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New Series

The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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Editorial

Terrorism and World Government

Lucio Levi

The terrorist attack launched against the USA on September 11th has changed the course of world politics. All of a sudden the US has lost its invulnerability. It is the first time since the war of 1812 that it has suffered an attack on its territory. The greatest power in the world has found out it is without arms to counter this challenge. For a few hours the United States was without a government. Bush took refuge aboard the presidential airplane and the federal government buildings were evacuated. But the effects of the aggression were not limited to the US. People in the world which had entrusted their security to the American Empire have suddenly realized they do not have any protection from terrorism.

The attack goes beyond the traditional schemes of power politics. The threat is not coming from another state (or from a coalition of states) nor from the missiles of rogue states. It is evident that against terrorism the so-called National Missile Defense (NMD) shield is useless. Airplanes, transformed into missiles by the hijackers, took off from American airports, the suicidal pilots were trained in the US. The enemy is hiding inside our societies.

These terrorist acts cannot be charged to a particular state, although the perpetrators belong to an organization that receives protection from Afghanistan and maybe from other states. This means that globalization has erased traditional differences, like the one between the internal and external aspects of security, or between crime and war.

The globalization process is causing new actors to emerge on the international political stage (the giant multinational manufacturing and financial

companies, the global civil society movements, the international crime organizations, etc.), which erode states' sovereignty. But what characterizes the international terrorist organizations is the fact that they combine the exercise of violence by militants willing to sacrifice their life, with the possession of big financial resources and the support of a part of the international public opinion. With these power-conferring tools they challenge the force monopoly exercised by the states, which have become unable to protect men against a violent death (the principal task of the state according to Hobbes).

All this proves that the states have ceased to be the exclusive players in international politics. So far the states, and above all those at the summit of the world power-hierarchy, have tried to govern the global civil society by co-operating within the international organizations. Now the attack is aimed at the heart of the power apparatus of states. Violence, displaying itself in terrorist attacks, but also in the action of the *Black Blocs* who infiltrate demonstrations of the people of Seattle, no longer held in check by political institutions, is spreading and risks to drive the world into a state of anarchy or into a new Middle Ages, as the supporters of globalization without government maintain.

The terrorist attacks on the American soil mark the decline of the world order based on US hegemony, as the first World War and the crisis of 1929 marked the decline of the British Empire. These two events opened an era of political turmoil which brought to power totalitarian regimes: first the Soviet and the Fascist, and later the Nazi.

Will the 21st century repeat the history of the 20th? If the terrorist threat is not eradicated, trade, transport, tourism and the very liberty of democratic regimes will suffer. In a climate of insecurity the globalization process, upon which development of the whole world is depending, will come to a halt, and the citizens themselves will call for more security and will ask, if necessary, to sacrifice liberty and democracy for it.

No other power in the world can nowadays aspire to replace the United States in the role of stabilizer of the world order. And yet it is unthinkable that the globalization process, which expresses mankind's tendency toward unification, can possibly go ahead ignoring politics and its non-eliminable function of providing first of all security and rules, ensuring, if possible, justice, equity and liberty; in short, a civilized social life. With the fall of New York's Twin Towers also the illusion fell that globalization will self-rule, subject only to market laws.

Anyway it is out of the question that a military solution alone will suffice to counter the terrorist threat. Certainly it is not by indiscriminate bombings over Afghanistan, which will create more innocent victims, that bin Laden and his followers can be eliminated. This way of reacting would be an additional proof of US impotence. It would be a tragic mistake to promote a crusade of the Western and Christian world against the Islamic one. Even because it comprises countries, like Egypt, which have been the victims of terror (remember the assassination of President Sadat). The Islamic world is divided between moderate and integralist trends. If a political strategy can be ascribed to terrorists, we can presume its goal is to inflame the hopeless masses of the Islamic world and to topple their moderate governments. On the contrary, the goal of the West and its allies must be to prevent integralism from taking over and the feared "clash of civilizations", which terrorists would like to provoke, from taking place.

In order to check the trend to disperse power and to international disorder, which is bound to

bring about new forms of violence and authoritarianism, it is necessary to take the road leading to a world federal government. This is the only formula that can compound the need for political unity, peace and security, necessary for reigning in violence and for ruling the world economy, and the safeguard of cultural diversity, which represents mankind's greatest asset.

The states' immediate reaction to the crimes in New York and Washington can be interpreted as the first step of a long journey in that direction. In fact the United States has promoted the formation of an international coalition of an amplitude without precedents, ranging from the European Union countries to Russia, China, down to Pakistan and many other Islamic countries, including the Palestinian Authority. The urge to fight the common enemy who has infiltrated every society has pushed the *raisons d'état* of most governments to converge.

This means that the conditions are being laid for increasing the role of the UN. The US decision to unfreeze the funds for settling its outstanding debts with the UN is a signal in this direction.

To fight terrorism, it is necessary to start measures of international policing. It would be wrong to use the word "war", which implies a clash among states and armies. The road to be followed instead is to fill up the ditch separating organized crime, which has become global and has learned how to use the most advanced technologies, and the security systems, which still remain national.

Therefore, the problem to be solved is how to progressively give binding force to international law and how to reform the UN in view of setting up new forms of statehood at world level. A first step in this direction is represented by the International Criminal Court, which will allow (once it will come into force) to apply international law to individuals, and hence to punish crimes against humanity, as those committed in New York and Washington. But the ultimate goal must be to transfer the

Editorial

coercion power monopoly to the UN.

But certainly repressive measures are not sufficient to defuse the bomb of Islamic integralism. It is necessary to build up a just world order. To this effect there is a significant fact to point out: the agreement between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, concerning the injection of liquidity for supporting the world market and staving off a serious financial crisis. It can be the beginning of a deeper entente addressed to govern the world economy, and which may foreshadow a Euro-American equal partnership. Of course this objective will be attained only when Europe will bring to conclusion its process of federal unification, that will allow it to speak with one voice. Lacking a government, Europe could not fill the power vacuum opened by the decline of US influence. So, it was not able to give any contribution to the solution of the conflicts in the Balkans and in the Middle East, nor was it able to rescue the wrecked economies in Africa and the Middle East. Ethnic conflicts, undeveloped economies and social hardship present in those regions are all phenomena which have fostered Islamic integralism. There is no doubt that Europe has a vital interest, much stronger than America's given its geographical contiguity, of promoting political stability and economic development in this region; however it is not doing so because of its political division.

If political cooperation between Europe and North America is not to be limited to promoting only the interests of North-Atlantic countries at the expense of the rest of the world, other subjects must be involved: first of all Japan, but also Russia and little by little all the rest of the world. The

world is looking for security beyond the old schemes based on domination and inequality. Security and economic development of any one state can no longer be conceived of as objectives to be pursued at the expense of other states. They have to be founded instead on the participation of all to the global control of economy and security.

Governments, political parties, NGOs and public opinion are searching for a model that shows how to govern globalization. The European Union is the most innovative experiment of a process of markets integration governed by a supra-national authority; it regulates competition, is provided with anti-trust powers, and is subject to a vote of approval by a Parliament directly elected by the citizens. In addition, the euro has eliminated speculative capital movements within the Union boundaries, thus showing both the goal (a world currency), if the same final objective is to be reached at the global level, and the intermediate objective (an area of monetary stability among the euro, the dollar and the yen, on the model of the European Monetary System). Despite its democratic deficit due to the concentration of excessive powers in the Council, which decides unanimously in crucial sectors, the European Union represents an important answer to the need of governing globalization.

If the European Union will be able to bring to conclusion the process of federal unification, it will not only represent the example to be followed to get to the democratic transformation of other international organizations. It will also be a valid reason for extending international democracy to other great regions of the world and within the UN.

It means it will become the engine for the democratic unification of the world.

New World Order Needed

Jo Leinen

The terrorist attacks on the US will change many aspects of world politics. The fight against organised terrorism shows clearly that no one country in the world is big enough to solve such a problem. Even the only remaining super power, the USA, needs the co-operation of countries around the world to fight and to punish the initiators of these attacks. Globalism, not unilateralism is the answer to such challenges.

With economic globalisation, we now urgently need political globalisation. The ideas of the WFM to strengthen the UN now get a new chance for realisation. Only in the framework of the UN will it be possible to fight terrorism and the causes of this fundamentalism. And also to fight the unjust economic order between the rich North and the poor South. We have to fight the ongoing loss of ecological stability as well as growing poverty and diseases in many countries.

A new world order has to be established, not the West against the East, not the North against the South, but a new worldwide coalition of all countries willing to resolve global problems. The UN Security Council must get a new definition and a new task. Not only military risks but all other non-military challenges should be part of the UN's negotiations. The Security Council must be reformed and democratized. The veto of one country has to be removed and majority voting introduced. Furthermore the UN urgently needs a parliamentarian assembly. Governments alone do not have the capacity and the legitimacy to solve this wide range of problems.

What is true for the global level is even more true

for the continental level. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington showed immediately the necessity of a common European policy. Only the EU is able to guarantee a certain level of security against organized crime on our continent. The events in September showed the big deficits that are existing in the third pillar of the EU. A purely intergovernmental method and the veto for every member state made many common policies impossible in the last years. Under the pressure of international terrorism, progress in the last weeks was quicker than in the last ten years. EUROPOL will be strengthened as an effective operating body. EUROJUST must get new competencies to prosecute criminal acts. Passport and visa questions should be harmonized on the EU level. Asylum and immigration policies must be decided on a common basis.

Actions in the field of police and security of course need democratic control. The present system of the EU is quite insufficient for transparency and democracy. The events in September must therefore push forward the democratisation of the EU on the basis of a European constitution. The UEF must be the initiator and the catalyst for this demand.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington showed the brutality of modern international crime. These events should not be a reason for hate and revenge. On the contrary we need a new dialog between religions and cultures. We need a transnational understanding for human values and we need the political framework for continental and global action. The strengthening of the EU and of the UN system is the right answer of the beginning of the 21st Century on September 2001.

The Attack Against the US and the Need for a New World Order

World Security through World Law

Garry Davis

The lesson of today's terrorist attack on the United States is clear. The violence of the nation-state is being devoured by itself. Commentators, as I write, are declaring that "war" is being waged on the US. But they fail to identify the real "enemy". It is the national war system itself which condones a condition of world anarchy from which "terrorism" derives.

The vulnerability of the anachronistic nation-state itself is being dramatically demonstrated by the carnage wrought by only three hijacked planes on the two principal symbols of America's dominance in the world: the Pentagon and the twin World Trade Towers. Chaos results not to mention the human casualties in and near those buildings.

United States so-called security experts from the CIA, the FBI, as well as the various police services have thus been exposed as totally incapable of protecting either the people or the institutions from attacks from unknown sources. The reason is crystal-clear. The global system itself is based on violence despite the naïve claim of an "open society". The impotence is further demonstrated by the evacuations of all personnel from government buildings in Washington, grounding all air traffic throughout the country, all postal services (Burlington main postoffice is closed until further notice) responding by shutting down the peoples service institutions. In short, the government is proving itself incapable of governing.

From the end of World War II, this writer, who participated in that war as a B-17 bomber pilot,

has been an active exponent of world government. Agreeing with Einstein's prophetic statement that "With all my heart, I believe that the world's present system of sovereign nations can only lead to barbarism, war and inhumanity, and that only world law can assure progress towards a civilized peaceful community". I claimed a civic status which alone could address the anarchic condition perpetuated by the nation-state system, that of world citizenship. Millions followed suit.

This status alone reaffirms the sovereignty of the individual human as well as humanity. Today therefore is a day of historic reckoning for Americans, of massive understanding and awakening to reality. No longer will the American people feel secure in their homes, cities or nation. Their government has been exposed as vulnerable to "alien" forces and purposes. The question each citizen must now answer is clear: Given the world community of humans, given the technology which can effectively eliminate the human race from the face of the planet, what kind of social and political order is necessary to protect the inalienable human rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"?

Each and every human being must address that question. That is the bottom line of the tragic yet inevitable events of today. Human survival depends on the correct answer.

September 11, 2001
www.worldservice.org
www.worldcitnews.org

WFM in Response to the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001

The World Federalist Movement expresses profound sadness for the tragic loss of life in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania resulting from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The Movement sends our condolences to the families of the victims and all those affected directly and indirectly by these horrible assaults. With our International Secretariat in New York next to United Nations Headquarters, the scale and depth of the catastrophe and the unimaginable suffering it is causing envelop us. Thankfully all our staff and their families are safe, but the UN itself remains a prime target, and concern and fear prevail.

These unbelievable attacks on innocent people, from nations all over the world, are crimes against humanity. We call upon the world community to join together in bringing the perpetrators and their sponsors to justice and in developing a global initiative to prevent and eradicate international terrorism. WFM stands solidly behind the efforts of the United States of America to protect its own citizens and to prosecute those guilty of these horrendous crimes. However, WFM urges the United States government to resist calls to engage in massive, unilateral military strikes against countries where terrorists are suspected to reside. In the past this has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocent civilians, often only further inflaming and expanding these terrorist networks.

Instead, building on the substantial

international support for the United States in this time, WFM encourages the United States to champion a multinational effort to combat terrorism under United Nations auspices. The United States joins a long list of countries around the world who have suffered from these terrorist attacks. Terrorism is a global problem, involving complex international terrorist networks and cells located in countries all over the globe. Only a multi-faceted, global approach can stop it, incorporating such efforts as: early-warning mechanisms and intelligence-sharing; an international tribunal to try suspected terrorists; stronger international legal mechanisms, such as conventions on terrorism; poverty-alleviation and development aid; conflict-resolution and democracy-building programs; and multinational enforcement, where necessary.

Let us build a safer, more peaceful, more just world for succeeding generations. That would be a fitting way to honor the memories of all those lost on September 11.

*WFM Statement
New York, September 19, 2001*

The Attack Against the US and the Need for a New World Order

World-Wide Terrorism: a New Responsibility for the European Union

The Bureau of the U.E.F:

expresses its full and warm-hearted solidarity with the American people following the horrible and cowardly terrorist hijack attacks of which it has been a victim;

declares itself strongly concerned with the instability of the current international situation and by the impossibility indicated by the USA, following the collapse of the cold war, to solely control and face up to the intensifying financial and political crises affecting the world in increasing numbers reliant upon its own resources;

emphasises that the situations of tension, misery and anarchy which nourish the current widespread aversion against the USA and the consensus enjoyed in many Arab countries by anti-American terrorism cannot be met exclusively by military means, but that they require a multilateral policy capable of assuring a peaceful global governance, aimed at the economic development and promotion of equitable and progressive political solutions in the poorest and most unstable regions of the world;

points to the responsibility of the European governments, whose division and impotence leave the USA alone in confronting a task too vast for its capacity, thus submitting the government to unbearable strain. As a consequence the USA has become a target of hate and aggressiveness, which originates from the situations of dejection and

hopelessness resulting from international anarchy;

notices that if Europeans were politically united, they would possess the material and human resources necessary to take on important international responsibilities, contribute to the development and pacification of some of the instability in certain world areas, beginning with the Middle East, in order to relieve the USA of a considerable burden it is currently obliged to shoulder and to establish a more stable world order, in which international co-operation could prevail over power conflicts and terrorism could be eradicated;

demands that the heads of state and government of the members of the European Union or the most visionary among them, in the face of the tragedy that has shaken the conscience of all civilised men, renounce their national sovereignties that paralyse the decision-making mechanism of the Union and condemn it to a culpable inertia. The European Federalists ask the EU Member States to unite into a democratic federation, capable of carrying out an effective foreign policy intended to defend and promote the values of liberty, democracy, social justice and tolerance all over the world, therefore guaranteeing the internal and external security of all Europeans.

*Declaration of the Bureau of
the Union of European Federalists
Brussels, 15th September 2001*

It's Time for Us Europeans to Carry Out Our Responsibilities

A European federation against the threats to peace and security

The brutal terrorist attack against the United States should open the eyes of every European to the tragic reality of a world more and more out of control. A feeling of solidarity towards the United States, and the deep sorrow for the thousands of innocent victims, are not enough. This immense tragedy should lead all Europeans - European Governments as well as European citizens - to reflect on Europe's responsibilities in the world order, today and in the future.

Europe is still a ghost in world politics. Despite the fact that the Member States can play only a minor role on the world stage, they keep on denying to the European Union the powers and the resources to be an effective and progressive actor at the global level. In the Middle-East, in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, the US are left alone, because Europe is unable to give its contribution to world security, even in the areas bordering Europe. The United States is continuously obliged to play the role of world policeman and shows more and more signs of a short-sighted unilateralism. A monopolar order has privileges, but as we have seen this week, it can also have tragic costs.

We Europeans should wake up from our irresponsibility. Peace and security are not ensured forever. Nobody is invulnerable. A world order able to ensure democracy and freedom, justice and prosperity will not fall from heaven. And it will not come from the

United States alone. It's time for us Europeans to take up our responsibilities. Peace, democracy and freedom, the values of our civilisation, in a way our lives as they are today, cannot be preserved only thanks to good intentions. We need action. A European Federation is the only solution.

It is high time for the Europeans to unite into a true European Federation, encompassing progressively the entire European continent. A Federation able to promote - side by side with the United States and the international institutions - a more democratic world with a fairer distribution of resources, power and prosperity. A Federation able to take its share of responsibility in the fight against terrorism, fanaticism and threats to world security.

This is the real issue at stake after Nice, today and towards 2004. The Europeans can choose the route towards the European Federation or can keep on playing with their division, inaction and irresponsibility, until another tragedy will hit, maybe directly against Europe not the USA this time. It's the time of choice, for everybody.

*JEF Press release
Brussels, September 13, 2001*

Comments

Spinelli and the Ventotene Manifesto

*John Pinder**

It is now sixty years since Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi completed the Ventotene Manifesto. This article recounts how they came to do this, the impact on Spinelli himself and, through him, on events in Europe since then. It is an exciting, moving and inspiring story.

Spinelli was arrested for anti-fascist activities in 1927, when still less than twenty years old. He was confined for ten years in a prison cell then six in prison camp. He was, when arrested, a leading member of the Italian communist youth movement, which he had joined for three main reasons. He saw it as the only effective opponent of fascism in Italy; he found in it an all-embracing idea that would enable him to play his part in making the world better for mankind; and he wanted to dedicate his life to such a cause.

In prison he read and read and read: books on politics, philosophy, economics and history; literature in Italian, German, French, English, Russian, Spanish, Latin and ancient Greek. He had time to reflect - one of his favourite words - on what he read; and that led him to an uncomfortable conclusion. He realised that he had committed himself to the wrong idea. Stalinism was a monstrosity that stemmed from the denial of individual freedom, with which he was temperamentally and morally unable to live.

Spinelli, Rossi and the Manifesto

In 1939 two things happened that are crucial for this story. World War Two began; and Spinelli came to the prison camp on the island of Ventotene, seeking the right idea to which to

devote his life. There he met Ernesto Rossi, a professor of economics who had been imprisoned for his anti-fascist activities in the social-liberal organisation 'Justice and Liberty', which was an early pioneer of the idea of combining liberal principles with social justice. He was the ideal 'maestro' for Spinelli's induction into the world of democratic politics.

Rossi had been a brilliant student of Luigi Einaudi, a more classical liberal of outstanding integrity who was to become the first President of the post-war Italian republic. There was wide latitude in what the prisoners confined on Ventotene could read, so Rossi and Spinelli were able to obtain a collection of essays by Einaudi, including two in which, in 1918, he had forecast that peace would not be preserved by a League of Nations based on the principle of national sovereignty, so a European federation was required. Rossi wrote to Einaudi asking him to send books on that theme.

It happened that the leading source of literature on the subject at that time was England, where a strong federalist movement had grown up in the late 1930s and leading intellectuals such as William Beveridge, Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins and Barbara Wootton had been writing books and pamphlets on the subject. Einaudi sent Rossi some of these and the impact on Spinelli was decisive. He had found the cause to which he was to devote the rest of his life. In his own words, these books were for him 'a revelation', with 'the clean, precise thinking of these English federalists, in whose writings I found a very good method for analysing the chaotic state of affairs

into which Europe was plunging and for drawing up alternatives¹. Typically, what Spinelli got from these books was not only analysis as food for thought, but also alternative solutions as a basis for action.

Having found the right idea to replace the wrong one and spent a few months digesting it, Spinelli suggested to Rossi that they write a manifesto to advocate it. Rossi agreed. Spinelli did most of the drafting but they discussed it intensively, paragraph by paragraph. The result was the Ventotene Manifesto, completed in the late summer of 1941. They launched this democratic and federal challenge in remarkable circumstances. Hitler controlled almost the whole of continental Europe, including much of European Russia where his armies had been winning victory after victory. Many, perhaps most people on the Continent expected him to win the war. Churchill and de Gaulle were among those who did not. So also was Spinelli; and he intended the Manifesto to initiate a campaign to create a European federation when the forces of democracy had won.

The Manifesto contained an analysis of the contemporary crisis of European civilisation and a call for action to establish the federal solution. The crisis was the international anarchy caused by absolute national sovereignty. The federal solution was liberal democratic government at two levels. The European federal institutions would comprise a two-chamber legislature with a house of the citizens and a house of the states, a federal executive responsible to the legislature and a court of justice as the supreme judicial authority for federal affairs. The federal powers would include foreign policy and defence, currency and trade, finance and the federal budget, and the guarantee of human rights. Other powers would remain with the member states.

Spinelli recalled later that these ideas were not new: others had already expressed them, 'certainly better than we did.' But the new ideas

concerned the action to be taken. Federation was seen as an objective for action now; and the line of division between progressives and reactionaries would henceforth be, not the traditional one between left and right, but between those who focus on winning national power and 'those who see as their central task the creation of a solid international state.' Spinelli also pointed out a few 'political errors' in what was his first piece of federalist writing. One was the assumption that federation could be established rapidly after the war was over, before the old structures of the national states had been re-established. But he learnt to sustain his action through a much longer process. Another was that his idea of a dedicated leading group of federalists was expressed in a way that was 'too crudely Leninist'². We must remember that he was still in the very early stages of learning how liberal democracy works. But he learnt remarkably quickly. One evidence of this is the first sentence of the Manifesto, with the fundamental affirmation of liberal political philosophy that 'man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but an autonomous centre of life'.

Already in 1941 the Manifesto began to exert its influence in Italy where it was circulated clandestinely; and it was published in 1944 after the fascist regime was overthrown. Spinelli was liberated in August 1943 and went immediately to Milan where he founded the Movimento Federalista Europeo, then took steps towards the foundation of the UEF. He was a great leader and played a decisive part in the development of both the Italian and the European organisation. But he was not an organisation man. His life was, rather, a saga of personal struggle to convert the vision of the Manifesto into the reality of a European federation. So the rest of this story will focus on six episodes in that struggle.

Spinelli, Monnet and the European Community

The first episode began in the summer of 1952 at a meeting with Jean Monnet who, having

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initiated the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community and led the negotiations to establish it, was about to become the first President of its High Authority. Monnet said how impressed he had been with the clarity of a paper drafted by Spinelli, in which he had proposed that the ECSC's parliamentary assembly be given the task of drafting a federal constitution. A few days later Monnet asked Spinelli to draft his inaugural speech to the High Authority³.

Spinelli used the opportunity to identify the federal elements in the Community which would enable it to grow beyond the form of a traditional international organisation, depending for every action on the agreement of all the member states, into a launching pad for development into a federal union: a European executive, independent of the member states' governments; a parliamentary assembly, precursor of the European Parliament, to which the executive was to be responsible; a Court of Justice, supreme within the fields of competence of the Community; and a limited power to tax. In these respects the institutions, the speech affirmed, were federal - though it was certainly not Spinelli but Monnet who added 'disons le mot' before the word federal, doubtless because, in France as later in Britain, the 'f' word was a cause of contention⁴. Spinelli became convinced that, although Monnet did not have 'the least idea' of what it meant to make a constitution, he was a federalist; and Monnet asked Spinelli to join the staff of the High Authority and write a series of speeches that could become the equivalent of *The Federalist* of Hamilton, Jay and Madison, which expounded the ideas behind the constitution of the United States. But Spinelli was determined to retain his independence until he could return to the European institutions in a political capacity: which, of course, he eventually did⁵.

The second episode concerned the European army and the European Defence Community

(EDC), which the six member states of the ECSC were planning to establish during the years 1950 to 1954. The governments' original idea was to give what would be the principal responsibility for the defence of the member states to a Council of Ministers, more intergovernmental than federal. Spinelli, who was fully versed in the principles of federal democracy, quickly realised that such responsibility could be given only to solidly democratic federal institutions. He persuaded the Italian government of this, which in turn persuaded the other five governments that an appropriate treaty should be drafted; and the task was given to the ECSC's parliamentary assembly, slightly adjusted for the purpose⁶. Spinelli was active in advising the assembly's constitutional committee that drafted the treaty for a European Political Community, which would have provided a quasi-federal constitution for the EDC. But in August 1954 the project for the Defence Community, hence also the Political Community, was killed by the French Assemblée Nationale, where it was vehemently opposed by both communists and nationalists.

Federalists had to start again; and Monnet and Spinelli went in characteristically different directions. Monnet set up the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, whose members were the leaders of the main democratic parties and trade unions of the member states, and sought their support for further development of the Community. The result was the Messina Conference in 1955, which was to lead to the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1958. Spinelli thought that the Community project had reached the end of the road and Monnet was finished⁷. He continued to pursue the constitutional route towards European federation. Since the governments were evidently not prepared to set up an assembly to draft a constitution, he launched a campaign to do it without them, founding the Congress of the European People to organise elections of citizens' representatives to a constituent assembly.

The campaign had some successes, but not nearly enough to create the nucleus of an assembly. It was a formative experience for the militants of the MFE which was to be important for their future work. But it came nowhere near to attaining its objective. Meanwhile, the great nationalist Charles de Gaulle had become President of France and Spinelli realised that so long as he remained President, the federal project would remain blocked. So the 1960s were, for Spinelli, what may be called his academic decade, when he shelved political action and concentrated on thought and analysis instead. He founded the Istituto Affari Internazionali, which did some pioneering work on federal projects and became the leading Italian institute of international affairs; and he became a visiting professor at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University. But in 1969 de Gaulle resigned and Spinelli seized the opportunity to return to political action.

The Commission and the Tindemans Report

One of the springs of Spinelli's dynamism was the tension between his federal idealism and his political realism. Spinelli the realist understood that his judgement of Monnet and the Community in the later 1950s had been wrong: that the Community could be seen as central to the development of a federal Europe and a vantage point from which to resume his federalist struggle. So, as he had told Monnet in 1952 that he would, Spinelli the idealist entered the European institutions in a political capacity, when the Italian government nominated him as a member of the Commission in June 1970.

He was an active Commissioner for industrial affairs, introducing new ideas that were in due course put into effect. But he was awaiting a chance to get the Commission to lead a campaign to convert the Community into a federation. In the spirit of one of his favourite metaphors, he was always seeking the Joan of

Arc to put the crown on the head of the Dauphin thus causing him to exercise his sovereign rights: but the Dauphin was now the people of Europe and Joan of Arc was whoever would cause them to assume their federal sovereignty. Late in 1974 an opportunity to get the Commission to play this part presented itself, when the Heads of State and Government asked Leo Tindemans, the Belgian prime minister and a federalist, to produce a report on how to convert the Community into a European Union. For the next year Spinelli strove to persuade the Commission to press Tindemans to propose a federal reform of the Community. But the Commission went only part of the way; and Tindemans produced a report whose conclusions could, he hoped, be accepted by his fellow political leaders of the other member states, and were hence yet farther removed from what Spinelli wanted. Finding that route also a cul-de-sac, Spinelli resigned from the Commission in May 1974. His four years as a Commissioner had, however, given him experience in practical politics at the top level and the standing of a major political figure in the Community, which were to be important assets in the final, parliamentary phase of his federalist saga.

The European Parliament and the treaty-constitution

The fourth episode, and the first in his parliamentary phase, started almost at once. In June Spinelli became a member of the Camera dei Deputati, as an independent on the Italian Communist Party's list. When I asked him why he had moved back towards the communists with whom he had broken some four decades before, his answer was threefold. First, as far as ideas were concerned, he had not moved towards them, but they had moved towards him, on the issue that they knew to be his overriding interest, the creation of a federal Europe; and their subsequent behaviour in the European Parliament was to confirm his judgement.

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Secondly, the political reality was that there was no other way for him to be elected to parliament; and the events of the next ten years were to show why he rightly believed that to be necessary. Thirdly, he had told the Communists that he would say what he chose, not what they might want him to say; and they had accepted this - doubtless because his name would help them in moving towards respectability in democratic politics.

Four months later Spinelli entered the European Parliament, whose members were not yet elected directly by the citizens, but indirectly by the parliaments of member states. His first action there was based on his understanding of a key event in the history of parliamentary democracy, when citizens' representatives in the English parliament gained control over public expenditure, hitherto the prerogative of the King. So Spinelli joined the Parliament's Budgets Committee and fought for parliamentary control over the Community's budget, hitherto largely the prerogative of the governments' representatives in the Council. Instigated by Spinelli, the Parliament fought battles on the issue and lost most of them. But Spinelli judged that the experience had radicalised the MEPs, preparing them for the critical struggle ahead: for the treaty-constitution to convert the Community from a system still dominated by the member states' governments into a European federation.

The direct elections of June 1979 gave Spinelli, now seventy one years old, the opportunity for which his life had prepared him since he drafted the Ventotene Manifesto nearly four decades ago. The governments of the Community's member states had given him the citizens' elected representatives that he had tried in vain to secure through the Congress of the European People. He underlined the status of MEPs by saying that they were a normal cross-section of Europeans who shared one unique

characteristic: all of them could say 'I have been chosen to represent the European citizens.' So they had the legitimacy to design Europe's future constitution.

This was his rendez-vous with destiny and he was determined not to fail. He wanted the Parliament to draft and approve a treaty that would provide the Community with a federal constitution. He formed the Crocodile group, named after the restaurant in Strasbourg where it first met, to help him promote the project. He then persuaded the Parliament to form an institutions committee, which would prepare the draft of the treaty, and to appoint him its general rapporteur. Although he had been renowned as too impatient and intolerant to work well with others, he co-operated in an exemplary way with all the main political groups and their MEPs to produce the text; and although he had generally been regarded as an all-or-nothing maximalist, he guided the committee to produce a draft treaty that he judged the Parliament would be able to accept. It was designed, not to by-pass the Community, but to reform it into a European Union, with institutions that were in substance federal but without the power over defence that a federation would have, though with an opening through which to move towards that too. His effort was rewarded on 14 February 1984 when a preponderant majority of MEPs voted for what was indeed a treaty-constitution.

The sixth and final episode in Spinelli's saga was his attempt to secure member states' ratification of the draft Treaty which, in order not to be subject to veto, was to enter into force when ratified by a majority of them with a population at least two thirds of the Community's total. After a meeting with Spinelli, President Mitterrand, in a speech to the European Parliament, offered warm support to its Treaty. But he was characteristically equivocal and went on to accept the Single European Act which fell

far short of the Parliament's Treaty. The Single Act was the product of a confluence of the Parliament's initiative and that of Commission President Jacques Delors to create the single European market, with the use of qualified majority voting in the Council. The draft Treaty left its imprint on the Single Act in, among other things, the beginnings of legislative powers for the Parliament, which were to lead on to its substantial powers of codecision. More fundamentally, the Treaty demonstrated how the Community could be reformed into a federation: a source of inspiration and regeneration for the federalist cause after many years of stagnation.

Spinelli's life and legacy

Spinelli died in May 1985, three months after the Single Act was signed. Tragically, he thought it was useless: a 'topolino morto' - a dead mouse - he called it. If he had lived longer he would have seen that it had in fact relaunched the Community, as the Rome Treaties had done in 1958. Thus the Single Act and the single market project, with the practice of majority voting and the start of legislative power for the Parliament, led on to the single currency, to the application of qualified majority voting and codecision to the bulk of the Council's legislative decisions, and to various other federal elements in the Union's powers and institutions: in short, to a European

Union that may be seen as over half way to becoming a federation. That represents great progress towards the federal Europe to which Spinelli devoted so much of his life; and the European Council at Laeken under Belgian Presidency in December 2001, to be followed by the Convention, offers federalists the opportunity to secure further federal reforms for the Union and a constituent process that should lead to a federal constitution.

Such was Spinelli's life and such is his legacy. His life, from Ventotene and the Manifesto to the European Parliament and his treaty-constitution, was a heroic struggle to convert his federalist vision into federal reality. His legacy is our chance to bring the struggle to a successful conclusion. He combined in a remarkable way the capacities of thought and action. Observing the difficulties of British federalists, he wrote in his diary of their need for someone with 'the organisational sense of Mr x and the subtle intellect of Mr y'; and he added 'But I don't see him.' These qualities should, he thought, be found in one person. But we all have to contribute according to our abilities and in our own ways. The Ventotene seminar gives participants the opportunity to reflect on Spinelli's legacy and on what one's own contribution to this historic enterprise can be. It is a great merit of the MFE to have created this opportunity for us to do so.

¹This article is based on the opening speech to the Ventotene seminar on 2 September 2001, celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Manifesto.

²Altiero Spinelli, *Come ho tentato di diventare saggio: Io Ulisse* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984), pp. 307-8.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 311-12.

⁴Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1948/1969*, edited by Edmondo Paolini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), pp. 142-3.

⁵Jean Monnet, 'Speech to the Inaugural Session of the High Authority', in his *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont commencé: discours et allocutions 1952-1954* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1955), pp. 55-8.

⁶*Diario europeo*, pp. 142-3, 163.

⁷See Sergio Pistone, 'Il ruolo di Altiero Spinelli nella genesi dell'Art. 38 della Comunità Europea di Difesa e del progetto di Comunità Politica Europea', in G. Trausch (ed.), *La construction de l'Europe, du Plan Schuman aux Traités de Rome* (Brussels, Bruylant, 1992).

⁸*Diario europeo*, p. 269.

Comments

Competition and Monopoly: Global Economy and National Anti-Trust Laws

Antonio Mosconi

The concepts of “competition” and “monopoly” could still be useful for the political guidance of the world in the process of globalization only after they have undergone a spatial and temporal revision.

A spatial revision is necessary because the economic models controlled respectively by the “invisible hand” of the market (that is, by the atomistic decisions of countless operators, none of which are provided with the power of changing the competition rules), and by the authority of a “centralized plan” (direct emanation of the power of states, of public and private trusts and of varied combinations of these) were devised with reference to the economies of sovereign national states, territorially defined. A separate branch of the social science, international economy, was necessary for explaining the economic relationships among national states; in this specialized sector of studies, the ideology of competition took on the denomination of “free exchange”. The disparity in the power relations among the exchangers was ignored: it was not the economists’ competence; and some people still believe it is not the competence of the federalists either.

A temporal revision is also necessary: with reference to the expansion of the historical time, the explosion of the scientific culture, the weakening of the humanistic one, the increasing divergence and the various forms that the interlacing of monopolistic rule and state power has taken; and because of the shortening of operational time (which I would define, somewhat mechanically and only for the sake of this argument, as the interval between the moment of conception and that of execution),

due to the very rapid success of a new technological paradigm, which has cancelled out time and space with the revolution in transport and communications.

These revisions look indispensable to anyone aspiring to research how to pass from an international to a globally-governed economy; the fact they have not yet been carried out proves how much the economic science is lagging behind, relative to the political and physical sciences.

In perfect competition no trustworthy economist ever believed, except as an ideal condition which, for its very perfection, everybody knew was unreachable. Yet, the concepts of perfect competition and free market became synonymous with the capitalist ideology. But extreme freemarketing has been shaken to its foundations by the most illustrious achievements of modern and contemporary economic thought. The Marxian critique to monopolistic capital; the theories, born out of Piero Sraffa’s fertile work at Cambridge, of imperfect competition, and differentiated and concentrated oligopoly. Schumpeter’s explanation of how competition tends toward monopoly, and how this can, under certain circumstances, foster innovation; the ensuing analysis of the relation between oligopoly and technical progress, to which a significant contribution was given by one of Galbraith’s, a follower of Keynes, description of the American economy as the co-existence of a competitive sector and an oligopolistic one; the irreverent interpretation of the economic behaviours of extreme freemarketing by a neo-keynesian scholar like Lester Thurow. All this

notwithstanding, two factors have determined the new revival of extreme freemarketing: the disastrous failure of real socialism and the survival, weakened as it is, of state and inter-state regulatory systems, functional to the survival of capitalism (just those systems the capitalists seem to be irritated by when they are not immediately turned to the privatization of profits and the socialization of losses).

In fact, as the market covers and regulates the world of competitive enterprises, so the plan contains and rules that of military and industrial national apparatuses, basically monopolistic, but increasingly exposed them too to the bloodiest global competition.

Most of the under-developed countries specialize in producing raw materials. The prices of commodities are made on the world market according to the law of supply and demand, and can be influenced by speculation, in particular by the use of stocking and unstocking policies, maneuvered more effectively by the purchasing industrialized countries than by the producers themselves. Even when the latter try to organize an oligopoly (like OPEC), the corresponding oligopsony (the Seven Sisters) proves to be stronger. It is a fact that the energy market is still unable to make it convenient to invest as necessary to convert the industrial system to renewable and less-polluting energies.

The industrialized countries in their turn are exporting investment goods, finished products and advanced services. The oligopolistic conformation of supply, undergoing an ever-more-advanced concentration process at world level, allows them in most cases to make the prices by applying a margin on direct costs. As Sylos Labini observes, "the comparison between the two price categories - raw materials and finished products - shows beyond any reasonable doubt that in a competition regime prices depend on supply and demand, whereas in an oligopoly regime they depend on direct costs, which tend to rise or to remain stable-very

rarely to decrease".¹

The world system is based on national states formally endowed with exclusive sovereignty, even if they are in point of fact subjected to the primacy of foreign policy and to the ever-more-intricated interlacing of treaties and institutions of inter-governmental cooperation. This artful independence in an interdependent world not only stresses the asymmetry of marketing power connected to the specialization in products which has been mentioned above, but also causes a disparity in the marketing power of enterprises, in relation to the sizes of the markets their states of origin control. It is not by chance that the question of trusts has been tackled in a diametrically-opposed way until the Second World War in the United States and in the European national states, with consequences still seen to this day. In America the first great, politically unified market was formed, the first big enterprises were created and, already at the beginning of the twentieth century, a process started tending to block competition and to concentrate in a few hands the control of the markets. The federal government's answer was the anti-trust legislation. The European national states acted in a diametrically-opposed way. As the size of the markets, so absurdly fragmented, did not allow the formation of enterprises capable of global competitiveness, each state bowed to its own *real-politik*, encouraging the formation of national trusts in order to use them or be used by them. How organic this plot was, cannot be better illustrated than by the relation in Germany between the coal and steel trust and the rearmament there between the two wars. The residues, in a Paretian sense, of that long and woeful period in European history can be found in expressions that enjoy a big audience in the media, although they are lacking any significance in explaining and regulating the globalizing economy, such as "country system", "national sample", "mad cow" (always the one bred by one's neighbour) and so on.

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In America the managers who, like Sloan², understood and developed the potential of the great unified market, had a long and prestigious life, and are still respected as national monuments. In Europe instead, men inspired by the same vision, from Rathenau³ to Herrausen⁴, were killed by terrorists, both red and black, infected by the same nationalist disease.

If we detached ourselves from this history and from the context it has created, which is the one we are living in, it would be difficult to understand the current debate in Europe over the anti-trust legislation and the vigilance on international financial markets. Debate out of which the opinion is emerging more and more clearly that economic globalization cannot be left to itself and that the creation of controlling Authorities can only be addressed by the UN⁵. In fact, in the hands of the USA and the EU it has already too often turned from a means for protecting competition and consumers into a new tool for protectionism. Too many mergers are blocked not for preventing the formation of a monopolistic power, but for protecting the existent "champion", American or European, from the rise of a possible rival that could eventually weaken it in global competition.

For the European Union protection of competition represents a primary mission (since the ECCS and the Common Market), as a pledge of the rejection once and for all of any *liaison dangereuse* between monopolistic interests and nationalistic ideologies. However, even now that the single currency is here, the objective of preventing monopolies from being set up (and of not yielding to somebody else's) is far from being attained. Privatization of public monopolies is uttered as achieving liberty of competition, whereas sometimes what is done is just following the Reaganite cycle of privatization of profits and socialization of losses, as demonstrated by the tariff rises occurred in Italy in lieu of the promised reductions. Einaudi's great

lesson on monopoly seems to have been attributed to a dangerous communist, and as such it has been ignored during the long extreme-freemarketing reaction. Anyway, if it is true that the sleep of reason generates monsters, it is also true that monsters cause rough reawakenings. Everywhere in Europe you can feel the premonitory signs of a renaissance, yet blocked by the persistent national fragmentation of its political will. The damage is not limited to Europe, but propagates to the whole world because of the EU's inability to propose and support a complementary idea of world government, modifying and, if necessary, replacing the American one.

The stall of negotiations within the WTO, after the failure of the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle and the missed start of the Millennium Round, is due also to European weakness. It is important to remember, in effect, that the idea of a global negotiation, aimed at finding a new balance between reducing the protections granted to some sectors (agriculture) and developing global markets for others (services), thus meeting the requests of developing countries, has been supported mostly by the EU. The United States instead considers more in accordance with its national interest to treat separately the agricultural questions (in regard of which the EU policy (CAP) is still open to criticism) from services, for which it enjoys a competitive advantage. Although the WTO has the power to enforce the agreements, these agreements are of an exclusively contractual nature. It is obvious that drawing up and observing contracts in a world of sovereign and armed national states remains a question of good will, left to the moral persuasion of a hegemonic power. This is regarded by an increasing number of countries and people as less and less moral and less and less persuasive. Contracts are better than war, but they have never averted it. Federalists' demand to found peace on institutions and not on volatile agreements is therefore a sound one. Coming back to the beginning, it would be

useful to have a theory of monopoly more adequate to a bipolar world in process of globalization than to a world of national states, formally sovereign but actually dominated by one imperial power. Certainly, as the possibility to find ourselves in one or the other situation depends on the political unification of Europe and on the (related) developments in Russia and China, it is necessary to explore the new world without ever forgetting that we are still living in the old one. However, only by venturing in the unknown territory of governing globalization will the federalist vanguard avoid withering in the rearguard of national states, although "federated" (by conviction or by necessity) at continental level. The federalist criticism of the dominant economic doctrine should take off from where Albertini⁶ left it, placing at the center of its

analysis the disparity in power relations among states, among economic operators and between the two of them. Looking for a way, which, by subjecting the states to the law of a politically unified humankind, will make it possible to enforce law on trans-national gigatrusters and even on the iron alliances between mafias and criminal states, is the task of that "peaceful revolution" in which Albertini was finding the sense of federalist action. Without it, it would be useless to set oneself out to save economic liberty, and liberty *tout-court*, from the contradictions which are already quite apparent - potentially catastrophic ecology upset, growth without welfare, explosive gap between a few excessive riches and many unimaginable miseries, volatility and unruliness of the globalized financial markets, borderless organized crime.

¹ Paolo Sylos Labini, *"Sottosviluppo. Una strategia di riforme"*, Bari, 2000

² Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. (1875-1966) was President of General Motors

³ Walther Rathenau (1867-1922) was President of AEG

⁴ Alfred Herrhausen was President of Deutsche Bank

⁵ Giuliano Amato, *"Il potere e l'anti-trust"*, Bologna, 1998, Guido Rossi, *"La sovranità degli stati di fronte ai reati globali"*, in *La Repubblica*, 13/12/2000

⁶ Mario Albertini (1919-1997) was Professor of Philosophy of Politics at the University of Pavia. He was President of the European Federalist Movement and of the Union of European Federalists.

Comments

Milosevic in Court: No Peace without Justice?

Laura Davis

Slobodan Milosevic's transfer from his Belgrade prison to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on 28 June 2001 was headline news: he would be the first head of state to stand trial, on the basis of individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility, for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war in virtue of his position as President of Serbia, member of the Supreme Defence Council and Supreme Commander of the VJ (Yugoslav Army)¹. The indictment currently covers only acts allegedly committed in Kosovo, although this is likely to be extended to Croatia and Bosnia as well.

Political destabilisation in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

The transfer of Milosevic to ICTY has led to considerable political destabilisation in both Serbia and FRY. Since the change of government following the federal elections in September 2000, there had been little substantive advance towards co-operating with ICTY, despite internal pressures from some members of the ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition and heavy external pressure from the international community. The transfer was carried out ultimately by the Serbian Republic, in consultation with federal President Kostunica and members of DOS. Federal organs had been unable to act before the deadline of 29 June -when an international donor's conference was scheduled to pledge aid to FRY, and vital for the country's economy and political rehabilitation- blocked essentially by the Montenegrin Socialist People's Party (SNP). Yet the issue was also divisive for DOS which had so

far held together, at least in public: pre-existing divisions in the coalition coalesced around the federal President Kostunica and the Serbian Republic Premier Djindjic. The transfer thus had ramifications not only for the cohesion of the DOS coalition, but also for the relationships between Serbia, Montenegro and the federation. Whether either the coalition or the federation can hold together much longer is an open question².

No Peace without Justice?

"No peace without justice" is an expression that is commonly heard, and is seemingly uncontroversial. Yet it bears closer examination – not least of all, establishing definitions for both peace and justice.

I would argue that peace is the situation in which war is impossible, yet this definition is probably too idealistic to have any practical use when discussing post-conflict situations. Whilst one can argue that, for example, France and Germany are at peace in the sense that their economies, political systems, and cultural relations are so closely knitted, especially in the context of the European Union, that war, if not impossible is highly improbable, we cannot imagine that the peoples of the former Yugoslavia can reach such a level of coexistence for at least another generation. In which case, a tempered definition, the situation in which violent conflict between self-defined groups is unlikely, may serve a better purpose: coexistence rather than peace.

Which leads to the definition of justice, to which a common riposte is "Whose justice?". Is international law, as embodied by ICTY, universal?

Or is it an essentially Western or Security Council view of justice, a foreign view of justice over which the peoples from all sides of a conflict feel little ownership? A charge constantly levelled at ICTY throughout the former Yugoslavia is that ICTY is a US court, a political rather than an impartial, judicial court. The legitimacy of the court has been questioned since its inception: the Dutch defence counsel Michail Wladimiroff (since appointed one of three *amici curiae* in the Milosevic case) for Dusko Tadic at the court's first trial unsuccessfully challenged the court's legitimacy. The charge that the court is a US court is unfounded; it was established by the Security Council, and its judges and jurors are highly respected and come from all over the world. Further, ICTY's relationships with NATO and Western diplomats have at times been strained when the latter felt that indictments and/or arrests would hamper peace negotiations. Two issues tend to promote the view that the court is biased, however: the lack, as yet, of any indictments against members of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) and the lack of investigation into whether NATO committed war crimes during its bombing campaign. There are also questions regarding the timing of indictments, such as the issuing of that against Milosevic et al. at the time of the NATO campaign against FRY. ICTY's relationship with the United Nations in its current form, lays it open to the charge, fair or not, that it is dependent on the Security Council members.

The ICTY is not perfect – it is not the solution to the region's problems. But it is an important part in rebuilding societies. In post conflict situations, the judicial investigation of alleged crimes, establishing facts with the burden of proof and thus taking the story of a conflict out of the arena of anecdote and propaganda, into the sphere of established fact are vital for the establishment of a common history of a conflict, a precondition for reconciliation. Importantly, the ICTY also establishes individual guilt – thus helping the communities, both those perceived as the victim and the perpetrator to move away from collective

guilt through the identification and punishment of those guilty for specific crimes. Further, its justice is not retribution; if justice is to be constructive to rebuilding societies, it cannot be based on vengeance.

The geographical and psychological distance between the Hague and the former Yugoslavia is both an advantage and a problem: the trials are conducted according to international procedure by external parties, but at the same time, the crimes are taken away from the context in which they were committed, thus reducing the healing effect of the trial itself. Ideally, ICTY would hold the trials in the capitals of each of the combatants, but this is not feasible from a security point of view, nor are any of the judicial systems in the states and entities concerned in a fit state to conduct such trials themselves.

The ICTY trials will contribute, gradually and slowly, to the erosion of "us" and "them", of the perception of one ethnic group being guilty or innocent, and rather focus on the guilt and innocence of the individuals concerned. Until the dividing lines and perceptions of wrong-doing by one ethnicity to another can be overcome, coexistence is impossible. This is a long, painful process, which ICTY can help.

International Justice

There has come to be an understanding that some crimes are simply too serious, or involve too many actors for a single state to handle alone. So far, the Security Council of the United Nations has established two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals – one for former Yugoslavia, the other for Rwanda (ICTR). Both should be welcomed: both attempt to introduce the concept of justice, impartiality from the combatants and with that, aid the reconciliation of the combatant societies with each other and with their own pasts through establishing what happened to whom when, and which individuals were responsible.

Comments

The problem of the lack of feeling of “ownership” by people in the former Yugoslavia of ICTY is much more serious in the case of ICTR. The ICTR struggles not only with an immense caseload that it cannot manage, but also with the perception that it is imposing “Western justice”. As a result, a traditional court system *Agacaca* has been established, with judges elected and acting at communal level, to supplement ICTR.

In other post-conflict societies, different mechanisms are used to dispense justice. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa may be criticised as it does not appear to punish the guilty in the sense that is commonly understood. Yet, the Commission was probably the only alternative to a protracted civil war, and whilst the required admission of guilt is far from the prison sentences handed down by other bodies, it can be seen as a type of punishment in itself. And certainly the South African case is so unusual precisely because the whole ideological basis and functioning of the state was on trial, as much as individuals.

Other initiatives include the pioneering step the Belgian courts took in 1993 by establishing universal jurisdiction over serious contravention of international humanitarian law³ regardless of whether the alleged crimes were committed on Belgian territory or not. The law has led to the prosecution of numerous Rwandese accused of genocide in Rwanda. It is also worth mentioning the bungled attempt to try Augusto Pinochet in British and other European courts for crimes against Chileans whilst he was head of state, as its very failure highlighted serious weaknesses in the concept of international justice in its present form.

The picture we have is this: two ad hoc UN tribunals concerned with crimes committed on two specific territories; numerous processes in other post-conflict societies adapted to the specific conditions of the conflict in question; and various

attempts by national courts to act internationally. Then there is also the question of “whose justice?” and ownership over and belief in the process by the communities concerned.

The absence of a permanent system is clear – a judicial process through which individuals can be tried for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, regardless of the territory on which the crimes were committed. Justice for crimes such as these can no longer be bound by national boundaries and national legal systems. Yet there is a dilemma: can an international court bound by international law be truly international, or is it merely the imposition of Western values on the rest of the world? And can an international court ever address the particular characteristics of crimes in different societies?

I believe that the answer, more than ever, lies in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Independent of the UN Security Council, it will have the opportunity, one hopes, of cultivating a real sense of ownership amongst its member states, small or large, rich or poor. A permanent body, it would not require the decision of the Security Council to be established in relation to a particular conflict, neither would its mandate be restricted to particular conflicts or territories. At the same time, the ICC should have the flexibility to act as locally as possible – to relate the trials to the societies in which the crimes were committed, and to seek supplementary measures specific to the conflict if necessary, as in the case of Rwanda and South Africa, and to attempt to reduce as much as possible political destabilisation such as in Serbia and FRY.

It is possible that the ICC could also have a deterrent value; for example, as the reputation of ICTY grows, helped at least in part by the transfer of Milosevic, it may act as a deterrent in Macedonia, should the conflict escalate there once Operation Essential Harvest is over⁴.

Milosevic's trial has set a healthy precedent: even a head of state is personally responsible for crimes against humanity committed while he was in office. If the 11 September 2001 marks the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, as 28 June 1914 marked the beginning of the twentieth, then the world needs to consider how it will govern itself. Wars are no

longer between states; national boundaries no longer define nor contain warfare – therefore the justice system must move beyond national boundaries to meet the challenge. But for that justice system to be effective, it must be exactly that: independent and truly global. If we can learn one thing from ICTY, the dispensation of justice, the global rule of law must become reality.

¹ <http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/mil-fact.htm>. Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanic and Vlado Stojiljkovic were indicted under the same order and remain at large.

² For more detailed analysis see the *International Crisis Groups Balkan Reports*, particularly *Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and the Region*, 6 July 2001

³ *Der Standaard* 14/04/2001

⁴ See "The Macedonia Tribunal" by Peter Bouckaert, Institute for War and Peace Reporting Tribunal Report No. 234 www.iwpr.net



Comments

The Regional Integration Process of Central America

Giannis F. Papageorgiou

The success of European integration and the stability and prosperity it offers has found followers elsewhere in the world. The majority of these regional integration schemes, however, limit themselves to economic objectives and tend to avoid ambitious political goals. This is particularly true in the American continent where, despite linguistic and cultural affinities, the various regional integration schemes stay within the framework of inter-governmental co-operation, mainly concentrating in areas of customs and economic approximation and integration. A notable exception to this pattern is Central America. Not only is it the most politically advanced integration process of the Americas, but it also presents several unique characteristics that federalists should approach with more interest.

The five countries that traditionally compose the Isthmus of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) share many common traits. They formed part of the Mayan cultural area and, following the Spanish conquest, they became a separate administrative unit (the General Captaincy of Guatemala) within the Vice-Royalty of New Spain (Mexico). The region lacked precious metals and was neglected both by the Spanish administration and by immigrants. Throughout the colonial period, it remained an imperial outpost, sparsely populated and with few and difficult communications with the rest of the world. A small minority of *criollos* (merchants or landowners) constituted the local aristocracy ruling over the mass of marginalised Indians.

The independence process of the 1820s was forced upon Central Americans who were

relatively satisfied with the status quo but had to adapt to the changing environment. After a brief annexation of the region to the Mexican Empire (1821-23), it declared its independence in the form of a federal state, the United Provinces of Central America. Its Constitution, strongly influenced by the American Constitution and the Spanish Charter of Cadiz of 1812, provided for a federal State, composed of five provinces (the future states of Central America), a two-tier Parliament and a federal President. Although in theory the central government had sufficient power, in practice military might and finances (including tax-raising) remained largely in the hands of the aristocracy of each province; at the federal level, the fight between conservative and liberal factions kept the Federation in a state of permanent warfare and impeded economic progress. At the same time, divisions between provinces were exacerbated. The final blow to the Federation was given by a peasant revolt of 1838 used by the conservatives to oust the established liberal federal government. After 1840, each province declared independence.

Notwithstanding this failure, the vision of a Central American union, "*the patria grande*" remained alive and guided a series of attempts to rebuild the Federation. They all failed for the same reasons the Federation did not survive: local antagonism, lack of communication, absence of democratic traditions, insufficient economic and political development, and foreign intervention. Only after the Second World War did there appear to be a successful integration scheme: the Central American Common Market (C.A.C.M.), founded in 1960, aimed at creating a customs union and,

later, a common market while at the same time co-ordinating the industrialisation and the economic development of the five Member States. Though the C.A.C.M. was one of the most successful examples of economic integration in the 60s (and thus constituted a prime example of the neo-functional theory), its failure to transform the economic performance into genuine prosperity and the unwillingness of Member States to allow for any democratic opening (most of them were openly or covertly authoritarian regimes) led to its demise in the early 70s, at the same time that the region foundered in a series of civil conflicts.

Almost throughout the 70s and during the first period of the following decade, Central America came to international attention, as civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua and foreign intervention in them brought the region in the centre of the East-West conflict. Amid concerns that the fight would expand gradually and the escalation might lead to a generalised regional war, regional integration came again to the forefront. When all external efforts to reduce tension (mainly those of the Contadora group, formed by neighbouring Latin American states) failed to produce results and with a military stalemate, Presidents Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica and Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala proposed a peace plan based on confidence-building, internal democratisation and the holding of free elections; the Esquipulas plan, adopted in the city of Esquipulas in July 1986 during the first meeting of all Central American Presidents for a generation, included the creation of a directly-elected regional Parliament, the Central American Parliament (Parlacen from its Spanish acronym) as a focal point for reconciliation and peace in the region.

It is important to underline the significance of this step in the history of the region: for the first time, Central American leaders recognised the link between pacification and internal and regional democratic consolidation. Breaking with the tradition elsewhere in Latin America, they looked

towards a regional tool in order to facilitate and measure democratic progress nationally and admitted that national and international democracy could not be separate. Thus, the renewed Central American integration process immediately followed a political path and appealed to the popular legitimacy, to be achieved through the direct election of members of the Parlacen.

However, this process was thwarted by national resistance, stemming essentially from Costa Rica: as the only democratic state in the region, Costa Rica rejected attempts to grant supranational powers to an institution where the majority belonged to less-than-democratic countries. As a result, the treaty establishing the Central American Parliament was an adulterated version of the original aims; it had practically only a consultative role while its few decisive competencies were frozen by the Costa Rican refusal to ratify the Treaty.

Despite this partial failure, the progressive normalisation of the regional situation allowed for a reinstatement of the old integration instruments and the creation of new ones. This revival culminated in the Tegucigalpa Protocol of 1991 that instituted a Central American Integration System (S.I.C.A.), which also included Panama. S.I.C.A.'s objectives are no longer only economic as were those of its predecessor, the C.A.C.M.; it represents the bridge between the traditional inter-governmental Cupertino and supranational democracy, recognising the indivisible character of development, peace, democracy and integration and the use of regional means to achieve them. Among the founding principles of S.I.C.A. are, in fact, the recognition of the Central American identity and the gradual completion of the regional economic integration.

The institutional structure of the S.I.C.A. draws much from the European model. The Meeting of Presidents is the supreme organ of the System; a Council of Ministers represents the political co-ordinating institution and the Executive Committee, a permanent organ, implements the

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decisions of the former. Alongside these inter-governmental institutions, one also finds the following integrated institutions: the Central American Parliament, the General Secretariat, which is responsible for the daily running of the S.I.C.A., and the Court of Justice, which has jurisdiction on all matters relating to the legal order of the S.I.C.A. The latter is, in fact, the only integrated institution with decision-making powers and a surprising number of competencies. A Consultative Committee, representing the civil society and the organised social forces of Central America, completes the institutional panorama of S.I.C.A.

At the moment, S.I.C.A. can boast of a number of significant successes. They include a common external tariff, an almost complete customs union and substantial advances in the area of free movement of persons, capital and services. The Court of Justice has shaped the embryo of a Community legal order and the General Secretariat has gradually become the System's administrative and political core, with the Secretary General obtaining an internationally recognised political status and role. The six-monthly meetings of the Presidents continue to be the motor of the S.I.C.A. and unanimity remains the rule in the decision-making processes, but a "community" attitude is slowly developing as are the level of popular participation and the concept of Central American identity. The "Managua Declaration", declared in 1997 by the six Member-State Presidents, established the Central American

Union, a step forward to the political integration of the Isthmus. Although the Declaration has yet to become a political reality, in part due to national resistance and in part to the backlash following a series of natural disasters in the area, in particular typhoon Mitch, it still remains the political beacon of integration in the region.

Central American integration continues to face formidable obstacles, including the progression of democratisation. Despite significant progress achieved, democracy is still fragile without, at the same time, being accompanied by social equality: the continued existence of mass poverty practically cancels any democratic achievement. Nationalist resistance to integration continues to be a barrier to full integration, as is the "presidential" character of these States. Furthermore, despite the long tradition of unitary efforts, one still notes the absence of an active popular movement for regional integration. More significantly, the prevailing trend in favour of larger regional or continental free-trade areas in the Americas constitutes a major stumbling block to the separate Central American political and economic integration process: the centrifugal forces advocate direct membership of Central American States in these larger units rather than creating a separate Central American union. The European Union, both as a model and as an aid, can make the difference and help shape the future: a Central America that is a regional union or an integral part of larger free-trade areas, or an amassment of powerless States individually trying to establish privileged relations with a larger group of countries.

Kofi Annan Embraces the African Union in Lusaka

Prince Joseph Simbwa

In July 2001 United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan was among the guest speakers and heads of state to attend the 37th and final summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. In his speech, Mr. Annan emphasized the need for courageous and principled leadership, based on democratic values, if the future is to bring success. Unfortunately, many of those with power in Africa do not act as leaders at all. Many act only of managers of their states, who instead of developing long-term policies designed to reach development objectives, merely control resource distribution and personnel allocation. Others act as rulers, focused only on the means they use to enforce their illegitimate control, such as vote rigging and *coup d'état*.

This lack of leadership and failure to co-operate have taken their toll on the OAU. While it started with high esteem in 1963, its power and meaning have slowly been degraded. It resembled a dog with no teeth. one that could hardly even bark.

African leaders have now put together a working document to create the African Union (AU). This second attempt at creating a transnational African organization is emerging in the 21st century. Democratic measures must be taken to ensure that these efforts are not lost to the disruptions of regional conflicts and misguided leadership. The African Union must

not be allowed to go the way of its predecessor.

Often a comparison is made between the European Union and the African Union. The EU works to better the interests of Europe as a whole. It forces countries to reach certain economic and democratic benchmarks before they can enter. One must wonder if the AU can act in a similar manner. Will it promote the interests of a common Africa (described in our local language as *omwana w' omuddugavu*)? Will it put the interests of the people before that of the leaders? Or is it just another talking shop for Africa's dictators, potentates, and other military rulers? World Federalists reserve judgment and hope for the best.

If it is to be successful, the AU must address issues of international commerce and globalization. Regressive trade barriers must be lifted if Africa is going to compete in the same global marketplace as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and South America's MERCOSUR. Any move that promises to bring Africa's people and economies together is worthy of support and encouragement. African World Federalists would like to see a fully integrated political, economic, and military Union of African States similar to the EU.

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Is Nationalism an Undefinable Phenomenon?

Reflections on Nationalism and Multiculturalism

Ludo Dierickx

Eugen Lemberg wrote in 1964 that we dispose of enough historical material concerning nationalism but that we failed to work out a theory¹. Has there, since then, been a change? Within the framework of a general theory several questions should be focused on: how many different kinds of nationalism can we identify? What to say about stages in the evolution of nationalistic movements? Are there any internal or external tensions that favour the development of nationalism? (reinforcing it). How to explain the impact, the power, the intensity, the success of nationalism²? How can nationalism be encouraged, promoted, exploited, channelled, restrained, fought? At any rate we need to define nationalism and to put forward a thesis-definition in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Do we have such an intellectual tool in the form of a manageable definition or at least are we acquainted with the most important differences of opinion in this matter? Some people assert that it is impossible to define nationalism. L.H.M. Wessels f.i. writes: "Nationalism is a many-headed, a chameleonic phenomenon that, because it is ideologically rather without substance and even can be looked upon as scanty and meager, can be connected with conservative as well as progressive ideas³". If nationalism is a chameleonic, elusive, vague and undefinable phenomenon, how can we then deal with it in political science and in politics?

We have to admit that nationalism takes different appearances (linked with dynastic, religious, linguistic, ideological, economic elements), in which different criteria for

solidarity play a role. (Eugen Lemberg calls them interchangeable criteria). Nationalism can pass different stages, from "soft" to aggressive, from cultural to political, from emancipatory to oppressive nationalism. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to examine which elements are found in all forms of nationalism and if these elements distinguish nationalism from all other political movements and lines of thought and if knowledge of these elements will help to identify nationalism in its embryonic stage and to observe it in its development before it actually boils over.

Before we put forward a definition, let us look at two prevailing definitions, which I do not consider satisfactory. The most prevailing definition at this moment is the one proposed by the author of *Nation and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), Ernest Gellner. I quote: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent". The pursuit of this congruency of natural, religious, linguistic, historical frontiers with those of a national state or of a member state of a federation appears very often in nationalism, but is this the whole of nationalism? On the other hand, there is the proposition of Ernst B. Haas, emphasizing the idea of sovereignty and self-determination: "A nation is a group of people who wish to practice self-determination. Nationalism is the belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one⁴".

The pursuit of national sovereignty and the

right to determine what is right and wrong and whether or not to submit to higher (international) law and legal authority belongs very often to nationalistic thinking and striving. But is this the entire substance of nationalism?

Can we assert that nationalism attains in its development peaks of intensity as soon as congruence and sovereignty are claimed, but that before this stage is reached and afterwards, "things" can occur that likewise can be called nationalistic? Nationalism can in its progress culminate in a struggle for cultural homogeneity (or congruency) and national independence (or sovereignty), but this stage can upstream be preceded, and downstream be followed by demands, aspirations and actions that can also be qualified as nationalistic.

We should here mention f.i. the economic selfishness of regions opposing transfers of wealth to less prosperous areas within the same country (the Lega North in Italy, Flanders in Belgium, Baden-Württemberg in Germany, Slovenia and Croatia in former Yugoslavia, just to mention some examples...). This kind of economic nationalism does not imply necessarily the claim for independence or cultural homogeneity.

When independence (national sovereignty) and even homogeneity (congruency) are reached, this does not mean that there are no more nationalistic policies to be pursued. Governments can participate in actions to promote peace and to enhance international solidarity, but they can just as well use their sovereignty to refrain from such a policy and thwart any attempt to create a supra-national legal order, to isolate themselves, to accumulate weapons, to exploit developing countries, etc...

Moreover, even multi-cultural states may claim complete independence and pursue an imperialistic foreign policy; and a province of a

federal state can plead for cultural or linguistic (or religious) homogeneity without demanding independence.

The question remains whether we can discern basic elements showing up in all kinds of nationalism and allowing us to set up a thesis-definition that permits us to identify and compare all kinds of nationalism and that is comprehensive enough to include state nationalism and people's nationalism, aggressive and defensive, democratic and fascist nationalism, etc... Proposing a workable definition is not easy because defining the concept "nation" is in itself a difficult and precarious matter.

There are forms of nationalism that encounter people's approval and understanding, but at the same time we have to state that nationalism (f.i. imperialistic nationalism) generates and provokes other nationalisms. It can be said that nationalisms feed and strengthen each other. This is one of the reasons for the success of nationalism. The problem is how to get out of this vicious circle of nationalistic movements fighting and encouraging, yet justifying each other.

In search of a practicable definition I start from a certain idea of political life in general and from a typology of political movements. Political action in its elementary form is seen by me as an instigation given by actors (subjects) in order to influence other actors: actors instigate (suggest, propose, lead astray, convince, give examples, create situations, seduce, mislead, enforce, command, threaten...) other actors to do something (to notice, to believe, to appreciate, to prefer, to choose, to act,...)

According to Bertrand de Jouvenel (*De la politique pure*) daily life is full of instigations but

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only few are related to “public affairs”. I add that *“les affaires publiques”* concern either the government (the administration) of communities or the formation of communities, or both at the same time. Innumerable instigations of all kinds collide with each other (also those giving a vision, a description, an analysis of reality as did Karl Marx), join other instigations, gain power, weaken, fail, nullify each other, get logged down, lose momentum...

To identify nationalism, we have to ask questions about the active and passive actors, (the subjects) and about the objectives of the instigation (the objects). The subjects, the messengers and the addressees of the message normally are discernible by external signs, mostly independent of the will, such as colour of skin, language, dialect, religious and other behaviour, attitudes, eating habits, notations in the identity cards..., or that they, when this is not the case, can at least be localized geographically.

The actors (messengers and addressees) of a nationalist movement or political party are always a confined group. Universalist movements, on the other hand, can be understood to mean those which can accommodate all human beings, not only as recipients and beneficiaries, but also as messengers or exponents. This is true of socialism, communism, Christian democracy, most religions, liberalism, the ecology movement. Everyone can to some extent become a good socialist, liberal, Christian, Muslim, and can live in a socialist, liberal, Christian, Muslim society, but not everyone can be a good Slovak and live in the Slovak state. The dividing line between universalist political movements and non-universalist political movements is not always clearly drawn. Leaders of universalist political parties are often required to identify with nation-states, to

support national and nationalist demands and interests and feel obliged to dissociate themselves from the universalist and internationalist aspects of their ideology. They allow themselves to be nationalized.

I have tried to outline what subjects (actors) of nationalism have in common. Let's now talk about the objects or objectives of nationalism, the objects of nationalistic instigation. I distinguish between objects which are by their nature nationalistic and those which are nationalistic by the way they are presented to the addressees.

Nationalistic objects by their substance and nature are those emphasized by Ernest Gellner (the congruency of nation and state: the demand for cultural homogeneity, which can lead to ethnic cleansing in either violent or non-violent way) and by Ernst B. Haas (the claim for independence and national sovereignty: right or wrong - my country). But there are other objects of nationalistic policy which can be called nationalistic by their substance: imperialism without the will to assimilate populations, colonialism, isolationism, disengagement, policies of economic, monetary, cultural, religious, military hegemony...

On the other hand there are objects of political instigation which are not nationalistic by their nature but by the way they are presented to the addressees: full employment and economic growth at the expense of foreign countries (or other regions of the same federal state), their inhabitants and their ecological environment; nuclear power plants in border areas to neighbouring countries. A social security system becomes a nationalistic matter if the idea is claimed that every nation, every linguistic group has to have its own system and that there is no need to bother about sick and unemployed people across the border.

It is no wonder that a great number of nationalistic

objects (attitudes, demands, actions at many levels) could be listed. It is not because nationalism is hidden or openly present everywhere and constantly that it has not to be identified and that it is not necessary to focus upon it.

It appears f.i. in a first approach rather harmless to reveal the differences and to divide humanity into cultures, linguistic, ethnic or religious groups (to begin within the minds, later on through institutions). Still it is true that delineation (by thinkers, scientists, politicians, institutionalists) always precedes the conflict situation, the reverse is never true. We are used to violently criticize those who stir up the compartments one against the other, but we treat with respect those who discovered, pointed out, stressed, sacralised the differences and created the compartments. Those who divide and insist on differences very often do this in the interest of one group and not in the interest of mankind. Here nationalism appears in its embryonic stage.

Far better, if possible, not to divide human society in potential national entities or homelands but to create compartments comparable to the Swiss cantons, which are not fully sovereign, which are not congruent with the linguistic groups of Switzerland (in contrast to the situation in Belgium with the exception of Brussels).

Common to all the objects of nationalism, say of the nationalist instigation, is that they are all represented as being objects of value, but only to the concerned subjects. Nationalists will state that nationalism is good for all people, but by saying this they pronounce a contradiction in terms.

My proposition of a definition departs thus from the precedings: nationalism is the sum of political activities, the sum of instigations, whose subjects as individuals or as a group can be identified by certain (external) distinguishing features (characteristics) and/or are localized in a territory, and whose objects (objectives) are by their substance or presentation only of value to the concerned subjects.

*This paper was proposed as a contribution to the Belgo-British seminar "Reflections on two multicultural societies" organised by the British Council and the Centre d'Etude de l'Ethnicité et des Migrations de l'Université de Liège, Brussels, 29, 30, 31 January 1996

¹ Eugen Lemberg, *Nationalismus II Soziologie und politische Pädagogik*, Rowohlt's deutsche Enzyklopädie, Hamburg, 1964, p II

² Subjects treated in Ludo Dierickx, *Belgen op de Tweesprong*, 1964 and 1967, *Het Europese besluitvormingsproces en het Europese Integratieproces*, 1972, *De Groene idee, mens en natie*, 1989

³ *Veranderende Grenzen, Nationalisme in Europa, 1815-1919*, p. 16, Edition Sun, Nijmegen, 1992

⁴ *What is nationalism?*, International Organisation 40.3, Summer 1986, p. 707-744

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A Successful All-Party Parliamentary Group

Simon Burall

“Her Majesty’s Government should make a solemn declaration that the creation of a world authority will be the aim of its foreign policy, and invite other governments to associate themselves with such a declaration.” Between 1947 and 1967, the first twenty years of its life, the All-Party Group for World Government raised this declaration with the government twenty three times through motions, questions and debates in Parliament and through letters to Ministers and national newspapers. In November 1967, its twentieth year, the government spokesman in the House of Lords stood up and said that *“Her Majesty’s Government are fully in agreement with world government. Step by step we will strive towards that goal”*

This followed earlier successes. In 1960 a clear majority of the members of the Labour Party in the House of Commons signed a motion asking that world government be included as a specific objective of policy of the Labour Party. As a result, it appeared in the Labour Party Election Manifesto for the first time.

Such successes in gaining support for the idea of Federal World Government were not followed up by significant changes in Government Policy towards this overall goal and, since the late 60s, it has become increasingly difficult to raise the issue in such a direct fashion. But, the stories illustrate the way the Parliamentary Group has been able to operate, building party and cross-party support for specific actions which have helped to set the tone and content of the national and international debate. As I will describe below,

this approach has had some spectacular successes and some key national and international changes can be attributed, in part, to the work of the Group.

The beginnings

Henry Osborne was elected to Parliament as a Labour MP in 1945, serving for a total of fourteen years before he lost his seat. He established the All-Party Parliamentary Group on World Government (PGWG) in 1947, two years after taking his seat, *“to act in whatever way it deems effective, as the focus in the House for study and action on world government”*.

In its prime, in the 1960s, the group had over 200 members from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. These members included many illustrious figures from British political life but most notable perhaps was the former Prime Minister Clement Atlee. It would be wrong of any history of the Group be written without mention of the indefatigable work of its first Clerk, Patrick Armstrong, who collaborated closely with Henry Osborne and, for nearly 40 years, provided ideas and initiatives and was responsible for many of its successes.

Through the 1970s and 80s the group suffered from a big slump in membership. By 1975 membership was just over 100, by the mid-80s this had dropped to below one hundred. By the 90s the situation was calamitous though, with the appointment of my predecessor, Daniel Wheatley, as co-ordinator of the group, membership was stabilised and by the mid-90s

it was slowly growing. At the time this article is written the group boasts over 160 members from both Houses of Parliament and from regional government in the UK and MEPs from across Europe and is now one of the largest in Parliament.

Though Winston Churchill was never a member of the Group, he obviously had great sympathy for its views declaring *"The creation of a cooperative all-powerful world order is the ultimate end towards which we must strive. Unless some effective world super-government can be set up and brought quickly into action, the prospects for peace and human progress are dark and doubtful."*

This statement from Churchill, which modern commentators in Britain seem to have forgotten in the current debate about the European Union, is echoed by a quote from Harold Macmillan, another former Prime Minister, made at the time he was defence minister; *"On the whole question of disarmament the Government's purpose is simple, and our record clear. Genuine disarmament must be based on two simple but vital principles. It must be comprehensive and it must have a proper system of control... The control must provide effective international – or, if we like, supra-national – authority invested with real power. Members may say that this is elevating the United Nations, or whatever may be the authority, into something like world government; be it so, it is none the worse for that. In the long run it is the only way out for mankind."*

It is undoubtedly true that the PGWG, with its support in both Houses of Parliament and across parties, was crucial in ensuring that these leaders were exposed to World Federalist thinking and influenced their thoughts about the way the world should be governed.

The PGWG had greater ambitions than influencing the debates inside Parliament. In

1951, the group established the One World Trust (OWT) as its charitable arm. The Trust was formed to promote research into the *"facts, principles and methods of planning and organising on a world basis to the greatest advantage of the human species."* It was also charged with promoting education around the same area of endeavour. The relationship between the Trust and the PGWG has always been close, with the director of the Trust playing the role of Clerk to the group and acting as the main co-ordinator and supporter of its activities.

Key successes in education

"Her Majesty's Government should encourage a dual perspective in education – world as well as national – so that opportunity is given in the curriculum for balancing national loyalty with a measure of conscious loyalty to the human race as a whole in all its diversity." This statement, taken from a summary of the achievements of the first twenty years of the Group's life, provides the starting point for one of its major national successes.

The PGWG and OWT together formed a special Education Advisory Committee in 1959 to work on this objective. Using their Parliamentary connections they were able to involve two of the key educationalists in the UK to chair this committee, Sir Edward Boyle and Prof. J Lauwerys. This committee had a nationwide structure and drew in individuals from all levels of the teaching profession. In carrying out research into the problems with education at the time it undertook a number of projects.

The Committee's most successful project started in 1963 with a competition to devise a new syllabus of 'modern studies'. This project began in response to the desire to develop a new way of teaching history; both more contemporary and with more time and effort spent on learning about global events and less

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on the UK. This competition led directly to the creation of a new history syllabus with London University, the GCE *'Modern History: 1919 to the present day'* syllabus.

This change in the way history was taught in Britain did not happen in isolation and clearly demonstrates the power that an all-party group can exert if its objectives are clear, simple and well resourced. By trading on its obvious connection to Parliament the group was able to draw in the key individuals from the educational world necessary to develop the research using their professional knowledge. The Parliamentarians alone would have had neither the knowledge, nor, more importantly, the time to undertake this work. Secondly, through sensible use of Parliamentary procedure, motions and questions, the Group was able to develop the national debate in a way which supported the practical work being undertaken by their committee. Though their written history does not say so, it seems likely that informal contacts with ministers assisted the eventual outcome.

In addition to the changing teaching content, the committee also produced a number of resources for teaching in schools and less formal settings. The two key facilitators and authors of these resources are still active in the 'Development Education' movement in the UK and continue to have an influence on teaching methods and content long after the committee was wound down, the world perspective they promote has affected the views and understandings of thousands of British children.

Successes in human rights

The focus of the group on the promotion of peace through international law made it natural that, in the late 1990s, it would begin to support the creation of an international criminal court. The ICC, by holding individuals accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other

barbarities committed in the heat of war, will do much, over the long term, to prevent the worst excesses of war.

The ICC illustrates yet another way in which the PGWG has been able to exert its influence. Working as part of both the national and international coalitions for the Court, the group has been in the position of receiving information about positive and negative developments and reacting to them in a way which assisted the British Government to work with the international community to develop the Court.

In contrast to the other work described above, the majority of the activity of the Group on this issue was behind the scenes; letters to Ministers, quiet delegations to the Foreign Office or discreet phone calls at times of crisis. This need for quiet diplomacy did not prevent the group from engaging in more public motions and debates with the government at critical moments in the process. By ensuring that its members were well briefed about the legal and political issues the Group was able to mount effective action as and when necessary.

Now that the statute of the Court has been written, the Group has continued to work with NGOs on a national level to ensure that the UK ratifies quickly. Members continue to follow developments and are keenly watching as the Court's structures and finances are finalised. It will be an important moment in the Group's history when the first case comes to trial. This will be the first time that world law holds an individual accountable for their actions and the Group can justifiably say that it played a small but important role in making that happen.

Successes in building broader international groupings

On United Nations Day, 24th October 1999, the One World Trust launched Charter 99, the

Charter for Global Democracy. Intended as a mass signature campaign, the Charter was signed by people in 120 countries in less than a year. An unplanned, but welcome consequence of this campaign was to bring us into contact with a number of MEPs and other Parliamentarians around the world. Global decision-making is concentrating in the offices of multilateral institutions and national government is increasingly less able to take decisions in isolation from the world community. Our new contact with national Parliamentarians around the world hints at new alliances the Group must make if it is able to have its voice heard in the places where it can make the biggest impact.

One of the implications of this might be that the Group will begin to work in alliance with other federalist groups in Parliaments across Europe and the World.

Key lessons

The group began with the commitment of 16 MPs signing a manifesto and reaching out into Parliament for greater support. Within a few years it had built up enough support to begin to influence the debate about the way the world is governed and challenge ministers on the negative developments, as the group saw them, in the development and reform of the UN. The Group's clear objectives and rootedness in the concerns of the times gave its actions a relevance which increased their effect beyond mere numbers of members.

The successes described above were achieved through clarity of objective and identification of particular institutional changes which were politically possible at the time. In particular, the Group was aware of its own limitations and either drew together the coalition it needed to succeed, or joined a coalition to which it could add its voice and assistance.

When the Group began in 1947 it was one of the few all-party groups in Parliament. The only group which is older, to my knowledge, is the All-Party Channel Tunnel Group, begun sometime in the 1930s. Its recent success provides hope for the World Government Group. The British Parliament now has over 200 single issue All-Party Groups and an additional number of country groups for nearly every nation on this earth. All-Party Groups have now become a crucial and accepted way for backbench MPs to make their views heard on issues which cut across party-lines.

The most successful of these groups have a dedicated staff member who is paid to co-ordinate their activities. The overwhelming number of these co-ordinators are paid by outside charities and only a few using an MP's meagre allowance. Those groups which use volunteers or unpaid staff find it very difficult to build-up the contacts they need to gain support for their actions or the resources needed to undertake the sort of activities, meetings and receptions necessary for efficient and effective working.

The modern situation is obviously very different from the early days of the PGWG's existence because MPs belong to a large number of Groups. Other work pressures are also reducing the time which a Member can devote to a single group. Much of the preparatory work must be carried out by the co-ordinator, and those MPs interested in a particular aspect of the Group's work must be identified and cultivated. Members will only get involved if they are convinced that their involvement will see a change in Government policy, it is no longer possible to sit the vast majority down in a room to formulate policy and develop actions from scratch.

Looking again at other successful groups, it is clear that members are happy to ask questions

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in Parliament and even take part in group sponsored events but they are also keen to have their voices heard outside Parliament. I have a report sitting on my desk at the moment which was produced by the All-Party Group for HIV and AIDS. This report makes recommendations about the Human Rights situation for patients in the UK. By publishing this report the group is hoping to influence organisations making representations to Ministers and Parliament. It also helps to raise the awareness of the Group's activities and ensure that it is involved in future work on the issue inside and outside Parliament. Other groups hold 'Select Committee' style enquiries where they interview key players about a specific issue and then make recommendations based on these hearings. The range of activities a group can undertake is only limited by the need to maintain a cross-party consensus of its members.

For the future

A growing awareness of the effects of globalisation make the view of the PGWG as important as ever. This, though well understood by the readers of this journal, is brought home to many outside our movement by the awful events in New York on September 11th. More people than ever are aware that individual governments cannot tackle cross-border problems alone but must work together to develop truly global solutions. All party groups such as the All-Party Group for World Government will offer a crucial voice in the growing clamour to bring justice for all the people's of the world.

*For more information, email owt@parliament.uk
or www.charter99.org*

The EU's View of the International Criminal Court

In May and June 2001, the European Union developed a common position on the International Criminal Court. In addition, the EU prepared and delivered to USA officials a paper, "The European Union's view of the International Criminal Court". The paper specifically refers to the United States Government policy review of the ICC and addresses a number of USA concerns directly.

According to the paper, "the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is possibly the most significant achievement of international law since the founding of the UN. The rapid establishment of the International Criminal Court is necessary in order to enhance the application of and the respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. By ending impunity for those who have committed or instigated atrocities, the Court will strengthen the primacy of law and contribute to global peace and security. [...]

Not least, due to the very significant contributions of the US negotiating team in partnership with other delegations, the Rome Statute contains adequate safeguards against political abuse and a high level of due process rights for defendants. The principles of complementarity provides that the Court may not exercise its jurisdiction if the case is or has been genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it. The Statute also ensures that the Prosecutor cannot begin an investigation without the approval of the Pre-Trial

Chamber, and the Pre-Trial Chamber has to confirm all charges.

The Statute has a very high standard of due-process protections and grants guarantees to the States in order to protect national security information (art 72 and 93.4).

[...]

Therefore the European Union would like to see the United States as a partner in the ICC. The US has been a leader in the battle against impunity and has consistently championed human rights. Once the Statute has entered into force, a number of important decisions will be taken by the States Parties, such as the elections of judges and the Prosecutor, the recommendation of a Registrar and the adoption of a number of agreements and other instruments. Furthermore, the States Parties will eventually have to take a decision on the outstanding issue of the crime of aggression. The European Union would warmly welcome the US as a partner in these decisions. The Court will play a crucial role in the development of international criminal law. It is therefore important that representatives of all major legal systems participate in this process.

[...]

The European Union looks forward to continuing dialogue and co-operation with the US, at the forefront in the fight for justice. The Union hopes that the US will remain engaged in the work of the Preparatory Commission, that it will not disown its signature of the Rome Statute and not foreclose any options as to its future relationship with the Court."

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Globalization, International Democracy and World Parliament

Discussion Paper by Lucio Levi

1. The Political Dimension of Globalization and the Decline of the Sovereign State

Globalization is the word which is on everyone's lips and is arousing the disquiet that comes from the prospect of deep and inevitable change. It is the word most commonly used to designate the new era that humankind has entered as a consequence of the revolution in production, communication, information and transportation technologies.

Globalization has been studied primarily as an economic process, while its political dimension has been largely neglected. The fact that the market has become global while governments have remained national is a contradiction that highlights the most significant change brought about by globalization. In other words, globalization has produced a shift of the borders between civil society and state. This means that it has opened a new space to civil society, that is that pre-political area of social life which is the ground where individual interests assert themselves and clash, but which does not produce those mediating mechanisms between interests from which the need originates to promote the common weal. Therefore, private centers of power such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations or criminal organizations have taken on a global size and acquired an increasing freedom of action with regard to the regulating power of states.

Here lies the root of the decline of the sovereign state, that will be overcome only through the establishment of new forms of statehood at world level. This is the condition that will allow

the restoration of the pre-eminence of politics toward global civil society.

2. The Response of Governments: International Organization

The response of governments to globalization has been to pursue international co-operation, not because it is their inclination, but because they have no other choice. The expansion of the phenomenon of international organization shows the way governments are going along to seek a solution to problems they cannot solve alone.

The weakness of international organizations lies in their decision-making procedures, that are based on the principles of unanimity and veto, and in the lack of executive powers. The most widespread definition of this way of managing globalization is the expression *global governance*. This is a formula that justifies the established world order, which is based on the principle of national sovereignty and on the dominance of multinational corporations in the world market and of the United States in world politics.

It is a formula that hides the illusion that a solution to the main international issues can be based on mutual consent among sovereign states. Federalism is the antithesis of the internationalist approach. Its strength lies in the alternative goals of world government and international democracy. However distant and though they can be pursued gradually, these goals are the answer to the need to control globalization and to start the process of establishing peace among nations through law.

3. The Decline of Democracy

When sovereign states decline, there is a parallel decline in democracy. The sharpest contradiction of our age lies in the fact that the problems on which the destiny of peoples depends, such as those of security, control of the global economy, international justice or protection of the environment, have assumed international dimensions, where democratic institutions do not exist, while democracy still stops at state borders. In consequence, democratic institutions, having lost control of strategic decisions, confine themselves to govern secondary aspects of political life. The people are excluded from control of the questions which determine their future. In substance, we must face problems of a global dimension, on which our destiny depends, while the world is still divided into independent sovereign states. The feeling widely shared by many citizens is that the most important decisions have migrated from the institutions they can control toward international centers of power, which are not submitted to any form of democratic control.

In conclusion, the decline of democracy has two aspects. On the one hand, national governments are unable to submit globalization to democratic control. On the other hand, the democratic deficit prevents international organizations from being something more than the place where sovereign states co-operate to solve global issues. It is a contradiction that can be overcome only through international democracy, i.e. through the extension of democracy to state relations.

4. The Process of Democratization in the World

The most revolutionary objective of our age is the democratization of the United Nations, which would allow the government of the world to be removed from the control of the big powers and

the other private centers of power, like multinational corporations, and put into the hands of all the peoples of the world. Of course, it is a long-term objective that can only be achieved gradually.

The democratization of the UN no longer appears a distant ultimate goal after the recent extraordinary advance of democracy in Eastern Europe, the ex-Soviet Union, Asia and Latin America. Today, for the first time in history, over half of the countries of the world (120 according to the last Report of Freedom House) have adopted a democratic form of government. Since the fall of fascist and communist regimes it may seem that democracy has defeated all its alternatives.

But the vacuum of power left by the fall of the blocs has opened the way to the revival of nationalism, which has triggered a series of processes of disintegration of international organizations and multinational states and is threatening the new-born democracies.

5. The Need for International Democracy

Democracy, precisely because it is fragmented among many national states, too small to assure the economic development and torn apart by international conflicts, is not strong enough to prevent the authoritarian degeneration of its institutions. Only democracy can submit international relations, which are still the ground of diplomatic and military clashes among nations, to popular control. As a matter of fact, democracy and independence can be reconciled only within the framework of federal institutions that must be created both at the regional and world level.

The analysis of the structures of international organizations shows that these are diplomatic machines within which governments pursue co-operation. But recently some of them have been enriched with parliamentary structures, which represent the response of national parliaments to the globalization process and the erosion of their power. In other words, they attempt to shift parliamentary control of governments at

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international level. Most of them are made up of national parliamentarians, but the European Parliament, which represents the most advanced evolution of this category of international assemblies, is directly elected.

The European Parliament is the laboratory of international democracy. After its direct election it has increased its legislative powers and control powers over the Commission, understood as the potential European government. This means that the democratization of the European Union has been a mighty tool for strengthening European institutions. On the whole, the lesson we can draw from history (and utilize for UN reform) is that both the strengthening and the democratization contributed to promote European unification.

6. The Decline of the Political Parties

The great revolutionary transformations marking the milestones of mankind's progress in history, have never been promoted by the established powers. These powers try to rule the new course of events with old ideological schemes and with old institutions. Revolutionary change, which creates new institutions and higher forms of political coexistence, has always been the result of the storming into the political scene of new social forces. These forces provide a vehicle for new cultures, new values and new political institutions. While the political parties have lost their attraction and their former capability for mobilization, no longer succeeding in motivating commitment from young people, all over the world a non-governmental citizen's movement has grown. This expresses itself outside traditional channels of political representation and is a manifestation of a new dimension of political participation. It operates at all levels of political life (but more efficiently in local communities and at international level, where the limits of the established powers are more significant) in the sectors of peace, human rights, international justice, aid to development, environment, cultural

goods, education, health and so on.

The decline of political parties is a consequence of the crisis of the sovereign state. Faced with the globalization of social, economic and political life, national power offers an observation-post that obscures reality as it is and prevents the mastering of it. Political parties are prisoners of the national states: like boats in a stormy sea, they find themselves in the trough of the wave, where they cannot see the horizon. Directed by powerless leaders, they depart from the real problems of humankind. Choked inside the tight limits of national states, the political decision-making loses any meaningful relation with real processes. Here lies the main root of the decadence of the moral and intellectual quality of the ruling class. When, in the debate among political parties, the great goals, those which make it possible to think of the future, are gone, politics deteriorates progressively in a mere power game which keeps at a distance the most dynamic and vital energies in society. The political parties represent for this reason politics without a future.

7. The Rise of the Global Civil Society Movements

On the other hand, the global civil society movements have tried to strengthen their influence over international politics. Wherever an international summit meeting gathers, a demonstration of the anti-globalization movement is expected. These are citizens who protest against being excluded from representation within international organizations and pretend to have a say in international affairs. They are the most genuine manifestation of the world unification movement and of the necessity, largely felt by young people, to deal with the great dramas of mankind. They are at present a varied mass of small and large groups, linked by a common situation (globalization). It is a movement dragged by the current leading toward world unification, but lacking the instruments to rule this process. It is not yet aware of its

institutional objectives, nor has it worked out a political strategy. It represents the future without politics.

Two different positions can be distinguished. Some NGOs have taken on the role of opposing international organizations and globalization itself, often resorting to violence, and consider the international organizations as irreformable. Other NGOs are integrated in the state system, are recognized by international organizations and behave according to a reformist attitude of mind. They participate in international conferences in an advisory capacity and exert real influence on negotiations.

The limit of these movements lies in that they have a partial and unilateral perspective: each movement deals with one single problem. But to the extent that they interpret new needs and are the protagonists of a process tending to redefine actors and roles of political life, we can formulate the hypothesis that they can become the vanguard of international democracy.

8. Domestic and International Democracy

Is it true that the process of democratization of the states' domestic order must be accomplished before we start acting for the creation of a World Parliament? As was pointed out by Kant in his treatise on *Perpetual Peace*, the first condition for the formation of a World Federation is that the member states have a republican regime. In other words, without domestic democracy, an essential pre-requisite of international democracy is lacking.

But the fact that the process of democratization of state regimes all over the world has not been completed does not represent an obstacle to start the process of democratization of the UN. Although in the logic of causal sequences the democratization of the states has to precede the democratization of the UN, in history these processes do overlap.

The six Western European countries that have founded the European Community did not wait

for the democratization of the institutions of all the states of Europe before starting the democratization of the European Community. The completion of the European unification and the democratic transformation of its institutions has become possible today, because a small group of states started the process of construction of the European unity fifty years ago.

9. The European Federation: the Leading Country of International Democracy

There is no concealing the fact that the plan to bring globalization under democratic control is meeting with formidable opposition not only on the part of the authoritarian regimes, but primarily on the part of the government of the United States, which does not let its power be lessened by the international organizations it belongs to, nor by movements arising in the global civil society. This shows that to be able to promote international democracy, it is not enough that a government has a democratic regime. This is a necessary but non-sufficient condition. The United States has such heavy world strategic commitments that it is unable to promote that design.

To defeat the opposition of the United States, a center of power must emerge with the capability of supporting the plan for a world democratic order. It is reasonable to believe that Europe will play such a role. The significance of European unification lies in the overcoming of the nation-state, a form of political organization that develops strength relations with the other states. Therefore it is fairly safe to assume that the European Union does not have, and in the future the European Federation will not have, hegemonic ambitions. Although the European Union aspires to independence of the United States, its objective will not be the replacement of the United States in the role of stabilizer of world political and economic order. Europe will rather pursue a policy of co-operation with the United States, with the prospect of a joint management of the world

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order, open to participation of other groupings of states (the emerging great regions of the world). On the other hand, Europe will hold sufficient power to relieve the United States of some of its overwhelming world responsibilities and thus have the authority to persuade it to support the democratic reform of the UN.

However, if it is to speak with a single voice, Europe must complete the process of federal unification. With a Parliament elected by universal suffrage, the European Federation can become the leading country of international democracy. Thus, it will be more inclined than any other political organization to promote this experiment in the other great regions of the world and at world level (democratization of the UN).

10. Many competing projects

The process of globalization and the rise of the global civil society movements have been accompanied by a flowering of proposals addressing the question of the democratization of the UN through the creation of an assembly which represents the world citizens. The problem to be solved is whether a traditional Parliament is an appropriate tool to meet the exigency of popular representation at world level. I will take into consideration the most significant projects.

11. A Virtual World Parliament

A virtual World Parliament has been proposed as an alternative to a real World Parliament. Of course, the Internet can help in the exchange of ideas, the dissemination of information, the preparation of meetings and so on. Moreover, it can be used as a mobilization network. It enabled a scattered mob to become the people of Seattle. But, in order to make its voice heard and to exercise a real influence on the political process, that people had to materialize in the streets and squares of a city. In addition, the circulation of the images of the demonstrations organized in Seattle increased the political weight of the movement

born in that city.

Likewise, the Internet cannot compensate or replace in any way the citizens' participation in the elections and the face-to-face relations which take place in a political assembly which physically gathers in a hall. The public space where an electoral campaign takes place and the representatives of the people meet, participate in public debates and take decisions is an irreplaceable aspect of democracy.

12. The Global Civil Society Forum

The Commission on Global Governance, in its report published in 1995 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN, proposed the creation of a permanent Global Civil Society Forum. It was conceived as the vehicle to voice the expectations emerging from the international civil society and to transmit them to the UN. More precisely it was proposed that the Forum should gather before the beginning of the annual session of the General Assembly and convey to it its claims.

This proposal reflects the impetuous growth of the global civil society movements and the necessity of instituting a body representing them at world level. The Millennium Forum, held from 22-26 May 2000 at the UN Building in New York, represented the dress rehearsal of such a Forum. It showed at the same time the potentialities and the limits of such initiative.

It is not an exaggeration to state that it represented the first babble of global democracy. Awaiting the formation of a parliamentary body and political parties at world level (are the NGOs not movements anticipating political parties?), the Forum was an assembly representing as closely as possible the peoples of the world or at least the most active part of them.

However, the limits of such an assembly must be pointed out. In the absence of international elections it is impossible to measure the degree of consent supporting the NGOs. The Forum would be lacking real democratic representation, being the expression of civil society movements and not

of the will of the people, which can only come from an election based on a free competition among political parties. It can be compared to the medieval parliaments in which the orders were represented, not yet the people. And as these had the function of limiting the power of absolute sovereigns, likewise the Forum of Civil Society will limit the absolute power of the sovereign states ruling the UN. That is, as the medieval parliaments are distant forerunners of the contemporary ones, likewise the Forum of Civil Society may be an institution anticipating a World Parliament.

13. The WTO Parliamentary Assembly

The proposal to create a WTO Parliamentary Assembly has been drawn up by the Canadian WFM member organization and received support from within the Canadian and European parliaments. According to this proposal, the Assembly should be composed of members of national parliaments and should have consultative powers.

The relevance of the proposal lies in the fact that it addresses the issue of the WTO's democratic deficit. Its limitation lies in its sectoral approach: it is a partial response to the challenge of international democracy. The approach which inspires this choice would entail the multiplication of one-issue assemblies: one for the IMF, one for the WB, one for the ILO and so on. On the other hand, the process of globalization does not involve only trade flows, but concerns many other aspects of political, economic and social life, like security, international monetary and financial issues, poverty, human rights, environment, health, education and so on.

In fact, the WTO is facing the problem of how to regulate the world market and correcting its distortions through the establishment of social and environmental standards, the creation of an anti-trust authority and so forth. These problems are different aspects of the activity of international economic organizations, but find no appropriate

answer, in the absence of the necessary powers and because of the plurality of bodies dealing with these problems. It will therefore be necessary to increase the powers of the new international economic institutions, and also to create a center to co-ordinate functions that are presently scattered in many institutions operating independently from each other (G8, IMF, WB, WTO, ILO, UNEP, etc.).

All this shows, in my opinion, that the problems concerning the strengthening and the democratization of the UN must be addressed together. The UN, as a whole, should be entrusted with new tasks, particularly those related with the international commercial, monetary and financial relations, and a Parliament should be constituted within the framework of the UN system. Therefore, if the goal to be pursued is the democratization of the process of globalization, the democratization of the WTO alone is not enough.

The same conclusion can be reached if we consider the global civil society organizations. If it is true that the people of Seattle began to act during a meeting of the WTO in December 1999, it should be taken into account as well that in the movement born in Seattle a great variety of claims (peace, human rights, environment and so on) are converging, being each of them a response to the various aspects of globalization. All those concerned about peace, international justice, sustainable development and protection of human rights need a democratic world order through UN reform.

14. The UN Parliamentary Assembly, an Old-Fashioned Project?

At a distance of approximately ten years from the publication of the booklet *The Case for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly*, written by Dieter Heinrich, it is necessary to reconsider this proposal, which has become one of most well-known and most cited world federalist programs and has received important acknowledgements

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from various milieux: the latest and most significant was the 2000 Millennium Forum. It is worth recollecting that the proposal was inspired by the example of the European Parliament, which, at the beginning, was an assembly made up of members of national parliaments and endowed with consultative powers. It was conceived as a preliminary step toward creating a real World Parliament directly elected by the world citizens and endowed with legislative powers. Even though the UNPA has not been established yet, we must ask ourselves whether it is still an adequate reply to the impetuous growth of globalization and the parallel increasing influence of the global civil society movements on international politics.

The European federalists started the campaign for the direct election of the European Parliament when the European Customs Union was achieved (1968) and a new goal - the Economic and Monetary Union - was put on the European agenda. This objective demanded an increasing intervention of the Council of Ministers, the ultimate decision-making authority in the Community, which was pursued without corresponding parliamentary scrutiny and approval. Hence the sharpening of the democratic deficit of the Community, which paved the way to the claim for direct election of the European Parliament and the strengthening of its powers.

Now the process of globalization has reached an analogous turning point. With the creation of the WTO the custom tariffs, which in 1946 amounted to 50% of the value of imported goods, have been reduced to less than 3%. While the present degree of world commercial integration is comparable to that of the six member states of the European Community in 1968, today the world has to face the contradiction between the increasing intervention of international organizations in the field of economy, finance, human rights, environment and so on and the democratic deficit of these organizations.

Since globalization wipes out the distinction between domestic and international politics, the

extension of democracy - which has asserted itself in the vast majority of states - to international relations has become an inescapable imperative. *Our traditional proposal - the UNPA - seems insufficient to respond to the increasing need for international democracy, because it confines itself to the mobilization of parliamentarians but does not reach the citizens and is unable to mobilize them.* What is more, the growing activism of the global civil society movements proves that there is a popular pressure demanding citizens' participation in global decisions that affect individual daily life.

In conclusion, I think that we are faced with a crucial choice. Should we continue to support the UNPA and consider ourselves satisfied with campaigning for an objective which seems too weak with regard to the big changes which are occurring in world politics and in the global civil society? Or should we propose a much more ambitious project aiming for the constitution of a World Parliament elected by universal suffrage by the world citizens, that would be a bold reply to the challenge of globalization and the claims coming from the global civil society?

15. A World Parliament

I think that we should choose the second alternative. *"For a directly elected World Parliament"* is the simple and strong watchword that identifies the sharpest contradiction of our time, the contradiction between globalization and the lack of international democracy, and expresses at the same time the deep reasons that inspire the global civil society movements, the need for an assembly representing the general will of humankind.

But we must be aware that the objective of a World Parliament is not incompatible with the four projects I have taken into consideration. In spite of the limits I have pointed out, they can be pursued as preliminary steps toward that final goal.

The historical role that the WFM can play is to become the reference point and the leading force of a large coalition of NGOs striving for a UN

Parliament. In fact, most of global civil society movements are striving for peace, the protection of the environment, international justice and the defense of human rights, but do not yet have a strategy for achieving these goals. The task of the WFM is to make these movements aware of the means (that is to say the institutions) which mankind needs to attain peace and international democracy and justice.

The role that the civil society movements have acquired on the international scene paves the way for new forms of political action, now termed *new diplomacy*. One of the most significant examples is the alliance between reform-oriented nations and NGOs, which generated enough critical mass to give rise to the ICC.

It is the updated version of an old scheme of action largely experimented by the European federalists. It stems from the experience of the creation of a new power in the area covered by many independent powers. The strategy of state unifications is twofold in nature. It requires the combination of two political subjects: a government-inspired current and a people-inspired one.

Governments view political unifications in terms of co-operation among sovereign states, while federalists conceive them in terms of the creation of a new power. Governments have the power, but are opposed to use it for objectives that go beyond international co-operation. Spinelli used to say that national governments are at the same time the vehicle and the obstacle on the way towards the European Federation. The vehicle, because they hold power; the obstacle, because they never spontaneously surrender national sovereignty. On the other hand, the federalists do not have the strength, but have an *initiating capacity*, which can be used during moments of crisis in order to spur the governments to transfer their authority to supranational institutions.

The action for the construction of a World

Parliament cannot be conceived otherwise. The World Parliament will be the result of the dialectical unity of the two currents mentioned above. According to two American academics, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, who published an article in *Foreign Affairs* at the beginning of this year entitled *Toward Global Parliament*, an alliance such as this could give rise to a treaty instituting a World Parliament. It could begin to exist after being ratified by a minimum number of states (20, according to the authors). But, if we consider that the European Union member states are 15 and their number will double in the next future, 20 states seem to be quite few. 50% of the UN members and world population can provide the sufficient basis for the entry into force of the treaty. As Falk and Strauss write, "once the assembly became operational, the task of gaining additional state members would likely become easier. A concrete organization would then exist that citizens could urge their governments to join. As more states joined, pressure would grow on nonmember states to participate".

In concluding, I would like to make two remarks, which would deserve a larger treatment. The first one concerns the role of political parties. The World Parliament will encourage the formation of true world political parties, which shall likely develop positive relations with the civil society movements. Secondly, I would like to emphasize the difference between Falk and Strauss's project and the federalist one. What the two authors fail to state is that, in order to democratize globalization, a global Parliament is not enough. The experience of democratic regimes teaches us that no parliament can govern a country alone. A government is necessary. So the World Parliament must be seen as a crucial milestone on the way toward forming a democratic government endowed with the necessary powers to enforce the laws passed by the World Parliament.

The UEF Congress

The 19th UEF Congress took place in Brussels from 12-14 October 2001. In his political report the President Jo Leinen stated that the campaign for a European Constitution, started in 1997, "has been a contributory factor why a number of political representatives, political parties and personalities are now demanding a European Constitution".

As regards the method of integration, Leinen said that, after a phase lasted more than 40 years, during which "every step of European integration was decided only by governments", owing to the failure of the Nice summit meeting, held in December 2000, "the intergovernmental method has run its course". Now "the governments do not seem to have the will or the capacity to make decisive progress toward a European Federation".

The Convention method, "which is both more democratic and more effective", must replace the intergovernmental one. The participation of parliaments at the Convention, which is expected to start its works in early 2002, "constitutes an important step toward a constituent assembly". In his concluding remarks Leinen stated that "if certain countries continue to block the process toward a federal Constitution the creation of an 'avant-garde' of countries ready to pursue integration will become necessary".

The resolution on general policy confirmed these assessments. It concluded that "within the Convention, the contradictions of the current phase of the process could come to the fore, thus enabling the federalists to carry on an

effective action aimed at promoting the elaboration, in a suitable framework, of a European Federal Constitution". In the resolution on the campaign for a European Federal Constitution it is stated that all the participants in the future Convention are invited "to behave as a constituent assembly, and consequently to draw up a real draft Constitution to be adopted on the basis of a system of majority voting".

In her message, the President of the European Parliament Nicole Fontaine declared that federalists are "the forerunners of a political Europe... and among those who launched the most innovatory, even the most revolutionary ideas".

Lastly Keith Best, the Executive Committee Chairman of WFM, asserted that "the history and lessons of the EU have great resonance for world federalists. Over the many years that I have been active in WFM I have come to realise the close ideological links between the European and world federalists and why it is so appropriate and why we should be so pleased to welcome UEF as a member organisation of WFM.

Indeed for many years our proposal for a UN Parliamentary Assembly has been schooled by the way in which the European Assembly developed into the European Parliament. The fundamentals are the same, whether in a regional or global context".

Jo Leinen and Bruno Boissière have been confirmed respectively as President and General Secretary of the UEF.

July 2002: WFM Congress in London

John Roberts

In one year's time, i.e. July 2002, there will be a world federalist congress held in Imperial College, London. We are now planning the usual features of hard work for Council members and the Executive and opportunities for other members to voice their concerns about the state of the world and what we are doing about it; and also to meet friends and influence people in the way of conferences. In short, a typical world federalist congress, memorable, useful and indeed indispensable.

From the time of the founding congress at Montreux in 1947 and across the years world federalists have met for these occasions in Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, New Delhi, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Ottawa and Brussels, among other cities. I know for I was there. They have debated world issues of moment while some of those have been at point of crisis and they have always debated them calmly and deliberately, without the rancor or division that were found in the crisis-torn lands themselves. Because the world federalists, right from the inception of the movement, had a consistent point of view and policies that became ever more honed to produce sensible solutions to global political issues that were being dealt with in totally other fashion by nation-state politicians.

We believe this because the view of the world citizen can make sense in situations where the stereotyped responses of the politician seeking what he considers his "national interest" simply leads to conflict. As the former President of the World Federalist Norman

Cousins wrote decades ago in *Who Speaks For Man*, there is nowhere an organisation more devoted to safeguarding the interests of humanity as a whole and now, after years of the bickering and in-fighting at the United Nations, that is still true.

So the Congress will particularly look at a few issues where something could be done to offer ways of answering this crying need. Of these discussions, one will be on making world institutions more accountable, one on the Tobin Tax, a key proposal for making a start with an independent source of funding for global purposes such as development and the UN. Two others will be the progress of the International Criminal Court, which we trust will be established and functioning by then; and rights for refugees.

The main event for the public will be an all-day Seminar with a panel of distinguished experts on "The Individual and the World" to be held on Saturday 13 July. There will also be a "Speakers Corner" with individual world federalists having the opportunity to give their own presentations; and also the chance for one or two brave souls to join our noted speaker Ted Wheatley on the Sunday morning during the Congress. They will then be able to give a pitch for world federalism to a diverse crowd of the world citizens who regularly assemble in Hyde Park.

It is none too soon to decide to join us in England for that occasion next year. We will be eager for input from federalists and world citizens everywhere. Ideas will be welcome!

Federalist Action

A Different World is Possible

Nicola Vallinoto

This is the watchword under which more than 800 associations joined the *Genoa Social Forum*. Genoa's Federalist Movement (MFE) has participated since the beginning, when the GSF included only local groups. Its goal was to get to know quite different associations, from ecologists to pacifists, from Catholics to the people from the Social Centers, and to contribute together with them to elaborate on and build up a different world. The people who were on the streets of Genoa (just as in Seattle) are not an anti-globalization movement, as repeated time and again by the mass-media. The movement, or the movements, struggle to establish a different globalization, more mindful of human rights, sustainable development, social issues and world peace, rebalancing the gulf between the standards of life in poor and rich countries.

As Gorbachev said at a press conference after an international seminar held in Genoa at the end of June, the *Genoa Social Forum* represents an interesting "political laboratory". It is, so to speak, the novelty of these last years. At world level, a network of associations that have become aware of global problems is being set up and is willing to react to economic globalization dictated by bodies like the WTO with a globalization from below. This would take into consideration factors not exclusively connected to the profits of big conglomerates. We do not know what will be the future of the *Genoa Social Forum*. Born in the wake of Porto Alegre, where in January 2001 the first meeting of the *World Social Forum* was held, the organisation was charged with handling, in a

unitary fashion, the Genoa counter-summit, giving a common casing to the initiatives programmed for the week from July 15 to 22.

In preparation of the July days, on May 4 and 5 the first European meeting of the GSF was held. The meeting was useful to get knowledge about the positions of the various joining groups and networks. After the presentation in a plenary assembly, the works proceeded with four workshops: global democracy, debt elimination, labour and peace.

In the session on democracy (with interventions by MFE's Vallinoto, Menin and Finizio) a rather wide difference of opinions was apparent. Three different positions are clear: 1) in favour of institutional reform of the UN (MFE, Table of Peace, Lilliput Network); 2) for commitment on specific campaigns or struggles, leaving the institutional aspects in the background (Mani Tese [Held-out Hands], Attac, Drop the Debt, Jubilee 2000); 3) opposed to any talk about international institutions, judged impossible to reform and delegitimated (anarchists, Social Centers, some groups of the left).

On July 3, Genoa's MFE and AICCRE organized a debate on "From European to World Democracy", with representatives of civil society and local institutions, and prepared a joint document which was distributed the next days within the GSF.

From July 15 to 22, the counter-summit took place, staging a series of general and thematic sessions, concerts, theatrical shows,

demonstrations and sit-ins. The session on "Which Mechanisms for Global Democracy" was addressed by Nicola Bullard (Focus on the Global South), Samuele Pii (GFE), Franco Praussello (MFE), Allegretti (Attac Italy), Giulio Marcon (Tavola della Pace [Table of Peace]), Claudia Sala (Lila), and a representative of Globalize Resistance Ireland. The chair was Raffaella Chiodo. Bullard argued that "The UN today is an international structure that we can regard positively, but is not capable of defending the weak because it is paralysed by the interests of the powerful. The international *elite* talks of *good governance* and not of democracy, and *good governance* is an aseptic expression suggesting a concentration of power". Praussello underlined that "It is necessary to transfer the mechanisms of market control from national state level to world level; but certainly creating institutions at the world level proves to be difficult. In international bodies the US wants its sovereignty to be safeguarded. However, we must indicate roads, not just criticize globalization. There is an intermediate solution: the political integration of the great regions of the world. Forms of economic integration with political implications (like Europe) can constitute a model in this sense. If today there is a hope of countering US hegemony, this resides in the EU. Examples of this are the permanent tensions in the WTO between the USA and the EU; or the EU's stand in favour of the Kyoto protocol, rejected by the US. A more immediate proposal could be to institute a Tobin Tax at the European level to help poverty in the Third World. This could be a concrete act by Europe to compensate for the consequences of globalization".

Samuele Pii said that "National states obstruct every step toward political globalization: they are our enemies. The *World Social Forum* in Porto Alegre shows that the process of global democracy from below has started. We must not renounce the vote, representation and

democratic mechanisms. We are a vanguard aware of this. Our generation operates in this context: we will have memories of the Holocaust and maybe we will vote for the first world Parliament. We are learning that there are visible enemies (dictatorships) but also invisible enemies (HIV, pollution). Globalization has experienced a first "negative" phase of integration, which consisted in removing the obstacles to the free circulation of goods and services. Now it is up to us to start a new phase of globalization. And the slogan for future G8's will be *no globalization without representation*".

For Umberto Allegretti "The states have still too great an importance, therefore we cannot speak of a decline of the state; globalization is not only an economic but also a military matter. Then, what is meant when people say that the state is losing power? It is losing power mostly to multi-national companies, to continental institutions like NATO, to planetary institutions... All this without there being a government: but a global government may be dangerous, because it could mean to give definite form to the power of the few. The UN is an international institution which, once reformed, could represent the basis for a long-wished international democracy". Marcon reminded that "on October 14 there will be in Assisi the March for Peace. Table of Peace's commitment for food, water and work for all is a struggle for international democracy and its goal is democracy from below. More than 500 associations will take part in the march, which will take place at the conclusion of the Assembly of the UN of the Peoples, aiming to offer an alternative to economic anarchy by creating or strengthening a supra-national institution. At the international level there is a democratic deficit. War has been staged with the UN approval: the UN died in Sarajevo".

Flavio Lotti, national coordinator of the Table of Peace, spoke on the 18th at the morning session

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on peace. Answering a question on the Table of Peace's proposals for making the UN a truly democratic body from a technical and operational point of view, he said: "We may act on three points: 1) proposing a UN parliamentary assembly on the European Parliament model. All prerequisites are there, we have only to build up a strong worldwide movement that asks for it; 2) setting up a forum of global civil society, that is, a permanent seat where all organizations struggling for improving the world can coordinate with each other, with the states and with international organizations to make their action more effective; 3) abolishing the veto power".

In the evening session on human and civil rights, moderated by Don Ciotti, the first to speak was Irune Aguirrezabal, invited by the MFE; she is European coordinator of the NGO-Coalition for the International Criminal Court, of which the WFM is the main promoter. Aguirrezabal, in her conclusion, said that "We believe in global justice. I know that some among you are against globalization. But as far as human rights are concerned, I believe that justice can be assured only in a global system. We believe that the rule of law, democracy and justice are interdependent. So, by strengthening one, all the others will be strengthened. With the ICC and by enforcing national laws we can indirectly work for harmonizing the policy of justice. Let us hope that this peaceful effort at world level will represent a step forward in the history of human rights, with a Court capable of intervening against violations of international humanitarian laws, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides".

The migrant people manifestation was held on the 19th, with the peaceful participation of 50.000 people. A small representation of the MFE was there with flags and a banner saying "A World Parliament for the Globalization of Rights".

On the 20th, inaugural day of the Summit, workshops had been programmed, when the attack on the city was started by the so-called *Black Blocs*, who could act freely in the entire "yellow area". Police forces were concentrated in the "red area". We saw Genoese citizens left in the hands of these violent groups, and then charged indiscriminately at peaceful and violent demonstrators. The killing of Carlo Giuliani by a youth of his own age represented the tragic epilogue of this day, which marked the failure of democracy.

The next day a massive demonstration of 200.000 people marched for several kilometers from Quarto to Marassi, along the sea-promenade. Considering the fights of the previous day, Genoa's MFE, not being in the position to guarantee that the violent fringes could be kept at a distance, decided not to participate.

In the days before the Summit, the federalists put up a stand with books, brochures, reviews, MFE documents, which attracted the interest of the many people present in Genoa, as indicated by the large number of items sold.

Genoa represents a stage in the process that views networks of associations on a world level operating as a means to propose alternatives to the development imposed by the current anarchical state of globalization. It represents a struggling for a globalization of rights and responsibilities, in the perspective of extending the democratic processes to a global scale. The next stages for pushing forward the project of supra-national democracy are the Assembly of the UN of the Peoples in Perugia from October 10 to 14, organized by the Table of Peace, and the second meeting of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in February 2002. On both occasions Genoa's MFE will be actively present and will strive to bring to the general attention the proposal of a world Parliament.

On the Causes of War

John Roberts

Hidemi Suganami

On the Causes of War

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996

This book came with high recommendation, but in the end proved disappointing. For over a century international law and international relations have been studied and no one can suggest that this has diminished the number or ferocity of wars. Most academics are cocooned in their own web of conventional thinking so that however daring or radical they appear at first, the limits to their thinking are soon to be seen. For 45 years from 1945 most western academics posited a conflict between 'Communism' and 'capitalism' as the prime mover in international affairs and by so diverting attention the more fundamental questions relating to the abolition of war were hardly tackled.

A further result was that at the end of the Cold War the vested interests on both sides sought alternative enemies and the so-called 'peace dividend' proved illusory. The author notes that there exists a 'vast body of writings, almost exclusively North American in origin', on the causes of wars. Unfortunately this vast body appears very often to resemble the notorious puzzle that was said to concern their mediaeval predecessors - how many angels can stand on the point of a needle? - both in complexity and utility. And, as the author admits 'no regular sequence has been identified concerning war as a whole'.

As a consequence of this failure, the book is more or less back to front - most experts in international relations are still engaged in justifying the present system and grappling with the problem of how it might be made to work. They do not seriously consider the case for root and branch reform. They are too like the mediaeval theological writers who produced elaborate treatises explaining how feudal lords could be induced to remain peaceful, when they were soon to be swept away with the advent of gunpowder and Renaissance realpolitik. If the aim of society is to create the conditions for peace then the theorists have not yet become serious in that pursuit.

There is, in fact, a refusal to examine the places and times where war has been abolished or prevented by constitutional means. Human beings create society and society exercises control by means of law to settle its relationships by peaceful means. If within the society a state of war should exist, e.g. as during the American civil war, the causes need to be sought in the relations within the society, but if it is outside that the state of war comes to exist, the problem of causation is different and needs to be considered quite separately.

The Bibliography is long but manages generally to evade the topic of federalism, and certainly of world government. Among words lacking in the index are 'individual' 'citizenship', 'loyalty'; 'human nature' is prominent but not 'human rights'. The analysis, which is claimed to be more stringent than is usual, lapses at times. On p. 50 'states' are effectively personified. On p. 52 the

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statement that 'no war could break out without the relevant governments' deliberate decision to resort to war' appears to seriously underestimate the effect of popular feeling at times of crisis. On p. 60 the definition of war is not very clear or precise and at times the author seems to be almost playing with a definition of anarchy. On p. 67 he agrees with the statement that no 'human order is proof against violence' but he then equates 'violence', (and not even international violence) with war!

The author points to the suggestion currently in fashion that liberal and democratic regimes are

likely not to go to war, but this recent conclusion has had a fairly short time to be tested. It would make more sense for the writer to start with Hamilton's words that "To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages." A thorough consideration of its truth or otherwise would be more fruitful than the interminable searching for some way of evading the question of federal union.

On Toleration

Anna Zaramella

Michel Walzer

On Toleration

New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997

The debate on the problem of immigration in Europe is currently a focal topic, often tainted by people's emotions and fear in the face of crime, or ignited by the clashing of different religious traditions, caused by a fear of Islam diffusing European society. In this context it is truly interesting and meaningful reading the essay by M. Walzer, the liberal Jewish-American scholar, one of the most esteemed theorists of multiculturalism; in it the author treats the theme of the peaceful coexistence of groups and people of different traditions, and therefore the

problem of toleration, meant not so much as an abstract attitude (tolerance), but rather as practice. Although leaning to pluralism more than unity, the author does not intend to sing the praises of difference, but rather he intends to argue in favour of the *necessity* of practising toleration, even in its most precarious displayings, as "toleration makes difference possible, difference makes toleration necessary". Walzer states in advance that he is not going to focus on toleration of eccentric fellows or political dissidents, but his concern is with toleration of differences opposing ethnic groups and religious communities that for historical reasons find themselves in the necessity of living together. What does it mean to tolerate such groups? Does it mean just a resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of

peace? or, in a democratic society, something more is possible?

In Walzer's opinion, there are historically in the West five models of tolerant society (excluding the mixed regimes, like France, Canada or Israel, which he dwells upon in another part of the book): for each of them historical and "ideal and typical" traits are given. The multi-national empires, the international society, the consociations, the nation-states and the immigrant societies are, in the author's terminology, the five regimes of toleration. They are described in detail and the mechanisms are illustrated that allow them, or have allowed them in the past, to operate.

In the first model, whether in the Persian or the Roman or the Ottoman empire, toleration of religious and cultural differences within their boundaries reached very high levels. Be it the Roman *jus gentium* or the Ottoman *millet system*, habits, customs and religious beliefs were free to perpetuate themselves from generation to generation, as the ethnic and religious groups practising them and living in their territories were totally closed in. In other words, there existed the freedom of groups, not of individuals: there was no right of freedom of thought or individual conscience.

With the fall of the great empires, the international society, defined ironically by Walzer "the most tolerant of all societies", saw a significant increase in the number of its members, and currently it became composed of mostly nation-states and to a lesser degree by consociations (a term used in the text to indicate bi- or tri-national states, characterized by a precarious balance, like the former Lebanon or the new Bosnia, but also like a state which is today a true federation, resting on democratic institutions, the Swiss Confederation).

The nation-state (which is not questioned by Walzer, as he intends to limit his discussion to factual data) is the regime that the various

ethnic-religious groups are aspiring to the most, because nowadays sovereignty ensures, except in special circumstances of very serious violation of human rights, that nobody *on the other side of the border* can interfere with what is done on this side: many of the old minorities incorporated in the great empires have fought for acquiring sovereignty and for being allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. This political model anyway does not imply that inside the nation-state there is ethnic or religious homogeneity, quite rare in the world today: there too there are minorities, but in a state the whole political and cultural life hinges on the will of the dominant ethnic group. The author realizes very well the limits of the nation-state, which, as to language, public education, symbols, ceremonies and holidays of any kind, "is an engine for national reproduction... it is not neutral among histories and cultures" the way the multi-national empires have been. Yet this state model, if there is no presence of rabid nationalistic ideology and if it rests on liberal and democratic institutions, does tolerate minorities. Certainly the jurisdictional autonomies granted by the great empires of the past have disappeared: in the national democratic state, tolerance makes reference not any more to the groups but to the individuals constituting them, who are considered first of all *citizens* and as such are given assurance of their fundamental rights. As to the groups, they do not disappear: they become mere voluntary associations, which may set up private schools, cultural organizations or publishing houses, on account of which their cultural and religious traditions, a treasure for mankind, can continue to be handed down (but for how long will it be possible?). However they are no longer allowed, as in the great multi-national empires, to exercise autonomously any legal jurisdiction over the members of the group. Thus no longer are those limitations of the individual's liberty tolerated, which are peculiar to certain religious

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traditions; the right of every citizen to liberty, and to eventually opposing the authorities of the group he is a member of, is protected, and the seriously discriminating customs, for instance those towards women, are, at least in theory, forbidden by law and considered outright crimes.

The most interesting part of Walzer's analysis is about those societies assimilating to a high degree and resting on democratic political institutions, like the United States, or Canada, or the European Union of the future, which the author defines "immigrant societies". "The members of the different groups have left their territorial base, their homeland, behind them; they have come individually or in families, one by one, to a new land and then dispersed across it". For them no territorial autonomy is possible: the ethnic groups, "if they are to sustain themselves, must do so as purely voluntary associations. The state, once it is pried loose from the grip of the first immigrants..., is committed to none of the groups that make it up. It sustains the language of the first immigration and, subject to qualification, its political culture too, but so far as contemporary advantages go, the state is... neutral among the groups,... and autonomous in its purposes". So massive immigration in the last two centuries has transformed the United States into a *radically multi-cultural* society, peculiar for the multitude of ancestors and the plurality of languages, religions, customs; "the only stable and common links for Americans have become the political principles and the maxims of tolerance".

Of course the state holds exclusive jurisdictional powers, all of his citizens being regarded as individuals rather than as members of groups: strictly speaking, the objects of tolerance are the free choices of the individuals, namely the acts of adhesion and participation in rituals of membership or worship, or the enactments of cultural difference. Hence individual men and

women are encouraged to tolerate one another as individuals, and toleration takes on a radically decentralized form: "everyone has to tolerate everyone else". In an immigrant society no culturally specific practice is required to obtain citizenship, then it is not humiliating to take on the reigning political identity, for instance "American". "But in an immigrant society many people prefer to have a *hyphenated or dual identity*, one differentiated along cultural or political lines. The hyphen joining Italian-American, for example, symbolizes the acceptance of "Italianness" by other Americans, the recognition that "American" is a political identity without strong or specific cultural claims. The consequence, of course, is that "Italian" is a cultural identity without political claims. That is the only form in which Italianness is tolerated, and then Italian-Americans must sustain their own culture... privately, through the voluntary efforts and contributions of committed men and women".

The interesting description of the "five regimes" makes clear the reality of the inter-ethnic relations in today's world; Walzer, always very moderate and free from dogmatism, never takes sides, but is evident his admiration for the American immigrant society, a society which, despite all its limits that the author is aware of (excessive individualism, loss of values, ever-increasing gaps in income), is forerunning the future, for its being composed of an extremely heterogeneous population, yet made united, over and above cultural differences, by its shared democratic political principles and by the loyalty to its institutions. Walzer does not use the term constitutional patriotism, he does not speak of federal institutions, let alone does he go so far as to criticize, if not implicitly, the nation-state, because the political-institutional subject is totally outside the matter he is treating. However his reliance on the importance of creating democratic institutions in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence of

peoples; his idea, repeatedly expressed, that differences produced by regionalism, ethnicity and religion can coexist with ever-needed solidarity, provided that citizens, or most of them, share a commitment to democratic principles, that their level of participation is high, that their civil rights associations enlist people whatever their differences, that public

education is good; his conviction that, once the immigrants have been accommodated into a country, they must be given the possibility to get naturalization and full citizenship: all these aspects of the Jewish-American scholar's thought make his perception strictly democratic and consistent with the federalist one.

Keynesians and Federalists

Antonio Mosconi

Susan Strange

Mad Money:

When Markets Outgrow Governments

Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998

The idea of the necessity of supra-national (regional and world) levels of government in order to influence the globalized economy is much more widespread among Keynesian economists than among monetarists. Susan Strange's example demonstrates this link more efficiently than any pedantic research on its causes.

Already very sick and nearing the end of her life, Ms Strange wanted to give a continuation to her former *Casino Capitalism, 1997*, with a vigorous denunciation of what another Keynesian economist, Robert Triffin, defined the monetary scandal. In *Casino Capitalism* Ms Strange had grouped the main monetary

decisions of the post-war period in three phases.

1) In the 1945-1970 period, Europe's refusal to contribute to NATO costs provided the US with the pretext for a non-fiscal financing of its security policy; the rich countries had refused to participate in a redistribution of income to the advantage of developing countries, choosing instead a (discretionary) case by case solution to the problem of debt, and adopting active policies of export promotion; Harold Wilson's Labour government had reopened the City as a center of international financial exchange, thus creating the premise for the New York-London axis to become the hinge of deregulation.

2) In the 1971-1986 period, the US, against the FED-President Burns' opinion, abstained from every intervention on exchange rates; it deliberately deceived markets, leading them

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to believe that the reform of the international monetary system was discussed seriously, whilst all rules had been put aside; it chose to clash with the oil producing countries and refused to negotiate with OPEC, countering the French initiative for a Conference on International Economic Co-operation; it always showed a complacent and acritical attitude toward Israel. The only positive decision (1974) was to react to the Franklin National and Bankhaus Herstatt bankruptcy by reinforcing co-operation among central banks in order to regulate the system and provide last-instance credits.

3) In the period 1987-1997, finally, other key decisions were taken: in 1987 the FED reacted to the stock exchange crisis and staved off the slow-down of the deregulation process; with the Basel Agreement of 1988 the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) standardized the bank-managing rules; after the fall of the Wall, the world markets went ahead with the unification process, with no consideration for the disadvantage of Eastern countries (except East Germany); in 1994 Mexico's bankruptcy was avoided; in 1996 the rules for the adequacy of banks' assets, adopted by BIS in 1988, were practically abandoned; in 1997 there was a reaction to the Asian crisis with the aim to keep on with the appearance of immortal sovereign states.

Such a conservative conduct was adopted while the global financial system was being upset by many innovative factors: technology, size of the markets, the end of banks (no more go-betweens), the emerging of Asia, the spreading of organized crime and the decline of the Basel Agreement, replaced more and more often by self-regulation of banks and non-banks.

Financial innovation, rather neglected by economists in comparison with industrial

innovation, requires governments' concurrence, but like the other one it saves labour and increases profits. Be they process or product innovations, they reduce the room for intervention by monetary and government authorities: this is the guiding thread of *Mad Money*. Among process innovations, beside the IT revolution and the satellite communication systems, Ms Strange cites the extension from the US to the entire world, and from domestic to currency transactions, of CHIPS (*Clearing House Interbank Paying System*). Among product innovations, the market of derived financial instruments, a sophisticated system of risk management that spread after the Bretton Wood crisis as a shelter from the fluctuations of exchange rates, and has since expanded to the prices of oil and goods, to interest rates and to insolvencies. No norm states that such "bets" can be made by banks only on behalf of their customers and that the clearing house must have enough resources to meet the obligations of insolvent operators. In 1987 the stock exchange was rescued, but one third of the brokers went bankrupt and it was found that the clearing house would have been insolvent. Thus the danger posed by the market of *futures* in the absence of legal, institutional controlling bodies came to light. Other foolish innovations were that of *leveraged buy-outs* (public bids financed with debts) and that of *junk bonds* (often issued to finance those bids). They allowed bold climbers to take control of big enterprises by investing much less than 1% of their share value (except that for paying their debts back they had to sell off substantial parts of the acquired companies, when they did not destroy them). These "innovators" could not achieve such big profits were it not for conniving political authorities and facilitating legislative flaws. The US pretended to take remedial measures, but the infection was transmitted to the rest of the

world, in particular through privatizations, the new watchword from the IMF.

The situation is out of control because "the international political system, based on the obsolete principle of sovereignty (that is, immunity from interferences) of states defined on territorial bases, has lagged terribly behind a global-market economy which has got an enormous power, but a feeble sense of social or moral responsibility". The political basis of international financial co-operation is still constituted by relations among national states. Two of these relations, the Franco-German and the Nippo-American, have a crucial importance; the first lead to the birth of the euro, but the European single currency will not be able to survive if it remains in a regime of fixed exchange rates among autonomous national governments; the second went through various phases and today it finds itself in an especially critical state. The US fostered Japanese mercantilism from 1949 to 1965. Then, because of the rising Japanese surpluses and American deficits, the US requested a free-trade-enhancing policy. As this was not obtained, the US deliberately devalued the dollar in 1971, but the situation kept worsening. In the 1980's the American military expenditures were financed mostly by Japanese loans. In 1989 the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Japanese financial bubble burst off, shares lost half of their value, the rush to buy goods in the US caused the value of American assets to rise sharply, the climate of confidence between the two countries gave way to a reciprocal conspiracy syndrome, up to a hasty repatriation of Japanese capitals. At Clinton's inauguration (1993), the approval of a "strategic trading policy" (that is, of more protectionism) had grown very much in the United States, but America's trading deficit with Japan proved to be

indifferent to trade, monetary, budget or currency policies. It's a fact that Japan is the most important creditor of the United States. Any American government will be vulnerable should Japanese funds flee the country. On the other side, the more China will be perceived as a threat, the more Japan will be inclined to maintain good relations with the US. (But, it may be feared, a Chinese-American rapprochement could even push Japan toward rearmament). In the financial arena, regional solutions are not sufficient to compensate for the lack of collective action on a global scale. As Kindleberg used to say, when things go wrong, the system needs a government, which however cannot be safeguarded, as in his model, by a single hegemonic power, but rather only by "a collective guide".

In this context determined by national interests, central banks are using their power to create credit for protecting private institutions. "The logic of the international political system of states does not allow to reach international agreements worked out under the terms and conditions provided by a legal and operational system of norms about bankruptcy". Only the countries with a strong control over the movement of capitals, like China, India and Taiwan, escaped the infection of the financial crisis. The poorer countries, locked in the debt trap, can be relieved by the remission of it, but nothing ensures that the situation will not repeat itself if the mechanisms and policies generating it are not modified.

Disorder fosters the intertwining of finance and crime, and makes the governments' loss of political and financial force over the markets more critical. The problem, Ms Strange underlines, has to do with "the structure of the international political system based on the principle of territorial

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sovereignty". The practice of fiscal havens "destroys governments' authority and enterprises' reputation". Self-warranting of professionals has no sense any longer and we must assume instead their conniving with their customers. The recycling of proceeds of drug-trafficking, of financial crimes, of tax evasion, of political and administrative corruption is very serious in itself, but even more so for its effects in perverting the normal functioning of democratic life. "Free-trade is knocking down the last bastions of national control systems more rapidly than we can replace them with new international control systems". The weakness of controls allows operators to react to the growing competition in banking and financial services not by reducing prices, but by taking greater risks. BIS' and IMF's failure in surveillance and the opposition the reform projects meet, make the international financial system more and more similar to the "Casino" already

lamented by Keynes. In sum: it is finance which conducts the orchestra; in contrast with political realists' view, national governments are less and less capable of exercising control; enterprises' growing concentration is more and more diluting their national identity; relations between finance and politics are producing moral contamination; inequality in the distribution of income (among citizens, among enterprises and among states) is growing steadily. All this is much-trumpeted as a big success of the US over Europe, and of the neo-free-traders over Keynesians, whilst it only proves how decision management at the international level goes beyond the capability of governments, that are to be accountable to their local voters. Therefore, Ms Strange calls for new politics. If this is not federalism, it is indeed a loud and clear demand for something that approaches it closely.

European Union, GE-Honeywell and Globalisation

The European Commission, representing also the UK, a country with strong historical ties with the US, has decided to reject the merging of two American companies, General Electric and Honeywell, despite the fact that the move had already received the approval of the American anti-trust. Commissioner Monti's decision has raised harsh disputes on the American side (none on Europe's) for the significant size of the companies in question (in 2000 GE's turnover was 1,5 times greater than Ireland's GDP) and for the sensitive sector the merge is affecting, the military. This is not however the only case: just remember the rejection, almost one year ago, of the merging between two American telecommunication companies. The present European initiative lends itself to several considerations, on some of which it is worth concentrating our attention.

The first is the result of the federalist analysis, which, starting from the end of the Second World War and the birth of the European Common Market, allowed us to show how the progressive strengthening of the European economy was undermining the dollar's supremacy, to demystify the alleged autonomy in foreign policy of De Gaulle's France, arguing that it was possible only thanks to the success of the European economy, to underline that the European agricultural self-sufficiency (in the years of crisis and tensions in the prices of agricultural products) was reached thanks to the Community's agricultural policy, to state that today the unity and stability of the European economy is safeguarded by the birth of the euro, etc.. Without these precedents, Commissioner Monti's initiative, which takes advantage with ability and courage of the autonomy spaces obtained by the European Union, would have been unthinkable.

The second consideration stems from the remarks of some newspapers, in whose opinion the tension between the United States and the European Union over the merging of the two industrial American giants is due to the tight integration of the two biggest markets in the world, and hence the problem would have never arisen in the context of a lesser development of the economic interdependence between the two shores of the Atlantic: the integration of the two markets and the growing marketing power determined by the incredible sizes of an ever-greater number of European and American enterprises is posing in a very concrete way the problem of a common control of competition across the two shores of the Atlantic. The fact that the European Commission's initiative had the support of the European industry and of part of the American, cut off by the GE-Honeywell merging, does not detract in the least from the fact that it shows it is possible to bring under control the globalization of economy, and indicates the marching direction to the anti-globalization movement.

But it is necessary that the limits of the communitarian action and the steps that have still to be taken be brought to light. The European Commission's action in the field of industrial policy and, more in general, of competition, is taken as a reaction to a market action: it gives the green light or not to initiatives taken by enterprises; it does not yet take its own initiatives - except then taking too long to put in place and deciding measures of limited scope if compared to America's similar ones - independently from enterprises and from national authorities, and aimed to develop a technologically advanced and competitive European industry. What the European Commission is presently lacking is to be clearly vested with the task of seeing to the European industrial policy and to have the strength of a democratic legitimacy which can only come from the adoption of a European Constitution providing these powers and this investiture. Only thus will the European Commission be legitimated to discuss with the US

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about the creation of an anti-trust, open to other world areas and involving the WTO, in order to bring under control an economy which is in the process of integrating more and more on a world scale; only thus will an evolutionary answer be given to the just concerns of the most serious part of the anti-globalization movement (*d.m.*).

EU Enlargement and Europe's Fiscal Sovereignty

The decision to proceed towards the European Union's enlargement to new countries is raising serious concerns as to the possibility of financing policies in countries whose per-capita income is significantly lower than the EU's. On this problem both the European Commission and the European Parliament have expressed their opinions; the first anticipated that the regions presently receiving Community subsidies will see them drastically reduced, and the second believed that the cost of enlargement will amount to a sizeable sum. So there is no surprise for Spain's stance on this subject in Nice, aimed at defending European subsidies to Spanish regions, nor for the perplexity expressed by the new Italian government, nor for the negative result of the Irish referendum on the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. The enlargement costs and their financing have revived the debate on the necessity of endowing the Union with taxation competencies of its own. One of the first to intervene on this problem was the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, who in his speech at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris on May 29th, set about developing the chapter on consolidating the common democracy, and stated that "the essential condition for building up a democracy is the consensus on taxation. In my opinion, any far-reaching reflection on the future of the European Union must see in its

agenda a reform of its financing methods."... "In the perspective of enlargement, the creation of a European tax (to be defined) in place of the current system of national contributions, a permanent cause of quarrels among states, would no doubt be a proper solution, indeed often summoned."

Later, the German Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, in an interview to the "Financial Times Deutschland", argued that "in the long run it is reasonable to expect the European Union to be provided with revenues of its own". Although the German Minister added that such tax should not imply an additional disbursement by European taxpayers, he stated that the fiscal competence should be given to the European Parliament and that the debate on this issue must start right now in the perspective of the reform envisaged for 2004.

Finally, the Belgian Prime Minister, G. Verhofstadt, in his presentation to the European Parliament of the program of the Belgian Presidency of the EU, last July 4th, said among other things: "Also the financing means of the EU must find a place in the Laeken declaration. The Union presently does not have a full competence over its budget. It does not have resources of its own, as it is financed mostly by national contributions based on GDP. We have at least to dare ask ourselves whether this indirect financing method is the best. Wouldn't a direct financing method be more legitimate and democratic?"

These statements by government representatives of the member states and the EU have laid out for discussion one of the essential institutional competencies on which to insist, in view of the next federalist demonstration in Laeken, that it be taken into consideration in the upcoming reform proposals of the European institutions (*d.m.*).

Disappointments from Durban

The much-expected UN Conference on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance, the third of its kind after the ones of Geneva in 1978 and 1983, was held in Durban, South Africa, from September 1 to 8; it closed among controversy and disappointment.

The purpose of the proceedings was to discuss the problem of racism, at first in general terms, trying to look for its causes and forms, and then focusing on its victims and on the concrete measures to be adopted for eradicating it from society. A major issues the conference has to deal with, as could have been guessed since the conference preparation, were the two most scorching issues on today's international agenda: the continuing tensions, clashes and bloodshed connected to the Palestinian question and the growing concern about the economic gulf between countries of the North and the South of the planet. So, despite a stern warning (given by video, given his difficult health conditions) by Nelson Mandela, symbol-figure of the struggle for racial emancipation and host of the conference, the delegates of the 153 States present (among them, it is worth mentioning, there was not one of the Heads of State and Government of Western countries with a white majority) clashed over the problem of the accusations of racism moved against Israel by the Islamic world, and over the question of the requests to the West of apologies and compensations for the misdeeds of colonialism and slavery.

A cause of scandal was the final document of the NGOs Forum, held in parallel to the conference, and the draft of the final declaration of the conference itself, to be submitted to the plenum of the delegates. In the first Israel was defined "a racist state, in which apartheid is in force, a perpetrator of crimes against humanity, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing". The second, although without explicit reference to the Jew-

ish state, was clearly hinting at it by defining Israel's policies "a serious violation of international human rights, a new apartheid, a crime against humanity", and also acknowledging the risk of Islamophobic drifts, as well as the rekindling of anti-Semitism.

The immediate outcome was the withdrawal of the US and Israeli delegations on September 3, with the risk of the complete failure of the proceedings.

Finally a final compromise text was worked out, recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination, without attacking policies founded on foreign occupation, military installations and military blockade. Such documents inspired by a quite aggressive spirit, displayed even by usually moderate Islamic countries like Egypt. The aim was probably an attempt to create a solidarity axis between the Arab world and the poorest countries, mostly those in Africa, cemented by their alleged common enemy - the American and Western Moloch supporting Israel.

The representatives from Washington, Colin Powell not among them (for many a missed opportunity), reckoned they could no longer stay in an ever-more-explosive meeting, capable of fuelling further hatred and tension. Israel, in Peres' words too, felt especially offended and indignant as a result of absolutely unacceptable statements, the content of which is strongly disapproved by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The severity of the claims is not even shared by those who recognize the gravity of the Palestinian problem and the existence of misdeeds committed by the Jewish state, like Kofi Annan himself.

In conclusion, many were disappointed: the Arab countries were hoping for Israel to be censured, Israel and the USA walked out of the proceedings, a decision not appreciated by the Holy See and by the public opinion in these countries, and the European Union was criticised for

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having kept too low a profile. No doubt one can share the opinion of those complaining there was no discussion of really crucial problems. The list is considerable: the enduring forms of slavery, India's system of castes, the creeping xenophobia in rich countries, minorities' miserable fate in some poor ones, from Algeria to Nigeria, and the more general problem of North-South relations, indeed heralding explosive hostilities; for all of this, Durban was a missed opportunity.

Attempts to rescue the conference came from the active mediation of the European Union, represented by the Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, and of South Africa, the host.

The other big question raised in Durban, concerning colonialism and slave trading, had initially split Europe into two groups of states. One of these groups, headed by the UK, contained states willing to admit their misdeeds but not to accept being criminalised. Others, including Germany, Belgium and Italy, were more inclined to a compromise. A solution was finally reached: the states with a colonial past offered their apologies and acknowledged slave trading, past and present, to be a crime against humanity, but with no commitment however to any compensation, and leaving hazy the more general issue of economic aid to Africa (e.g.).

Museveni on the Unity of Humankind

Yoveri Koguta Museveni, President of Uganda, in his intervention during the UN Conference on racism on August 31 stated: "Racial discrimination? A nonsense. Science ascertained that all the nations of the world come from Africa. Therefore, we can state that, in point of fact, the Europeans are African migrants".

Borges on the Absurdity of Borders and Nations

We present to our readers an excerpt of an interview to Jorge Luis Borges, one of the most distinguished writers of the twentieth century, who died in 1986. The interview, conducted by Ramón Chao in 1978, was first published in *Le Monde Diplomatique* in August 2001.

"The idea of borders and nations seems to me absurd. The only thing which can save us is being world citizens. I tell you a personal anecdote. When I was a child I went with my father to Montevideo. I was perhaps nine years old. My father said: 'Look well at the flags, the customs, the soldiers, the priests, because all this shall disappear; and you will be able to tell your sons what you have seen'. The opposite occurred. Today there are more borders and more flags than ever".

It is true. Since 1945, when the UN was created, the number of sovereign states has quadrupled. But at the same time the globalization process, the rise of the global civil society movements, the challenge of international terrorism seem to open the way to the overcoming of national borders. This remark allows us to hope that Borges' father was right. (l.l.)

Two Rwandan Nuns Convicted

In June in Brussels two Rwandan nuns were sentenced to long prison terms for helping Hutu extremists to slaughter up to 6,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in the spring of 1994.

The trial was brought under a law unique to

Belgium that allows war crimes to be judged in the country's courts even if they were committed abroad. In 1993, in fact, Belgium passed a law giving itself the right to try war crimes suspects regardless of their nationality or that of the victims, or the location. Human rights groups predicted that the verdict would send a powerful signal to war criminals that they would not be guaranteed freedom from prosecution if they fled their country.

Sister Gertrude, a former Benedictine Mother Superior at a convent in Rwanda, and Sister Maria Kisito were convicted of directly participating in the brutal murder of Tutsi refugees. A 12-member jury sentenced the two nuns respectively to 15 and 12 years in a Belgian jail. Nowadays justice seems to have less and less borders (*an.v.*).

The Death of Mortimer Adler

The renowned political philosopher Mortimer Adler passed away on 28 June at the age of 98. Professor at the University of Chicago from 1930, in 1945 Adler helped launch the Great Books of the Western World program at the University of Chicago and St. John's College in Annapolis, and from 1974 he headed the editorial board of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* at the university of Chicago.

One of the pioneers of the world government movement, Prof. Adler wrote the seminar *How to Think About War and Peace* in 1944, reprinted in 1995 by Fordham University Press, New York, with an introduction by John J. Logue. He served with other members of the University of Chicago committee, which included Chancellor Robert Hutchins,

G.A. Borgese, Stringfellow Barr and Robert Redfield (the latter two were advisors of the Student Federalists), that produced (1945-48) the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*. From 1947 he also contributed to the committee's monthly magazine about world government, *Common Cause* (*j.o.s.*).

Letters to the Editor

Letter from Ronald J. Glossop*

In his review of John Roberts' *World Citizenship and Mundialism* in your March issue, Antonio Mosconi is very complimentary about the book as a whole. He says, "The only point on which I dissent from Roberts, for reasons not idealistic but practical, concerns his warm defence of the adoption of Esperanto as a world language." I would like to defend Roberts on this issue.

Mosconi argues that English is no longer "identified with the imperialism that determined its spread" and adds that "English has also established itself by linguistic selection." I disagree with both of those assertions. There is no doubt that English is in its present predominant position because of the economic, military, and political power first of the British and now of the Americans, not because of any innate superiority of the language. Whether we consider the influence of the Greek language after Alexander the Great, the influence of Latin after the Caesars, or the influence of French after Napoleon, it is evident that the spread of the influence of a language depends on factors other than the language itself. This would also be true outside of Europe; consider the wide influence of Arabic due to Muslim conquests or the influence of written Chinese in Asia due to the political dominance of China.

To look at the English language itself just briefly, is there any other language in the world where the spelling of words (consider "enough" or "through") is less logical? How can one speak of the superiority of a language where the same word (consider "bow" or "invalid") can have different pronunciations and totally different

meanings? In reading, is the word "read" present tense or past tense? How can simple frequently used words such as "so" and "do" have such different pronunciations? Consider the lack of regularity in prepositions indicating time when one says "I'll see you at ten o'clock on Wednesdays in September." I do not see how one can argue that English as a language is innately superior.

A factor which Mosconi fails to take into account is the decreasing proportion of the world's population which speaks English as its first language. At the end of the second World War that proportion was perhaps as large as ten percent. It is now below six percent, 341,000,000 out of over 6,000,000,000. [All of my current statistics are from pages 301 and 862 of *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* for the year 2001.] Other languages such as Mandarin Chinese, Hindi, and possibly Spanish have more native speakers than English. So why should everyone else in the world learn English? That looks very much like linguistic/cultural imperialism to me as well as to many others.

Mosconi says, "How could compelling people who already understand International English, [sic; a native speaker of English would not put a comma here!] to learn an artificial language whose only merit is that it does not evoke the spirit of departed dominations, contribute to the cause of the political unity of humankind?" Several unwarranted assumptions and verbal put-downs are being made in this question. Why would people be "compelled" to learn

Esperanto any more than they are compelled (probably by economic considerations) to learn English? How many people in the world already know "International English"? Even the most generous estimates are less than ten percent. With a world population of over 6 billion [or is it "milliard;" which version of English are we going to use here?] there would need to be at least 600 million who know International English to reach ten percent. That means that even then over 90 percent of the people of the world are going to be "compelled" to learn some new global language in order to participate in a democratic global federation. Would it be easier for them to learn the rule-guided, totally phonetic, artfully constructed language of Esperanto or the irregular, nonphonetic, illogical language of English? Experiments have shown that persons whose first language is English or French or Spanish learn Esperanto in one-fourth of the time that it takes them to learn one of those somewhat similar national languages as a second language. For Asians such as Chinese or Japanese, learning Esperanto (definitely a Latin-based European language) is much easier than learning any national European language all of which have irregularities of one kind or another while Esperanto does not. Also the word-building system in Esperanto allows the learner to gain a large vocabulary much more rapidly. To suggest that Esperanto's "only merit" is its political neutrality reveals a great

lack of knowledge about the language.

In terms of where languages stand in the world now, about one-fifth of the world's population knows English or French or Spanish or Portuguese or German or Italian. Esperanto can be viewed as a mixture of these six European languages put together in a blender and then strained through a filter so that only that which is rule-guided and phonetic comes through. Consider too that the world-wide adoption of the absolutely phonetic Esperanto would provide a great assist to the development of computers capable of taking in and giving out both written and spoken language. It would also be a great blessing to the less developed countries whose peoples would have much easier access to the global community with Esperanto than if they have to deal with the much more difficult-to-learn English.

Roberts is right that a global democratic federation will require a common language for the whole world community. Roberts rather than Mosconi is right in claiming that Esperanto would be a much better choice than English. I would add that Esperanto is also a better choice than Mandarin Chinese, an alternative that most non-Asians have not considered but which on the basis of the current number of native speakers (874 million) ranks way above English as a contender for that role of common language for the global community.

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