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New Series

The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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Francesco Ferrero

Editing Staff

Grazia Borgna
Stefano Chicco
Fabio Pascarella
Anna Sarotto
Elisa Zanardi

Layout

Pier Mascanzoni

by order of Ferrari&Melideo Agency - Milano
e-mail: gp.melideo@ferrarimelideo.it

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Via Vagnone 1 - 10143 Torino

Administrative Office:

The Federalist Debate

Via Schina 26,
I - 10144 Torino, Italy
Phone and Fax +39.011.473.28.43
e-mail: federalist.debate@libero.it

Jeunesse Européenne Fédéraliste (JEF)

Place du Luxembourg 1,
B-1050 Bruxelles

Union Européenne des Fédéralistes (UEF)

Place du Luxembourg 1,
B-1050 Bruxelles

World Federalists Movement (WFM)

International Secretariat
777 UN Plaza, 12th Floor,
New York - NY 10017



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To the Readers

We resume publication of The Federalist Debate after a brief interruption, due to the necessity to overcome some organisational difficulties and at the same time to renew this review in its content, its format and its editorial formula. We engaged in this attempt in order to fulfil two needs. Firstly to respond to requests from our readers, who did not fail to send us their constructive criticism and suggestions. Secondly to stimulate and to feed the circulation of ideas and information among the various federalist organisations, and among these and the movements in the global civil society that are growing impetuously in all regions of the world.

In order to better respond to the process of renewal presently under way in the federalist movements, we have constituted a joint editorial board, formed by representatives of European (JEF and UEF) and world (WFM) federalists, whose task is to demonstrate to be able to promote, in a more efficient way than in the past, a real borderless debate.

We realise we are entering an unexplored region; we consider our attempt to be a kind of experiment, so it will constantly receive adjustments in its course. We rely on the active participation of our readers, from whom we expect to receive information and materials, as well as criticism and suggestions (l.l.).



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New Political Commitments for Federalists

Lucio Levi

The great revolutionary transformations, marking the milestones of mankind's progress in history, have never been promoted by the established powers. These powers try to rule the new course of events with old mental and ideological schemes and with the old instruments of power. Revolutionary change, which creates new institutions and higher forms of political coexistence, has always been the result of the storming into the political scene of new social forces. These forces provide a vehicle for new cultures, new values and new political institutions. While the political parties have lost their attraction force and their former capability for mobilisation, no longer succeeding in motivating commitment from young people, all over the world a non-governmental movement has grown. This expresses itself outside traditional channels and political representation, and is the expression of a new dimension of political participation. It operates at all levels of political life (but more efficiently in local communities and at the international level, where the limits of the established powers are more serious) in the sectors of peace, human rights, international justice, aid to development, environment, cultural goods, education, health, and so on.

The decline of the political parties is a consequence of the crisis of the sovereign state. Faced with the globalisation of social, economic and political life, national power is a standpoint that obscures reality as it is and prevents the mastering of it. Political parties are prisoners of the national states: like boats in a stormy sea, they find themselves in the trough of the wave, where they cannot see the horizon. Choked inside the tight limits of national states, the process of political decision making is reduced to the control of secondary aspects of

political life and loses any meaningful relation with the real processes. Here lies the main root of the decadence of the moral and intellectual quality of the ruling class. When, in the debate among political parties, the great goals, those which make it possible to think of the future, are gone, politics deteriorates progressively in a mere power play which keeps at a distance the most dynamic and vital energies in society. The political parties represent for this reason politics without a future.

On the other hand, movements in civil society are expressions of a commitment that, for intense and various meanings, is not inferior to that which once characterised active participation in the political parties. Mostly the international NGOs have addressed the great problems on which the future of mankind depends, and have contributed in a decisive way to form a world public opinion. They have acquired the role of recognised counterparts of governments inside international organisations and diplomatic conferences. Even if they have only advisory powers, they exert a real influence on world politics, as is shown, for instance, by the role played by the peace movement in the decision to dismantle the Euro-missiles, and by the role played by the human rights movement in the formation of the ICC. Their limit lies in that they have a sectorial perspective: each movement deals with one single problem. They are an expression of civil society, that is, that pre-political area of social life which is the ground where individual interests assert themselves and clash, but which does not produce those mediating mechanisms between interests from which the need originates to promote the common weal. The civil society movements represent therefore the future without politics.

In spite of their present decline, parties will still be necessary in the future as a means to orient public opinion, to promote syntheses among expectations coming from civil society and to propose political initiatives. However, in order to continue to fulfil these tasks, they will have to undergo a process of radical transformation. First of all, they will have to gain an international dimension, if they want to be able to meet the challenges which will determine the future of mankind. But this will become possible only when supranational democratic institutions have formed, in which sovereign States are reduced to the level of member-States of Federations of regional dimensions, and later on, of the World Federation. Secondly, political parties will have to open themselves to outside reality, accepting the contribution of civil society movements. Party Congresses will become the meeting point between these movements and the occasion for a confrontation over general political prospects, and the electoral programme will be the moment of synthesis among various social instances that will come together in the political parties. To sum up, the civil society movements can be seen as a stage of a process which, at the beginning, has an exclusively social character, but tends to increase its political significance and ultimately leads to the formation of supranational parties and governments.

* * *

Let us now consider the real and potential relation between non-governmental international organisations and organised federalism. The commitment of non-governmental organisations to peace, environment protection, international justice and human rights defence are the expression of an active engagement similar to that of federalists. They are the most genuine manifestation of the world unification movement and of the necessity, largely felt by young people, to deal with the great dramas of mankind. They are at present a varied mass of small and large groups, linked by a common situation (globalisation). It is a movement dragged by the current leading toward world unification, but lacking the instruments to

rule this process. It is not yet aware of its institutional objectives, nor has it worked out a political strategy. It occupies the political scene and by now it has acquired the role of interlocutor between governments. To the extent that it interprets new needs, and is the leading actor of a process tending to redefine the subjects and roles of political life, it is the vanguard of international democracy. It is the embryo of the new revolutionary subject.

The great world conferences which, beginning with the Rio Conference in 1992 on Environment and Development, have followed one another in the last years, have shown which are the two potential subjects that will promote the world unification process. On the one hand there are governments, which are the expression of the diplomatic dimension of the process. They are able to start the process, but not to bring it to conclusion, because they think of world unification in terms of collaboration among sovereign States. On the other hand there are the civil society movements, which represent the democratic aspect of the process. When they become aware of their political objectives and join together, they will turn into what could be rightly called the movement for peace and international democracy.

What characterises the federalist position with respect to the other two is that it questions State sovereignty, whilst both governments and the peace movement are prisoners of the culture of the past and think of the solution of world problems in terms of international co-operation, that is co-operation among sovereign States. This position may be defined as mundialism. There is a clear similarity between mundialism and europeanism, the historical force that supported the European unification movement. And as we distinguished three forms of europeanism, it is possible to do the same with mundialism: diffused mundialism is the attitude favourable to world unification spread out in the public opinion; organised mundialism is formed by civil society organisations of world-oriented inspiration as a whole; and organisable mundialism is that part of public opinion and of civil society movements that may

be influenced by the mundialist movement. The historic task that the World Federalist Movement must accomplish is to bring a federalist awareness to the peace movement and to lead it towards the strengthening and democratisation of the UN.

But federalist movements will be able to pursue this objective only if they achieve the unification of their organisations, more precisely unification between the two largest federalist organisations: the UEF (with its youth organisation, JEF) and the WFM. This unification process began with the adherence to the WFM of the MFE, the Italian chapter of the UEF, in 1994, and of the JEF in 1995. This was followed by the Montreux joint meeting of UEF and WFM in 1997, and the association of the UEF to the WFM in 1999.

The contribution that European federalism can give to this unification process consists in the theoretical and strategic experience of a movement that has been able to defeat the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state. This victory, even though not fully achieved, is due to the political and organisational autonomy that the European federalists have been able to keep in every circumstance and to the choice of regional unification, conceived as a stage on the way to World Federation, that should be intended as a Federation of Federations as large as entire regions of the world.

On the other hand the contribution of world federalism lies in having inspired thinking and action in favour of the idea that only a World Federation will represent the ultimate goal of federalist commitment. But the great merit of the WFM is that it identified coalition building among NGOs as the way to exercise leadership in civil society movements, in order to make them aware of the means (that is to say the institutions) which mankind needs to attain peace and international democracy and justice.

Precisely because they are active in the two lar-

gest federalist organisations, the European and world federalists have great responsibilities. Their association is vital, because we must combat new enemies: the forces of fragmentation, which are the most recent reincarnation of the old demon of nationalism. The two movements must face the challenges of the new epoch together. They cannot continue to be the guiding forces of organised federalism without being involved in problems which concern all federalists. The time is ripe to plan the stages of a process of unification. First of all, unity means effectiveness. Unity is synonymous with strength. In the second place, unity means credibility. It is in fact up to us to achieve what we ask of the governments: to unite, to create a democratic supranational organisation. The goal that the unification of federalists has to pursue is the creation of a strong world federalist political actor, capable of establishing the necessary principles of action to mobilise the crucial forces in building a democratic government for the world. This must become a reference and initiative point for those civil society movements which have chosen a commitment at global level. In other terms the objective of the federalist strategy is to transform mundialism into federalism.

The events that led to the institution of the ICC showed the WFM's capacity to place itself at the head of approximately 300 NGOs, on this basis conditioning and influencing the proceedings of a world diplomatic conference. It is not exaggerating to state that the ICC would not have been instituted without the vast movement of public opinion that expressed itself in the Rome Conference through the NGOs.

The lesson to be learned from this fact is that only a great coalition of forces of popular inspiration can break the resistance of the governments. The democratisation of the UN, conceived as a stage on the way to the world Federation, seems to be the common objective on which the peace movement and the federalist movement can converge.

The UN and East Timor

Why should a crisis created by imperialism be resolved by nationalism?

Laura Davis

Imperialism has long been the method of control in Indonesia, and the UN's policy of promoting a definition of the state as national rather than administrative cannot bring long-term peace in this, or any other region.

In the light of East Timor, I would like to consider the following points:

1. Imperialism as the motor for the crisis.
2. The long term consequences of UN policy.
3. What should the response of the international community be?
4. What can prevent similar crises in the future?

Imperialism as the motor for the crisis

Nationalism and Imperialism

Nationalism, the identification with one ethnic/cultural group ("nation"), is the basis of a nation-state, as it seeks to merge nation and state. In turn, it is reinforced by the state (whether coinciding with the dominant group or in opposition to the dominant group), which is itself the result of historic and/or geographical accident. There are two types of nationalism: the first is the "benign nationalism" of the nineteenth century Enlightenment when a group will define itself as ethnically or culturally different to its oppressors, and is motivated by a desire for freedom and independence or "national self-determination". The second is the aggressive nationalism associated more with the twentieth century which will typically include xenophobia and is expressed at its most extreme in the fascist states. This second type is the force driving imperialism: aggressive expansionism, (territorial and/or economic), the desire of one nation-state to dominate another. These two types of

nationalism may appear distinct, but the first has a historical habit of developing into the second.

Imperialism in Indonesia

The modern Indonesia is effectively the remnants of the old Javanese Empire, colonised by the Dutch to become the Dutch East Indies. After 1948, communism was no longer a serious threat, so Indonesia, in contrast to Korea and Vietnam, was not a crucial player in the Cold War. As a result, the Dutch could not rely on the USA to maintain control and withdrew, leaving modern Indonesia as an empire built on a vast and varied archipelago with significant ethnic and religious diversity, ruled by a government born of the nationalist pro-independence movements that had formed in opposition to Dutch colonisation.

Given the size of the population, and Indonesia's location, there was no question that the nationalist, military regime should be supported by the First World during the Cold War. The nationalist regime required stability to maintain control, and the First World reasoned that if the price of stability was repression of the Indonesian peoples, so be it. Furthermore, Australia, a large and under-populated country, had a large and populous country close at hand which it felt must be appeased in the interests of Australian national security. The imperialist legacy in Indonesia is therefore two-fold: firstly the creation of the modern Indonesia, and secondly the system of military dictatorship, created in the first instance as opposition to Dutch rule, and in the second maintained during the Cold War.

The division of Timor into East and West is

likewise a direct result of imperialism: until 1975, East Timor was colonised by the Portuguese. It is no co-incidence that the East Timor independence movement identifies East Timor's separate ethnic and religious identity with one of the legacies of Portuguese imperialism, the Catholic faith, in contrast to "Indonesian", Islamic West Timor.

The very diversity of the Indonesian archipelago, and the absence of pluralist democracy means that the only way the state can be held together is by actual or threatened military force. Opposition to Jakarta's rule in Indonesia's component parts, from Sumatra to the Spice Islands to Irian Jaya, will and can only take the form of insurrection, and can only be prevented or quelled by actual or threatened military repression. The current leadership, whether it is the army or the government, cannot risk "losing" East Timor for fear of the repercussions across the rest of the archipelago.

The long term consequences of UN policy

President Habibie's announcement on January 27 that the people of East Timor would be able to choose in a referendum between political autonomy inside Indonesia and independence took the world by surprise. However, Australian intelligence reports to the UN showed that the Indonesian army had been escalating activity in East Timor and across the border in West Timor since July 1998. By July 1999 it was clear that the attempt to influence the ballot by intimidation had failed, and plans were in place for widespread terror after the poll. The army was supplied notably by the UK with weapons which it passed on to the militia, and there is clear evidence that tens of thousands of pounds of government development funds were being channelled into the army, and going to support the militia in East Timor.

The UN took charge of running the ballot, yet Indonesia remained in charge of security both before and after the referendum. The UN was incapable of preventing or responding to the

atrocities committed by the army and militia, men armed by at least one Security Council member. The UN is therefore committed to the securing independence for East Timor, in accordance with its allegiance to the principle of national self-determination. Securing independence will be a long process and probably high in human and monetary cost. Yet this commitment to national self-determination cannot succeed in bringing peace and democracy in the long term.

A keystone of federalist principle is the right of self-determination of the individual, where an individual has an identity comprising many elements - national self-determination is in direct opposition to this. A state based on a concept of national self-determination requires that individuals be defined, and define themselves, according to their "national identity": individuals living in the state must identify themselves first and foremost by one component of their identity (namely ethnic), and their relationship with the state will be determined primarily by this. This subjugation of many elements of identity by one cannot, by its very nature, allow for the self-determination of the individual. Furthermore, the state will represent the interests of the "nation" and therefore facilitate the tyranny of the majority. As a result, both freedom of the individual to act as a being with a complex identity, and pluralist democracy inclusive of all people, however they choose to define themselves, is impossible.

Externally, the national definition of a state requires that all other states are different. Therefore, in order to protect the "national interests" of the dominant group whose identity defines and is defined by the state, the state must enter into relationship with other states based on the concept of difference and competing interests. This in itself necessitates that relationships between such states can only be based on conflict, whether dormant, passive or active.

By promoting the concept of national self-determination throughout the globe, the UN is

not providing any long-term solution for war and the abuse of human rights. The UN, following such a course of action, might be able to remove war and violent oppression in the short term. In the long term, however, the creation of more nation-states, whose identity is based on the concept of conflict, can only lead to an escalation of violence and oppression.

What should the response of the international community be?

In East Timor

However, it is too late for the people of East Timor. The crisis has been allowed to reach a stage where no solution other than the creation of an independent nation-state is now possible. The creation of such a state will not be easy or quick. At the time of writing, independence is to be secured by UN military personnel working alongside the Indonesian army who have been fighting against such an outcome for a long time. Independence must be guaranteed by UN forces preferably comprising a majority of Asian troops to bring the rule of law and order to East Timor, and oversee the transition from occupied state to autonomous and pluralist democracy.

The pluralist element of democracy will be the most difficult to achieve, but also the most crucial. East Timorese¹ have been both the oppressors and the oppressed in the past years, yet any stable future for the area must allow for pluralism. Reprisals, however "natural" a response they may be, cannot be allowed to happen, and it will be the task of the UN to ensure that they do not. The establishment of such a state should also be facilitated by other international organisations such as ASEAN and APEC.

An International War Crimes Tribunal must be set up, as called for by Mary Robinson, the UN Human Rights Commissioner, and George Robertson, the future Secretary-General of NATO, in order to bring those guilty of atrocities to trial and punished under the due process of law.

In Indonesia

Democratic rule must be brought to Indonesia. There is no reason why Indonesia could not function effectively as a massive and diverse democracy, such as India. Yet Indonesia is dominated by the military in a way that India is not, the relationship between the government and the military is far from clear. First of all, an international arms embargo must be applied to Indonesia immediately.

Economic embargoes and the end to aid from the IMF should be threatened unless Indonesia's leaders sever all military links with East Timor, and allow free and fair elections in all of Indonesia, and end the channelling of aid into the military. If the conditions are not met, then the threats must be carried out. Economic embargoes will carry risks: Indonesia appears on the brink of democracy, and desperately needs to restore its economy in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis. Economic sanctions may halt or reverse both processes. It is also possible that withholding economic aid might set off a second Asian economic crisis. However, it must be made clear to President Habibie, the generals and opposition leaders such as Mrs Sukarnoputri, that Indonesia can only be held together by persuasion and not force, by democracy and not military dictatorship. Unless the international community ensures that democracy is irrevocably installed in Indonesia, any attempts to solve the East Timor crisis can only be temporary and cosmetic, and any attempts to prevent similar atrocities in the rest of the Indonesian archipelago fruitless.

Can similar crises be prevented in the future?

So far in 1999, both Kosovo and East Timor have shown that the international community in the post Cold War age is incapable of conflict prevention, and that its response to crises can only be considered after loss of human life, is *ad hoc*, disjointed, and too late. Kosovo and East Timor have also shown that intervention has only taken place where the interests of world powers (EU and Australia/UN) are clearly at stake, and

where the “CNN effect” has brought the horrors to the TVs of the world’s richest citizens. Rwanda was allowed to happen because it lacked both of these elements, while Chechnya is allowed to continue because Russia is strong enough to keep foreign intervention out.

Peace and Conflict prevention

The international community must redefine the terms in which it considers peace and conflict prevention, and prioritise conflict prevention. Peace is not the absence of war – peace is the circumstance in which war is impossible. Peace cannot be enforced, it is decided by the people and maintained through democracy and the rule of law. “Peace-keeping forces”, “peace-keeping missiles”, “arsenals for peace” are all contradictions in terms – whether such “peace-keeping” missions are carried out by the UN, NATO or other bodies, they do not bring peace, but prevent or end the articulation of war.

A strong lead in the reassessment of peace and conflict prevention must be taken by the Europeans. The European states with traditions of neutrality and/or conflict prevention must take the lead.

Firstly, European countries must de-militarise. The EU and USA together account for 80-90% of the world’s armament production. If the Europeans stop or significantly reduce the arms trade, the number of weapons available in the world will be massively reduced, and the USA might be persuaded to follow suit.

Secondly, European federalism, based explicitly on the rule of law and democracy at all levels of government, must be taken to and beyond the European Union to the international bodies, specifically the UN. Federalist institutional reform of the UN is a long-term project, but environmental change through a new attitude and approach is possible. To a limited extent, this has already happened: the international community no longer accepts the sovereignty of states but the sovereignty of people. NATO intervened militarily in the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia because, it argued, the right of people not to be oppressed by the state was greater than the state’s right to impose its will on the people. This shows a distinct shift in attitude from the days when there was no intervention (military or other) to prevent the Stalin’s gulags or Hitler’s concentration camps, to name but two examples. This attitude must be made general rather occasional.


Yet this attitude must be taken out of the military arena of world order and placed in the civilian. Not only is military force incapable of bringing peace, it is also undesirable and is always too late to prevent bloodshed. What is needed is an international system of law. Each crisis brings with it demands for Tribunals – but, like military action, these tribunals happen after the fact. A permanent International Criminal Court would establish self-determination of the individual and human rights as universal rights, be able to monitor human rights abuses when they begin and pass an independent judgement to be backed up by economic or political sanctions before the abuses escalate to the level of loss of life. Should sanctions prove insufficient, then as a last resort, judgements by the ICC would have to be enforced through independent UN Security Forces. Only through the international rule of law, arbitrated by an independent court, can the dominant policy of national self-determination, as espoused by the UN, be replaced by self-determination of the individual.

In the meantime, military force is still necessary. While “peace-keeping forces” may not bring peace in the long term, their prevention of the articulation of war is an important function. Yet the decisions for such intervention cannot continue to be taken on an ad hoc, geopolitical basis. There is an urgent need for an independent UN Security Force, controlled by a Security Council in which the European Union and other regional bodies take a full part in the decision making process. Only through such a mechanism could the relief, albeit belated, that was brought to East Timor also be guaranteed to cases such as Rwanda and Chechnya.

It is the Europeans, as a political community, who must take the initiative to force the USA to apply the federalism that determines its domestic politics to the international sphere. Institutional reform of the UN may still be a long term aim, but the principles of federalism can shape the way in which the international community acts and can be introduced earlier. Institutional reform will follow. Peace can only be achieved when the state ceases

to be defined in national terms, and simply becomes a convenient unit of administration for the people who live within its borders. Freedom can only be achieved when individuals have the right to determine his/her identity and how he/she is governed, and when that right is guaranteed by universal law. Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points came at the beginning of the bloodiest century in world history: why, at the beginning of the next, does the international community still cling to them?

¹ By which I mean the population of East Timor, regardless of ethnic identity



The Ratification of the ICC Started

William R. Pace

We have just passed the anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC). Eighty-three nations have signed the Rome Statute, which has been described as the greatest advance in the rule of law since the adoption of the United Nations Charter. Four nations have already ratified the Statute and three or four additional ratifications are expected in 1999. At the same time, important ICC-related resolutions continue to be adopted by intergovernmental organizations: by the SADC (South Africa Development Community) governments meeting in Pretoria (July 9), the Francophonie's Assemblée Parlementaire (July 7), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (May 26), CARICOM (Caribbean Community) Law Ministers (March 17), the Organisation of African Unity Ministerial Conference on Human Rights (April 16), the European Parliament (May 6), and Commonwealth Law Ministers (May 7).

In a preliminary assessment of the status of the ICC treaty, the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) predicts that another 20-30 nations may sign the treaty during the next 18 months, and during each of the next two years between 15-30 nations will complete the ratification process. Thus, the predictions that it would take 10-15 years to ratify the ICC treaty seem as miscast as the even longer estimates of how long it would take to adopt a statute.

Other developments reflect and add to the growing global momentum for the ICC. Within weeks of the adoption of the Rome Statute, Spanish courts requested the United Kingdom to transfer Chile's Augusto Pinochet for trial, a request twice upheld by the Law Lords. In a truly

historic action, on May 27 ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour announced the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, the first time a sitting head of state has been indicted by an international tribunal. Foreign affairs experts the world over predicted this would destroy all chances of ending the raging war in the Balkans. Instead, with great assistance from Finland and Russia, within two weeks a peace agreement had been concluded with Milosevic. It is now argued that the indictment actually expedited the peace process!

On June 28, both houses of the French Parliament met in joint session and approved an amendment to the French constitution for the purposes of ICC ratification, which is scheduled to be completed this autumn. Extraordinary, for only one year earlier this government was not included among the strongest supporters of the ICC. On July 1, Italy's Parliament approved ratification and on July 26 Italy became the first European Union nation to deposit its ratification with the United Nations. The CICC predicts that at least 12 additional EU member states will ratify during the next three years.

The globalisation of justice, led largely by the historic ICC process, is an amazing development in international affairs, and an antidote to so many other dark and dangerous global forces. The NGO Coalition for an ICC is aware that tremendous efforts must still be made, and that the dangerous forces – those emerging from chaos and as well as from ignorance – will threaten to undermine this great initiative. The only secure answer to these threats is to complete the establishment of the ICC. The NGO Coalition joins governments, parliaments, regional and international organizations in this great endeavour.

The Increasing Demand for International Justice

Anna Montani

Discussion regarding the role of international tribunals has recently intensified. The activities and presence of these courts have increased parallel to growing public concern with the safeguarding of human rights and democracy throughout the world. In turn, this concern has been fueled by the greater availability of information on the dramatic events that every day take place in every part of the world – such as the recent ethnic cleansing in the ex-Yugoslavia, which brought war to the doorstep of a peaceful Europe.

Our growing expectations of international tribunals represent the most tangible sign of the fact that humanity is becoming aware of the limits of international law, which was created to regulate relations between states, as well as national legislation, which governs relationships between citizens within individual states. To the extent that many problems in our daily lives take the form of the world's problems, what is needed is a system of law that can go beyond national borders to safeguard humans as humans, and not as members of a particular national community.

Although there is agreement on the need to regard *international law* in these new terms, it is not generally recognized that to do so it is necessary for this law to become *supranational* – that is, the operation of the organizations that administer it must be freed from the power and influence of states. It is no coincidence that the most controversial and delicate point of the current discussion concerns the efficacy of existing international organizations.

As they operate today, international courts are an anomaly among known legal systems. They

are established, and come into operation, outside of any specific state politico-legal system – they have their own rules and issue judgments, but have no real powers of constraint since they lack their own resources. In some cases, the same indictment proceedings can depend on the prior opinions of nations bound by the treaties that set up the court in question. In addition, the execution of sentences depends on the co-operation and the administration of the individual nations that accept the court's jurisdiction.

We can examine this first issue by citing a recent example. On 1 July 1999 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea passed its first judgement, relative to a violation of human rights (the tribunal was set up only three years ago). The incident in question occurred in October 1997, when a St. Vincent and Grenadines oil tanker came under attack by a Guinean patrol boat, which acted with aggression and without first issuing the warnings required by international law.

The Hamburg-based tribunal ruled that the Republic of Guinea had used undue force, thereby endangering human life. The tribunal ordered that damages be paid both to the Saint Vincent and Grenadines shipping company – assessed at slightly more than two million dollars – and to every member of the crew and person who was on board at the time of the incident.

This judgement is very significant, since it sanctions the notion that even a state can be obliged to compensate damage caused to the individual citizens of another nation. The judgement's enforceability, however, largely stems from the fact that according to Guinea's *raison d'état*, its governors are advised against breaking the

treaty under which it accepts the jurisdiction of the tribunal and, therefore, they endeavored to avoid conflict with the states to which the shipping company belongs, the ship's crew, and the countries' allies. The enforceability of the judgment therefore stems from political convenience, and not from the tribunal's constitutional power or the existence of prisons, bailiffs, or an international police force at the service of the tribunal.

An even more delicate issue is the operation of international criminal courts, who must bring to justice those who have committed crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague has been extremely busy in recent times dealing with crimes committed in the ex-Yugoslavia. Recently, the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic – the president of Serbia believed to be responsible, along with his collaborators, for atrocities against the Kosovars – prompted both public outrage and approval all over the world. The ruling on the case of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, in which he was stripped of the immunity he had held by virtue of being a former head of state, had a similar effect.

These types of cases reveal two sources of confusion that characterize the operation of international tribunals. In the first place, crimes against humanity committed in situations of intense political conflict highlight the contradiction of a world bent on pursuing universal values that has a political make-up governed by the mentality of the *raison d'état*, which at times is cruel and unjust. As highlighted in an article dated 13 June 1999 by Cherif Bassiouni, President of De Paul University College of Law's International Human Rights Law Institute: "Perpetrators of large-scale victimization are frequently the same persons with whom political settlements are necessary". For this reason, although arousing a great deal of interest and support among the public and having an important moral value, many of the judgements made by international tribunals are not carried through.

The second element of confusion is that the law implemented by these tribunals is, by definition, selective and depends on the world balance of power. In effect, it is the law desired, or permitted, by the strongest powers and their allies. For example, while Milosevic, a "friend" of Russia, was rightly indicted, the same proceedings were not brought against the president of Croatia – a self-declared pro-Western nation – who was responsible, some years earlier, for a similar variety of ethnic cleansing against thousands of Serbs. If the main aim of international justice is, as noted by Bassiouni, "to bring about some form of prevention and deterrence", then it "cannot be selective". Until now, however, as Bassiouni recognizes, international criminal law has never been free from political influence.

For the law to be non-selective, therefore, it must be wielded by organizations with the power to sit in judgement of all. The assertion of this principle is the major development represented by the International Criminal Court, established with a treaty signed in July 1998 in Rome. This tribunal has emphasized the need to bring individuals to justice, thus claiming the authority to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of states by relieving them of the decision to charge and sit in judgement of their citizens. This principle is fundamental for establishing a groundwork for supranational law. It has finally been put in place, but is encountering many difficulties as regards its acceptance and implementation.

The International Criminal Court will come into operation when it has been ratified by sixty states. The United States is yet to do this, and is displaying a strong resistance to allowing its citizens – particularly those involved in military operations – to be judged by an international tribunal.

Such limitations do not always emerge from the discussions presented by the mass media. Indeed, there is considerable confusion and misinformation regarding the effective operation of international organizations. To cite only

one of the many examples, the editorial in the 2 July 1999 edition of the *New York Times*, written by Tina Rosenberg, speaks enthusiastically of international tribunals, claiming they are a clear sign of the collapse of the sacred notion of the sovereignty of states – that is, the system that has influenced relations between countries since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. At the same time, however, while citing the reasons that led to the intervention in Kosovo, the article blatantly contradicts its own argument. The article is heavily nationalistic and one-sided when praising the work of NATO, criticizing the “non-humanitarian, non-universal, and eminently political” motivations of Russia and China in the recent war against Serbia. Rosenberg is stunned that there are people capable of believing that the NATO bombing of Serbia – which resulted in the slaughter of civilians – was motivated by the US government wanting to consolidate its position in the Balkans or to ensure the supply of oil in the Caspian Sea region.

The fact is that not only do we live in a world still governed by relationships based on force, but also international law is inadequate to avert recourse to war – the greatest conceivable crime against humanity from the federalist perspective – as an extreme measure for resolving world disputes. As Kant understood, what is needed to achieve true universal justice is a system of supranational law – a system, that is, that goes beyond the borders of nations, not only to protect individuals, regardless of nationality, but also, and in particular, to eliminate war from our future through the prevalence of reason and rights in relations between states. It will only be possible to say that this objective has been reached once there is a world state that is capable of implementing, through its institutions, a universal law.

Today we are a long way from reaching this objective. Nevertheless, there are signs that humanity has taken some important steps

forward, such as the current debate on international law, the increased influence of public opinion on governments to see that justice is done in particularly dramatic and high-profile cases, and current attempts by NGOs to equip world organizations with their own resources and, therefore, with effective powers of intervention overriding the sovereignty of states.

In this context, the example presented by Europe for the rest of the world is of great importance. The birth of a European Federation would constitute a tangible example of the fact that it is possible to construct a supranational state capable of exerting peace and law within an area that extends beyond national borders. Even today, for all their imperfections, European institutions are changing the relationship between the laws of Member States and an emerging supranational European system of law is causing the idea to grow in the minds of the public that justice is not confined to within national borders.

An article in the 29 July 1999 edition of *Le Monde* supports this view. The article reported that on 28 July the European Court of Human Rights ruled against France – home of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights – for having allowed its police to torture a Moroccan expatriate. The comments of Régis de Gouttes, Advocate-General of the French Court of Cassation, regarding the judgement were unusual and significant: “French law is essentially in tune with the European Convention, but the jurisprudence of the court obliges France to be more vigilant. The principles of the European Convention have revolutionized French legal practice. In addition, it has changed the relationship between judges and national laws – traditionally, the judge was entirely subordinate to the law as an expression of national sovereignty. The European Convention now prevails over national laws. It has therefore become a true ‘European constitution of human rights’”.

Fighting Once More against Child Labour

Barbara Francescoli

Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: "The undersigned acknowledge the right of children to be protected against economic exploitation and the execution of labour that is dangerous or conflicts with the right to education".

Today, in the world, some 250 million children work in often exploitative and hazardous conditions, and face injury, illness and even death: about half or 120 million work full time, while the remaining children struggle to combine work with schooling or other non-economic activities. The figure of 250 million working children is considered to be an underestimate: it does not include those who work in regular non-economic activities, such as providing full-time domestic service in the homes of their own parents or guardians. The number of such children is relatively large (about 15-20% of the total population of the same group). Globally, child labour is most prevalent in the less-developed regions. In absolute terms, Asia has the largest number of child workers (approximately 61% of the world total) as compared with Africa (32%) and Latin America (7%). Noting that millions of child labourers were "defenceless" and often did not have opportunities for proper schooling, the former ILO Director General Mr. Hansenne stated that child labour is simply the single most important cause of child exploitation and child abuse in the world today¹.

The Clean Clothes Campaign (some cases)

The Clean Clothes Campaign, begun in the 1990s, aims to improve working conditions in the garment industry, strongly condemning the use of child labour and other forms of exploitation.

For example, Nike is an American company, but almost all the shoes are produced outside the USA. It does not produce for itself: it is much cheaper to subcontract production to factories in Asian countries. There, the wages are much lower, independent unions are not tolerated, or are very weak; and also the laws complying with safety are less harsh. Nike knows the working conditions of the workers are poor: so, to support its image, the company wrote down a Code of Conduct concerning a minimum wage, overtime, child labour and safety in the workplace. The problem is that there is no monitoring of the suppliers' promises, so Nike shoes still are produced under very poor conditions.

A report published in the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* (October 18, 1999) reveals that Benetton is using child labour in Turkey for the production of its garments. Clean Clothes researchers also noted violations of workers' rights in plants that produce for this company in other countries (Romania, Madagascar). The workers there have made accusations of long working hours, forced and unpaid overtime, low salaries, lack of medical assistance, dirty working environments, and sexual harassment. Despite a social image built up through well-planned publicity campaigns, Benetton is one of the companies that is marked by a lack of transparency. The Clean Clothes Campaign urges Benetton to sign a code of conduct that contains the internationally-recognised labour-standards of the ILO and to accept independent monitoring of the entire production process.

H&M (Hennes & Mauritz) is the largest fashion chain in Sweden by sales and one of the biggest

and fastest growing retailers in Europe. Their goods are made in countries with low basic salaries. According to H&M, they drew up a set of rules for producers in 1994. The standard contract which was used prohibited child labour. In this regard the company referred to the UN convention on the rights of the child and to ILO convention n. 138. Finally, H&M stated that it has a series of criteria which enable the company to control whether a producer respects the requirements of H&M concerning workers and children's rights. When a producer does not respect these criteria, the contract will be terminated. However evidence of violations of basic labour rights by H&M suppliers kept coming up. After a television documentary in Sweden had shown child labour practices in the Philippines, the director of H&M was shocked and reacted rapidly: he called upon their clothes producers to sign a treaty in which they must state that they have no children working in their factories. As a result, in December 1997 a new code of conduct was developed, and it has become one of the important points within this case.

Conclusions

All agree that a key element in the struggle against child labour would be the parallel struggle against poverty. It would enable social and economic policies against poverty to focus on the needs of families and communities, with special emphasis on providing families of child workers with sustainable employment and income opportunities. Child labour is both a consequence and a cause of poverty, and strategies for poverty reduction are needed to address the root cause of child labour. The problem is primarily a national responsibility, and national governments must design policies and programmes aimed at providing productive employment attacking poverty. But it is also a world responsibility: efforts must be made at the international level to see in which ways the world community can be mobilised in a sustained attack on world poverty. Child labour is a one-world problem and we must be united in saying "no" to child labour and "no" to its causes.

¹ *World of Work - The Magazine of the ILO*, December 1997, n. 22



The Declining Superpower

Samuel P. Huntington's contribution to the debate on the future world order

Vera Palea

A significant contribution has been made to the debate on the future world order in a recent article by Samuel P. Huntington, entitled *The Lonely Superpower*, published by the US journal *Foreign Affairs*. In this article Huntington, an American political scientist, defines the current world system of states as “uni-multipolar”, because characterised by the presence of a superpower, the USA, and by certain powers dominant at regional level such as Germany and France in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in South-west Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa.

In this system, the United States represents the only global superpower, in a position to dominate every decisive sector of world power – economic, military, technological, cultural and diplomatic – and therefore of exercising a political influence which no other country possesses. The major regional powers, on the other hand, are able to play a role of supremacy only within their own region, not having the resources and influence to aspire to world hegemony.

Huntington also identifies a third level within the current world system, constituted by those states which he calls “secondary regional powers”, since they lack the capacity to exercise regional leadership; their interests are often antagonistic to those of the more powerful regional states. At this level we find Great Britain in relation to France and Germany, Ukraine to Russia, South Korea to Japan, Pakistan to India, Saudi Arabia to Iran, and Argentina to Brazil.

After the bipolar system which characterised the Cold War and a short period of American monopolism coinciding with the Gulf War, the current uni-multipolar system will last one or two decades, according to Huntington, before entering a truly multipolar phase. The transition from an uni-multipolar to a multipolar system will be determined by the further weakening of American leadership. Thus Huntington is taking up again the theory of the decline of US power in the world, maintained by Kennedy and Kissinger even before the end of the bipolar system and also espoused by Brzezinski¹ in *The Grand Chessboard*.

The decline of American hegemony, in Huntington's view, is evident if one considers that, although the United States is the only global superpower, the resolution of crucial questions for the international community increasingly often requires co-operation between the USA and the rest of the world. The two principal tools of coercion available to the USA – economic sanctions and military intervention – must be supported by other states if they are to be really effective, and that is decreasingly the case.

At home, neither the public opinion nor the American political class itself is willing to pay the costs and to accept the risk of US world leadership. Abroad, American leadership comes up against the growing intolerance shown by the rest of the world towards a monopolar order. Accusations of “financial imperialism”, of “intellectual colonialism”, and of the imposition of “coercive co-operation” are more and more frequent; the USA finds itself increasingly alone from the rest of the world on an ever-increasing number of matters (such as the question of UN

dues, sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Iraq and Libya, the failure to sign the treaty on anti-personnel mines, the failure to recognise the International Criminal Court, and, lastly, the military intervention against Yugoslavia).

Undoubtedly, the strongest response to American hegemony comes in the formation of the European Union and in the creation of the Euro. Despite this, Huntington objects that a coalition able to counter-balance the leadership of the USA has yet to emerge. In his view, the crucial element preventing the emergence of such a coalition is the cultural, and in particular religious, differences existing between the various regions of the world. In the multi-ethnic world of today, global politics necessarily involves countries with profoundly different cultures. Even the ideal of equality, characteristic of western civilisation, does not constitute a universal value and therefore a guiding ideal for non-western societies, which see hierarchy rather than equality as the natural relation among people.

Towards what kind of new international order are the states moving then? According to Huntington, the future planetary system will be the result of the interplay of two factors: culture and power. In coherence with his basic thesis – namely that the world is evolving towards the creation of regional units which are internally culturally homogeneous, but very different from and potentially in conflict with each other (the principal civilisations being Sino-Confucian, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, Western, Latin-American, Russo-Orthodox, and African)² – states with cultural commonalities will tend to cooperate, while those which present widely different cultures will develop antagonistic and conflictual relations which will inevitably lead to a clash of civilisations. According to this view, the fault lines between the various civilisations will then define the lines of clashing in global politics. In terms of power, the USA and the “secondary regional powers” will probably share the objective, and therefore the strategies, of limiting the dominance of the major regional

powers. For example, the US special relationship with Britain provides leverage against the emerging power of a united Europe; the US cooperates closely with Saudi Arabia and Japan to counter the respective plans for regional supremacy of Iran and China; or, again, US relations with Argentina have greatly improved with the aim of containing the emergence of Brazil as the dominant state in Latin America.

The interplay of culture and power suggests that the USA is likely to have difficult relations with the major regional states, though less so with those which are culturally similar. On the other hand, the USA will have an interest in establishing and intensifying co-operative relations with the “secondary regional powers”, although here co-operative relations will be closer with those states that have similar cultures (Great Britain, Argentina), rather than with those which have different cultures (Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Pakistan).

Finally, relations between major and secondary powers within each region should be less conflictual in the presence of cultural homogeneity (the EU and Great Britain, Russia and Ukraine, Brazil and Argentina, rather than China and Japan, or Israel and the Arab states).

If the power dynamic encourages rivalry, cultural commonalities facilitate co-operation, and the achievement of almost any major American goal in foreign policy will, in Huntington’s view, depend on the triumph of the latter over the former. In this context, relations with Europe take on a central role. In particular, considering the anti-American outlook of France, and the pro-American outlook of Great Britain on the other hand, Huntington believes that relations with Germany are central to US relations with Europe. Healthy collaboration with Europe is the prime antidote for the American loneliness.

As a multipolar system emerges, Huntington thinks that American leadership in maintaining international order should be replaced with a system in which it is the major regional state

which assumes primary responsibility for maintaining order by mediating internal conflicts. There is no reason why the United States should take responsibility for maintaining order if it can be done locally. Internal conflicts can certainly be better resolved by the leading states of the various regions rather than through external intervention. The intervention of the USA could thus be limited – but this affirmation proves contradictory in the light of the theory of American decline just expounded – to those situations of potential violence, such as the Middle East or Southern Asia, involving major states of different cultures and therefore involving clashes of civilisation.

The model of the system of states presented in this article clearly bears the hallmark of Huntington's ideological schema, in which the basic element of society is culture, and religion in particular. According to this hypothesis, it would be cultural patterns which determine relations between states and not *raison d'état*.

The first objection to this view is that the growing interdependence between peoples and states, brought about by globalisation, makes it possible, on the contrary, to identify in the convergence of *raisons d'état* the long-term evolutionary tendency of the new world order. The fact that many of the problems on which the very future of mankind depends have now taken on a global dimension – such as security, control of the economy and protection of the environment – is inducing the states to seek new common rules of behaviour, manifesting, weak though it may be, a convergence of interests. Obviously, to say that there is a convergence of *raisons d'état* is not the same as saying that there will be no more wars: nevertheless, the current tendency seems to be that of making law prevail over violence. An example of this is the establishment of the International Criminal Court, which indeed shows the need for a legal world order.

Huntington's vision therefore, which sees in the world a tendency to fragmentation into closed

and homogeneous civilisations in conflict with each other, thus preventing the construction of a rational political order which can embrace the whole of mankind and guarantee peace, can be opposed by the identification of a tendency, certainly very weak and therefore a long term one, towards convergence and even unification.

The second inevitable objection to the model under examination is that the multipolarism which Huntington refers to is of nationalistic stamp, and as such, cannot lead to co-operation between states. As history has sadly shown, since nationalism has always ruled out the idea of subordinating the states to a supranational power, it has finished up promoting the politics of power, which leads either to imperialist solutions or to the aggravation of international anarchy. Even the rule of non-interference by the international community in the internal affairs of the various regions – which the author upholds – involves abstention even in the face of serious violations of human rights, such as ethnic cleansing.

A counter-vision must be opposed to this vision: a logic based on overcoming the nation-state through the creation of federal structures, the only system which allows international anarchy to be held in check, and a rational and democratic political order to be built.

In this Europe can play a fundamental role, which however Huntington either ignores or does not understand. Huntington fails to grasp that the building of the European federal state represents the keystone of the future world order. The European Federation constitutes the starting point of world unification in two respects. First, the enlargement to the East will complete the process of bringing peace to Europe. At the same time, it can also constitute the institutional model of reference for other projects of integration in other regions of the world, looking towards the world federation which should, in turn, take the form of a "federation of federations". For this reason, a possi-

ble regression of the process of European integration could have devastating effects and lead to the failure of other integration projects already under way in Africa, Asia and the Americas.

The more Europe is able to integrate and unite,

the more quickly will progress be made towards the unification of mankind. And a common government of the world is certainly necessary if we want to banish the use of force in international relations, to build peace, and to solve global problems in an effective and democratic way.

¹ Cf. A. Falcone, P. Vacca, "Leadership for a New World Order?", in *The Federalist Debate*, XI, 1998, n. 2

² Cf. G. Borgna, "Towards a Clash of Civilisations?" in *The Federalist Debate*, XI, 1998, n. 2



Rethinking the “European Common Home”

Antonio Mosconi

The solution of Russia’s grave economic crisis and the consolidation of its recent and fragile democratic institutions represent the prime objectives for European security today.

Consider the population and income of the various zones of Europe compared to those of the United States¹: turning from the Union to the nineteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one cannot help feeling concern and scepticism over the uncertain prospects of enlargement. These countries have an average *per capita* income of three thousand dollars (something like that of China), but the quota of resources they allocate to defence is more than twice that of the EU. Their foreign trade with the EU and developing countries is growing rapidly compared to the traditional relations of integration between Central and Eastern European countries. These include Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Moslem countries, whereas the Christian religions are predominant in the EU; they aspire to a lay concept of the state which, as in the EU, allows the separation of the political from the religious sphere, but some of them are still threatened by the complex links between religious fundamentalism and political nationalism. The acceleration of the entry procedure for the principal countries of the former Eastern bloc, in contrast to the postponed consideration of Turkey’s admission, delineates an alarming scenario, aggravated by the lack of implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy².

If one then looks further to the East, where the per capita income of the four European republics which used to belong to the former Soviet Union has fallen to two thousand dollars, it is

hard even to imagine how the geographical, historical and cultural unity of Europe can ever be crowned by its political unity. And yet the prime trading partner of these four states, apart from the CIS itself, is the EU. Like “the Nineteen”, “the Four” too allocate twice the proportion of resources to defence that the EU does. The Orthodox Church, which is predominant in “the Four”, is not in harmony with the Catholic Church; the former had to learn to live with communism, while the latter celebrated its funeral rites, while taking exclusive credit for its demise. The contribution which Christian unity could make to the chances of peace is important, but in reality we have so far witnessed the identification of the various churches with opposing nationalist movements, not only at diplomatic level, but also in local wars.

With the end of Gorbachev’s political project, which had aimed to transform the Soviet Union into a federation capable of gradually steering the transition from soviet socialism to the social market, and thus to start a process of development through opening up to the world market and co-operation with the EU and the USA, most of the Eastern European countries have looked towards the European Union and towards NATO to rebuild prospects of development in a framework of security. Those who have studied the theory of *raison d’état* cannot fail to see how all this feeds Greater Russian nationalism and could re-ignite the flames of power politics. To prevent such a regression, which could cast the region back into darkness, even the most enlightened American plan³ is inadequate. The latter tries to hypothesise Europe as an “American outpost in Eurasia”,

capable of attracting into its own orbit Ukraine too, which is already pro-western, (unlike Byelorussia and Moldova, both pro-Russian), detaching it from Moscow. Such a manoeuvre, however, could not but increase Moscow's sense of insecurity and frustration, already dangerously high, reinforcing its most nationalist, revanchist and antidemocratic tendencies. The chance of peace cannot be seized if Russia itself cannot find its own ambit of freedom and security by securing its own links with the EU until they can be genuinely institutionalised. Whether the result is reached by a political strengthening of the OSCE, or by establishing a federation among federations, or even by setting a date, however distant, for Russian membership of the EU, is an important question, since the choice of means influences the realisation of the ends. For now however, and until the EU implements the CFSP, it is crucial to be aware of the strategic priority of avoiding the collapse of Russia.

A first reflection must be made on the strategy of enlargement. To us Europeans it appears that, for the building of the Union, the method adopted started with the market and will arrive, via the currency, at foreign and security policy. But this is not the case. First came defence and the currency (NATO and the dollar), provided by the Americans, then the market. The opposite course only concerned the winning of independence from the United States. This optical illusion could prompt us to propose the "community method", i.e. the order market-currency-defence, as the strategy for enlargement. I believe that one could not make a more serious mistake. An excessive faith in the capacity of self-regulation of the market in countries where this is lacking, and the extension of the logic of the "Maastricht parameters" to economies which can hardly call themselves monetary, would increase the probability of a profound and prolonged de-stabilisation of the former Soviet empire. The situation demands that references are sought rather in the mix of policies put in place by the Americans immediately fol-

lowing the Second World War: a Marshall Plan, then a defence community. This means turning upside down the order of priorities of the "Community method". Defence and foreign policy must once more assume first place, so that on the one hand, Russia can feel secure both in the western sphere and in relation to the Asian powers whose economic and military strength is rapidly rising; and on the other, the United States can be reassured by the Russia's entry (in whatever form) into NATO and not only into the European Union.

The currency, i.e. the euro, must precede the market and enable its completion, just as the adoption of the dollar as European currency preceded the formation of the Common Market. Only the economic and financial reform of Russia, which will be made possible by a "Marshall Plan" supported mainly by the EU, particularly considering the American incapacity to support a further burden on the already enormous foreign debt, can finally allow the largest European country to enter the continental single market and the global market. Only then will Schumpeter's "entrepreneurs" become the protagonists of Russian economic progress instead of the "buccaneers" evoked by Keynes.

A second reflection concerns the formulation of the plan. Russian-produced consumer goods will for some years yet prove inadequate to the sophisticated demands dictated by global competition. The theory and practice of five-year plans allowed industrialisation by forced stages and the production of the tanks and aeroplanes necessary to stop Hitler at Stalingrad, but they had catastrophic results when applied to the production of consumer goods. However, in order for Russia to put itself in a condition to present itself on the world markets, one cannot simply trust to the market. The resources on which Russia can draw to finance the immense investments necessary for *perestroika* essentially consist of energy, raw materials and the military industry, all sectors in which the American suc-

cess too owes more to planning than to the market¹. The exploitation of these resources requires strategic security and political stability (consider the vulnerability of oil and gas pipelines many thousands of kilometres long), an adequate financial plan and investments in the most advanced technologies; without forgetting the need to ensure the availability of food and

other consumer goods in sufficient measure to prevent the development of a Weimar scenario. Only a European Union government would have the necessary authority to draw up, along with Russia itself and with the United States, a strategy based on the sequence defence-euro-plan-market to prevent a grand collapse on our eastern "frontiers".

¹ 1996 statistics. Population in millions. GDP in billions of \$ at the current rate of exchange (World Bank method). *Per capita* GDP in thousands of purchasing power parity \$ (PPP\$, UN method). The figures in parentheses are on a scale of 1 – 100, where the corresponding US figure equals 100. The nineteen Eastern European countries are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Iceland, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary. The four European republics which previously belonged to the former USSR are: Byelorussia, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

	Population	Current GDP	P.C. PPP GDP
United States	270 (100)	7.263 (100)	27.358 (100)
European Union	372 (138)	8.586 (118)	23.064 (84)
Swiss and Norway	11 (4)	451 (6)	24.733 (90)
Eastern European Countries	189 (70)	549 (7)	3.093 (9)
Former Soviet Republics	214 (79)	441 (6)	2.060 (8)
Europe	786 (291)	10.027 (138)	12.690 (46)

² So far eleven countries which have applied for membership of the Union, eight of which previously belonged to the Eastern bloc (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Hungary), and the other three are situated on the fringes of the Arab-Moslem world (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey).

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, New York, Basic Books, 1998.

⁴ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1967.



Galileo: Europe is not Falling out of the Sky

Francesco Ferrero

Raised by the European Commission in a document dated 21 January 1998 entitled *Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network*¹, the problem of building a European satellite-based positioning and navigation system was relaunched during a debate which took place after the end of the Kosovo crisis on the creation of a European defense system independent of Nato.

GNSS systems (the acronym for *Global Navigation Satellite System*) consist of a network of satellites orbiting around the earth which, in conjunction with land - or vehicle - based receivers, enable users to fix their position anywhere on the planet and at any time with an extraordinary degree of accuracy (give or take anything from a dozen metres to a handful of millimetres). The technology was first developed in the United States around the mid seventies primarily for military purposes, and since then the massive potential for civilian applications has become compellingly apparent. Strategically, the technology can plot the position of any moving vehicle (including ships and aircraft) at any point on the globe, minute by minute.

It is being increasingly utilised for a host of different applications, from observing the theatre of military operations, to protecting territories from enemy invasion, and aiming so-called "smart weapons", which began to be used with growing frequency at the time of the Gulf War. On the civilian side, GNSS technology provides significant opportunities for optimizing land, rail, air and sea traffic, thanks to its ability to ease congestion and enhance safety, while reducing travel time, costs and fuel consumption, with obvious benefits for the environment.

Other possible applications include electronic toll payments, fertilizer sowing, fishing, driving for the sight-handicapped, predicting earthquakes, meteorology, crime prevention and prospecting for oil and gas.

To date there are two satellite-based positioning systems operating, both originally designed for military use: GPS, controlled by the US, and GLONASS, controlled by the Russian Federation. Both systems are based on a dual signal architecture featuring an encrypted high-precision military signal combined with a standard signal available to non-military users free of charge, but whose accuracy is artificially lowered to prevent the system being used for strategic purposes by enemy forces. This second type of signal guarantees horizontal accuracy to within 70-100 metres but does not offer adequate guarantees insofar as continuity and integrity. It may fail for brief periods of time and at certain latitudes; if a fault occurs, it can take up to 12 hours to advise users that incorrect data is being transmitted. Horizontal accuracy can be incremented to within centimetres using local enhancement techniques known also to civilian users and available at relatively affordable prices; nevertheless the inadequate continuity and integrity of both signals, including the military one, prevent the system from being used for critical applications like the controlled landing of an aircraft under low-visibility conditions², since the system was originally designed to provide levels of accuracy far lower than those required today. These very limitations are probably what lie behind the disappointing performance of the "smart" weapons deployed during the recent bombing of Serbia, which caused so many civi-

lian victims. It is against this background that the Commission raised the issue of defining a European strategy for satellite navigation, based on the following consideration: simply acknowledging the existing systems, and at most contributing to their enhancement, would put Europe at serious risk, specifically:

1. the prospects for an independent European defence strategy would be jeopardised;
2. European users could fall prey to excessively high charges or rates, if a monopoly situation were to develop (hardly a far-fetched scenario, considering that operating GLONASS is putting a severe economic strain on the Russian Federation) or if the unilateral decision were taken to put a price tag on the free signal;
3. the competitiveness of European firms operating in the positioning and navigation systems and services industry would be irremediably harmed. According to Commission estimates, Europe alone had a market in 1997 worth US\$ 229 million, a figure expected to grow to US\$ 960 by 2004³, of which European enterprises control just 15%. It appears highly likely that the US intends to exploit its strategic edge to secure a dominant position on the market.

According to the Commission, Europe has no choice but to make a significant contribution towards a global navigation satellite system. Based upon high level discussions held since 1998, it transpires that the Americans do not intend to share control of the GPS system with Europe. This stance is supported by strategic considerations and reflects the American decision to preserve the hegemony that its technological predominance has earned. Conversely, the United States would look favourably on the development of an independent European system that is compatible and fully interoperable with the GPS system; this would increase the overall strength of the system and enable GNSS services to be used for critical applications. On the opposing front, however, it emerges that

the Russian Federation is also keen to develop a new civilian system based on GLONASS, in full partnership with Europe. This option is strongly supported by the Commission because it would offer major benefits to both sides. The Russian Federation lacks sufficient resources to maintain and update GLONASS; Europe could make use of soviet know-how and of the highly desirable radio frequencies already available to GLONASS to build a system totally independent of the American system; the costs would be lower and the implementation faster, and Europe would climb out of the technological void into which it has fallen in recent years. Moreover, on the political front, this operation would strengthen ties between Russia and the European Union, and represent the first step towards creating a Euro-Russian security zone, which would guarantee stability in an area vital to European interests. The experiment could then be extended into other defense sectors, in the event that Europe should at last decide to opt for a single defense and foreign policy, releasing it from the protection of the US. The recent intervention in Kosovo showed that military might is increasingly based on technologies that support a sort of "remote controlled" war, a war that does not imperil the lives of military personnel. So in strategic terms, an independent European positioning system seems destined to outweigh the importance of nuclear and conventional arsenals, becoming a *sine qua non* for making strategic decisions independently of the United States.

The European pillar of the GNSS system, which the Commission suggests naming Galileo, would feature very high costs, estimated to be in the order of € 3 billion during the period 1999-2008, followed thereafter by an annual cost of € 205 million⁴. Considering that the GPS-GLONASS signal has been available free of charge up till now, it is likely that in the initial stages private users might not be overly interested in investing in the project; accordingly, it would need to be financed largely by public funds channelled through the Trans European Network programme, for which

the Commission has budgeted the sum of some € 5.5 billion within the framework of Agenda 2000, the Fifth Framework Programme, the European Space Agency budget and, if the private sector is also involved, via long-term loans from the EIB and EBRD.

Europe will be able to attract private capital to the project only if it opts for a certified, high-quality system with adequate risk coverage, that can be used, unlike the current systems, for critical life-saving applications. The US has already given the green light to a project for enhancing the GPS system with the addition of two new high-quality civilian signals, so Europe will have to speed up its decision-making or run the risk of losing the challenge once and for all. Returns on initial investments will have to be sufficient: according to Commission and ESA estimates, by the year 2008 approximately 100,000 jobs will depend on Galileo, and the relevant economic benefits could conceivably be in the order of 80 billion in the period 2005-2023, without counting indirect benefits such as traffic and pollution reduction, and so on⁵.

The project has already gained the full support of the European Parliament⁶; on the governmental

front, the ESA Council on 11-12 May 1999 allocated € 58.4 million to the project definition phase⁷ and the Council of European Transport Ministers (17 June 1999) passed a resolution inviting the Commission to embark without delay on the definition phase, to which € 40 million have been allocated, but also urging the European Union and the Member states to ensure the broadest possible involvement of private interests in the development and financing of the system, as this constitutes a critical factor in decisions concerning the future of the project⁸.

The story of the Galileo project tells us that after creating the Euro, Europe is now tackling the problem of defining its strategic role in the world. However, this project demands massive public investments and the political credibility required to attract private capital. The previous Delors Plan clearly proved that only a European government can meet these requirements. As long as national governments struggle to minimize the community budget, Europe will never be able to make an independent contribution to maintaining the world order, nor rise to the twin challenge of competitiveness and employment.

¹ Cf. *Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network: a European Strategy for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)*, COM(1998) 29 def.

² For further technical details on the functioning of the GPS system Cf. Thomas A. Herring "The Global Positioning System", in *Scientific American*, February 1996

³ Cf. *Galileo. Involving Europe in a New Generation of Satellite Navigation Services*, COM(1999) 54 def.

⁴ *Ibidem*

⁵ *Ibidem*

⁶ Cf. Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament *Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network: Including a European Strategy for Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)*, A4-0413/98

⁷ Cf. *Ministers shape the future of European space activities*, ESA press release, n. 17-99, Paris, 12 May 1999

⁸ Cf. 2191st Council Meeting - Transport - Luxembourg, 17 June 1999, C/99/134



European Union: a Model for Regional Unification

W. James Arputharaj

The European Union is a model for our efforts towards South Asian regional unification. We need not invent a new wheel. We can learn from the achievements and mistakes of the European Union. First, I will dwell on the need for regional unification and then look at how the European Union can be a model.

Rationale for Unification

Today, most of what is South Asia was once simply a large continent. The rationale for the divide between India and Pakistan was that Muslims would inhabit Pakistan and Hindus would inhabit India. This very criteria is anti-federalist in principle, as Federalism advocates structures to unite multi-plural societies. Practically speaking, there are few examples of a unipolar world or absolutely homogenous communities. Even if one takes the criteria seriously, it has not worked and it will never work. There are more Muslims living in India than the population of Pakistan and Bangladesh put together. Both India and Pakistan are still at loggerheads, with both following aggressive expansionist policies, increasing tension by producing nuclear arsenals, and increasing conflict across the border by raking up patriotism.

During the recent IndoPak Kargil conflict, if an Indian soldier was killed in action on the Pakistani side, in Pakistan he was called an intruder, and in India, he was called a hero. The same thing applied for a Pakistani soldier. Therefore, for the peace of innocent people on

both sides who were once one community, it is essential to have regional unification.

The enemy phobia in the region is enhanced to increase military budgets. The military establishment is a powerful lobby influencing policy. In Sri Lanka the military budget was as high as 6% of GNP in 1996 and in Bangladesh it is 1.6%. India and Pakistan spend a large portion of their GNP on non-plan expenditure, and the expenditure on nuclear R&D is not even under the purview of Parliament and the Auditor General of India. This is sheer wastage of resources which, when effectively used, could long ago have eliminated poverty, lack of primary health care and education, from the South Asian region. It is argued that the cost of one tank can build 20 schools across the country. The issue is between guns and butter!

It is a violation of human rights if a government is unable to provide safe drinking water to millions of people but can spend billions on "Agni" nuclear missiles. Hence regional unification is essential from economic necessity.

Further, in the region, India presently assumes a "big brother" role. There are people who argue that in such a hegemony, regional unification is not possible. India and Pakistan both consider their nuclear weapons as necessary for minimum deterrence, rejecting the idea of first use. The fact is, we in South Asia are more insecure than before but our governments say that nuclear weapons contribute to create greater security in South Asia.

The region is rich with resources. It is not

uncommon to find that while one area is experiencing floods, another area not far away will suffer from drought. The heavy rains in the Himalayas of Nepal in India will flood Bangladesh faithfully every year in the month of November. At least on this score, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has made considerable progress, and there is now the Barraka River Accord between India, Bangladesh and Nepal. Natural resources like rivers, which have no borders, cannot be enslaved by national sovereignty. Similarly, nuclear disasters will affect the whole of the region and the globe as well. Therefore, for global security the South Asian region should follow the path of European Union.

South Asia, the oldest civilisation in the world, is heading towards economic collapse, basically due to increasing foreign debt stemming from excessive imports. The principle of subsidiarity therefore assumes significance. Pakistan, India and the rest can help each others' economies to grow. For example, Bangladesh right now seeks expensive technical assistance outside the region, whereas other countries in the region could help. At present, barriers to trade exist, and the free movement of people is hampered. Regional unification therefore will preserve the multi-plural ethnicity of the region following the principle of subsidiarity.

In our region, we share more than a common identity, but also discrimination against girls and children, problems of child labour, and so on. Girl-trafficking from Nepal into India and child labour from Bangladesh could be prevented if we, the people in the region, take stock of the situation as a collective responsibility and attempt to solve our local problems using the federalist approach. Therefore, regional unification will solve basic problems facing the people of the region.

The EU Experience

The European Union is indeed a forerunner. Since the end of the 1940s, when the efforts towards

European Union started, there has not been any military conflict in the region. Stronger economic integration has indeed stabilised weaker economies within the region. The European experience inspires us to include the excluded.

There are many refugees within the South Asian region who are stateless, for example the Tibetans, the Chakma tribes, the Afghans, and the Sri Lankan Tamils. During my student days in Strasbourg, I watched with delight the proceedings of the European Parliament on Youth and Employment in Europe. The pre-federal structure therefore solves problems of mutual concern.

Alongside, our efforts should continue to democratise the UN. The UNPA is an important step in this direction. We should also try to influence the democratic process in Bhutan and Burma. The civil society organisations within the region run parallel to government. Since they are powerful, they should influence policy framework for the region. Serious consideration must be given to social and cultural impediments to political unification. Similarly, social factors which contribute to this political unification will be identified and strengthened.

I fear the possible rise of a European nationalism, and believe it must be avoided. We conceive our regional unification as part of the world federal structure. If we allow European patriotism, Asian and American patriotism, we cannot solve global problems as federalists.

The EU should also move away from common European security to that of global security and follow the principle of subsidiarity in encouraging other regional federations. The EU should be more committed to strengthening a UN peace-keeping force and not NATO. The UN is the first step toward federal World Government.

Towards South Asian Union

Several initiatives towards global peace have been taken in the South Asian region. Sri Lanka was a strong proponent of the law of the sea and Nepal has promoted the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. India and Indira Gandhi played a crucial

role in the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77. These initiatives should take the region towards greater stakes in global security rather than mere regional security. Global peace and harmony is our common responsibility.

Co-operation already exists between government bodies in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, in forming SAARC. Initially, they took up common programmes on cultural exchange, tourism, art and music. NGOs such as the Asian Youth Centre (AYC) influenced them to take up issues such as those relating to female children. They have also addressed issues of child labour, the environment and terrorism. Since this government mechanism already exists, we have to take this forward

towards our dream of a federal structure. All we need is a large minority of intellectuals to support the South Asian Federalists.

We in South Asia, need to put political Union first before even thinking of the rupee-dollar. The systems and federal structure need to be created. The word democracy is not new to the region. We are not only the region which would have the largest population in the world, but elements of democracy have been practised among tribal societies for more than 5000 years.

We strongly believe that the European Union, South Asian Union, South American Union, and African Union all together will contribute to the strengthening of a world federal structure based on democracy, justice, development and peace.



A Parliament without Sovereignty

Charles Gioja

Two months before the first anniversary of the Scotland Act, and three months after the first Scottish general election, the Scottish Parliament is a somewhat precarious reality, awaiting the move to its permanent seat and dutifully beginning to fulfil some of its many roles. The first national assembly in four hundred years according to some of its members, a fancy name for an administrative provincial council according to others, the Scottish Parliament is a victim of all the contradictions of the system of nation states that it attempts to challenge. This article is a brief review of the legal and institutional foundations of the Scottish Parliament, and an attempt to understand its identity and scope.

Section 28 of the Act claims that the Scottish Parliament "may make laws for Scotland". However, a line or two below we read that "this section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland". This is a peculiar arrangement. As long as Westminster declines to intervene, it seems, the Scottish Parliament can make laws. Then, as soon as the Parliament of the Kingdom convenes, the Scottish Parliament is instantly reduced to being a consultative assembly.

Section 29 gives a list of "reserved matters", subject matters which the Scottish Parliament is not allowed to discuss. Items such as foreign policy, or social security, are, as expected, at the head of this list. However, these matters are not really "reserved" in a strict sense: the British Parliament can still interfere at will, in that the restriction only operates on one of the sides.

Section 30 clarifies the meaning of the previous

two sections. "Her Majesty may by Order in Council", in other words, the British Cabinet may by simple administrative decision, "make any modifications" to the list of reserved matters, as long as the territorial jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament remains within Scotland. In other words, the Scottish Parliament is not only subject to the national legislature, but also to the executive. This is in contrast with the claim that the Scottish Parliament is, in any sense of the word, indeed a parliament, and even further removed from the federalist understanding of what a regional assembly should be.

One of the main issues of confusion is the concept of sovereignty. The traditional definition of sovereignty in the national history of Britain aims to make the Monarchy, and secondarily the British Parliament, legitimate objects of national loyalty. Therefore, the sovereignty of the British Parliament is identified with the absolute power of making laws for Britain, outside of any formal constraint, by virtue of national investiture. In this light, a written British constitution is deemed unnecessary, because a national parliament represents the will of the nation in a way that is at once more flexible and more accountable than written law. Similarly, sections 28 to 30 of the Scotland Act are explained away as means to ensure that the British Parliament retains its "sovereignty", and to avoid the dissolution of British national unity.

This ideology differs greatly from the federalist understanding of sovereignty, and even from those definitions commonly accepted in other, related national traditions. In the Constitution of the United States of America, for example, the sovereignty of the federal government (the

monopolies of army, money and nationhood) does not affect the constitutional rights of the State legislatures to make laws affecting all areas not explicitly given to the federal government by the Constitution. It seems to be clearly possible to have a sovereign state which maintains separate institutions with separate levels of government and citizenship, and safeguards the rights of all parties by means of a federal constitution.

However, the British government, in drafting the Scotland Act, pushed for a different solution. How effective can this solution be? The claim that the Scottish Parliament is really a Parliament for Scotland is misleading in many ways. First, the Scottish Parliament is not a Parliament within Scotland, because Scotland is not a sovereign state. Second, it is not a Parliament in the United Kingdom, because national ideology forbids the existence of a system of balances between regional and federal institutions in Britain. Third, it is even less of a Parliament in the traditional British sense, because, as opposed to having absolute powers, it has no power at all.

We are left with a poorly understood institution which is forced to play many parts, depending on who is controlling it. For instance, were the Scottish National Party to win the next general elections, it could predictably manipulate the national ideology of British sovereignty, described above, to claim that a Scottish Parliament can only mean independence (else it would be of no use). On the other hand, a certain Conservative majority in Westminster could easily lead to wasteful disputes over issues that, in any reasonable federal system, should pertain only and exclusively to the regional government (issues such as, say, land reform). The new

Scotland Act, and the Scottish Parliament, seem then to be designed to amplify conflict rather than mediate it.

It would seem as if the British government has fallen prey to its own ideology. In the European context, a sort of mirror image of Scotland from a British perspective, the most efficient solution is often abandoned for the most ideologically reassuring one: the sovereignty of the nation state is nominally defended even when it leads to virtual paralysis on the international scene. However, the ills of nationalism can hardly be cured by more nationalism, also because the process, as in the case of Scotland, can suddenly backfire.

However, the Labour government does not lack ambition. There is no doubt that the issues of regional devolution and supranational integration are peculiarly connected, in so far as they are symmetrical elements of the century-long death dance of the nation state. The only coherent framework that encompasses both, while affirming the rational values of democracy and statehood, is that of federalism. Hence the Scottish Parliament, essentially, shares in the same dilemma that is affecting the European Parliament. Both would greatly benefit from a European constitution that would increase their powers. Both would lose out if they allowed national governments to have their way in setting their agendas, which would be afflicted by those same contradictions they are meant to resolve. In both cases, the dangers of imbalance are obvious, but it is up to the federalists to show how an integrated equilibrium according to federal principles is exactly the solution everyone is looking for.

The Origins of the Algerian Crisis

Djilali Ould Braham

We publish this article, which was written before the Bouteflika era and the opening of the process of national reconciliation, because it reconstructs the origins of the Algerian crisis, throwing light on the most recent events occurred in this country.

Faced with the tragic evolution of the situation in Algeria, many foreign observers ask themselves the following question: how could it get like this? Or how did this metamorphosis come about that has tipped Algeria into another age? One explanation is present in all minds: it was the halting of the electoral process of 1992 which led Algeria into this situation. The eagerness with which people subscribe to this explanation is where the problem lies: apart from too easily satisfying simplistic minds, it corresponds to the cruel truth that foreigners have not understood the Algerian crisis.

An initial observation is essential: in Algeria it did not all begin this year, nor in 92, nor in 88, nor with independence. The crisis, which has dragged down the situation, began before all that, and the answer to the question necessitates appealing to several disciplines at once to better define the objective reasons for the crisis and its evolution.

The crisis, which is shaking Algeria, has its origins in the national movement of the 40's, when the definition of Algerian identity was the subject of discord within the PPA/MTLD. On the one hand the wing led by Messeli Hadj advocated an "Arab-Muslim Algeria", while the other wing wanted to define it as "Algerian Algeria", with all its elements. This crisis was arbitrarily settled by inscribing the Algerian identity as "Arab-Islamic", after all opponents of this definition had been expelled from the party. The independence of the country in 1962,

which should have been the ideal moment to re-claim its historic memory, was, alas, no more than a relentless continuation of the same policy. Thus the FLN power which emerged from the national movement perpetuated this line and institutionalised the state by confirming the *ulamas'* slogan, "Algeria is my country, Arabic is my language, Islam is my religion".

The nature of power since 1962

After independence in 1962, the battle for power was declared between the *maquis* of the "interior" and an army stationed "outside" the Algerian borders. Ahmed Ben Bella, supported by Colonel Houari Boumedienne and his "border army", seized power before the latter overthrew him in a *coup d'état*, on 19 June 1965.

The notion of a single party and the establishment of a Jacobin state were imposed, with the banning of opposition parties: the PCA was outlawed on 29 November 1962, the PRS of Mohammed Boudiaff in August 1963, and later the FFS of Hocine Ait Ahmed. Most of the opponents to the regime were imprisoned or exiled.

After the death of Boumedienne in 1978, the FLN appointed Colonel Chadli Benjedid as third president of the Algerian republic. The latter merely carried on the policy of his predecessors until he was ousted by the army on 11 January 1992 because of his shady deals with the FIS.

The system is blocked

A new post-war generation in the 70's, led by a young and pugnacious intellectual elite, engaged in a patient struggle to reclaim their identity. This culminated in the events of Kabylie in

1980, commonly known as “the Berber spring”. The demonstrations were of course suppressed, but they produced, for the first time since independence, a full-scale public counter-debate in a country functioning on the principle of unanimity, and so projected the Berber question onto the national scene; but meanwhile a movement of another nature was born right under the government’s nose and even with its blessing. This movement is distinguished by its extremism and its retrograde vision, but what are the reasons and factors which have contributed to the birth and development of this movement?

State fundamentalism and the birth of political Islamism

The various concessions made to the “Arab-Islamist” clan in power represents the first official sign of the birth of the Islamist domain. These concessions, which are of a political order, concern the most sensitive domains and institutions which form society.

a) The educational system (school): the FLN power which emerged from the national movement put education (the school system) into the hands of the “Arab-Islamists”, as early as the 70’s. The latter appealed to their Egyptian and Syrian fundamentalist “brothers” to co-operate in the Arabisation of the schools. Here it is important to point out that these pseudo-volunteers are all Islamic extremists of whom their governments wanted rid.

b) The family code: on 29 May 1984, Parliament adopted the family code despite many protests about its content. This code, inspired by Islamic law, makes the Algerian woman a minor, so that polygamy is legalised and women are forbidden to marry a non-Muslim. Like the few progressive women’s groups, the fundamentalists reject the family code, but because they find it is not sufficiently in accordance with Islamic law. And so they find the opportunity to spread their ideology, since they find a source of encouragement from those in power.

c) Places of worship (the mosques): the increase in places of worship, which have so far been controlled by the authorities through the Minister for Religious Affairs, creates an increased need for “imams” as state employees. Thus the preachers closest to the Islamist circles profit by this shortage; the preachers of the “private” mosques feed Islamist mobilisation by spreading their ideology and conducting the campaign for a so-called moralisation of a society which they consider ungodly.

Since it is impossible to explain all factors in a text of this length, we can summarise this chapter in the words of Khalida Messaoudi: “it is desecration committed within the institutions of the republic”, in the judiciary system and in the media, in particular television, which are at the origin of this phenomenon. Nevertheless other factors of another order have played their roles: the cultural desert in which Algerian youth has lived and continues to live, the deterioration of the socio-economic situation, shortages and unemployment after the fall in oil prices in 1986, and finally the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran in 1979.

The political victory won by the Berber spring of 1980 laid the premises for the evolution, which resulted in the demonstrations in Oran in 1982, Constantine and Setif in 1986 and the events of October 1988. The MCB (*Mouvement culturel berbère* – Berber Cultural Movement) was not only a cultural movement: it has always been part of a broader perspective, which is why its organisers were encouraged to extend the range of their demands, as shown in this text by Said Sadi, principal actor of the MCR and currently president of the RCD (*Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie* – Union for Culture and Democracy): “After the struggle for recognition of the Berber culture, respect for fundamental freedoms and academic freedom, the organisation of the children of martyrs of the war of liberation appeared. (...) After broad exchanges within the Movement and after seeking advice from other institutions concerned ... we decided to establish an Algerian Human Rights League”.

The upheaval of October 1988 and its repercussions

One year before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, Algeria saw the collapse of the one-party system, which with the army formed an authoritarian framework surrounding the whole of Algerian society. Then the race began between “the democratic pole” and “the Islamist pole” to present themselves as the alternative to the FLN one-party system. In 1988, the situation had become visibly explosive because socio-economic problems – the accommodation crisis, unemployment, shortages of all sorts – had created unrest and discontent among the people. Tensions also existed at government level, tensions which appeared hard to solve except by the masses.

The clashes of October 1988, which left more than 500 dead among the rioters, profoundly shook the state and Algerian society. The Islamist activists showed their importance in popular mobilisation and the charisma of some of their leaders. On the other side, a democratic pole tried to form: on 10 October a group of 70 Algerian journalists issued a *communiqué* denouncing the ban on objective reporting of events, the non-respect of press freedom, and attacks on human rights. A national committee against torture, created at the end of October, rallied academics and trade unionists; they called for profound reforms of the political system, the end of the single-party system and the guarantee of democratic freedoms. Hence these clashes marked the end of one epoch and the beginning of another.

Multi-party system and political turmoil

On 23 February 1989, a massive majority of the Algerian people approved the new constitution, which in article 40 establishes a multi-party system, and once more political parties saw the light of day. The RCD, created by Said Sadi at the national assembly of the Berber cultural movement at Tizi-Ouzou, was legalised. The RCD championed the principle of separation between politics and religion, in other words

secularity, while recognising the Muslim dimension in Algeria. On the other side of the political chessboard, the *Front islamique du salut* (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) led by Abassi Madani advocated the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Algeria; it was legalised by the Hamrouche government on 14 September 1989. Former opposition parties whose leaders lived in exile obtained their legalisation, such as the FFS led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, and the MDA, led by Ben Bella.

Between 1989 and 1990, 44 parties were established, and human rights leagues, independent women’s associations and cultural movements developed. The formation of public opinion was above all linked to the circulation of the printed media: journalists flung themselves into the creation of newspapers. In 1990, several national dailies were established, such as *El Watan*, *Le Matin*, and *Liberté*, which rapidly supplanted the traditional *El moudjahid* in sales and circulation. The process of democratisation was real, but still quite far from a genuine multi-party system, for the FLN remained omnipresent.

The singularity of the FIS

Having begun in Algeria in the years 1974/75 with the movement of “Muslim brothers”, fundamentalism has largely developed thanks to its organisation. The FIS, which is the official expression of this Muslim religious fundamentalism, re-entered the political scene after 1988. Although it rejects the constitution since it demands the application of Islamic law, this current has constituted itself in political terms and makes extensive use of the mosques as a platform to spread its ideology. Article 5 of the law on political associations specifies that “a political association cannot be created and active on an exclusively denominational basis”. One might therefore raise an eyebrow at the assent accorded to the FIS.

Resolutely placing its vision of the national environment beyond the borders inherited from the war of independence, by its constant refe-

rence to an “Islamic *umma*” – the community of Muslims – the Islamists placed themselves outside the classic trajectory of Algerian nationalism. The economic context is also a factor in the development of the FIS, spearheaded by the transition from a centralised economy to a market economy. In this spirit, in 1991, the FIS inaugurated its first “Islamic souks”. This party, which bases its political action on the Muslim religion, is seen by its rank and file as a return to the traditions of a mythical nation destroyed by the arrival of colonialism. Hence they conceive of Islam not only as a faith, but also an organisation of society, a legal code and a way of life. They therefore consider not only that secularity is unimaginable, but also that they are entitled to demand the application of Islamic law; and that the Gulf War revealed the demonisation of democracy conceived as a product of the west and not as a universal principle. Ali Belhadj, a charismatic figure of the FIS, declared in the course of a sermon on 6 October 1989: “democracy is foreign in the house of God, be on your guard against those who come and tell you that the notion of democracy exists in Islam. Only *Choura* (dialogue) exists, which has its rules and its constraints. We are not a nation which thinks in terms of majority–minority. The majority expresses itself by the truth.” But in the end, the crucial element in any account of the process is this: the FIS did not fall from the sky, in any strange or circumstantial manner. It is on the contrary the result of a history begun long ago by Algerian nationalism. The FIS has not come from nothing, but finds the sources of its dynamism in a complex past, as we have seen, which is still functioning in the present; to understand this history allows us to rid ourselves of simplified images.

The interruption of the electoral process: historic error or patriotic duty?

The armed insurrection launched by the FIS back in 1992 reveals yet another reality: world stability is played out not only in the east, but also in the south. After the landslide victory of

the FIS at the first round of the legislative elections civil society organised itself to save Algeria from mortal chaos. It was thus that the trade union group UGTA, women’s associations, and political parties, chief of which was the RCD, appealed for the electoral process to be halted, and created the CNSA (*Comité national pour la sauvegarde de l’Algérie* – National Committee for the Protection of Algeria). Some months later, the FIS began the policy it would pursue over the following years, which consists of grabbing power even if it means resorting to arms. We should point out, however, that this movement resorted to arms well before 1990, beginning with the assassination of the progressive student Kamel Amzal, on 2 November 1982 at the FAC of Algiers, and with the insurrectionist movement (MIA) led by Bouali in 1985.

Westerners always like to point out that the FIS won the elections of December 1991. And here, the fundamentalists of democracy join those of Islam. We recall that it was the democracy of the Weimar Republic which allowed Hitler to accede to power. If, at that time, some German patriots had used force to stop the march of the Nazi party, they would certainly have been condemned by the unquestioning supporters of democracy.

The first targets of Islamic terrorism were the *intelligentsia* of the country, so that journalists, doctors, teachers, magistrates and politicians were the first victims of this killing machine. Then came the turn of the economic institutions (factories, schools, businesses and others) and finally it was generalised to all strata and categories of the Algerian people.

Seven years later, what is the score? Thousands of dead (Algerians and foreigners), thousands of widows and orphans, thousands of millions of dollars lost in economic sabotage and the crisis continues, but why? The answer is both simple and complex at once: the government has never attacked the matrix of terrorism, which is political Islamism, and above all this government makes compromises with the Muslim-conservative forces within the state institutions

themselves, i.e. the more the government backs down before the democratic expectations - aspirations - of the Algerians, the more the Islamists persist.

Except for the Boudiaff period (January - June 1992), all his successors, both presidents and governments, have tried to negotiate and come to terms with the Islamists, but also none of them has presented a clear social and democratic programme.

The role of Europe

Although the outcome of the crisis depends above all on the Algerian people themselves, let us consider the question of the role which Europe has played since Algeria gained independence, particularly since the emergence of Islamic terrorism.

As we mentioned above, the new generation of militants which appeared during the 70's and which campaigned on human rights and democracy was only supported in Europe by a few isolated voices who saw in this battle their own, and history has done nothing but justify the rightness of their stance. But after 30 years, what is the position and the role of Europe? Alas, once more, while women, young people, trade unionists, journalists, intellectuals, artists and others who form civil society in Algeria daily defy fear and wait for their European counterparts to listen to them and support them in their resistance in the face of barbarity, the latter have done nothing, with the exception of a few voices in France, Belgium and Italy. By this inaction leaving the field open to the allies

of the cut-throats, the European capitals have become rear bases offering the Algerian terrorists logistical support and platforms for propaganda since 1992.

Seeing the failure of their logic of war, thanks to the resistance of the people, the Islamist executioners appeal to their western political allies who, under humanitarian pretext, cast doubt on the authors of the crimes ("who is killing whom?"); but also and above all undertake such dangerous initiatives as the "contract of Rome", which means signing a peace pact in Italy and continuing the war against the people in Algeria. Why does international opinion pursue this policy of double standards, in which people condemn fundamentalism in Tel-Aviv, Cairo and Kabul, but when it comes to Algeria they want us to negotiate with the GIA. This determination to deny the truth is similar to that which held sway during Nazism and Stalinism.

The Algerians know their cut-throats, and as for those who propose that they negotiate with the criminals, let them do it first in their own countries. The solidarity which the Algerian people are waiting for is that solidarity which means that they are not politically, economically, socially and culturally isolated from the rest of the world; that women and men like them reject obscurantism and oppression in all its forms; and that the battle they are fighting has meaning. Quite obviously this solidarity is lacking and will remain so until Europeans realise that what is at stake in Algeria is also important for European society: in other words tomorrow's plan for Algerian society and history will bear witness before both sides.



International Peace Making and the Crisis in Kosovo

Lucy Webster

As Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, the universal sense of outrage that has been provoked by the present crisis in Kosovo should “give every future ‘ethnic cleanser’ and every state-backed architect of mass murder pause”. It should also give us all pause as to how the international community acts to redress gross violations of human rights. While the principle of humanitarian intervention is important, most instances in history have been self-serving for the country undertaking the intervention and have not, on balance, benefited the people in whose name the intervention took place. Consequently, this essential principle should be applied with diffidence and sensitivity.

The principle of international action to stop or to prevent gross violations of human rights is essential because it puts people before states. This concept, putting people first, also needs to be honored in finding the means for taking action. Clearly the people of Kosovo have not benefited from the action that NATO has taken in the name of humanitarian intervention. No matter how many of the Kosovar refugees are able to return home in safety, the last months will always be a terrible tragedy for them.

There is also a permanent tragic loss to the economy and culture of all Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the cost to NATO will prove to be many times the two billion dollars spent every year on the UN basic budget including its peace-keeping budget and its minuscule expenditures on preventive action. Economists Allied for Arms Reduction is planning to examine the costs and

potential efficacy of security through alliances compared to security through global institutions.

NATO was the wrong instrument; bombing was the wrong action

Bombing was wrong because it was predictable that it would give cover to the police and military of Yugoslavia to do whatever they chose to force ethnic Albanians to leave their homes. It was wrong because experience shows that bombing stiffens the solidarity and resistance of those who are bombed. NATO was the wrong instrument for action to arrest gross violations of human rights in Yugoslavia because it is perceived by many people in Central and Eastern Europe and throughout the world as a military pact designed for Western control for the sake of Western international interests. It is not an impartial actor that could have provided the best way to implement a Security Council decision, even if there had been one.

How the United Nations can be used to prevent war and degradation

The Security Council could have given a green light for preventive action, peace making, and some form of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo within the framework of existing international law. The discussion which took place in the Council provided a basis for UN action. What was needed was a readiness to act through the United Nations by the permanent members of the Council in a form that would have been strongly endorsed by most non-permanent members and

not vetoed by Russia or China. This might have been done without a formal resolution. Or, had Russia and China been kept in the loop during the various negotiations from Dayton through Rambouillet and Paris, a Council resolution might have been formulated on which Russia and China would have abstained, leading to action by the Secretary-General.

If action is to be taken at the initiative of the Secretary-General when there is clear agreement on the part of most of the international community, it will be necessary to have an action-ready standby UN Peace Keeping Force, which does not now exist. There are a number of admirable plans for UN Rapid Reaction Forces that have been developed by various governments and by concerned civil society scholars and groups.

These plans have not been endorsed by the permanent members of the Security Council – a fact that civil society actors can change. If those five key countries would give firm support to such a plan and offer to contribute logistic assistance, action would be possible once the will of the international community is clear. This would be in line with the long-standing practice of keeping the major military states out of UN peace-keeping units, but in for logistics. At the same time it would

be different from the past if the governments and citizens of the P5 and other influential states would make a commitment to assertive international action.

The support of most states in the Security Council is critical, but, even if it is not forthcoming, it is unwise to give up on the United Nations' legal mechanisms. If the Council will not endorse action to maintain peace, then it is possible to act legally through the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. This can be done with the Chapter VII rights normally enjoyed only by the Security Council, to act with or without the permission of the territorial state.

The aim is to help the people

Humanitarian intervention with light forces designed to prevent violations of human rights on the ground would be able to do what bombs can not do. Such units would be able to deter coercive action against civilians by local police and military forces and keep records of clear crimes against humanity. Such action would curtail such crimes and could more readily lead to compliance with the norms of international law. These norms are recognized by the Government of Yugoslavia in principle if not in practice. Crimes that could not be denied would be less frequently committed.



The Future of the Balkans

Elisa Zanardi

The war in Kosovo has officially ended. Although it is difficult to say what that really means to the people who live there, since fighting, death and suffering continue. However, it was already clear that the signing of peace agreements would have only been the first step towards normalisation, that they would “solely” put a halt to Nato air strikes but certainly not put a stop to centuries of hate and rivalry which were stirred up, according to many, by this recent Western interference.

There is no need to continue the debate on the timeliness of the attack since thousands of words have been spent and it now seems to be a closed chapter. The issue at hand is post-war reconstruction and it is of no small proportions since not only does it involve those who will be responsible for re-building and the concrete amount of aid (which in itself is difficult to assess), but above all the political strategy of reconstruction on which the future of peace in the Balkans will be based. Evidently, a reconstruction plan will have to be tied to clear confines aimed at stabilising peace and democracy in the area, otherwise it would merely strengthen Milosevic and paradoxically prepare him for further atrocity.

Talk of a new Marshall Plan in the Balkans has been heard and it is an obvious comparison, even though the conditions of Europe and the world in 1947 were certainly different to those of today. Europe was fundamentally readier for peace after World War II than what the Balkan peoples are at present, especially considering the trouble spots where fighting is still going on. In these areas, poverty and lack of confidence in a better future are embittering ethnic conflicts thus splitting

social tissue even further. There is no governing class able to grasp the importance of putting political renewal in these nations before economic renewal, in order to reach a living standard that is certainly not comparable to ours but at least safeguards human dignity.

In addition, Western interests are different to what they were 50 years ago: at the time America needed Europe to contain the pressure of the communist block, while nowadays Europe must stem poverty in the Eastern countries and check possible breeding-grounds of war to stop the have-nots flooding across its borders, as well as contrasting the threat of war, which has been contained to date in a relatively small region but could in future spread to all the former communist countries and become unmanageable in this instance or even worse lead to the risk of another world conflict.

Therefore, all the EU members, i.e. rich Europe itself runs the risk of being “balkanised” if it does not come up very soon with a foothold or some hope for the Eastern countries which are torn by centuries old hate and rivalry; but let us not forget that these nations have been annihilated by economic and financial disasters, which have brought them to their knees and deprived them of any initiative, particularly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Given this general overview of how Europe today differs from the Europe of the Marshall Plan, it is still to be hoped that something like it will be set up in the Balkans. According to Yves-Thibault de Silguy, European Commissioner, speaking at a G7 summit in Washington, 30 billion dollars will be needed to re-launch the eco-

mony of former-Yugoslavia, i.e. simply to repair war damages. It has still to be decided who will actually meet this onus (although it seems to be taken for granted that it will fall on the European Union, yet it is not easy to prove why Europe alone should shoulder the burden of a war which it did not choose to conduct autonomously, be it due to incapacity, cowardliness or debatable *laissez-faire*); on the other hand Europe on its own should come up with a political proposal to develop as a premise to aid administration. It goes without saying that a European foreign and defence policy is called for to implement this project and to bring to an end the horrors we have experienced to date.

At the same time it is essential that the nations to which Europe directs its aid prove themselves ready to develop an integration policy and lay aside local nationalisms at least in the name of economic welfare, as a step towards a gradual entry into the European Union. This is, in fact, the way to get rid of Milosevic and all those like him who have played on such ravaging conditions to pursue their own base and personal interests. The European Union should become an example to follow and a driving force but certainly not alone.

The world as a whole, and not only a part of it no matter how powerful, will have to find an accord on this delicate issue. The way in which the war ended, in fact showed us that neither America alone, nor Nato reached the much sought after peace treaty, but rather that the G8 did, including Russia, let us not forget this. Once more, this confirms that in a highly interdependent world, nothing can happen without the involvement of all its parts, and the more difficult and critical the issues, the greater the need for transversal accords. The UN is currently the only international organisation representing all the world's nations: therefore, it is the only organisation which will be able to enact a peace plan, which will be carried out in the bosom of the European Union, but only through compromise and agreement within the United Nations.

Rugova: The Fragile Colossus of Kosovo

Cristina Frascà

This is the title of a recent French work about Ibrahim Rugova, the current president of the Kosovo Democratic League. The disdain of Jean-Yves Carlen (one of the co-authors) and a militant of MAN (Movement for a Non-Violent Alternative) stems from the statements made by Rugova when he was a hostage of Milosevic. At the time he claimed he was against NATO air strikes, however he promptly took back his words upon his arrival in Italy: "I never said I was against the bombing. It's propaganda". After being a hostage of Milosevic he is now a NATO hostage. Likewise his stand on the degree of Kosovo independence has been equally changeable.

During the negotiations at Rambouillet, Rugova favoured regional autonomy for Kosovo in the bosom of Serbia, but again at the end of the war, he increased his demands and claimed the right to self-determination and therefore complete independence for his nation: this was a shameful concession to rampant nationalism in the Balkans.

As a comment, we reproduce (for those who do not remember it) the famous reflection of Machiavelli on unarmed prophets: "It is necessary ... to examine whether the innovators are independent, or whether they depend upon others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out their designs they have to entreat or are able to compel... Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have conquered and unarmed failed" (*The Prince*, Chap.VI).

Founded an Intergroup for a European Constitution

Giovanni Biava

The European Parliament had its opening session on 19 July 1999, in Strasbourg. The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were directly elected by European citizens on 13 June. UEF and JEF organised a demonstration in front of the Parliament, demanding real institutional reform of the EU through the creation of a European Constitution. Over 100 federalist activists participated, from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Spain. They demonstrated under a huge banner proclaiming “European Constitution Now!” and waved green federalist flags. There were also many placards with the portrait of Altiero Spinelli (as the best warning to the new MEPs) and many banners in various languages voicing one common expectation: “European Parliament wake up! It’s Constitution time. It is time for a federal Europe”. A smaller group of fifty activists gathered again on the morning of Tuesday 19 July as the MEPs arrived at the Parliament for the official opening session, where they reminded the MEPs that their primary duty is to work to satisfy the expectations of the citizens of Europe for a stronger, more democratic and more effective European Union.

Guido Montani, the Secretary-General of MFE (Italian chapter of the UEF) talked with Nicole Fontaine, immediately after she was elected President of the European Parliament for the term 1999-2004. She confirmed her commitment to achieving a European Constitution. The federalists gathered significant statements of support also from Gil Robles (former President of the European Parliament) and other MEPs, who encouraged us to continue to support the idea of the role that a democratic

European Union could have in the “Old Continent” and in world affairs as well.

A group of MEPs, who are also members of UEF, have decided to create a federalist intergroup in the European Parliament, called the “Intergroup for a European Constitution”. These include Jo Leinen (President of UEF and member of SPD Germany), Monica Frassoni (from the Belgian Green Party and former JEF Secretary-General), Gianni Vattimo (from DS Italy), Guido Bodrato (from PPI Italy), and Demetrio Volcic (from DS Italy). They demand the involvement of the European Parliament in the next Intergovernmental Conference on an equal footing with the representatives of the member States. In the meantime they also expressed their willingness to work on a draft of a European Constitution to be proposed to the Governments and Parliaments of the Member States.

On 15 September, an Intergroup for a “European Constitution” was formed at the European Parliament’s Strasbourg session. The Intergroup is the result of a successful initiative launched in July by 14 MEPs from the EPP, the ESP, the ELDR, the Greens and the EUL. In fact, a total of 125 MEPs from all of the different political groups in the EP expressed their interest in such a parliamentary initiative for a European Constitution. On the occasion of its constituent meeting, chaired by Jo Leinen (ESP, D), the group vowed to win a majority of MEPs for the following objectives:

- a new method for revising the treaties, ensuring the effective participation of the European Parliament;
- the constitutionalisation of the European Union;

-
- a dialogue between the European Parliament and national parliaments on this constitutionalisation;
 - a large-scale debate with citizens and organisations of civil society about the constitutional future of the EU.

The Intergroup, which will meet regularly on the occasion of the Parliament's Strasbourg session, intends to exert strong political pressure

over the next few months regarding the scope and new method for the revision of the treaties, as well as regarding the legal status of the EU charter of citizens' rights.

A first steering committee has been formed; its members are: Jo Leinen (ESP, D), Alain Lamassoure (EPP, F), Andrew Duff (ELDR, UK), Monica Frassoni (Greens, B), Mihail Papayannakis (EUL, GR), Carlos Carnero Gonzalez (ESP, E) and Cecilia Malmström (ELDR, S).



International Seminar on European Constitution

The Union of European Federalists (UEF) together with the Young European Federalists (JEF) and the International Federation of Europe Houses (FIME) organised an international seminar taking place from September 23 to September 25, 1999 at Europa-Haus Marienberg (Germany) on the question of European constitutional developments.

Present at the meeting were about 100 participants from twelve European countries, amongst them current and former Members of the European Parliament, various EU and national officials as well as a number of well-known European academics. Elmar Brok, MEP (EPP), underlined the need for the extension of majority voting in the Council of Ministers in view of

the projected enlargement of the EU. Andreas Gross, Director of the Wissenschaftliche Institut für Direkte Demokratie Zürich, made a plea for the introduction of direct democracy at European level, and Prof. John Pinder (UK) outlined the ideal division of competencies among EU institutions. UEF President and newly elected MEP Jo Leinen (ESP) emphasised the need for a "method change" as regards the revision of EU treaties and demanded reforms allowing a much more effective participation of the European Parliament in this process.

Other topics being discussed were: *Elements of a European Constitution, the Charter of Basic Rights, and Europe's Cultural Dimension* (p.v.).

It's Time for the Constitution

Growing mobilisation among citizens

Daniel Hulas

After the last European elections, which saw many candidates declare their support for a European Constitution, it is worth taking stock of the actions undertaken by UEF-France in the context of our Campaign for a European Constitution.

Appeal to the citizens

On 1st July 1999, 860 people supported our Appeal, thanks to the effective work of several federalist militants in bringing it to the people, particularly in Ile de France, Rhône-Alpes and Midi-Pyrénées.

Letter to the political parties

In the context of the European Parliamentary Election Campaign, we asked for the views of the lists of candidates. Some – and the most prominent ones at that – did not consider it worthwhile replying to us: this was the case of the two lists which declared themselves in favour of a federal Europe: the new UDF list (Union for French Democracy), led by François Bayrou, and *Réinventer l'Europe, l'écologie – les Verts* (Reinvent Europe, Ecology – the Greens) led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Dominique Voynet.

We quickly pass on to the *Parti de la loi naturelle* (Natural Law Party), for whom “your federalist approach to Europe is very attractive” and calls for “a united Europe, which respects the cultural diversity and integrity of each of its members, where the power of decision-making is decentralised so that problems can be solved at a local level”.

The *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR – Rally for the Republic) presented its approach to us in its “European Charter for the Union”. It declared

“all our efforts must aim rather at creating a strong European Union capable of acting, while preserving the diversity of political, cultural and regional traditions”. It wants to “integrate the new democracies of Eastern Europe as rapidly as possible, to build the Europe of all Europeans”. It intends to “provide the Union with a genuine capacity for autonomous defence by fusing the WEU with the Union, thereby constituting a European defence industry”.

For the RPR, “the moment has come to clarify the institutions, to recast the Treaties as a whole, by drawing up a document presenting the constitutional principles on which the European Union will henceforth be based. We want to give a new weighting of votes in the Council, adopting the principle of the double majority: that of the states and that of the populations. But the states have to be able to oppose decisions which threaten their national interests”.

Le Mouvement des citoyens (The Citizens' Movement), in a laconic response, declared that “the federalist illusions have now been defeated and the successful outcome of an enlarged Europe can only be confederal”.

Le Parti communiste français (The French Communist Party) “is not in favour of federalism in Europe”. The manifesto of the candidates on the list *Bouge l'Europe* (Move Europe) states that “today France and the world need Europe, a Community of peoples and nations where people want to be, and, together and in equality, to build a peaceful power able to stand up to the American empire, while spreading another message throughout the world: shared prosperity, solidarity and law”.

In a telephone conversation, those in charge of the list *Écologie, le choix de la vie* (Ecology, the choice of life) presented by Antoine Waechter, assured us they share our federal vision of Europe and that they are on the same wavelength as the ideas of Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

Le Parti Socialiste, with its list Let's build our Europe led by François Hollande, wrote back to us saying that it intended "to consolidate and clarify the Treaties in order to produce from them a Constitution of the European Union, including the writing of a fundamental Charter of civic and social rights of the citizens". It deplored that fact that the ballot method remains unchanged in France. It proposed "that the next European Parliament should launch this constituent process, which would be based on a Charter of fundamental civic, economic and social rights, on the basis of broad-based consultation with European political, civic and social forces". Finally, it is worth "advancing, with those European states in favour, towards a common defence and a European defence industry". It called for an "extension of majority voting in the Council, wherever it is desirable" and for the Parliament to have "the power to co-decide European laws with the Council".

Ventotene Seminar

60 members of JEF gathered on the island of Ventotene for the annual seminar *European Union, Federalism, and International Democracy* which examined the federalism as a political theory and its application to the European Union, in order to build a Europe governed by democracy and the rule of law at the international level. Aspects of other forms of international governance, such as NATO and the UN, were also considered and their relationship to the EU (*l.d.*).

We note the courageous initiative of Franck Sérusclat, the socialist senator from the Rhône, who, at the National Convention of the PS "Nation/Europe" (27 -28 March 1999), proposed a strongly federalist text, taking up the proposals of our appeal in their entirety. But this was not reflected in the PS account.

Approaches to MEPs

The remarkable work undertaken by our European Secretary-General, Bruno Boissière, with the outgoing MEPs, has proved productive. About a hundred of them, belonging to seven of the eight political groups, supported the Appeal. Among them were 12 French MEPs, some of whom signed the text, thanks to the efforts of our sections Paris IDF and Rhône-Alpes. The commitment of Pervenche Beres (PES), Jean-Louis Boulanger (EPP), Bernard Castagnade (ERA), Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens), Olivier Duhamel (PS), Dominique Saint-Pierre (ERA), André Soulier (EPP) will be remembered. In France, all deputies and senators have been canvassed – with little response, though we note the support of Marie-Hélène Aubert, André Aschieri, François Léotard (MP) and Franck Sérusclat (Senator).

UEF Contributions during the European Election Campaign

A personalised letter was addressed, individually, to the first 10 or 20 candidates on the "main lists", inviting them to come out in support of our Campaign. This initiative was carried out by our regional sections Rhône-Alpes and Midi-Pyrénées for the "regional" candidates. Candidates supporting our campaign in the Midi-Pyrénées region were Gérard Onesta (Verts), Alain Filiola (PS), JM Baylet (PRG), Françoise de Veyrinas and JM Rivière (UDF), and Joan Claret (Catalan in Spain). In Rhône-Alpes, we received the support of Thierry Cornillet (*Parti Radical*), and Jean Bollon, *Conseiller Général* of Savoie. The Lyon federalists had a strong presence at the political meetings of François Bayrou, François Hollande and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, with appreciable results.

Although they did not answer our “Appeal to the political parties” it is clear, on examination of the party literature, that two main lists clearly declared their federalist convictions: those of François Bayrou and of Daniel Cohn-Bendit. We will merely quote extracts from their manifestos.

La Nouvelle UDF declares that the drafting of a Constitution is the peoples’ business, and that it must include (in preamble) the fundamental rights and duties of the European citizens, but also the distribution of competencies between the Union and the states. The UDF also proposes the extension of the qualified-majority voting procedure and, for the European Parliament, genuine power of control over the executive authorities of the Union, and election by proportional representation in the context of regional constituencies for MEPs. The UDF recommends the creation of a genuine Defence Community, as a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, based on a policy of Union military research and the European arms industry. For the UDF, the European Union is a federation in the process of being constituted, uniting the states, nations and peoples. This federation is the best guarantee of the national and regional identities (proximity, decentralisation).

In their manifesto, *les Verts* (the Greens) call for a democratic and federal Europe, by the drafting of a federal Constitution and a Charter of fundamental citizens’ rights. They call for the reinforcement of the powers of the European Parliament and those of the regions, and for the right to vote and eligibility to be extended to all foreign residents. As partisans of a European index-linked guaranteed minimum wage and of a guaranteed social income from the age of 18, they want to develop a socially responsible economic sector which creates new types of jobs. They call for a redefinition of the CFSP and, in the longer term, the replacement of NATO by a security system for Europeans. They are in favour of a Senate of the Regions and of the peoples of Europe, alongside the Assembly of deputies representing the citi-

zens, which will eventually replace the current Council. The Greens hope for a European Parliament directly elected by proportional representation on the basis of transnational lists. “We defend the federal Europe, with a Parliament endowed with genuine powers, a responsible Commission and increased transparency of the institutions; Europe must be given back to the citizens”, declare Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Dominique Voynet.

On the basis of these analyses, the UEF France made a public statement in a press *communiqué* of 11 May, asking the electors to vote for one of the lists which declared itself clearly in favour of a genuine European Federation, including the need for a Constitution. All these actions of the UEF were the object of numerous press *communiqués* to the national and regional media: these received little coverage, except in the regional press of Midi-Pyrénées.

Relations with other organisations

The UEF stance and campaign were widely publicised among European associations. *Citoyens du monde* reported extensively on it in issue n.118. The ICARUS network came out in favour of a European democratic Constitution, as did the *Rassemblement civique pour l’Europe* (Civic Rally for Europe).

On 18 February 1999, the UEF, AFEUR, *Groupe X-Europe*, ARRI, the Liaison Committee of the European Movement IDF, and the *Jeunes Européens France*, organised a colloquium on *A Constitution for Europe*. It was attended by 210 people, and showed broad agreement for a European Constitution. The proceedings are available from the National Secretariat. On 27 May, our president Martine Méheut and Robert Toulemon represented UEF at the round table organised with the club *Vouloir la République* and the *Jeunes Radicaux*. *Vouloir la République* came out in favour of a Constitution, and Pascal Louap and Aloys Rigaud, national President and IDF of the *Jeunes Radicaux*, affirmed the commitment of their Movements and joined our campaign.

What is the Millennium Forum?

Rik Panganiban

“Millennium Fever” has struck everywhere – from hysteria regarding the Year 2000 computer bug to religious revival – and the United Nations is no exception. The UN General Assembly has decided to call its fifty-fifth session at the end of the year 2000 the “Millennium Assembly” highlighted by a high level “Millennium Summit” bringing together heads of state to United Nations headquarters.

In addition, the Secretary-General has been asked to prepare a report to the Millennium Summit/Assembly, taking into account consultations with governments, intergovernmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations. In light of this, non-governmental organizations have organized a “Millennium Forum” to take place from May 22-26, 2000 at UN headquarters.

The stated purpose of the forum is to assemble the innovative ideas and proposals of non-governmental organizations and civil society from all levels, seeking to create not only a new vision for the future but also an organizational structure whereby the peoples of the world can participate effectively in global decision-making.

While the Forum is intended to create an “organizational structure” for people to participate in global decision-making, it is important to note that the Millennium Forum is a one-time event, not an annual assembly. A similarly named network called the Millennium Peoples Assembly seeks to create a permanent forum for civil society at the United Nations, but should not be confused for the Millennium Forum.

The general theme of the forum is *The United Nations for the Twenty-First Century* with the sub-themes of:

1. Peace, security and disarmament
2. Eradication of poverty
3. Human rights
4. Sustainable development and the environment

5. Facing the challenge of globalization: achieving equity, justice and diversity
6. Strengthening and democratizing the United Nations and international institutions.

WFM and the steering committee of the Millennium Forum encourage groups at all levels to participate in the Forum activities. WFM Executive Director William Pace serves on the Executive Committee and the Consultative Council of the Forum, as well as chairing the thematic group dealing with legal and institutional matters. World Federalist organizations will probably be most interested in sub-theme six on strengthening and democratizing the UN. But the other themes will also be important for Federalist groups to be involved in.

There were a series of regional meetings convened by the UN regional offices on the Millennium Assembly which invited the participation of representatives of civil society. The schedule for the regional hearings included:

- The Western Asia Regional Hearing for the Millennium Assembly, 23-24 May 1999 – Beirut, Lebanon
- The Africa Regional Hearing for the Millennium Assembly, 24-25 June 1999 – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

For more information or to become involved, contact

Millennium Forum Secretariat

866 UN Plaza, Suite 120
New York, NY 10017-1822, USA
Tel. +1 212 803 2522
Fax +1 212 803 2561
e-mail: mngof@bic.org
web: www.millenniumforum.org

- The European Regional Hearing for the Millennium Assembly, 7-8 July 1999 – Geneva, Switzerland
 - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 1-2 September 1999 – Santiago, Chile
 - Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 9-11 September 1999 – Tokyo, Japan
 - A final North American regional forum is scheduled for January 24-25, 2000 in Chicago, United States.
- Thematic groups have also been formed around a host of issues from the disabled to globalization. Further consultations and meetings will certainly take place over the next few months, culminating in a series of thematic reports that will be transmitted to the UN Secretary General.

The actual Millennium Forum event will take place at UN Headquarters in New York from May 22-26, 2000. From 1500-1800 representatives from global civil society will be invited to participate in the forum, with priority given to geographic, gender, and thematic balance. (Plans are underway to involve other civil society groups through video simulcasts and Internet communications.) The results of the forum, and its regional and thematic groupings, will be communicated to the Secretary-General and governments participating in the Millennium Assembly/Summit. The end result of the Forum will thus be a massive package of recommendations from global civil society obtained through a massive effort of worldwide consultations and dialogue. On a more general note, the Millennium Forum will come and go sooner than we think, like the many global convocations that came before it. What matters is that we as World Federalists utilize this and every opportunity to push forward the ideas, initiatives, and campaigns that bring us closer to our eventual goal of a governed world. The Millennium Forum and the Millennium as a historic event in general are such opportunities. I foresee that the Millennium (which really does not begin until 2001, anyway) will be a time for intense reflection and inspiration for many people of the world. Many people will be reflecting on the world in which they find themselves and wonder if there should be a better way to solve the global problems we all face. If we are savvy and strategic, we can reach these people with our important message.

Perhaps the Millennium will be the crucial lever for us as a world movement to advance our cause of a just and democratic world order.

A New Name for Japanese Federalists

The Annual Assembly of the World Federalists of Japan, held in Tokyo on 27 April 1999, passed a resolution to change the current name of the organisation (United World Federalists of Japan). The new name is now World Federalist Movement of Japan. The day chosen for the inauguration of the new name was 6 August, the 51st anniversary of the establishment of the Japanese federalist organisation and the 54th anniversary of the explosion of the nuclear bomb over Hiroshima (*ll*).

German UNPA Initiative

Andreas Bummel

The German world federalists are collecting support among the members of the European Parliament from their country on the project of an UNPA. The project aims at the initiative within the European Parliament in order to draft and pass a resolution early next year, calling the European Governments and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the establishment of an UNPA into the agenda of the Millennium Assembly. Up to now, 17 MPs (out of 99) have expressed their interest to support the campaign, 8 of them are ready to join a WFM Parliamentary Group in the EP. Three members of the Bundestag have declared their readiness to support an UNPA-initiative in the German Parliament, among them a former minister. The project to be launched officially in early 2000 combines the parliamentary approach with a media campaign in order to raise public awareness.

WFM Resolution on the Kargil War

The recent conflict between India and Pakistan around the line of control has demoralised the spirits of the people in India and Pakistan who have forged alliances against nuclear proliferation – the Indo-Pak Citizens Forum against nuclear arms. There has been tremendous co-operation between the people among the South Asian region, particularly between India and Pakistan. The recent conflict clearly therefore puts people versus governments. People on either side witness that when a soldier dies he is called a patriot, while when a soldier of the opposing country dies it is said that an intruder has been killed. Whom one country hails as an intruder becomes a heroic soldier for the other side. What both sides fail to understand is that so many lives of people and soldiers are taken away because of the unwanted war across the borders.

Why This War?

More than specifically giving in causes to the origin of the present conflict it will be worthwhile to focus whether the conflict is within the framework of United Nations. India claims that Pakistan did not respect the line of control while Pakistan claims that it is the people of Kashmir's right to self determination. Since both India and Pakistan are signatories to the UN Charter, they should subject themselves to UN mediation. UN not NATO soldiers should be placed on the line of control. The actual line of control decided in 1962 at the Simla Agreement is a difficult territory where soldiers cannot be placed during winter. Therefore, the line of control is violated in sum-

mer and the soldiers vacate it in winter. The UN should refix the line of control.

This situation warrants that India and Pakistan need to sign the CTBT. However, India may claim that CTBT falls short of comprehensiveness and still holds the monopoly of nuclear weapon states. In the absence of any other UN instrument to control the nuclear race, India and Pakistan should subject themselves to CTBT.

It is not merely a conflict between India and Pakistan, as both have been puppets in the hands of their superpowers during the Cold War. War as well as the internal conflicts are encouraged by multinational arms exporters. Both governments are spending enormous military budgets as high as 4% of the GNP, which otherwise would have eradicated poverty long ago. Further, the tension in the region is not enabling the South Asian solidarity and therefore there is a need to strengthen South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). As this report is filed the war still goes on.

WFM

- *appeals* to both the Governments of India and Pakistan to invite UN Secretary-General as a mediator.
- *appeals* to both the Government of India and Pakistan to ratify CTBT.
- *emphasizes* that all UN resolutions should be respected and that all area disputes should be dealt with in an open, civilized and non-military manner striving for giving the involved people the best possibilities for active democratic participation.

The Hague Appeal for Peace Conference

Gouri Sadhwani

Civil society held the largest international peace conference in history on May 11-15, 1999. Over 9,000 activists, government representatives and community leaders from over 100 countries attended the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference. During the four day gathering participants discussed and debated in over 400 panels, workshops and round tables mechanisms for abolishing war and creating a culture of peace in the 21st century.

Participants included representatives from 80 governments and international organizations, and hundreds of civil society leaders including: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, Queen Noor of Jordan, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Arundhati Roy of India, Rigoberta Menchu Tum of Guatemala, and Jody Williams from the Landmines Campaign.

This event marked the centennial of the first International Peace Conference, which began in May 1899 in The Hague. This first conference was the beginning of The Hague process, the process of active interaction of civil society and governments to prevent war and control its excesses, which ultimately brought several conventions on warfare, including the treaties under which Slobodan Milosevic is accused of war crimes, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice, both in The Hague, the League of Nations, and the United Nations.

This Hague Appeal Conference was made even more significant because unlike the UN global summits of the past decade, this conference was organized entirely by civil society,

not governments. The UN did not receive the governmental support needed to convene a global summit on peace. So, the people organized it themselves. The Hague conference proved to governments that civil society is serious, desperate, and fed up with war.

The conference launched an action-plan, the Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century, containing 50 detailed programs which set the international agenda for coming decades on conflict prevention, implementing human rights, peacekeeping, disarmament, and coping with the root causes of war. Hundreds of civil society organizations from many countries collaborated over a year on producing the Hague Agenda.

The conference was a living example of what is known as the new, or democratic diplomacy – the collaboration of civil society, governments and intergovernmental organizations which has already proved its effectiveness in bringing about the treaty to ban landmines, the statute creating the International Criminal Court and the World Court opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

The Hague Appeal for Peace also successfully redefined peace as not only the absence of conflict between and within states, but also the absence of economic and social injustice. From this belief, we brought together environmentalists, human rights advocates, humanitarian aid and development workers and others who have traditionally not thought of themselves as “peace activists” to work together for the development of a sustainable culture of peace.

Some conference highlights

1500 youth participants showed us the peace movement is alive and kicking, producing a great Youth Agenda for Peace and Justice; Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis reached an unprecedented peace agreement on Kashmir; Ethiopians and Eritreans held a dialogue on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict; young people from Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus wrote a 4 page "Timetable for Peace in Cyprus" action-plan; sports was proven to be a powerful medium for promoting peace and friendship in "basketball diplomacy" – a 3 day tournament in which the Californian youth team of Athletes United for Peace played local Dutch youth teams; five Nobel Peace prize winners participated in the conference, as well as HM Queen Noor of Jordan, heads of UNICEF, UNESCO, UNIFEM and the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan. Messages of support were sent from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (via video), Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela and Graca Machel; two prime ministers, a deputy prime minister, two foreign ministers and ambassadors spoke and PM Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh agreed to mail the Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century to heads of state around the world (she has done this already!); the Hague Agenda has been submitted as a UN document, will be translated into all UN languages, and will be formally presented to the Fall 1999 UN General Assembly.

The Conference also launched seven key initiatives, all of which are looking for individuals and groups to join them. They are: the International Action Network on Small Arms (hrwatchnyc@igc.org), the Global Campaign for Peace Education (mailbox@ipb.org), Global Ratification Campaign for the International Criminal Court (cicc@igc.org), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (icbl@icbl.org), Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (wagingpeace@napf.org), Global Action to Prevent War (info@globalactionpw.org), and Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (beckerj@hrw.org). Additional campaigns launched at the conference include: a call for a global ban on depleted uranium (mtpdu@ime.net), a campaign to end genocide

(gstanton@wfa.org), and an international network on disarmament and globalization (ssstaples@canadians.org).

Where do we go from here?

The Hague Appeal for Peace sent a delegation to the Centennial Conference of "Friends of '99" the governmental meeting commemorating the 1899 first Hague Peace conference. Hosted by the Netherlands, this legal expert level meeting reviewed the 3 agendas of 1899: armaments, the pacific settlement of disputes, and international humanitarian law. Another delegation attended the second round of the governmental meetings in St. Petersburg on June 22 to discuss implementation of the agenda areas. The Hague Appeal for Peace is one of only three non-UN member states invited to participate in these governmental meetings, the others being the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Hague Appeal's participation in this meeting made history as the first governmental level meeting in which a civil society delegation has sat with government delegates as equal partners with equal rights.

The Hague Agenda will also be presented at the Millennium NGO Forum in New York, June 2000, and at many other international meetings. Report back meetings are happening around the world as word spreads about the success of the Hague conference and the Hague Agenda is distributed and discussed. New regional coalitions are forming, for instance a South Asian Agenda for Peace and Justice has developed. We are creating a world database of all the organizations which participated in the conference, to facilitate networking. This database will soon be available on our website: www.haguepeace.org.

The purpose of the Hague Appeal for Peace gathering was to unite the diverse elements of the international peace and justice movements in an appeal to our governments and the citizens of the world to find ways to end war. As Peter Weiss put it, we raised, in a serious and realistic way, the

question of whether, at the end of the bloodiest century in history, humanity can find a way to solve its problems without resorting to arms; whether, from the next century onward, war is still

necessary or legitimate; and whether, given the nature of the weapons currently in arsenals and on drawing boards, civilization can survive another major war.



Kofi Annan's Address

My dear friends and fellow workers for peace, thank you for that wonderful welcome! I cannot tell you how heartening it is to see you all here this morning. I don't mean just your sheer numbers – though that is impressive enough. I mean knowing how many different countries and continents you come from, and what a great variety of movements you represent. I mean the thought that so many people in so many places, and in so many different ways, are devoting themselves to the cause of peace. Not just casting a vote every four or five years. Not just giving a few dollars now and then – or guilders, or even euros! Not just signing the odd petition when someone pushes it under your nose. But really working, day in, day out, to make things change.

The United Nations, as you know, is an association of States. Some unkind people have even called it a trade union of governments. But, I have always believed it needs to be much more than that, if it is to make any real difference in the world. Not for nothing did our founders begin the Charter of the United Nations with the words "We, the Peoples". They knew that States exist to serve peoples, and not the other way round. At that moment, the world was just emerging from a war in which over 50 million people had died; in which whole countries had been laid waste; in which great cities had

been reduced to mile upon mile of smouldering rubble. Our founders knew that people all over the world were looking to them to make sure that such a nightmare would never be repeated. It was that hope, that expectation, which they captured so unforgettably, in words that echo down to us across the decades: "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

My friends, I cannot pronounce those words before you this morning without a feeling of deep frustration. We all know how far, far short of fulfilling that great expectation we still are. Forgive me if I think first of all my fellow Africans, who are feeling the scourge of war today, even as we speak. The genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have at least received world-wide publicity, even if far too little effective international action... In Africa as a whole, there are now some 4 million refugees, and probably at least 10 million internally displaced persons. Africa has the largest share of conflict today. But, no part of the world is immune. This morning, our minds focus especially on what is happening here in Europe. At the end of this century, the scourge of war has returned, with a vengeance, to the continent which produced two world wars in the first half of the century.

During this decade, we have witnessed, in the former Yugoslavia, scenes which Europe thought it had left behind forever in 1945. And in the last two months, in Kosovo, those scenes have reached a

ghastly climax: villages burnt; families driven from their homes at gunpoint; men separated from their families and taken away – many of them, it seems, massacred in cold blood; whole cities and tracts of countryside emptied of their population; people herded into train cars; roads clogged with refugees; tent cities springing up overnight in what had been barren borderlands, and filled with thousand upon thousand of uprooted, bewildered people.

Who among us, seeing or hearing of these things, has not burned with indignation? Who among us has not felt that something must be done to stop it – something swift, forceful and effective? And yet, who among us is not also troubled by the implications for world order, and for the United Nations itself? While supporting and encouraging all those who worked for a peaceful solution in Kosovo, I recognized publicly – as long ago as last June – that there might come a moment when force would have to be used. And I voiced the hope then that, if that moment did come, the Security Council would shoulder its heavy burden of responsibility... But, what I want to say to you now, my dear friends, is this: Don't despair. Don't be discouraged. Above all, don't give up.

No one ever promised it would be easy to rid the world of the scourge of war, which is so deeply rooted in human history – perhaps, even in human nature. No one ever said there would be no setbacks. No one ever promised us that the road would always be clear, or that those sincerely committed to peace would not sometimes be deeply divided. We all want peace. We all want justice. No one wants to choose between the two. All of us feel instinctively that they must go together. Is not injustice one of the main causes of conflict and war? Can there be true and lasting peace without justice? In a broad sense, I am sure there cannot. If people's just grievances are constantly denied or ignored, sooner or later their anger will boil over into violence. We all know that. But don't we also know that sometimes to insist on perfect justice is to insist on perpetuating conflict? Don't we all admire the choice that the new South Africa has made, in settling for truth and reconciliation rather than

absolute justice?

What hope of peace would there be if we insisted on full justice for every wrong done to indigenous peoples all over the world, in 500 years of colonialism? In truth, we can never really make amends to the dead. All the dead can ask of us is that we do our utmost to spare the living, and those yet unborn, from repeating their ordeal.

Yes, we must insist on ending the culture of impunity. We must, and we will, give our full support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, based here in this city, which has a legal obligation to prosecute all those responsible for crimes against humanity. And we must push ahead with the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court. Let me acknowledge once again the magnificent contribution made by voluntary groups from all over the world, many of whom are represented in this hall today, in getting the Statute of the Court adopted in Rome last year. Let me also welcome the campaign launched by Amnesty International, the International Federation for the Rights of Man, and Human Rights Watch, calling for United Nations Member States to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

We do all these things for the sake of the future, not the past. We do them to secure peace, not to perpetuate war. The conflicts still raging in Africa, in Europe, and elsewhere must not discourage us. It is not true that we are getting nowhere. Many conflicts have been ended. Many others have been prevented, because disputes were settled peacefully. Precisely for that reason we do not think about them – we may not even have heard of them.

I commend to you especially today a new book published by the United Nations and available for the first time at this Conference: *Peaceful Resolution of Major International Disputes*. In it, you will find guidelines for negotiations, derived from real case studies of very serious disputes, which could have done terrible damage to world peace – but did not. Those disputes – the border dispute between Russia and China, and the arguments over nuclear arsenals between the United States and the Soviet Union – were successfully and peacefully resolved.

So you see, my friends, it can be done. Disputes can be resolved peacefully. Wars can be ended. Even better, they can be prevented. It takes wisdom and statesmanship on the part of political leaders. It takes patient and skilful diplomacy. But, perhaps most important of all, it requires a deep change in civil society – the development of a culture in which statesmen and diplomats alike know what is expected of them. They have to know that, in the

eyes of their fellow citizens, the ultimate crime is not to give away some real or imaginary national interest. The ultimate crime is to miss the chance for peace, and so condemn your people to the unutterable misery of war. My friends, it is you – and people like you, all over the world – who are slowly bringing about that deep and essential change. Let me thank you once again, and say: please keep it up!



William R. Pace's Address

The first (Hague) International Peace Conference was convened by 26 governments to discuss "rules for war". The conference one hundred years later has been convened by more than 700 non-governmental organizations of civil society to adopt an agenda to prevent war – to say "NO" to war. More governments and more international organizations have been part of our conference than the first. On behalf of the 72 members of the Organizing Committee, I congratulate you – delegates and organizations – for this historic achievement.

The Hague Appeal for Peace conference has been, at its heart, a world peace conference process to identify an agenda for peace and international justice which if adopted and implemented will result in hundreds of millions of human lives in the 21st century being saved from the ravages of war so destructive, universal, prevalent, costly and terrible in this century. The Agenda itself is a combination of issues, initiatives, and actions being proposed by the participants.

We are here because conventional approaches to peace have failed miserably in this century – and are continuing to fail miserably even as we meet.

The humanitarian disaster of the Kosovo war is utterly tragic – a conflict to which this conference has given enormous attention. But this new war in Europe should not blind us from the reality that there are other disastrous wars occurring in Africa and Asia, international and internal conflicts and wars on every continent which must receive equal attention from the international community and global civil society.

Our concerns for these disastrous conflicts must not deter us from one of our main goals – to promote an Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century to prevent future Kosovos, Rwandas, East Timors, Chiapas and Chechnyas. To confront the failure of traditional approaches, global civil society is demanding new approaches, citizen-based, community-based, "bottom-up" alternative strategies and strengthened international structures for peace, early-warning and conflict-prevention.

The ranges of issues we have discussed have been enormous and daunting. Mr. Secretary-General, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, the main themes of the Hague Appeal for Peace include our support for:

-The New Diplomacy model of international decision and law-making

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- For redefining national security in terms of human security
 - For replacing the law of force with the force of just law
 - For international democracy, or as it is increasingly being called, democratic global governance
 - For demanding more just, speedy, non-selective mechanisms of humanitarian intervention to stop impunity, genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity

Which, Mr. Secretary-General, should be conducted under the authority of the United Nations - not by unilateral decisions of superpowers - but therefore a fundamentally strengthened and more democratic United Nations. The Hague Appeal process respects and values

the independence, priorities and mandates of organizations. Each will decide which parts of the Agenda and which initiatives and actions they will support in carrying forward our global campaign. Some issues will be more important in some regions and cultures than in others.

From here, our campaign is first and foremost a process of application, ratification and implementation of the key actions and initiatives launched at the conference. Several of these were identified in the conference Agenda, and many others have emerged during the conference.

It has been a great honor and privilege to serve as the Secretary-General of the Hague Appeal for Peace and for my organization, the World Federalist Movement, to serve as a secretariat for this extraordinary peace conference.



The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice

Luisa Moisis

The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century has emerged from an intensive consultation process among the seventy-two members of The Hague Appeal for Peace and the hundreds of organisations and individuals involved in it. This document represents what civil society organisations and citizens consider to be some of the most important challenges facing humankind as it prepares to embark upon a new millennium, and underlines some vital steps in order to create a 21st century of peace and justice. The Agenda is divided into four sections as follows.

Root Causes of War – Culture of Peace

The starting point to establish a culture of peace is education: it is necessary to implement peace education to empower people with peace-making, conflict-resolution and consensus-building skills. Another important step is to identify possible causes of conflict, and consequently find strategies and solutions to deal with them. For example, the alarming concentration of economic power, that marginalises broad sections of the world's population and widens the gap between the rich and the poor where the first are consumers and polluters, calls for a redefinition of security in terms of human and ecological needs, as well as for democratising and regulating the international financial system and enriching international environmental law.

International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and Institutions

To enforce the universal observance of international human rights legislation, it is necessary to recognise the increasing convergence between the fields of humanitarian and human rights law and

to encourage their co-operation. The victims' right to hold abusers accountable must be extended throughout the whole international legal system, and all national legislative and judicial systems worldwide should incorporate the principle of universal jurisdiction for gross human right violations to avoid impunity for those responsible. Furthermore, it is important to improve protection for human rights defenders and humanitarian workers; to train grass-roots organisations to use all possible mechanisms in the enforcement of international law; and to promote public knowledge and understanding of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Prevention, Resolution and Transformation of Violent Conflict

There are four major positions in this section. The first one stresses the importance of strengthening local capacities, as well as those of the United Nation, to prevent and resolve wars. The second one deals with the right timing for intervention: early warning and early response, particularly in the form of conflict prevention, are preferable and possible if they are encouraged by dedicating more resources, creating networks and generating the political will to do so. The third point made concerns the selection and preparation of those involved in the action. The Agenda stresses the importance of civilian professional peace-builders, and states two aims for the next century: the development of an international body specially trained to intervene in conflict areas at short notice, and a multi-track approach to international violence involving as many sectors of society as possible. The last position regards conflicts between states and non-represented peoples. The

Agenda argues that, while the denial of the right to self-determination leads to conflict, its recognition can actively promote peace.

Disarmament and Human Security

This section envisages a “Global Action Plan to Prevent War”. This includes the following major steps: strengthening global and regional security institutions; replacing unilateral military intervention with multilateral defence against aggression and genocide; and negotiating the reduction of military forces and budgets with the aim of a global defensive security system. Some urgent actions to be taken by the international community in the field of disarmament are: a worldwide treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, and the worldwide ratification and implementation of the Land-mine Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

These measures must go hand in hand with the demilitarisation of the global economy, which will reduce military budgets, shifting resources toward human security projects, and will make states and corporations accountable for the impact of the production of military power, its testing and its use, on health and on the environment.

The importance of this document lies in the number of civil society organisations involved in it, showing that there is a world public opinion sympathetic to the cause of perpetual peace, which is the ultimate target for federalists. Nevertheless the authors of the Agenda do not seem fully aware that NGOs’ activity and inter-governmental solutions can not be definitive answers; only the birth of world federalist institutions will allow the permanent achievement of peace.

A perfect example of this lack of consciousness can be detected where the Agenda greatly stresses the role of grass-roots movements in the enforcement of international law. Indeed, only institutions with the required legitimacy, and which are able to exercise, if necessary, a monopoly of force, can carry out such a task. The role of citizens in this effort should be that of assisting those institutions and of scrutinising their conduct, as provided for by representative democracy. The same blindness can be perceived in the way the document deals with peoples’ right to self-determination: the recognition of such a right, far from being a solution, will multiply conflicts among mutually hostile micro-communities. Only within a federal system is it possible to guard the unity of the state, avoiding war, and at the same time to recognise and protect minorities.



Global Action to Prevent War

Anna Sarotto

The Programme

Global Action To Prevent War is a coalition-building policy programme and plan of action for groups and individuals working to reduce the frequency and scale of armed conflict, decrease the burden of military spending and promote non-violent conflict resolution. It is for people and governments everywhere: some components of the programme concern mainly governments, other components can be implemented by individuals and states and local communities as well as by national governments.

The Global Action programme proposes a series of gradual changes, carefully designed not to create new situations of uncertainty in which the risk of war might increase. The programme proposals are designed to enhance radically institutions for the prevention of war; to limit the accepted uses of armed force to deterring and defending against aggression, genocide and other forms of mass violence, and to replace national armed forces, which may be used in arbitrary, self-interested ways, with UN and regional forces for

use in a non-partisan fashion. Economically, the programme should bring major savings both to the potential victims of armed conflict and to the potential donors of emergency relief and reconstruction aid. In addition, by cutting the world's largest conventional armed forces and major weapons systems, the programme should release enormous resources for non-military uses.

The Global Action programme is a work in progress: it envisages four phases of change, each lasting 5-10 years, to implement fully a wide array of measures to prevent international and internal war, genocide, and other deadly conflict. The current phase is one of disseminating and strengthening basic concepts and recruiting coalition members.

The Global Action programme is based on a "living" platform that is constantly being updated with input from new and old supporters, and it combines vision with practicality. Concerned individuals throughout the world are invited to make suggestions and report activities. Every six months a co-ordinating group will publish updated versions of the programme materials. (The 11th revision of Global Action To Prevent War, with input from new and old supporters, will be available towards the end of 1999).

The Global Action plan will be sustained by a very broad coalition of groups and individuals until the programme wins the support of the governments of many countries, especially the most heavily armed countries, including the United States.

GAIN – the Global Action International Network

The basic structure for creating this movement is provided by the Global Action International Network (GAIN), a worldwide association of

For further information contact

Global Action to Prevent War,
c/o Institute for Defense &
Disarmament Studies
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
e-mail: info@globalactionpw.org
web: www.globalactionpw.org

groups and individuals who support Global Action To Prevent War. It allows individuals and organisational members of the network to work for diverse goals while identifying themselves as part of a truly global effort. Members of GAIN are organisations and individuals involved in similar efforts by groups such as the Hague Appeal for Peace, Earth Action, or the European Conflict Platform, which have multi-issue campaigns to prevent war; and

groups working for specific goals within the overall Global Action platform, such as Abolition 2000 (advocating government commitment to talks on a plan to abolish nuclear weapons), the campaigns against landmines and small arms, or efforts to cut military forces and spending, limit the arms trade, promote education and training in non-violent conflict resolution, strengthen the UN, or increase the use of the international courts.

What is Peace Boat?

Erika Boscolo

Peace Boat is a non-governmental organisation based in Japan: its aim is to establish a global network among people, grassroots movements and other NGOs, working on issues such as peace, human rights, the environment and development. In the past fifteen years, it has made twenty-five voyages and taken over ten thousand people to more than eighty ports.

Personal exchanges and co-operation with people in other countries – particularly in conflict areas – are the means used to promote peaceful solutions to global problems and to increase mutual understanding. Peace Boat is independent of any religion or political movement; it is composed of an executive committee of fifty people, from many different backgrounds, and a large volunteer staff.

Participants on a voyage pay a cheap fare and all have a voice in deciding the on-board activities. A typical voyage would include on board lectures on various social and environmental issues, with the specific aim of informing participants about topics

related to each port of call prior to arrival. In each port of call, the activities are a mixture of educational and exchange programmes in order to develop stronger ties with NGOs around the world, as well as to promote peace and friendship.

The activities – linked to NGOs around the world – in which Peace Boat is involved are: the campaign to abolish land mines; the Eritrea law assistance; an aid team; an environmental team.

For further information contact

Peace Boat

NOKK Bldg 4F, 3-13-1 Takadanobaba
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan 169-0075

Tel. +1 212 803 2522

Fax +1 212 803 2561

e-mail: XLC00501@nifty.ne.jp

web: www.peaceboat.org

World Federalism and Strategic Squint

Antonio Mosconi

D. Archibugi, D. Held, M. Koeler (eds),
Re-imagining Political Community,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988

Achille Occhetto,
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Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1988

We are witnessing a real explosion of demand for political management of globalisation and for cosmopolitan democracy, resulting from the end of the bipolar balance of power and the reactions of the peoples of the world to the absurd American claim to replace this with imperial rule. This phenomenon is clearly represented in the essays of Archibugi, Beetham and Occhetto. Yet on the other hand it is notable that the contribution of the European and world federalist movements, to whose initiatives and influence are owed the most important theoretical and strategic designs for moving towards a new and less unjust world order, is systematically ignored in political journalism and academic literature.

We know that this is the price to pay for federalist autonomy, but we also know that autonomy is not an end in itself, but one of the means necessary for the pursuit of our political objectives. We should therefore not limit ourselves to claims of our "superiority" and "difference", unless we intend to give up politics. Rather we should ask ourselves whether this lack of recognition of our role is not in part due to a certain "strategic squint": we contemplate these two objectives as if they were located one

to the right and the other to the left, one in history and the other in the apocalypse, whereas they are co-axial, so co-axial as to make invisible to the human eye which is in front and which behind. For example, the initiative of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, to which President Occhetto makes frequent reference in "Governare il mondo" (Governing the World), has led our country to espouse the concept of a unitary representation of Europe in the UN Security Council, thus abandoning the previous line of representation by rotation. With this step, comparable to that of the unilateral direct election of Italian delegates to the European Parliament, an approach to UN reform, made possible by the birth of the European Union, in turn proves necessary for the Union to endow itself with a single foreign and security policy. How indeed could the CFSP be implemented if Germany and not Europe had a seat on the Security Council?

The fact remains that Occhetto, who has the primacy of politics in his blood, has made a step in the right direction, on concrete terrain; even if on theoretical terrain, undermined and contaminated by diplomacy, he then seems to accept "realistically", as a minor evil, that concept of governance which seems invented specifically to avoid speaking of world government. This is because the forces of the left, having recently and simultaneously reached power in Europe, consider the "formal" recognition of the role of world government played "de facto" by the United States indispensable for their own legitimation. The Christian Democrats at least, being able to take for granted

their own Atlantic loyalty, dared to claim from their masters some greater degree of freedom, beyond their usual meagre reward.

In the Beetham model, democracy, human rights and institutions appear equally co-axial. The equal right of citizens to participate in public affairs, freedom, and civil and political rights (in their turn inseparable from economic, social and cultural rights) and the representative and responsible institutions of the state are essential components of democracy. Yet in many cases it was economic, social and cultural emancipation which made it possible to overcome the old order of domination (typically the French Revolution); in others it was the adoption of formal democracy which levelled the road for more substantial progress (the Italian Constitution constitutes an example of this possibility); in each case the advances were shown to be lasting only when the necessary institutions had been built to enforce the new social pact as the foundation of legality, thus allowing them to develop and produce results.

Adopting the standpoint of institutional analysis (i.e., finally, of the state and government, and no longer of governance), Archibugi introduces, as superior to the confederal and federal models, a third model, that of cosmopolitan democracy. Yet although the expedient of distinguishing the federalist model from that of cosmopolitan democracy may perhaps boast a certain heuristic efficacy, it is without academic foundation. Rigorous examination shows that federalism and cosmopolitan democracy are the same thing, although a strategic squint may make them appear double; fortunately however, a squint is one of the problems which for some time has been happily resolved by ophthalmology.

Archibugi judges the three models on their capacity to develop democracy within the nations, democracy between states, and global democracy, concluding in the superiority of the third model for attainment of all three objectives. I will leave aside examination of the confederal

model, which holds no secrets for federalist criticism, in order to examine the presumed differences between the other two. These can be summed up in the fact that cosmopolitan democracy means taking a few steps back from federalism, probably considered necessary to reach a world consensus, but certainly contradictory to the essence of democracy. The need to take intermediate steps towards a model-objective does not mean these transitory positions can be passed off as a new and more advanced model. The three aspects which, according to Archibugi, distinguish cosmopolitan democracy from federalism, in fact appear fundamentally regressive.

The former requires the application of the rule "one state one vote", while federalism would claim, more rigidly, that of "one citizen one vote". False, since the existing federalist states are characterised, on the contrary, by the quest for equilibrium between the lower chamber (representing the people) and the upper (representing the states); and the federalist proposals for reform of the UN are inspired by the same quest. Then in the model of cosmopolitan democracy, "an active policy of disarmament is practised", but the states "keep their own armed forces" (sic!), while in the federal model the central government controls both foreign policy and the armed forces. Finally, in cosmopolitan democracy, participation in the Union is voluntary and revocable (perhaps with a view to dissociating oneself from Earth and joining Mars), whereas in the federal model secession from the federation is impossible. Mario Albertini, in his introduction to a reader on Kant (Bologna, 1985), went much further. "Federalism can manifest itself fully and firmly only in a well-defined historical context: that of the disappearance of differences of class and of military power, in other words at a stage of development of material production and of consequent human interdependence, in which the division of society into antagonistic classes has already been overcome, and in which the division of mankind into nations is potentially obsolete. This shows that, in their profound essence, the

two poles of federalist social behaviour are community and cosmopolitanism". It is from this observation that one must start if one wants to "think the impossible" (Occhetto); develop a "re-evaluated conception of democracy" exten-

ded to cultural rights in a multicultural society (Beetham); and "provide the citizens of the world with the institutional channels to participate and take on duties affecting the destinies of all the world" (Archibugi).

The Kurdish Question and Turkey

René Wadlow

Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow,
*The Kurdish Question and Turkey: an
Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict,*
Frank Cass, London, 1997, 237 pp.,
\$47.50

The arrest in Kenya by Turkish security agents in February 1999 of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan and the spectacular demonstrations by Kurdish supporters throughout Western Europe have focused international attention on the role of the Kurds in Turkey. As the authors of this important study indicate: "The Kurdish question in Turkey is a highly complex, controversial and extremely politically sensitive issue. And because of its trans-state nature, developments in northern Iraq in particular are also causing additional complications for Turkish decision-makers".

Kemal Kirisci has already written a useful study of the international relations of the PLO and so he is familiar with a movement working in difficult conditions to create an independent state. Both Kirisci and Winrow teach political science at the Bogazici University in Istanbul and so they are close observers of the Turkish political

scene. They are sensitive to the fact that expressions of concern for the position of the Kurds in Turkey "could incite Turkish nationalist extremists to resort to violence in order to pre-empt what they might fear to be the first steps toward the break-up of the state".

This study was written with a grant from the US Institute of Peace and is part of the Institute's on-going interest in nationalism and ethnicity. Thus, the study begins by reviewing the concepts of nation, ethnic group, ethnic nationalism, minority rights and self-determination. The authors trace the parallel growth of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism during the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. During the Ottoman period, religion was the main factor of identification and division. Kurds and Turks were grouped together in "the house of Islam", while others, Christians and Jews existed in a largely self-governed *millet* system.

The Kurdish question is an element in the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into modern Turkey – a shift from a traditional society, where identities were religiously determined at a communal level, to a modern society where the aim was to define an individual's identity at the state level. At the state

level, there are only Turkish citizens or citizens of Turkey. The dilemma is whether all citizens are also ethnic Turks or whether a citizen of Turkey can also have another ethnic identity while still having all the rights of a citizen.

The first period of the Turkish state (1924 to 1945) was to say that everyone was a Turk even if he did not know it. The theory was that as the Turks had come from Central Asia, they had absorbed all prior inhabitants, even those, like the Kurds, who lived in isolated mountain areas and spoke a non-Turkic language. The state propaganda through history teaching and linguistic studies was to insist that everyone was a Turk, even those who had forgotten the fact. The Kurds were "mountain Turks".

As often happens when history and linguistics are used for political ends, counter history and linguistics come to the fore. Intellectual Kurds started to study their history, and little by little, an intellectual structure of Kurdishness developed basically after the Second World War. Although most Kurds thought of themselves in narrow Tribal terms, among intellectuals and politically-aware individuals a pan-Kurdish identity started to grow and saw the kinship with the Kurds living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and in some of the republics of the then USSR. In the 1920s and 1930s, there had been short-lived but violent Kurdish revolts against the centralising tendencies of the Turkish government. But these revolts were usually led by tribal chiefs or charismatic religious leaders.

It was not until 1984 that the PKK, made up largely of Marxist-influenced youth independent of traditional Kurdish tribal leaders, started a program of violence against the Turkish state and against Kurds considered as allies of the Turkish government. The PKK was strong in the poor mountainous areas where the state authorities had difficulty to penetrate. The PKK had military bases in northern Iraq and training

camps in Syria.

The Turkish government's first reaction was to consider this violence as terrorism and to treat it as a military problem to be solved with military means. This is still the attitude of many political figures and most of the military. But after 15 years of violence, many dead and villages destroyed, the PKK is still there. The PKK does not necessarily represent the majority of the Kurdish people, but the arrest of Ocalan has touched a wide chord of sympathy even among those Kurds who reprove the violence and sectarian spirit of the PKK.

Kirisci and Winrow outline some of the elements which could lead to compromise and an end to violence. Above all, there is a need to establish some basis of trust for compromise to be possible. There is a need for a general democratization of the Turkish state so that all views may be freely stated. There is a need for a decentralization of authority and political initiative, as well as economic programs to reach all areas of the country.

With a certain amount of good will, the violence in Turkey could diminish, but the road to calm may still be long. As the authors state: "Within Turkey itself, hopes for further democratization and devolution of decision-making powers, the development of a dialogue, and the possible emergence of a multiculturalism based on a real and genuine civic nationalism still remain at present only hopes. Not all Turkish officials and political parties are willing to accommodate moves toward further democratization and pluralism in Turkish society. At the same time, there is a tendency among many Kurdish radicals to pursue a policy based on what amounts to exclusive ethnic nationalism." There are no easy solutions, but time will not heal by itself. There must be leadership both among Turks and Kurds to break out the sterility of violence and build a base for a democratic and liberal society.

Democracy and the WTO

The battle between the US and EU over bananas is just the first skirmish. Trade in a world of constant innovation, cheap transport and powerful interests inevitably creates conflict. Different standards of production, environmental protection and working conditions will always be disputed. That is why we need a World Trade Organisation to agree rules and resolve disputes if they are broken. What is missing is a fair and effective enforcement mechanism to stop bullying by big powers like the US – or evasion by the EU. Trade needs a framework of just rules, as Adam Smith argued, and in democratic societies the rule-makers must be accountable to the people.

We cannot accept rules from the WTO while it lacks democratic legitimacy or scrutiny. The WTO needs greater transparency and democratic accountability. It also needs to be able to compensate communities who suffer as a result of its decisions – just as Europe and the US do already. And it needs to be able to take account of social and environmental issues in ways that are sensitive to the needs of people in the south. The WTO has the power to decide whether or not we should be able to buy or ban beef boosted by hormones, genetically engineered food, wood from endangered forests, goods

made under conditions close to slavery. We now need elective representatives, proportional to population, to scrutinise the WTO's work. One representative for every 5 million people would create an assembly of about 1,200. That is less than half the number of journalists who attend G7 summits or the climate negotiates in Kyoto. We can't stop trade disputes. But we can create democratic, legitimate ways of resolving them in peace.

On 24 October, the AWF in Britain joined a coalition of organisations to publish Charter 99, A Charter for Global Democracy, in the national press in Britain and on the World Wide Web (see www.charter99.org). The Charter calls for democratic accountability of global governance and sets out twelve areas for urgent action, including incorporation of the WTO into the UN system as a step towards democratic world government (*t.a.*).

Schroeder, Germany and the UN

This theme has come even more dramatically to the foreground following the recent events in the Balkans and was the subject of an interview published on June 6 in *Welt am Sonntag* and released by Gerhard Schroeder, upon his return from the European Council meeting in Köln. The interviewer asked the Chancellor, in the light of Germany's role to end the Kosovo conflict, what his position would be should Germany receive a renewed proposal to hold a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Mr Schroeder's reply was "This is not a priority issue in German politics". He added: should Germany receive the offer of a permanent seat, "we will favour a contextual solution on a European level".

The prospect of a unified foreign and security policy in the bosom of the European Union, which seems to be near, has moved the present German Government to give up its claim for a

For further information contact

Titus Alexander
Charter 99
A Charter for Global Democracy
Westminster United Nations
Association
32 Carisbrooke Road
London, E17 7EF, UK
e-mail: info@charter99.org
web: www.charter99.org

permanent seat on the Security Council. European Union entry will open way to the transformation of this organism in the Council of the great world regions. This will be the only manner to entitle all nations to be represented in the Security Council through their respective regional organisations (*c.f.*).

Perceptions of the United Nations

The results of a survey, shown at a press conference at the United Nations Building on 27th April 1999, have drawn attention to current perceptions of the UN. It emerged that the organisation enjoys substantial support (higher than 70% in Mexico, Brazil, Italy and the US), particularly among young people: in all countries involved in the poll, those interviewed who were younger than 29 expressed more favourable judgements than those over 65. The survey was carried out by Zogby International (US) and GfK Great Britain Ltd (GB) in 13 countries (the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, South Africa and 6 European countries) during the three first months of this year. There were two questions: "in general, what is your overall opinion of the United Nations?", and "can you name something in which the United Nations is involved?". The most quoted activity was the maintenance of peace, followed by humanitarian aid and support for economic development.

At first sight these results show that awareness of the need for supranational solutions for the problems faced by humankind (in particular the maintenance of world order) is spreading in the world, above all among young people. On the other side they show that international public opinion has no consciousness of the limits of the United Nations, paralysed by financial crises (caused by the non-payment of dues) and by the continuation of the power of the veto. The high esteem felt for the UN which has been revealed in the United States should, if nothing else, warn

American politicians to pay the United Nations the fee without which the organisation has no future (*a.f.*).

Canada Favours the Tobin Tax

Last March the Canadian House of Commons passed a motion to "encourage the Government to promote a supranational levy on financial speculation in agreement with the international community". This was the first time a National Parliament had reached a decision in favour (although not binding) on an international levy.

The Tobin Tax, which owes its name to the Nobel award winner James Tobin, who proposed it in 1978, is a tax on short-term financial transactions. It would significantly reduce the gain margins of worldwide speculators, who move an estimated \$1,400 billion investments daily, without any productive return and cause serious instability to the world's economy. This tax could technically be applied but would come up against a series of difficulties: (a) like the Carbon Tax, it only works if universally applied (one sole "tax haven" would allow dodging); (b) it is unclear who should manage the revenue and how it should be invested.

The issues which are raised when supranational levies are discussed bring to light the lack of adequate institutions to face the problems of the global economy. In the final count, however, only an international Government, which is responsible to an international Parliament, would have the authority to enforce such a levy and legitimately manage the revenues in homage to the principle of *no taxation without representation*, which is so dear to liberal democracy.

However, the decision of the Canadian Parliament is important because (a) it is a sign that there is a growing awareness in the world for the need to govern globalisation with supranational tools to stop the wealth of a few prevailing on common

good; (b) it is an initial instance of who the federalists' enemies and allies will be in the battle to build supranational institutions: on one side there are some national governments, organisations of civilised society and a fringe of enlightened financiers, who perceive the inherent threat in international economic anarchy; on the other there are the super-powers, multinational industrial and financial corporations, and those who largely benefit from the absence of a government for globalisation (*ff.*).

The European Parliament for a UN Parliament

On 26 March 1999 the European Parliament passed a resolution on UN reform, proposed by Enrico De Melo, the Portuguese member of the European People's Party. It is noteworthy that the resolution recommends "the introduction of a parliamentary dimension in the UN system". Even though the passage echoes the WFM proposal for the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), it is to be regretted that the European Parliament will not take any initiative to carry out this design (*l.l.*).

European Justice

France, birthplace of human rights, has been convicted by the European Court in Strasbourg of having violated article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. According to the judges, five French policemen committed serious and cruel acts of violence against a drug-pusher of Moroccan and Dutch nationality while he was under detention. There can be no appeal against the sentence, and the French State must pay 500,000 French francs to the victim. Among the 41 member countries of the Council of Europe, only Turkey has been subjected to such a humiliating sentence. The European Court of Human Rights, established

in 1950 and amended last year to allow it to deal with the growing demands of a community which now includes eight hundred million people who can appeal directly to its judgement, has taken on a new lease of life. The Court's authority has been progressively affirmed over the years so incisively as to force the member states to modify their legislation. Great Britain has been obliged to abandon corporal punishment in schools, Ireland to modernise its legislation on abortion and divorce, Belgium to modify the Constitution on the matter of linguistic rights. Italy has been condemned for the slowness of trials and Great Britain for the methods of repression used against the IRA.

Thus European justice, whose sentences have never been contested, has made itself respected as an international appeal court, to which individuals can resort directly against any violation of human rights. The influence of the Strasbourg judges and of the first international court ever established to protect human rights is destined to grow because it is part of a wider movement, which last year led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court and claims to uphold the principles of international justice (*l.l.*).

The India-Pakistan Crisis

The crisis between India and Pakistan has once more become acute. There is now a real possibility of it turning into a direct conflict between the two countries. What should concern us most is the possibility of uncontrolled escalation, which could lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Pakistan has already said it does not rule this out if it feels itself seriously threatened). Such a development may be possible not so much because it forms part of a hegemonic plan of either of the two countries, as because the degree of political responsibility of both states is very low. Within both countries a conflict is going on between nationalists and those who want to open up and reform the economy, society and culture, and in this struggle a

military conflict becomes, in their respective realities, an opportunity to defend the territorial integrity of the "fatherland" and therefore to legitimise themselves, demagogically, in the eyes of public opinion. The ruling classes vie over who cares most about the sacred national borders. In this situation the only common point between the two countries is the continual growth in arms expenditure. What is most striking about all this is the fact that these two countries have enormous economic and social problems, and how nevertheless they decide to reserve for these only a part of the resources possible. Once again considerations of the power politics of the nation-state win over the primary interests of the citizens.

Three elements emerge from this crisis: a) the practical impossibility of the United States managing all crises, despite the fact that the Pentagon considers the Asian area to be one of the most important in the context of future US defence and security policy; b) the complete absence of any world order. Wherever there is neither equilibrium nor hegemony, conflict is inevitable and hence the states find themselves in a continuous state of potential war; c) the urgent need to build a framework of rules to govern relations between states.

The reform of the United Nations, the place where these crises should be prevented and not dealt with *a posteriori*, can therefore no longer be put off; now more than ever it is necessary to have a real European foreign and security policy carried out by a federal government. This would constitute the fulcrum on which to build the UN of the future, by reforming the Security Council on the basis of assigning seats to regional federations and no longer to the nation states. Yet the European Summit in Cologne too has decided to side-step the problem of European defence and the federal reform of the Union: once more the European federalists must highlight the contradictions between national institutions and supranational problems, problems which the political classes are now incapable of tackling (*f.f.a.*).

The Nuclear Spectre

Serious friction between India and Pakistan over Kashmere have brought to the foreground once again the fear of a nuclear arms race; although a global war using non conventional weapons seems unlikely, nuclear weaponry is still considered an effective deterrent by some developing powers and the cold war climate, which seemed to have been forgotten after the end of the bipolarism, is reappearing on a regional scale. Tension between India and Pakistan was reported on May 25 by news agency *Pakistan News Service* "India exchanges artillery fire in Kashmere". Subsequently the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement that "Pakistan reserves the right to respond appropriately". The nuclear arms race between the two nations has seen a remarkable acceleration over the last months: on April 11, India tested the ballistic missile Agni II with a 2,300 kilometres range; on April 14, Pakistan launched a Ghauri II series missile of the same range; on April 15, India declared that Agni II could carry nuclear warheads.

The prospect of a conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out; although it would most likely involve conventional weapons, yet the reasons which trigger these nations to an arms race cannot be confined to deterrent needs at a local level. There is an evident attempt to gain a ranking in terms of power on an international scale. The very fact that India is ready to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provided it is admitted to the "nuclear club" or alternatively if there is complete dismantling of nuclear stockpiles speaks for itself. However, the latter option seems remote since the recent accord to reduce potential nuclear weaponry between Russia and America (START II) has not yet been ratified by the Duma even though it was passed by the US Senate on January 26, 1996. The Chinese factor has also weighed heavily on the increased nuclear threat. The Director of the Centre

for Defence Studies and Analyses of the Indian Government, has quite openly accused the United States, following the recent scandal on the news leak at Los Alamos, of handing China, via the Internet, millions of secret military data concerning nuclear tests. In addition to this, India reserves the right to maintain a minimum nuclear stockpile, as a consequence of the "continued deployment of nuclear arms on the territory of non nuclear nations which are NATO members".

The international scenario appears highly fragmented. The lack of control on the development of nuclear weapons on an international level continues to grow more and more dangerous. Can one of the developing nations' need for emancipation threaten global security? Maybe the first step to solving this crisis is to convince the Indian Government to sign the CTBT: which would seem a reasonable step since the President of the Commission on Indian Nuclear Energy himself stated, on May 10, this decision would not weaken the nation's nuclear deterrent capacity. This shows there is still a long way to go (*g.u.*).

A New Environmental Crisis

When one speaks of an environmental catastrophe one thinks of a serious impending threat but without its immediate effects. Deep down we always irrationally believe that when man realises the danger at hand he will always quickly set right the earth's gravely endangered environmental balance. In point of fact, it is not so easy, because the stage, which marks an irreversible phenomenon and therefore an environmental catastrophe, is not known. The fairy tale of the sorcerer's apprentice should keep us on guard. New unknown phenomena are constantly being added to those we already know. A recent environmental study, conducted by US

scientists at the National Science Foundation and at Scripps Institution of Oceanography, San Diego, has revealed that atmospheric pollution produced by American and European industry is adding up to what is produced by induced Asian industrialisation to saturate the atmosphere.

This new pollution is above all generated from the combustion of fossil fuel and is formed by carbon dioxide, soot, ash and sulphur. It comes from China, India and South-East Asia and concentrates to form a toxic cloud of about 9.9 million square kilometres, the size of the USA at a height of 3,000 metres. It is moved by winter monsoons and tends to hover for many months in an area between the Gulf of Bengal and the Arabian Sea and as far south as the Equator. Thus reducing the amount of solar energy absorbed by the Indian Ocean and at the same time cooling the areas mentioned while having a greenhouse effect on others.

This new phenomenon certainly has adverse effects, which cannot yet be forecast, on the earth's climate and will worsen the acid rain phenomenon which together poisons and damages not only the atmosphere, soils and oceans but even flora and fauna of which man is an integral part.

The issue therefore remains as to how to limit the impact of human activities on climate and the environment. Nations and corporations, who have become prisoners to unbridled competition caused by market liberalisation without political control, do not accept readily the idea of regulation and on the other hand, there is still no international authority capable of curbing the most powerful nations and aiding the weaker ones to conduct global development from a sustainable social and environmental viewpoint. Therefore, action must be taken to promote a democratic world government. To this end, the UN Security Council reform may be the first fundamental step towards renegotiating the political weight of each continent starting from Europe itself (*g.b.*).

Iran between Reform and Recession

Faced with economic globalisation and the spread of the scientific revolution, countries like Iran, locked in a theocratic regime, are in increasing difficulty. They try to suffocate the impulse of the new generations, women and economic forces which want development, the opportunity for dialogue with the rest of the world, and democratic reforms, and who do not consider this incompatible with maintaining their religious convictions and cultural traditions, believing that religion should be a personal spiritual matter and not a political imposition.

This is why the rebellion begun by students in the month of July, in the major Persian universities, was joined by a substantial proportion of civil society, the opposition in exile, that part of the press that has been reduced to silence, and an intelligentsia decimated by the regime. They call for reform of the state and contest the overweening power of the spiritual leader of the revolution, the heir of Khomeini, the ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The latter is inspired by fundamentalist Islam and by hatred of western civilisation, which is identified with "Satan". Khamenei bases his strength on the secret police, on Ansar-e Hezbollahis vigilante gangs and on the Pasdaran and Basiji militias, who fiercely repress every form of opposition, defending the indissoluble identity between religion and state. These "Blackshirts on motor-bikes" generally come from the poorest and most ignorant strata of the population and, being able to count on impunity, interpret the defence of the "*sharia*", Islamic law, as repression and elimination of transgressors by corporal punishment and murder. It seems that they infiltrated peaceful student demonstrations to create incidents and justify heavy-handed repression.

The President Mohammed Khatami, to whom the students were appealing, is a cautious reformer, elected by 70% of the vote, particularly by

young people and women; he is in favour of opening up towards the west, the indispensable key to combating economic recession and launching a democratic development plan. He might have the support of the institutional armed forces (army, air force and navy), whose authority has been superseded by the special forces commanded by Khamenei, but he is obliged to act with great prudence, particularly as the elections will take place in February. The large counter-demonstration headed by ayatollah Khamenei in person suggests caution. But Mr. Khatami, facing the recent sentences to death of 4 leaders of the students' organisations, has reaffirmed the validity of his commission of inquiry doomed to greatly extenuate the responsibilities of the university students. He has stated in front of the Pasdaran's commanders, referring to the imam Komeini: "armed forces have the right to hold opinions and to make choices, but they must not meddle in politics".

Iran, which is the third non-Arab country in the Middle East, is divided between two opposing visions of the world, which could lead to civil war. In contrast to the suggestions of some political scientists (for example Samuel Huntington), who affirm that the future world order will necessarily be characterised by conflict between culturally homogeneous civilisations closed to the outside world, what is happening in Iran bears witness to the fact that internally, these so-called civilisations are on the contrary shaken by conflict between fundamentalist, nationalist and conservative forces, and reforming and progressive forces, currently suffocated by religious power, poverty, inflation and unemployment, who can clearly see that the closed theocratic society is an obstacle that must be pulled down in order to be able to embark on development and democracy.

It is not possible to open up the markets without reforming the state, without conceding the democratic freedoms which allow mobility and transmission of data and information in real time. What is the west doing to help this tendency?

And Europe, which is so close and yet still so absent? It could have a very important role in the political and economic evolution of these countries which are its natural interlocutors. So far it has limited itself to some generic declaration of support in favour of Khatami, which has not however had a valid corresponding follow-up in terms of economic aid directed at encouraging development. Such declarations could have the effect of weakening Khatami: the fundamentalists have used them to denounce the latter's links with the hated and dangerous west (*g.b.*).

African Unity, like the Arabian Bird

The forty-three Heads of State and Government of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), who met on 9-10 September in Syrtis, Libya, have decided to give new impetus to the project for the United States of Africa. In Lomé next year, the platform arranged by the Abuja Treaty should be rediscussed; it anticipates "an African common market, a common parliament, a central bank and a federal court". The idea of the United States of Africa represented not only a dream, but a political project for many of the founding fathers of the new Africa, liberated from colonialism, including Julius Nyerere, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and Kwame Nkrumah. It is on the basis of that ideal, it must not be for-

gotten, that the OAU was born in 1963, a petty compromise modelled upon the ineffective United Nations Organisation.

The debate on African unity now resumes at a moment when Africans are apparently very far from those ideals, after the tragic events in Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia, and the permanent tensions in Sudan, Ivory Coast, Togo, Angola and many other countries. Maybe it is precisely because of these new disasters, and of those that appear imminent, that the ideal of a united Africa, pacified and independent, able to talk on an equal level with the other world powers, may revive. This can be perceived in Muammar Qaddafi's remark, who, in greeting his guests in Syrtis, was hoping for "a seat for united Africa in the Security Council of the United Nations".

The disintegration of the USSR and the crisis of the international order have created a vacuum in world power which is certainly not filled by American monopolism, and which pushes peoples in every continent to look for a new role in the world. In some cases, tendencies toward disintegration are prevailing, as Africa has sadly experienced. But there are also opposite pressures toward unification, both at continental and world level, passing through a suitable reform of the United Nations, as Qaddafi was hinting at. Of course a victory on the front of the European Federation could tilt the balance in the right direction, that is the one of peoples' unity (*g.m.*).



Jo Leinen

UEF President

Congratulations on your election to the European Parliament. It is the first time that a UEF President has become a Euro-MP. How will you promote the aims that federalists are pursuing from this position? Do you think that this new period during which the European Parliament will remain in office may have a constituent nature?

Many thanks for your support. A UEF President in the European Parliament will mean more opportunities and chances. We now have our foot in the door and are no longer left outside closed doors.

The first thing I will concentrate on is the formation of a Parliamentary Intergroup for a "European Constitution". The idea is that federalists from all political parties can work together closely to promote the adoption of a constitution. About 100 MEPs have already expressed their interest in such an initiative.

The Member States want to start another Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) at the summit in Helsinki, which should be concluded by the French Presidency. The European Parliament should make it very clear that it will neither accept the method nor the outcome of such a conference. Many citizens, parliaments, as well as many in the media, do not want another IGC where decisions are made with the exclusion of the public. Limiting the political discussions of this conference to the "left-overs" from Amsterdam will not suffice if the challenges lying ahead of the Union are to be met. Here the Parliament needs to enter into a critical dialogue with the governments. The result of this debate should be a decision on whether the European Parliament should present a draft European Constitution, as already happened once under Spinelli.

European policy demands public scrutiny through the European Parliament. It must be politicised and not left to faceless technocrats. It is vital to organise parliamentary conferences involving the European Parliament, as well as the national and regional parliaments.

Some recent events, such as the joint gathering of the UEF and the WFM in Montreux (September 1997) and the association of UEF to the WFM deliberated by the UEF Congress in Bonn (April 1999), seem to show that the slow rapprochement between the world's largest federalist organisations is proceeding today with renewed energy. Do you agree with this statement? What are the reasons for this speeding up?

What are, in your opinion, the principal similarities between the Union of European Federalists (UEF), the World Federalist Movement (WFM) and the Young European Federalists (JEF), and what are the gaps to be filled? Do you believe that the reshaping of The Federalist Debate as a body of permanent discussion among different federalist trends can contribute to strengthening this process?

The UEF and the WFM share common roots and common goals. During World War II, many people already realised that freedom, peace, democracy and tolerance would only be possible if nation states gave up some of their sovereignty to international institutions. The European federalists have largely concentrated on the project of European integration. While there is much room for improvement regarding the state of European integration, what has been achieved so far can be considered to be of historical importance. Throughout the EU freedom, peace, democracy, and to a large extent prosperity, prevail.

In the age of globalisation Europe is much more


interlinked with the rest of the world and is consequently more affected by all types of crises occurring in far away regions. It is for these very reasons that Europe needs to have a strong interest in global stability. This world order must neither be dominated by only one superpower nor by a small group of powerful states. An acceptable world order will only be achieved if and when nation states world-wide are prepared to give up part of their sovereignty to international institutions as prescribed by the federalist model. At the turn of the XXI century, European federalists will therefore have to adapt their vision more and more to the establishment of a global order. It is against this background that closer co-operation between the UEF and the WFM seems to be the logical next step. After all both organisations were formed on the same day in Montreux more than 50 years ago with similar objectives in mind. Nowadays young people across the globe share a strong sense of "belonging together". They also have a special interest in their future being shaped and not having it destroyed by global crises. *The Federalist Debate* should become a forum of discussion for the different federalist schools in order to guarantee an exchange of information and to give our goals a stronger profile.

The new format of The Federalist Debate envisages a section devoted to opinions from exponents of NGOs and representatives of civil society wishing to discuss European and World federalism with us. Taking into account the decline of political parties and of voter turn-out, what role can these political entities play in the process of European and world unification?

One of the major changes that the so-called

"Information Society" has brought about is that every individual can become an "actor". Political parties have lost their monopoly over political projects and debates. NGOs and the institutions of civil society have taken the initiative, and are fulfilling important political functions.

Organisations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the Campaign against Landmines, and other pressure groups, are clear indicators that a new map of the political arena is now being drawn. The "Federalist Debate" should provide NGOs with a platform for discussion. Quite often NGOs have been pioneers in the field of transnational co-operation and could therefore be interesting partners in the construction of a World Federation.



Do you think that the commitment of the European federalists to build a European Federation can help the world federalists to achieve a World Federation? What initiatives could a European Federation take to expand international democracy into other regions of the world and to promote the transformation of the United Nations into a World Federation?

Everywhere in the world, the European Union is considered to be the model of transnational integration. In Latin America, Asia and Africa this form of continental integration is sure to be followed. This is why it is necessary, after having established the Single Market and monetary union, to go ahead with the completion of political union with a constitutional basis.

Important lessons for a world federation can be learnt from the EU experience. It is, for example, of the utmost importance to balance the rounds of intergovernmental negotiations with adequate parliamentary input. It is an urgent

goal to establish a parliamentary assembly and eventually a world parliament at the UN.

The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has come to play a crucial role in the process of European integration. The principles and values of European unification have often been defended by it against the resistance of national governments. This is why it is important to support the International Criminal Court in its work.

The Economic and Social Committee (ECO-SOC) and the Committee of the Regions (COR)

are important institutions representing the interests of civil society and the decentralised levels of government in European politics. This representation should also be guaranteed at UN level. Bodies from civil society, as well as the municipalities and the regions, have to be institutionalised by the UN. Additionally, the "Charter of Local Self-Governance" of the Council of Europe should have its equivalent at world level. Local democracy all over the world represents an important basis for people to take control of their own destiny and to overcome the limitations of national barriers.

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Contributors

KOFI ANNAN
UN Secretary-General

W. JAMES ARPUTHARAJ
Vice-President of South Asian Federalists and
Member of WFM Executive Committee

GIOVANNI BIAVA
Member of the JEF

ERIKA BOSCOLO
Student in Political Sciences at the University
of Torino and Member of UEF-Italy

DJILALI OULD BRAHAM
Algerian Student in Social Anthropology at
the University of Paris

ANDREAS BUMMEL
Member of WFM Council

LAURA DAVIS
JEF Secretary-General

FRANCESCO FERRERO
Member of UEF-Italy Central Committee

BARBARA FRANCESCOLI
Student in Political Sciences at the University
of Torino and Member of UEF-Italy

CRISTINA FRASCÀ
Member of JEF-Italy Central Committee

CHARLES GIOJA
Senior Honours Student in Pure Mathematics
at the University of St. Andrews, Edinburgh
and Member of JEF-UK

DANIEL HULAS
UEF-France Secretary-General

JO LEINEN
UEF President and MEP

LUCIO LEVI
Professor in Comparative Politics at the
University of Torino and Member of WFM
Executive Committee

LUISA MOISIO
Member of JEF-Italy Central Committee

ANNA MONTANI
Member of JEF-Italy Central Committee

ANTONIO MOSCONI
Member of CESI Council

WILLIAM R. PACE
WFM Executive Director, Convenor of the
Coalition for an International Criminal Court
and Secretary-General of the Hague Appeal
for Peace

VERA PALEA
Researcher in Business Economics at the
University of Torino and Member of UEF-Italy

RIK PANGANIBAN
WFM Membership Director

GOURI SADHWANI
Campaign Coordinator of The Hague Appeal
for Peace

ANNA SAROTTO
Member of UEF-Italy

RENÉ WADLOW
Editor of *Transnational Perspectives*

LUCY WEBSTER
Executive Director of Economists Allied for
Arms Reduction, Vice-President of US World
Federalist Association and Vice-Chair of WFM
Council

ELISA ZANARDI
Member of UEF-Italy