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New Series

The Federalist Debate

Papers for Federalists
in Europe and the World



*The problem of establishing a perfect civil Constitution
depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations
and cannot be solved unless the latter is*

Immanuel Kant

The Federalist Debate

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
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The Blind-Alley of the UN Reform

Lucio Levi

The world summit, meeting in New York on the occasion of the UN's 60th anniversary, ended in failure. In the wake of the speech by President Bush the debate focused for three days on terrorism, while other crucial issues such as disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, poverty, human rights and the protection of the environment were largely neglected.

The summit's final document does not even mention arms control, or nuclear non-proliferation. Mostly, it confines itself to statements of principles. The Millennium Development Goals have been reaffirmed, but with the exception of an EU pledge to double its development aid for Africa no mention can be found regarding the means to pursue international justice. If we take into account that only a few developed countries will commit themselves to pursue the goal of 0.7% of GDP for development aid, the achievement of the aim of halving poverty by 2015 has been mainly entrusted to the free market. This is wholly unrealistic. After a time-span of five years from the solemn announcement, the Millennium Goals now seem to be yet another of those broken dreams that have scarred the UN's history.

The summit did decide on the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Human Rights Council and a Democracy Fund. But despite these objectives being in accord with the current US Administration's policy of spreading democracy, positive action to achieve them failed to materialize.

For the first time a political commitment has been made to protect populations from

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, though when the question arises of how to assess the right moment to intervene, it is foreseeable that divisions among member states will inevitably emerge.

Terrorism was condemned once again, but no agreement was reached on a shared definition. Most Islamic countries asked that the notion of violence against civilians by fighters for freedom and independence should be excluded from the definition. This has the effect that the necessary conditions for entrusting the task of combating terrorism to the UN do not at present exist.

Lastly, the summit failed to produce a new architecture for the global system. Kofi Annan's proposals for Security Council reform met with strong opposition. The Big Five will continue to be the UN's masters, even though they have been weakened by the emergence of new powers.

* * *

What obstructs progress towards UN reform is the asymmetry of the current world order characterized by the overwhelming political, economic and military superiority of the US. The US aims to submit the UN to its will whenever possible. Otherwise it acts unilaterally, free from any international discipline, as was shown by its decision to attack Iraq.

The fundamental lesson which can be drawn from the history of international relations is that only power can limit power.

This means that only when states are able to keep each other in check there is space to ensure the rule of law. This balance of power – that is, the mechanical interplay of opposing forces – can act as a brake on the aspirations of every member of the states system and thus play the role of deterrent against violations of international law. On the other hand, when one state acquires a dominant position, as was the case with the US after the end of the Cold War, it will act solely in accordance with its own interests, possibly infringing international law and disregarding the rights of other states. Relevant examples can be found in the fact that the US – at least in relation to itself – opposes the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and a specific level of development aid.

* * *

To propel the US along the multilateralist road the formation of one or more large regional actors is an inescapable precondition. In Europe this process has begun. The EU is the most intensively regulated region of the world. It is based on a stable balance of power. Its political institutions impose restraints on what sovereign states may do in their relations with each other, and in this it shows the way to what the UN could become in the future: namely, the guardian of international law and the framework of a process of constitutionalization of international relations.

The EU is not only a model for the UN reform. It is also the motor. In the monetary sphere the euro has triggered a process of evolution towards world multilateralism. A recent step forward was the decision of the Chinese Central Bank to unpeg the yuan from the dollar. This means that the emergence of a monetary multipolarism opens the way to a reform of the international economic

organizations, i.e. a new Bretton Woods. The ECOSOC should be transformed into an Economic Security Council, in order to co-ordinate the various UN institutions and agencies dealing with economic matters, finance, trade, development, labour and environment.

But monetary multipolarism is not enough. A single EU foreign and security policy is the paramount condition of any move to defeat the pretension of the US to act unilaterally and to consider itself above the international community. To confront the present imbalance the way must be opened to a single European seat within the Security Council and to transform this body into the Council of the great regions of the world. With this reform, the US would eventually become the equal of other regional actors and therefore obliged to respect new rules of the game.

The EU's international prestige has, however, been considerably weakened by Germany's campaign, supported by France and the UK, to obtain for itself a permanent seat in the Security Council. In this attempt to revive anachronistic nationalist ambitions, the EU has made a pitiful spectacle of itself, and at the very moment when it should have been able to speak with one voice in the cause of the construction of world peace. Nation states in this age of globalization are little more than remnants of a bygone epoch. The future belongs to the great regional groupings of states and their co-operation within the UN.

At this summit, the African Union was the sole regional organization to challenge the Big Five's monopoly of the power of veto. It claimed two permanent African seats in the Security Council, with the right to veto. On the other hand it refused to support the ambitions of the four Security Council aspirants – Germany, Japan, India and Brazil – although they did not ask for veto rights. In the debate on Security Council reform Africa proved able to speak with

one voice and demonstrated its ability to free itself from its condition of dependency and to participate in the crucial decisions concerning the future of humankind.

* * *

In an article published in *The Boston Globe* on September 12, 2005 Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the US House of Representatives, recently put forward a characteristic argument against UN reform, namely that: "The UN must be a fundamentally limited institution because it has no democratic accountability but has at times pretensions of asserting legitimacy akin to that of a democratic nation state". It is true that the UN is not accountable to the people. But what distinguishes the neocon viewpoint from that of world federalists is that, for the former, the UN is

not, cannot and should not be a democratic institution. We should therefore ask what future would democracy have in a world where the significant decisions are taken at global level, while democracy itself does not reach beyond state borders. It is unacceptable for genuine democrats to leave these important decisions solely in the hands of big powers and of private actors, such as multinational corporations or criminal and terrorist organizations. In a globalized world, democracy is destined to decline unless it too becomes international.

That it is feasible to extend democracy to international level has been demonstrated by the European Parliament, which proves that it will be possible, in the not far distant future, to build a UN Parliamentary Assembly, conceived as a step toward a World Parliament.

What Sort of Federalism will Provide Best for Human Unity?

John Roberts

Democracy has only been widely accepted, at least in theory, as the proper basis of government, for the past 100 to 150 years. The runaway explosion of population poses new and serious challenges to political ingenuity. But the resulting problems have been so pressing that they seemed to demand immediate and, usually, local and improvised solutions.

Constitution-mongering

So the constitution-makers have, in general, felt that the time is not right for their work, deciding, probably correctly, that once the political will to achieve a federal solution for the world is evident, the work of thrashing out a constitution will become urgent. Then it will be undertaken, but the political in-fighting and manoeuvring will be immense and prove more important than the good or bad points of constitutions then on offer. It is rare to find foresight exercised in political affairs: desperate haste to deal with pressing crises is more common.

The benefits of preparation

That is certainly true, but that overlooks the value of having had work already done on federal plans and even complete constitutions. The last 50 years have seen an immense outpouring of political ideas that will make the task of new constitution-makers not only easier, but more fruitful. This is observable in the discussions about a constitution for the European Union. The federalists engage in the discussions with clear ideas about principles and cardinal rules for the creation of new institutions, in a way that was hardly

imaginable in 1945 when the United Nations Charter was being written.

The example of Europe

The creation of the European Union, through its successive stages, constitutes the greatest political innovation since 1945 or 1919, perhaps even since 1787, although its final development has yet to be assessed. Certainly the various experiments and devices that have been tried and tested over the past 50 years exemplify new ways of federal power-sharing that are invaluable guides to what can and should be done to build the new institutions that will enable larger societies to live in peace and harmony.

The work of the federalist theories

Beginning before the Second World War, a bevy of political writers have worked at giving theoretical answers to the creation of new federal institutions. Is a constitution for the European Union now the answer to the present problems of enlargement? Only, one may suspect, if it makes provision for the Union to continue enlargement, seek a new type of relationship with its neighbours, and offer itself as a model and catalyst for the establishment of a universal constitution. It would be a betrayal of the principles of the founders and of their federalist supporters if the EU did not try to point the way and act as a pilot plant for a greater union – a federal union of the entire planet.

What shall we need?

One lesson lies in the process which has brought the EU so far. It is only now, after

half a century, that the EU is ready for something like a constitution. But it has not got so far by accidental incremental intergovernmentalism. Thwarted, in the 1950s, in the attempt to draft a federal constitution or political union, Europeans adopted instead what can be called the Monnet method – of agreeing specific steps to deal with real common needs, but doing it in a way which contained an enduring federal element. Thus the founding of the Coal and Steel Community dealt with the need to permit Germany's industrial recovery in a federal partnership of equals under a High Authority, and with a parliamentary assembly and a court. The next key step, the economic community or common market, retained these key federal elements for the economy as a whole, and prepared the ground for the later key step of the direct election of the Parliament. The Single European Act in turn led to the completion of the Single Market and opened the way to a Monetary Union. The Monetary Union and enlargement in turn forced an increase in the Parliament's real powers.

A world federal government is also unlikely to be brought suddenly to birth by agreement on a global constitution. Rather, key incremental steps are needed towards the long-term goal of an effective, democratic world government. One such step has been the creation of the International Criminal Court. Another might be a series of steps towards a world parliament. Another might be the creation of a global community to counter the devastation of climate change, and yet another some breakthrough on nuclear disarmament and reform of the Security Council.

The second lesson from the EU is that the world is too large and its problems too complex to deal with all of them from the centre. What the EU has done and is doing is providing an example for other regions. If the world is to be united in a peaceful and

lawful future, it will be necessary to achieve elsewhere the same sort of regional unity that has already been achieved, if slowly, in Europe. That, in some ways, could be easier. For example, unlike Europe, South America has only two principal languages that are used throughout the entire continent. Africa is also an area where three colonial languages (English, French and Arabic) have been imposed and are used by the elite everywhere.

Means of progress

The route to such regional unions cannot be left entirely to the regions. For example, unless the spread of nuclear weapons is brought under control at global level, there is little hope that India and Pakistan will be ready to engage in negotiations together with the other members of South Asian Regional Cooperation for a unified sub-continent. Nor is there any hope that Israel and its Arab neighbours will bring about the much-needed unity of the Near East that will be necessary until the United States ceases to use Israel as its permanent and favoured military ally in the region.

Even in the economic field, hegemonic outside powers can hold back regional unity by upholding wider arrangements which they dominate simply by the divide and rule concept. Thus the US deliberately blocked Japan's initiative for an Asian Monetary Union, which might have rescued its neighbours from the 1998 financial crisis. Instead of a residual neo-colonial relation with a former imperial power, warm cooperation between Britain and France to support Africa's federal aspirations would be a help. Until the United Nations is able to keep a semblance of peace or at least moderate our current arms-races, there is little scope for many regions to manage their necessary steps towards unity. A world Community of Communities needs to be born, both through diverse initiatives in the regions and a strategic effort to transform the UN into an effective federal

authority, meeting the common challenges that demand global solutions.

Untidiness is all – principles not theory

The world will not be united in uniformity. Diversity in unity has to be the watchword. This will require tolerance and toleration, not something that many societies find easy to bestow upon rivals, or even upon their own citizens. But until they do manage to live and let live, their story will be a continued sorry tale of conflict and chaos. The meek may inherit the earth, but they will have a hard time until the bruisers have battered each other into quiescence or learnt through crisis that better ways must and can be found to resolve differences, and give expression to common interests through institutions and the rule of law.

Conclusion

The growing interdependence of humans and our dependence on the ailing natural

world require us to achieve a hitherto unwonted political unity of purpose and of action. Since human unity is the urgent need of our time and the most serious failure is of political unity, we should concentrate our efforts in the direction of remedying that political failure. And, since an authoritarian unity will be neither acceptable, nor durable, we should seek federalist solutions to the creation of unity. This entails working with likeminded movements and offering help to federalist thinkers and activists.

We should seek to bring the lessons and principles of democratic federalism to bear on all routes to human unity: the need for a reform of the economic system and the management of the world's physical environment. Moreover, it is to be appreciated the value of working with civil society as a whole. This will require cooperation, creative thinking and joint efforts by millions of people: world citizens in spirit if not in name.

Excerpts from John Roberts, *Federalism: A Testimony*, The One World Trust, London, 2005. The whole pamphlet can be obtained by contacting The One World Trust (<http://www.oneworldtrust.org>)

The United Nations: 60 Years of Achievements

Keith Suter

The UN Charter was signed on June 26, 1945. In all the day-to-day controversies, the UN's long-term achievements tend to be overlooked. Here are 10 achievements. They are not in any order of importance.

1. Longevity

The UN has lasted three times as long as its ill-fated predecessor, the League of Nations. The League was often seen as the "great experiment", with the implication that it may not be here to stay (which in fact it was not). But the UN has outlasted all the predictions of imminent doom. The UK's conservative *Daily Express* in 1948 first predicted that it would soon be wound up, but in fact it has lasted the course. Even the current Bush Administration (easily one of the most hostile anti-UN Administrations in US history) is not seeking to wind it up.

Indeed part of the UN's problem is that it has been around for so long that people take it for granted. UN Associations have difficulty in attracting interest in the UN because so many people have never known a world without it. It has become a fixed fact of their life.

2. Universal Membership

Virtually every country in the world is a member of the UN. The League of Nations never had that benefit. The US never joined and the USSR joined late and was expelled (over its invasion of Finland). Japan, Italy and Germany all resigned because of their aggressive foreign policies. Nowadays as soon as a territory achieves independence it seeks UN membership as part of its journey into the international community. East Timor is the newest member (number 191). If President Bush's "roadmap for peace" is

eventually successful in the Middle East, then an independent Palestine will also join.

Proof of the UN's inevitable universality is the way that the United States has rejoined the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Its campaign against Iraq has obliged it to win friends and influence people. One of its decisions has been to rejoin this major UN agency. In 1984, President Reagan withdrew the United States from UNESCO. The Reagan decision was seen as a sign of the administration's desire to pull out from as many UN bodies as possible. Right wing think tanks had lobbied for the withdrawal.

The decision to withdraw was highly controversial. Within the United States, there were critics who claimed that the decision was ideologically driven and reflected a new isolationism within the administration. Some American scientists argued that the withdrawal would be expensive, because the US would have to do research on its own rather than collaboratively through UNESCO projects.

But the US has now discovered a need for the UN. This was first obvious after September 11, 2001, when the US needed an international coalition for its war on terrorism. The US now needs an international presence in Iraq. The Bush administration has recognized that international co-operation is a two-way street. If it wants the international community to assist the United States, then it also needs to put something back into the international community.

3. The UN Survived the Cold War

The UN had a troubled birth. Its birth coincided with the onset of the Cold War. Winston Churchill forged the "Great Alliance" (US, UK

and USSR) against the Axis Powers (Germany, Japan and Italy). He hoped to keep the Grand Alliance together in what became known as the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security. But the Cold War broke out and hindered much – but not all – of the UN’s work. The Cold War is over and the UN has survived.

4. Forum for Decolonization

Colonization has been a feature of world history for as long as records have been kept. The most widespread form of it has been in the last 500 years. In the 1490s Europeans started to move off their rocky outcrop at the western end of the massive Eurasian landmass and travelled to all points of the world. The first explorers were from Spain and then Portugal. Later came the French, Dutch and British. The Germans were late getting involved.

A century ago, the European domination of the world was taken to be the norm. Almost all the world (even including most of Antarctica) was under the control of Europeans or peoples of European descent (such as the US). It seemed that the empires would last for many more years to come. White people, it seemed, were destined to rule the world.

Decolonization was a fixed agenda item for the UN’s early decades. Almost all the empires have now been wound up. Now the smallest number of people (as a percentage) is in a colonial situation. For example, the British empire in the Pacific now consists only of Pitcairn Island, with its 72 people and the wreck of the “Bounty”. The struggle for decolonization was waged partly at UN meetings (hence the anger of the *Daily Express*, which wanted to keep the British Empire in one piece).

5. Functional Co-operation

Even during the height of the Cold War, countries were working across national lines to make the world a better place. Technical experts were brought together to, for example, standardize telephone systems, so that a person can ring from one country to another. The vast network

of UN Specialized Agencies enable the technical cooperation to go ahead, such as sending letters from one country to another, exchanging ideas on educational material, and pooling resources on foreign aid. Diseases and pollution do not recognize national boundaries and they need to be combated by international co-operation. Smallpox has been eradicated through the World Health Organization (the first disease in world history to be eradicated) and there are hopes that polio may be eradicated this year.

The UN Security Council may get the international media attention, but it is the UN’s functional co-operation that makes a difference to the lives of everyone. The UN is at work each day, all day, every day. If this part of the UN did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it. This is a good example of how the UN is too often taken for granted.

6. Forum for Small States

The UN has provided a platform for small states. Until 1945, a handful of states ran the world. They still do, of course (though it is now a different collection of states, with other ones emerging, notably China and India). But the UN has enabled other countries to have a say in how the world is run. This has been important for small countries, which would have otherwise been only on the margin of international politics.

7. Protection of Human Rights

The 20th century saw both some of history’s worst violations of human rights and yet also some of the most spectacular international advances in their protection. There is a still long way to go. But there is the recognition that human rights are now a global (and not merely a national) issue. Human rights are still being violated. But people know their rights are being violated, and so there is less resigned acceptance that such violations are an inevitable part of life. Additionally, people in other countries have a greater sense of obligation to assist others whose rights are being violated. This is still not the creation of some form of “international family” but there is a greater sense of “community” than

ever before. Additionally, respect for human rights is now a criterion in assessing countries. For example, China lost out in the bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games (which went to Sydney) and had to promise to do better, among other things, in the protection of human rights in order to secure the 2008 Games.

The basic UN human rights document is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Among its 30 Articles are: the right to life, liberty and security of person; equality before the law; freedom of movement and residence; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to seek in other countries asylum from persecution; freedom of thought, religion and conscience; the rights to vote and to participate in government; the right to education; the right to work; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to health protection; and the right to participate fully in cultural life.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948. It was adopted with no negative votes. But there were some abstentions: the USSR and its satellite countries (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia) did not vote for it because of the UDHR's right to own property; South Africa opposed the principle that blacks were equal to whites, and Saudi Arabia disagreed with the principle that women were equal to men (Honduras and Yemen were absent). It is a sign of the progress in the protection of human rights that these governments would not now abstain if there were a vote on the Declaration today.

The UN has since produced a diverse range of declarations and treaties flowing from the UDHR. There is no precedent at all for this level of inter-governmental action on human rights.

8. Forum for Disarmament

The UN is the global centre for disarmament negotiations. Much remains to be done but at least some progress has been made in reducing

nuclear and chemical weapons, and biological warfare has been scrapped.

9. Protection of the Environment

There was little thought given to the environment in 1945. It is a sign of the UN's flexibility that it has been able to absorb the international protection of the environment into its workload. The first major step was at the 1972 UN Conference in Stockholm on the Human Environment. It has been able to get countries to work together on common environmental issues, such as through the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

10. Forum for Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs were involved at the 1945 San Francisco conference that created the UN and they have remained involved. Their work shows that governments have no monopoly over information and ideas. For example, NGOs undertake public education work, such as alerting people to the dangers of pollution and generating new ideas for coping with problems. NGOs develop close ties with politicians and (even more importantly) public servants to work on new treaties etc. NGOs are adept at using the mass media for their campaigns. They sometimes challenge governments and transnational corporations to do better, such as the current Global Justice Movement. NGOs provide an alternative route for people who wish to work for a better world. Political parties are not the sole route for working for that objective. Indeed, given the widespread disenchantment with politicians, NGOs are important avenues for peaceful social change.

The UN recognizes the importance of NGOs by granting various forms of consultative status to NGOs to enable them to take part in its work. Also, some national government delegations to UN meetings sometimes contain NGO personnel.

In sum, the UN has many achievements to its credit. It will be interesting to see what the next 60 years will bring.

Short-Sightedness of the Elites

Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

Fair weather in the world economy today and for most of tomorrow: strong growth in 2005, no abrupt stop in sight. But for the day after tomorrow the camp is split in two: those who forecast a clear sky and those who announce storms; Pangloss, Voltaire's character stubbornly convinced that we live in the best of possible worlds, and Cassandra, Priam's far-sighted daughter, saying that the calm is turning into storm. The row dividing them concerns not only the economy, but also politics.

Pangloss says: wealth has never grown so much in the world as during this generation and thanks to the market it will spread ever more to all. The recent turbulences (financial insolvencies, Enron, the stock market's boom and fall, the tsunami effect, rising oil prices) have been overcome more easily than the previous ones (the first oil shock, the crisis of South American debt). Yes, there will be more turbulence, but the market will take care of that. After all, I, Pangloss, am not saying that our world is wonderful, nor that it is absolutely the best, but that it is the best possible. Be confident: storms will come, but we know how to face up to them.

Cassandra says: we are protracting a feast that cannot last, and for the end of which we are not preparing ourselves. The energy we consume (coal, petrol, natural gas) is running out, we are squandering the resources of the planet, whose life and climate we put in danger. The market, which we are delighting in, is a beast out of control. We are entering a new state of nature where even the use of force is privatized, from the suicide terrorists to the black market of

weapons of mass destruction. The economy seems to be governing an anarchical world, but it will end up being its victim. What should we, common citizens, think? I try to suggest a few points, which originate from one and the same consideration: well before the market and politics, there is society, which has an influence on both of them, and is also influenced by them.

First point: everybody able to read can and must form an opinion of his own. He would be wrong in considering himself inadequate, in comparison with the specialists of the matter or the holders of power. This may make those who expect miracles from scientists and people in power uneasy; instead, in my opinion, it should be reassuring. Whenever it is not in tune with common sense, the economy is usually wrong. We live in democracy, and everybody contributes to choose policies and rulers. Thinking that citizens as a whole have common sense and sufficient information for making reasonable choices is a good reason for having a great confidence in the future of our freedom and in positive results by a good government. The widespread attitudes in the social body are reflected in the functioning of the market and politics.

Second point: the "us" used above is an aggregate of different interests. It comprises enterprises and families, consumers and producers, leading sectors and declining sectors, debtors and creditors. Often the fortune of some is the misfortune of others. Trousers and cheap furniture supplied by the Chinese and by Ikea are a problem for a

national producer, but are very welcome by a consumer. The diversity of interests is cutting through the same individual, the same firm, the same sector, not to say the Country. It is as if we were at the same time employees in Alitalia (more than 1000 euros for a Rome-London flight) and Ryanair users (less than 50 euros for the same flight). Between contrasting interests one has to choose, and the two processes by which choices are made in our societies are the market and democracy.

Third point: for understanding and choosing in the right way one has to be long-sighted. Only this allows us not to arrive unprepared at the events. Economists' forecasts and governments' decisions tend, instead, not to look beyond the short-term horizon of models or of the deadline of the next elections. Should scientists and politicians look farther, they would jeopardize what they cherish most, scientific prestige and power. And yet, only by scanning the misty landscape of the day after tomorrow can some not-too-painful solutions be arranged in advance for facing the difficulties that are approaching. The recent dispute with China over textiles and clothing has occurred because we almost forgot that trade agreements, freely signed and known for a long time, were approaching maturity.

Fourth point: the future is open. In the economy, in economic policies, in human relations, more than one future can originate from the same present. Despite the importance of Fate in Greek culture, even Cassandra was picturing catastrophes against which, if she had been trusted, countermeasures could have been prepared. Her tragedy was that Apollo, to punish her, left to her the gift of prophecy, but took away from her that of persuasion. On us Apollo did not play such a nasty trick. Cassandra's warnings are well-

founded. The richest society on the planet (the United States) cannot live for many more years on the credits of poorer peoples and countries. The global market cannot continue to develop in a peaceful and ordered fashion if the institutions for governing it remain insufficient, with no power and no legitimation. The Earth resources (from forests to energy sources) cannot but become dramatically more expensive, and finally run short, if the consumption we make of them continues to increase as if they were limitless. The equilibrium of life cannot but be upset if we, almost two centuries after man discovered it, continue to ignore the greenhouse effect. The disparity in living standards among human beings – like the Europeans and the Asians –, with almost equal levels of culture and working ability, cannot remain without serious consequences. September is high season for international economic diplomacy: all over the world analyses and talks are taking place, culminating in the meetings of the IMF in Washington. Regional meetings (the European Union, the Asian countries), sectorial meetings (finance, trade, energy, development), talks among rich countries (the G7) and poor countries (Africa, Latin America, developing countries). They assess the situation in the year that is ending and will determine with what disposition we are going to look at the future. There is reason to fear that the message the specialists and the people in government will send will be more short-sighted and reassuring than what would be justified by a disenchanting observation of the long-term trends in the world economy and in our societies. It is left to the common citizen's reflection, common sense, desire to be informed and to understand, to become aware of that and draw his own conclusions, that will shape the way he will look at the future and will act in economic and social matters.

A European Dilemma: Amending Aid or Expanding Foreign Policy?

Amelia Hadfield

Development policy is as old as the EC itself. It was written into the 1957 Treaty of Rome, making it – along with external trade – the oldest objective of Community policy. It is also the policy with the greatest potential to absorb and ultimately transmit political and security objectives. Nowhere is this more evident than in the recently amended 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed on 23 June, 2005 between 25 EU states and 78 states from the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group.

The original Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed in 2000 between 15 EC member states and 77 ACP states, and committed €13.5 billion for an initial five-year period. The purpose of the project was to tackle poverty reduction in ACP states by means of targeted aid assistance, based on EC-ACP dialogue and sector-specific aid instruments. However, the Revised Cotonou Agreement appears to have substantially altered many of its original development goals. Such alterations suggest that the Cotonou Agreement does not represent an assistance programme in the traditional sense of EC Development policy. Indeed, the contents and objectives of the Cotonou Agreement revised in 2005 reveal areas of EU foreign policy at work in underdeveloped regions. These changes also call into question the whole ethos of EC development policy. Motivating aid and assistance now indicates a foreign policy motive in which both politicisation and securitisation characterise EC aid projects. Will this transform EC Development from an autonomous policy area into a new form of EU foreign policy?

EC Development

The EC is unquestionably a patron of the

developing world, providing roughly half of all public aid to developing countries as well as representing the main trading partner for most. Its development activities extend around the globe in a network of multilateral treaties, bilateral association agreements and partnership projects. The European Communities Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided roughly half of the world's US\$54 billion of development assistance in 2000, making the EC the fourth largest provider of international aid.¹ At the same time however, EC aid allocation emerges from a structure that has deeply political contents. Development Policy remains a Community rather than Union policy, operating within Pillar One of the European Union. Aid is provided by the Community, and managed by both the Council and the Commission, the latter being divided into DG Development and DG Relex in its management of both development projects (like Cotonou) and external agreements (like the Barcelona Process).

The overlap between development themes and external relations means the objectives of aid and the instruments by which to make aid effective lacks a clear mandate. This situation is somewhat worsened in that EC Development as a policy exists alongside Member States' own contributions to the European Development Fund (EDF), which falls outside the Community budget. Thus, while member states have largely delegated responsibility to the Commission for overseeing development support, their individual EDF donations allow them continued budgetary leverage, as well the ability to imbue their aid with foreign policy content. A fine line appears to exist between development aid as an independent EC policy area and development

aid as an instrument of EU foreign policy.

What is the ultimate purpose of development? The European Commission's statement in 2000 to the Council and the European Parliament regarding EC Development Policy provides a good example of the difficulties of defining development policy. The statement argued that 'the main objective of Community development policy must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty.'² Poverty itself was identified with both the obvious 'lack of income and financial resources' but also the complex, frequently intangible factors where a *range of access* is denied, from food and water to education, employment, health, 'credit facilities, information and political involvement' up to and including 'infrastructure' writ large.³ For Development policy to be truly effective, the Council and Commission Statement argued that poverty reduction strategies had to be of a multi-dimensional nature and that sustained growth was an essential prerequisite for poverty reduction. As a result, the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement tackles poverty via sector-specific categories of economic development, social and human development, regional integration and 'thematic issues' of gender equality, environmental sustainability and institutional development. It also takes as its underlying context the need to integrate underdeveloped states into the global marketplace to prevent further marginalisation. The Council and Commission development statement also makes two general points, the first typifying the first Cotonou Agreement, the second foreshadowing its 2005 revisions. The first point is that reliable and transparent communication is the engine of efficient aid allocation. Thus, within the Cotonou Agreement, ACP states are tasked with 'ensuring transparent and responsible management' of development resources, while the EC must develop a result-based approach, with a more independent appraisal process.⁴ By all accounts, this has happened successfully with the majority of ACP states. Areas of under-development are determined based on criteria that define the

'needs' of a given recipient and the 'performance' by which assistance is judged to have made a viable impact. Two such instruments include the use of case-specific Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and the broader country-specific National Indicative Plans (NIPs).

CSPs and NIPs enable the various EC/EU donor sources to tailor their financial assistance more accurately to levels of need. As criteria-determining instruments, NIPs and CSPs undoubtedly represent a sea change in approaching development as a series of renewable projects (based on sequentially amended multilateral treaties) rather than just a broad policy area *per se*. However such instruments also have the potential to contain and transmit politicised, even securitised elements – such as gender equality, good governance, regional cooperation – which are only loosely connected to poverty reduction.

The second point is the single but crucial reference in the 2000 Council and the Commission Statement regarding the causality role of poverty in contributing to security. The 2000 Statement suggests that insecurity and security problems are an *outcome* of poverty, not a contributory cause: 'Poverty, and the exclusion which it creates, are the root causes of conflict and are endangering the stability and security of too many countries and regions.'⁵ Here, chronic underdevelopment generates conditions from which poverty takes root, exacerbated by marginalisation and which gives rise to security problems. The document indicates that the prevailing belief by the EC as a donor entity is that underdevelopment begets poverty, and poverty begets insecurity. As such, tackling the causes of poverty reduces the chances of subsequent security problems.

2005 Revisions

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, however, signed in the same year as the Council and the Commission Statement, deviates from this logic by reversing the argument, suggesting instead that security and geo-political instability are the

root causes of underdevelopment, which then creates poverty.⁶ The 2005 Cotonou Revisions have taken this logic one step further, by adding a most surprising clause that makes central the EU's belief that security must be tackled first or at least in tandem with poverty reduction strategies to have any effect upon a given society.

The 2005 revisions to Cotonou Partnership Agreement contain four headings: the Political Dimension, Development Strategies, Investment Facility, and Implementation and Management Procedures. Under the first heading, the EU has availed itself of the opportunity 'to put into practice certain recent security commitments undertaken at international level' and which it now hopes will be reflected in the practices and development of the ACP states.⁷

Of the new clauses forming the revised Cotonou Agreement, the most important is that of Article 11b, entitled 'Cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', in which parties 'agree to cooperate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through full compliance with and national implementation of their existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements'.⁸ That the EC regards WMD non-proliferation as an 'essential element' of the revised Cotonou Agreement, equal to the three other essential elements described in Article 9, including human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, represents an enormous change regarding both the contents of a multilateral treaty dedicated to development and the objectives of EC Development policy in general.

This article further outlines that those ACP countries actively cooperating to stamp out WMD will be granted 'additional financial and technical assistance' from sources *other* than ACP-EU Development cooperation.⁹ However, the line between ACP's cooperation and compliance over WMD remains ambiguous, with reference only to 'strengthened political dialogue' established on the basis of reports

produced by the IAEA, the OPCW and other relevant multilateral institutions.¹⁰ The message is clear, even if the repercussions are not. Securitisation has entered the development world. ACP states failing to fulfil obligations based on such reports are required to supply 'both the ACP and the EU Council of Ministers with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution', failing which 'appropriate measures may be taken' (not specified).¹¹ Space forbids a deep analysis regarding the correctness of this new provision. Suffice it to say that both the jurisdictional remit of the EC to include such a clause and the broader relevance of including WMD compliance regulations within a Development treaty is highly contentious. The EU has neither the mandate nor the capability to supervise such activities. Neither is the ACP group itself a particularly potent source of WMD. It is highly doubtful that the ACP group constitutes a genuine area of concern regarding the construction, transit or use of WMD. Examining ACP states for their atomic, biological or chemical capability makes this obvious. The EU has far more legitimate WMD concerns within its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

Far more applicable is the new clause in the revised Cotonou Agreement relating to 'the prevention of mercenary activities'.¹² This appears a more commonsense inclusion in which mercenary activities are treated via the conditionality that accompanies other essential elements such as human rights and the rule of law, and which could feasibly enact change in ACP states that commit to preventing such activities. A third addition of interest requires parties to 'share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court', a diluted reference to some attempt at legal harmonisation based on emerging precepts of international law.¹³

Conclusion

Whilst the revised Cotonou agreement of 2005 undoubtedly retains its focus upon reducing poverty and the causes of poverty, it also mirrors the broader trends of twenty-first century development policy by insinuating elements of emergent EU foreign policy within aid packages. This may be a structural problem in which the cross-pillarisation of EC/EU policy-making prevents policy coherence, or a subsequent problem in which external policies attempt to break free of their ambiguity by imbuing them with politicised or securitised content that makes the EU appear a more viable global actor. This may be a legitimate response to a protracted problem. However, the revised Cotonou Agreement is the incorrect forum for such endeavours.

Attempting to induce WMD non-proliferation cooperation in the Revised Cotonou Agreement may prove to be ineffective at best and at worst risks being regarded as disingenuous and duplicatory. The Cotonou is a development instrument. As such, it possesses neither the relevant clauses to truly make WMD non-

proliferation effective, nor does the EC itself possess the mandate to undertake such goals. WMD may well be the defining feature within an expanding discourse of extra-territorial securitisation – certainly North America and Western Europe are in the throes of this particular discourse – however it is alarming that it has unreflectively found its way into a multilateral development treaty whose stated objective is that of poverty reduction.

Based on the methods of conditionality by which EC aid is distributed, EC foreign policy combines these same conditional measures with preventative elements that allow structures like Cotonou to represent both assistance *to* and the securing *of* third party states. If the politicisation of aid is a well established reflex, the securitisation of aid appears to be something of an emerging trend. Neither, however, are uncomplicated developments. They also indicate the same dilemma, namely that Europe has yet to decide ‘whether it wants development aid to be an instrument of its diplomacy or an autonomous policy with its own objectives and rationale’.¹⁴

¹ OECD, DAC (Development Assistance Community) Aid Peer Review of the European Community, Paris, OECD, DAC 2002

² European Commission 2000, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Community's Development Policy*, COM (2000)212, subsequently adopted by the Council of the European Union, as *The European Community's Development Policy: Statement by the Council and the Commission*, 2000, p. 2

³ *Ibid*, p. 2

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 2 and p. 5

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 1

⁶ European Commission, DG Development, *Cotonou Agreement*:

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/overview_en.htm

⁷ European Commission, DG Development, ACP-EC Agreement, Negotiations on the Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, The Information Note on the Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, page 1, available at

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/negociation_20050407_en.pdf

⁸ Council of the European Union, 8851/05, ACP/CE/2005/en 4, *Agreement amending the Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, Article 11b, Paragraph 1, author's copy

⁹ *Agreement amending the Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, Article 11b, Paragraph 3

¹⁰ *Ibid*, Article 11b, Paragraph 4

¹¹ *Ibid*, Article 11b, Paragraphs 4 and 6

¹² *Ibid*, Article 11, Paragraph 3a

¹³ *Ibid*, Article 11, Paragraph 6

¹⁴ C. Santosio, *Improving the Governance of European Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation as an Element of Foreign Policy*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 189, October 2002, p. 2

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From 9/11 to New Orleans: The Necessity to Reconsider the World

Giampiero Bordinò

The societies of uncertainty and risk we are living in put every day on top of the agenda the problem of security. Terrorist acts, interstate and civil conflicts, natural catastrophes, environmental disasters, “accidents” that emphasize the frailty of our ever more complex societies and technologies: all this, and the ever more frequent recurring of the same, pictures an unforeseeable world, in which no place is safe any longer, no living perspective can be reasonably and easily anticipated, no social and cultural condition is assured to endure.

In essence, the States (including the superpower) and the international system (as the crisis of the UN shows) are unable today to adequately produce the “public good” of security, and hence they are going through a deep crisis of legitimation and consensus.

We have, in fact, a “*nomos*” (system of rules, institutions) less and less efficient and legitimized, a “*demos*” (the people) ever more unsatisfied and insecure, a “*paideia*” (culture, education) ever more mobile and uncertain, in need to be reconsidered and rebuilt. In one word, the “*polis*” we were used to live in – the national sovereign States, a Westphalian international order, territoriality, a well-defined identity and allegiance – is at its twilight, and we must be able to think of and build, before the twilight comes to completion and night falls, a different and new “*polis*” to live in.

But in order to think of and build a new post-national and global “*polis*” it is necessary to

operate in a coherent fashion on the three basic elements that compose it: the “*demos*”, its people; the “*nomos*”, its system of rules; the “*paideia*”, its educational content.

As far as the “*demos*” is concerned, we must recognize that the new peoples of the 21st century – the ones potentially able to act as new actors for a new world – will more and more be the migrant peoples, the trans-national diasporas that interlace and hybridize it. Peoples of multiple identities and allegiances, protagonist of experiences of cultural half-breeding, essential for going beyond the territorial and mental “enclosures” of the national states and their declining exclusive sovereignties. In such a direction, I believe that the federalist theory has still a long way to go – in terms of learning, interpreting and reflecting, and then of elaborating a strategy – before being in a position to contribute to the thinking of the world in a more adequate manner. In fact, a specific reflection on this matter, appropriately embodied in the federalist thought, is still lacking.

Instead, for what concerns the “*nomos*” the federalist theory, if revisited in the light of the globalization process (and there is to say that not all federalists appear to be willing and able to make such a revisiting) is objectively the only institutional proposal to be concretely on the table. The projects of global governance, that are most frequently proposed in the political debate today, are at best *transition projects* to more efficient and better-assured forms of global government.

The project of the federalist "*nomos*", instead, is exactly a *government project* beyond the governance phase, and is a decisive contribution to the challenge posed by the problem of security in the "societies of risk" we are living in.

Finally, for a new "*paideia*" the federalist culture can propose a route in civil education adequate to the new "*demos*" of the 21st century we talked about before: a route that takes into consideration the plurality of "public spaces" we are living in more and

more, from the local ones to the national, to the continental, to the world. These spaces are exactly the spaces the federal institutional model for the world makes reference to.

Beyond 9/11 and the New Orleans tragedy there is then the necessity to radically reconsider the world: its system of rules, its peoples, and its culture. For the federalist doctrine it is a complex challenge to take up, that can only be faced with a considerable disposition to the practice of divergent thinking, and of creative imagination.

EU Joins Demands for International Control over the Internet

With what has been defined by the American negotiators as "a very shocking and profound change", the European Union joined the rest of the world in demanding the creation of a new international body to govern the internet. The new position emerged during the preparatory talks that precede the second meeting of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a formal UN summit at the level of heads of State and Government which will meet in Tunisia on 16-18 November.

The clash between the US and the rest of the world focuses on the juridical status of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), an internationally organised, non-profit corporation that has responsibility for Internet Protocol (IP) address space location and for managing the Domain Name System (DNS), a huge database that allows end users to recur to easy-to-remember names (e.g. www.google.com), instead of weird dotted-decimal numbers (e.g. 66.249.93.104), to reach a specific host among the millions which populate the internet.

ICANN operates at present, for well-known historical reasons, under a contract to the US Department of commerce, which will run out by the end of 2006. This means that disputes with ICANN must follow the Californian laws. The EU is instead calling for the establishment of an arbitration and dispute mechanism based on international law, similar to the one which presently operates inside the WTO. The problem lies in the fact that the internet has become an essential medium for business and communication all over the world, and few admit that it remains regulated by American laws.

According to the Brazilian delegation to the talks, quoted by the *International Herald Tribune*, "On internet governance three words tend to come to mind: lack of legitimacy [...] Only one nation decides for all of us". Analogous concerns have been raised in the past by many countries, and by international bodies like the UN International Telecommunication Union. In reply to those concerns, the Bush administration, backed by a bipartisan recommendation by the US Congress, announced that it wants to maintain full control over the DNS even after 2006. A new chapter of the battle for multilateral world government will be written in Tunisia in the next weeks (*f.f.*).

The Unpegging of the Yuan

A Step towards the de-Dollarization of the World Economy?

Antonio Mosconi

The Chinese government's decision to unpeg the yuan from the dollar, to which it was tied by a fixed exchange rate, and to tie its value, instead, to a basket of currencies, does not limit itself, as asserted by some diminishing interpretations, to making possible a tiny revaluation of the yuan.

When the decision was announced, some American banks and some economists reckoned that the weight of the dollar in the basket would remain higher than 50%. But soon the Chinese authorities made its composition known (among the weightier currencies: the dollar, the euro, the yen and the Korean won; among the less important ones: the British pound, the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Singapore dollar, the Russian rouble, the Malaysian ringgit and the Thai bath). Although the weight of each currency in the basket's composition has not been specified, the People's Bank Governor explained that it is based on China's trading exchanges. The analysts at JP Morgan have then drawn the conclusion that the weights should

be: 23% for the yen, 21% for the dollar, 15% for the euro, 8% for the won; about one third of the basket should be divided among the other currencies. A confirmation could come from a gradual decrease of the dollar's worth in the Chinese currency reserves, from a continuation of the yuan's revaluation trend and perspectively from the yuan reaching full convertibility.

Therefore, what we see is not just a modest revaluation by 2%, but the latest, probably the decisive, step of a long process of dollarization and subsequent de-dollarization of the world economy, a process that started at Bretton Woods and that must come to conclusion with a new Bretton Woods. This time around, however, the problem cannot be solved by passing the baton from one hegemonic power to the next. An ordered system must replace a dis-ordered order, a multi-lateral system (a system of systems) a unilateral order, a cooperative system a hegemonic order, a global system a circumscribed order, an equitable system an iniquitous order.

The EU: A Model for Conflict Resolution?

John Parry

When discussing security it is worth recalling that the European project began with what today we would call “soft security” measures. Prompted by the devastation caused by World War II and the widespread desire for peace and justice, the debate initially concentrated on the need for a new approach to international relations. For federalists meeting in Montreux in 1947 this meant working for a world federation, though some saw the need to rebuild war-torn Europe in a new, federal mould as both more urgent and more likely to achieve early success. Essential guidelines were already available in the Hertenstein proposals drawn up the previous year.

The Hague Congress (1948), chaired by Winston Churchill, set the process in motion. Its task was to lay aside “the petty rivalries of national states” and to “look forward to the development of a harmonious society in Europe”¹. The agreed solution foresaw regular intergovernmental meetings and the drawing up of a Charter of Human Rights – essential after the murderous behaviour of fascist regimes –, plus a Court of Justice, and a European Assembly. These aims were realised in the foundation of the Council of Europe which first tackled the roots of conflict in its Convention on Human Rights, and later extended its work to such ground-level areas as education, local government, and the treatment of minorities. As an intergovernmental organisation it followed the pattern suggested by many earlier political thinkers² and is structurally similar to the League of Nations or, in a later strengthened form, the United Nations.

However, with the sharpening by 1949-50 of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union – they now had the atom bomb – and talk of re-arming Germany sending shivers down the backs of every Frenchman, a more federal arrangement was clearly needed. Thrice during the previous eighty years their two countries had fought each other. To avoid a repetition, France and Germany together with the Benelux countries and Italy now undertook preventative action by agreeing in the Paris treaty of 1951 to place the two key resources on which the armaments industry relied at that time, coal and steel, within a common legislative order administered by common institutions which would include a Court of Justice to rule on disputes.

Its principal aim was “to substitute for age-old rivalries *the merging of their essential interests*; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and *to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared*”³. On the military side, and roughly in parallel with the Paris Treaty negotiations, agreement was also reached on the establishment of a “hard security” European Defence Community with a common European army. This was torpedoed by the French National Assembly’s negative vote. It was a step too far.

Yet the soft security approach was still alive. Economic deprivation had led in the inter-war period to extreme nationalism, populist dictatorships, and war. It was no surprise, therefore, that the six states decided next to

merge their interests over a much wider range of economic activities in order to “ensure the development of their prosperity in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations ... thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty”⁴. Again progress was achieved by the use of soft security measures to avoid a resurgence of armed conflict between the ex-combatants in western Europe.

The military dimension

Already in 1948, preliminary moves towards establishing a European security structure had been agreed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries in the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social & Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, later renamed the Western European Union. Its military responsibilities were soon to be incorporated within NATO⁵ as part of the Atlantic Alliance’s defensive bulwark against Soviet expansion. But by 1992, and against the background of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Community grew increasingly aware that its economic success brought with it other responsibilities which it was ill-equipped to handle. The Maastricht reforms of that year therefore endowed the Union some limited competence in the field of Foreign & Security Policy and at the same time declared the Western European Union (WEU) to be “an integral part of the development of the Union”⁶ whose task would be to organise and plan military activities with the stated objective to “preserve peace, and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, ... to promote international cooperation, [and] to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”⁷. Despite these worthy aims, peace in ex-Yugoslavia was only achieved under American leadership.

Nevertheless, the WEU Council of Ministers did succeed in agreeing the basic rules which should govern EU security policy,

namely that troops would be deployed only for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. These so-called Petersberg principles of 1992 were incorporated into later EU treaties⁸ and have been respected. At the time of writing, for example, the EU has six thousand peace-keeping troops in Bosnia. Police missions have also been undertaken in Macedonia and Kinshasa (Congo), with ‘rule of law’ missions to Georgia, Iraq, and Aceh (Indonesia). EU representatives have also participated in negotiations for a coordinating office for Palestine Police Support. A paper entitled *European Security Strategy* (December 2003) gives the general policy outlines.

Deployment of armed forces is not without its critics. One commentator has pointed out that the EU’s acquisition of “deployable military and civilian capabilities for crisis management operations has been frustratingly slow”⁹. Others feel that an emphasis on military means “will push Europe away from the moral high ground” and that reliance on civilian rather than military power distinguishes the EU from NATO and the US¹⁰. The Commission publishes Country Strategy Papers relating to those areas where help is deemed necessary, but the final decision to act lies solely with the Council – that is, with member states’ governments – voting by unanimity, although a state may opt to abstain without blocking common action by the other members. The European Parliament has no say in the decision. Despite all the fine rhetoric there is a clear absence of EU-level democratic control over security policy.

Nor does the EU have its own army. For its operations, often conducted in collaboration with NATO and/or the United Nations, the necessary military units must be supplied by those member states willing and able to take part. Eurocorps, which might one day form the nucleus of a future EU army, is

described on its website as “A force for the EU and NATO” and includes participants from Turkey and Canada as well as EU countries. Europe’s defence against external aggression still rests with NATO, but that body – highly sophisticated and successful though it is – now undertakes “out of area” operations, such as in Afghanistan, with which the EU might not always collectively agree.

Nineteen EU member states are also members of NATO and, with the Union’s increased economic and political influence in the world, a more reasonable balance between Europe and North America, with possibly a revision of the present treaty arrangements, might be expected. Yet to strengthen Europe’s voice requires a greater willingness among its member states to respect their existing EU treaty commitment to coordinate their foreign policy and work more coherently together in international organisations such as NATO and the United Nations¹¹.

The internal threat

Since the end of the cold war the main threat comes not from uniformed armies but from international terrorism. This poses a double-headed danger – “double-headed” because the security measures now being hastily introduced are potentially more damaging to democracy than the terrorist attacks in themselves. EU-level agreements under the so-called Pillar Three provisions are strictly inter-governmental with no parliamentary input even where they directly affect individual rights and freedoms. For example, the security services’ proposals for the long-term storage of all emails, details of telephone calls, access to bank accounts and credit card dealings could lead – from the best of motives – to a more thoroughly effective police state than ever before, thereby undermining the principles on which the European project is based and constituting a breach of the EU’s commitments on human rights.

Soft security

It is time the EU returned to the fundamental principles upon which the European project was founded. Our continent’s devastating experience of the ravages of war, most recently repeated in the Balkan conflicts, should have taught us the need to identify the underlying problems and take steps to deal with them before they become too acute. Better control of the arms trade must be the first soft security policy to be put into place. The Draft Constitutional Treaty provided for an improvement in “military capabilities” and the establishment of a European Defence Agency to strengthen “the industrial and technological base of the defence sector”¹², yet it dodged the question of how the arms trade feeds conflict elsewhere in the world. While a Commission communication *On Conflict Prevention*¹³ emphasizes the need to control the supply of small arms and an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export is in place, EU companies and governments are nevertheless busily competing for contracts to sell everything from pistols to missiles and military aircraft.

Armed forces may provide a defence against aggression and protection against disorder, but the lessons of our own history show that the roots of peace lie deeper. Our philosophy should be to use EU expertise, investment, technical facilities and resources to combat such known sources of conflict as 3rd world poverty, malnutrition, and the spread of communicable diseases, as well as to promote education and training in the skills necessary for modern democracies to function effectively and – to put it bluntly – to survive. Only by the establishment of stable societies and improved living standards can the problems of population flows and human trafficking be solved.

Without waiting for the USA, the EU should also have the confidence to take a lead in applying the Kyoto Protocol provisions aimed at halving CO₂ emissions and should

assist 3rd world countries to make use of the technologies required for sustainable development. By such positive action the EU would demonstrate that it is not simply the world's largest trading bloc but also a political union made up of countries and peoples who have voluntarily put centuries of internecine warfare behind them in order to build a future

based on the principles of peace, justice and respect for human rights. The EU's own internal development – namely, of a common institutional framework within which to work out solutions to any tensions which may occasionally occur between its member states – offers a suitable blueprint for conflict resolution elsewhere.

¹ Congress of Europe 1948, Economic & Social Resolution

² See for example *An Essay towards the present & Future Peace of Europe* by the British Quaker William Penn, first published in 1693

³ Preamble, Treaty establishing the European Coal & Steel Community, Paris 1951. My italics

⁴ Preamble, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957

⁵ See *NATO Handbook*, Chapter 15; also Willem van Eekelen: *Debating European Security*, 1998

⁶ Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.4. See also The Declaration of Western European Union attached to this Treaty

⁷ Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1

⁸ See, for example, Title V, Article 17-3 of the post-Nice Consolidated TEU

⁹ "The Strategic Culture of the European Union," *International Affairs*, July 2005

¹⁰ *op.cit.* pages 801-2

¹¹ See Title V, Article 19 of the post-Nice Consolidated TEU

¹² Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-41

¹³ COM(2001) 211 final

Alliance with Europe: A Strategic Stake for the Future of Russia

Olga Michelot

Twenty years ago, relations and co-operation in sensitive fields like defense or security could not have been possible between Russia and Europe, who were then adversaries in a climate of cold war. The concepts of security and defense are coupled, because of the new world situation and the increase of terrorism. Previously, any attack against a country would have called for a response of the same level, but nowadays the troubled context obliges to reconsider the logics of defense and security and to adapt oneself (like, for example, the preventive war launched by the United States against Iraq). The world context has changed, and that collaboration is not only possible, but can appear, under many aspects, necessary.

Today, collaboration between the European Union and Russia is above all economic. The collaboration agreements in the field of defense are not possible without such economic cooperation. Even if the economic issues are at the center of the Agreement of partnership and co-operation, the importance of the relations between Russia and the European Union goes well beyond this field. Russia feels this cooperation to be a very important stake: it is a question of finding adequate ways and means to restore its credibility as a super-power on the international scene, blurred since the fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, military collaboration on defense should be a pillar of the partnership between the two parties, as well as economic collaboration. The EU did not work out, until now, a true strategy with the Russians.

Common crisis management

For Russia, a co-operation with the European Union is potentially good for the reinforcement of peace in Europe. However, it is only in March 1995 that the Permanent Council of the Western European Union (WEU), the security and defense alliance involving states throughout Europe, made the decision to establish a dialogue with Russia (and also Ukraine). It was underlined that these contacts with Russia should contribute to the development of a dialogue with the WEU and to exchanges of information on questions of common interest. To make these relations go further, consultations between the permanent Representative of the country having the presidency of the WEU, the Secretary-general of the WEU and the Russian Ambassador in Brussels take place regularly. The Declaration of Petersberg, on June 19, 1992, constitutes a central element in the will to develop the WEU as a component of the European Union's defense, and as a means to reinforce the European side of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO). The Member States of the WEU say they are ready to allow the WEU to use military units (coming from all the range of their conventional forces) for missions conducted under the EU authority. The various types of military missions under EU responsibility were defined as follows: in addition to a contribution to the common defense within the framework of the application of article 5 of the Treaty of Washington and article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels, the military units of the

Member States of the EU can be used for humanitarian missions or evacuations, peacekeeping, and crisis management missions, including operations for restoring peace. The declaration of Petersberg also states that the EU is ready to support, individually and in accordance with its own procedures, the effective implementation of measures of prevention of conflicts and crisis management, especially peacekeeping activities of the CSCE (now SOEC) or of the Security Council of the United Nations. Since 1996, the Russia-EU co-operation has been under discussion. It is in 1997, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, that the missions of the Union have been defined: they are called the "Petersberg missions". For these missions, it is only the EU as such that is to deal with the co-operation of Russia, and not another structure or another European institution. The Russian position on its relationship with the political and military institutions of the West is to require the transformation of those institutions in structures intended to achieve mainly political tasks and peacekeeping operations within the framework of a new "Pan-European" security system. The military structures of the EU, unlike those of NATO, answer this criterion perfectly. According to Russian experts, "from the point of view of Russia, the relative weakness of the military component of the EU is conditioning its interest, more than the one expressed by NATO, in using third party countries, including Russia, to achieve the "Petersberg tasks"". From a practical point of view, Russians were admitted as observers at military operations (Crisex-98) in 1998, during which, for the first time, the crisis management conceptions of the EU were exposed to the Russian military. Russia's participation in the "Petersberg missions" can be considered in various forms:

- within the framework of the concept of Multinational Groups of Forces, i.e. with a participation of Russia in operations under

the "political control and the strategic direction" of the WEU;

- in operations under the aegis of the WEU as an autonomous organization, or under the direction of one of its Member States.

The co-operation within the ESDP during crises was discussed during the summit between Russia and the European Union held in Brussels on October 3, 2001. Both parties agreed to use all means to intensify their concrete co-operation and give it an operational character within the framework of the ESDP. We must add that, two years later, agreements were signed between NATO and the European Union, as decided during the European Council of Copenhagen, on December 12-13, 2003. These agreements, called "Berlin+", authorize the NATO allies to take part in the ESDP, showing its willingness of opening and collaborating. The European Union needs Russia and a political support by Russia for the ESDP, and a credible quick-deployment force is essential, or at least that would strengthen the European Union in its actions, in particular if the operations should be carried out under the mandate of the UN Security Council. Differences in opinion between Europeans and Russians do exist however, on crisis management and the use of force. From an operational point of view, in case of crisis, dialogue and consultations between the European Union and Russia would be intensified in the period before the Security Council's decision. This intensification of the consultations will allow exchanges of information on the evolution of the situation and on the positions of the European Union and Russia. As soon as the plan of operations is approved, Russia could be invited to take part in the operation. Russia then would communicate to the European Union a first indication of its contribution, which is further specified in exchanges with the commander of the operation. In an operation requiring NATO resources, Russia

could be involved in the planning according to procedures determined within NATO. In the case of an autonomous operation in which Russia will be invited to take part, it will set up a liaison officer at the EU's strategic headquarters. This will allow exchange of information on planning and contributions to the operation.

A technological collaboration

Within the framework of bilateral contacts, results have been obtained in the technological field since the end of last century, between the WEU and Russia. First of all, a contract between "Rosvooroujenii", a Russian enterprise, and the WEU Satellite Center for the provision of satellite images. In addition to archive files, Rosvooroujenii provided the WEU with satellite images "on request". The WEU studied the possibility to acquire satellite images from the State center "Priroda" (a federal service for geodesy and cartography), as well as from the «*Sofinformspoutnik*» association.

We can also mention the co-operation between Russia and the EU in the development of military equipment. In 1998, the first contacts were established with the Armaments Group of the Western European Union, under the control of the EU. In July 1998, General Schlieper, President of the WEU group, met in Moscow with the Head of Armaments, Gen. Sitnov, at the Russian ministry of Defense.

Russia let know that it was ready, in theory, to examine the question of a collaboration with the Armaments Group, and in the long term with the WEU, in the sphere of armaments and military equipment. Russia reaffirmed that it was not only ready to cooperate with the Armaments Group on a multilateral basis, but that it had also the intention to continue to work in common to produce armaments and military equipment on a bilateral basis (with Germany, Italy, France, etc). The position of the Armaments Group was that they should urgently start a preparatory work on lawful and legal bases to start working together. The co-operation for building a trainer airplane, the MIG AT, was set up in the last years. This plane, built by the MIG engineering department in Russia, will receive French engines, built by Snecma, and a cockpit instrument panel made in Europe by Thalès. Another example is the Mi-24 combat helicopter, which will undergo a modernization cycle, the result of a common work between Russia and Europe.

The Russian answer to the American propositions to develop anti-missile (non-intercontinental) systems highlighted another continental representation of security based on three poles: American, European and Russian. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed not only to Washington but also to the European Union, to build a common system. But this did not go further, yet.

Prosperity for All People A South African Perspective

Neels C.G. Kilian

Democracy is a requirement for federalism; it is not merely a means or medium for free expression, it colors the content and meaning of free expression. On the other hand, democracy is the preamble of a workable constitution as an instrument to give effect to liberty, justice, dignity and prosperity for all people. The people, therefore, defines the legal context of what is to be perceived as liberty, justice, dignity and prosperity. To appreciate the latter more clearly, we must first set the political scene of South Africa.

When South Africa developed into a union in 1910, it had Dutch (Afrikaans) and English as the two official languages, with equal status. These two languages as the only official languages of South Africa were constitutionally protected until 1993, when the era of a multicultural society was introduced by the creators of the new constitution of South Africa. For the first time in South Africa's history, constitutional recognition was given to cultures other than Dutch and English. A very significant part of the new constitution was the introduction of a set of principles that were aimed at developing the nine "new" cultures to the same status that the two official languages enjoyed prior to the 1993 constitution.

The product of disregarding other languages prior to 1993 can be found in the statistical evidence of political violence, political unrest, illiteracy, poverty and racism. In order to balance the scale of past injustices, the constitution states that every person shall have the right to education and equal

access to educational institutions. Needless to say, the new constitution places a heavy burden upon tertiary institutions to admit prospective students from disadvantaged backgrounds, as to uphold the constitutional spirit. Strangely enough, the admission requirements for entering any South African university could themselves be seen as a form of discrimination that prevents a person from achieving his full potential in life.

Prior to 1993, no specific constitutional provision concerning economic rights existed in South Africa. All that was required to participate in the economy was the willingness to be an entrepreneur. This by itself sounds simple, but in reality was difficult to achieve, due to cultural barriers. For example, traditionally the number of children per family and the number of cattle per family determines the economic wellbeing of a family within an African context. The new constitution regulates economic rights in more detail by providing that every person shall have the right to participate in the South African economy. This regulation is not a realistic approach to balance the past scales of capitalism in South Africa and therefore the legislator created additional law to narrow the cultural gap that exists in South Africa. A fine example is Black Affirmative Action and Black Empowerment. Due to clever constitutional inventions, these legislations do not constitute racial discrimination. More difficult to comprehend is the fact that these legislations have a perpetual character and are not bound by a time period whereby the scales of capitalism

must be balanced. Somehow the effectiveness of these legislations is questionable, since there are less than 5 million Europeans in a country that is home to nearly 45 million people. Can one presume that these legislations are the result of irrational and/or abusive governmental power? Although this is an ordinary question, the answer to this question is quite surprising and would be even more surprising for outsiders. To appreciate the answer it's important to consider the negotiation process prior to the 1993 constitution.

During the governmental transition period the previous government negotiated on the principles of federalism as a future form of governance. The government suggested that absolute protection of minority rights, protection of power sharing and protection of economic interdependence must be part of the new South Africa. This suggestion resembles the philosophy behind the African Freedom Charter. This Charter states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it. Why then was the negotiation process a failure? Black intellectuals argued

that by recognizing different cultures, the black population would only experience a psychological liberation. In other words, federalism would only wake-up the black culture in an artificial or static manner and immobilize blacks in the face of the economically "superior" European culture that exists in South Africa. There are some problems with the latter. Firstly, the differences in culture are not a sign of superiority, and the purpose of the constitution is simply to recognize different cultures equally. Should equality be given a twisted meaning, as to imply "superiority", then the government could rate the black culture higher than economic efficiency and this would ultimately exclude South Africa as a partaker in globalization. There are ample examples in Africa where economic efficiency was ignored. A recent example is Zimbabwe with its land distribution process. This process is characterized as a shameless, naked, self-interested, uneconomic activity which is a brutal governmental display of vigor. If principles of democracy are being abused by a government, it indicates a sure economic failure for the country overall.

Peace Prizewinning Embezzler

Harold S. Bidmead

Opinions differ widely on international so-called law. It should perhaps be termed *folklore*, being mostly myth. It derives from no legislature and its enforcement seldom seems to serve justice. According to one interpretation, a sovereign state is the only entity legally entitled to employ war as an instrument of policy and to manufacture, buy and/or sell armaments, weapons of mass destruction.

So-called statesmen such as President Bush and Prime Minister Blair are among those who profess to believe that the creation of yet another sovereign state in the Middle East will result in peace for the entire region, even if the government of the newcomer contains Hamas and other terrorist elements. Might it not instead result in the worst explosion that has ever occurred in that region?

In the eyes of the Palestinians, Arafat was a hero. Human beings will believe anything, provided it is repeated often enough. To Arafat it was poetic justice that his share of the Nobel Peace Prize should be used to finance suicidal terror. After all, the money came from dynamite in the first place.

When will the world realize that the primary cause of war is national sovereignty? Even some self-styled statesmen appear to be unaware of the true meaning of the term. A popular definition might be "*the claim to act as judge and jury in one's own case*". Those who accept this definition, which would also explain civil war, will admit that it is the primary cause of war, overriding such secondary causes as

poverty, greed, totalitarianism, social injustice, armament, kings and the like.

By definition, the cure for international anarchy is international government. An international government ought to derive its authority from the governed – its citizens. Law cannot be enforced without violence unless it acts directly on individuals. The failure of all leagues throughout history (e.g. the UN) has proved the truth of this essential element of democracy. The laws should therefore act directly on the citizens. The parliament must therefore be directly elected by the citizens.

The ideal is a federal system whereby the powers of government are explicitly restricted to international affairs only, *all other powers being left with the national parliaments and citizens where they already rest*. Such a union should be open to all other nations able and willing to meet the democratic requirements of its Constitution. This last proviso, though not an essential element of federalism, is the key to world peace.

That anarchy is cured by government is of course a truism, obvious especially to classical scholars who realize that *anarcos* means 'absence of a head'. ("Government is the only alternative to solution by combat that mankind has discovered". W.B. Curry, *The Case for Federal Union*). The federalist element is the only rational, logical and practical solution to the problem of international government. It is surprising that more professing democrats do not accept it, since it represents the extension of democracy across national frontiers.

Union Bonds to Relaunch the Lisbon Strategy

Christian de Boissieu, Alfonso Iozzo, Alberto Majocchi, Giorgio Ruffolo

The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referendums have made the ratification process of the European Constitutional Treaty very difficult for two clear reasons: firstly, the no votes prevailed in two of the founding countries of the European Community, particularly in France, and it is well known that without France there can be no further development in the European integration process; secondly, the no votes strongly point out (in Holland nearly two-thirds of the voters opposed the ratification) a great disappointment with the results of EU performance, particularly after the start of the monetary Union. From here we probably need to start again, if we want to relaunch the integration process on a federal basis, which is still essential if Europe wants to be able to play an active role in the promotion of peace and prosperity worldwide. On the other hand, the figures show that the euro generates more employment than the dollar: inhabitants being approximately equal, the number of employees from 2000 to 2004 increased by more than 4 million in the euro area, and by 2.3 million in the US. It is nonetheless clear that the economic performance has been particularly disappointing in recent years.

In Europe it is widely held that, in the current phase of moderate but prolonged stagnation, a coordinated investment plan should be promoted to close the infrastructural gap existing in many EU countries stemming from the restrictive policies necessary to respect first the Maastricht parameters and then the Stability and Growth Pact obligations; moreover an expenditure plan must be

undertaken in order to strengthen European productivity competitiveness on the basis of the decisions made by the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000.

This plan should roughly consist of:

- a) investments to complete the European network in the telecommunications, energy and transport sectors, taking into account the connection needs related to enlargement;
- b) a plan of research and development and higher education expenditure, to strengthen the competitiveness of European production;
- c) public and private investments in advanced technologies and to foster the creation of European champions in key sectors;
- d) the financing of a series of projects to improve the living standards of EU citizens (sustainable mobility, water purification, renewable energy, new clean energy sources, etc.);
- e) investments to ensure the preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage and natural resources.

Such a plan would lead to a strong acceleration towards the achievement of the objectives fixed by the Lisbon Strategy, which so far seems very difficult. This is due to the fact that the national accounts must comply with the Maastricht parameters and, although the recent adjustments to the Stability and Growth Pact allow greater flexibility, they are not able to support a budget expansion to finance the Lisbon Strategy. On the other hand, the European budget is not only limited but also many resources are absorbed in agricultural expenditure, and the disastrous outcome of

the European Council in Brussels has clearly shown that a radical reform of its breakdown is not feasible.

In this situation the only serious way out to implement the Lisbon Strategy is connected to the recourse to a Union bond issue, that is, EU bonds guaranteed by the European budget (and by the national budgets) to finance the Lisbon Agenda. Considering the EU world reputation and the euro's current strength, these bonds could be issued at a low interest rate and would contribute to the strengthening of the European financial market absorbing some liquidity excess actually present, and could support the financing of the European development plan by attracting a large share of the world savings which currently is, without good alternatives, placed in the US market despite the progressive depreciation of the dollar.

The French and Dutch no votes force Europe to make a choice that cannot be postponed: the stop to the ratification process requires a turnaround in the economy to restore trust in the EU to the European citizen; on the other hand, the euro's strength could be exploited to attract external capital in order to support the financing of a European growth plan. *Hic Rhodus, hic salta*: Union bonds could represent the essential tool to implement the Lisbon Strategy and to relaunch growth; if that happened the integration process towards a federal completion could be relaunched. This would mean enforcing the golden rule not at a national level, but at a European level so that the investments needed for the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda can be financed by the issue of Union bonds, while forcing at the same time every Member State to guarantee respect for the Stability and Growth Pact obligations.

Thus the infrastructure investments could be financed by the European Investment Bank in partnership with private investors. In regard to R&D and higher education expenditure, and the other investments envisaged by the Lisbon Agenda to foster European productivity competitiveness and to boost growth, the Member States of the eurozone should appoint a "Minister for Lisbon" charged with first working out and then attending to the implementation of a "Plan for Lisbon", which, after European Council approval, could be co-financed by a "European Agency for Lisbon" by Union bond issues. However, part of the debt would be charged to individual national accounts, as it happens with Structural Funds, whereas the debt burden would be only partially charged to the national accounts as the interest on Union bonds would be covered by the EU budget.

To restart the process leading to overcome definitively the democratic deficit, which would characterise the EU even after the final approval of the Constitutional Treaty, the European economy needs to be boosted through a big bond issue aimed at growth. However, the renewal of the unification process in the political field is also inevitable if we want to proceed towards a multi-polar world, able on the one hand to foster peace exploiting all the available soft power resources of Europe, thus avoiding a further resort to military force, and on the other hand to assure the EU the necessary power to manage the European economy successfully, to plan the growth of those countries where Europe exerts an influence, and to negotiate on the same level with the US and the other regional areas a sustainable world economic growth plan.

Defining the Future of the European Continent

Jo Leinen

In the coming twelve months there is to be a phase of reflection about the future of the European project. Unfortunately, the European Council did not tell us how this reflection phase is to be organised, or what should happen with the results produced by this debate. I see two major dangers: first, by stopping the ratification process, we also risk freezing the debate about the EU constitution. The 'pause' in the ratification process takes the dynamics out of the debate.

The second danger is that the European discourse could be led, once again, top-down and not from the bottom up. The idea launched by the French President Jacques Chirac, to have a special summit to discuss the consequences of the 'No' votes, is symptomatic of the old approach of the European elites. These kind of top-down debates do not correspond to the requirements of European democracy and to the wish of the European demos to be directly involved in European decision-making, which manifested itself so forcefully in the referenda.

A reflection exclusively via or within civil society is equally doubtful. Civil society is fragmented into different interest groups and it does not have a legitimate umbrella organisation which would represent all parts of the population. To me it therefore seems that now the hour of the parliaments has come. The European Parliament and the national parliaments could call a European Congress in the form of parliamentary hearings, to serve as a platform for the grand dialogue about Europe. If the name had not

been used up already by then Convention president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, I would call this a 'Congress of the People'. As a new institution within the EU structure, this was not a good idea. As a new instrument for as broad a public debate as possible, such a body could still be useful.

Parliamentarians are the only directly elected representatives of the citizens at European, national and often regional level. They thus have the task of organising the debate with the citizens about the future of Europe. Similar to the Convention, the European Congress should be an open and transparent forum and should conduct the debate together with the other European institutions, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Centralised events in Brussels are not sufficient, however. In parallel there should be European fora for dialogue with the population at the national and, where possible, at the regional and local level as well. The politicians should first and foremost listen to what the citizens have to say. Also, using modern media like the internet, key questions and key concerns of the people should be discussed.

Among the most important issues for debate are the growth and employment crises in the EU, the pressures on our social standards and social systems from global competition, questions regarding the enlargement and the borders of the EU, problems of transparency and democracy in the decision-making system of the Union and fears of the loss of identity. After the listening phase we need a

phase of synthesis. The European Congress would have the task of producing concrete recommendations as the result of the broad debate. These recommendations should go to all the institutions which are actors in European policymaking, and should lead to concrete action plans in order to promote the European project with more clarity and more decisiveness. Such an open and broadly based debate could help to win back the citizens' confidence in the usefulness and effectiveness of the EU. In a mid-term review in May/June 2006 it would then have to be decided how to proceed with the European constitution. If

there is sufficient support from the European public, ratification should be continued and completed. If the resistance to this project remains, we might have to consider alternatives.

The current crisis is also an opportunity. On few occasions have we had such a good chance to interest large parts of the public in the European issue. There will therefore be no pause in the thinking in the coming months, but rather a call to join the big debate about defining the future of the European continent.



The Ambiguous French 'No' to the European Constitution

Immanuel Wallerstein

On May 29, 2005, the French voted in a referendum not to ratify the proposed European constitution. Three days later, Dutch voters did the same. In both cases, the margin was solid. Since then, the world press has been filled with discussion about the future of Europe as a vision and as an institution. But the consequences of these votes are in fact extremely ambiguous.

Take the French vote. There were three groups which hailed the vote as a victory: the neo-cons in the United States, large segments of the French left (and particularly the alterglobalists), and rightwing Euroskeptics throughout Europe. In the U.S., William Kristol, editor of the leading journal of the neo-cons, the *Weekly Standard*, ended his editorial on "A New Europe?" with "Vive la France." The proponents of the "no" on the French left celebrated in the streets of Paris. And rightwing Euroskeptics were delighted at last to win a round in their efforts to derail Europe.

Could they all have been right? Let us see what they were celebrating. For the U.S. neo-cons, the French "no" (and the Dutch "no") were defeats for arrogant, anti-American European elites, and no doubt particularly for the current prime nemesis of the neo-cons, Jacques Chirac. "This is a moment of hope – for the prospects of a strong pro-American, pro-liberty, more or less free-market and free-trade, socially and morally reinvigorated Europe," said Kristol.

For French alterglobalists, the "no" vote

represented quite the opposite – both a rebuff to Anglosaxon conservative values and a rejection of neoliberalism as a program, as incarnated in the proposed Constitution, and as represented by the members of the European Commission and the bureaucracy in Brussels (and represented for them as well by Chirac's government in France). And for the rightwing Euroskeptics, the vote represented a blow against this same Commission and this same Brussels bureaucracy, which stood in their eyes for imposing socialism on Europe. There was also a strong xenophobic element in the French "no" (and even more in the Dutch "no") – a rejection of the possible future admission of Turkey into the European Union, and an attack on the policies that had admitted so many Moslem immigrants into Europe.

Obviously, as in all referenda, the "no" vote put together very different groups with very different objectives. What seems to have provided the additional "no" votes to previous referenda in France were an increased percentage of Socialist and Green voters who were angry about the state of the economy and fearful of further "globalization" – a view they expressed by defeating the treaty. And what seems to have provided the additional "no" votes in the Netherlands is an upsurge of fears about Muslim immigrants in their country caused by recent very notable acts of violence.

Whatever the explanation of the votes, what are the consequences? The "no" votes mean the definitive end of the proposed

Constitution, since it required unanimous ratification, and there is zero likelihood that France or the Netherlands will have a second vote to undo the first. This does not, of course, mean the end of institutional Europe. The EU is left with the structure it has. The problem is that the existing structure was considered by most people to be inadequate to the needs of an expanded Europe, and the Constitution was supposed to improve the situation by reducing the need for unanimity in a number of areas, and by creating two central posts (a president and a minister of foreign affairs) to increase political solidity. It may be some time before European governments try again to improve the present institutional structures.

Since one of the main problems that led both to the attempt to write a new Constitution and to the rejection of this very Constitution was the expansion of Europe from 15 to 25 members, further expansion may well be on hold. Bulgaria and Romania were scheduled to join the EU in 2007. The chances of Croatia, Macedonia, Ukraine, and of course Turkey to be allowed to join seem even thinner for the moment.

There are those who are quietly happy. One of them is Tony Blair. The French “no” has various positive consequences for him. It saves the United Kingdom from holding its own referendum in 2006 as promised, and therefore a probable public defeat for him. Blair can now contend that he was in favor of the defeated Constitution but that a British referendum is now irrelevant. Furthermore, Blair cannot be unhappy about the rebuff to Chirac (as well as to Schröder in the separate and earlier German regional elections). It is welcome relief from his difficulties at home because of his Iraq policy. Blair may now try to put himself forward as the leader of Europe.

Kristol’s editorial no doubt reflects the mood of the Bush regime. They have been trying for four years to throw a monkey-wrench

into a stronger Europe. The rejection of the Constitution and the confusion that it is causing is the first good news they have had in two years on that front. In the long run, Europe will no doubt continue to pull away from U.S. domination, but Bush at this point is more concerned with the short run, and in the short run the French “no” is definitely helpful to him.

As for the French alterglobalists, what have they gained? They have demonstrated an increased strength within the family of all those left-of-center in France. Indeed, the French Socialist party and the Green party are both in turmoil as a result of the vote. There may be important realignments and it is not at all sure that the French rainbow coalition of the left can reconstitute itself in a way that will enable it to win the 2007 presidential elections, especially if the center-right coalition manages to get its act together better than the center-left coalition.

Have the alterglobalists made a major impact on the struggle against neoliberalism in the world-economy? They were already doing well due to the rise of protectionist sentiment throughout the countries of the North (North America, western Europe, east Asia). The vote in France is a reflection of this. But will this vote accelerate the movement? That depends on two things. One is whether the alterglobalists can separate in the popular mind the fight against neoliberalism from the xenophobic, anti-Islamic sentiments that are overtaking much of Europe. And the second is the degree to which the position of the Bush regime continues to erode in the geopolitical arena, and it is therefore unable to capitalize on the setback to European political integration.

Many people in Europe are saying that now is the moment to “start over” in the whole exercise of European unity. The problem from the beginning has been that a more social Europe is not possible unless it is a more

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federal Europe. But significant segments of the European left (and not only the left in France) have always been afraid that a more federal Europe meant an undermining of the social achievements in their own country. Until the European left is ready to test its strength and fight its fight within a more federal European

structure, it is going to go from confused referendum to confused referendum, find itself weakened internally in the struggle to maintain national social achievements, and find Europe unable to play the world geopolitical role vis-à-vis the United States that the European left wishes it to play.

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm>, Commentary No. 163, June 15, 2005

European Lessons

Fernando Iglesias

Following the French-Dutch “NO”, a cascade of statements on the future of the European Union invaded the global infosphere. Their common denominator was superficiality. According to the unappealing nationalist interpretations, the French-Dutch “NO” meant the inevitable failure of the European Constitution, if not the reversal of the EU’s expansion to 25 members and even the end of the Euro. One commentator claimed, with undisguised glee, that the debacle demonstrated the impossibility of constructing supranational political institutions, and perhaps even the end of globalisation and a welcome return to the old, great and revered nation-state.

Such apocalyptic viewpoints ignore the realities of the EU-building process. The obstacles posed by French nationalism are in line with the general tradition dating at least from 1954 when the French Assembly rejected the creation of a common European foreign policy and a European Army. Since then the European project has continued to advance despite, for example, De Gaulle’s negative attitude to British integration and the “empty chair” crisis which put the whole process in jeopardy. Nevertheless, none of the many French nationalistic hesitations led to the dissolution of the European project nor to the French withdrawing from it.

The day after the French referendum, the main Argentine “leftist” newspaper chose Jean Marie Le Pen’s “*Non, merci*” as its main front page headline. This was no mere coincidence. The fact that during the last decade Europe has achieved continent-wide economic unity, created the first supranational currency, enlarged to 25 member states and, moreover, reached these amazing

goals in a completely peaceful way is, according to some typically Argentine nationalist logic, clear evidence of failure. On the other hand, the fact that Argentina experienced more than six bloody and tyrannical decades after its Declaration of Independence (1816) before becoming a truly national state (about 1882), is regarded as a fantastic achievement. Perhaps, too, they might consider that Latin-American unity, proclaimed by Simón Bolívar even before Argentine independence, has now become, some two centuries later, a mere ghost of an inter-governmental agreement with no credible chance of ever being realised. The fact that it is already in the hands of former Argentine president Eduardo Duhalde (whose fame is all but clear) is maybe a singular demonstration of Latin-Americas’ deep yearning for a continental “Patria Grande” homeland.

Despite their rare rejoicing over the *possible* failure of the first attempts to agree a European Constitution, recent reports from the Old Continent referred to more than the French-Dutch “NO” and the Anglo-French polemic on the budget. They also spoke of the opening of the first “serious negotiations on the multinational fusion of big banks, started by the first Italian bank and the German second one”, according to “The Economist”. Though unnecessary, this move confirms that, even in trans-national Europe, economic agents know how to profit from the opportunities that globalisation of technological human powers can offer, whereas on the other hand politicians, parties and governments continue to be tied to the heavy yoke of the nation-state. How this can really be good news for those who consider themselves

supporters of Democracy and Equality is hard to understand.

The French-Dutch “NO” demonstrates that the lessons of the nineties have still to be learned. The global apogee of so-called “neoliberalism” cannot be ideologically understood and explained, it being based on the asymmetry between a global economy and a national/international polity, with the resultant failure of redistributive-expansive Keynesian schemes when applied on a national scale. The current world order, a rare mixture of chaos and tyranny, is not just “*neolib*” but also “*neocon*”. By that I mean it is not just economically neoliberal-globalist but also politically neoconservative-nationalist. That is, it is not based on “Globalisation of the Economy” so much as on “Globalisation of Economy without Globalisation of Politics” with the resultant imbalance between Markets and Citizenship, and Capitalism and Democracy.

As if the example of “Neoliberal” icons such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were not enough, George W. Bush has chosen to preserve the current *status quo* by confining democracy to the national level and managing global affairs accordingly. That is why the rejection of the Kyoto protocols, the International Criminal Court and public scorn for the UN or other embryonic forms of supranational power is as intrinsic a part of the current Republican administration policy as its ‘fight-to-the-death’ support of American national sovereignty and the “pre-emptive” invasion to Iraq.

The *chic progrès* girls of the French and Dutch “left” who shared in the celebrations of the “NO” vote with guys like Bossi and Le Pen should ask their grandparents how life in Europe was before the advent of the EU, when nation-states reigned as complete sovereigns over the ruins of war. If they were to study the true history of Europe in the 20th century instead of being “informed” by *Le Monde Diplomatique’s* soft-Leninism, they would realise that turning their backs on an incipiently globalised world in favour

of one based on national protectionism and autarchy would be to take a course similar to that followed during the emblematic year of 1913, which had very much the same motives as those proclaimed by the current “NO” campaigners. That *annus terribilis* for Europe and the world was followed by two world wars, totalitarian regimes, and the worst genocide ever committed by humanity. It is also worth remembering that the rise of Fascism and Nazism and the advent of the most destructive war in history followed the failure of the first concrete attempts to create a European Union, negated by French and German nationalism.

Now, as then, the choice for Europe and the world is between democratic unity or Fascism. Indeed, Europe’s real problem is not its exaggerated size, as nationalists claim, but its smallness of scale when compared with the reach of global capitalism. Continent-wide policies aimed at keeping the European welfare state intact in the global world economy, into which the nations of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) have erupted, are too ambitious and utopian. For an honest European Left the question is not a matter of rejecting Polish plumbers and workers from Senegal, as Bossi, Le Pen and Haider propose and French-Dutch citizens approve. An honest European Left must recognise that defending European welfare standards by extending labour and ecological regulations to the East and the South will only be possible if democratic institutions can be raised to continental and global levels.

Compared to the *absence* of any concrete attempt to replace the elitist Global Governance, imposed by the UN Security Council, the WTO and the IMF, with a worldwide democratic representative system, at least the European Constitution was a valuable initiative towards building a continental democratic political unity. It was almost destroyed by the referendums, and the fact that certain declared “leftists” are celebrating

this failure is overwhelmingly worrying.

Nevertheless, the EU is far from suffering a *debacle*. The French-Dutch “NO” has not put continental unity at risk, for the building procedure started since 1950 is still valid. It is based upon sovereign national decisions made by national executive powers, and not upon the power of the European Parliament, whose tasks are still more “consultative” than “legislative”, with the only meaningful exception being in the economic sphere.

The so-called “European crisis” is a crisis of *confederate* Europe, dependent on unanimous decisions by the nation states, even when agreeing the draft Constitution. It is the lack of a truly *federal* Europe based on continental parliamentary democracy which has brought about the European crisis. The elitist methods of the current confederate Europe discourage large scale and open participation in the EU-building process, thus causing Europe’s citizens to lose interest in continental polls or leading them to participate on the basis of purely national criteria. As the Constitution was unanimously approved by the member states’ governments, this nationalistic approach in the polls was a manifest contradiction.

The results of such a contradiction are now easy to notice. The Europe of Nations (and not a Europe of Citizens) has now been defeated by its own national referendums after having proved unable to agree on a simultaneous, unified continental referendum. Was this the fault of its conservative leaders, who, since Churchill, De Gaulle, Monnet, De Gasperi and Adenauer, contributed to create the unity of our continent? Or was it rather the result of the weakness and blindness of Leftist forces in Europe, which have often been absent from the unification process or else reduced to minority expressions (among which the European Federalist Movement led

by Altiero Spinelli has been the more heroic and moving example) when not in the camp of its most convinced opponents?

If the nineties were years of economic unification, the current decade in Europe has to face the challenge of political unity. Its basic creed should not be to accept a half-way house but to promote authentic federalism, both parliamentary and republican. The European Left must find its *raison d’être* through this project, and not as part of the assorted carnival in which it nowadays walks side by side with Neofascists. The only consequential democratic and leftist strategy for achieving European unity is to fight to overcome nationalist deviations which have led to unfair agricultural subsidies, the current apartheid policy aimed at poor immigrants, and the failure of constitutional projects to promote the globalisation of democracy.

The 21st Century world will be faced with the same global choices that defined the 20th century Europe: namely. authoritarian nationalism or supranational democracy. Each and every political polarity is reconfigured by the emergence of globalisation. The narrow margins offered to national institutions by global capitalism dissolve the previously clear distinction between national Left and Right; and, on the global scale, this tension becomes sharper than ever before, splitting political forces between those working for the construction of a democratic, federalist and pacifist global order and those upholding an authoritarian, elitist and belligerent polity.

The political battle for Europe – cradle of nations and now the first to experience their inevitable sunset – is decisive. Whether the democratic forces are victorious or defeated, the consequences will inevitably affect the future of the world’s citizens here, there and everywhere.

A Proposal for Re-launching the European Constitutional Process

Andrew Duff & Johannes Voggenhuber

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Treaty of Nice,
- having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
- having regard to its resolution of 12 January 2005¹ on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
- having regard to the Declaration by the Heads of State or Government on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Council, 16-17 June 2005,
- having regard to the opinions delivered by the Committee of the Regions on ... and the European Economic and Social Committee on ... at the request of the European Parliament,
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and the Committee on Petitions (A6-0000/2005),

Whereas

A. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the twenty-five Member

States of the European Union on 29 October 2004,

B. The Constitution was drafted by the European Convention which achieved new levels of openness, pluralism and democratic legitimacy,

C. The European Parliament endorsed the Constitution by a majority of over two-thirds as "a good compromise and a vast improvement on the existing treaties ... [which] will provide a stable and lasting framework for the future development of the European Union that will allow for further enlargement while providing mechanisms for its revision when needed"²,

D. Fourteen Member States, representing a majority of the population of the Union, have since ratified the Constitution according to their own constitutional requirements³,

E. France and the Netherlands, following referendums held on 29 May and 1 June respectively, have failed to ratify the Constitution – with the result that the ratification process has subsequently stalled in most of the remaining nine Member States,

F. Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Constitution will not enter into force unless and until it is ratified by all Member States,

G. It is necessary to respect the verdict of those Member States and their peoples which have ratified the Constitution as well as those which have not,

H. The No votes appear to have been rather more an expression of dissent at the present state of the Union than a specific objection to the constitutional reforms, but that, paradoxically, the result of the Noes is to maintain the status quo and block reform,

I. The European Council in June decided on a

“period of reflection ... to enable a broad debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties”; the heads of government agreed that in the first half of 2006 they would “make an overall assessment of the national debates and agree how to proceed”⁴,
 J. The heads of government declared that the ratification process could continue, although they also agreed that the original timetable for the entry into force of the Constitution (1 November 2006) would be extended,
 K. The European Council, however, failed to give a clear focus to the period of reflection or to define methods, and has since been seen to lack both the political will and the capacity to stimulate and manage the European dialogue,
 L. The European Commission is preparing to re-launch its communications policy without, however, giving a decisive political lead to a campaign to save the Constitution,
 M. The national parliaments have declared their support for a series of joint parliamentary meetings that will ‘stimulate, steer and synthesize’ the European dialogue⁵,
 N. There is in theory a number of options available to the Union – ranging from abandoning the constitutional project, seeking to continue with the present text, or embarking upon a complete re-write; a clear majority of French and Dutch voters seem to be in favour of a modification of the text⁶,

1. Confirms its commitment to reaching without undue delay a constitutional settlement of the future of Europe which strengthens parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, anchors fundamental rights, and enhances the capacity of the Union to act effectively at home and abroad; fears that without such a constitutional settlement it will not be possible for the Union to expect the loyalty of its citizens, to maintain the momentum of integration or to become a respectable partner in world affairs;
 2. Recalls that the political problems and institutional weaknesses that the Convention was set up to address will persist – and, indeed,

grow – unless and until there is a good settlement along the lines of the proposed Constitution;
 3. Acknowledges that the ratification of the Constitution has now encountered insurmountable difficulties;
 4. Rejects the establishment of core groups of certain Member States bound together by size or wealth; recalls that the Treaty of Nice does not facilitate enhanced cooperation between integrationist minded Member States across the whole range of policy; deplores any suggestion that coalitions of certain states could be formed outside the EU system;
 5. Warns that a strategy based on the selective implementation of the Constitution risks destroying the consensus between the institutions and among Member States, thereby aggravating the crisis of confidence; supports exclusively, therefore, certain democratic reforms that could be introduced by revision of rules of procedure or inter-institutional agreement – such as transparency of law making in the Council of Ministers, introduction of a form of citizens’ initiative, improvements to the comitology procedure, and the more rigorous scrutiny by Member State parliaments of EU affairs;
 6. Proposes to use the current period of reflection to re-launch the constitutional project on the basis of a large public debate about the future of European integration; resolves that this European dialogue should clarify, deepen and democratise the consensus around the Constitution and address criticisms and find solutions where expectations have not been met;
 7. Welcomes the beginnings of a fresh debate about the Union’s policy direction but stresses that this must take place within the context of overcoming the constitutional crisis, and that policy prescriptions at EU level must relate directly to the rules, powers and procedures of the EU institutions as well as to the competences conferred on the EU by the Member States;
 8. Insists that the dialogue should be conducted and coordinated across the Union, structured by common themes and in realistic stages according

to an agreed framework for evaluation, and designed to lead to decisive political choices;

9. Warns that uncoordinated, narrowly focussed national debates will serve only to harden national stereotypes and accentuate divisions; and an imposed dialogue without political goals will be nebulous, even vacuous, thereby giving rise to public cynicism;

10. Proposes that a series of conferences between European and national parliamentarians – ‘Parliamentary Forums’ – should be organised in order to stimulate the debate and to shape, step by step, the necessary political conclusions;

11. Recognises the critical importance for the Parliament of avoiding a second failure of the constitutional project; commits itself therefore to playing a leading role in the European dialogue, in particular by publishing ‘European Papers’ on each of the big issues facing the Union which may be used as a common European template for the national debates and which should be used as the basis for the deliberations of the Parliamentary Forums;

12. Proposes that the first Parliamentary Forum be convened in the spring of 2006, in advance of the June meeting of the European Council, in order to hear reports from the French and Dutch parliaments about the negative referendum results and to discuss, on the basis of this Resolution, the structure of the European dialogue; the aim of this Forum is to make comprehensive recommendations to the European Council about how the Union should proceed to find the way out of the crisis;

13. Proposes that the outset of the European dialogue should analyse where the original consensus enshrined in the Constitution holds good and where the controversial questions lie;

14. Proposes to organise other Parliamentary Forums to address four priority questions about the future of Europe, as follows:

- (i) what is the goal of European integration?
- (ii) what role should Europe have in the world?
- (iii) in the light of globalisation, what is the future of the European social and economic model?

(iv) how do we define the boundaries of the European Union?

15. Believes that a rich debate on these fundamental issues will open up new perspectives for European integration and prepare the ground for reform of the common policies in those areas where dissension exists;

16. Believes, moreover, that the European dialogue will only overcome the constitutional crisis if it engages not only each EU institution but also state and regional parliaments, local government, political parties, social partners, civil society and the academic community; puts particular value in this regard upon practical contributions from the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions;

17. Requests Member States to organise a large number of public meetings and media debates on the future of Europe – ‘Citizens’ Forums’ – at national, regional and local level, structured along the commonly agreed themes, with the assistance of the Commission; urges the social partners and civil society organisations to get engaged in these debates;

18. Expects political parties to give much more prominence to the European dimension in both their internal debates and electoral campaigning;

19. Would welcome citizens’ petitions that contribute to shaping the debate;

20. Urges the Commission and Council to give a greater priority to EU cultural and educational policy, and reiterates its budgetary proposal for increased funding of the PRINCE programme;

21. Suggests that the conclusions of the period of reflection should be drawn in the second half of 2007 according to the criteria set out in paragraph 1, and that a clear decision is reached at that stage about whether improvements to the Constitution are needed and, if so, how they should be undertaken;

22. Insists that if the outcome of the European dialogue demonstrates that the text of the Constitution has to be modified in order to renew consensus and facilitate ratification, the negotiation should treat the 2004 Constitution

as a good first draft, seeking to maintain the key reforms that will improve the system of democratic governance of the EU and which have not proved controversial during the ratification process;

23. Insists, further, that if it is decided to revise the text extensively a mandate should be prepared for a new Convention to be held during 2008;

24. Calls on the members of the European Council to accept both individual and collective responsibility for bringing into force an eventual constitutional settlement; and insists that they coordinate more closely both the content and timing of the national campaigns and give evidence to the citizen of their political will and mutual solidarity;

25. Takes note of the European Commission's 'Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate', but calls on the Commission not only to

deliver its communications strategy but also to show decisive political leadership to help the Union emerge from its current constitutional difficulties;

26. Urges that any revised Constitution be submitted to a consultative ballot across the EU at the same time as the next European Parliamentary elections in 2009 so as to give a popular verdict on its outcome;

27. Demands in any case that every effort is made to ensure that the eventual Constitution enters into force during 2009;

28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, and to the Parliaments of the Member States, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, the former Members of the European Convention, and the Parliaments and Governments of the accession and candidate countries.

¹ OJ C 247 E, 6.10.2005, p. 88

² European Parliament Resolution of 12.1.2005, *see above*

³ Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

⁴ SN 117/05, 18 June 2005

⁵ XXXIV COSAC meeting, 10-11 October 2005

⁶ For example, 62% of the French and 65% of the Dutch say they want 'renegotiation' for a 'more social text'; Flash Eurobarometer 171-172

Draft report: Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the period of reflection: the structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union (2005/2146(INI))

International Weapons Destruction Day

Unregistered weapons are often involved in killings, torture, forced displacement, dispossession of property, rape and other heinous crimes across the world. It is time that individuals, organisations and governments take decisive steps to put an end to illegal weapons. It is heartening to note that there is an overwhelming appreciation among governments and the international community that weapons in the wrong hands cause hundreds and thousands of deaths of innocent people, including women and children. A greater community awareness and dedication can make a tremendous impact on the control of illicit weapons.

July 9th (the International Weapons-Destruction Day) has been dedicated to the reduction of

illicit small arms around the world: this day is marked in many countries by public destruction of illicit weapons. All citizens who are interested in the creation of a crime-free peaceful society are always invited to participate in these events, as a demonstration of their commitment and support for the cause.

This year, several events have been organised also in Sri Lanka by the South Asia Small Arms Network (SASA-net): in particular, the Ministry of Public Security, Law and Order, together with the National Commission Against Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (NCAPISA) has organised the destruction of 26.000 weapons at the Independence Square on July 8th (*r.r.*).

Japanese National Diet Approves WFM Japan Resolution

2005 is by far the most uniquely memorable year for Japanese world federalists. On August 2 the Japanese National Diet adopted a resolution advocating a world federation. The resolution reads "Japan should make maximal efforts to get on well with all citizens of the world... by pursuing the creation of a milestone for eventually realizing a world federation for the whole globe". 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of when the late Mr. Yukio Ozaki, the first President of the United World Federalists of Japan, presented a bill called "A resolution concerning the construction of a World

Federation in the Globe" to the National Diet on 11 December 1945. Although the resolution was voted down, Japanese world federalists have continuously placed this resolution bill on the agenda of the National Diet. The recent adoption of this resolution is the result of many years of hard work on the part of members of both the Japanese Parliamentary Group for World Federation and WFM Japan.

The full text of the resolution can be downloaded from <http://www.wfm.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=199> (*WFM Japan*).

UEF Launches the First European Citizens' Convention

Francesco Ferrero

The French and Dutch "NO" to the European Constitution opened a difficult phase, in which the forces of nationalism and populism, led by the governments who oppose the Constitution, are trying to bury forever, together with the project, the very idea that Europe needs a Constitution.

In this context the UEF launched the idea of a Citizens' Convention, which will take place in Genoa, Italy, on December 3-4. The debate which preceded the referendums showed that citizens did not perceive to be sufficiently involved in the constituent process. This is why we need a Citizens' Convention. It will gather all the political forces and the movements of the civil society that want to counteract nationalism and to continue the struggle for a better Europe.

The Convention will draft a *Manifesto for a United Europe*, more open, democratic, effective, and closer to the wishes of its citizens. The meeting in Genoa is just a first step. To attain the largest involvement of all the European citizens, similar Conventions shall be held in as many EU countries as possible. Another meeting of the Convention has already been scheduled for the end of the Austrian presidency.

The Convention will try to answer some of

the crucial questions which our citizens face in their daily life. How can the EU speak with one voice to the rest of the world? How can it give an answer to the fears generated by the process of enlargement and of globalisation? How can Europe secure peace and development in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the other poor countries? What can we Europeans do for the world's sustainable development? Only by giving an answer to those questions will the EU institutions be able to regain the confidence of the citizens.

The Citizens' Convention aims to pave the way for the *Congress of the European People*, which we expect to be promoted by the Federalist Intergroup for the European Constitution inside the European Parliament. This Congress should convene MEPs and MPs in a great continental "assizes", and make concrete proposals for relaunching the constitutional process. This is why the Citizens' Convention will promote an open confrontation between parliamentarians, political parties, trade unions, grass-root movements and local institutions from all over Europe. These forces were at the head of the Nice demonstration in the year 2000, and have always proved to be the most active in the struggle for a political Europe. More details on the event are available on <http://www.citizensconvention.net>.

World Democracy for a New Left

Giorgio Grimaldi

Fernando A. Iglesias

¿Qué significa hoy ser de izquierda?

*Reflexiones sobre la Democracia
en los tiempos de la Globalización*

Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2004

In this collection of sixteen essays and articles written on several occasions from the end of the 1990s to last year, Fernando A. Iglesias, an Argentine writer and journalist, and Secretary of the World Citizens Foundation in his own country, offers his contribution to an in-depth and long-awaited renovation of the international Left. His concern is to find a way forward for a democratic left, though not as an end in itself, and it gives rise to interesting reflections for one specific reason: in effect, the non-deferrable necessity to prevent the perpetuation of economic and social inequalities and to put an end to wars, poverty and the destruction of the natural environment by means of a significant reform of world politics. Iglesias strongly and passionately argues that it is the national States, be they democratic or authoritarian, which through their selfish behaviour and their patent inability to regulate economic globalization have in only a few centuries caused the deaths of several millions of human beings through violence and war. They are in the main responsible for the lack of a democratic and cosmopolitan world order based on the principles of liberty, the recognition of human rights and equality. Meanwhile the left, rather than striving to adjust to the times in the face of advancing liberalism, have in their refusal

of modernity ended by becoming entrenched in defending the national State and the national self-determination of peoples when they should instead have been working out an alternative, supra-national political project that would have allowed them to renovate their ideas, abandon utopian proposals and ideological visions, and respond to the true needs of present-day societies.

In his first paper, *Pasado, presente y futuro de la izquierda*, Iglesias writes of the hegemonic success of transnational capitalism which serves private well-being to the prejudice of the public good, and he highlights the inadequacy of policies organized and atomized at the national level, making it impossible to confront the bigger global ecological, social, demographic, economic questions. This being the situation, the emergence of a world society should not be seen as a threat, for it offers a promising future for the growth of a world left capable of fighting for the development of supra-national, democratic political institutions to replace the present virtual 'ministry of global economy' represented by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization – none of them democratically accountable. Those other international institutions which could be possible embryos of world political powers are still too weak; and, in the absence of supra-national organizations representing the world's citizens, national States can too easily avoid being restrained by agreements and commitments. These considerations apply, among others, to labour problems, environmental management, and policies

for the redistribution of wealth. Historically, the left has pursued the two-fold aim of democratizing political power and of extending its geographical boundaries. The birth of the modern nation was an important vehicle in this process, but – particularly in the 19th century – it also led to a new ‘feudalism’ and to claims of specific ethnic, linguistic and cultural singularity which gave rise to extermination wars. Hitler’s National Socialism was the most perverse example. According to Iglesias, the Left, being unable to propose an international policy corresponding to the economic and technological level the world has attained, has abdicated its role and left room for capitalist economic globalization to take root. But that should not be the only possible answer to modernity. It is of crucial importance, he believes, for the Left to become a proponent of the creation of a multicultural world republic, thus promoting a progressive political union of nation-States and the economic, social and democratic reorganization of the whole human community. The author does not forget the tragic regression in the Left’s political thinking brought about by Jacobinism, and later by Leninism and Stalinism, which produced authoritarian and totalitarian forms of nationalism and the negation of internationalism and democracy. The experience of communist regimes and the tragic example of Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian socialist nationalism are aptly mentioned as lessons in a history not yet fully understood by today’s leftist political parties. It is expedient then for a new Left not to limit itself to opposing capitalism, but to follow the only possible path towards improving living conditions on our planet: namely, the building of a supra-national democracy.

Starting with a commentary on two contrasting passages from Marx’ and Engel’s *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, which are cited as examples of conflicting attitudes to world-wide globalization, *¿Qué significa hoy ser de*

izquierda? offers an enlightening description of the Left’s mistakes (violence, nationalism, class struggle, personalism, collectivism, authoritarianism, militarism, etc.) which have only too often betrayed its basic claim to be founded on the French Revolution’s values of liberty, equality and fraternity, and the respect of human rights. The author notes the confusion present in the thinking of the various tribes defining themselves as leftist and which consist of an heterogeneous and contradictory set of parties and movements, sometimes expressing fundamentalist or self-pitying attitudes or, quite often, even nationalist positions, unable in the name of the group, movement or class to acknowledge the value of individual autonomy. In response, Iglesias proposes a new, pragmatic concept of Left and Right, suggesting that a possible convergence of democratic liberalism with social-democratic thought could help the Left to evolve towards becoming a political force which is internationalist, cosmopolitan, and anti-nationalist, modernizing and progressive, attentive to the dialogue between the political and civil society, aware of its place in history, active in defence of human rights and solidarity, championing the sovereignty of the individual and the democratic promotion of mankind’s mutual interests, committed to international cooperation and to realizing concrete Utopias (*practopias*) based on the ethics of responsibility, and finally, to paraphrase Kant, tending to consider each man as an end in himself (*un fin en sí mismo*).

In the essay *11 de Septiembre: El colapso de los estados nacionales*, Iglesias argues that the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon highlight the deep crisis of nation-States, and in particular of the USA as the first global nation-State, aware of its vulnerability, the dangerous consequences of the war in Afghanistan and the second war in Iraq. The author believes the cause of the tragedy to be the mistake of applying nationalist political principles to a globalized

world; but he is against following the example of third-world orientated leftist movements which criminalize the US, seeing the globalization of democracy as the only therapy for countering global terrorism. Pedantic, rear-guard discussion of whether somebody is for or against globalization is a waste of time. It is more important to understand *what* is being globalized and who controls the process.

In *En defensa de la Modernidad, la Globalización y los Estados Unidos*, Iglesias defines more precisely the limitations of the critique of US imperialism now gaining widespread approval among the international left. He considers the crucial objective in promoting democratic values to be the abolition of the centrality of national States on the world stage and its replacement by a global network of democratic, representative institutions, in which the Nations would represent only one component, and not necessarily the most important.

Two better focused papers make concrete proposals aimed at reforming the United Nations and the international order. In *Por un Foro de la Democracia Mundial*, presented by the author at the World Democracy Forum in 2002, Iglesias suggests close cooperation between the various elements of the civil and political society within a Forum of World Democracy, open to political, non-governmental labour organizations, educational and university-level institutions, and individual participants. Its aim would be the progressive realization of planetary democratic institutions. *Una Realpolitik democrática y global* is devoted to UN reform and is perhaps the book's most interesting and stimulating paper. After some remarks on the present democratic deficit at the UN and on the so-called 'global governance', a phrase which covers a galaxy of institutions and bodies lacking transparency and political accountability, Iglesias then reviews the features of various international players such as national or

continental political units, democratic and non-democratic international organizations, and international financial organizations, and considers the democratic global institutions still to be established. These, based on the "one man, one vote" principle, could be created by a pragmatic process composed of four stages. Firstly, the UN General Assembly should declare the present UN organizational arrangement to be obsolete, proclaim itself to be the UN's central body, and apply the "one man, one vote" principle to all its agencies. Secondly, a Chamber of Deputies of the World Parliament should be elected with the task of drafting a federal World Constitution, a code of world justice and a code of procedure for the democratic world institutions, based on the Universal Declaration of human rights of 1948. Thirdly, the Assembly should become the Senate of the World Parliament, endowed with powers relating to the global-competence sphere, while all other competencies should be re-allocated to the various decision-making levels, according to the subsidiarity principle. Finally, the powers of the World Parliament should be distributed for one half to the Chamber of Deputies, which would have a legislative role at global level, and the other half to the Senate, 50% of whose members would be appointed according to the "one man, one vote" principle, and 50% by means of a formula assigning a varying number of seats per country in proportion to the size of their economic contribution to UN activities aimed at supplying basic human needs.

In the short paper *Por el Mercosur a Europa*, dating back to July 2003, Iglesias declares himself in favour of a clear strategic and political choice for South America: namely, an association between Mercosur and the European Union, giving as his reasons the fact that the EU has given birth to democratic political institutions that have become progressively stronger in parallel with the creation of the common market; that the European social model pays greater respect

to social rights than the American system; and lastly that Europe can offer opportunities for economic development. An option of this kind would also, he feels, incline the US to offer better conditions to Mercosur for its entry in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and would be in tune with the new international situation, in which geographical boundaries no longer represent decisive factors or insurmountable obstacles. Ample space is also given to Argentina's political, social and economic conditions after the financial collapse of 2001, to an analysis of the decade that preceded it and to the domestic and external circumstances that still make the democratic and economic development of that country very uncertain.

Iglesias proves himself to be a sharp observer, able to make connections between local, national and global situations. Studying the case of Argentina confirms the urgent need to start work on a worldwide democratic project as an alternative to the continuous re-emergence of popular and populist nationalisms, due basically to immaturity and comparable to the behaviour of Argentina's former *golesador* Diego Armando Maradona. Two short reflections on the tango and Buenos Aires close this pleasant book. It is useful for those wishing to become thoughtful world citizens, and can be recommended to the many activists and politicians of the Left who to this day mostly remain indifferent to the lessons of history.

The Silence of the UN Security Council

René Wadlow

Virgil Hawkins

*The Silence of the UN Security Council:
Conflict and Peace Enforcement in the 1990s*
Firenze, European Press Academic
Publishing, 2004

“From the outset of my mandate”, said in 1993 the then Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “I have been convinced that the structure of the Organization must mirror, as closely as possible, the tasks it is assigned to undertake. An institution must reflect the objectives it pursues... The UN therefore faces the difficult task of relating our aims to our means, of updating and reforming institutions set up at different times and with different imperatives.” Boutros-Ghali proposed measures to promote coordination and decentralization within the UN system, greater cooperation with non-governmental organizations and regional bodies, and creating more effective UN financing and budget-making mechanisms.

He went on to stress the vast challenges of famine, drought, AIDS, civil wars, uprooted and dislocated populations and deepening human misery in many parts of the world, which make dramatic demands on the UN system. The UN system is called upon to respond to very diversified requirements, often involving the provisions of crucial and direct aid to peoples in deep distress and involving also sensitive new fields of social, economic and political transformation.

Over a decade later, Kofi Annan could make

the same observations as he set out his own proposals for structural reforms, which will be discussed by a high level government Summit in New York in September 2005. Non-governmental organizations are preparing their own observations and recommendations which are to be fed into the governmental consultations.

If we look at the United Nations structure as a reflection of the objective it pursues effectively, we see a more simplified organigram than the complex chart indicating links between UN bodies, Specialized Agencies and programmes. Basically the function of the UN is to create consensus (being of one mind) on crucial world issues. Such consensus-building is slow and is done by repeating endlessly in resolutions of the General Assembly, year after year, the same idea until it becomes a commonplace. Slowly national governments align their policies upon this common core. There have been at least five or six such slow consensus-building milestones in the General Assembly.

1. Colonialism had reached its end as a form of government. This was repeated nearly from the start of the UN through the 1960s, when most colonies became independent states.
2. Apartheid is a bad structure for South Africa and for other countries tempted by similar structures.
3. There are basic human rights and these should be respected. Spelling out such norms was the function of the Commission on Human Rights, but it was the General Assembly's constant references to human rights that brought about the legitimacy of the consensus.

4. Related to the idea of human rights but needing a special effort at consensus-building is the idea that women are equal to men and should be so treated.

5. There should be a Palestinian state. From the 1947 partition plan to today, this idea has been repeated, and there is broad consensus but still no state.

6. The ecological balance of the world is in danger and needs remedial action.

Thus, basically, the UN is the General Assembly, the Secretariat which services it, and sections within the Secretariat which slowly build programs around the points of consensus. The other and newer function of the UN is humanitarian relief, basically the coordination of humanitarian relief between UN agencies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations.

Development, finance and trade which theoretically could be tasks of the UN are really outside. The World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the Specialized Agencies such as FAO, ILO, UNESCO have lives of their own. The UN Economic and Social Council has never been able to play a coordinating role. Its function is really a specialized discussion forum for the consensus building of the General Assembly.

Is the prevention of war a task assigned by member states to the UN? Theoretically, yes. When the UN Charter was being drafted in 1944 and 1945, the on-going Second World War was on the mind of the drafters, many of whom had participated in the work of the League of Nations. "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" has the chief spot in the Preamble to the Charter, and the Security Council was made a principal organ – small enough so that it could reach decisions quickly, but with five vetoes built in, so that no decision could be taken against the interests of key states or their allies. The UN would not repeat the error of the League in condemning a key state

and seeing it withdraw, as Germany and Japan did.

Thus the signing of the Charter in June 1945 was the high-water mark of the Security Council, and it has rarely been heard of since. Diplomacy concerning security is carried out at the national level between a very small number of great powers and an occasional regional power when a conflict concerns that region.

By the end of 1945, the Cold War had become the defining structure of world politics. The Americans and the Soviet leaders decided that if there were to be any negotiations between them, it would be outside the UN, with the UK and France dragged along since they had responsibilities in occupied Germany – a key Cold War battleground. Thus, if we begin with the hypothesis that the Security Council from its start in 1945 was never thought of as the focus for discussion of major security problems, much less any joint action, on these issues, we are not surprised at the silence of the Security Council.

Virgil Hawkins' book, first designed as a PhD thesis at Osaka University, is well researched and has an extensive bibliography. He has useful chapters on the possible types of Security Council action, such as presidential statements – a technique used to be able to maintain the appearance of being concerned in resolving a conflict without the intention of taking any concrete action to do so – and resolutions. He notes "Security Council resolutions are based largely on political considerations, and the wording of Council resolutions is often the result of some form of political compromise, with the result being a lack of clarity regarding exactly how a mandate should be implemented in the field." He also deals well with the different meanings that can be given to the idea of peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention.

He stresses that "The failure of the Council to respond to the majority of the major conflicts of the 1990s – with peace enforcement or other

lesser measures – despite the massive unchecked loss of life, the forcible displacement of millions, and despite the clear threat to peace and security posed by those conflicts, deserves more academic attention than it has received.” His aim is “to explain why the Council’s response to conflicts and its handling of peace enforcement in the 1990s were so selective, disproportionate and often ineffective.” In particular, the thesis focuses on three factors that influence the Security Council members: national interests, its own or that of a close ally; the practical limitations on the availability of national forces and logistics for peace enforcement; and the degree of media coverage of a conflict and its consequences – refugees, hunger, disease.

Of these three factors, national interest is the most important. Hawkins reveals massive imbalances between the level of conflict and the level of response. “On the one hand, non-conflict situations were met with a high level of Council response, and on the other, large-scale wars resulting in massive casualties were largely (and in some cases completely) ignored by the Council.”

At the start of the 1990s, there were those, myself included, who thought that with the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the UN might play a larger peace-making role. But as Hawkins indicates well, 50 years of inaction and the inability to show that collective action might replace Great Powers’ pressures has resulted in the effective silence of the Security Council. The Security Council, along with the Trusteeship Council, has vanished, except on the UN’s organizational chart.

Today, there is a good deal of discussion about ‘enlarging’ the Security Council by taking in as permanent members such states as Japan and Germany – their final revenge on the League of Nations – and a few large regional states such as Brazil, whose contribution to positive world politics has gone largely unnoticed. Enlargement is not the real issue. Rather, the key issue is how to establish a world security network to deal with the tensions and conflicts of today. Hawkins’ review of current practice is a good place to start to see the distance we have to go.

The European Project: Jacques Delors' Contribution

Florina Laura Neculai

Jacques Delors
Mémoires
Paris, Plon, 2004

Europe after 1945 is the history of two projects. On one side, a failure-doomed single-party system in the East based on communist ideology; on the other side, a developing European project in the West based on liberal democracy: the European project. It brought together peoples from 6 countries, then from 9, then 12, then 15, recently 25 and soon 27, each contributing with a bigger or a smaller stone, but all of them very important in building and solidifying the project. France – like all the other founding countries – gave many important figures that gave a major contribution to both the building and solidification of the European project. And one of these figures is... Jacques Delors.

Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission in the period 1984-1994: it is the period of the Single Act, of Spain and Portugal accession, of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and of the Maastricht Treaty, just to name few important events. In his recently published *Mémoires*, the reader can find a compact volume of French, European and international politics. The volume is a dialogue with Jean-Louis Arnaud and it starts and ends with 1994, the year of the end of his mandate as President of the European Commission, and it smoothly goes back in time... to 1943.

The reader meets an 18-year-old Jacques,

listening to the suggestion of his father to be an intern at the Banque de France (BDF), that later proved to be a very fruitful professional experience. While learning his trade at the BDF – a field where he himself admits that everything was very new to him – and preparing himself to pass the exam for a position in the Banque de France, his mind was still at finishing literature studies. This aspiration was shattered the day when, following the advice of one of his superiors, he applies and gets accepted as a student at the Centre d'Etudes Supérieures de Banque. For the next three years, Jacques combines morning work at the BDF and evening classes that facilitated the clarification of many issues of economy and bank technique. Excelling as a student, he is again suggested to present himself at the exam for the inspector position, that he declines, given his concern that this might damage the equilibrium between his family life, the professional and the militant ones. This is the period when the reader can see Jacques as a family man, a practising Catholic, a trade-unionist, and read about his concerns to join the big French political parties. The book fascinates with descriptions of different events of domestic and foreign policy in France, while the reader can simultaneously follow the vertical ascension of Jacques Delors's career up to the position of President of the European Commission.

It was in 1984, before the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau, when Helmut Kohl – then Chancellor of Germany – let Delors know that he was Germany's proposition for the position of President of the European

Commission. It was Germany's turn to name a German as European Commission's President, but due to different political interests, a French candidate appeared to be better suited. "In this case, I would accept only a person whose initials are JD", said Kohl to Jacques Delors. The moving to Brussels at around 60 years of age, all spent in France, leaving all his friends and activities behind for a new life in Brussels, was a difficult decision to take, mainly for Mrs. Delors. "My wife made me a magnificent gift in that day, when she accepted this change of life", writes Jacques Delors in *Mémoires* (p. 58). "As President of the Commission, I was going very seldom to Paris to join my family. These ten years in Brussels (...), for what concerns friendship relations have been a great sacrifice. Other members of the Commission could go home every week, but me..., I could not" (p. 181).

Once President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors proved to have a clear strategy: to adopt a central project that would give a new momentum to the European economy; an institutional reform to facilitate the decision-making system at the European level; and to adopt different measures that would increase the cooperation between the member states of the European Union and that would bring about more solidarity by underlining also a common future for all Europeans. This strategy is the outcome of a long previous work experience with the European institutions: with the European Economic Committee in the 1970s, as an elected member of the European Parliament (1979-1981), and as French Minister of Finances (1981-1984).

The contribution of Jacques Delors to the European economic project is very well-known. That is the reason why I would not dwell upon it and will instead underline his contribution to the European political project. As member of the first European Parliament directly elected in 1979, he attends the debates on the "Spinelli project" for a European

Political Community, that he characterizes as "encouraging and promising". In the Economic and Monetary Commission of the European Parliament, of which he was the Chairman, Altiero Spinelli was arguing on budgetary conflicts that were opposing the Parliament and the Council, mainly due to the lack of a common project and strategy, and was accusing the functionalists for the repeated failures of a political European community. Although Delors himself was inspired by functionalism, he describes with admiration Altiero Spinelli's "long and difficult battle". "Personally, I believe that without this action by Spinelli himself and by the Parliament, it would not have been possible for me to insert so many factors of progress in the treaty revision adopted in December 1985, with the less explicit title of Single Act, that Spinelli severely criticized (...), which fact caused me surprise and pain" (p. 218).

Priorities of the Delors Commission in terms of economic and institutional reforms proved to be federalist-oriented at the European level. The accomplishment of the common market by 1992, for example, was one of the priorities that from a federalist point of view was a major step forward towards a political unification of Europe. Other reforms, such as a co-decision power for the European Parliament, the extension of the majority vote and of the community method, as well as many other issues, are described in detail. Delors insists on many proposed reforms at the European level, presenting them in his *Mémoires* from different angles, so that the reader can have a full picture of the way the reforms were approached officially during summits and other official meetings, and non-officially and in private discussions, as well as his own thoughts and judgment. This particular writing-style that Delors adopts from the first page to the last is very enriching, because it gives lots of information from different angles on every important event that he has contributed to during his career.

The book also describes the European Commission from an insider's point of view, Delors insisting on the importance of a good and friendly environment in order to make Europe go further: "In the history of the Community, the success was always linked to the collegiate force of the Commission" (p. 275); for the relations with the exterior, Delors underlines the importance of communication between the European Commission and both the state and non-state actors.

In this sense, Delors talks of the relationship between the Commission and the mass-media, to whom the President of the European Commission dedicates a lot of time because "it must explain, listen, announce, react" (p. 313). The relationship with the Church is also mentioned. As President of the European Commission he held meetings with the representatives of different Churches, be it Anglican, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant or representatives of other different religious confessions. In the larger context of the debates for a European

Constitution, Jacques Delors – President of the European Commission and a practicing Catholic – writes: "my objective was neither to put God into the treaty nor to support the polemics on the religious roots of Europe, but to stimulate the spiritual forces, those that believe and those that do not believe in God, to work so that Europe be not only an economic and market accomplishment. I put in practice my programme 'A Soul for Europe'" (p. 332).

The *Mémoires* by Jacques Delors is a book of a great complexity, as the memoirs of other European and international leaders. However, this particular book is a great synthesis of European history, with an eye looking outside, framing Europe into the world, and with another eye looking inside, at politics and policies, at the people that make them and that are subject to them. In January 2005, the European Commission had a new President but the goal stays the same: to make the European project of the European Founding Fathers go on.

A Democratized UN Should Fight against Genocide

On the occasion of the impending UN summit in New York, the Society for Threatened Peoples International (STPI) regrets the inability of the world organisation to put a rapid end to genocide, mass expulsion and other serious crimes against humanity. "For the victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing it is unacceptable that the five powers with the right of veto in the Security Council, USA, Great Britain, Russia, France and China repeatedly prevent a rapid and robust procedure against mass killing" says the president of the STPI, Tilman Zülch. "Although the UN fact-finding commissions have admitted the failure of the world organisation in Srebrenica and Rwanda, and although the continuing genocide is accepted in Darfur in the West Sudan, not even the British initiative of a draft agreement in the case of genocide has a chance of overcoming the resistance within the UN General Assembly. With our frequent initiatives at UN bodies for persecuted minorities for the ending of genocide and expulsion we are constantly confronted with the fact that the governments responsible deny the crimes and prevent UN intervention".

As a human rights organisation with consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the UN, the STPI calls for a comprehensive democratisation of the world organisation and the creation of a UN force, which is ready for action and in a position to react rapidly and robustly in the case of crimes against humanity. "The dominance of the UN by the five great powers must be ended step by step" says Zülch. "The UN General Assembly must no longer be dominated by the representatives of the governments, but supplemented by a democratically elected parliamentary assembly at the UN. Here the Parliament of the European Union could serve as a model. In conclusion, international human rights organisations and

representatives of the individual victims groups should be given the chance of being heard as well" (f.z.).

UN Finds Global Inequality Rising

According to Susannah Price, BBC correspondent at the United Nations, a UN report has found that the world is more unequal today than it was 10 years ago, despite considerable economic growth in many regions. This year's report on the world's social situation argues that although living standards have improved in some places, poverty remains entrenched. The authors warned that focusing only on economic growth is an ineffective way of achieving development. They said wealthy nations are the main beneficiaries of economic development.

The UN report – drawn up by the UN's Economic and Social Affairs Department – found that the gap between rich and poor is now wider than it was a decade ago, and called for immediate action. The report focuses on worldwide inequality in income and wealth, along with other areas such as health and education.

The report said that although China and India had seen considerable income growth, there was a wide income gap. It said it would be impossible for the 2.8bn people living on less than \$2 a day to ever match the consumption levels of the rich.

The UN Secretary General said the report showed the development agenda could not be advanced without addressing inequality, such as the gap between skilled and unskilled workers and between the formal and informal sectors. The report recommends expanding opportunities for productive employment, bringing marginalized groups into society and working to distribute the benefits of what it called the increasingly open world economy.

Ninety percent of Languages will Disappear

Researchers at UNESCO forecast that ninety percent of the languages presently spoken in the world could disappear by the end of the century, under the thrust of globalization: already today 97% of the world population is speaking a number of languages that barely represents 4% of the total linguistic heritage of the planet, while the remaining 96% of the languages is spoken by a mere 3% of the world population.

In addition, one tenth of the idioms to be found on earth is spoken in communities composed of not more than 100 individuals. These estimates are proof of an astonishing linguistic diversity, which UNESCO experts and linguists of the whole world intend to safeguard with a complex “rescue operation”, devised to protect linguistic richness from the world-wide prevailing trend that shows an increase of the predominance of the main tongues: Chinese, English, Hindi/Urdu, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, Russian, Bengali and Japanese.

Is Switzerland Coming Closer to the EU?

On September 25 last, 56% of the Swiss voted in favour of the free movement in Switzerland of the citizens of the ten new countries that have become members of the EU. The turnout has been the highest in the last ten years, with 53,7% of the electorate going to the polls.

The clear victory of the yes casts away any doubt on the prosecution and the strengthening of the relations between Switzerland and the EU. In fact, on June 7, just two days before the

referendum in Switzerland on its association to the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, the European Commission had ruled that the entry into force of the two conventions was depending on the outcome of the Swiss referendum. That statement was based not on a legal constraint, but on a merely political decision, because Brussels wanted to avoid that within the EU two different levels of citizenship be created.

Free movement of people was part of the first package of the Bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU signed on May 25, 2000 (and entered into force on June 1, 2002). Switzerland had agreed on the free movement of EU citizens (at that time the EU, however, was composed of 15 countries). As the first Bilaterals formed a single package, during the negotiations it was decided that the package had to be approved or rejected as a whole (the so-called “guillotine effect”). The September referendum had taken on, thus, a considerable importance, considering that:

- a) since May 1, 2004, ten new States (with about 75 million citizens) had joined the EU;
- b) on June 5, 2005, Switzerland had voted Yes in a referendum on the Schengen Convention on free movement of people of 1985 and on the Dublin Convention of 1990 on the right of asylum of June 1990, entered into force in 1997;
- c) in case of a negative outcome, all the other protocols (for example on migration, overland transit agreements, air transport, public contracts, agriculture, technical obstacles to trade, research) contained in the first Bilaterals would have been annulled.

For sure, the favourable outcome of the Swiss referendum of September 25, 2005, has definitively paved the way for arriving at a greater integration between Switzerland and the EU, and has staved off isolationism from William Tell’s homeland (*f.o.*).

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