons in the USA and the USSR who had lived in the nuclear-weapon test areas. Its aim was to work to abolish nuclear weapons and to push for compensation for the persons suffering from the medical consequences of the tests. Thus, Rusten Tursunbaev, the vice President of "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" could say: "The signing of the agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is a remarkable, unbelievable moment and event – not just for Central Asia, but for the whole world."

It is an unfortunate aspect of world politics that constructive, institution-building action is usually undertaken only because of a crisis. The growing pressure building in the Middle East could lead to concerted leadership for a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. The IAEA has the technical knowledge for putting such a zone in place[2]. Now there needs to be leadership from within the Middle East states as well as broader international encouragement. ElBaradei's appeal may be the sign of a serious start.

[1] see Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982; Louis Rene Beres (ed.), *Security or Armageddon*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1985; Roger Pajak, *Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East*, Washington, DC, The National Defense University, 1982
[2] see Michael Hamel-Green, *Regional Initiatives on Nuclear-and WMD-Free Zones*, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005

ASEAN 'People's Charter' to Advance Civil Society

In November, Southeast Asian civil society leaders met at the Third ASEAN and Civil Society Conference in Singapore. There, representatives from non-governmental organizations, trade unions, grassroot organizations and the academic community called for the launching of an ASEAN People's Charter.

The campaign for the People's Charter is expected to be launched if the actual ASEAN Charter, which is to be agreed and signed by ASEAN Heads of States, fails to address the aspirations of civil society. This important initiative really shows how people feel uneasy about allowing a handful of policy-makers to decide their fate.

The People's Charter should illustrate the ideal charter people have in mind to the High Level Task Force, currently responsible for the finalization of the draft of the ASEAN Charter. Actually, local, national, and regional civil society groups are concerned about the final outcome of the ASEAN Charter, whose failure would represent a significant drawback for the people of Southeast Asia. The adoption of the ASEAN Charter should in fact provide a sound foundation for the implementation of regional governance in the future and, as a consequence, an effective solution to complex problems in the Southeast Asian region, such as undemocratic change of government or gross and systematic violations of human rights.

Representatives of ASEAN civil society groups also expressed their concern regarding the space provided by ASEAN and its member governments on the making of the ASEAN Charter. For this reason, they called for an assurance from ASEAN leaders for a substantive participation from people at the national and regional levels in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter. This would also include a referendum at the final phase of the charter process (*v.p.*).

Kosovo: After Serbia's Refusal, a Strong European Initiative is Needed!

Alfonso Sabatino

The resolution of December 26, 2007, passed by the Serbian Parliament, represents the last attempt made by Belgrade to block the road to Kosovo independence. On December 19, 2007, the UN Security Council actually registered the failure of the international negotiations on the future of the province tried by the Group of Three (USA, Russia and the EU). With this resolution, Belgrade has refused any possible swap between the loss of the province harbouring an Albanian majority and a fast process for its own adhesion to the European Union (EU) and NATO. Furthermore, the document commits the government not to sign any international treaty, including the Stabilization and Association Agreement for the accession to the EU, if they do not strictly abide "to the sovereignty and integrity of Serbia". With reference to the NATO, Belgrade denounces the pro-Kosovo position of the organization and stresses its determination for a military intervention in favour of the Serbian minority of the province, with the approval of international institutions, if the UN mission could not do it. Lastly, the Parliament is against the possible EU mission[1] that could replace the present UN mission (UNMIK) established in 1999, because it could endanger Serbia's territorial integrity and constitutional order. At this point, we can only add that Belgrade is ready to give a very large autonomy to the province, instead of independence, on the basis of the new liberal Constitution enforced in January 2007.

On the other hand, the same rigid positions are also taken by Kosovo's authorities. The last election of November 17, 2007, saw the victory of Hagjim Thaci of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, former leader of the extremist UCK, the movement that militarily reacted in 1999 to Milosevic's repression of separatism. The previous Premier was Agim Çeku[2] of the Democratic League of Kosovo, the political party founded by Ibrahim Rugova, who died in January 2006. Rugova has led the pro-independence movement of the Albanian Kosovars using democratic and peaceful means since 1989, after the abolition of the province's autonomous status by Milosevic. The present government in Pristina is sure that it can declare independence from Belgrade, just as Slovenia and Croatia did in the nineties, because of the Comprehensive Proposal submitted by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, Martti Ahtisaari. The independence is supported by the USA, that has built the very large military base of Bond Steel in the province. It should be added that the international protectorate assured by UNMIK has only worsened the problems in the province, still formally under Serbian sovereignty according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 approved in 1999 after the end of NATO military operations. Notwithstanding the large international aid, the province lives in limbo, the economy is stagnating, corruption and illegal activities are spreading, unemployment has reached 60% for the Albanian and 80% for the Serbian Kosovars. The two communities have hard contacts and are supervised by KFOR (Kosovo Force), the NATO mission that also protects the numerous Orthodox monasteries scattered in a territory inhabited by a majority of Muslim Albanians. During both the 1999 war and the

revolt of 2004, Kosovo extremists attacked Serbian houses and monasteries and that heightens the concerns of Belgrade and the international community over independence. In fact, many Kosovars want to get rid of the inefficient international protectorate, they do not like to be ruled by Belgrade due to past limitations to their autonomy and hope to get sizeable foreign investments and rapid gains in economic growth, surely through EU membership too.

Belgrade is directly supported by Beijing and Moscow in its opposition to the international recognition of Pristina's independence. Beijing and Moscow both have a veto power in the UN Security Council. The EU, as such, has no definite position. Within the EU Council of Ministers, the perspective of Kosovo independence, compensated by a fast track for Serbia's adhesion to the EU, finds the opposition of Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, countries that fear for domestic reasons the political destabilization that could follow the recognition of Kosovo's right to secession. And it is precisely the risks in the Balkans (starting from Bosnia) and in other world regions, resulting from the recognition of this right, that Belgrade is using as a lever to justify its position. This position, furthermore, does not lack good bases from the viewpoint of international law and domestic political reasons. For the international law, Serbia's position is correct, as the UN Statute, which Resolution 1244 refers to, does not take into consideration the right to secession and asserts that State boundaries are intangible. On the domestic political side, the Serbian resolution of December 26th is the result of the agreement reached by Serbia's Democratic Party (DSS) of Premier Vojislav Kostunica and the pro-European Democratic Party of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadic. In sight of the presidential elections of January 2008, both parties aim at preventing the possible victory of the ultra-nationalist leader Tomislav Nikolic and get the confirmation

of the moderate Tadic. However, there is another reason that pushes Belgrade to reject the secession of Kosovo. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the inter-ethnic wars of the nineties have filled Serbia with refugees from other regions and this has spread frustration and nationalism among Serbian citizens, who have always considered themselves as the leading force of Yugoslavian identity. Indeed, this was precisely the point that fuelled Milosevic's ruinous nationalism.

Social and ideological unrest should not be undervalued today in the political situation of Serbia in search of new equilibriums. Anyway, considerations on international law and domestic constraints can be overcome, but a very strong European initiative is needed. Lacking such an initiative, we could have a further worsening of the clash between Pristina and Belgrade. This is largely a consequence of the wrong political choices made by the EU and the international community with respect to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia since the first moment, that of Slovenia's secession. Today, the EU risks to fall into the trap of the recognition of yet another ethnic division. The EU has not the political courage to refer to its own constituent values, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, for implementing a policy of reconciliation and building a common European future for the population that faced the drama of the Yugoslavian dissolution and are still paying for those events. In fact, it is surely a great achievement for Slovenia to be the first among the new EU members of 2004 to be awarded the EU presidency, to circulate the Euro since January 2007 and to enter the Schengen area in December 2007. We shall wonder whether this could have been the destiny of all Yugoslavia, swept away by the dissolution drama. In 1991, Austria, Germany and the Vatican supported the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, and the remaining European countries had no courage to offer the EU membership to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Such a move would

have certainly strengthened the democratic reformists living in Belgrade, Ljubljana, Zagreb, as well as in Sarajevo and Skopje, in their commitment to domestic constitutional and economic reforms, and could have been validated by a referendum on keeping their federal unity, certainly meeting the consensus of the majority of voters. This could have averted eight years of wars, massacres, destruction and violence; this could have saved 250,000 victims and the radicalization of hate and inter-ethnic conflicts. The EU that emerged from the Schuman Declaration, that promoted the reconciliation of the European peoples and started the process of political unification, has a stain on its conscience that must be removed.

Today, Europe risks to reopen the Balkan wounds because, after the independence of Kosovo, the possibility emerges that the Serb-Croatian-Bosnian Federation can be destabilized by a possible secession of the *Republika Srpska*, without considering its fall-out in the former Republic of Macedonia, that also hosts an Albanian minority. The Europeans cannot push Belgrade towards nationalistic extremism and rekindle ethnic confrontation, nor can Kosovo become a reason for a USA-Russia confrontation. Solutions are needed, therefore, for furthering the reconciliation between the peoples of former Yugoslavia, for protecting the rights of the minorities and for lessening the importance of national sovereignty, as already happened with the EU member States through the introduction of the European citizenship and the Euro, the Schengen agreements and the direct election of the European Parliament. The EU member States share their sovereignty in these and other sectors. This is the road to peace. The Europeans should offer to Serbs, Kosovars, Albanians, Macedonians, Croatians and Montenegrins a rapid perspective for EU membership. This road has been indicated in the 2005 Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (the Amato Report)[3]. The paper realistically takes note of Kosovo's divorce from Serbia but, differently

from the Ahtisaari Proposal, introduces the perspective for independence of the province in the framework of a "Member-State Building Strategy" aimed at ensuring democracy, rule of law, human rights guarantees and economic growth to every people in a framework of shared European sovereignty. It is necessary that the Amato Report be translated in a concrete project opening, in a credible way, the European perspective to Kosovars, Serbs and other peoples, rebuilding the economic, social, cultural relationships amongst former Yugoslavian peoples and extending them to Albania. At this point it should be reminded that the resolution on the Western Balkans, approved by the Federal Committee of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) on April 22, 2007, in Munich (Germany), is critical of the Ahtisaari Proposal on Kosovo independence, condemns the ethnic divisions and proposes recovery strategies of the Balkan inter-relationships by means of a strong and clear regional initiative, as did the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for the European process. The project to establish an Authority for Infrastructures in the Balkans, open to every Balkan State and under the control of the European institutions, proposed in the federalist resolution, takes as a model the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority instituted by President Roosevelt in the thirties to introduce cooperation in territorial recovery and power production among eight North-American States, periodically damaged by the irregular flows of the Tennessee river. The federalist project, aimed at filling in a short time the European void in the area, reinforces the Strategy proposed by the Amato Report for the Western Balkans. It is conceived so as to let the local ruling classes and peoples cooperate in building a modern and safe economy and a pluralistic, multicultural and cooperative society, lined up to meet the challenges of globalization. To let the Balkans be a bridge towards Turkey and the Middle East, to close the black hole that Europe itself created in the Balkans, that contributed to the dissolution of

former Yugoslavia. The present Presidency of the EU, presided over by Slovenia, has the duty to propose and adopt a strong initiative to make it easier for the still-excluded Balkan people to enter into Europe. The European Parliament has the duty to debate the new crisis emerging in the Balkans and call on the European Council to present a "fast track" proposal for assuring the European membership to Western Balkans countries.

[1] See the Conclusions of the European Council of December 14th, 2007; *http://www.consilium.europa.eu/kosovo*
[2] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agim_%C3%87eku
[3] See http://www.balkan-commission.org
[4] See http://www.federaleurope.org

German Federalism
after the Constitutional Reform

Marc-Oliver Pahl

In June 2006, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat passed the most comprehensive package of amendments to the "*Grundgesetz*", the German post-war Constitution. This reform package was called "*Föderalismusreform*". In nearly 60 years, since the *Grundgesetz* came into force, a steady strengthening of the legislative, executive and budgetary powers of the federal level was balanced by an ever stronger role for the Bundesrat. The academic world, starting with Fritz Scharpf, baptized this development "joint-decision trap" ("*Politikverpflechtungsfalle*"). The Bundesrat was originally intended to be the voice of the *Länder* at federal level, but in the last decades it was regularly used by the Bundestag opposition parties, which often had a majority in the Bundesrat, to act as a second chamber of the Federal government, because its approval was necessary for around 60% of the federal laws. For the German citizens it was therefore often unclear which political forces were responsible for the major political decisions. Therefore the main goal of the constitutional reform was a clearer distribution of competences and responsibilities between the Federal level and the *Länder* level.

The cornerstone of the reform was a reduction of the "co-decision" powers of the Bundesrat, the strengthening of the Federal legislation in some fields, like environmental protection, and the correspondent introduction of a right for the *Länder* to derogate from some Federal legislation, especially in the field of procedural provisions and environmental legislation. Furthermore, Federal powers in the field of schools and universities and on the remuneration of the *Länder's* civil servants have been strictly limited, and some Federal/*Länder* co-financing schemes, primarily in the field of schools and universities, have been reduced.

Also, some provisions on the relationship between Germany and the European Union have been amended: the rights of the *Länder* to represent Germany in the Council of Ministers have been strengthened for school, cultural and media issues, but weakened for all other matters. For the first time it is laid down in German law that the *Länder* have to pay the penalties fixed by the Commission and the Court of Justice for any breach of EU law (Art 228 EC Treaty = Art 160 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) in so far as the constitutional responsibility to transpose or implement the relevant EU law lies with the *Länder*.

It is too early to judge whether the constitutional reform reached its goals. Currently the Bundestag and the Bundesrat interact quite smoothly, as the political parties of the "grand coalition" in the Bundestag also have a strong Bundesrat majority. But in case of a return of diverging majorities in the future, the risk of a certain blockade of the Bundestag by the Bundesrat might re-appear, as the "co-decision" provisions have been amended but not abolished. Now it is less a question of how the Federal law is executed but more the financial consequence of a Federal law that decides whether the Bundesrat approval is necessary. Presumably 40-50% of Federal laws will be co-decided by the Bundesrat in the future.

So far the instrument of derogating *Länder*

legislation has not been widely used; the derogation from the Federal environmental legislation will only be allowed after 2010 (possibly when a new Federal Environmental Code ("*Umweltgesetzbuch*") bringing together the major pieces of the Federal environmental legislation will be passed).

Only very few of the financial provisions of the Constitution have been amended by the "*Föderalismusreform*". The most important rules for dividing public revenues and public expenses, e.g. the rules for distributing tax legislation and tax resources between the Federal level and the *Länder*, the mechanism for balancing the *Länder*'s finances ("*Länderfinanzausgleich*") and the specific schemes for the eastern *Länder* ("*Solidarpakt*") are currently discussed in a new round of talks, the so-called "*Föderalismusreform* II". It is not clear whether these discussions will come to any results.

From a European point of view, it was interesting to see the parallels but also the contradictions in the debates on the creation of a European Constitution (or eventually the reform of the EU treaties) and the reform of the German Constitution. Both processes aimed at making the responsibilities of the different layers of public power more transparent or at avoiding the "joint-decision trap". A new delimitation of competences was at the heart of both reforms. But the discussion on the roles of the Council of Ministers (and respectively the European Parliament) was very different from the discussion on the relationship between Bundestag and Bundesrat. And, in contradiction with the German debate on limiting the co-financing between the Federal level and the *Länder*, there is widespread

discussion at European level on extending co-financing between the EU and the member states (and quite often also the regions, like the German *Länder*, are involved in co-financing, like with the structural funds).

Whether the constitutional reform has enhanced Germany's capacity to transpose and implement the EU law is still open. On the one hand, the new rules on who has to pay penalties for breaches of the EU law might motivate the *Länder* to do more for a correct transposition and implementation. The strengthened competence of the Federal level in the field of environmental protection might make the transposition of EU environmental directives easier, which constitute the basis of around 80% of the German environmental legislation. On the other hand, the derogating legislation of the *Länder* in many fields of environmental legislation might lead to a competition over which *Land* has the best investment conditions, meaning the lowest environmental standards ("race to the bottom"). This might also end up in breaches of the EU law and not only one breach for the whole of Germany, but perhaps 16 different breaches in 16 *Länder*. We will see what happens after 2010 …

The last two considerations show that the relations between the constitutional systems of the European States and the EU become more and more intense ("Constitutional Compound", after Ingolf Pernice). Therefore it would be very fruitful to strengthen the exchanges amongst the politicians and constitutional lawyers at a member state level and their counterparts at European level. Talking to each other means learning from each other and thus improving together the functioning of the European Constitutional Compound.

Problems of Democratization

George Modelski*

Democratization is one of the central phenomena of our times. Let us bring together, with the help of an attractive image, some basic facts about it, viewing it as the process whereby democratic practices have been spreading world-wide for a considerable time now. We set out to accomplish this task with the help of the image displayed on page 39 that succinctly summarizes the information about the condition and the progress of democratization at various points in time in the past century and a half.

By condition we mean to indicate the relative importance of democracies in the world picture. With progress we intend to show this to be a dynamic picture that opens out a window to the future. The image "World Democratization" is simple but it displays this crucial information in two ways. First, it shows seventeen discrete data points that depict, at ten year intervals, the proportion of the world's peoples that at that point in time lived in democracies. The first of these data points refers to 1840, and indicates that in that year some 3.9 per cent of the world population lived in democratic countries, and more specifically, in the United States, and the United Kingdom, the only two that could thus be described. By the year 2000, the last of the data points, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, that figure had risen to 57.1 per cent, and the number of democracies to 87.

The second feature of our table is more analytical, and traces the best part of an S-shaped curve that not only fits our 'hard' data quite accurately but also extends well into the future, to the 22nd century. We might call this the learning curve of world democratization.

Here we have two sets of basic information; so what to make of it? Let us highlight four of its features: democratization is a powerful process; it is world-wide, it has a long reach in time, and it might be seen as a learning experience. We then ask: what are the implications of these arguments?

A powerful trend
A glance at the seventeen actual data points confirms, first of all, that these are not scattered or random bits of information but rather a series or sequence pointing to the existence of a trend, and not just any trend but one that is persistent and powerful. Viewed over a time span of 160 years, the trend shows both ups and downs, and registers some setbacks (including a notable one centered on the 1930s, and World War II), but overall it moves clearly, and strongly, upward. In absolute numbers, the expansive force of democracy is simply staggering, from some 40-plus million people in mid-19th century, to close to 3.5 billion at the turn to the 21st. A trend of such power is not easily reversed, or aborted.

A world-wide trend
In our chart, democracy takes off as a transatlantic project, and for a long while, appears, in the main, as a 'Western' phenomenon. But over time, and since the mid-20th century, its spread has been to most parts of the world, and (as shown) it now engages more than half of the world's population. It has diffused via a demonstration effect because, by and large, democracies work better, know better how to cooperate, win wars but do not engage in mass killings, fight hunger more effectively, and, on the whole, are more productive and more prosperous. That makes

democratization a likely universal process spreading by imitation.

A long-term trend
Our poster 'World Democratization' covers more than two centuries, making it plain that while undoubtedly powerful, this is a process whose progress is measured, deliberate, even slow, and not really to be hurried. It took over a century for democracy to move from a 'market share' of under ten per cent, to a majority position (in which India plays a large role) a few years ago. We suppose that for the bulk of the world system to be 'saturated' with democratic practices it will take many decades, and the path taken by China will be a key factor.

A learning process
Roughly connecting the dots in our chart is a line in the generic form of a learning curve. That curve marks not just the path of world-wide democracy over the past century and a half but also projects that path forward one century into the future, on the assumption that what we are observing is a learning process: humans settling into a cooperative mode; humans learning to live with each other. That strongly suggests that the trend we have charted is not just a summary of events past but a process of some regularity that (jointly with others) is likely evolutionary.

Democracy has for some time been a subject of contention between foreign policy Idealists and Realists. Idealists, advocating the spreading of democracy, speak sometimes in grandiose terms of principle, even morality, point to the record of successful societies and claim to represent the wave of the future. Realists warily eye the problems of the day, discount the future and counsel prudence. Our presentation suggests that both sides score in that argument and that both are in effect right.

Implications
What are the implications, for the next decade or two, of these basic facts about democratization? First, if democratization is indeed such a

powerful process then it might be expected to proceed, we might say, under its own steam or, as it might be put more technically, as a form of self-organization. That is, in the ordinary course of world events, humankind seems on track, gradually, albeit slowly, to build a growing domain of democracy, and that is why what is called for, above all else, is patience.

There is no "duty to export democracy" nor is there any requirement for extraordinary measures such as costly military interventions, or risky preventive wars, to foster it. Arguably, such measures are likely to prove counter-productive rather than facilitative. Indeed, as we look at the chart once again, we see that the point reached in the year 2000, a high point of the entire story, and following the spectacular expansion of democracy at the end of the Cold War, is well above the trend line (or the learning curve). That suggests that we may be 'ahead of schedule', and that a slowdown of the process could well lie ahead. And that suggests caution. Second, if in fact we are at present 'ahead of the curve', then the other watchword must be consolidation. The greater urgency lies with safeguarding and solidifying the gains of the recent past, and building up the links among existing democracies.

That might take two forms: protecting the elements of the emerging global democratic community, and continuing to strengthen the institutions that have proved their value and effectiveness. The elements of an emerging global democratic community are now in place. They include North America, the European Union, India, Japan-Korea, and Australia-New Zealand: components of what might be called an 'oceanic' grouping whose linkages are not due primarily to geographical propinquity but rather to participating in long standing networks of social, maritime and air connections.

This is a prosperous and active ensemble now accounting for the majority of the world's population, but its cohesion is not to be taken for

granted and must be assiduously maintained in the face of rising pressure on at least two fronts: the demographic and the Islamist. Population might soon start declining both in Europe, and in Japan, reducing their weight in the democratic world. Democracy, moreover, is under challenge from the Islamists and the Jihadists, notably so in the Middle East, but also in Europe and Central Asia. In more narrowly political contexts, the way to consolidate the gains of the past is to cultivate and to strengthen the institutions that have proved their worth in the past century. One example is NATO, that since its inception in 1949 has been animated by strong transatlantic relationships; the organization has expanded its membership and could of course broaden its functions. Then there are the Bretton Woods institutions, and indeed the entire United Nations system that has a strong potential for democratic development. In all of this, of course, the role and policies of the United States remain of key significance.

The figure shows, at ten-year intervals, the proportion of the world population living in democracies (left scale). Fitting the data is a classic learning curve. Graph by T. Devezas, based on data in: "Democratization in long perspective' revisited", by G. Modelski and G. Perry III, in *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 69 (2002), 359-376

Comments on Modelski's Article

Kimon Valaskakis

It is refreshing to read a paper on the long term evolution of democracy and what its author sees as its positive prospects for the future. The quantitative analysis in Professor Modelski's paper is quite interesting. His thesis is that democratization is a major world process, a powerful and long term trend which is bound to come to full fruition in the not too distant future. Soon the entire world will be democratic. If we consolidate all will be well.

I hope he is right. But my own view on the topic, recently published in the *Widener Law Review* under the title "The Perils of Dumb Democracy" argues that unless there is a fundamental modernization of the concept of Democracy itself, to fit it to 21st century realities, the democratic gains we are currently seeing around the world can be illusory and short-lived. In that article, I make a distinction between what I call "dumb" or superficial democracy (the caricature of the real thing) and "smart" or sustainable democracy (a political regime which is not only desirable but also efficient and practical and therefore sustainable). My overall forecast is positive but is much more qualitative and conditional than quantitative and categorical. Here then are my specific comments (constructive I hope) regarding Professor Modelski's paper.

1. Trends vs. Cycles

Are the quantitative data presented by Prof. Modelski evidence of a true long term uni-directional process or the upswing of a long cycle, to be later balanced by a future counter-trend? History is replete with cycles that masquerade as unidirectional trends.

Herman Kahn, one of the fathers of modern "futurism", argued that there are two major errors in forecasting: the first is to assume that a present trend will continue into the future. The second is to assume a present trend will not continue into the future! Unless we know what are the forces behind the perceived trend we cannot make a judgement as to its future course. Extrapolation is a perilous game and inflection points and trend reversals are the norm rather than the exception. Change is ubiquitous. What goes up must come down and conversely what goes down must come up.

A decade ago "endism" was the flavour of the moment. We were treated to "The End of History", the "End of Work", the "End of War", only to be cruelly contradicted by facts. History did not end, work is still with us and so is war. The current flavour seems to be the opposite of "endism" which I call "birthism". It should also be viewed with caution. What looks like "the beginning of a new age", a "new wave", a "major paradigm shift", etc. may or may not materialize as permanent change. More often, like the seasons, we are experiencing repetitive cycles, some short, some long. Very little seems to be permanent in Nature. Change and mutation including full circles seem to be the rule rather than the exception.

Applied to the evolution of Democracy, with a capital D, the long term historical evidence is, unfortunately, not encouraging. The plain fact of the matter is that Democracy was tried many times in the past only to be subsequently replaced by totalitarian regimes. Fifth Century Athens, the birthplace of democracy eventually

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succumbed to tyrants and foreign occupation. Roman democracy, led to the Roman Empire with authoritarian emperors. In contrast, the Byzantine Empire, the most successful multinational political regime in history, which lasted a thousand years, was not particularly democratic. The French Revolution mutated into Napoleonic rule, not once but twice, in the 1790s and the 1850s with Napoleon III. The Weimar Republic in Germany was followed by Hitler. Russian liberalization under Gorbachev and Yeltsin is now being replaced by the doubtful credibility of Putin-style democracy. China, with a quarter of Humanity, is still not democratic and many countries of Africa and Latin America have alternated between democratic and authoritarian rule. Finally, we should note that, for a Martian visiting Planet Earth, the most sustainable political regime by far, over the millennia, would appear to be not, sad to say, democracy, but hereditary monarchy. In macro history it is that form of government which Planet Earth's inhabitants seem to have chosen overwhelmingly, with Democracy being a footnote.

For all these reasons, the powerful democratization trend identified by Prof. Modelski must therefore be viewed with great caution. Democratization appears to be not a one-way street but at least a two-way highway with the possibility of U-turns.

2. Democracy is not a homogenous concept. It is culturally relative

Democracy is not a simple product. It is highly relative and subject to modifications by different cultures and ethnic groups. Therefore, to monitor its long term evolution purely quantitatively, as one would measure say arithmetic improvements in life expectancy, is an oversimplification. There are three reasons for this.

First, we must note the existence of fictitious democracies. Modelski seems to take it for granted that if a country's political regime looks like a democracy it is therefore a true democracy in the Western sense of the word. There are currently 193 countries who are members of the United Nations. Most, if not all, pay lip service to democracy and have some form of parliament, a measure of democratic consultation, sometimes by plebiscites with 99% voting for the reigning regime. Does that make them true democracies? Some observers have argued that the number of true democracies, in the Western sense, is less than 50 in the 193 sovereign nations members of the UN.

Second, it must be noted that even if we shy away from the pejorative adjective "fictitious," even "real" democracies around the world are very different from one another. This has been true throughout history. Fifth Century Athens would probably not be considered a democracy today because the electors, Athenian "citizens," were a small part of the residents of that city. Women and slaves did not vote. By the same token, contemporary US Democracy might be considered suspect by purists because of the excessive link that exists between the electoral process and money. The overwhelming influence of media with spin doctors gives such importance to election financing that there is a danger of moving from a "one-person-one-vote" to a "one-dollar-one-vote" system, winner takes all. In the end, actual democracy, even of the real type, may be as relative as national cuisines. What is tasty and considered good in some cultures may be anathema in others. Like cobblers, democratic engineers must realize that one size does not fit all and a customization procedure is needed for the successful implant of sustainable democracies, especially in non-Western countries.

Third, above and beyond cultural relativity, even if all the 193 countries members of the UN were truly democratic, this would not automatically make the world democratic. Under the UN formula of sovereign equality, all states, big or small, have the same one vote. The operating system is "one state-one vote" independently of size. This tends to

over-represent small countries like Luxembourg and Iceland and under-represent the large ones like China and India. The individual voter in Luxembourg exerts considerable more power than the individual voter in India in decisions made by intergovernmental organizations. This counter-intuitive situation tempts the larger under-represented countries to look down or ignore decisions and recommendations made by IGOs. In addition, when one country like the United States exerts such enormous power over the rest of the world, there is a serious democratic deficit. Because of the extent of American power, true global democracy would expect the US President to be elected by the whole world and not just by American voters. "No governance without representation" would be an appropriate extension of the original "No taxation without representation", the well-known motto of American democracy. Yet obviously this cannot be so. Consequently, a world of democratic states would not automatically lead to a democratic world without global parliaments or some forms of global federalism.

3. How successful will the Democratic form of government be in dealing with emerging global issues

Perhaps the most important single criterion of sustainability of the democratic form of government will be how well it can deal with contemporary and emerging global challenges. There is an implicit assumption among idealists that Democracy is a panacea. Once democratic institutions are in place, problems disappear, there is planetary peace, prosperity and security for all. *Tout le monde il est beau, tout le monde il est gentil*, as they would say in French.

This, unfortunately, is not automatically the case. On the radar, as we speak at the beginning of 2008, there are looming challenges facing the world. These include growing human insecurity (*vis-à-vis* wars, terrorism, criminality, the threat of unemployment, etc.), natural disasters, climate change, economic inequality, potential pandemics, etc. How effective can

Democracy be in dealing with these threats, especially given the fact that problems are global and the democratic institutions, when they exist, are all at the national level? Already we have seen that when faced with the trade-off between civil liberties and security against terrorist or criminal threats, the public's response is to sacrifice some freedom for more security. The same is true for economics, where people will prefer jobs and a decent income, especially at subsistence level, to free elections. In the extreme case of hurricanes, earthquakes, war or pandemics, democracy is temporarily suspended even in Western countries and authoritarian rule takes over at least temporarily. This implies that the democratic form of government is judged not to be well suited, in its present form, to crisis management, and full executive power concentrated in an individual or supreme ruling body is preferred. Sustainable Democracy requires that it adapts well to crisis management otherwise, as soon as there is a crisis, democratic institutions will be set aside.

In the end, the true litmus test of Sustainable Democracy is like the test for Sustainable Development itself, is durability, not just flash-in-the-pan green, orange or blue revolutions which come and go. Modelski says it himself: "In more narrowly political contexts, the way to consolidate the gains of the past is to cultivate and to strengthen the institutions that have proved their worth in the past century." This is true, but I would add that the road ahead is qualitative, not just quantitative. Plotting the quantitative extension of democracy throughout the world is not enough and actually can be misleading, given the existence of fictitious and pseudo democracies. What is needed is more R&D in order to make this democratic regimes truly innovative and competitive, well beyond the mantras and the *clichés*. Ideally we need adaptive mechanisms which can translate the will of the people into meaningful strategies and actions for the common good. Such a system is yet to be perfected.

Of Global Democracy and Global Government

Joseph Baratta

I was truly pleased to receive a complementary copy of the *Widener Law Review*, 13, 2 (2007), on "Envisioning a More Democratic Global System." I would like to comment critically on one passage in Richard Falk's article, "What Comes after Westphalia?" I always listen respectfully to Prof. Falk, who is so much my superior in scholarship and in meeting the opposition. When I was a graduate student, I came across his book, *A Study of Future Worlds* (1975), which helped to give me direction in choosing my dissertation topic on the history of the world government movement. I even wrote to him an appreciative letter, which he was kind enough to answer, which meant a lot to a struggling novice in so big a field. I have always paid the closest attention to his objections to mere world constitution drafting, while neglecting the *struggle of the oppressed*. And I, too, have come to the conclusion that the solution of the problem of international anarchy (war) cannot be simply to repeat the efforts of the world federalists of the 1940s and after.

But I think we are making a mistake with rather superior comments on the historic project of establishing a world federal government like this: "If global democracy is guided by statist experience, the logical culmination of advocacy of global democracy would be support for a world state and a world government. It is important to understand that this kind of global statism is one possible way of actualizing a commitment to global democracy, but it is probably not the most plausible way and it is certainly, from the perspective of the present, not the most desirable way. It would pose great dangers of world tyranny and world anarchy that would be highly unlikely to produce a form of global governance that could be called 'humane.' Also, transition to world government seems politically infeasible to such an extent that its endorsement is quickly dismissed as 'utopian,' that is, unattainable. Although we cannot peer into the future to discern what pathways to global governance will open up under a variety of circumstances, it does not seem useful to give serious attention to world government, whether proceeding from perspectives of global governance or global democracy" (p. 249).

Let us consider carefully the reasoning here. There is an initial admission that world (federal) government is the "logical" solution to the need for world democracy. But why is it not "plausible"? Why is it not "desirable?" Have not many free governments been established in the last 250 years, even our own? Have not many older governments, like France or Germany, undergone centralization and effective establishment of national law in place of the relics of feudalism? Even the League and the UNO in the 20th century were, on a historical perspective, astonishing examples of "what comes after Westphalia." Perhaps we have forgotten *The Federalist*, No. 23 and No. 51 on the *necessity* of a government to maintain peace and justice of a free people. A lack of calm, long-range confidence in the progress of liberal government, of the very sort needed for "global democracy," is at work in such pessimism.

And why do we suppose that it is a government

of the world that poses the "dangers of world tyranny"? (I leave out "world anarchy," since it is the *absence* of government, as in the present international system, which produces the anarchy. Even a world empire would effectively abolish anarchy, though empire would be so unacceptable to once free peoples as to feel like anarchy, and it would move them to replace the empire with what you have been calling *democracy*). The threat of tyranny derives from the necessity, in a democratic government, of delegations of sovereign powers to the union government and the monopolization of force in order to constrain the member states or their peoples to make use of new political institutions, like a global parliament, or new judicial courts for the resolution of inevitable disputes. The history of any of the 30 "national" (actually multinational) federations should be our guide. Did not the new United States government, under the federal Constitution, present a threat of tyranny? Indeed it did, and you know that, until the Civil War, the checks and balances and the people's constant vigilance was all that restrained the government. After the Civil War and the World Wars of the 20th century, the federal government has grown into such a centralized colossus (with a budget 1/4 of GDP and a military budget, following Chambers Johnson, approaching \$1 trillion) that many (including me) feel that we have crossed the line into tyranny. Would a global government be different? The tendency of federations is toward centralization (unitary governments tend toward devolution). Hence the task is to devise such checks and balances and such popular support that the necessary government of the world is kept from tyranny.

Why do we say that a world government cannot be "humane"? This is to say that we cannot create a *good* world federal government. I grant that we are considering the greatest work of statecraft yet historically taken up by humanity, but to assert that humanity in the 21st century is incapable of creating a humane, good government of the earth is to doubt the whole project of *global democracy*. Indeed, we cannot expect that leaders of national states, as we now find them, can be relied upon to act in the wise, selfless spirit of the Founding Fathers of the United States. But things, politically, would be very different if millions of people were attracted to the banner of promised world citizenship, as you contemplate. "Public sentiment is everything," President Lincoln once said. "With public sentiment nothing can fail; without public sentiment nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes or decisions possible or impossible to be executed" (Speech at Ottawa, 1858). We are building such public sentiment as the basis of the world democratic politics of the future. When a similar political project was taken up in the not so distant past, Lionel Curtis advised the founders of Federal Union in Britain that they should aim at one million adherents; when United World Federalists were forming in America, Raymond Gram Swing set the target at *fifty million*. If there were 50 million members of a movement to establish world federation – or a global parliament – to abolish war or to solve global problems, do you not think that the whole question of plausibility or humaneness would be transformed? And how can we get to a global parliament if we do not recognize that we are trying to exercise the sovereignty of the people?

Lastly, is the project of world federal government "politically infeasible," "utopian"? All of the issues we are encountering with the proposal of creating a global parliament were once faced by the world federalist movement. I deliberately wrote my history, *The Politics of World Federation*, to guide those who saw the "logic" and the "wisdom" of facing the present anarchy and trying to create new, effective institutions of world law to build a better world. The world federalists once brought about resolutions in 22 states in favor of US participation in a world government. Some

sixteen world federalist resolutions were introduced in Congress between 1945 and 1949, and there were hearings on complementing or replacing the United Nations with a world government in the House of Representatives in 1948 and 1949, and in the Senate in 1950.

Congressional leaders who cosponsored the leading bill, HCR-64, and whom we remember as bipartisan builders of the post-war world included: Brooks Hays, Walter Judd, Mike Mansfield, Jacob Javits, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Abraham Ribicoff, Christian A. Herter, John F. Kennedy, Gerald R. Ford, Charles A. Eaton, Peter Rodino, John M. Vorys, Henry M. Jackson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. In the Senate, cosponsors included: Charles W. Tobey, Claude Pepper, Hubert Humphrey, John Sparkman, Brien McMahon, B. Russell Long, Frank Graham, Lister Hill, Paul H. Douglas, and Wayne Morse. Senator J. William Fulbright supported a comparable Atlantic union bill. Even Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy supported such bills before the Korean War.

And outside the United States, the constitutions of at least 37 states have been amended to permit delegations of sovereign powers to supranational organizations. The world movement for world federal government by 1951 had 73 national organizations in 22 states, with a total paid-up membership of 151,000 people. That was too little to produce the changes that Falk contemplates, but it was enough to get on the political agenda and to provoke vicious opposition, as by the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

In my book, *The Politics of World Federation*, I have particularly concentrated on the transition. See especially, for official approaches, chapters 17, 20, 22, 23, and 24; for *unofficial* ones (direct appeals to the sovereignty of the people), chapters 18 and 19. My conclusion favors gradual, official approaches.

History can be a guide. I do not think anyone can escape the lessons of the past by imagining that a global parliament, somehow, does not raise all the issues of world federal government. What is a legislature without an executive and a judiciary? Everybody should recognize that a second chamber could hardly be a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly, if its legitimacy may empower it to enact laws and even supplant the states members. History should be reviewed. To avoid raising hackles, one might keep silent about the analogy with world government, but everyone will perceive it, just as they did Prof. Falk's and Prof. Mendlovitz's world order models project. I think it would be better policy to quietly affirm the dignity of the world federalist argument (quote *The Federalist* on the necessity no less than the practicality of government), and to not degrade it as something "utopian". Down deep, Prof. Falk should know that he is embarked on a world revolution not unlike the English, American, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. As Harris Wofford (founder of Student Federalists) once said, it is "the revolution to establish politically the brotherhood of man."

Prof. Falk lastly lists six developments as humanity gropes toward some alternative between empire and world government. The reason why these are so disappointing, I think, is that they have drawn relatively little public sentiment. The UN global conferences, from Rio to Istanbul (1992-96), he admits, have produced a geopolitical backslash from the states, as has the NGO successes with the land mines treaty and International Criminal Court. As for the European Union, its friends closest to the processes of integration (as in Italy) are just as cynical, but from my historical perspective across the Atlantic it is the brightest news for the project of global democracy. The revival of the European constitution in Lisbon is encouraging for the future, but of course it will fail again if the people see it as just the work of the Brussels Eurocrats. The Belgian law permitting national courts to enforce human rights standards, as in

the Pinochet case, has been rescinded due to US government objections, though the people of the world seem not to have known. His last two examples – the global peoples assembly and the world tribunal on Iraq – are presented as unofficial legal initiatives of civil society, as if it were a world body politic, though it is not openly spoken of so.

With all due respect, I think we are just too timid. The projects we have in mind are perfectly feasible, logical, right, and consistent with social contract theory. But they await the degree of crisis to wean the public from foreign policy as usual and to demand new leadership. Come the next crisis like the one that produced the League of Nations or that which produced the United Nations, world federal government or global democracy could come like a flash. John Ikenberry understands this. So did Jean Monnet, who used to say that, for the hard work of uniting sovereignties, mankind will act only when faced by a crisis (*Mémoires*, 13, 421). Thomas Jefferson said much the same when he wrote, "All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than they are to right themselves by changing the forms to which they are accustomed." Surely the present world crisis is enough; all the forces are accumulating. We are living at a time of world political creativity not unlike that at the end of the Enlightenment.

The IGPCC report on climate change generated some movement on a successor to the Kyoto protocol, but perhaps the Greenland ice sheet will have to slip off the shelf for the people to wake up. If 100 small changes to the UN system, one of which is establishment of a second chamber, are made in the next 50 years, I think we should be satisfied. But each step should be designed to increase democracy. As I often say, "the unity slowly being forged out of diversity in the future will probably be as novel in comparison to the historic national federations as the federations were to the confederations and monarchies that preceded them" (2, 17, 536).

Democracy-Adventurism is Doomed. Democracy-Promotion will Endure

Ira Straus

Democracy promotion is not a Bush Administration event. It has a long background, and has been carried out by many free countries in addition to the US. It has been impressively successful over the centuries, with the normal share of mistakes and detours along the way. It is alive and well. It has a good future ahead of it. It is only the radical overextension of Democracy-promotion under Bush II that is doomed. It has already faded; it will die a natural death Jan. 20, 2009.

Democracy promotion has been a major endeavor of Western countries for an entire century, and it has a 500-year pre-history. It has done on the whole quite well in the course of that history. It also has a long term secular trend of playing an increasing role in the course of the modern centuries.

The adventurism of the Bush Administration's democratization policies, while disastrous and potentially catastrophic, are in the *longue durée* picture a blip on the screen. They will cause a retreat and retrenchment in democracy-promotion. It is important for the West to get a more serious discussion underway about the substantive content of the corrections needed. Nevertheless, assuming that humanity survives its crises, the long-established fundamentals of democracy-promotion are here to stay.

In most of the 20th century, democracy promotion in the third world went together with development-promotion, or, as it was called in the preceding four centuries, with the spreading of civilization. Its achievements from the 16th-19th centuries are wide and deep; they penetrate the entire world, and have borne fruit in decent and democratic or quasi-democratic government in about half the world. The colonization of America was meant to spread what was called civilization, including norms for decent treatment of humans; as one Latin American writer put it, it replaced religions of human sacrifice to the gods with a religion where a god sacrificed himself for humanity. This program was carried out with an ample share of war and brutality, magnified by the greater technological capabilities on the part of the more developed societies (or more civilized ones, if the reader thinks that old-fashioned language more honest); in those days, few people on the weaker side doubted the rights of stronger societies to conquer, and few people on the stronger side doubted the merits of using force and strategy to spread civilization. Human rights were massively violated, but nevertheless at the same time advanced as global norms. Within the British colonies, representative government was also spread; the beginnings of democracy in northwestern Europe were exported to North America, with a result that today "developed" democracies cover the better part of both continents, not just Europe.

In addition to what were called "colonial empires", the Western European powers – which were meanwhile becoming fully democratic powers – had the "dependent empires". Vicious human rights abuses such as suttee were outlawed in them although far from eradicated; meanwhile the imperial powers continued to apply force and sometimes

massive brutality for their own purposes. The imperial powers gradually became embarrassed when there was a gulf between their civilizing goals and their own behavior, and reduced greatly the brutal and violent elements in their rule; later they became embarrassed to rule with force at all without the consent of the governed, and withdrew from empire, convincing themselves along the way that it was too expensive to remain. Thanks perhaps to the longevity of imperial rule in the Indian subcontinent, democracy has stabilized in India along with a rule of law connected to English common law and its norms of human rights. A number of smaller ex-dependencies have also maintained democracy. Many however have suffered regression, and some of their older people remember the imperial period as a golden age (as do some Central Asians today, after they have suffered the consequences of being forced into independence of the Russian empire). In much of Africa, what used to be called "neo-imperialist" intervention has in recent years been welcomed by the populaces and sometimes the rulers in order to salvage their societies. Similar sentiments of nostalgia for Western imperialism are at times found in the Islamic world, and might be found more often if it were not for the oil-rent wealth, which

has found its necessary moral rationalization in a religious- or civilization-pride doctrine that it is part of God's plan for restoring the supremacy of Islamdom over the West or Christendom. In these conditions, what is amazing is not how much resistance there has been in Iraq but how many Iraqis welcomed the initial invasion for the hopes it gave them of freedom in the Western sense of the word.

Democracy promotion took place not only in the "underdeveloped" world but also among other "developed" countries. There it went together with the world wars of the 20th century and their aftermath. It also went hand in glove with promotion of regional and trans-Atlantic integration of the new post-conflict democracies with the older pre-conflict ones. This gave the new democracies a tie to democratic experience and a pro-democracy international strategic perspective within which they could realize national aspirations that they had earlier sought through anti-Western strategies and anti-democratic regimes. It has borne solid fruit in democracies in Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, South Korea, and a few other countries. It has also borne fruit in what seem by now to be fairly well consolidated democracies in most of Eastern Europe.

Reflections on the Future of WFM

Some considerations about the 25th WFM Congress in Geneva
and the dialogue between WFM members and leaders

Jean-Francis Billion

The 25th Congress of the World Federalist Movement (WFM) met in Geneva from August 27 to 31, 2007. A report by Nicola Vallinoto was published in the last issue of *The Federalist Debate*, while other accounts were given in the media, such as Fernando Iglesias's in the Argentine press, Rolf Paul Haegler's in the Swiss *Weltföderalisten*, or my two different accounts in *Europe fédérale* -UEF-France's bulletin and a longer one in *Fédéchoses - pour le fédéralisme*, a political quarterly review edited in Lyon. Some reports can also be found on the web.

The WFM's International Secretariat (IS) has also sent information to the members of the Movement's Executive Board and Council, and various notes with the text of the resolutions. It would not be necessary nor interesting to go over again in detail on the proceedings of the Congress. On the other hand, it seems useful to me to go back over some particular points concerning the organization of the meeting, the debates and the manner in which the WFM thinks and develops its political action.

Indeed, while long debates have taken place and numerous resolutions have been debated and approved, other interesting proposals for the future of the Movement have not been discussed, or at best they have been sent back to the Council and/or the Executive Board for consideration. These issues should not be forgotten or neglected; it is on this specific topic and on some others that I want to expatiate a little, by selecting three of them which I deem most important:

a) Domenico Moro, Director of the Altiero Spinelli Institute of Federalist Studies, proposed to open more widely the annual Ventotene International Seminar to World Federalists;

b) Fernando Iglesias insistently asked for a generalization of simultaneous translation in the debates of our Councils and Congresses (what about the Executive Board?); such a request is, in my opinion, fully justified, even if it may imply a budgetary effort;

c) finally, Lucio Levi has, once more, suggested that we should organize our political debates, as a priority, between the WFM members and not between outsiders and external experts (as it is too often the case in the seminaries that accompany our international meetings).

In my opinion this last point is fundamental, since World Federalists have few opportunities to debate together, and because history has given us political and associative cultures of a great variety. I shall add, because it is a penalising point in our meetings, and especially in our Congresses, that too many members do not know or do not seem to know the functioning (or voting) procedures which govern these events, which causes a large waste of time and, more particularly, misunderstandings which are deplorable and prejudicial for our agenda.

From the outbreak of the Korean War to the end of the Cold War, the WFM and its oldest offices remained in a 'virtual political world', because the international political situation made it impossible to make any significant

or decisive progress towards the final goal: the World Federation. Besides, the WFM has long been in its majority an Anglo-Saxon (and white) organization, with, in second position, organizations in India, Japan and a few European countries (often outside the European unification process).

Today, the coming closer (still in process) of the WFM and UEF-Europe, the revitalization of relations with JEF-Europe and the birth and growth of new offices (non-Anglophone and mainly in Latin America, where the WFM had practically disappeared in the mid-seventies with the collapse of the Movimiento pro Federacion Americana – MPFA), make indispensable an effort of reflection and 're-foundation', which must bear on the Movement's internal functioning but also on its basic and essential strategic choices.

In fact, this debate is already open following the Geneva Congress and the report by Nicola Vallinoto in *The Federalist Debate*. Indeed, Vallinoto in his conclusion believes that the WFM is divided into two movements: one "top down", from the International Secretariat (whose decisive role he acknowledges in the creation of the International Criminal Court) to the base, and the other "bottom up", from the members and associate organizations towards the International Secretariat. These two movements not always conduct the same actions, which sometimes are even unknown to each other. To this criticism, William Pace, the WFM Executive Director at the head of the International Secretariat, has briefly answered expressing his disagreement; he thinks that the divisions within the Movement are much more complex, at the same time "multiple and multidimensional"; to sum up, the approaches are "regional or global"; "maximalist or minimalist" (concerning the powers of a World Federation); "UN Reform" or "Constituent Assembly"; "Parliamentarian approach (UNPA)" or "direct elections to a

People's Congress"; "reform" or total overhaul of the Security Council (…); the role of the basic organizations, or the functioning and the (elitist or mass) nature of the WFM.

The differences pointed out or claimed by William Pace, and forgotten or overlooked by Nicola Vallinoto, are perfectly justified from an historical point of view, but I think that they are less important than in the past, and I regret that William Pace thinks to take them for granted, when in front of such a range of options he feels that it is simply its duty to follow "as many of these paths as we can in concert with the policies and governing bodies of our Movement". It seems to me that we should aim at a greater collective efficiency, and to coordinate and bring our points of view together, rather than to accept as intangible realities differences which survive (at least some of them) merely as abstract notions in our collective memory.

My own view is that the WFM has reached a turning point in its history. Preoccupied with its survival, withdrawn into itself in a hostile political climate, it has been able, thanks to William Pace and his staff and collaborators in particular, to acquire and develop for over ten years a central role in the fight for international justice, to create and inspire a coalition of more than 2500 NGOs all over the world. Moreover it has proved capable of working with the UN services and agencies, with an ever increasing number of "like-minded States" and with the NGO community to impose on reluctant States, and especially the US, the creation of the International Criminal Court. Progressively, it should be possible to develop general plans and proposals of the same kind in other fields. From my point of view, the "projects" or "programmes" the more likely to rapidly give World Federalists a central role and a leadership of the Civil Society Organizations seem to be: in the field of climate change (global warming

and sustainable development), in the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), and in the reform of the international monetary system, as proposed in one of the major resolutions approved at our Geneva Congress.

To seize these opportunities, the WFM must clearly show its capacity to make clear strategic choices and tackle those who have priority, and start working out appropriate rules and procedures which can be understood and accepted by the greatest number of members. The Executive Bureau and the International Secretariat should as early as possible and with the utmost urgency look into these political and organizational matters and report to the next Council, before the end of 2008, if that can be done.

From Geneva an Appeal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly

Parliamentarians, representatives of non-governmental organizations and other activists of the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) from 18 countries gathered in the UN's "Palais des Nations" in Geneva on 19-20 November 2007 for a discussion on the UNPA project and the Campaign strategy. The meeting reiterated the principles laid down in the "Appeal for the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly at the UN", such as a gradual approach which allows for initial steps without making a change of the UN Charter necessary. It was also stressed, however, that at the same time the eventual goal of a world parliament should be considered. While some questions were vividly debated, the meeting also concluded, among other things, that a UNPA should be open for participation of regional parliamentary assemblies and should offer innovative ways for strong NGO participation. It was agreed that the goal to establish a UNPA-Coalition should be pursued with a series of preparatory conferences rather than with one single event. Host of the conference was the Society for Threatened Peoples-International (*a.b.*).

The Citizen's Agora:
A Step toward European Democracy?

Marta Semplici

The Citizen's Agora meeting gathered more than four hundred associations from European civil society. During two days at the European Parliament, participants from all over Europe discussed the Reform treaty and the future institutional challenges of the European Union.

The differences among the issues and interests which have been raised testify to the complex reality of civil society in Member States. Although defining a common framework could be a difficult game to play, there's a good reason for trying to do that. This would considerably help all these fragmented claims to converge and share a common vision when dealing with European issues and making all their important links with local realities enriched by stronger links with other European actors. Agora could be seen as a valuable tool toward the socialization of European civil society, thus strengthening the participation process of citizens in European politics.

Nonetheless, Agora – as it has been repeated by many – is not meant to become a second European Parliament nor a substitute of the latter. Could it be a step toward democracy? Even if there is no democracy until the EP doesn't have real powers, the Agora somehow testifies the willing of some MEPs to get advantage of new democratic tools, like the consultation of civil society. This also means a quite strong desire of the MEPs to act autonomously from the intergovernmental game.

Some concerns deal with the selection of participants as well as their representativeness,

but the first test of this forum should be considered as positive. What has to be outlined is the strong desire of almost all the associations for a more democratic and transparent way of taking decisions in European politics. This widespread feeling will help federalist solutions to be better listened to. There is a growing awareness of the need to make European institutions closer to the citizens, being the only way to build any further integration. The question dealt with all through the two days was exactly this one: how to make it a reality? The Agora declaration pointed out some important suggestions. One certainty we can retain once back home is that the EU, as a unique experiment of supranational democracy, needs new tools to develop its transparency. Therefore associations throughout Europe should be active in putting them forward. And next time, they will maybe listened to again by the MEPs.

One of the Agora workshops dealt with the democratic deficit of the EU and with the future stages of European integration. The main points on the agenda were: the structure of European civil society and the ways in which it can act; simplifying the machinery of Europe's institutions and making their workings more transparent; a new power enabling the EP to amend the treaties; ways of consulting and informing the people and enabling them to take decisions.

Several arguments were raised both in favour and against the institutionalisation of this kind of forum. A minority of the participants thought Agora was not representative of

European citizens and thus unable to become a permanent body. On the contrary, with many others we consider this initiative a valuable step toward a more concrete recognition of the role of civil society in Europe. Although not being a representative forum, further Agora meetings could be useful in order to meet a part of European citizens and to let the organisations have a more effective role in the political process. Finally, we agreed on the idea of making the Agora a permanent way for the European Parliament to consult civil society. This should consequently lead to provide a common framework to define what a European association is. The lack of communication in Europe has been outlined and the debate mainly covered the question of the role of the media in fostering European news. On this point, the need of an educational programme to be adapted in each Member state has also been raised.

An interesting point was the request that the EP should convoke a Convention tasked with drafting a social pact for Europe in order to develop more coherent policies on common market, sustainable development and social protection. The final text could be submitted to the citizens through a European consultation in the same day in all the European member states. The working group also discussed the European citizens' initiative as a valuable tool of direct democracy in Europe. The EP was asked to guarantee its full application as well as to state more concretely its procedures. At the same time, the EP should ask for more power and for sharing with the European Commission the presently exclusive right of initiative.

A huge concern of the participants was the unequal application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: the EP has been encouraged to issue a declaration asking for uniform application. Another fundamental right has been mentioned: the right for citizens to be consulted on any important change of the current treaties. The EP should call for this right and a consultation should be held on the same day all over Europe in addition to national ratifications. It becomes clear that a new way of consulting citizens in Europe should be found. Our previous message of a pan-European referendum assessed the right direction. This need is more acutely perceived on the question of the Constitution. Some participants were simply sceptical about the idea of obtaining a Constitution in the future. The concern is now basically how to succeed in making the next Constitution approved by the people. The only answer is that no government can oblige its citizens to accept it if unwilling, and vice versa. The way out is to abandon the unanimity rule that is at the very basis of national ratifications. Mr. Carlos Carnero, Member of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the EP, agreed on this point.

All these reflections should help JEF Europe in being more confident of its role. The whole meeting turned around the question of democratic deficit in Europe, the method of the Convention has been claimed as the best way so far to achieve common results and the idea of consulting people on fundamental issues for Europe has been retained by many other associations. At a time of ever growing challenges for Europe and of weak consensus toward European institutions, the role of our organisation is far more important. Agora is there to show how much our voice is relevant.

Towards a Euro-like Currency for the World (in a EU-like UNO)

Antonio Mosconi

Morrison Bonpasse
The Single Global Currency. Common Cents for the World
Single Global Currency Association, Newcastle, Maine, 2006

Morrison Bonpasse is the president of the Single Global Currency Association, which he founded in 2003. The association organises every year a gathering at Bretton Woods, in the same hall where the famous conference was held, in which the theoretical and organizational questions concerning the promotion of a single world currency are discussed, together with the progress and the results of the monetary unions already in existence, like the European, or in a planning phase in the wake of its success, like that of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The fact is, as Bonpasse sarcastically observes (p. 112), that, completely ignoring Mundell's theory, "optimal or not, the people of the world are slowly asserting their interest in euro-like currencies". In the present "multi-currency foreign exchange world" (p. 2) the currency cannot fulfill any of its three functions (means of exchange, reserve of value and unit of account) due to fluctuating exchange rates. Currency transactions amount to 2,73 trillion dollars a day (2,5 trillions in traditional foreign exchange trading and 230 billions in currency options) with respect to a world GDP of 42,2 trillion dollars (2005 data). Such a system produces, in addition to huge losses of GDP and of human lives when currency crises occur, total worldwide transactions costs prudently estimated in 400 billion dollars a year,

the sterilization of massive currency reserves and a reduction of assets value due to exchange risks estimated in 36 trillion dollars (almost one year of the world's GDP) (p. 35).

The dollar cannot play the role of sole world currency because "its value is inextricably tied to the fortunes of one country, and its management is not shared with others as a common currency" (p. 31). The present regime is based on the acceptance of the dollar as the international currency and on the pricing and payment of petrol in dollars. Considering the US current accounts deficit and its growing foreign indebtedness, something can go wrong at any moment. For example: some oil-producing country can stop pricing the oil in dollars (as Iraq did between 2001 and 2003), a speculative attack against the dollar can cause a panic wave, some central bank can accelerate the conversion of its dollars into other currencies or use them for buying gold, commodities and non-American financial assets (as China's sovereign fund, recently instituted, will do). Each one of these events can trigger off a dollar crisis.

At the same time, the success of the euro has shown that monetary unions are indeed possible, and their advantages (p. 112-116) are by far greater than their supposed disadvantages (p. 117-125). The idea of a world monetary union dates back to John Stuart Mill. Key stages of its development were the establishment of the International Settlements Bank (1930), the Bretton Woods Conference with Keynes' proposal of the bancor (1930), the IMF's (Ossola and Triffin) introduction of the SDRs (1969) (pp. 150-159). Its opponents (pp. 206-222) basically come up with two arguments: that of sovereignty and that of the exchange rates manoeuvre as an answer to asymmetric shocks. The States' monetary sovereignty is precisely the cause of today's evils, whilst the exchange rates manoeuvre obstructs or slows down the necessary adjustments. "Until the rise of the international monetary unions, central banks were considered to be best oriented to a single nation, but that alignment made money a symbol of a nation, instead of being a symbol

and unit of value. Once that critical distinction was discovered or re-discovered, the road to Global Monetary Union was opened" (p. 135).

A single currency, as Stiglitz too argues, is part of a good globalization. Bonpasse describes and, where possible, quantifies its benefits, that here can only be summed up: it eliminates the costs of foreign exchange transactions; it increases the value of the world's assets and GDP; it eliminates the problem of balance of payments, the need to keep currency reserves, the risk of excessive capital flows, the speculation on currencies, the fluctuation of exchange rates, the exchange rates manipulations and currency crises; it separates the value of a currency from that of a country; it reduces the cost of managing many currency systems; it fulfills the human right to a stable currency, it makes the currency value a standard (like the meter), it reduces inflation and ensures low and stable interest rates; it allows trade to thrive; it makes the international financial system more equitable; it makes currency understandable, and allows for more accurate reporting.

The progress towards a single world unit is favoured by some current trends. Firstly, the development of the information and communication technologies (ICT) reduces the importance of money, replaced by the digit as a means of exchange and reserve of value; hence its most important function remains that of unit of account. Secondly, economic cycles have become, thanks to globalization, more concurrent (the Great Moderation). Thirdly, the total cost of the multi-currency system is ever more visible and measurable, hence unacceptable. Last but not least, the importance of the American economy compared with the global one has been drastically reduced, the basic unbalances are ever more troubling, the world economy can find a credible alternative to the dollar, e.g. the euro, and the threat of a crisis of the multi-currency system hovers over the markets. These factors fuel Bonpasse's expectation that the goal of a single currency is in the agenda, so much so that he proposes: an operational plan for mobilising the stakeholders

(pp. 256-267); intermediate steps, among which the creation of regional monetary unions stands out; implementation methods re-enacting the European experience (EMS, ECU), setting the year 2024 as the goal for attaining the final objective (Global Monetary Union, Single Global Currency and Global Central Bank). All of us will see it accomplished, Bonpasse confidently reassures us.

The problem of convincing the most powerful States to renounce their monetary sovereignty does not worry Bonpasse a bit. For him, currency is independent of a State as much as the meter is; with the establishment of a monetary union, the use of war in politics should be drastically reduced, because a country staging a war against another member of the Union should drop out in order to procure money for itself, and that would not be convenient.

Thus, too hastily he considers solved the problem of the relation between currency and power. Mario Albertini (*Le problème monetaire et le problème politique européen*, in *Le Fédéraliste*, 1972, no. 3) devoted his attention to that problem before committing the MFE and the UEF to the struggle for Europe's monetary unification; he compared gold to primitive law, which is characterised by self-defence, and paper money to developed law. Without a world power, world paper money would be a sham, a mask for the dollar. From the economic point of view, Albertini described the difference between national and international money as follows: "With national (paper) money, the economic aspects of terms of trade can manifest themselves autonomously. Parity, as an equal relationship for all between monetary resources and goods and services, is constantly ensured, or immediately re-established after serious crises, within restricted margins of variation. And the margins of variation (monetary policy) depend on the public will; they are a function of the characteristics and requirements of the national market, and can be considered right or wrong according to the criteria of the economic policy. With international money, on the contrary, the economic aspects of terms of trade are not

manifested autonomously. Parity is established by the relationship of monetary resources between themselves and with international money, with only indirect reference to goods and services; the variations of this parity are manifested in fixed exchange rates, in their fluctuation, and in their disintegration into a range of parities. These variations can be considered right or wrong in relation to the requirements of international trade and not according to the criteria of a genuine economic policy. National money has a single aspect of power: the state. The power aspects of international money, on the contrary, vary according to the (unequal) distribution of political power in the world as a system of states, and depend in general on the balance of power manifested in the system, and in particular on the position of power of each state in the system". This, Albertini concluded, may produce three different situations: international disorder, the dominance of one state, and the convergence of the *raison d'état* between various states. "World money – on the other hand – stands outside this context because its political base requires the elimination of the world system of sovereign states (absolute sovereignty), and its replacement with a world federation. There is no other way to transform the current relations of force between states (primitive law) into proper juridical relations, i.e. dependent on the public will. This is sufficient to assert that it is quite meaningless to accept the absolute sovereignty of the armed states – i.e. relations between the states as relations of force – and yet, despite everything, to conceive plans for a world currency; as it is meaningless, after all, to think that the UN, an organisation of sovereign and armed states, can guarantee peace". Only the European monetary unification could, under these circumstances, be put on the historical agenda as a well-defined problem, with a single solution. "The economic aim is to transform a group of national currencies, with limited and subordinate international possibilities, into a national (European) currency which covers the whole area in question. It is therefore a question of using political means: one public will, constitutionally defined, on the same area. This is to say that one cannot plan the monetary unification of Europe without planning the creation of a European federal state…; the crucial point seems to me to be this: one has to accept and support, against all logic, a gradual operation of monetary unification, preceding rather than succeeding the creation of a European political power, because the protagonists in the execution of that process (the initiative is certainly not theirs) do not behave according to logical criteria…; it is an expedient, but there are useful expedients. Perhaps there are expedients which can push the political forces onto a slippery slope and allow for the momentum to take over". Thirty-five years have passed since Albertini wrote those reflections, and many decisive historical events have occurred: the establishment of the European Monetary Union and its success; the end of the bipolar balance and the development of new economic regional powers; the globalization process and the emergence of an uneasiness (coming from the contradiction between the global dimension of the main governance-issues and the national dimension of political power) that could jeopardize its progress; the disastrous results of the US attempt at a unilateral governance of the world. Certainly, in the pluri-polar world-context thus established, the individual *raisons d'état* of the major regional powers should converge towards strategies of cooperation and peace, rejecting scenarios of rivalry and war. However, one cannot take that for granted, as Bonpasse seems to believe. It is a good thing to struggle for a world currency, and the WFM too has committed itself to do so in its recent Congress in Geneva, but simultaneously there must be a commitment for the creation of a democratic world government and for the completion of the European Union's federal institutions, without which even the "example" of the euro may well prove to be precarious, like so many other monetary unions that disintegrated in the past. Making a monetary unification before a political one constitutes today, like 35 years ago, an expedient.

Beck's Cosmopolitan Europe

Fernando Iglesias

Ulrich Beck & Edgar Grande
The Cosmopolitan Europe
Paidos, Barcelona, 2006

Among the large number of theoretical interpretations that the emergence of the post-industrial and post-national society has generated, Ulrich Beck's works deserve special consideration. In fact, Beck's work is different from almost every other due to the exact understanding that the German social scientist of *The Risk Society* has of the epistemological character of the revolution under way, whose real nature and trends it is impossible to understand if one applies the national-industrial categories in which our way of thinking has been formed. To say it in terms agreeable to the authors, Beck himself and Edgar Grande, professor of Political Science at the Munich University, *The Cosmopolitan Europe* is an attempt to lay down the coordinates of a Second Modernity, leaving aside the "zombie" categories that our mind is perceiving as faulty residues of the first Modernity, with its heavy consequences in terms of political instability, environmental degradation and global social inequalities.

Beck-Grande's work places itself in the context of the political crisis aroused by the deceleration of the European Constitution project caused by the NO in the referendums in France and the Netherlands. It is an attempt to define in a rational manner the terms of such a rejection, that are not those of a refusal, but rather those of the crisis of that specific model of European construction put in place by the political *élites*, behind the shoulders of its citizens. In wider terms, Beck-Grande's analysis of the process that led the nationalist, bellicose and ruined Europe of the first half of the 20th century to become the continent with the best living standards and the largest enjoyment of democratic liberties, goes well beyond the European dimensions. It is significant that only today, several decades later, some aspects of that process can be understood, thanks to the worldwide spread of the de-territorialization and globalization processes. In fact, when Europe was the most technologically – and economically – advanced continent of the planet and the one with the smallest and most fragmented political unities, the contradiction between its techno-economic forces, with a tendency to become global, and its policies, linked to the territorial container of the nation-State, manifested quite early its devastating potential. However, just as the Europe of genocide and of the two world wars produced terrible experiences that are extraordinarily useful in the analysis of the globalized risk-society, likewise the cosmopolitan Europe risen from its ruins, that has established new supra-national paradigms for constructing Justice and Democracy, is providing a continental political experience that the European federalists have identified – with good reasons – as "a laboratory of international and world democracy". These are the issues that this new work by Beck deals with, with his usual cleverness, re-inventing a term, "cosmopolitan democracy", from the glossary of Daniele Archibugi and David Held.

What is the novel statement in *The Cosmopolitan Europe*? What is the approach by which such a vast analysis of the European process offers ideas that transcend the continental mark? In my opinion, its key statement, that justifies the entire book, is the one that allows its authors to make a decisive step leading much beyond the traditional tension opposing yesterday's nationalism to internationalism: namely, that which is expressed today in the contraposition between national-international and global-worldwide. To say it with the words of the authors: "Methodological cosmopolitanism systematically challenges national catechism... The negative principle 'this or that' is replaced

with the positive principle 'not only but also'. A widening of power in the supra-national level does not imply a loss of power at the national level, but rather the opposite is true: in working together, powers get bigger, therefore nationality, trans-nationality and supra-nationality complete and reinforce each other. Thus... a better defense of the national State is possible by opening it to cosmopolitan relations". And, further on: "It is not rivalry, but cooperation that furthers national interests. Thus, there is a destructive way – national autism – of defending national interests and augmenting power, and an optimal way – cosmopolitanism".

These are not at all abstract statements. Compare them, for example, with the theses always present today in Argentine's national politics, which advocate defense of national interests with a paranoid and conflictual attitude, and believe that after the neo-liberist and globalist climax of the 1990s it is necessary to come back to the sacred national State in order to provide welfare, rights and equality to citizens. But let us make a list of – say – the top ten national States with the greatest equality and where the most deprived citizens have access to welfare, and you will invariably find that the absolute majority of them will be national States that are members of the European Union; that is to say: they are not those that are focused on the political and methodological varieties of absolute national sovereignty, but those that have overcome it by devolving some of their functions to supra-national institutions, according to the cosmopolitan strategy described by Grande and Beck.

And so we come to the book's only weak point: its authors' partial understanding of the dynamics of globalization or Europeanization, which is apparent in their ontological insistence on giving a continental, European analysis-scale to a scenario that they themselves see as a "*worldwide* risk-society". To their excellent questions: "Why not the world? Is it not anachronistic to insist on global interdependence – on the one hand –, and, on the other, pretend to replace the unity of the national State with the unity of Europe?",

Beck and Grande give an insufficient answer, that does not catch the direct relationship between Europe's present crisis and its scarce capacity of promoting the creation of other democratic, continental unities of the same kind (in particular in two regions where its influence is enormous, Africa and South America), its unwillingness to reach compromises abroad on equitable trade agreements that its very existence has put in place domestically (see the problem of subsidies to agriculture), its insufficient role in world politics, due to the non-existence of a continental-wide common foreign policy, its poor contribution to a UN democratic reform and to the creation of democratic world institutions; in sum, the inability demonstrated by the very successful European Union in accomplishing the program planned since the times of its foundation by its federalist fathers: "Unite Europe to Unite the World".

Advocating a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly

Renata Pantucci

The campaign for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) seems to be taking off. Hundreds of political leaders, academics and civil society activists from all over the world have already signed the UNPA appeal launched last year by a group of parliamentarians and NGOs, while the initiatives

in its support are multiplying. Among them, the publication of this pamphlet called *The Case for Global Democracy - Advocating a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly*[1].

The initiative has been taken by the renowned MEP Graham Watson (ALDE, UK), who has co-authored the pamphlet together with three MEPs: Pia-Noora Kauppi (EPP-ED, Finland); Jo Leinen (Socialist, Germany, currently Honorary President of the UEF and member of the steering committee of the European Movement); Gérard Onesta (Greens, France). The introduction has been written by Boutros Boutros Ghali, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-1996).

The four essays included in the brochure express the urgency of 'democratizing globalization' by effectively integrating civil society (or rather, "the individual human person, the one irreducible entity in world affairs and the logical source of all human rights", as Boutros Ghali states) into the development of global cooperation and international law. So far, according to Kauppi, free markets and globalization have been able to reduce poverty and solve numerous problems. Nevertheless, they could be made to work better, and that could be achieved by rendering more democratic and open to the public that "hallowed meeting-ground of states" which is the United Nations. As both Leinen and Watson point out, organizations such as the WTO, the IMF or even NATO have dramatically broadened their power and influence, without any parallel development in global democracy to counteract the progressive curtailment of the power of the nation state – the entity around which the international system is based ("an entity mainly formed in the 19th century and, on some continents, the main driver for incessant fighting and bloodshed", using Leinen's words). The result is that not only are individual citizens scarcely represented in international organizations due to the centrality of national governments (instead of representative institutions) in those contexts, but they are also less and less represented even by their own governments.

It is time to make some serious "efforts to create a world Parliamentary Assembly, which would allow people from all countries to become involved in the global decision-making process", Watson writes. Such an assembly would strengthen the UN's capacity to tackle military conflicts, population explosion, famine, water shortages and so on, adding legitimacy to an organization that already "enjoy[s] high levels of trust from the world's citizens".

Not surprisingly, the model for the UNPA is the European Parliament. The four authors praise the EP's progressive acquisition of status and its impact on the EU's development and integration. For the first time, Onesta observes, "in that nascent European Parliament delegates chose to band together not under their national flags" but "under the ideological banners of their respective political families", in a dynamics which "has much to teach to the world".

As far as its election, composition and political role are concerned, a few hypotheses are taken into consideration. To sum them up, initially the UNPA could be composed of representatives from each national parliament (but also of members of NGOs and other non-state actors, as Boutros Ghali warmly suggests) and could act as a small consultative body under the UN General Assembly. With time, direct universal suffrage could be introduced (with a distribution of delegates proportional to population size, in Watson's opinion), and the UNPA could become an essential part of the UN decision-making process. The assembly could even "evolve into a world parliament". The impact of a direct universal election would be enormous, because on that day – a day which every democratic person "can only dream of", in Onesta's words – "humanity will have learned to let go of the petty nationalisms that have caused so much bloodshed in years past". To make this dream less unrealistic, we can start by subscribing the appeal of the UNPA campaign[2].

[1] The whole text is accessible on the web at http://www.unpacampaign.org/documents/en/MEPBROCHURE.pdf
[2] See http://en.unpacampaign.org/appeal/support/index.php

East African Community: Towards the Monetary Union

Anna Sarotto

At the last Summit held on August 20th, 2007, the East African Community (EAC) Heads of State deliberated and decided to move expeditiously towards establishing a Common Market and a Monetary Union by 2012 and then move on to a Political Federation.

The EAC Council of Ministers, who met in September, reviewed progress towards the establishment of the EA Monetary Union, noted that the negotiations on the Common Market should begin in October 2007 so as to be finalized by December 2008 and assured guidance on the necessary steps in the process of establishing the Monetary Union by 2012.

In recent decades, Africa has suffered from abysmal economic performance and has become increasingly marginalized. Since independence, Africa has seen a series of regional integration initiatives aimed at reducing conflicts and promoting scale economies in production and distribution. However, there has not been a generalized takeoff towards rapid growth or expansion of trade.

There are a number of regional monetary integration initiatives presently being considered in West and in South Africa. In East Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have agreed to revitalize the EAC, which was dissolved in the 1960s, and the Republics of Rwanda and of Burundi joined recently.

The EAC regional integration process is at a high level at the moment. The encouraging progress of the East African Customs Union,

the enlargement of the Community with the admission of Rwanda and Burundi, the ongoing negotiations of the East African Common Market, as well as the consultations on fast-tracking the process towards an East African Federation, all underscore the serious determination of the East African leadership and citizens to construct a powerful and sustainable East African economic and political bloc.

What the EAC is
The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was signed on 30th November 1999 and entered into force on 7th July 2000 following its ratification by the original three partner States – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi joined the EAC on 18th June 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from 1st July 2007.

Aims and Objectives
The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this end the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and are working towards the establishment of a Common Market by 2010 and a Monetary Union by 2012 and ultimately a political Federation of the East African States. The

major developments and expansion of the regional programme reflect a serious determination of the five EAC Partner States to construct a strong regional bloc. The 3rd East African Development Strategy (2006-2010), which was launched in November 2006, sets out an ambitious programme and a target for the realization of a vastly transformed and fast-modernizing East African region by the years 2010/2015.

Enlargement of the Community

The realization of a large regional economic bloc encompassing Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with a combined population of 120 millions, a land area of 1.85 million square kilometres and a combined gross domestic product of $ 41 billion, bears great strategic and geopolitical significance with prospects of a renewed and reinvigorated East African Community.

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European Citizenship and the EU Democratic Deficit

Bronisław Geremek

Historian, member of the European Parliament, former Foreign Minister of Poland (1997-2000) and co-founder of the movement Solidarność.

How can, in your opinion, the EU federal transformation process be re-launched?

The impulse towards the EU's transformation in a federal direction, shall come from the commitment of the European citizens, which has to be directed to the Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice, the three great EU's institutions. But my answer is marked by a certain bitterness, because in the last three years we have seen the resurgence of national selfishness, most of all in the big countries, with regard to the economy and in particular the Stability Pact. A new economic patriotism, most of all in France and Germany.

But as the progress of European integration took place so far thanks to the determination and political will of the European peoples, I believe that in the future too no progress could come without it. The legitimacy of the EU power must be resumed in the notion of European citizen. And when I say that it is necessary, in the community-building process, to mobilize the nations, I refer myself to the commitment of national Parliaments and Governments. Otherwise, the process will stall, as happened with the referendums on the Constitution in France and the Netherlands.

On what bases do you think that a European identity can be formed?

I think that the idea of citizenship can originate from the encounter of history and geography,

i.e. from the world of values which have been shaped in the course of civilization on European soil, and the common interest, i.e. the answer to the question why we live together, why there is an interest uniting the Finns and the Italians, the Poles and the Greeks. If there is the recognition of an interest furthering such an encounter between history and geography, we have the answer to the question. We know that there is an identity, founded on the notion of human person, and rooted in the Jewish-Christian tradition or in the secular ideas of Humanism, which is something that unites Europe. Secondly, there is the problem of the European interest, which is still not strong enough to unite and overcome national interests. For the task to be accomplished a central role can be played by the European citizens.

What is missing, in your opinion, for bringing that task to an end?

I think that today's problem is which part the citizens play in the construction of Europe, what place they have in it. It is necessary that the citizens feel themselves important in the construction of Europe. Today it is not so. Few things depend on the citizens, everything passes through the national level. The moment of the elections of the European Parliament is not a significant moment in the European political life and in participation. In Poland, for example, where voter turnout in national elections is 40-41%, it has been half of that in the European elections. Citizens should be asked questions. I am not a great supporter of referendums, in particular in big countries. I think that only local referendums are meaningful, due to the fact that

they do not have political consequences. But what counts is to introduce at the European level the habit of popular consultations. If one day all over Europe, in the same day, the question were posed not whether the Constitution is accepted or not, but about a European army, a basic income, or foreign policy, the involvement of the citizens would be high. If *Eurobarometer* would propose such questions to the citizens, they will not feel themselves the objects of a market survey, because it will be a European institution asking the questions, i.e. the institution that will make a decision taking into account the opinions expressed by the citizens. In Europe the right formula has not been found yet, but all the polls confirm that if questions are asked concerning concrete issues like the European army or the EU foreign policy, two thirds of the citizens will respond positively.

You are a member of the European Parliament, the first supra-national Parliament in the history of mankind, which represents a great innovation, but shows also significant limits in realizing democracy and the common good. How can the relations between the EP and the citizens be improved, as well as European democracy?

First of all, it is necessary to create a European public space. Also Habermas called for it. European communication media of a very high quality standard are necessary. The TV channel *Euronews* is an example, but there is still much to be done. My colleague and friend Gérard Onesta, MEP elected in France for the Greens, has promoted a big gathering of NGOs and mass media interested in European problems. It is a project called *Agorà*, which in a few days[1] will meet at the EP building in the presence and with the participation of the MEP[2]s.
Moreover, there is another problem which has not been solved yet in a clear fashion. Every European member of Parliament feels he represents the European constituency, but each of them has been elected in one of the European countries. The question I ask is: "How

to establish a connection with those who have elected us? The contacts shall be local, regional, national or European?". I make an example. There is a habit to invite groups of citizens to visit the European Parliament. I once met a group of young people from Poland who had been sharing for many years an exchange program with a German school. Students and teachers can speak two languages, Polish and German. My impression was that this is indeed the European constituency, the overcoming of that Tower of Babel. This is the route to follow, that of a European Parliament representing the interests of the European citizens, which takes legislative decisions concerning the whole European people. To accomplish this, it is necessary that a MEP has a closer relation with the voters, not only with the national voters but with the European citizens.

The UEF has worked on the project of a European referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, now dropped. That proposal would make easier to overcome the unsolved question of national ratifications, that will come up again with the new Treaty. Since you have expressed your preference for a European referendum, what is your opinion about keeping the national ratifications procedure?

It is a difficult problem. In the past I proposed a European popular consultation, to be held on the same day in the whole Union on concrete questions which could be answered with a Yes or No, given that no citizen is willing to read a Treaty more than 500 pages long. I was happy to find out that the movement of young federalists gave my proposal a warm reception, and I continue, then, to support their initiatives. But why no decision was taken? In the 2005 elections, 41% of Polish citizens participated, in the recent elections 53%. About 2 million people more, and with a sizeable participation of young people. I think the answer is: partly because the negative French and Dutch referendums cost too much and arose the fear that defeat could happen again.

[1] The meeting took place after the interview, on 8-9 November 2007 at the European Parliament
[2] See http://forum.agora.europarl.europa.eu/jiveforums/category.jspa?categoryID=9

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